Security Cooperation between Japan and the Nordic States in Uncertain Times

Introduction

Amid rising geopolitical tensions, from the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war to continued regional flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific, the security interests of Japan and the five Nordic states—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—are increasingly converging. These states have all made strong commitments to building up their own defence capabilities. Security cooperation—originally one of the least developed areas of the Japanese–Nordic relationship—has accordingly assumed greater importance in their policy agendas.¹ The trajectory, limitations and possibilities of this cooperation will influence both regional and global dynamics in ways that require deeper analysis.

At the same time, the return of Donald Trump to the United States presidency has added growing uncertainty over US policies towards transatlantic as well as Indo-Pacific alliances.² Security cooperation between Japan and the Nordic states, conceived and promoted by both to diversify security partnerships as much as to explore potentials of their respective strengths, now faces new complexities even as it is becoming more urgent and timely.

This SIPRI Policy Brief explores Japanese–Nordic security cooperation and provides recommendations for ways forward. Starting with an overview of their respective security priorities and threat perceptions over the past decade, the brief outlines a growing convergence that has further accelerated since 2022. It then discusses existing security cooperation both within the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) frameworks and through bilateral engagement between Japan and the Nordic states. The brief concludes with a summary of the limitations of current Japanese–Nordic security cooperation and provides recommendations for how this cooperation might best serve their common interests in enhancing regional and global security—especially when the geopolitical context remains an important, and increasingly unpredictable, variable.

Security Priorities and Threat Perceptions

Security priorities in Japan and in the Nordic states have undergone dramatic changes over the past years, recognizing ‘unprecedented challenges’ to peace and stability, to include threats of both territorial and hybrid nature.³ The Nordic states’ threat perceptions have focused—albeit to varying degrees—on Russia since at least its 2014 annexation of Crimea. This culminated in the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO and strong Nordic support for Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion.⁴ Japan’s support for Ukraine, which has included sending non-lethal military equipment to Ukraine and participation in the sanctions regime against Russia, aligns with Nordic states’ security interests.⁵

Japan’s main security concerns are focused on the Indo-Pacific theatre. However, Japan and the Nordic states increasingly acknowledge the interconnected nature of their respective security environments, due not least to the political alignment and strategic partnership between China and Russia.⁶ For example, Japanese–Nordic threat perceptions converge with their shared security concerns regarding joint Russian–Chinese military exercises in both regions and the growing security ties between North Korea and Russia.⁷ Both Japan and the Nordic states hold a common position that ‘unilateral attempts to change the status quo are unacceptable’, in reference not only to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but also China’s position on Taiwan as well as tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and in the South China Sea.⁸ It is in recognition of heightened security threats of a traditional, territorial nature that Japan and the Nordic states have begun to emphasize military power to include increased military spending and boosting arms industrial capacity.⁹

Beyond traditional security threats, there has also been significant concern about non-traditional threats, including but not limited to cyber warfare, attacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation and economic coercion, with the term ‘hybrid warfare’ used to reflect that the line between traditional and non-traditional threats has become blurred.¹⁰ In addition, as Japan and the Nordic states are all highly trade-dependent nations, securing sea lines of communication has been of particular importance. For Japan, much of this agenda falls under the concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP).¹¹ The FOIP concept relates to a wider extra-regional agenda for a free and open maritime order, including respect for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that Japan shares with the Nordic states specifically as it relates to the High North and the Arctic.¹² In 2021 the EU released its own strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of which one of the priority areas is security and defence. It has also affirmed Japan’s FOIP concept.¹³

Economic security has also emerged as an important priority area for Japan and the Nordic states, particularly vis-à-vis China and its use of economic statecraft for geopolitical purposes.¹⁴ Japan has been at the forefront of policy thinking around economic security, including within the Group of Seven (G7) framework, to highlight ‘the view that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is becoming “increasingly inseparable” ’.¹⁵ Several of the Nordic states have borne the brunt of Chinese use of economic coercion in recent years.¹⁶

Convergence in threat perceptions, and their growing investment in and attention to defence matters, suggest that there is ample room for cooperation between Japan and the Nordic states. Indeed, even before the advent of the second Trump administration, Japan had reached out to various extra-regional partners to forge new security partnerships and alignments, such as the Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP), a partnership between Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom for developing a sixth-generation fighter jet; the NATO-IP4, a partnership between NATO and four Indo-Pacific states (Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand); and, more recently, Japan’s Nordic diplomacy initiative, which aims to deepen security cooperation.¹⁷

