14. Conventional arms control and security co-operation in Europe

ZDZISLAW LACHOWSKI

Summary

Despite the unparalleled success of European conventional arms control in the beginning of the decade, the evidence that it is at a crossroads was reinforced in 1993. The implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements continues fairly smoothly, but they fail to address a qualitatively changed situation--the fragmentation of the international system, numerous incidents of local armed hostilities, chiefly those in Eastern and South-eastern Europe tinted with ethnic, religious and other colours.

The functions of arms control are changing from confrontational to co-operative, and the arms control process is becoming more political in character, shifting from a global to a regional perspective.

The November 1993 deadline of phase I of implementation of the CFE Treaty was successfully met. About 17 450 TLE items had been destroyed or converted to non-military purposes (NATO—over 5700 items; the former WTO group—over 11 500 items, including 6700 in the former Soviet republics).

Targets for the next two one-year phases will be difficult for the former WTO states, which have already encountered technical and financial hurdles in reducing their TLE during phase I. The problem of flank zones has become outstanding, with Russia insisting on revising the relevant Treaty provisions.

States participating in the CFE-1A Agreement continued to reduce and restructure their forces, and a number of governments have declared or approved plans for further considerable reductions.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Central and East European states continued steadily during 1993, although its pace was exposed to the vicissitudes of Russian politics and Russia's relations with its neighbours. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany continued according to the agreed schedule. The Russian military presence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also decreased over the year, but Russia pursued a differentiated policy towards the three Baltic states, using a variety of instruments (suspension of talks, military demonstration, low-rank representation at the talks, etc.) which resulted in differently paced troop withdrawals and uneven progress in handling the withdrawal problem.

Work in the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) is a continued attempt to inject stability into a destabilized environment. It also serves as a platform for security consultations and exchange of information among CSCE participating states. In 1993 the Forum continued to work on new measures for arms control and for enhancing security and confidence focusing on harmonization of arms control obligations; a code of conduct for security; stabilizing measures; non-proliferation and arms transfers; military contacts and co-operation; defence planning information exchange; and global exchange of military information.

During 1993, the main problem faced by CSCE participating states continued to be the lack of compatibility between European confidence- and security-building (CSBMs) and arms control regimes, and the politico-military situation prevailing in the southern and eastern parts of the continent. CSBMs, tailored to `fair-weather' circumstances, have failed when it comes to dealing with conflicts and hostilities. As from the 1993 CSCE Rome Council meeting, the FSC took over responsibility for the implementation of CSBMs.

Ratification of the Open Skies Treaty proceeded slowly, partly because the original intention of making the Soviet/Russian military sector more transparent had already been achieved in other ways, thus reducing the political urgency of the Treaty, and partly because of the high cost of implementing the provisions. By the end of 1993 only 11 states had deposited their instruments of ratification. Open Skies signatories continued to conduct trial overflights for training purposes during 1993 pending the entry into force of the Treaty.