Related commentary: Dual–use and arms trade control
Observers have voiced concern about what they perceive as a disconnect between the foreign policy rhetoric of the Biden administration and its foreign policy practice. This WritePeace blog explores what light SIPRI data on arms transfers can cast on the discussion.
Using information from SIPRI’s database of ATT-relevant cooperation and assistance activities, this Topical Backgrounder provides an updated picture of assistance activities involving countries in the MENA.
This topical backgrounder provides an overview of the state of conventional arms transfer controls and small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls in MENA countries.
This Topical Backgrounder presents recommendations for both future research and steps that could be taken by states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations to improve the coordination and effectiveness of SALW-related assistance efforts in sub-Saharan Africa.
The ancient Romans used to say: ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ (‘If you want peace, prepare for war’).
The Missile Technology Control Regime is a cornerstone of states’ efforts to control the development, proliferation and use of missiles and other unmanned delivery systems. However, it faces serious structural, operational, membership and technology-related challenges that call for new initiatives and a strengthening of the regime’s resilience.
The international sanctions regime against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) is the strongest and most comprehensive set of sanctions currently in effect against any one country.
One of the many events that has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic is the seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) on the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPOA) on small arms and light weapons (SALW), which was due to take place this week in New York but has been postponed to 2021.
The 2009 EU Dual-use Regulation (Council Regulation 428/2009) creates a common legal basis for European Union (EU) member states’ controls on the trade in ‘dual-use items’ (i.e. goods, materials and technologies that may be used for both civilian and military purposes) and is a crucial component of global non-proliferation efforts.
Article 7(4) of the Arms Trade Treaty requires that states parties—when deciding whether to approve an arms export—shall take into account the risk that the items may be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence (GBV) or violence against women and children.
The states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are gathering in Geneva from 29 July to 8 August for a series of Meetings of Experts. Among other topics, states are reviewing scientific and technological developments that impact the objectives of the treaty.
The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the first international, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for regulating the trade on conventional arms. The ATT also includes specific provisions on implementation assistance.
‘Today we have taken a significant step forward in delivering our commitment under the Iran nuclear deal to preserve sanctions relief for the people of Iran.’ These were the words of Jeremy Hunt, Foreign Secretary of the UK, as he introduced the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is the latest attempt by the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) at preserving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, or the J
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force in 2013 and aims to promote a more transparent, responsible and better regulated global arms trade. On Friday 24 August the ATT’s Fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4) concluded in Tokyo after five days of constructive deliberations.
New developments in the 3D-printable gun case have revived the debate on the dangers of 3D-printing of firearms and the sharing of their electronic blueprints online. While these developments may only have a limited immediate impact on the proliferation of small arms, this approach has the potential to undermine controls on 3D printing and export controls on technical data more broadly.
This backgrounder provides an overview of ongoing and potential work on measuring states’ achievement of goal 16.4. It begins by outlining the SDG process and how it has sought to overcome the challenges associated with measuring illicit arms flows. It then summarizes the data collection efforts to date and outlines some possible options for filling the gaps that exist.
Under the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export, which was replaced in 2008 by the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, member states of the European Union have committed themselves to achieving ‘high common standards’ and ‘convergence’ in their arms export controls.
What implications will Brexit have for arms export controls in the UK and the EU?
The recent Biennial Meeting of States, held at UN Headquaters in New York, has produced an outcome document related to combatting the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
Following the trend in 2012–14, 2015 is likely to be another disappointing year for transparency in arms transfers.
The first Conference of States Parties (CSP1) to the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), held in Cancun Mexico, ended yesterday.
With two days of talks to go, the draft of an arms trade treaty (ATT) being negotiated in the UN looks dangerously likely to be a relic before it ever comes into force.
Toothpaste is a harmless consumer product, but it contains fluoride compounds—industrial chemicals that are needed to manufacture the deadly nerve agent sarin—making it a so-called dual-use item.
Between July and September this year, the international community will be faced with the daunting prospect of concluding negotiations on an international arms trade treaty and a review of the implementation of the United Nations programme of action on small arms and light weapons.
When the penultimate meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepComm) for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) convenes in New York in July, the delegates will have a packed agenda.
A steady and incremental growth of ballistic missile capabilities is taking place fairly close to the perimeter of NATO as several countries improve the range and accuracy of their missiles. Technical barriers, such as export controls harmonized under the Missile Technology Control Regime, have not prevented these programmes from blossoming, and there is no meaningful international arms control effort to curb or reduce missile proliferation.