Imported arms have significantly shaped developments in the Middle East since Israel and the United States launched coordinated attacks on Iran last month. In this Q&A, Zain Hussain (ZH) and Pieter Wezeman (PW) of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme discuss what the latest SIPRI arms transfers data can tell us about how arms imports have featured in the conflict, as well as implications for arms supplies beyond the region.
Q: The Middle East has long been one of the biggest importer regions for major arms. Which Middle Eastern states are the biggest arms importers?
ZH: In the past five years, just over a quarter of all international transfers of major arms—26 per cent—went to the Middle East. Of those, by far the most went to Arab states of the Gulf, most notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The six Gulf Arab states (which also include Bahrain and Oman) together accounted for almost 20 per cent of global arms imports in 2021–25 (see table 1). Over the past decade (2016–25), the main types of arms imported by the Gulf Arab states were aircraft and missiles—including for air defence systems—as well as ships (see figures 1–3 below).
Israel was the world’s 14th largest arms importer in 2021–25. Although Israel has a large domestic arms industry, it is quite specialized in areas such as air defence, intelligence and reconnaissance equipment, drones and missiles. The Israel Defense Forces depend heavily on arms imported from the United States for several key capabilities. For example, all of Israel’s active combat aircraft come from the USA. In addition, Israel enjoys significant leeway from the USA to integrate locally designed subsystems into imported US combat aircraft, which shows the deep military relations between Israel and the USA.
Only three states supplied major arms to Israel in the past five years: the USA accounted for 68 per cent of Israel’s imports in the period, followed by Germany at 31 per cent and Italy at 1.3 per cent.
Iran is not a significant arms importer and in 2021–25 accounted for only 0.2 per cent of regional arms imports, and less than 0.05 per cent of global arms imports.
Table 1. Imports of major arms by states in the Middle East, 2021–25
Q: Who are the main arms suppliers to the Middle East?
ZH: In 2021–25 around 94 per cent of the arms imported by states in the region came from the USA (which accounted for 54 per cent) or Europe, chiefly Italy (12 per cent), France (11 per cent) and Germany (7.3 per cent).
France has consistently been the third largest arms supplier to the Middle East since 2011–15, but Italy and Germany have both significantly increased their roles. Italy has nearly quadrupled its share of arms supplies to the Middle East compared with 2011–15, largely due to surging exports to Kuwait and Qatar.
Until recently, Russia was the region’s second largest supplier, but in the past five years it accounted for only 0.3 per cent of regional arms imports. Between 2016–20 and 2021–25 Russia’s arms supplies to the region shrank by 98 per cent and none of the Gulf Arab states imported Russian arms in 2021–25. Russia is the only state to have supplied major arms to Iran in the past decade.
China has been trying to increase its supplies to the Middle East, but by 2021–25 it had not succeeded, accounting for only 0.3 per cent of imports of major arms to the region in the period.
Q: Why has Iran imported so few major arms in recent years?
ZH: Despite its prominence as a regional power, Iran imports very few major arms. It was formerly a much larger importer, supplied mainly by China and Russia, particularly during the 1990s.
Starting in 2006, a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions imposed an increasingly strict arms embargo on Iran. In response, Iran stepped up its own domestic production of arms, especially missiles and drones. Even after the UN embargo expired in 2020, Iran has received relatively few major arms, presumably because it has achieved a high level of self-sufficiency in the systems it assesses that it needs and perhaps due to a lack of trust in potential suppliers. The UN restrictions were reinstated in 2025.
Q: How significant a role are imported weapons likely to be playing in the current conflict?
ZH: Imported arms have been critical, both to the air strikes on Iran and to minimizing damage from Iranian missile and drone attacks around the region. Many of Israel’s long-range aerial attacks have used combat aircraft supplied—and to a great extent paid for—by the USA, including F-35s, F-16s and F-15s. These are armed with bombs and missiles, some of which were supplied by the USA. US forces, of course, have relied mostly on domestically produced arms.
Iran for the most part has relied on arms that it has produced itself. Air defence systems and aircraft imported from Russia seem to have done little to protect Iran from Israeli and US air strikes.
The Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iran—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are all using air defence systems imported from the USA, including Patriot and THAAD systems against ballistic missiles and a range of other types of air defence system against drones and cruise missiles. They also have significant stockpiles of imported weapons that could be used to strike targets deep inside Iran, particularly advanced combat aircraft, but these have not yet been used in the current conflict.
