Building an Effective Infrastructure for Peace in Syria and Lebanon

Executive summary

Infrastructure for peace (I4P) is an institutionalized approach to peacebuilding and an interconnected framework that links actors, regulations and mechanisms across local and national levels to support conflict prevention and sustainable peace.

Syria and Lebanon are primary cases of protracted conflict and socio-economic degradation combined with fragile and constrained state capacity and exclusionary governing mechanisms. The two cases underscore the importance of having an institutionalized approach to peacebuilding. In Syria and Lebanon, building an effective I4P entails embedding and adapting its core components—actors, regulations and mechanisms—to local political, social and institutional realities, and identifying ways to transform existing drivers of conflict into structures that foster the building of sustainable peace.

The cases of Homs in Syria and Akkar in Lebanon demonstrate distinct but related challenges and opportunities. Across both Syria and Lebanon, a central pattern that emerges is the fragmentation of peacebuilding efforts alongside the persistence of localized, adaptive forms of conflict management. In both contexts, formal state institutions remain weakened, contested or unevenly present. This leaves significant space for subnational actors—municipal authorities, civil society organizations (CSOs), community leaders and informal networks—to assume critical roles in mediation, dispute resolution and service provision. While these actors demonstrate resilience and innovation, their efforts are often ad hoc, under-resourced and insufficiently connected to national-level frameworks. This results in a disjointed peace landscape in which local initiatives mitigate immediate tensions but struggle to scale or sustain broader systemic impact. The absence of coherent coordination mechanisms across levels of governance further reinforces this fragmentation, limiting the transformation of localized stability into durable peace.

At the same time, both cases reveal a shared need to transition from reactive, crisis-driven approaches to more institutionalized and preventive I4P. In Syria and Lebanon alike, there is a clear gap between existing peacebuilding practices and the development of an integrated architecture that aligns actors, regulatory frameworks and mechanisms across local and national levels. Efforts at local levels illustrate the potential for building such infrastructure, yet also underscore common constraints, including political polarization, weak accountability structures and limited state legitimacy. The convergence of these dynamics suggests that sustainable peace in both countries depends not only on strengthening local capacities, but also on embedding them within inclusive, networked systems that can bridge local initiatives with formal governance structures. Recognizing and addressing these shared structural challenges are essential for advancing a more coherent and effective I4P in both contexts.

Syria requires a more institutionalized and networked peace architecture that effectively links national peace and justice mechanisms with local constituencies. Supporting Syria’s transition requires moving beyond short-term and reactionary interventions to instead invest in a networked peace architecture that strengthens institutions, links local and national mechanisms, broadens participation, protects civic space and addresses local grievances before they escalate. Without such an approach, Syria risks reproducing instability under new political conditions, rather than building a more inclusive and resilient peace.

Recommendations for Syria focus on developing a national I4P road map, strengthening local branches of transitional justice and peace institutions, reviving national dialogue processes, broadening inclusive participation and reforming restrictive regulations on civil society. Syrian CSOs should engage constructively with state institutions while maintaining independence; prioritize cross-community initiatives; strengthen coordination across sectors and governorates; and connect mediation efforts to concrete local grievances such as housing, land and service access. International donors should support a networked peace architecture, invest in local mediation capacities, integrate peacebuilding into economic recovery and reconstruction, and provide targeted capacity-building in areas including transitional justice and housing, land and property rights.

In Lebanon the priority is to move beyond fragmented and ad hoc mediation and crisis-management efforts towards a coherent national peace infrastructure that connects local prevention initiatives with broader governance reform. There is an urgent need to formalize and anchor I4P within Lebanon’s governance architecture. This requires institutionalizing municipality-centred peace and mediation desks, with clear mandates, safeguards and referral systems; linking local early warning to national-level response and policy adjustment; integrating reform of the delivery of services (i.e. water, waste, education and energy) into a conflict-prevention strategy; embedding accountability and rule-of-law pathways into local mechanisms so that mediation complements, rather than replaces, formal justice; and ensuring inclusivity across sectarian, gender, youth and refugee–host divides in order to prevent I4P from reinforcing existing hierarchies.

Recommendations for Lebanon emphasize integrating I4P into national security and governance frameworks, strengthening municipalities as local peacebuilding anchors, and rebuilding state legitimacy through equitable service delivery. Lebanese civil society actors should expand coalition-building (including with diaspora networks), strengthen local mediation and leadership capacities, and shift from reactive responses to preventive peacebuilding approaches. International donors should move away from fragmented project-based interventions towards system-based support that reinforces existing local and national institutions, prioritizes municipal-led initiatives, and incorporates conflict sensitivity and early-warning mechanisms into development programming.

1. Introduction

Achieving and sustaining internal peace require not only managing conflict but also structurally transforming the underlying drivers and dynamics of conflict. Over the past two decades, various approaches have emerged to prevent, manage and transform conflicts, as well as to build and sustain peace. Among these, infrastructure for peace (I4P) represents an attempt to shift from ad hoc responses towards a more systematic and institutionalized approach to peacebuilding.

I4P is an interconnected framework in which different peacebuilding mechanisms are designed to reinforce one another across local and national levels through coordination, linkage and sustained interaction among diverse actors—including development agencies, state institutions and civil society. Peace infrastructure is thus understood as being the

persistent networks of institutions, organizations, and mechanisms that span various, potentially every level of a society, which contain expertise in conflict resolution or conflict transformation, and address ongoing or emerging conflicts within their respective areas of influence.¹

More specifically, I4P can be defined as

A network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society.²

I4P emphasizes the creation of durable structures that allow societies to address grievances, mediate tensions and facilitate dialogue before conflicts escalate into violence, all while embedding these dynamic processes within a network of institutional infrastructure.³

Institutionalizing peace capacities allows the conceptualizing of the I4P framework as a networked ecosystem guided by a national road map that links three key components: actors, regulations and mechanisms. While typically embedded within national frameworks, I4P may emerge through either top-down government initiatives or bottom-up processes led by civil society and local community leaders (including notable figures and religious and tribal leaders). Regardless of its point of origin, the effectiveness of I4P depends on several critical factors: the degree of local ownership; the extent to which mechanisms are embedded within existing institutions; the presence of sustained political commitment; and the integration of the infrastructure into broader peacebuilding strategies.⁴ Effective I4P fills voids where justice, security and dispute resolution are weak by providing rapid and inclusive multistakeholder platforms that bridge societal divides and link local and national levels.⁵ Crucially, I4P should complement, not replace, state institutions, with safeguards for inclusivity, neutrality and accountability.⁶

Syria and Lebanon are primary cases of protracted conflict and socio-economic degradation combined with fragile and constrained state capacity and exclusionary governing mechanisms. These two cases underscore the importance of having an institutionalized approach to peacebuilding. Supporting the development of I4P in Syria and Lebanon that connects the core components of actors, regulations and mechanisms entails situating that infrastructure within the countries’ contexts. These contexts are characterized by compounded crises, constrained state capacity, persistent conflict risk, and only narrow openings for reform, collective action and coordination.