While Japan and the Nordic states continue to share a common normative and values-based agenda on upholding a rules-based international order, they will be hard-pressed to maintain it absent the USA as a pillar of that very order. At the same time, Japanese–Nordic security cooperation will remain embedded within the broader European context as Japan continues to build its partnerships with the EU and NATO. That said, there are several approaches—and shared interest among Japan and the Nordic states—for deepened security cooperation that Japan and the Nordic states can emulate.

Existing Security Cooperation

As Japan and the Nordic states continue to view each other as ‘like-minded’ countries, they are exploring opportunities for developing or deepening cooperation, especially in security and defence. Most prominently, this can build on Japan–EU and Japan–NATO security ties, which have undergone substantive developments in the past few years. Dedicated Japanese–Nordic security cooperation, such as Japan’s Nordic diplomacy initiative launched in 2024, also offers avenues forward. This section provides an overview of security cooperation within the EU and NATO frameworks as well as through bilateral engagement between Japan and the Nordic states.

Japan and the EU

A major development conducive to future Japanese–Nordic security cooperation was the signing in November 2024 of a security and defence partnership (SDP) between the EU and Japan—the EU’s second ever, and the first with an Indo-Pacific country.¹⁸ The SDP reaffirms the normative foundations of security cooperation between the EU and Japan, and acknowledges the interconnected nature of European and Indo-Pacific security. It includes provisions for joint military exercises, port calls, capacity-building efforts for third-party countries in the Indo-Pacific region and exchanges on matters related to the arms industry. The SDP notably follows on from the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), which was the first bilateral framework between the two parties. The SPA was signed in July 2018 and entered into force on 1 January 2025 after ratification by all EU member states. It covers 40 areas of cooperation, including security, economic, energy and social issues.¹⁹ The SPA is legally binding and aims to establish long-term strategic collaboration to protect the values and principles shared by both parties. An annual joint committee was established to coordinate the overall partnership.²⁰ While the SPA explicitly outlines the challenges and areas for cooperation, it notably refrains from naming specific countries as sources of concern. Nonetheless, some observers have argued that certain references—such as the explicit mention of UNCLOS in Article 29 (maritime affairs)—are largely driven by concerns over China’s actions in the East and South China Seas.²¹

Japan and NATO

With the accession of Sweden and Finland, all Nordic states are now members of NATO, which is the most crucial security framework for the region and a central platform for security cooperation between Japan and the Nordic states.²² The security ties between Japan and NATO have advanced steadily, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept for the first time identified China as a challenge to the alliance’s ‘interest, security and values’, which aligns with Japan’s long-standing view of China as a primary security threat.²³ These shared threat perceptions and security concerns provide a foundation for deepening cooperation between Japan and NATO.²⁴ However, support for such cooperation is not entirely uniform among NATO members, as indicated by France’s opposition to the establishment of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo, out of concern that Beijing may view it as provocative.²⁵

But political ties have been advancing. In 2022 Japan’s then prime minister, Fumio Kishida, attended the NATO Summit in Madrid, becoming the first Japanese prime minister, together with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, ever to participate in such meeting.²⁶ Japan has elevated its diplomatic presence within NATO, initially designating its embassy in Belgium as its mission to NATO in 2018 and later establishing a dedicated diplomatic mission to NATO.²⁷ Moreover, in 2023 Japan upgraded its partnership with NATO under the ‘Individually Tailored Partnership Programme for 2023–2026’, which aims to strengthen dialogue and consultations and to enhance interoperability.²⁸ More recently, in April 2025, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte met with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Tokyo, and the two leaders highlighted their mutual willingness to step up cooperation in areas such as cyber defence, space, emerging and disruptive technologies, and interoperability. The emphasis is on arms industry cooperation including dual-use technologies, advanced technologies and the enhancement of standardization. On cyber defence, the first Japan–NATO Cyber Dialogue was held in 2023. Japan has also participated in NATO’s Cyber Coalition and Locked Shields exercises and NATO welcomed Japan’s posting of an official to the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.²⁹ Joint military exercises between the two parties are likely to continue.³⁰ However, these may serve more as a political gesture than a demonstration of high-level military cooperation.

