As the Group of Seven (G7) holds its annual meeting in France this week, the question of how to secure supply chains for strategic goods, including critical minerals, is high on the agenda. In recent years, China has been able to create a chokepoint on supplies of critical minerals and related technologies through its export controls. It has exploited this chokepoint to respond to the United States’ own use of export controls and tariffs targeting China and to punish Japan for statements about Japan’s possible intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan and its perceived ‘remilitarization’ and ‘nuclear ambitions’. This has disrupted global supply chains in both civilian and military sectors and provided China with a far more detailed picture of which companies—including in Europe—are reliant on its products.
The G7 states and others may be tempted to respond in kind via their own export control systems. This would risk escalating the cycle of action and reaction and disrupting global trade even more, ultimately harming all sides. It would also further weaken the already challenged set of frameworks for coordinating states’ export controls—particularly the four multilateral export control regimes—that help to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and destabilizing build-ups of military equipment. The controls agreed in the multilateral regimes are country-agnostic and based on common non-proliferation and international security rationales. The widespread adoption of export controls that target specific states or pursue solely strategic interests risks undermining the legitimacy of the regimes and of export controls more broadly.
This backgrounder examines the role of the multilateral export control regimes in preventing the proliferation and misuse of military and dual-use items. It describes how the unilateral and coercive use of export controls jeopardizes these regimes and the legitimacy of export controls more broadly. It also identifies steps that the USA, China, the European Union (EU) and others, particularly middle powers, could take to preserve and strengthen the multilateral regimes, even in times of heightened geopolitical tension.
The multilateral export control regimes
Export controls are instruments states use to oversee and regulate the trade in military items and certain dual-use items that are designed for civilian purposes but can also be used in the development, production or use of conventional arms or WMD. States have an obligation to regulate this trade on the basis of their commitments under international law, including the Geneva Conventions and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
While their goals and objectives have, in some cases, become increasingly blurred, export controls are a separate and distinct tool from trade sanctions. Export controls traditionally apply to all recipients and are applied in pursuit of non-proliferation and international and regional security objectives and norms. In contrast, trade sanctions are applied to an individual state or end-user and are aimed at achieving a specific behavioural change on the part of the target.
Groups of supplier states have developed a set of four multilateral export control regimes to establish a common understanding about the scope of states’ export controls—what items and transfers are subject to control—and the criteria for denying or approving exports. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1975, focuses on exports of nuclear-related equipment, materials and technology. The Australia Group was established in 1985 to deal with exports that could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established two years later and covers missiles and other uncrewed aerial vehicles capable of delivering WMD and related dual-use items. The Wassenaar Arrangement, founded in 1996, focuses on exports of conventional arms and related dual-use items.
The multilateral regimes are informal groups of states that operate by consensus. They maintain guidelines, control lists and good practice documents that serve as the primary reference points for the export controls both of regime members and of many non-members. They also provide a space to discuss developments in science and technology that are of security and proliferation concern and should therefore be subject to export controls.
The USA is a founding and, until recently, leading member of all four regimes. The EU and several middle powers inside and outside Europe play significant roles in enabling the current system to operate. The EU uses the regimes’ control lists as the basis for its common set of legal instruments in arms and dual-use export controls, which supports their adoption internationally. Australia acts as the informal secretariat of the Australia Group while France and Japan are the points of contact for MTCR partners and for the NSG, respectively. China’s relationship with the multilateral regimes is complex. In the 2000s China joined the NSG and applied for membership of the Australia Group, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, these applications stalled due to regime members’ remaining concerns about China’s proliferation patterns and the consequent declining interest in membership on China’s part.
During the 2000s and 2010s the four multilateral regimes experienced a prolonged period of growth and consolidation. States that were initially sceptical of them due to concerns that they were preventing transfers of advanced technologies, including India and Mexico, sought and gained membership of one or more regimes.