Syria, which has suffered from 14 years of protracted conflict, is still facing profound human suffering, the displacement of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), significant loss of human capital through sustained brain drain, and extensive economic, environmental and infrastructural degradation.⁷ The new authorities that took power in December 2024 have consolidated power, advanced international normalization and sustained a basic level of order and service provision, albeit with substantial shortages and uneven access nationwide. Yet these gains have not translated into a stable or inclusive internal transition; despite important political change, Syria’s transition therefore remains fragile, remaining deeply constrained by trust deficit, limited participation, the fragile security environment and resource shortages.

Since 2019 Lebanon has experienced a series of overlapping crises, including a financial collapse, popular uprisings, the Covid-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosion and the ongoing aggression by Israel.⁸ What began as a financial and monetary collapse gradually evolved into a compounded polycrisis marked by economic breakdown, institutional erosion, social strain and heightened security risks.⁹ Rather than unfolding as isolated shocks followed by recovery, these crises accumulated and reinforced one another, producing a prolonged state of instability. This sustained pressure weakened public institutions, eroded trust and further constrained already limited prospects for reform, deepening Lebanon’s structural fragility. Despite these challenges, recent political developments have led to the formation of a new government, formally ending a prolonged period of political paralysis. While their effectiveness remains uncertain, these developments have renewed both domestic and international attention to key issues, including state sovereignty, rule of law, economic stabilization and border governance.¹⁰

The paper continues in chapter 2 by briefly describing the internal drivers of conflict in Syria and Lebanon. It then in chapter 3 examines the pillars for building an effective infrastructure for peace in Syria and Lebanon. Chapter 4 focuses the analysis on the case studies of Homs in Syria and Akkar in Lebanon and proposes concrete recommendations to design and implement an operational action plan for the infrastructure for peace of Homs and Akkar. The paper concludes in chapter 5 by offering targeted policy recommendations for peacebuilding efforts by central governments, civil society organizations (CSOs) and international organizations in Syria and Lebanon.

2. Drivers of conflict in Syria and Lebanon

Syria

The transition in Syria has followed the military offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in December 2024 that resulted in the deposition of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the collapse of his regime and the appointment of Ahmad al-Sharaa as interim president. It has unfolded in a fragile context marked by deep trust deficits, limited political participation, a fragmented and weakly accountable security environment, and acute resource shortages. Together, these dynamics undermine legitimacy and perpetuate instability—the core drivers of conflict. This is reflected in persistent social mistrust, political exclusion, localized violence and rising socio-economic tensions.

A central challenge remains the erosion of trust between citizens and institutions, driven by weak justice systems, unresolved wartime grievances and the persistence of informal, patronage-based arrangements.¹¹ Political participation, inclusion and representation have also remained narrow and uneven. Key milestones, such as the National Dialogue Conference and its communiqué in February 2025 and the October 2025 parliamentary elections, fell short in inclusivity, representativeness and transparency.¹² These shortfalls left political processes concentrated within a limited elite and lacking effective follow-up mechanisms.¹³

The security landscape remains fragile and insufficiently regulated. The dismissal of former security personnel and the dissolving of the armed forces created significant gaps, which were filled through rapid and uneven recruitment. While partly a feature of the transition, recurring violence in Alawite-populated coastal areas, Druze-populated Suweydá governorate and such cities as Homs highlights ongoing risks of localized conflict, revenge dynamics and weak accountability.¹⁴

At the same time, severe resource constraints continue to exacerbate social tensions in Syria. Widespread poverty, damaged infrastructure, limited state revenues, documentation gaps, and unresolved disputes over housing, land and property (HLP) intensify competition and insecurity, particularly in mixed and return areas such as Homs. The estimated reconstruction cost of US$216 billion coupled with a Human Development Index that places Syria near the lower end of global rankings underscore the scale and complexity of the country’s recovery challenges.¹⁵

These elements of drivers of conflict in Syria highlight the urgent need for institutionalized mechanisms that mitigate further deterioration and ease tensions before they escalate. An I4P approach can offer a framework for linking local mediation capacities, civil society initiatives and state institutions within a coordinated system of conflict prevention and dialogue.

Lebanon

The internal key drivers of risk, conflict and institutional vulnerability in Lebanon are deeply interconnected. They are closely tied to governance failures such as breakdowns in service delivery, economic precarity, gaps in justice, digital misinformation and border volatility. Rather than operating in isolation, these drivers reinforce one another, embedding instability within everyday systems and institutions and shaping how conflict risks are produced and sustained.

At the core of drivers of conflict in Lebanon lies persistent economic and financial fragility.¹⁶ A deeply impaired banking system, currency collapse and the expansion of a large informal economy have eroded purchasing power, weakened state capacity and pushed much of the population into multidimensional poverty.¹⁷ While modest signs of stabilization exist, recovery remains contingent on structural reforms, restored confidence and improved governance.

This economic strain is compounded by governance and institutional fragility, which limits the prospects for recovery and undermines stability. Despite the appointment of a president in January 2025 and subsequent formation of a new government, effective policymaking and service provision continue to be undermined by entrenched corruption, elite capture, rent-seeking networks, weak accountability and selective application of the law.¹⁸ The resulting crisis of legitimacy reinforces public distrust, financial leakages and institutional inefficiency, further entrenching the conditions that sustain instability.

