Developments and Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations, 2025

A total of 58 multilateral peace operations were active in 34 countries or territories around the world in 2025 (see figure 1 and table 1). This was three fewer operations than in 2024. Although the number of peace operations has remained relatively stable for the past decade, it fell below 60 in 2025 for the first time since 2016.

The number of personnel deployed with multilateral peace operations continued to decline in 2025.¹ The total of 78 633 in December 2025 was 17 per cent lower than a year earlier and 49 per cent lower than in December 2016 (see figure 2). It was the lowest December total since at least the year 2000.

The United Nations was still the main organization deploying multilateral peace operations in 2025, accounting for 18 operations and 67 per cent of all deployed personnel—a slightly smaller share than in December 2024, when it accounted for 69 per cent. However, as in 2024, most peace operations were deployed by regional organizations and alliances, which accounted for 34 operations in 2025—three fewer than in 2024. Ad hoc coalitions of states conducted six multilateral peace operations in 2025, the same number as in 2024.

For every year of the past decade except 2025, sub-Saharan Africa has hosted the largest number of multilateral peace operations. However, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa both had 18 active peace operations in 2025. This was due to a decline in the number of operations in sub-Saharan Africa, from 21 in 2024. Another 14 operations were located in the Middle East and North Africa, 5 in the Americas, and 3 in Asia. The Central African Republic (CAR) and Kosovo each hosted four operations, the largest number of active operations in a single country or territory in 2025. All of the top 10 contributors of both military and police personnel to multilateral peace operations were states in the Global South (see figures 3 and 4). The largest military personnel contributors were predominantly from sub-Saharan African or South Asian states. Eight of the top 10 contributors of police personnel were in sub-Saharan Africa.

Two new multilateral peace operations were launched in 2025: the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in Haiti. Four operations closed during the year: the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti (MSS); the Personal Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference (PRCIO); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC); and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI).

Developments in Personnel Deployments

The marked drop in peace operation personnel in 2025 was primarily due to reductions in sub-Saharan Africa (see figure 5). Sub-Saharan Africa hosted 70 per cent (55 229) of all deployed personnel. Another 15 per cent (12 005) were deployed in the Middle East and North Africa; 12 per cent (9755) in Europe; 1.7 per cent (1336) in the Americas; and 0.4 per cent (308) in Asia and Oceania.

In previous years, significant annual declines have been driven by the closure of one or two large peace operations. In 2025, however, the decrease reflected reductions in personnel across several operations, particularly UN peacekeeping operations, while the replacement of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, which closed at the end of 2024) with AUSSOM and the closure of SAMIDRC had a smaller effect. The largest overall declines in peace operation personnel happened late in the year (see below).²

Personnel deployments with multilateral peace operations declined in sub-Saharan Africa (–21 per cent), the Middle East and North Africa (–17 per cent) and Asia (–2 per cent) but increased in the Americas (+61 per cent) and in Europe (+10 per cent). In the Americas, the increase was primarily driven by reinforcement of the MSS in Haiti early in the year. However, the MSS had reached only 737 uniformed personnel by the time of its closure at the end of September—well below the mission’s planned strength of 2500. The MSS was replaced by the GSF, which, despite a significantly higher authorized ceiling of 5550 personnel, retained broadly the same personnel strength as its predecessor. In Europe, the overall increase was largely due to a rise in troop deployments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Developments by Type of Conducting Organization

United Nations

At 18, the number of UN-led multilateral peace operations remained the same in 2025 as in 2024. However, one UN operation, UNAMI, closed on 31 December 2025. This followed a request from the Iraqi government, which argued that the country had made ‘significant progress towards stability’.³

By December 2025, the number of personnel deployed in UN peace operations had fallen by 18 per cent compared with a year earlier to 53 007.

Personnel deployments to UN operations have declined consistently over the past decade, but 2025 saw the largest drop in the period. This was directly linked to the UN’s broader liquidity crisis. Budgetary pressures caused by member states not paying or delaying payment of their assessed contributions to the UN caused peace operations to abruptly reduce expenditure, including through personnel cuts in several major operations.

