Summary

Events in 1998 led to renewed concern about the effectiveness of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan did not encourage other states to promptly follow suit; however, they highlighted weaknesses in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular its lack of universal adherence and legitimacy. Together with renewed suspicions about secret North Korean and Iraqi nuclear weapon programmes, the tests contributed to a growing sense that the nuclear non-proliferation regime was under siege by an unprecedented series of challenges. 

Overall, the year was a largely disappointing one for nuclear arms control efforts. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) continued to hang in limbo. The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives faced considerable obstacles. The START II Treaty remained stalled in the Duma, thereby blocking progress towards deeper reductions in the still sizeable US and Russian nuclear arsenals within the framework of a follow-on START III accord. In addition, the controversy over a US national ballistic missile defence system and the future of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) jeopardized support for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear forces and threatened to reverse the progress made in recent years in reducing those forces.

Appendix 12A. Tables of nuclear forces

Appendix 12A contains tables of the nuclear forces of the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China. 

Appendix 12B. Nuclear explosions, 1945–98

Series of nuclear tests were carried out by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. Since the signing of the CTBT, none of the recognized nuclear weapon states has conducted a nuclear explosion. The fact that not all the explosions announced by India and Pakistan were detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS)—now being set up to verify the CTBT after it has entered into force—raised questions about the CTBT verification capabilities, especially among those critical of the treaty. However, most scientists agree that the system in fact worked well and will work even better in the region if or when India and Pakistan decide to adhere to the CTBT and provide IMS seismic stations on their territories.