Within this context, conflict and security risks remain elevated. A volatile security environment is sustained by the absence of a consolidated state monopoly on the use of force, coupled with the continued influence of armed non-state actors. Fragile ceasefire conditions, continued periodic violence and the growing role of organized crime and smuggling networks weaken state authority and embed insecurity within border regions and local communities.¹⁹

These dynamics are further intensified by social and demographic pressures, including rising poverty, regional disparities, widening inequality and sustained large-scale emigration.²⁰ Declining trust in institutions alongside sectarian tensions and strained relations between host communities and refugees and IDPs contribute to social fragmentation and increase the risk of localized conflict.²¹ As grievances deepen, they are more likely to be expressed through identity-based and community-level tensions.

Finally, service delivery and infrastructure failures both reflect and reproduce broader drivers of conflict. The collapse of essential services (e.g. electricity, water and waste management, healthcare, and education) has led to highly unequal access and the proliferation of informal and often exploitative parallel systems.²² Weak regulation and political interference not only entrench these inequalities but also undermine accountability and public confidence in the state, reinforcing a cycle in which governance failures and conflict risks become mutually sustaining.

These elements of drivers of conflict in Lebanon highlight that without standing, institutionalized mechanisms linking early warning, mediation, service delivery reform and national policy coordination, the burden of stabilization has fallen disproportionately on society rather than the state. Therefore, in environments marked by compound crises, constrained sovereignty and persistent conflict risk, I4P can function as a stabilizing bridge between emergency coping and institutional renewal.

3. Infrastructure for peace in Syria and Lebanon

Syria

Building an effective infrastructure for peace in Syria requires the integration of its three core pillars—actors, regulations and mechanisms (see table 3.1 on page 8)—within a coherent, state-led strategy that connects national peace and justice institutions with civil society organizations and local communities to form a functioning peace architecture.

Drawing on developments since December 2024, as well as data collected on peacebuilding-related events and regulatory trends, this analysis finds that elements of an I4P are already emerging, but in a fragmented and uneven manner. While the Syrian transitional authorities remain the central actor with the capacity to shape this architecture, the regulatory environment is still highly centralized and only partially institutionalized. At the same time, civil society and local communities retain significant peacebuilding potential, but their contributions are constrained by political exclusion, regulatory ambiguity and limited operational space. Meanwhile, the mechanisms for building an I4P, in the form of initiatives and platforms, remain ad hoc and fragmented.

Actors

At the level of state institutional actors, four recently established bodies have the potential to play a pivotal role in shaping I4P in Syria: the National Commission for Transitional Justice; the National Commission for the Missing; the Higher Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace; and the General Secretariat for Political Affairs.

The National Commission for Transitional Justice represents one of the central state-led bodies emerging within Syria’s evolving infrastructure for peace. Established in May 2025, the commission is mandated to address accountability, wartime grievances and transitional justice processes following the collapse of the Assad regime.²³ It remains a highly centralized and top-down process, with limited public consultation and without a fully developed constitutional or parliamentary framework. Similar to other transitional bodies, the commission’s operational reach remains concentrated at the national level, while its local presence and mechanisms for community engagement remain limited.

The National Commission for the Missing was established on the same day as part of the broader transitional institutional architecture aimed at addressing one of the most sensitive humanitarian and political legacies of the Syrian conflict.²⁴ This commission is intended to deal with issues related to missing and forcibly disappeared persons, a challenge that affects hundreds of thousands of Syrians across different communities and conflict phases. It remains largely centralized, with limited clarity regarding its long-term legal framework, operational mechanisms, and coordination with local actors and the families of victims.

The Higher Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace was established in March 2025 following violence in coastal governorates, with a mandate to engage communities, address grievances, and promote stability and national unity.²⁵ In practice, its work has remained limited and reactive to the coastal region, and has focused on managing the immediate aftermath of the violence there. Although it functioned as a rapid-response mechanism, the committee did not expand to address other incidents or develop a broader institutional structure. Its crisis-driven mandate, lack of local branches and controversial actions (such as issuing pardons) have drawn criticism and raised concerns about its scope and effectiveness.

The General Secretariat for Political Affairs, established in March 2025 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the most prominent, and most controversial, of the new institutions.²⁶ It has a questionable role overseeing political activities, public engagement and community-related functions through central offices and governorate-level branches. Its offices include those for youth, women’s affairs, unions and cooperation associations, public events, community development, and religious and other minorities. It is responsible for shaping political plans and repurposing assets of parties and institutions affiliated with the former regime. The secretariat builds on earlier structures linked to HTS and has drawn criticism for operating without a clear constitutional or legal mandate. In May 2026 the media reported that the authorities intend to dissolve the secretariat.²⁷ However, the questions of what will fill the gap and the fate of its assets and human resources, among others, remain answered in a context of uncertainty where a new law regulating political parties is yet to be drafted.

CSOs, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have expanded rapidly, with many returning from the diaspora and re-establishing operations inside Syria. More than 650 NGOs were registered in the first six months of 2025.²⁸ However, the NGOs face regulatory ambiguity, political exclusion, declining funding and operational restrictions, while internal divisions and competition further limit their collective effectiveness.²⁹ At the local level, communities and tribal actors are playing increasingly visible and evolving roles, although patterns of participation vary across regions. In some areas, communities remain inward-looking; in others, local and tribal leaders are gaining influence within the emerging local governance frameworks.³⁰

In the Syrian context, a state-led infrastructure for peace appears more likely to be implemented under current dynamics of post-conflict consolidation. Such a top-down I4P may help secure political will and facilitate policy mainstreaming. The effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts will depend on local ownership and better coordination between state institutions, civil society and local actors. More inclusive engagement, alongside strengthened dialogue, mediation and participation mechanisms, will be critical to bridging fragmentation and supporting viable I4P.

Regulations

Syria’s emerging regulatory framework for I4P has developed rapidly since December 2024 through a series of decrees addressing political dialogue, constitutional reform, transitional justice and civil society governance. However, this framework has largely been shaped in a top-down manner, with committees and institutions established without broad consultation, reflecting limited participation and high centralization.

Many of these bodies—often created by presidential or ministerial decree—lack clear constitutional or legal foundations, operate with limited capacity and have weak accountability mechanisms. Their membership is typically restricted to a narrow circle of elites, which constrains inclusivity and limits the development of representative and sustainable governance structures.

At the same time, several mechanisms, such as the Higher Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace, remain reactive and crisis-driven; they focus on short-term stabilization, rather than building permanent systems for dialogue, mediation and social cohesion. Their limited institutional reach further reduces their long-term effectiveness. The regulatory environment for civil society remains restrictive as the government continues to rely on the outdated 1958 Law on Associations while imposing additional controls on funding and international engagement.³¹ This constrains the role of civil society actors at a time when their participation is critical.