Today the four regimes face a range of challenges. Arguably the most significant is that Russia—which is a member of the MTCR, the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement—has been using its position to veto the adoption of new control list items by these regimes. Even without a Russian veto, the process of negotiating and agreeing additions to their control lists can often be lengthy. This has led some commentators to question the value of the regimes and to propose the establishment of alternative coordination arrangements. The lack of traction that these proposals have generated, and the fact that the regimes have continued to function, testifies to the unique role they continue to play. Although the Wassenaar Arrangement has failed to adopt several major proposals to add items to its control lists since 2022, it has provided a forum for discussing controls on quantum computers, semiconductors and additive manufacturing technologies, which have since been adopted as national and EU export controls.
The increased use of export controls for coercion and retaliation
While states have an obligation to regulate the trade in military and dual-use items, they also have the right to determine the content of their national export controls. The precise scope and criteria of states’ export controls are therefore driven not only by the imperative to prevent the proliferation and misuse of dual-use and military items but also by foreign, security and—in some cases—economic and other domestic objectives.
Since 2018 the USA has used export controls to impose a widening set of restrictions on transfers to China of advanced semiconductors and, later, quantum computers and related technologies. This was both to prevent China from using US technology to advance its military capabilities and to maintain US technological leadership. Under the administration of Joe Biden these restrictions often went beyond the scope of the control lists agreed in the multilateral regimes. However, the USA remained focused on using export controls for national security objectives and actively supported the work of the regimes.
The current US administration of Donald J. Trump has maintained or expanded earlier controls targeting China but it has also used national export controls as bargaining chips in broader trade negotiations with China. In addition, it has signalled a reduced interest in multilateral cooperation on export control issues. In March 2025 the US Department of Commerce reportedly restricted staff travel to Wassenaar Arrangement meetings and ‘significantly curtailed staff-level engagement with foreign governments’.
Since 2023 China has expanded the list of items that are subject to national export controls to include critical materials and related processing technologies. China has used these controls to respond, first, to US technology transfer restrictions and, later, to the imposition of higher trade tariffs by the Trump administration. China has also used export controls to target Japan, following remarks on Taiwan from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as well as to impose end-user restrictions on European companies. The controls targeting European companies were presented as a response to their arms sales to Taiwan, but also came one day after the EU announced sanctions on Chinese companies accused of providing ‘dual-use goods or weapons systems to the Russian military–industrial complex’.
China has indicated that its use of export controls is aimed at safeguarding national security and national interests and fulfilling non-proliferation obligations. However, their scope goes far beyond the coverage of the multilateral regimes’ control lists. While China has a right to introduce controls on the basis of national and security concerns, some other states have argued that it has failed to adequately explain the rationale behind its new controls and that their scope may be disproportionate to the achievement of security-related objectives.
The EU is currently debating how to respond to China’s export restrictions. Much of the debate is focused on enhancing Europe’s own production of critical materials and addressing China’s industrial over-capacity and trade imbalances, something that will also be discussed at the G7 summit. However, using export controls to restrict transfers of advanced technologies where the EU still retains key advantages may also be appealing.
Ongoing discussions on how export controls can be used to strengthen the EU’s economic security might provide further momentum to supporters of this course of action. To date, these discussions have centred on using export controls to prevent the diversion of military and dual-use items, in particular, to strengthen EU sanctions measures imposed on Russia since 2022 and stop EU-origin goods and technologies from being integrated into the weapon systems being used against Ukraine. However, some commentators have suggested using export controls ‘as a tool of deterrence’, especially to restrict transfers of advanced semiconductor technologies to China.
Whichever tools the EU deploys, China has signalled that it will retaliate, and some commentators have suggested that this could include further expansion in its use of export controls.
Threats to multilateral coordination of export controls
The ongoing and expanding use of unilateral export controls to advance narrow national interests and to manage strategic competition creates a range of challenges to multilateral cooperation on export controls.
In recent years, China has suddenly imposed, and in some cases quickly withdrawn, export controls without providing clear technical justifications, particularly on critical minerals. The USA has used export controls to achieve economic or trade concessions from China. Both types of behaviour risk eroding the trust among states necessary to achieve any meaningful form of multilateral cooperation, including in the field of export controls. They also undermine the long-term credibility and effectiveness of export controls as tools to attain common non-proliferation and security objectives. Further, the adoption of controls outside of the multilateral regimes disrupts essential processes, which they developed over decades, of technology evaluation, information sharing on control lists and good practices, and coordination of national controls.