Japan and Nordic States

In 2024 Japan launched its Nordic diplomacy initiative, which re-emphasized the inseparability of the security of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic, and the unacceptability of using force in ‘unilateral attempts to change the status quo’.³¹ Maintaining the rules-based international order in the maritime domain, including in the Arctic, is one of the four pillars for cooperation in the initiative. Another core pillar is enhanced security and defence cooperation, for example through a tailored approach to security dialogues and the procurement of defence equipment from Nordic states by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.³² Even before the diplomacy initiative was launched, there were a number of instances of such cooperation. In 2023 Patria Group, Finland’s state-owned arms company, signed a licence agreement with Japan Steel Works Ltd on manufacturing Finnish AMV XP 8×8 armoured vehicles in Japan.³³ Japan’s three joint statements on strategic partnerships issued with Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2023 all emphasized the importance of defence dialogues and cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, countering disinformation, and defence equipment and technology.³⁴ In 2022 Norway and Sweden each signed a bilateral agreement with Japan on the transfer of defence equipment and technology, while Finland is currently in negotiations for a similar agreement.³⁵ These bilateral agreements enable joint research, development and production of defence equipment and technology. It is worth noting, however, that the primary reason Japan and Sweden signed their agreement was to enable Sweden’s participation in the GCAP, from which Sweden eventually chose to withdraw in favour of developing its own jet through its arms company SAAB and GKN Aerospace.³⁶

Political ties are also growing closer. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson paid a visit to Japan in December 2024, the first visit by a Swedish prime minister since 2008.³⁷ While Sweden and Finland are the only Nordic states with defence attachés accredited to Japan, Norway plans to establish a defence attaché position in Tokyo by 2026, as its current defence attaché in Beijing is also accredited to Japan.³⁸ Denmark is considering taking a similar step.³⁹

While Japan and the Nordic states have no formal military presence in each other’s region, joint military operations within broader EU and NATO initiatives are steadily expanding. As mentioned above, Japan has already participated in several NATO military exercises and the Norwegian naval frigate has joined this year’s UK Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific.⁴⁰ The possibility of integrating Japan in the Joint Expeditionary Force, particularly in the context of extended missions in the Indo-Pacific, has also been raised in defence circles.⁴¹

Limitations and Recommendations

Despite the growing efforts to deepen Japanese–Nordic security cooperation, engagement remains limited. What cooperation exists is primarily focused on their responses to the three key areas outlined above: the challenges to the rules-based international order, which both Japan and the Nordic states uphold; cyber defence and counter disinformation; and arms industry and defence technology research. Moreover, the recent push for closer ties between Japan and the Nordic states is partly driven by increasing threat perceptions of Russia arising especially from its war on Ukraine and its strengthened strategic partnership with China.⁴² However, differences in Japan’s and Nordic states’ strategic priorities and attention persist. The Nordic states will continue to focus predominantly on Russia and the developments in Ukraine, with the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions remaining key areas of concern. Japan’s focus lies in its immediate region, where China and North Korea are regarded as matters of ‘serious concern’.⁴³ It remains to be seen whether either Japan or any of the Nordic states has the necessary resources and political will to act beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Complicating the future trajectory of security cooperation are the USA’s rapid policy shifts which have created a geopolitical context of unpredictability.

Nevertheless, bound by shared interests as well as shared values, Japan and the Nordic states are likely to continue their efforts to diversify and deepen their security partnerships with like-minded countries—including with each other. Although their policy priorities will be informed by their respective threat environments, setting realistic goals, focusing on areas of policy alignment and complementary strengths, and closer policy coordination can deliver concrete results.

To promote a clearer vision for further security cooperation, this brief makes three recommendations for approaches that Japan and the Nordic states could adopt.

