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8. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation



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In 1999 the controversy over ballistic missile
defence and the future of the ABM Treaty moved to the fore of
the nuclear arms control agenda. In the USA there was an emergent
consensus in favour of developing a limited national missile
defence (NMD) system designed to protect US territory against
attack by a small number of ballistic missiles launched by ‘rogue
states’. Proposals from the US Administration for amending
the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system
were rejected by Russia, which warned that the entire Russian–US
nuclear arms control framework was in danger of collapse. China
also expressed concern about the implications of US missile defence
plans for its nuclear deterrent.

The other major development was the US Senate’s vote in
October 1999 to reject ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The decision marked a setback for efforts
to bring that treaty into force. It did not in itself undermine
the no-testing norm codified in the treaty, since President Clinton
reaffirmed the USA’s intention to continue to observe its
nuclear weapon testing moratorium. However, the Senate vote heightened
international concern about the health of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, which continued to face a number of serious challenges
from both inside and outside the regime.


Appendix 8A. Tables of nuclear forces


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Appendix 8A contains tables of the nuclear forces
of the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and


Appendix 8B. Nuclear verification: the IAEA strengthened safeguards system


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The IAEA strengthened safeguards system,
reviews the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) strengthened
safeguards system, aimed at providing increased assurance of
the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material, with
the ultimate aim of reinforcing the global non-proliferation
regime. The international safeguards community and the IAEA reacted
swiftly to a number of challenges that confronted the global
nuclear verification regime in the 1990s: a growing list of responsibilities
combined with limited resources, the ambitions of some states
to acquire nuclear weapons, exemplified by the case of Iraq,
and a longer agenda resulting from the nuclear disarmament process.
The adoption, in 1997, by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Model
Additional Protocol for strengthening safeguards measures represented
a step of fundamental importance towards limiting the spread
of nuclear weapons and enhancing international security. However,
progress with acceptance of the new provisions by the IAEA member
states has been disappointingly slow. Universal acceptance and
full implementation of the new system are imperative for guaranteeing
the political assurances necessary for advancing the non-proliferation
and disarmament agenda.

Shannon N. Kile