Linking the use of export controls to broader trade negotiations also further blurs the line between trade sanctions and export controls, putting additional pressure on already stretched national licensing and enforcement authorities. This, in turn, could potentially weaken oversight of the trade in sensitive items.
Finally, the unpredictable and inconsistent use of export controls creates a range of other problems, including increasing uncertainty for companies, disrupting global supply chains and legitimate trade, and leaving economies more vulnerable to retaliatory and coercive measures. More broadly, it also sets a dangerous precedent by creating incentives for more states to use export controls in retaliatory and coercive ways and could ultimately lead to a retreat from international trade, negatively affecting global prosperity and economic development.
Signs of support for de-escalation
Some US commentators have called for mutual de-escalation in the tit-for-tat use of unilateral export controls to gain economic or geopolitical advantage and have argued that the USA needs to return to cooperation with like-minded partners.
A bipartisan bill, the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act, was recently introduced to the US Congress that proposes working with partner states to apply US export restrictions on their exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Some US observers have noted that such an effort would likely fail if the USA does not re-engage in bilateral or plurilateral negotiations on export controls. The debate generated by the bill has not so far addressed the need for the USA to recognize the importance of the regimes and to re-commit to working with them in an active and constructive way.
In contrast, China has recently signalled its recognition of the essential role that the multilateral regimes play in setting global standards for export controls. China’s white paper on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation in the New Era, published at the end of 2025, highlights China’s active participation in the NSG and engagement with the other multilateral regimes. It also stresses China’s efforts to continuously improve its export control system. However, China has not yet publicly acknowledged how far its domestic controls now deviate from the content and purpose of the regimes’ agreed control lists or the potential risks that this deviation poses.
EU member states and other middle powers remain committed to multilateral coordination on export controls for non-proliferation and shared security objectives. While they can do little to influence the actions of China or the USA directly, they should avoid following their path and take steps to strengthen the functioning of the multilateral regimes and maintain their legitimacy.
Conclusions
The tension between the use of export controls to achieve multilaterally agreed objectives and unilaterally defined interests has always been present. However, it has approached a breaking point in recent years. The increasing use of export controls as ‘offensive economic tools’ risks diverting resources and political attention from non-proliferation and international security objectives.
Although there is some interest in the USA in ending the current tit-for-tat application of export controls and China continues to state that it values the multilateral regimes, both sides could make greater efforts to refrain from using export controls in ways that deviate markedly from the regimes’ aims and, in the USA’s case, make greater efforts to re-engage with their work.
The EU and middle powers, such as Australia, are among the states that have shown the most interest in supporting the current architecture. These states have a significant stake in multilateral export control coordination in the light of the multiple dependencies many of them have on both China and the USA. It would thus make sense for them to renew their efforts to coordinate export control policies in order to address proliferation risks, and resist the temptation to use export controls as tools of coercion.
There is of course no guarantee that China––having discovered the power that it can exert through its export controls––will cease its coercive and retaliatory use of export controls even if the USA, European states and others decide not to respond in kind with export controls or other measures and refocus their attention on multilateral cooperation on export controls.
One way forward might be for states participating in the multilateral regimes to try to further include China within these forums; for example, by reviewing China’s pending applications to participate in the Australia Group, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. While this remains highly challenging in the current international context, small steps in that direction might encourage China to step back from national controls that go beyond those multilaterally agreed and considered to be the international standards. In the long term this could also lead China to further align its controls with those agreed within the regimes and implement them in line with WMD non-proliferation and international security objectives.
While all options come with challenges, maintaining the current trajectory risks crippling an essential tool for preventing the proliferation of WMD and the diversion and potential misuse of military and dual-use items.
