Developments and Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations, 2024

A total of 61 multilateral peace operations were active in 36 countries or territories around the world in 2024. This was two operations fewer than in 2023 (see figure 1 and table 1). Two of the 61 operations started during 2024, while six closed.

The United Nations conducted 18 operations, more than any other single organization. It was followed closely by the European Union (EU), which conducted 17, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with 7 and the African Union (AU) with 5. Another 8 operations were conducted by other regional organizations and alliances. In total, 37 peace operations were deployed by regional organizations. The remaining 6 operations were conducted by ad hoc coalitions of states.

UN-led operations accounted for 69 per cent of the 94 451 international military, civilian and police personnel deployed with multilateral peace operations as of December 2024. This was 6 per cent less than a year earlier but 42 per cent less than in 2015 (see figure 2). While deployments decreased nearly every year, much of the drop was linked to the closure of large missions such as the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2020 and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023.

Of the 61 operations active in 2024, 21 were in sub-Saharan Africa, 19 in Europe, 14 in the Middle East and North Africa, 4 in the Americas and 3 in Asia and Oceania. Sub-Saharan Africa also hosted nearly three quarters (74 per cent) of all deployed personnel, with 69 913, which is 6459 (8 per cent) fewer than at the end of 2023. Another 15 per cent (14 498) were deployed in the Middle East and North Africa; 9 per cent (8898) in Europe; 1 per cent (828) in the Americas; and 0.3 per cent (314) in Asia and Oceania. Personnel deployments in the Americas more than doubled (+120 per cent) compared to 2023 but remained relatively stable or fell in other regions (see figure 3).

All of the top 10 contributors of both military and police personnel to multilateral peace operations in 2024 were states in the Global South (see figures 4 and 5). Most of the top 10 contributors of military personnel were states in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the top three were South Asian states—Nepal, Bangladesh and India—who mainly contributed to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which were the two largest multilateral peace operations in 2024 (see figure 6). With the exception of Pakistan and Rwanda, the other states in the top 10 chiefly contributed troops to regional peace operations such as the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; SAMIDRC). Among the top 10 contributors of police personnel, only two were from outside sub-Saharan Africa.

New Operations in Haiti and Somalia

Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti

The Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti (MSS), authorized by the UN Security Council in October 2023 as an ad hoc coalition, finally began deploying in June 2024 with the arrival of Kenyan police personnel.¹ The Haitian government had first requested international support to address the country’s deteriorating security situation in 2022.

The mission’s launch faced several challenges including contentious negotiations in the UN Security Council, difficulties in finding a lead nation for the operation, legal challenges in Kenya that temporarily blocked the government’s decision to deploy police abroad, and funding shortfalls.²

Mandated to support the Haitian police in combating organized criminal groups and protecting critical infrastructure, the MSS achieved some initial progress in 2024, such as regaining control over parts of Port-au-Prince and its airport.³ However, the overall security situation remains critical: gang violence killed over 5000 people in 2024, essential services have collapsed, and more than 1 million people had been displaced by early 2025.⁴

The MSS’s limited impact to date is largely due to its insufficient resources.⁵ The mission was still more than 2000 short of its mandated 2500 personnel at the end of 2024, lacked sufficient funding and had not secured its full budget, which should come entirely from voluntary contributions by UN member states. As the United States has been the MSS’s primary funder, the USA reducing its international funding commitments makes the mission’s budget even more precarious.

During mandate renewal negotiations in September 2024, some member states, including the USA, pushed for turning the MSS into a UN peacekeeping operation, an idea supported by the Haitian government. Among other reasons, this was to ensure stable funding.⁶ China and Russia opposed the proposal, citing the record of past peace operations in Haiti and arguing that the country’s political and security conditions remained unsuitable for such a transition.⁷ As a result, the mission’s mandate was renewed without a transition plan and questions around future funding remain unresolved.⁸ In February 2025, the UN secretary-general recommended establishing a UN-funded support office to provide logistical and operational assistance to the MSS.⁹

United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia

On 31 October 2024, the UN Security Council established the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), replacing the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) as of 1 November 2024.¹⁰ This followed a request from the Somali government to terminate UNSOM by the end of its mandate period in October 2024, which was later amended to allow a two-year transition period.¹¹

UNTMIS is tasked with gradually transferring responsibilities to the UN Country Team in Somalia over two phases. Until 31 October 2025, it will retain UNSOM’s core functions while focusing on new priorities, including support for state-building, human rights, rule of law, coordination with donors and with the UN system, and cooperation with ATMIS and its successor from January 2025, the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).¹² The second phase runs until 31 October 2026, by which time all responsibilities are expected to be transferred to the UN Country Team.