Q: What do we know about Iran’s arms supplies to its so-called proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen?
ZH: Solid open-source information on transfers to these groups is hard to come by because they tend to be done in secrecy, partly because of arms embargoes on the groups and possibly to prevent the arms from being intercepted. SIPRI’s database does include data on some past transfers, partly based on UN reporting, but we do not have the whole picture.
According to the data we do have, between 1989 and 2023 Iran supplied Hezbollah with a range of weapons, including anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missile launchers, reconnaissance drones, multiple rocket launchers and portable surface-to-air missiles. We have also recorded transfers from Iran to the Houthis between 2020 and 2023 of surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, one-way attack drones and reconnaissance drones. The Houthis are known to have used Iranian missiles to attack international shipping and have missiles that can reach Israeli territory.
Q: Looking beyond the current conflict, the USA is the main arms supplier for many states that see China, Iran and Russia as major threats. Can US production keep pace with demand, particularly given the rate at which US-produced munitions are being used up in the Iran war?
PW: At the global level, demand for arms has been on the rise in recent years. This is mainly due to European states building up their militaries following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but conflicts and tensions in Asia and the Middle East continue to drive large-scale arms procurement, including imports.
The Iran war is likely to drive up demand even further. However, it could also affect availability of certain types of arms, and even delay some deliveries of arms that states already have on order.
In the short term, there is the immediate demand related to the war. The main players will need to keep supplying their armed forces, while other states that have been targeted by Iran or Israel will need to replenish their stockpiles.
Intercepting the thousands of missiles and drones Iran has launched against Israel, regional US military and naval bases, and Gulf Arab states has most likely taken several air defence missiles per interception. If stocks of these missiles are depleted too far, we may see more Iranian missiles penetrating air defence shields and causing much greater casualties and damage than they have to date.
There is a real likelihood that the USA will slow its exports of some arms—particularly precision-strike missiles and guided bombs, drones and air defence missiles. This is because the USA is likely to prioritize its own forces’ needs and replenishing its own stockpiles before exports.
Regardless of the course of the war, its effects will deepen uncertainty about regional security. Middle Eastern states are likely to consider investing in other arms, such as the kind of precision-strike weapons that have been used heavily against Iran. Although European states are currently focused on Russia, they are also likely to reconsider what military capacities they need to invest in to deal with instability in the Middle East.
It is also likely that international demand for US, Israeli and European air defence systems will increase further. These systems are expensive but they have been remarkably successful in Ukraine, in Israel’s defence against missiles and drones since October 2023, and now in the Gulf.
US suppliers of air defence missiles and systems had started expanding their production lines to meet rising global demand even before the war and have plans to expand further. For example, the producer of the Patriot PAC-3 missile, one of the most widely used missiles capable of shooting down many types of ballistic and cruise missile, announced in early 2026 that it would ramp up annual production capacity from about 620 missiles in 2025 to about 2000 in 2032. But these expansions take years, not weeks or months, so a lag is inevitable.
Q: Looking specifically at the war in Ukraine, what are the implications of armament developments related to the Iran war?
PW: I would say that the war in Iran is on balance likely to help Russia. Ukraine has depended heavily on imported arms. It was the world’s top arms importer in 2021–25, and the USA supplied 41 per cent of those arms. It seems likely that the Iran war will limit what is available for Ukraine. This does not only affect US military aid to Ukraine—European states have been paying the USA to provide Ukraine with air defence missiles and guided bombs because the capacity to produce similar weapons in sufficient quantities does not currently exist in Europe.
The picture is different when it comes to Russian imports. Iran has been a useful source of arms for Russia in recent years. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 failed to yield a quick victory, Russia started to look for any means with which it could continue the war against Ukraine. It soon found in Iran a willing supplier of drones and missiles that were relatively crude but sufficient for Russia’s objectives in Ukraine. We estimate that Iran supplied Russia with some 7000 Shahed-136s—long-distance one-way attack drones—and several hundred Fateh-360 ballistic missiles with a 200‑kilometre range, which have been used over the past four years in the terror bombing of Ukraine.
