Summary

More than anything else, political will appears to be the key to both the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the achievement of a meaningful protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In 1999 agreement on a range of technical matters ensured the steady advancement of the CWC treaty-building process and the negotiation of the protocol to the BTWC.

Russia’s internal political, social and economic problems raised questions about its ability to meet and enforce its treaty obligations. Russia was the only declared possessor not to have started the destruction of its chemical weapon stockpile. Taking Russia’s domestic situation into consideration, the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC (meeting on 15–19 May 2000) agreed to the Russian request to have the first destruction deadline extended. Serious international concern persists that Russia still has illegal biological weapon programmes.

During 1999 the USA was increasingly perceived as not fully committed to multilateral chemical and biological weapon (CBW) disarmament. It strongly opposed compliance mechanisms for the future BTWC regime and was in technical non-compliance with the CWC regarding initial industry declarations. Prior to the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC the United States submitted the required declarations, which eased tensions among the states parties. In 1999 the US Congress reduced the appropriations for assistance programmes that provide funding to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of CBW in Russia.

Proliferation of CBW remained a major concern in 1999. Some states are unwilling to join the CWC despite the effect on their national economies in terms of reduced access to certain key chemicals for their industry as of 29 April 2000. This may indicate a determination to maintain major CBW armament programmes in the face of strengthening international norms. 

Appendix 9A. Risk assessment of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons

JEAN PASCAL ZANDER, EDVARD KALRSSON, LENA MELIN, ERIK NÄSLUND AND LENNART THANING

Summary

In the light of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack with chemical and biological weapons (CBW), no government can remain unprepared. CBW represent a new qualitative element in the terrorist threat. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach to the question of CBW terrorism, the authors analyse the requirements for setting up terrorist CBW acquisition programmes, profile terrorist organizations and present computer models of the release of chemical or biological warfare agents using realistic parameters.

The processes for manufacturing and disseminating CBW in large quantities are complex. There is little likelihood of the recurrence of an event like the 1995 release of sarin in the Tokyo underground by a religious sect. Governments thus face a threat that is possible but unlikely to occur. The key issue is to devise and execute balanced policies. Overreaction can easily lead to country-wide anxiety and paranoia. In such an atmosphere, hoaxes may become as efficient as actual attacks with CBW.

Appendix 9B. The future of chemical and biological weapon disarmament in Iraq: from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC

MARIA WAHLBERG, MILTON LEITENBERG AND JEAN PASCAL ZANDERS

Summary

Despite efforts between 1990 and 1999, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was unable to complete the total elimination of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon capabilities and failed to set up a long-term monitoring mechanism to ensure that Iraq does not acquire these weapons in the future. The UN Security Council, succumbing to the short-term interests of some members, was unable to deal with Iraq’s blatant and determined violation of the UN’s rules. Serious doubts therefore exist as to whether the UNSCOM successor organization, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), will be able to complete UNSCOM’s tasks in Iraq. As of 1 June 2000 Iraq has not accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which created UNMOVIC and established the future disarmament and monitoring regime. Thus no inspections have taken place.