Operations Terminated in Azerbaijan, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Somalia

Russian–Turkish Joint Monitoring Centre

The Russian–Turkish Joint Monitoring Centre (RTJMC) in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam district closed on 26 April 2024. Established through a memorandum of understanding between Russia and Turkey, since 30 January 2021 it has monitored the ceasefire agreement between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war (in 2020). The centre used uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) as the primary tool for ceasefire monitoring—the first time a peace operation has done so.¹³ However, limited public information is available on the RTJMC’s activities.

The closure of the RTJMC followed Azerbaijan’s consolidation of control over Nagorno-Karabakh. After a military operation dismantled the ethnic Armenian de facto authorities and disarmed local forces, nearly the entire ethnic Armenian population fled the enclave. By 1 January 2024, all institutions of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh had been dismantled.

European Union Training Mission in Mali

The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) closed on 17 May 2024. Launched in 2013 in response to the crisis in northern Mali, where armed groups had seized swathes of the country, it was initially mandated to provide advice, education and training to the Malian armed forces.¹⁴ Over time, its mandate expanded to support members of the G5 Sahel group—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—and assist Mali’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process alongside MINUSMA.¹⁵

Although EUTM Mali contributed to strengthening the response capacity of the Malian armed forces, progress was hindered by political instability, including two military coups in 2020 and 2021.¹⁶ EUTM Mali’s already difficult relations with the military junta deteriorated further after the Wagner Group’s involvement in Mali led the mission to suspend its training activities in April 2022.¹⁷ The junta’s decision to withdraw from the G5 Sahel the following month contributed to the mission’s continued suspension.¹⁸ In May 2024, the EU decided not to renew EUTM Mali’s mandate, citing the ‘evolving political and security situation’.¹⁹

Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique

The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) ended on 15 July 2024. Established on 23 June 2021 in response to escalating violent extremism in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, the operation was mandated to support the government in countering terrorism and violent extremism, restoring peace and security, and facilitating humanitarian relief efforts. In 2022, the SADC approved SAMIM’s transition into a multidimensional peace operation—although it remains unclear to what extent this was implemented.²⁰

Over three years, SAMIM supported the Mozambican armed forces in regaining territory from insurgents and stabilizing parts of Cabo Delgado.²¹ By 2023, attacks associated with violent extremism had decreased considerably.²² However, insurgent groups regained ground shortly before SAMIM’s withdrawal and violent attacks once again surged, triggering renewed population displacement in December 2023.²³ By March 2024, over 110 000 people had been displaced.²⁴

Despite concerns about the deteriorating security situation, SAMIM’s mandate was not renewed. The SADC’s capacities were strained by sustaining two major deployments simultaneously after the launch of SAMIDRC in 2023.²⁵ SAMIM also faced persistent operational challenges, including strained security cooperation with the Mozambican government, gaps in critical capabilities and financial constraints.²⁶ Personnel-contributing countries were responsible for covering their own troop costs but often struggled to do so, forcing the SADC to draw from its contingency fund.²⁷ These factors combined to undermine the mission’s effectiveness and are likely to have contributed to a high casualty level among mission personnel. Although SAMIM was authorized to deploy 2916 military personnel, it never reached full strength.

EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger

The EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) officially closed on 30 September 2024 after Niger’s military junta revoked the legal agreement for its deployment.²⁸ The junta announced the decision in December 2023, giving EUCAP Sahel Niger and the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (not a peace operation), six months to withdraw. The withdrawal process was marked by tensions and disruptions. In early 2024, the junta temporarily denied re-entry to several EUCAP Sahel Niger personnel, including the head of mission, and seized the mission’s equipment during unannounced searches of its headquarters and field office.²⁹

Launched in 2012 to strengthen Niger’s internal security sector, EUCAP Sahel Niger’s mandate was later expanded to include countering terrorism, organized crime and irregular migration.³⁰ However, the mission faced several challenges including a lack of strategic direction, an overstretched mandate and limited public support in Niger.³¹