At the start of the UN peacekeeping budget cycle in July 2025, UN operations faced a shortfall of US$2 billion—more than 35 per cent of the total $5.6 billion budget for the 2024–25 cycle.⁴ This forced the UN to reduce peace operation expenditures by 15 per cent, which translated into cuts in uniformed personnel of around 25 per cent, alongside significant cuts in civilian staff.⁵ Despite these reductions, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) remained the two largest multilateral peace operations at the end of the year (see figure 6).

The pressures persisted into 2026, when UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the organization faced ‘imminent financial collapse’ and could run out of cash within months if assessed contributions were not paid.⁶

In July 2025 the UN General Assembly approved a peacekeeping budget of approximately $5.38 billion for 2025–26, the lowest in the decade in nominal terms (see figure 7). A continued decrease in funding over the decade reflected the closure and downsizing of several UN peace operations, along with financial and political pressure to contain costs.

On 28 August 2025, the UN Security Council voted to close the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after a final renewal of the mission’s mandate until 31 December 2026, at which point the mission should begin an ‘orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal’.⁷ During the mandate renewal negotiations, the United States had pushed for UNIFIL to be terminated and fully withdrawn by 31 August 2026, but other Security Council members argued that any transition should be tied to conditions on the ground, such as the government of Lebanon gaining full control of all Lebanese territory.⁸ The extension for 16 months was a relative compromise.

Taken together, these developments indicate a progressively smaller role for the UN in conflict management. Financial constraints clearly accelerated the personnel reductions but were not the only factor. As the debate over UNIFIL illustrates, geopolitical divisions and increasingly difficult negotiations in the Security Council have made it harder to sustain existing operations or build support for new ones.

Regional Organizations and Alliances

As of December 2025, multilateral peace operations established by regional organizations or alliances deployed 22 079 personnel, a year-on-year decrease of 17 per cent.

Four African regional organizations—the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the SADC—conducted nine multilateral peace operations in 2025, one fewer than in 2024. Together, these organizations deployed
13 414 personnel in 2025, a decrease of 29 per cent compared to the previous year. This drop was primarily due to the closure of SAMIDRC and the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM.

ATMIS closed at the end of 2024 and AUSSOM became operational on 1 January 2025.⁹ ATMIS had replaced the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on 1 April 2022, and AUSSOM was designed to continue to support the Somali authorities by countering the al-Shabab armed group and supporting stabilization efforts. AUSSOM’s mandate differs very little from that of its predecessor and is to a large extent a continuation.¹⁰

Beyond the AU, the role of other African regional organizations in peace operations continued to shrink. This trend was reflected in the closure of SAMIDRC and ECOWAS setting timelines for ending its remaining missions. In addition, the future of IGAD’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) in South Sudan remained uncertain due to persistent financial constraints.¹¹

On 13 March 2025, the SADC officially terminated SAMIDRC, which had been active since December 2023 supporting the Congolese armed forces in trying to suppress armed groups in eastern DRC.¹² This happened amid deteriorating security conditions, including the capture of the city of Goma by the March 23 Movement (M23), during which SAMIDRC suffered direct casualties.¹³

The ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and the Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau (SSMGB) were renewed for a final time in June 2025; ECOMIG was extended for 24 months and the SSMGB for 18 months.¹⁴ The political situation in Guinea-Bissau worsened in late 2025 following a military coup. The ruling junta requested the withdrawal of the SSMGB in December 2025, but it revoked the request in January 2026. National elections are currently planned for December 2026.¹⁵

Like the UN, African regional organizations have faced financial challenges that have affected their ability to sustain operations and implement mandates. This has been intensified by shifts in external support, including a decline in funding dedicated to peace operations under European Union (EU) instruments. Since the EU’s African Peace Facility was superseded by the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, African-led peace operations have increasingly competed for funding with a wider range of EU security and defence priorities outside Africa (see figure 8).

