Summary

The legitimacy of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) continued to be strengthened during 1998 as additional states signed and ratified the convention. At the end of 1998, there were 121 states parties and 48 signatories. Moreover, 90 states parties submitted their initial declarations to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and 85 states parities notified the OPCW of their National Authority. A total of 384 inspections in 28 countries were also carried out by OPCW inspectors. Progress in adding a verification protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has been limited, but the success of implementation of the CWC should serve to increase faith in the goal of universal disarmament in the BW area as well.

The work of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) experienced serious setbacks during 1998, culminating in the air strikes by the UK and the USA in December. The difficulties between UNSCOM inspectors and Iraqi officials in 1997 were carried over into 1998, characterized by blocked access to facilities requiring inspection, disputes over the national composition of inspection teams, and a general lack of cooperation by Iraqi officials with respect to the requirements of UNSCOM inspectors. The inability of UNSCOM to declare Iraq free from non-conventional weapons meant that sanctions against Iraq would continue, despite the opposition to such measures by China, France and Russia.

Appendix 13A. Benefits and threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering

MALCOM DANDO

Summary

Concern about the proliferation and possible use of biological weapons (BW) increased in the 1990s, and attention was given to the history of BW development in offensive biological warfare programs. The scientific and medical advances centred on the Human Genome Project could bring great benefits to humanity. However, developments in biotechnology will cause enormous social changes, and the norm must be reinforced which promotes the peaceful use of the new biotechnology capabilities but prevents their misuse in offensive BW programmes. Both national and international medical associations have warned that future scientific and technological advances could be misused.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) does not restrain beneficial research designed to achieve the kinds of medical advances, but its parties undertake 'never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain . . . . [m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes'. The urgent necessity now is for the verification protocol to the BTWC, under negotiation in Geneva, to be completed. Current indications are that an effective and efficient protocol could be agreed before the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001. This would considerably strengthen the prohibitions embodied in the BTWC.