With support from the Australian Department of Defence, SIPRI is conducting a project examining China’s export controls and their implications for the multilateral export control regimes that underpin non-proliferation efforts as well as for Australia’s National Defence Strategy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Dr Mark Bromley is the Director of the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Giovanna Maletta is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
As the Group of Seven (G7) holds its annual meeting in France this week, the question of how to secure supply chains for strategic goods, including critical minerals, is high on the agenda. In recent years, China has been able to create a chokepoint on supplies of critical minerals and related technologies through its export controls. It has exploited this chokepoint to respond to the United States’ own use of export controls and tariffs targeting China and to punish Japan for statements about Japan’s possible intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan and its perceived ‘remilitarization’ and ‘nuclear ambitions’. This has disrupted global supply chains in both civilian and military sectors and provided China with a far more detailed picture of which companies—including in Europe—are reliant on its products.
The G7 states and others may be tempted to respond in kind via their own export control systems. This would risk escalating the cycle of action and reaction and disrupting global trade even more, ultimately harming all sides. It would also further weaken the already challenged set of frameworks for coordinating states’ export controls—particularly the four multilateral export control regimes—that help to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and destabilizing build-ups of military equipment. The controls agreed in the multilateral regimes are country-agnostic and based on common non-proliferation and international security rationales. The widespread adoption of export controls that target specific states or pursue solely strategic interests risks undermining the legitimacy of the regimes and of export controls more broadly.
This backgrounder examines the role of the multilateral export control regimes in preventing the proliferation and misuse of military and dual-use items. It describes how the unilateral and coercive use of export controls jeopardizes these regimes and the legitimacy of export controls more broadly. It also identifies steps that the USA, China, the European Union (EU) and others, particularly middle powers, could take to preserve and strengthen the multilateral regimes, even in times of heightened geopolitical tension.
The multilateral export control regimes
Export controls are instruments states use to oversee and regulate the trade in military items and certain dual-use items that are designed for civilian purposes but can also be used in the development, production or use of conventional arms or WMD. States have an obligation to regulate this trade on the basis of their commitments under international law, including the Geneva Conventions and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
While their goals and objectives have, in some cases, become increasingly blurred, export controls are a separate and distinct tool from trade sanctions. Export controls traditionally apply to all recipients and are applied in pursuit of non-proliferation and international and regional security objectives and norms. In contrast, trade sanctions are applied to an individual state or end-user and are aimed at achieving a specific behavioural change on the part of the target.
Groups of supplier states have developed a set of four multilateral export control regimes to establish a common understanding about the scope of states’ export controls—what items and transfers are subject to control—and the criteria for denying or approving exports. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1975, focuses on exports of nuclear-related equipment, materials and technology. The Australia Group was established in 1985 to deal with exports that could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established two years later and covers missiles and other uncrewed aerial vehicles capable of delivering WMD and related dual-use items. The Wassenaar Arrangement, founded in 1996, focuses on exports of conventional arms and related dual-use items.
The multilateral regimes are informal groups of states that operate by consensus. They maintain guidelines, control lists and good practice documents that serve as the primary reference points for the export controls both of regime members and of many non-members. They also provide a space to discuss developments in science and technology that are of security and proliferation concern and should therefore be subject to export controls.
The USA is a founding and, until recently, leading member of all four regimes. The EU and several middle powers inside and outside Europe play significant roles in enabling the current system to operate. The EU uses the regimes’ control lists as the basis for its common set of legal instruments in arms and dual-use export controls, which supports their adoption internationally. Australia acts as the informal secretariat of the Australia Group while France and Japan are the points of contact for MTCR partners and for the NSG, respectively. China’s relationship with the multilateral regimes is complex. In the 2000s China joined the NSG and applied for membership of the Australia Group, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, these applications stalled due to regime members’ remaining concerns about China’s proliferation patterns and the consequent declining interest in membership on China’s part.
During the 2000s and 2010s the four multilateral regimes experienced a prolonged period of growth and consolidation. States that were initially sceptical of them due to concerns that they were preventing transfers of advanced technologies, including India and Mexico, sought and gained membership of one or more regimes.