Strengthening Security Dialogues Between Japan and the Nordic States

To strengthen security cooperation and better coordinate policies, Japan and the Nordic states should institutionalize a structured and systematic approach to conducting topic-based security dialogues.⁴⁴ This could include topics of shared strategic interests such as societal resilience and civil defence, cyber defence, maritime security, and emerging technologies, as outlined in Japan’s Nordic diplomacy initiative and in other joint statements and bilateral agreements between Japan and individual Nordic states. This approach could follow the Japan–EU model, such as the annual joint committee under the SPA, by establishing regular consultation mechanisms, joint working groups and expert exchanges to help Japan and the Nordic states understand each other’s core security concerns as well as near-term and long-term defence priorities and operationalize concrete policy coordination if not cooperation. A stable framework for dialogue and a better understanding of each other’s strategic cultures allows for proactive planning, enabling Japan and the Nordic states to coordinate their policies and capabilities in an increasingly complex security environment.

Promoting Japanese–Nordic Track-II Dialogues on Security and Defence

Outside of official dialogues, Japanese–Nordic track-II dialogues on security and defence should be promoted. Exchanges between Japanese and Nordic think tanks and academic institutions remain few and far between. More frequent exchanges, including short-term visits by researchers and joint research projects, would serve as platforms for informed discussions on security issues of mutual interest. Workshops on specific topics, such as cyber defence, economic security and emerging technologies, with the participation of Japanese and Nordic scholars, analysts and officials in their private capacity, would provide useful venues for debates, discussions and policy recommendations. These track-II dialogues would not only inform policy input but also foster a Japanese–Nordic community of security research and analysis.

Maintaining Focus on Challenges of Hybrid Warfare

Japan and the Nordic states should maintain a focus—individually and jointly—on hybrid threats that continue to affect regional and global security, amid geopolitical uncertainties. Responding to the challenges of these hybrid threats is where greater policy coordination and sharing of best practices may be most fruitful. There are comparable grey-zone operations in the Baltic, Arctic and Indo-Pacific theatres that threaten both communications and maritime security. For instance, the 2024 Baltic Sea undersea cable disruption, which highlighted the importance of protecting and investing in undersea cables, provides valuable lessons and experience that would benefit both Japan and the Nordic states. Another area of mutual interest is in strengthening societal resilience, including against hybrid threats such as disinformation. Regular joint cybersecurity exercises and structured exchanges on best practices for countering disinformation could also serve as ways forward for strengthening security partnerships and societal resilience in both regions.

Endnotes

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3. 3 European Commission, ‘EU–Japan Summit—Joint statement’, 13 July 2023.
4. 4 Nordic Council, ‘Three years on from the invasion—the Nordic Council reiterates its strong support for Ukraine’, 25 Feb. 2025.
5. 5 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan’s efforts in response to the situation in Ukraine’, Japan’s International Cooperation: White Paper on Development Cooperation 2022, Mar. 2023.
6. 6 European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Security and defence partnership between the European Union and Japan’, 1 Nov. 2024.
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8. 8 European Commission (note 3).
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28. 28 NATO, ‘Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2023–2026’, 20 July 2023.
29. 29 Shigeru, I. and Rutte, M., Joint Statement of the Prime Minister of Japan and the NATO Secretary-General, Apr. 2025, p. 2.
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33. 33 Sato, D., ‘Japan to produce Finnish AMV XP armored vehicles’, Defence Blog, 1 Sep. 2023.
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38. 38 Kalvik, J., ‘Norway and Japan are strengthening their security and defence policy cooperation’, Defence and Intelligence Norway, 3 Sep. 2024.
39. 39 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint leaders’ statement on the deepening of the strategic partnership between Japan and the Kingdom of Denmark’ (note 34).
40. 40 British Royal Navy, ‘British and Canadian frigates depart Plymouth to join carrier strike force’, Navy News, 22 Apr. 2025.
41. 41 Boyd, R. and Arnold, A., ‘Stretching the Joint Expeditionary Force: An idea for our times’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security, RUSI Commentary, 8 Sep. 2023; and ‘Bridging regions: Nordic–Japan security cooperation in uncertain times’, SIPRI workshop, Solna, Sweden, 6–7 Mar. 2025.
42. 42 Stokes, J., Wright, E. and Schochet, N., The China-Russia Entente in East Asia: Contending with Authoritarian Partnership in a Critical Region (Center for a New American Security: Washington, DC, 26 Sep. 2024).
43. 43 Japanese Government (note 10), p. 9.
44. 44 Pohlkamp, E.-K., ‘No time to drift: Trump, China, and the urgency of a stronger EU–Japan alignment’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Apr. 2025.