Until the 2023 coup, Niger was the EU’s main security partner in the Sahel. After it, their relations deteriorated and Niger eventually turned to Russia for security cooperation.³² The closures of EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTM Mali reflect a broader breakdown in EU engagement with military-led governments in the region.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNSOM was established in 2013 to support Somalia’s peace and reconciliation process. Its mandate included providing policy advice on peacebuilding and state-building to both the Somali government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); assisting in coordinating international donor support; and strengthening institutions in human rights and protection issues.³³ UNSOM was also tasked with monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.³⁴

In 2017, its mandate was expanded to include support for Somalia’s National Security Architecture and the Comprehensive Approach to Security framework.³⁵ On 1 November 2024, UNSOM was replaced by UNTMIS.

African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

ATMIS ended on 31 December 2024. It had replaced AMISOM from 1 April 2022, with a mandate to support Somalia’s fight against al-Shabab and other terrorist groups, providing security, building the capacity of national security forces and institutions, and supporting peace and reconciliation efforts.³⁶ ATMIS largely retained the structure, personnel levels and financial challenges of its predecessor, relying on UN logistical support, EU funding for personnel, and the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility to cover troop reimbursement shortfalls.³⁷

In 2024, ATMIS completed its three-phase drawdown, withdrawing 5000 troops and transferring 14 military bases to the Somali government.³⁸ However, all phases experienced delays, largely due to security conditions on the ground. In June 2024, the Somali government requested that ATMIS’s drawdown be paused amid concerns that al-Shabab could exploit a security vacuum—echoing warnings from neighbouring states and a joint AU–Somali technical assessment mandated by the UN Security Council.³⁹

Although ATMIS and Somali forces together made territorial gains and several bases were handed over, Somali forces are still struggling to consolidate control of recaptured territories without external support, and al-Shabab remains a significant threat.⁴⁰ In August 2024, an al-Shabab attack in Mogadishu killed 37 people, underscoring the ongoing insecurity.⁴¹ In March 2024 the Somali government requested the establishment of a follow-on peace support operation.⁴² The AU Peace and Security Council endorsed the request and on 27 December the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of AUSSOM, starting on 1 January 2025.⁴³

Trends in Multilateral Peace Operations

Geopolitical Rivalries

In recent years, growing tensions between Western powers and Russia and China—intensified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—have increasingly influenced discussions and decision making around peace operations. In 2024, the UN Security Council renewed all eight peacekeeping operations requiring annual renewal, but in four cases the renewal did not receive unanimous support: MINUSCA; the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and UNMISS. Achieving consensus in the Security Council has become harder and discussions have grown more contentious, especially on issues such as human rights, climate security and mission transitions. In September 2024 UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, observed that ‘As geopolitical tensions have mounted . . . peacekeeping operations are increasingly unable to rely on Member States to act in a strong, unified manner.’⁴⁴

Geopolitical rivalries have made decision making on the deployment, mandates and financing of peace operations increasingly difficult. This was evident in the case of Haiti, where discussions over the MSS began in 2022 but the mission was only authorized nearly a year later. Concerns raised by China and Russia about external intervention in the country contributed to the extended negotiations, and by the time the mission began deploying it was already close to the time for its mandate to be renewed.⁴⁵

Geopolitical rivalries are closely linked to growing funding challenges facing peace operations. Traditional donors such as the EU and the USA are shifting their focus away from Africa, where most peace operations are deployed, towards national security and territorial defence in their own regions. This shift is reflected in shrinking peace operation budgets.

Peace operations have long been hampered by financial constraints, which in 2024 became even more visible: the MSS faced funding shortfalls and African-led missions had limited options for funding, which contributed to the withdrawal of SAMIM and the uncertainty over AUSSOM’s future financing. Moreover, a liquidity crisis in the UN peacekeeping budget during 2024 impacted the ability of peace operations to carry out their mandates. This was caused mainly by delayed or incomplete payments from major contributors, particularly China and the USA. ⁴⁶

Regionalization of Peace Operations

Over the past decade, there has been a shift away from new operations being conducted by the UN towards operations being conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions. Since the establishment of MINUSCA in 2014, the number of active UN peacekeeping operations has declined and the UN has launched only special political missions, which are smaller in both size and scope. In parallel, the number of multilateral peace operations deployed by regional organizations has grown. This trend is reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (December 2023), which emphasizes UN–AU strategic partnership and allows AU-led operations to draw up to 75 per cent of their budgets from UN assessed contributions.⁴⁷ However, the implementation of this funding mechanism, particularly in the case of AUSSOM, remains uncertain.