However, Russia has started producing its own copies of the Shahed-136, and over time has developed its own versions. These are produced with components from all over the world and there is little to indicate that Iranian input is needed for this production. This means that even if Iran is no longer able to provide arms or components, arms supplies to the Russian armed forces are unlikely to be much affected.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Zain Hussain is a Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Pieter D. Wezeman is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Imported arms have significantly shaped developments in the Middle East since Israel and the United States launched coordinated attacks on Iran last month. In this Q&A, Zain Hussain (ZH) and Pieter Wezeman (PW) of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme discuss what the latest SIPRI arms transfers data can tell us about how arms imports have featured in the conflict, as well as implications for arms supplies beyond the region.
Q: The Middle East has long been one of the biggest importer regions for major arms. Which Middle Eastern states are the biggest arms importers?
ZH: In the past five years, just over a quarter of all international transfers of major arms—26 per cent—went to the Middle East. Of those, by far the most went to Arab states of the Gulf, most notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The six Gulf Arab states (which also include Bahrain and Oman) together accounted for almost 20 per cent of global arms imports in 2021–25 (see table 1). Over the past decade (2016–25), the main types of arms imported by the Gulf Arab states were aircraft and missiles—including for air defence systems—as well as ships (see figures 1–3 below).
Israel was the world’s 14th largest arms importer in 2021–25. Although Israel has a large domestic arms industry, it is quite specialized in areas such as air defence, intelligence and reconnaissance equipment, drones and missiles. The Israel Defense Forces depend heavily on arms imported from the United States for several key capabilities. For example, all of Israel’s active combat aircraft come from the USA. In addition, Israel enjoys significant leeway from the USA to integrate locally designed subsystems into imported US combat aircraft, which shows the deep military relations between Israel and the USA.
Only three states supplied major arms to Israel in the past five years: the USA accounted for 68 per cent of Israel’s imports in the period, followed by Germany at 31 per cent and Italy at 1.3 per cent.
Iran is not a significant arms importer and in 2021–25 accounted for only 0.2 per cent of regional arms imports, and less than 0.05 per cent of global arms imports.
Table 1. Imports of major arms by states in the Middle East, 2021–25
Q: Who are the main arms suppliers to the Middle East?
ZH: In 2021–25 around 94 per cent of the arms imported by states in the region came from the USA (which accounted for 54 per cent) or Europe, chiefly Italy (12 per cent), France (11 per cent) and Germany (7.3 per cent).
France has consistently been the third largest arms supplier to the Middle East since 2011–15, but Italy and Germany have both significantly increased their roles. Italy has nearly quadrupled its share of arms supplies to the Middle East compared with 2011–15, largely due to surging exports to Kuwait and Qatar.
Until recently, Russia was the region’s second largest supplier, but in the past five years it accounted for only 0.3 per cent of regional arms imports. Between 2016–20 and 2021–25 Russia’s arms supplies to the region shrank by 98 per cent and none of the Gulf Arab states imported Russian arms in 2021–25. Russia is the only state to have supplied major arms to Iran in the past decade.
China has been trying to increase its supplies to the Middle East, but by 2021–25 it had not succeeded, accounting for only 0.3 per cent of imports of major arms to the region in the period.
Q: Why has Iran imported so few major arms in recent years?
ZH: Despite its prominence as a regional power, Iran imports very few major arms. It was formerly a much larger importer, supplied mainly by China and Russia, particularly during the 1990s.
Starting in 2006, a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions imposed an increasingly strict arms embargo on Iran. In response, Iran stepped up its own domestic production of arms, especially missiles and drones. Even after the UN embargo expired in 2020, Iran has received relatively few major arms, presumably because it has achieved a high level of self-sufficiency in the systems it assesses that it needs and perhaps due to a lack of trust in potential suppliers. The UN restrictions were reinstated in 2025.
Q: How significant a role are imported weapons likely to be playing in the current conflict?
ZH: Imported arms have been critical, both to the air strikes on Iran and to minimizing damage from Iranian missile and drone attacks around the region. Many of Israel’s long-range aerial attacks have used combat aircraft supplied—and to a great extent paid for—by the USA, including F-35s, F-16s and F-15s. These are armed with bombs and missiles, some of which were supplied by the USA. US forces, of course, have relied mostly on domestically produced arms.
Iran for the most part has relied on arms that it has produced itself. Air defence systems and aircraft imported from Russia seem to have done little to protect Iran from Israeli and US air strikes.
The Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iran—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are all using air defence systems imported from the USA, including Patriot and THAAD systems against ballistic missiles and a range of other types of air defence system against drones and cruise missiles. They also have significant stockpiles of imported weapons that could be used to strike targets deep inside Iran, particularly advanced combat aircraft, but these have not yet been used in the current conflict.
