Summary

In 1999 the controversy over ballistic missile defence and the future of the ABM Treaty moved to the fore of the nuclear arms control agenda. In the USA there was an emergent consensus in favour of developing a limited national missile defence (NMD) system designed to protect US territory against attack by a small number of ballistic missiles launched by ‘rogue states’. Proposals from the US Administration for amending the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system were rejected by Russia, which warned that the entire Russian–US nuclear arms control framework was in danger of collapse. China also expressed concern about the implications of US missile defence plans for its nuclear deterrent.

The other major development was the US Senate’s vote in October 1999 to reject ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The decision marked a setback for efforts to bring that treaty into force. It did not in itself undermine the no-testing norm codified in the treaty, since President Clinton reaffirmed the USA’s intention to continue to observe its nuclear weapon testing moratorium. However, the Senate vote heightened international concern about the health of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which continued to face a number of serious challenges from both inside and outside the regime.

Appendix 8A. Tables of nuclear forces

ROBERT S. NORRIS AND WILLIAM M. ARKIN

Appendix 8A contains tables of the nuclear forces of the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel.

Appendix 8B. Nuclear verification: the IAEA strengthened safeguards system

NICHOLAS ZARIMPAS

Summary

The IAEA strengthened safeguards system, reviews the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) strengthened safeguards system, aimed at providing increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material, with the ultimate aim of reinforcing the global non-proliferation regime. The international safeguards community and the IAEA reacted swiftly to a number of challenges that confronted the global nuclear verification regime in the 1990s: a growing list of responsibilities combined with limited resources, the ambitions of some states to acquire nuclear weapons, exemplified by the case of Iraq, and a longer agenda resulting from the nuclear disarmament process. The adoption, in 1997, by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Model Additional Protocol for strengthening safeguards measures represented a step of fundamental importance towards limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing international security. However, progress with acceptance of the new provisions by the IAEA member states has been disappointingly slow. Universal acceptance and full implementation of the new system are imperative for guaranteeing the political assurances necessary for advancing the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.