This paper asks how Feminist Foreign Policies (FFP) fit with non-proliferation and disarmament goals. In particular, it highlights the multifarious and overlapping approaches to FFP and locates nuclear weapons as a feminist issue that requires a feminist response. How transformative the adoption of an FFP might be for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is dependent on the specific vision of feminism adopted by a state.
Emerging and disruptive technologies and their security and defence uses have become central to European Union (EU) initiatives. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are no exception. As the focus of great power rivalry and increasing weaponization, AI technologies present both risks and opportunities in terms of transforming civil–military relations, due to their dual-use characteristics, and their increasing deployment in the cyber-physical domain.
Satellite navigation, communications and imagery are critical to military doctrine. They provide the capability and functionalities required to operate increasingly complex military assets with unprecedented precision. On account of their growing importance, there is a need for EU member states to develop their own satellite infrastructure, and to ensure control over and superiority in the space landscape in which satellites operate in order to protect their security.
This paper provides a range of potential policy recommendations and actionable steps that the EU and its member states could take at legal, institutional and operational levels to minimize the nuclear security threats posed by armed conflict in the future.
The European Union (EU) has a long history of commitment to improving biological security and supporting multilateral approaches to arms controls and non-proliferation. It has supported various biosecurity programmes in recent years and continues to increase its financial support towards these, with a focus on the universalization of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the centrepiece of global efforts to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and further the goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament.
The supposed benefits of hypersonic missile technology and the reconsideration of the European security landscape following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine may act as a catalyst for multiple European states to acquire or develop high-speed systems. Although these systems are currently challenging to develop, trends in other missile technology point towards a gradual diffusion of explicit and tacit knowledge that ultimately lowers production costs, resulting in greater affordability and accessibility.
This paper explores China’s and Russia’s most recent official documents and statements on their respective nuclear and space postures, combined with some corresponding technological advances. It then makes recommendations to European Union member states on topics that could be addressed in future strategic stability talks that include either one or both countries.
In 2011, the European Union (EU) launched a review of its regulation establishing controls on exports of dual-use items. This began a process involving the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU that led to a recast of the regulation which enters into force on 9 September 2021. This paper examines the main underlying concerns that drove the review and recast process: exporters’ regulatory burden, uneven national implementation, exports of cybersurveillance items and advances in emerging technologies.