9. Proliferation and use of missiles and armed uncrewed aerial vehicles

The demand for and proliferation of both conventional and dual-capable missile systems, as well as a wide variety of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), are increasing. The systems are being produced and exported at much higher rates than previously, driven by ongoing conflicts and by states seeking to replenish or expand their arsenals. Advances in guidance, propulsion and payload integration are progressively making one-way attack UAVs more like short-range missiles, adding another layer of complication to efforts to regulate such systems.

Use in armed conflicts

Missiles and armed UAVs were used in armed conflicts during 2025 in a wide variety of strike roles. These included long-range precision-strike missions against adversaries’ infrastructure and strategic targets deep inside their territory; saturation salvo attacks seeking to overwhelm air and missile defences; UAV swarm and first-person-view attacks as part of battlefield operations; and intricately planned operations using attack UAVs deployed from within an adversary’s territory to strike strategic targets or assassinate high-ranking military personnel.

The fast pace of development of armed UAVs across the entire spectrum of such systems as well as their affordability and versatility represent a game-changing trend that is altering the nature of warfare, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. The rapid proliferation of UAVs and the surge in their use in armed conflict have spurred a parallel arms race in countermeasures.

Regulatory mechanisms

Arms and export control frameworks in this area are already lagging behind, with existing instruments such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies covering only parts of the emerging threat spectrum. There is no dedicated, binding instrument governing armed UAVs, and recent multilateral forums have struggled to achieve consensus, especially in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war.

States are shifting towards more versatile, autonomous, AI-integrated platforms that can perform multiple roles (e.g. strike, ISR or swarm operations), while also investing in layered ‘drone wall’ concepts and home-land missile-defence projects (e.g. the US Golden Dome) to address evolving threats. Many types of missile and armed UAV operations taking place in conflict zones violate principles of distinction and proportionality under existing laws of armed conflict, and the push towards fully autonomous lethal UAV systems raises questions about accountability and compliance with international humanitarian law.