Regional organizations and alliances from the Global North—the EU, NATO and the OSCE—conducted 24 multilateral peace operations in 2025, two fewer than in 2024. The combined number of personnel deployed by these organizations was 8645 in December 2025, an increase of 13 per cent over the previous year—primarily due to KFOR reinforcements. NATO has increased KFOR deployments since the escalation of tensions between Kosovo and Serbia in 2023.

In 2025 the EU conducted 15 missions and operations within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that met SIPRI’s criteria for multilateral peace operations. This was two fewer than in 2024. Together, these EU missions and operations deployed 2724 international personnel in December 2025, which was 1.4 per cent more than in the previous year. This modest rise was driven by personnel increases in missions and operations in the EU’s eastern neighborhood, the Horn of Africa and Palestine.

During the year, tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina escalated after the authorities in the Republika Srpska adopted laws barring Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state police and judiciary from operating in the entity, while intensifying separatist rhetoric.¹⁶ In response to the subsequent political crisis, the EU Force Bosnia and Herzegovina Operation ALTHEA (EUFOR ALTHEA) temporarily increased its personnel numbers with reserve troops. By the end of the year, however, it had returned to roughly its earlier size.¹⁷

The OSCE conducted seven multilateral peace operations in 2025, the same operations as in 2024. In December 2025, 172 personnel were deployed to these operations, two fewer than in the previous year. On 1 September 2025, the OSCE Ministerial Council approved the termination of the PRCIO following a joint request by the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹⁸ The post of Chairperson-in-Office, established in 1995 after the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, had been vacant since April 2024, following the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive that led to the dissolution of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh and the displacement of most of its ethnic Armenian population.¹⁹

OSCE budget negotiations ongoing since 2020 have proved difficult due to geopolitical tensions and the organization’s consensus-based decision making. In 2026 participating states reached an agreement that includes cuts of around 10 per cent (€15 million; US$17 million) to the organization’s budget.²⁰ These reductions, along with prolonged political disagreements, are likely to further constrain the scope and functioning of OSCE field operations.

Ad Hoc Coalitions

In 2025 ad hoc coalitions of states conducted six multilateral peace operations. The number of personnel deployed in operations in this category increased by 18 per cent from the 2024 level, reaching 3547 in December 2025. This increase can be explained almost entirely by developments in Haiti. The MSS accounted for 432 personnel in December 2024, while its successor the GSF accounted for 982 personnel in December 2025. At the end of the year, however, the GSF was still operating well below its authorized strength.

Another notable development in ad hoc multilateral peace operations in 2025 was the authorization by the UN Security Council of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza.²¹ However, no personnel had been deployed as of 31 December 2025 and the mission remained in the preparation phase.

The State of Conflict Management and Peace Operations

Multilateral conflict management and peace operations are under severe pressure. Although the number of operations fell slightly in 2025, personnel numbers are falling much faster. Moreover, peace operations have closed or drawn down in places where conflict management is still needed—such as the DRC, Lebanon and South Sudan—while new operations have not been established in contexts that could possibly have benefited from their deployment—such as Syria, Ukraine or Yemen. This shrinking investment in multilateral peace operations has its roots in increased geopolitical tensions, self-interested or transactional politics, and related financial cuts.

In recent years, the UN Security Council has been unable to reach the necessary agreement to address new agenda items, while regional organizations such as the AU are also increasingly divided. Russia’s involvement in conflicts in Africa has already contributed to the fragmentation of security governance there. The USA under President Donald J. Trump is no longer willing to sustain the multilateral system, while China and the EU are unwilling or unable to take on this task.