Today the four regimes face a range of challenges. Arguably the most significant is that Russia—which is a member of the MTCR, the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement—has been using its position to veto the adoption of new control list items by these regimes. Even without a Russian veto, the process of negotiating and agreeing additions to their control lists can often be lengthy. This has led some commentators to question the value of the regimes and to propose the establishment of alternative coordination arrangements. The lack of traction that these proposals have generated, and the fact that the regimes have continued to function, testifies to the unique role they continue to play. Although the Wassenaar Arrangement has failed to adopt several major proposals to add items to its control lists since 2022, it has provided a forum for discussing controls on quantum computers, semiconductors and additive manufacturing technologies, which have since been adopted as national and EU export controls.
The increased use of export controls for coercion and retaliation
While states have an obligation to regulate the trade in military and dual-use items, they also have the right to determine the content of their national export controls. The precise scope and criteria of states’ export controls are therefore driven not only by the imperative to prevent the proliferation and misuse of dual-use and military items but also by foreign, security and—in some cases—economic and other domestic objectives.
Since 2018 the USA has used export controls to impose a widening set of restrictions on transfers to China of advanced semiconductors and, later, quantum computers and related technologies. This was both to prevent China from using US technology to advance its military capabilities and to maintain US technological leadership. Under the administration of Joe Biden these restrictions often went beyond the scope of the control lists agreed in the multilateral regimes. However, the USA remained focused on using export controls for national security objectives and actively supported the work of the regimes.
The current US administration of Donald J. Trump has maintained or expanded earlier controls targeting China but it has also used national export controls as bargaining chips in broader trade negotiations with China. In addition, it has signalled a reduced interest in multilateral cooperation on export control issues. In March 2025 the US Department of Commerce reportedly restricted staff travel to Wassenaar Arrangement meetings and ‘significantly curtailed staff-level engagement with foreign governments’.
Since 2023 China has expanded the list of items that are subject to national export controls to include critical materials and related processing technologies. China has used these controls to respond, first, to US technology transfer restrictions and, later, to the imposition of higher trade tariffs by the Trump administration. China has also used export controls to target Japan, following remarks on Taiwan from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as well as to impose end-user restrictions on European companies. The controls targeting European companies were presented as a response to their arms sales to Taiwan, but also came one day after the EU announced sanctions on Chinese companies accused of providing ‘dual-use goods or weapons systems to the Russian military–industrial complex’.
China has indicated that its use of export controls is aimed at safeguarding national security and national interests and fulfilling non-proliferation obligations. However, their scope goes far beyond the coverage of the multilateral regimes’ control lists. While China has a right to introduce controls on the basis of national and security concerns, some other states have argued that it has failed to adequately explain the rationale behind its new controls and that their scope may be disproportionate to the achievement of security-related objectives.
The EU is currently debating how to respond to China’s export restrictions. Much of the debate is focused on enhancing Europe’s own production of critical materials and addressing China’s industrial over-capacity and trade imbalances, something that will also be discussed at the G7 summit. However, using export controls to restrict transfers of advanced technologies where the EU still retains key advantages may also be appealing.
Ongoing discussions on how export controls can be used to strengthen the EU’s economic security might provide further momentum to supporters of this course of action. To date, these discussions have centred on using export controls to prevent the diversion of military and dual-use items, in particular, to strengthen EU sanctions measures imposed on Russia since 2022 and stop EU-origin goods and technologies from being integrated into the weapon systems being used against Ukraine. However, some commentators have suggested using export controls ‘as a tool of deterrence’, especially to restrict transfers of advanced semiconductor technologies to China.
Whichever tools the EU deploys, China has signalled that it will retaliate, and some commentators have suggested that this could include further expansion in its use of export controls.
Threats to multilateral coordination of export controls
The ongoing and expanding use of unilateral export controls to advance narrow national interests and to manage strategic competition creates a range of challenges to multilateral cooperation on export controls.
In recent years, China has suddenly imposed, and in some cases quickly withdrawn, export controls without providing clear technical justifications, particularly on critical minerals. The USA has used export controls to achieve economic or trade concessions from China. Both types of behaviour risk eroding the trust among states necessary to achieve any meaningful form of multilateral cooperation, including in the field of export controls. They also undermine the long-term credibility and effectiveness of export controls as tools to attain common non-proliferation and security objectives. Further, the adoption of controls outside of the multilateral regimes disrupts essential processes, which they developed over decades, of technology evaluation, information sharing on control lists and good practices, and coordination of national controls.