Q: What do we know about Iran’s arms supplies to its so-called proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen?
ZH: Solid open-source information on transfers to these groups is hard to come by because they tend to be done in secrecy, partly because of arms embargoes on the groups and possibly to prevent the arms from being intercepted. SIPRI’s database does include data on some past transfers, partly based on UN reporting, but we do not have the whole picture.
According to the data we do have, between 1989 and 2023 Iran supplied Hezbollah with a range of weapons, including anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missile launchers, reconnaissance drones, multiple rocket launchers and portable surface-to-air missiles. We have also recorded transfers from Iran to the Houthis between 2020 and 2023 of surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, one-way attack drones and reconnaissance drones. The Houthis are known to have used Iranian missiles to attack international shipping and have missiles that can reach Israeli territory.
Q: Looking beyond the current conflict, the USA is the main arms supplier for many states that see China, Iran and Russia as major threats. Can US production keep pace with demand, particularly given the rate at which US-produced munitions are being used up in the Iran war?
PW: At the global level, demand for arms has been on the rise in recent years. This is mainly due to European states building up their militaries following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but conflicts and tensions in Asia and the Middle East continue to drive large-scale arms procurement, including imports.
The Iran war is likely to drive up demand even further. However, it could also affect availability of certain types of arms, and even delay some deliveries of arms that states already have on order.
In the short term, there is the immediate demand related to the war. The main players will need to keep supplying their armed forces, while other states that have been targeted by Iran or Israel will need to replenish their stockpiles.
Intercepting the thousands of missiles and drones Iran has launched against Israel, regional US military and naval bases, and Gulf Arab states has most likely taken several air defence missiles per interception. If stocks of these missiles are depleted too far, we may see more Iranian missiles penetrating air defence shields and causing much greater casualties and damage than they have to date.
There is a real likelihood that the USA will slow its exports of some arms—particularly precision-strike missiles and guided bombs, drones and air defence missiles. This is because the USA is likely to prioritize its own forces’ needs and replenishing its own stockpiles before exports.
Regardless of the course of the war, its effects will deepen uncertainty about regional security. Middle Eastern states are likely to consider investing in other arms, such as the kind of precision-strike weapons that have been used heavily against Iran. Although European states are currently focused on Russia, they are also likely to reconsider what military capacities they need to invest in to deal with instability in the Middle East.
It is also likely that international demand for US, Israeli and European air defence systems will increase further. These systems are expensive but they have been remarkably successful in Ukraine, in Israel’s defence against missiles and drones since October 2023, and now in the Gulf.
US suppliers of air defence missiles and systems had started expanding their production lines to meet rising global demand even before the war and have plans to expand further. For example, the producer of the Patriot PAC-3 missile, one of the most widely used missiles capable of shooting down many types of ballistic and cruise missile, announced in early 2026 that it would ramp up annual production capacity from about 620 missiles in 2025 to about 2000 in 2032. But these expansions take years, not weeks or months, so a lag is inevitable.
Q: Looking specifically at the war in Ukraine, what are the implications of armament developments related to the Iran war?
PW: I would say that the war in Iran is on balance likely to help Russia. Ukraine has depended heavily on imported arms. It was the world’s top arms importer in 2021–25, and the USA supplied 41 per cent of those arms. It seems likely that the Iran war will limit what is available for Ukraine. This does not only affect US military aid to Ukraine—European states have been paying the USA to provide Ukraine with air defence missiles and guided bombs because the capacity to produce similar weapons in sufficient quantities does not currently exist in Europe.
The picture is different when it comes to Russian imports. Iran has been a useful source of arms for Russia in recent years. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 failed to yield a quick victory, Russia started to look for any means with which it could continue the war against Ukraine. It soon found in Iran a willing supplier of drones and missiles that were relatively crude but sufficient for Russia’s objectives in Ukraine. We estimate that Iran supplied Russia with some 7000 Shahed-136s—long-distance one-way attack drones—and several hundred Fateh-360 ballistic missiles with a 200‑kilometre range, which have been used over the past four years in the terror bombing of Ukraine.
However, Russia has started producing its own copies of the Shahed-136, and over time has developed its own versions. These are produced with components from all over the world and there is little to indicate that Iranian input is needed for this production. This means that even if Iran is no longer able to provide arms or components, arms supplies to the Russian armed forces are unlikely to be much affected.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)