Despite their increasing role in conflict management, regionally led peace operations have struggled with operational and financial challenges, including shortages of funding, equipment and personnel. Recent deployments by the East African Community (EAC) and SADC have faced such constraints, contributing to the missions’ termination and increased risks for personnel (see box 1 on casualty levels among peace operation personnel in 2024).⁴⁸ Gaps in operational capacity have also negatively affected these missions’ performance; for instance, neither the EAC Regional Force in the DRC (EACRF), which closed in 2023, nor SAMIDRC was able to prevent territorial advances by the March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars, M23).

Relations with Host Governments

Over the past few years, relations between peace operations and several host governments have deteriorated, leading to the closure of operations in Mali, Sudan and Niger. Similar tensions, though with less immediate consequences, emerged in the DRC and Somalia, where MONUSCO and ATMIS were initially requested by the host governments to withdraw, with tight timelines. Host governments’ growing dissatisfaction with peace operations’ performance, combined with the emergence of alternative peace operations and increased private military security company (PMSC) and bilateral deployments, emboldened them to make greater demands or withdraw consent for continued deployments.

In 2024, however, this trend started to give way to a more complex dynamic. While government–mission relations have not significantly improved, host governments increasingly started to recognize the challenges of managing conflicts without the support of ongoing peace operations, especially in the face of persistent threats from armed groups. Some were also reconsidering the effectiveness of the alternatives they initially pursued.

This shift was evident in the DRC and Somalia. MONUSCO and ATMIS both began drawing down from areas still experiencing instability. In June 2024, MONUSCO withdrew completely from South Kivu, after which incursions into the province and violence by armed groups increased.⁴⁹ Similarly, al-Shabab proved resilient in regions of Somalia where ATMIS transferred security responsibilities to the Somali government.⁵⁰ Both countries’ governments have since requested slowdowns in the transition processes, arguing that conditions for withdrawal have not yet been met.⁵¹

Experience from earlier cases highlights the risks of premature withdrawals. UNAMID’s withdrawal from Sudan in 2020 created a security vacuum in which the situation on the ground deteriorated.⁵² Similarly, in Mali and Mozambique, the withdrawals of MINUSMA and SAMIM have coincided with rising threats from insurgent groups.⁵³ These cases offer important lessons for the ongoing transitions in the DRC and Somalia.

Prospects for Peace Operations

The landscape of conflict management is changing quickly, making it difficult to discern what may happen in the future. In particular, the foreign policy agenda pursued by the second administration of President Donald J. Trump in the USA is likely to have significant consequences for peace operations. Cuts made to development cooperation funding by several donors and recent proposals to terminate US peace operation funding could not only undermine operations’ capacity to fulfil their mandates but also exacerbate the crises they aim to address.⁵⁴ While the full, longer-term implications of such changes remain unclear, in the short term they are likely to lead to greater inaction, deinstitutionalization and militarization in multilateral peace operations.

Inaction

Decision-making bodies authorizing peace operations are likely to continue to face deadlocks, mainly due to geopolitical rivalries and financial constraints. Geopolitical polarization has already challenged consensus in both the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. Moreover, the USA’s less predictable positioning in UN bodies in recent months—for example siding with China and Russia rather than France and the United Kingdom on some issues—could further complicate negotiations, making it harder to establish or adapt peace operations in response to emerging or deepening crises.

Financial constraints are also likely to hamper the establishment of new large-scale peace operations and significant changes to the mandates of existing missions. Cuts to US foreign aid budgets and shifts in European funding towards defence priorities are likely to reinforce this. Financial challenges are also likely to impact the future and credibility of AU–UN partnerships under Resolution 2719, as exemplified by funding for AUSSOM, where US opposition to automatic implementation of the hybrid funding mechanism appears set to continue.⁵⁵

Deinstitutionalization

As it becomes harder to agree on the deployment of new peace operations within established multilateral frameworks, governments are likely to turn increasingly to more flexible alternatives. Ad hoc coalitions, bilateral deployments, reliance on non-state armed actors such as PMSCs and militia, and multilateral initiatives outside traditional peace operation frameworks are already becoming more common tools for conflict management.