Overall, while these regulatory developments signal engagement with key transition issues, they remain fragmented, centralized and insufficiently inclusive. Strengthening Syria’s I4P will require a more coherent and participatory legal framework that integrates national institutions with local actors, expands civic space and establishes durable channels for dialogue and accountability, including a greater role for syndicates, trade unions and professional associations.

Mechanisms

Mechanisms for I4P in Syria consist of actions, initiatives and platforms that translate policy into practice. Based on interviews and data collected on peacebuilding-related events, it can be concluded that the majority of the mechanisms remain largely state-driven. Government institutions dominate through governorate-related bodies and the expanding role of the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, while civil society engagement is still limited and mostly consultative, despite the proliferation in the number and initiatives of NGOs.

Even with these constraints, CSOs demonstrate important potential in areas 
such as dialogue facilitation, mediation, women’s participation, documentation and community-level dispute resolution—particularly around such issues as transitional justice and HLP conflicts. However, their contributions are not yet fully institutionalized and professional associations remain largely absent.

At the community level, grassroots initiatives such as local donation campaigns have emerged to support social solidarity and early recovery.³² Yet, concerns around transparency, elite capture and limited tangible impact highlight underlying challenges, especially in the absence of large-scale, state-led reconstruction efforts.

Geographically, peace-related initiatives are concentrated in major urban centres (e.g. Damascus, Aleppo and Homs), with limited reach in rural and high-need areas. Combined with declining donor support, this uneven distribution underscores a key gap: the lack of integrated, networked mechanisms linking state institutions, civil society and communities—an essential condition for a functional and inclusive I4P.

The three core pillars—actors, regulations and mechanisms—can be mapped to specific institutions, legal instruments and frameworks and ongoing initiatives (see table 3.1). This demonstrates that elements of I4P are already taking shape in practice—albeit in a fragmented and uneven manner.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, building an effective I4P requires capitalizing on the existing pillars of resilience, despite their limits. Lebanon’s endurance and continuity despite the compounded polycrises have not been anchored in institutional recovery or in a coherent state-led stabilization framework. Rather, they have largely rested on the externalization and societal redistribution of risk: financial inflows from the diaspora have substituted for macroeconomic policy; private sector actors have recalibrated business models to operate amid currency volatility and regulatory ambiguity; and civil society organizations and informal networks have assumed functions traditionally associated with state institutions, ranging from basic service provision to emergency assistance.³³

What has emerged is a form of resilience that is adaptive but conditional, allowing survival in crisis, without resolving the structural drivers of the crisis itself. On the one hand, this form of contingent resilience has prevented a full systemic breakdown and preserved a minimum of socio-economic functionality. On the other, it is fragmented, socially stratified and uneven. Access to remittances, foreign currency and transnational networks determines the capacity to cope and reinforces existing vulnerabilities and inequalities.³⁴ Moreover, the adaptive coping mechanisms that sustain households and communities operate largely outside formal governance structures, limiting their scalability and long-term developmental impact.

These coping and survival strategies also have an impact on incentives for reform. When households and communities absorb the immediate costs of institutional failure, political pressure and incentives for structural change become diffused. The burden and responsibility of crisis management become societal, rather than institutional. In this context, survival strategies feed into a cyclic pattern of dependence on informality, discretionary governance and parallel service provision.³⁵

With a new government in place, the critical question now is whether structural transformation can emerge from this status quo, or whether it will entrench a low-level stability that perpetuates institutional fragility and defers meaningful reform. Whether Lebanon’s current political opening evolves into structural transformation will depend in part on its ability to institutionalize these preventive mechanisms. If effectively consolidated, I4P can shift the country from reactive crisis management towards structured conflict prevention and inclusive governance. If left fragmented, it risks remaining a patchwork of local fixes in a system still vulnerable to cyclical breakdown. The opportunity is therefore not only to sustain peace at the community level, but to embed prevention into the architecture of the state itself.

Lebanon’s decentralized pillars of resilience can be categorized as follows. To reflect the above findings, in place of the three typical pillars—actors, regulations and mechanisms—I4P in Lebanon can be better structured around five decentralized pillars of resilience: networks; civil society; islands of trust; human capital and the private sector.

Social and community networks

Social, family, kinship and community networks have played a critical role in mitigating hardship through informal support, remittances and mutual aid. In the absence of a functioning state safety net, families became the primary providers of social protection, while local volunteer groups and diaspora initiatives were central to emergency response efforts (e.g. after the Beirut Port explosion). These networks enabled rapid and flexible support, sustaining access to basic needs amid economic collapse and service failure.³⁶ However, their benefits have been uneven as access to remittances (totalling $6–7 billion annually by 2022–23) and support often depends on existing diaspora ties.³⁷ This leaves more vulnerable groups, including refugees and marginalized communities, less protected.

While community-based coping has therefore functioned as a critical buffer against total collapse, evidence from the financial crisis, the pandemic, the Beirut Port blast response and the 2023–24 conflict underscores the structural limits of this buffer: it mitigates acute suffering but does not substitute for systemic recovery and in some cases reproduces inequality, fragmentation and patronage-based access to resources. Recent responses to displacement suggest a more coordinated state role, with government institutions providing shelter, healthcare and aid in collaboration with international actors. The complementarity between community-based support and state-led intervention offers an entry point that could transform this pillar of resilience into a pillar of an effective I4P.

Civil society and non-state actors

Lebanon’s civil society has played a vital role in sustaining service delivery, advocacy and crisis response, often filling gaps left by a weakened state. However, heavy reliance on civil society has exposed structural limitations, leaving actors with a key lesson from Lebanon’s polycrisis: strengthening accountability and coordination frameworks between CSOs, donors and public authorities enhances the effectiveness of civil society engagement and prevents gaps in service continuity and reform advocacy. Civil society thus forms another pillar for an effective I4P.³⁸

Institutional islands of trust

Public confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has remained high throughout Lebanon’s period of compounded crises, even as trust in other state institutions has declined. The LAF thus represents a critical institutional island of trust.³⁹ Its role as a pillar of resilience is significant: it anchors public order and serves as a unifying institution capable of maintaining security when other institutions falter.⁴⁰

However, while public trust in the LAF remains high, structural, financial, security and political constraints undermine its effectiveness and long-term resilience.⁴¹ Tackling these structural challenges would facilitate the process of building an effective I4P.