In 2025 the USA took significant action to withdraw from, defund or challenge the efficacy of various UN bodies.²² This included seeking the termination of UN peacekeeping operations such as UNIFIL.²³ Moreover, although the Security Council endorsed the establishment of the Board of Peace as a new international transitional body to supervise governance in Gaza, the Board’s founding charter contains far more ambitious aims that are potentially in competition with those of the UN.²⁴

Reduced funding for multilateral peace operations and the resulting substantial personnel reductions in UN peace operations are major consequences of geopolitical tensions and of the USA’s undermining of the multilateral system.²⁵ In March 2025 the UN launched the UN80 Initiative, which is aimed at drastically reducing costs and restructuring the UN.²⁶

African peace-support operations are suffering as well. The EPF has funded African-led missions in the past, but EU funding for AUSSOM did not materialize in 2025, pending the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on financing African-led peace-support operations through UN assessed contributions. Once again, the USA was the main obstacle.²⁷ In addition, while the EPF has previously funded African multilateral peace operations, it is increasingly being redirected towards strengthening national armed forces, including in Africa, and shifting the geopolitical focus of resources away from Africa to Ukraine and others states in Europe and West Asia.²⁸

As a result of these dynamics, the peace operations and conflict management landscape is further fragmenting and deinstitutionalizing. In his 2023 New Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General proposed workarounds for the geopolitical challenges in the Security Council through reliance on ‘networked and multilateral peace operations’ involving partnerships with regional organizations.²⁹ However, these actors also frequently have divided memberships and often lack the capabilities required to replace the UN.³⁰ In practice, the UN’s role in conflict management is declining and regional organizations are unable to fill the gap. In fact, the numbers of peace operations and personnel deployed by regional organizations also declined in 2025.

In this context of multilateral inaction, middle powers—among them Brazil, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have gained increased room for manoeuvre in substituting for, or complementing, the multilateral security frameworks while actively advancing their own national interests. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, small and medium-sized states have deployed military forces in other states based on bilateral agreements. For example, Rwanda has deployed forces in the CAR and Mozambique; the UAE in Somalia; and Uganda in the DRC and South Sudan. Rwanda and the UAE have also actively supported rebel movements with lethal materiel and other means in the DRC and Sudan, respectively.

At the lower end of the continuum of violence, ad hoc diplomacy by regional organizations and small, ‘mini-lateral’ groups of like-minded states is taking place in the absence of multilateral conflict management. For example, Qatar and the USA have sought a conflict-resolution role in the DRC, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia and the USA have done so in the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute.³¹

These deinstitutionalized military and diplomatic engagements share a focus on short-term security outcomes, paying limited attention to the long-term causes of conflict.³² They are part of a broader global dynamic of reduced adherence to previously agreed normative frameworks. In peace operations, the USA in particular tried to roll back commonly agreed language on international humanitarian law, gender mainstreaming and climate change in the UNMISS and MONUSCO mandate-renewal processes in 2025, although other Security Council members successfully resisted most of these proposed changes.³³

The outlook for multilateral conflict management is not good. Less conflict management may lead to more conflict, while reduced adherence to normative frameworks may lead to more severe conflicts.³⁴ Amid increasing geopolitical tensions, accelerated reductions in resources, and growing fragmentation and deinstitutionalization, the coordination of conflict management efforts and renewed attention on integrated approaches will become more important than ever.

Despite perceptions that UN peace operations are ineffective, the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial indicated that many UN member states remain strong supporters of these operations.³⁵ Moreover, demand for peace operations is not expected to diminish in the future, as ceasefire and peace agreements continue to require their deployment on the ground—for example, the ISF for Gaza. The GSF in Haiti might provide the most palatable—if not necessarily the most effective—mission model in the current geopolitical environment for the coming years: mandated by the Security Council, staffed by an ad hoc coalition and funded by donors, with modular assistance from a UN Support Office.³⁶

