On 6 May 2014 the NPT PrepCom concluded its ‘Cluster 2’ discussions on implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), with statements by eight states. The Chairman also continued his consultations in connection with the preparation of a draft paper on recommendations from the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 Review Conference. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty The highlight of the day was the signature by the five nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—of the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty. Each party to this Protocol undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any party to the CANWFZ Treaty. The states party to the CANWFZ Treaty, which entered into force on 21 March 2009, are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Statement by the representative from the United Arab Emirates The United Arab Emirates (UAE) stated that the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT, and in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, has been challenged in the past and continues, in some cases, to fail to provide the required assurance on the exclusive peaceful nature of nuclear activities in some states. States developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses should fully adhere to comprehensive safeguards obligations; fully cooperate with the IAEA; and take the required steps to fully address all international concerns and obligations including those of relevant IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is designed to provide credible assurances of the peaceful nature of all declared activities. However without bringing into force an Additional Protocol, the issue of possible undeclared nuclear activities is not addressed. Therefore, it is essential to enhance the conclusions provided by the Safeguards Agreement through utilizing the tools supplied by the Additional Protocol. Implementing an Additional Protocol as an integral part of the safeguards system will provide confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of national nuclear activities both declared and undeclared and will facilitate the full support and confidence of the international community. The international community has stressed that it is essential for Iran and the IAEA to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all outstanding issues concerning its nuclear programme and to exclude the existence of a possible military dimension. This was affirmed by multiple resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, which called on Iran to take the required steps by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, personnel and documents requested by the IAEA. The UAE continues to support diplomacy and dialogue as the only way to address Iran’s nuclear issues. However, it remained concerned that no substantive progress has yet been achieved in reaching a comprehensive agreement to address all outstanding issues including those referred to as the possible military dimension issues. Concrete results are needed to build confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The UAE, therefore, continues to call on Iran to fully address the Agency’s serious concerns regarding the possible military dimension, and to engage with the IAEA substantively on all outstanding issues. The UAE encouraged Iran to spare no efforts in building confidence in its nuclear activities, and to work closely with the IAEA to achieve such objective. The UAE further encouraged all states to contribute positively to that effect. Assessment and looking ahead The Chairman of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, announced that following further consultations with states parties, he would circulate a draft of the recommendations from the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, on which he would seek consensus for adoption following consideration of the document. The draft recommendations are expected to range across the three pillars of the NPT—nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—as well as regional issues, including the Middle East and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Key areas of contention are likely to include the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons, the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s nuclear programme, progress in nuclear disarmament, access to civilian applications of nuclear technology, security assurances, and compliance. Thus far, the Chair has enjoyed the confidence of the states parties in his handling of the work of the Preparatory Committee and they are eagerly awaiting the release of his draft recommendations.
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