Human capital and diaspora engagement

The tension between the short-term benefits of remittances and the long-term losses from brain drain highlights a difficult dilemma that Lebanon needs to address as it operationalizes its I4P: while external financial flows mitigate immediate economic hardship in personal ways, the departure of skilled workers weakens Lebanon’s future development potential and hampers sustainable growth. As the World Bank concludes, Lebanon is effectively using its most valuable human assets to pay for temporary imports and survival, rather than for building a sovereign economic future.⁴²

This dynamic reduces the labour force available for economic renewal, depresses innovation and productivity, and constrains the quality of services, especially in health, education and critical infrastructure sectors. These, in turn, will have major implications for the long-term potential of building an effective infrastructure for peace in Lebanon.

Adaptive private sector behaviour

Finally, in Lebanon’s protracted crisis, the private sector has played a visible role in sustaining core economic activity and access to essential services where public systems have faltered, forming another key pillar of an effective I4P. However, without foundations such as predictable security, a functioning banking system, robust rule of law, fair competition and lower transaction costs, the innovation and adaptability of the private sector remain localized coping mechanisms, rather than scalable engines of national recovery.⁴³

Strengthening the enabling conditions by implementing broad reforms, reducing harmful regulatory barriers, improving infrastructure, and enhancing regional economic integration by restoring confidence in the reliability of the Lebanese state is essential if Lebanon’s private sector is to transition from short-term adaptation towards sustainable growth and broader resilience conducive for building an effective infrastructure for peace in Lebanon.

These decentralized pillars of resilience have collectively prevented a total systemic collapse in Lebanon. They have ensured continuity where formal governance failed, providing liquidity, economic activity and essential services in the absence of coordinated state leadership. Yet these mechanisms are inherently limited in scope and sustainability. A transition from survival to sustainable recovery requires reintegrating these dispersed sources of resilience into a transparent, accountable and functioning state framework.⁴⁴ Without such reintegration, Lebanon risks remaining suspended between collapse and recovery: stable enough to endure periodic shocks, yet too fragmented to achieve structural transformation. Its capacity to adapt is notable, but without institutional renewal and meaningful reform, adaptation alone cannot secure a sustainable future.

This analysis can be synthesized to visualize the balance between risk and resilience (see table 3.2). This provides the analytical bridge to the subsequent discussion on I4P in Lebanon.

4. Case studies: Homs in Syria and Akkar in Lebanon

Homs

The city of Homs, Syria’s third largest urban centre (after Damascus and Aleppo), is characterized by a diverse social and sectarian composition. Fourteen years of conflict have left deep marks on the city, and its urban landscape and social cohesion have been severely damaged. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, tensions intensified with the revival of social disputes, the absence of effective transitional justice and the stigmatization of Alawite neighbourhoods and regime supporters. Moreover, extensive wartime destruction and the slow pace of reconstruction have deepened housing, land and property disputes.

In 2025 the local and central authorities took a number of steps to signal a recognition of the scale and sensitivity of HLP grievances. In January the governor of Homs announced the formation of a committee to review claims for the restitution of property, including those seized under the former regime. In parallel, in October the Ministry of Justice outlined the legal framework for addressing cases of unlawful property seizure.⁴⁵ However, the effectiveness of these steps is limited by the absence of transparent procedures, inclusive participation and effective dispute-resolution mechanisms that take into consideration local particularities. A combination of government-led, civil society-led and hybrid initiatives is therefore needed in order to signal a more holistic commitment to building an effective I4P.

On the government side and mainly led by the Homs branch of the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, various activities have taken place since the collapse of the Assad regime, including youth dialogue, a public dialogue on national unity, a workshop on social cohesion, and engagement with religious and communal actors. This showed an increasing role for the General Secretariat for Political Affairs. Meanwhile, the opening of a local office to the National Commission for Transitional Justice in March 2026 was an important step towards bringing central mechanisms and institutions to the local level, but their operationalization is yet to be tested.

In parallel, civil society played a visible role through initiatives and mechanisms that contribute to confidence-building, facilitate mediation across local divides and serve as a preventive mechanism. Examples include the Syrian Caravan, a transitional justice dialogue; the Seeds of Peace project; and the From the Neighbourhood to the Decision initiative, which has conducted community dialogues across Homs. Meanwhile, there have also been more locally rooted initiatives such as Wednesday Talk, a weekly open dialogue space in varying locations across the city that brought together citizens from different political, social and communal backgrounds to discuss current political and social issues.

The case of Homs illustrates both the scale of need and the potential for action (see table 4.1). Social mistrust, sectarian tensions, HLP disputes and limited local participation intersect to shape conflict dynamics on the ground. At the same time, there are local peace efforts, including civil society-led dialogues and the informal civil peace committee. However, these initiatives remain largely reactive and reliant on individual efforts, rather than being embedded within a coherent, institutionalized and sustainable peace framework. The case of Homs captures this tension well: it shows that dialogue, mediation and community engagement are possible; but it also shows the limits of ad hoc arrangements, the lack of institutional backing and the failure to translate national mandates into local practice.

Accordingly, based on the above analysis and on interviews with activists and researchers from Homs, it is possible to identify the following concrete steps, ideas and recommendations to design and implement an operational action plan for an infrastructure for peace for Homs.⁴⁶

Establish localized branches of national justice and peace mechanisms in Homs

The National Commission for Transitional Justice and the National Commission for the Missing should open permanent and functioning local offices in Homs to address the current gap between national mandates and local realities. Embedding these institutions locally will also help shift perceptions of transitional justice from a politicized tool to a community-centred process.

Create a Homs-level coordination platform for civil peace and transitional justice

The governorate political affairs directorate, security actors, religious leaders and civil society should establish a formal coordination mechanism to replace the current ad hoc arrangements. This platform should build on existing informal efforts while institutionalizing roles, clarifying mandates and enabling rapid response to emerging tensions. This would also help align fragmented initiatives and reduce duplication across actors.

Prioritize resolution of housing, land and property disputes in mixed and high-risk neighbourhoods

Given the centrality of HLP disputes in fuelling tensions (particularly in mixed neighbourhoods such as Karm al-Zaytoun and al-Iddikhar), the governorate should establish targeted mediation and legal support mechanisms. These should combine community-based mediation with formal legal pathways. Addressing HLP issues is critical to preventing localized conflicts from escalating into broader sectarian tensions.