Bilateral agreements for military deployments have proliferated in several conflict-affected areas. For example, following SAMIM’s closure, forces from Rwanda—the Mozambican government’s preferred partner in fighting the insurgency—expanded their presence in Cabo Delgado.⁵⁶ Troops from Tanzania, a former SAMIM contributor, also remained in Mozambique under a bilateral agreement, primarily to secure its border against insurgent crossings.⁵⁷ Additionally, the South African contingent that had been part of SAMIM continued operations in the country to combat insurgents.⁵⁸

In the DRC, the resurgence of the M23 armed group was followed by the signing of bilateral agreements by the Congolese government with Burundi and Uganda for the deployment of armed forces to counter armed groups and cross-border activities. In both the DRC and Mozambique, these deployments reflect neighbouring states’ efforts to prevent conflicts from spilling over and to confront hostile armed groups operating beyond their borders.

Other alternatives to peace operations have also gained ground. In March 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced plans to establish a joint force to fight extremist insurgent groups operating on their territories, although the force remains non-operational.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, some host states continue to turn to PMSCs for conflict management, although their prominence has declined due to poor performance records in contexts such as the DRC and Mali.⁶⁰

The proliferation of conflict management actors has often created coordination challenges. Many operate in parallel, often without structured engagement or joint planning, and some pursue diverging or even competing priorities. With geopolitical tensions rising there is the potential for friction between different actors engaged in conflict management, possibly escalating into confrontation.

Militarization and Securitization

As new peace operations are likely to continue being launched primarily by regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions for at least the immediate future, a growing number of operations are likely to adopt more militarized and securitized approaches—a process that has already started. This development goes hand in hand with a weakening of the normative agenda that has traditionally underpinned UN-led peace operations, including commitment to human rights, gender equality, the rule of law and good governance.

Peace operations have increasingly come under pressure from host governments to respond to threats such as terrorism and insurgency, pushing many towards more robust, securitized mandates. Moreover, operations deployed by regional organizations, particularly when intervening in neighbouring states, have strong incentives to prioritize quick containment of armed groups and to prevent conflict spillover, encouraging a militarized approach. This was evident in recent missions deployed by the EAC and the SADC.

Although most regional organizations maintain normative frameworks, in practice regional security concerns often take precedence. Political sensitivities within regional organizations also tend to limit how far peace operations are willing—or able—to press host governments on normative issues. This approach can seem convenient: contributing countries prioritize immediate security concerns in the region, while host governments value military assistance without additional political conditions. However, recent experiences show that heavily militarized approaches have struggled to deliver lasting stability. While the shift towards militarization and securitization has been in part a response to frustration with the shortcomings of multidimensional peace operations, militarized approaches have not consistently demonstrated better outcomes.

If these patterns persist in the long run, they may eventually prompt a broader reassessment of the role and objectives of peace operations—which could renew faith in the value of more comprehensive, multidimensional approaches in addressing complex crises.

