9. Chemical weapon developments

Summary

The crucial question for 1993 was: Does the overwhelming support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) affect the behaviour of states and chemical weapon (CW) proliferation?

There was no significant change in the number of countries alleged to be attempting to acquire or to already possess a CW capability or arsenal. Such allegations were made about a number of countries, including Libya and North Korea. Libya was alleged to be attempting to construct a second CW production plant with help from foreign countries. In the case of North Korea, suspicion about its CW and biological weapon (BW) programmes may be fuelled by its suspected activities in the nuclear field.

Currently well-functioning export controls, such as those of the Australia Group, have to be reconsidered taking into account the demands of some countries that such policies be abolished under the CWC. The dissolution of COCOM was not unexpected, but a common export control policy which includes the new republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union has yet to emerge.

In 1993 there was intense debate about allegations that Iraq had used CW against the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq, which could not be confirmed by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). Allegations of CW use in the former Yugoslavia multiplied but were not confirmed; and new evidence surfaced in 1993 about an alleged CW programme. International procedures to verify allegations of use remain difficult to apply; a situation which will only change under the CWC.

The destruction of the US CW stockpile is envisaged to be completed by 2004 at a total cost of over $8.6 billion, according to 1993 estimates. The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) facility in the Pacific finished its operation verification tests, thereby proving that incineration technology can be employed to destroy CW.

Russia is still faced with the challenge of completing its initial CW destruction programme. Local opposition from communities where destruction is planned and major financial difficulties seem likely to delay the process. International support, both financial and technical, is increasing but more is needed.

The number of states experiencing problems with old and abandoned CW is increasing, and states have begun to realize that the removal and destruction of these weapons will be very expensive. There is now a clearer picture of past dumping of CW at sea, particularly in the Baltic Sea, and of what was dumped in the immediate period after World War II. Efforts to clean these areas will be very expensive and are currently unfeasible.

The experience gained in the 1991 Persian Gulf War requires that more emphasis be given to BW protection and to early warning.

In 1993 questions were raised in the USA about whether health problems suffered by Gulf War veterans could be linked to the possible release of CW agents during the war. Early reports of illness were consistently denied by the US Government. To some extent, the political response is reminiscent of the Agent Orange debate.