Encourage cross-neighbourhood dialogue and engagement initiatives

Civil society actors in coordination with local authorities should scale up and institutionalize cross-neighbourhood and inter-community dialogue platforms, particularly between mixed, returnee and previously divided areas. Building on existing initiatives such as the Wednesday Talks, these engagements should be regular, inclusive, and structured to bring together residents from different sectarian and social backgrounds, including minorities and marginalized groups. Such platforms can play a critical role in easing tensions, providing informal early warning of emerging grievances, and gradually rebuilding trust and social cohesion across fragmented urban spaces in Homs.

Strengthen early warning and community-based mediation capacities

Building on the pattern of localized violence (e.g. kidnappings, targeted killings and retaliatory acts), Homs requires structured early-warning systems linked to community actors. Training local mediators (including neighbourhood-level mukhtars, religious leaders, youth actors and civil society representatives) can enable faster de-escalation of tensions. These mechanisms should be connected to local authorities to ensure that responses move from reactive security measures to preventive engagement.

Akkar

Akkar in northern Lebanon is a border governorate with high poverty and chronic service deficits, where cross-border dynamics with Syria elevate spillover risk in the context of limited state reach. Informal crossings of the Lebanon–Syria frontier and border tension episodes are persistent, while demarcation and coordination efforts can improve security.⁴⁷ Socio-economic vulnerability is acute, with poverty increasing sharply in Akkar relative to other regions.⁴⁸ Yet Akkar is not homogeneous: interviews conducted for this paper capture distinct local conflict ecologies.⁴⁹ These range from low-conflict villages with strong civic organization and trust in formal institutions to high-pressure localities where unemployment, resource scarcity, refugee–host tensions and informal mediation dominate.⁵⁰ This heterogeneity often intersects with sectarian composition, migration patterns and institutional complexity. In turn, this requires differentiated, location-based I4P, rather than a uniform approach.

A review of the key informant interviews across seven localities in Akkar indicates that local conflict dynamics are predominantly an everyday occurrence and are resource-linked and governance-related, rather than being ideologically driven. In line with Lebanon’s 2019–26 polycrisis trajectory—marked by economic collapse, institutional erosion, service failures and heightened security risk—Akkar exhibits low thresholds for escalation, heavy reliance on informal dispute resolution and highly uneven local resilience capacities across villages.⁵¹ Proximity to the border amplifies exposure to spillover risks from Syria through porous crossings, smuggling economies and episodic border tensions, particularly where the state is perceived as absent or reactive.⁵²

The Akkar case suggests that I4P is already present in practice through municipalities, reconciliation committees, youth-led initiatives and insider mediators. But it remains fragmented, under-resourced and weakly connected to formal justice and service systems, which limits its fairness, legitimacy and preventive capacity. Villages vary in levels of social cohesion, leadership styles, civic organization, and connectivity to state and formal institutions. Infrastructure for peace in Lebanon must therefore be calibrated to meet those differences, as standardized templates carry the risk of reproducing formally similar, but substantially weaker, structures. Such a tailoring promises legitimacy for this infrastructure and guarantees its effectiveness. Local granularity is a principal precursor to the success of scaling I4P in Lebanon. The role of municipalities may be enhanced if accompanied by reform of the municipal system, including strengthening their formal mandate, sustainable financing, and clear and transparent linkages to national systems. This would enable their transition from being reactive or observing to being structural, preventive and developmental components of governance.

Based on classification of conflict intensity and key drivers of conflict, tailored I4P entry points for seven localities in Akkar can be proposed (see table 4.2). Accordingly, based on the above analysis and interviews, the following concrete steps, ideas and recommendations can be identified to design and implement an operational action plan for Akkar’s infrastructure for peace.

Establish municipality-centred peace and mediation desks

Each municipality in Akkar, unions of municipalities, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should formalize terms of reference for a peace and mediation desk, along with referral 
pathways and safeguards (including confidentiality, neutrality, and gender and youth inclusion). This aligns with good practice in I4P regarding structured local peace committees and inclusive forums.⁵³ The experience of Mechanisms for Social Responsibility in multiple municipalities across Lebanon shows how municipalities are favourable mediums for conflict identification, dialogue and response.⁵⁴ These mechanisms highlight the importance of grounding peace infrastructure in locally legitimate institutions.

Formulate border-sensitive early warning and rapid de-escalation protocol

Municipalities, the LAF, the General Security Directorate (Lebanon’s intelligence agency) and the UNDP should create a joint municipal–security coordination mechanism to monitor border-adjacent incidents (e.g. crossing closures and smuggling-related clashes) and, when needed, trigger immediate mediation and protection responses.⁵⁵ Without a border-sensitive approach that integrates local efforts into national security coordination, local peace mechanisms risk being overwhelmed by dynamics and exogenous shocks that they are not designed to manage.

Prioritize a water and wastewater conflict-prevention package

The Ministry of Energy and Water, municipalities, the UNDP and the World Bank should prioritize the targeted rehabilitation of wastewater leak points and water-quality monitoring. Community water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) committees should be linked to the Ministry of Energy and Water to manage borehole licensing and irrigation disputes.⁵⁶ By alleviating the material conditions that underlie conflict, service delivery functions as a mechanism of conflict prevention. This makes economic and social development inseparable from peacebuilding. Investments in water, energy, waste management and education are tools for stabilizing communities and reducing conflict risk.

Manage fairer agricultural value chains through cooperatives

The Ministry of Agriculture, municipalities and the UNDP should strengthen agricultural cooperatives to manage farmer–trader contracting and payment disputes. ⁵⁷ Agriculture acts as both a pillar of livelihood and a source of conflict due to irrigation pollution and power imbalances.⁵⁸

Pilot municipal justice referral and legal aid pathways

The Ministry of Justice, bar associations and the UNDP should pilot legal aid clinics to connect cases to competent courts, ensuring that peace infrastructure complements rather than replaces state institutions.⁵⁹

Invest in digital peace and misinformation response

The UNDP, local media partners and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) should invest in establishing community digital focal points linked to fact-checking networks in order to mitigate offline tensions caused by online incitement.⁶⁰ Effective I4P in Lebanon must integrate digital monitoring at a local scale by early detection of online narratives and fact-checking tools with rapid, trusted intervention by community-based mechanisms. This integration is crucial to sustainable and responsive local peace infrastructure.