Endnotes

1. 1 UN Security Council Resolution 2699, 2 Oct. 2023.
2. 2 Security Council Report, ‘Haiti: Briefing and consultations’, What’s in Blue, 25 Apr. 2023.
3. 3 Stimson Center, ‘Emerging practices in new mission models: The Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti’, Project note, 5 Dec. 2024.
4. 4 UN news, ‘More than 5600 killed in Haiti gang violence in 2024’, 7 Jan. 2025; and UN news, ‘Haiti: Spiralling gang violence has left more than one million displaced’, 14 Jan. 2025.
5. 5 United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2025/122, 27 Feb. 2025.
6. 6 United Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 22 October 2024 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2024/765, 25 Oct. 2024.
7. 7 Security Council Report, ‘Haiti: Vote to renew the authorisation of the Multinational Security Support Mission’, What’s in Blue, 29 Sep. 2024.
8. 8 Security Council Report (note 7).
9. 9 United Nations (note 5).
10. 10 UN Security Council Resolution 2753, 30 Oct. 2024.
11. 11 Ross, A. and Paravicini, G, ‘In surprise move, Somalia asks UN to end political mission’, Reuters, 10 May 2024; and Security Council Report, ‘Somalia: Vote on a draft resolution*’, What’s in Blue, 29 Oct. 2024.
12. 12 UN Security Council Resolution 2753 (note 10).
13. 13 ‘Russia and Turkey open monitoring centre for Nagorno-Karabakh’, Reuters, 30 Jan. 2021.
14. 14 Council Decision (CFSP) 2013/34 of 17 Jan. 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), Official Journal of the European Union, L14/19, 18 Jan. 2013.
15. 15 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446 of 23 Mar. 2016 amending and extending Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), Official Journal of the European Union, L78/74, 24 Mar. 2016; Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/434 of 23 Mar. 2020 amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), Official Journal of the European Union, L89/1, 24 Mar. 2020; and Pichon, E. and Fardel, T., ‘The G5 Sahel and the European Union: The challenges of security cooperation with a regional grouping’, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) Briefing, Sep. 2020.
16. 16 Baudais, V. and Maïga, S., ‘The European Union Training Mission in Mali: An assessment’, SIPRI Background Paper, Apr. 2022.
17. 17 Euractiv, ‘EU ends part of Mali training mission, fearing Russian interference, Borrell says’, 11 Apr. 2022.
18. 18 Euractiv, ‘EU leaves military training in Mali suspended, stops short of ending mission’, 18 May 2022.
19. 19 Euractiv, ‘EU not renewing Mali military training mission’, 8 May 2024.
20. 20 Southern African Development Community, ‘Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Organ Troika of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) plus SAMIM personnel contributing countries and the Republic of Mozambique’, 12 Apr. 2022.
21. 21 Elias, M. and Bax, P., ‘What future for military intervention in Mozambique?’, International Crisis Group, 5 Aug. 2022.
22. 22 Elias and Bax (note 21).
23. 23 Cabo Ligado, ‘Update: 8-21 July 2024’, 24 July 2024; and International Organization for Migration News, ‘Over 110,000 displaced in Mozambique amidst surging violence as needs soar’, 8 Mar. 2024.
24. 24 International Organization for Migration News (note 23).
25. 25 Elias and Bax (note 21); and Hailu, T., ‘How does the withdrawal of SAMIM affect AU’s engagement in the conflict in northern Mozambique?’, Amani Africa, 15 July 2024.
26. 26 Mandrup, T., ‘Lessons from the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)’, ACCORD, 24 Apr. 2024.
27. 27 Cabo Ligado, ‘Cabo Ligado Monthly: July 2021’, 16 Aug. 2021.
28. 28 European External Action Service, ‘Niger: Déclaration du Haut représentant Josep Borrell sur les derniers développements concernant EUCAP Sahel et EUMPM’ , 5 Dec. 2023.
29. 29 Wilén, N., ‘Procurement by proxy: How Sahelian juntas acquire equipment from ousted security partners’, Egmont Policy Brief, no. 338, Mar. 2024. .
30. 30 Council Decision (CFSP) 2012/392 of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), Official Journal of the European Union, L 187/48, 17 July 2012.
31. 31 van der Lijn, J., Baldwin, G., Malejacq, R., Sandor, A., Poupart, P., Oumarou, M. B. and Mahamane, S. O., ‘Assessing the effectiveness of European Union Civilian CSDP Missions involved in security sector reform: The cases of Afghanistan, Mali and Niger’, SIPRI Policy Report, May 2024.
32. 32 Ewokor, C. and Armstrong, K., ‘Russian troops arrive in Niger as military agreement begins’, BBC, 12 Apr. 2024.
33. 33 UN Security Council Resolution 2102, 2 May 2013.
34. 34 UN Security Council Resolution 2102 (note 33).