Endnotes

1. 1 Unless otherwise specified, figures for personnel deployed with multilateral peace operations are as of 31 December 2025 and include only international personnel, not local or national personnel employed by peace operations. Figures and percentage shares may not add up to stated totals or subtotals due to the conventions of rounding.
2. 2 Mishra, V., ‘Funding crisis forces deep cuts to UN peacekeeping missions’, UN News, 16 Oct. 2025.
3. 3 UN Security Council Resolution 2732, 31 May 2024.
4. 4 UN Peacekeeping, ‘Budget gaps threaten global peace efforts’, 16 Oct. 2025.
5. 5 UN Peacekeeping, (note 4).
6. 6 Lederer, E., ‘United Nations faces “imminent financial collapse” without urgent action, UN chief says’, Associated Press, 31 Jan. 2026.
7. 7 UN Security Council Resolution 2790, 28 Aug. 2025.
8. 8 Security Council Report, ‘UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): Vote on final mandate renewal and drawdown’, What’s in Blue, 28 Aug. 2025.
9. 9 UN Security Council Resolution 2767, 27 Dec. 2024.
10. 10 International Crisis Group, ‘Eight priorities for the African Union in 2025’, 6 Feb. 2025.
11. 11 Radio Tamazuj, ‘Peace monitoring body to downsize staff due to lack of funding’, 11 Dec. 2023.
12. 12 Southern African Development Community (SADC), ‘Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government’, 4 Nov. 2023; and Gras, R., ‘DRC: Will SADC regional force be deployed in September?’, Africa Report, 21 July 2023.
13. 13 SADC, ‘Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of States and Government of the Southern African Development Committee’, 13 Mar. 2025.
14. 14 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Sixty-seventh Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, ‘Final Communiqué’, 22 June 2025.
15. 15 Amani Africa ‘Update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau’, 4 Mar. 2026; and Reuters, ‘Guinea Bissau sets December 2026 election date after coup’, 22, Jan. 2026.
16. 16 Sito-sucic, D., ‘Bosnian Serb region bars central state authorities in separatist move’, Reuters,
    28 Feb. 2025.
17. 17 EUFOR ALTHEA, ‘EUFOR Forum’, Mar.–Apr. 2025.
18. 18 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Decision no.1/25: Closure of the OSCE Minsk Process, personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference and the High-level Planning Group’, 15 Sep. 2025.
19. 19 OSCE, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, SEC.GAL/118/21 (OSCE: Vienna, 2021), pp. 29–30; and Light, F., ‘Karabakh Armenians dissolve breakaway government in capitulation to Azerbaijan’, Reuters, 28 Sep. 2023.
20. 20 Reuters, ‘OSCE nations agree on first budget in five years, make cuts demanded by US’, 19 Mar. 2026.
21. 21 UN Security Council Resolution 2803, 17 Nov. 2025.
22. 22 Baldwin, G., ‘Pursuing peace on a shoestring: Conflict management in an increasingly complex world’, SIPRI Research Policy Paper, Oct. 2025.
23. 23 Security Council Report (note 8).
24. 24 UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (note 21); and Charter of the Board of Peace, 16 Jan. 2026.
25. 25 Mishra (note 2).
26. 26 United Nations, ‘UN80 Initiative: Key documents’.
27. 27 Haile, T. Z. and Yohannes, D., ‘Two years on, UNSCR 2719 on peace operations remains at a crossroads’, ISS Today, 15 Dec. 2025.
28. 28 Council of the European Union, ‘Timeline: European Peace Facility’, Updated 29 Jan. 2026.
29. 29 United Nations, Our Common Agenda: A New Agenda for Peace, Policy brief no. 9, July 2023.
30. 30 Baldwin (note 22).
31. 31 Baldwin (note 22).
32. 32 Baldwin (note 22).
33. 33 Security Council Report, ‘UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS): Vote on mandate renewal resolution’, What’s in Blue, 8 May 2025.
34. 34 Baldwin (note 22).
35. 35 United Nations, Department of Peace Operations, ‘UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin brings new commitments to strengthen peacekeeping operations’, 14 May 2025.
36. 36 Mohor, D., ‘Haiti in-depth: The new Gang Suppression Force and what it means for Haitians’, New Humanitarian, 3 Dec 2025.