5. Conclusions and policy recommendations

Across both Syria and Lebanon, a central pattern that emerges is the fragmentation of peacebuilding efforts alongside the persistence of localized, adaptive forms of conflict management. In both contexts, formal state institutions remain either weakened, contested or unevenly present. This leaves significant space for subnational actors—municipal authorities, civil society organizations, community leaders and informal networks—to assume critical roles in mediation, dispute resolution and service provision. While these actors demonstrate resilience and innovation, their efforts are often ad hoc, under-resourced and insufficiently connected to national-level frameworks. This results in a disjointed peace landscape in which local initiatives mitigate immediate tensions but struggle to scale or sustain broader systemic impact. The absence of coherent coordination mechanisms across levels of governance further reinforces this fragmentation, limiting the transformation of localized stability into durable peace.

At the same time, both cases reveal a shared need to transition from reactive, crisis-driven approaches to more institutionalized and preventive I4P. In Syria and Lebanon alike, there is a clear gap between existing peacebuilding practices and the development of an integrated architecture that aligns actors, regulatory frameworks and mechanisms across local and national levels. Efforts in both Homs and Akkar illustrate the potential for building such infrastructure, yet also underscore common constraints, including political polarization, weak accountability structures and limited state legitimacy. The convergence of these dynamics suggests that sustainable peace in both countries depends not only on strengthening local capacities, but also on embedding them within inclusive, networked systems that can bridge grassroots initiatives with formal governance structures. Recognizing and addressing these shared structural challenges is essential for advancing a more coherent and effective I4P in both contexts.

Supporting Syria’s transition requires moving beyond short-term and reactionary interventions to instead invest in a networked peace architecture that strengthens institutions, links local and national mechanisms, broadens participation, protects civic space and addresses local grievances before they escalate. Without such an approach, Syria risks reproducing instability under new political conditions, rather than building a more inclusive and resilient peace.

In Lebanon, there is an urgent need to formalize and anchor I4P within Lebanon’s governance architecture. This requires institutionalizing municipality-centred peace and mediation desks, with clear mandates, safeguards and referral systems; linking local early warning to national-level response and policy adjustment; integrating reform of the delivery of services (i.e. water, waste, education and energy) into a conflict-prevention strategy; embedding accountability and rule-of-law pathways into local mechanisms so that mediation complements, rather than replaces, formal justice; and ensuring inclusivity across sectarian, gender, youth and refugee–host divides in order to prevent I4P from reinforcing existing hierarchies.

As part of an I4P framework, both Syria and Lebanon should establish national and local mechanisms aimed at mitigating the destabilizing effects of misinformation, disinformation and politically weaponized media narratives. In fragile and conflict-affected societies, fake news and other modes of misinformation can be instrumentalized in times of crisis to inflame sectarian anxieties, weaken institutional legitimacy, deepen mistrust, instil panic and incite violence.

A central recommendation for both Syria and Lebanon would be the establishment of locally grounded, cross-sectarian information-resilience initiatives that combine media literacy, rapid-response fact-checking and trusted community communication networks. These initiatives should encourage partnerships among municipalities, CSOs, educators, journalists, religious leaders and local media institutions in order to foster public trust across fragmented social and political environments.

Importantly, efforts to counter misinformation should avoid becoming instruments of censorship or political repression. Rather than relying primarily on punitive state controls over speech, an I4P approach would promote transparency, civic trust and credible public communication. This includes improving government crisis communication capacities, supporting independent journalism, increasing public access to verified information and establishing trusted channels for disseminating accurate information during periods of conflict or instability.

As part of an I4P framework, both Syria and Lebanon should also further prioritize gender-sensitive and youth-inclusive peacebuilding mechanisms, including the systematic inclusion of women and youth in local mediation initiatives, municipal governance, civic dialogue platforms and post-conflict recovery planning. Strengthening women-led civil society networks and ensuring gender-disaggregated assessments of conflict impacts can improve institutional responsiveness, social trust and community resilience, particularly during periods of displacement, economic crisis and external instability.

Accordingly, the following targeted policy recommendations can be proposed for central governments, CSOs and international organizations in Syria and Lebanon. The effectiveness of the I4P approach ultimately depends on the extent to which these initiatives are connected into a coherent system of collaboration and coordination, rather than implemented in isolation, particularly in contexts where formal central coordination is weak or contested as experienced in both Syria and Lebanon.

For the Syrian transitional authorities

Develop a national road map for I4P for Syria

The Syrian authorities, with support from international partners, should develop a national road map for infrastructure for peace in Syria. Such a road map would clarify institutional roles and mandates, link the national and local levels, and help shift current practice from reactive crisis management to more proactive conflict prevention.

Establish local branches of national peace and justice mechanisms

The National Commission for Transitional Justice, the National Commission for the Missing and the Higher Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace should establish governorate-level branches or representative offices. This would help bridge the gap between national mandates and local realities, while enabling more direct engagement with communities and local grievances.

Broaden inclusive participation in governance and dialogue

The authorities should expand participation in governance and peace-related processes, particularly by including women, youth, minorities, displaced populations and local civic actors. More inclusive participation would strengthen the legitimacy of transitional institutions and reduce the political exclusion that currently fuels mistrust.

Revive the national dialogue processes

The authorities should revive the national dialogue processes, including establishing standing committees to follow the implementation of the communiqué of the February 2025 National Dialogue Conference. These processes and standing committees will keep the national dialogue alive, ease social tensions and ensure a degree of political participation, pending the convening of the parliament.

Reform the legal framework governing civil society

The authorities should review and update the legal and administrative framework regulating CSOs, including the 1958 Law on Associations and subsequent restrictive circulars. Broadening civic space and having a transparent and accountable regulatory framework would allow civil society actors to contribute more effectively to dialogue, mediation and community-based peacebuilding.

For Syrian civil society organizations

Constructively engage state peace and justice mechanisms

CSOs should seek structured engagement with relevant government bodies (including national-level peace and justice mechanisms as well as governorates and local councils), while maintaining their autonomy and accountability to communities. A constructive but independent role would allow civil society to serve as both a bridge and a corrective within the emerging I4P architecture for Syria.