Linking the use of export controls to broader trade negotiations also further blurs the line between trade sanctions and export controls, putting additional pressure on already stretched national licensing and enforcement authorities. This, in turn, could potentially weaken oversight of the trade in sensitive items.
Finally, the unpredictable and inconsistent use of export controls creates a range of other problems, including increasing uncertainty for companies, disrupting global supply chains and legitimate trade, and leaving economies more vulnerable to retaliatory and coercive measures. More broadly, it also sets a dangerous precedent by creating incentives for more states to use export controls in retaliatory and coercive ways and could ultimately lead to a retreat from international trade, negatively affecting global prosperity and economic development.
Signs of support for de-escalation
Some US commentators have called for mutual de-escalation in the tit-for-tat use of unilateral export controls to gain economic or geopolitical advantage and have argued that the USA needs to return to cooperation with like-minded partners.
A bipartisan bill, the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act, was recently introduced to the US Congress that proposes working with partner states to apply US export restrictions on their exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Some US observers have noted that such an effort would likely fail if the USA does not re-engage in bilateral or plurilateral negotiations on export controls. The debate generated by the bill has not so far addressed the need for the USA to recognize the importance of the regimes and to re-commit to working with them in an active and constructive way.
In contrast, China has recently signalled its recognition of the essential role that the multilateral regimes play in setting global standards for export controls. China’s white paper on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation in the New Era, published at the end of 2025, highlights China’s active participation in the NSG and engagement with the other multilateral regimes. It also stresses China’s efforts to continuously improve its export control system. However, China has not yet publicly acknowledged how far its domestic controls now deviate from the content and purpose of the regimes’ agreed control lists or the potential risks that this deviation poses.
EU member states and other middle powers remain committed to multilateral coordination on export controls for non-proliferation and shared security objectives. While they can do little to influence the actions of China or the USA directly, they should avoid following their path and take steps to strengthen the functioning of the multilateral regimes and maintain their legitimacy.
Conclusions
The tension between the use of export controls to achieve multilaterally agreed objectives and unilaterally defined interests has always been present. However, it has approached a breaking point in recent years. The increasing use of export controls as ‘offensive economic tools’ risks diverting resources and political attention from non-proliferation and international security objectives.
Although there is some interest in the USA in ending the current tit-for-tat application of export controls and China continues to state that it values the multilateral regimes, both sides could make greater efforts to refrain from using export controls in ways that deviate markedly from the regimes’ aims and, in the USA’s case, make greater efforts to re-engage with their work.
The EU and middle powers, such as Australia, are among the states that have shown the most interest in supporting the current architecture. These states have a significant stake in multilateral export control coordination in the light of the multiple dependencies many of them have on both China and the USA. It would thus make sense for them to renew their efforts to coordinate export control policies in order to address proliferation risks, and resist the temptation to use export controls as tools of coercion.
There is of course no guarantee that China––having discovered the power that it can exert through its export controls––will cease its coercive and retaliatory use of export controls even if the USA, European states and others decide not to respond in kind with export controls or other measures and refocus their attention on multilateral cooperation on export controls.
One way forward might be for states participating in the multilateral regimes to try to further include China within these forums; for example, by reviewing China’s pending applications to participate in the Australia Group, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. While this remains highly challenging in the current international context, small steps in that direction might encourage China to step back from national controls that go beyond those multilaterally agreed and considered to be the international standards. In the long term this could also lead China to further align its controls with those agreed within the regimes and implement them in line with WMD non-proliferation and international security objectives.
While all options come with challenges, maintaining the current trajectory risks crippling an essential tool for preventing the proliferation of WMD and the diversion and potential misuse of military and dual-use items.
With support from the Australian Department of Defence, SIPRI is conducting a project examining China’s export controls and their implications for the multilateral export control regimes that underpin non-proliferation efforts as well as for Australia’s National Defence Strategy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)