15. Non-cooperative responses to proliferation: multilateral dimensions
In 1998 continued actual or suspected cases of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the absence of a comprehensive arms control and disarmament agenda raised the question of whether to respond using the threat or actual use of force, sanctions or technology denial.
In 1998 the threat and actual use of force, along with sanctions, were used to address breaches of disarmament commitments by Iraq.
In the case of Iraq, the use of force in support of disarmament objectives by the UK and the USA in December 1998 underlined the failure of external powers to achieve implementation of UN Security Council resolutions short of the use of force. In practice, the use of force may have hastened the modification of the decisions of the UN Security Council rather than bringing about Iraqi compliance.
India and Pakistan violated the widely supported norm against nuclear testing that was established by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Some states introduced sanctions in response to the tests, but the international community in general showed little enthusiasm for coercive measures or sanctions. Responses were mainly based on diplomacy - increased efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to join the CTBT - and narrowly focused export controls - a technical barrier to arms acquisition that raises the costs of nuclear weapon development for India and Pakistan.
Appendix 15A. Multilateral weapon and technology export controls
IAN ANTHONY AND JEAN PASCAL ZANDERS
Appendix 15A is a discussion of multilateral weapon and technology export controls. It contains a table of the membership of the control regimes.