Prioritize locally grounded and cross-community initiatives

Civil society actors should expand initiatives that bring together participants across sectarian, ethnic and geographic divides, particularly in mixed and tension-prone localities. Such efforts are essential for rebuilding trust, reducing stigma and preventing local grievances from hardening into more durable forms of exclusion and conflict.

Strengthen coordination and coalition-building across sectors and localities

Syrian CSOs should move beyond isolated, project-based interventions and invest in stronger coordination across thematic areas and governorates. This also includes close coordination between diaspora CSOs and those that remained in Syria during Assad’s time.

Link dialogue and mediation work to concrete local grievances

CSOs should ensure that dialogue initiatives are not limited to symbolic encounters but are tied to practical issues such as housing, land and property disputes, service access, return dynamics, and local safety concerns. This would make I4P efforts for Syria more relevant to communities and more likely to generate sustainable local buy-in.

For Syria’s international donors and organizations

Support the development of a networked I4P architecture for Syria

International donors and organizations should support the development of a networked peace architecture that links government institutions, civil society actors and local communities. Funding should prioritize creating a national strategy, coordination mechanisms and institutional linkages, rather than isolated short-term projects.

Prioritize local mediation and dialogue capacities

Donors and international organizations should invest in strengthening local mediators, community leaders and CSOs, especially outside the main urban centres. Such support can help address local grievances early, reduce the likelihood of violence and strengthen trusted channels for dispute resolution.

Integrate peacebuilding into economic recovery efforts

Recovery and reconstruction programmes should be designed through a conflict-sensitive lens and linked to peacebuilding objectives. Particular attention should be given to housing, employment, services and HLP-related tensions in return areas and mixed localities.

Invest in targeted capacity-building with multiplier effects

Donors and international organizations should prioritize capacity-building in areas 
such as documentation, HLP rights, victim participation, local mediation and transitional justice awareness. Well-targeted support in these areas can generate multiplier effects that strengthen both institutional performance and local peace capacities.

For the Lebanese central government

Adopt I4P in national security frameworks

The Lebanese central authorities should adopt infrastructure for peace in their national security frameworks. These should include clear definition of roles, mandates and coordination mechanisms across ministries, municipalities and security actors. They should also ensure legal recognition and budget allocation to move I4P beyond ad hoc and donor-dependent arrangements and towards national recognition.

Strengthen municipalities and vertical linkages to national bodies

Municipalities are viable I4P anchors if resourced and linked to formal systems. They have emerged as a crucial layer of governance in times when the central government was hollowed out and national institutions remained fragmented. Strengthening municipalities includes increasing budget allocation to municipalities and supporting their tax-collection and development efforts. It is vital to define clear coordination channels to link municipalities and local peace mechanisms to national institutions. This requires upward communication to the central authorities and downward support by local initiatives and committees for prevention and response.

Rebuild legitimacy through equitable service delivery

The delivery of essential services through the formal local or national institutions is a crucial measure to prevent violence and an I4P priority. Peace infrastructure can only be grounded in the political economy of equitable service provision and adequate access to resources. Rebuild legitimacy through equitable service delivery entails addressing structural drivers of conflict by prioritizing equitable access to basic services (i.e. water, electricity, waste management and education), particularly in marginalized regions.

For Lebanese civil society and other non-governmental actors

Build networks and coalitions (e.g. with other initiatives from the diaspora)

An effective infrastructure for peace approach necessitates building coalitions and the presence of horizontal linkages between different local initiatives. This is advanced via enabling information-sharing, joint programming and collective engagement. Engaging with diaspora networks and capitalizing on the diaspora-supported initiatives at the local level allow a crucial asset to be utilized.

Strengthen mediation, facilitation and local leadership capacities

Local institutions possess the capacity to respond to and tackle needs in a much more localized and specific manner, especially in conflict prevention and mediation. This should be substantiated by investing in training and supporting local mediators, community leaders and grassroots actors to ensure that conflict resolution mechanisms are both technically effective and socially legitimate.

Expand engagement in prevention, not only response

An effectively consolidated I4P can shift the focus towards structured conflict prevention and inclusive governance. This requires a shift in focus from reactive interventions towards preventive approaches, including community dialogue, youth engagement, education and digital awareness initiatives, and tools that address early drivers of conflict before escalation occurs.

For Lebanon’s international donors and organizations

Shift from project-based to system-based interventions

Strengthening accountability and coordination frameworks between the different actors enhances the effectiveness of external interventions and increases the value of the dispersed sources. A fundamental shift in the donor’s operations towards system-based interventions entails advancing an interconnected peace infrastructure across existing local and national institutions. This, in turn, supports existing linkages between the two, rather than launching new projects or initiatives.

Prioritize locally embedded and municipal-led structures

Municipalities are the most realistic anchor for scaling I4P in Lebanon. Strengthening locally embedded structures requires channelling funding to locally situated actors who can directly advance peace infrastructure without needing to build it. This entails ensuring flexibility to adapt interventions to village-level institutional realities and empowering bottom-up approaches, while avoiding adopting standardized models.

Integrate conflict sensitivity and early warning into development programming

Existing early response mechanisms remain informal, personality-driven and under-
resourced. International donors and organizations need to prioritize building mainstream conflict analysis, digital monitoring and early-warning systems across all sectors (e.g. service delivery, infrastructure and livelihoods). This will ensure that development interventions actively contribute to conflict prevention, rather than operate in parallel to peacebuilding efforts.

building an effective infrastructure for peace

Endnotes

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23. 23 Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, Presidential Decree no. 20 of 2025 Establishing the National Commission for Transitional Justice, 17 May 2025 (in Arabic).
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25. 25 Presidential Decision Establishing a Higher Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace, 9 Mar. 2025 (in Arabic).
26. 26 ‘Foreign Affairs establishes new department “General Secretariat for Political Affairs”’, SANA, 28 Mar. 2025.
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Acknowledgments

This paper is the outcome of a collaboration and partnership between the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and SIPRI. The authors would like to thank the FBA team for their valuable feedback on the paper.

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Dr Fadi Nassar to the Lebanon research and insightful revisions during manuscript preparation. We also extend our thanks to the colleagues at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) regional hub in Amman and country offices in Damascus and Beirut for their valuable contribution to this research. Special and warm thanks to the reviewers of the paper, as well as to the experts and officials we interviewed for this paper.