35. 35 UN Security Council Resolution 2358, 14 June 2017.
36. 36 UN Security Council Resolution 2628, 31 Mar. 2022.
37. 37 Amani Africa, ‘Briefing on the situation in Somalia and ATMIS’, 27 Oct. 2024.
38. 38 ATMIS news, ‘AU Transition Mission in Somalia concludes phase one of troop drawdown—hands over final two forward operating bases’, 30 June 2023; ATMIS news, ‘ATMIS completes phase two drawdown—seven military bases transferred to the government of Somalia; two others closed’, 2 Feb. 2024; ATMIS news, ‘Burgavo Base handover marks the end of ATMIS phase three drawdown’, 14 Nov 2024.
39. 39 Nichols, M., ‘Somalia asks UN to delay peacekeeper drawdown after “significant setbacks” ’, Reuters, 22 Sep. 2023; and Barigaba, J., ‘Somalia defers ATMIS drawdown plan yet again’, The East African, 20 June 2024.
40. 40 Institute for Security Studies, ‘Will Resolution 2719 be a game-changer for ATMIS?’, PSC Report, 6 June 2024; and International Crisis Group, ‘Eight priorities for the African Union in 2025’, Crisis Group Africa Briefing no. 205, 6 Feb. 2025.
41. 41 France 24, ‘More than 30 killed in Somalia beach attack claimed by al-Shabaab’, 3 Aug. 2024.
42. 42 African Union, ‘Communiqué of the 1205th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council held on 26 March 2024 and 3 April 2024 on the Briefing by the Federal Republic of Somalia on its Proposal for a Post-ATMIS Security Arrangement in Somalia, Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2710 (2023)’, 7 Apr. 2024.
43. 43 UN Security Council Resolution 2767, 27 Dec. 2024.
44. 44 Mishra, V., ‘UN peacekeepers saving lives but need stronger political support and resources, top official urges’, UN News, 9 Sep. 2024.
45. 45 United Nations, Security Council, ‘The question concerning Haiti’, 25 Jan. 2024.
46. 46 UN News, ‘Lamenting UN’s dire liquidity crisis, Fifth Committee urges concerned states to pay arrears in making up $1.5 billion regular budget shortfall’, 23 Oct. 2024. In 2024, the approved budget was US$5.59 billion—nearly $100 million less than proposed by the UN Secretary-General and more than $700 million less than the previous year’s budget. UN News, ‘Fifth Committee approves $5.59 billion budget for 14 peacekeeping operations, service centres, headquarters support staff, concluding resumed session’, 21 June 2024.
47. 47 UN Security Council Resolution 2719, 21 Dec. 2023.
48. 48 Dzinesa, G. and Malebang, G., ‘AU and UN support: Propping SAMIDRC towards a political end goal?’, ACCORD, 29 Aug. 2024; and The Economist, ‘Why South Africa’s army is floundering in Congo’, 8 Aug. 2024.
49. 49 United Nations, Security Council, ‘United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/689, 20 Sep. 2024; and Security Council Report, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, September 2024 Monthly Forecast, 30 Aug. 2024.
50. 50 Hiiraan Online, ‘Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive in Somalia exposes critical security gaps’, 21 Mar. 2025.
51. 51 Africa Defense Forum, ‘Al-Shabaab attacks increase in Somalia amid ATMIS troop drawdown’, 6 Aug. 2024; Kasongo, A. A., ‘Congo says UN exit unlikely while Rwandan troops present’, 13 July 2024; and Sheikh, A., Ross, A. and Paravicini, G., ‘Somalia asks peacekeepers to slow withdrawal, fears Islamist resurgence’, Reuters, 20 June 2024.
52. 52 Kleinfeld, P. and Amin, M., ‘UN peacekeeping pullout leaves security vacuum in Darfur’, New Humanitarian, 25 May 2021.
53. 53 Africa Defense Forum, ‘“We cannot describe the horror”: Violence in Mali surges as MINUSMA withdraws’, 17 Oct. 2023; and Gould, T., ‘What does the end of SAMIM mean for Cabo Delgado?’, Zitamar News, 29 Jan. 2024.
54. 54 Landay, J. and Pamuk, H., ‘Trump administration proposes scrapping UN peacekeeping funding’, Reuters, 15 Apr. 2025.
55. 55 International Crisis Group (note 40).
56. 56 Nhamirre, B., ‘Are Rwandan troops becoming Cabo Delgado’s main security provider?’, Institute for Security Studies, 22 Oct. 2024; and Africa Defense Forum, ‘As SADC Mission in Mozambique winds down, terrorism resurges’, 28 May 2024.
57. 57 Nhamirre (note 56); and 360 Mozambique, ‘Cabo Delgado: Tanzania pledges continued support in fight against terrorism’, 16 Feb. 2025.
58. 58 The Presidency, Republic of South Africa, ‘Extension of SANDF employment for various international obligations’, 24 Apr. 2024.
59. 59 Rukanga, B., ‘Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to form joint force to fight jihadists’, BBC, 7 Mar. 2024.
60. 60 Triebert, C., Peltier, E., Mellen, R. and Varghese, S., ‘How Wagner’s ruthless image crumbled in Mali’, New York Times, 1 Nov. 2024; and Wafula, I., ‘DR Congo’s failed gamble on Romanian mercenaries’, BBC, 31 Jan. 2025.