Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran

When does the legitimate application of military technology to the problem of national defence become needlessly provocative? What obstacles must developing countries overcome if they hope to use military technology effectively? And when might military technology itself become a cause of conflict? This book addresses these questions in the context of four particularly important states: China, India, Pakistan and Iran. Military Capacity and the Risk of War represents the effort of a unique group to put aside unhelpful national rhetoric as well as conventional academic thinking. Contributions from Iran give a valuable insight into the emergent viewpoints in that country, as well as the opportunities for arms control and confidence building in the Persian Gulf. Chapters on topics of military and technological interest combine the expertise of natural scientists, military professionals and social scientists specializing in cultural aspects of technology transfer.

Key findings:

• • Contrary to a common misperception, the end of the cold war has seen a collapse in the availability of military technology to the states considered in the study. Less imported equipment is available and efforts to develop weapons indigenously have fallen far short of expectations.
  • Given formidable barriers to applying imported civilian technology to military applications, concerns about military modernization should not prevent this important contribution to economic development.
  • Although air defence is an essentially non-provocative mission, air defence systems can be destabilizing in the specific context of southern Asia. Airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) in particular could be destabilizing if transferred to the four principal states discussed in the book, although AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia and Taiwan are probably stabilizing.
  • India's plan to double its budget for military research and development during the current five-year plan is likely to harm Indian security by distorting national science priorities and reducing the combat capability of the armed forces to an extent that might provoke greater reliance on ballistic missiles.
  • Iran's efforts to prepare a conventional defence against Iraq are not only necessary in their own right, they contribute to stability in the region by encouraging the professionalization of the armed forces and competing with programmes that might threaten other Arab states or Israel.
  • Threats to attack sites associated with Iran's civilian nuclear programme may provoke a stronger emphasis on deterrence in Iranian military doctrine, a development that could lead Iran's paramilitary forces to spend more money needlessly and deploy weapons that could be seen as destabilizing.
  • Arms-control and confidence-building initiatives launched by Iran in hopes of undermining support for the role played by the USA in the Gulf region are unlikely to achieve that aim, but nevertheless constitute a much more productive approach to Iran's security concerns than preparing for a maritime campaign in the Gulf. These include special visits to nuclear sites and a decision not to acquire missiles capable of striking Israel.
  • Although China continues to prepare to use military means of reunifying with Taiwan, a campaign as currently envisioned by Chinese planners is very unlikely to succeed and is becoming less feasible as Taiwan's conventional defences are bolstered by Western arms suppliers. Despite recent arms deals with Russia, China's conventional forces are inadequate to deter the United States from supporting Taiwan in the event of war.