The NPT PrepCom continued on its fourth day with statements by 23 states in the morning in the Cluster 2 discussions on non-proliferation, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). In the afternoon session, statements were made by the Facilitator and 17 delegations, with a focus on regional issues, in particular on the Middle East and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Statement by the Egyptian representative
Egypt asserted that while the obligations of the nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) under Article I of the Treaty prevent them from transferring nuclear weapons to any other state, practices which violate Article I—including nuclear sharing under security arrangements such as NATO—continue. These practices also violate commitments by the non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS), some of which accept stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories or build their security under nuclear umbrellas provided by the NWS, in contradiction of the very letter and spirit of the Treaty and in a practice which offers false legitimacy to these weapons and obstructs the drive towards the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free-world.
Egypt stated that it is clear that violations of Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) contribute over time to the erosion of the credibility of the Treaty and undermine the potential to advance respect for its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Furthermore, the practice of steadily seeking to increase the safeguards obligations on NNWS in the absence of any parallel or legally-comparable safeguards obligations on the NWS is unhelpful to the nuclear disarmament aspirations embodied in the NPT and in effect seeks to disconnect the non-proliferation dimension of the NPT from its disarmament dimension and only serves to assure the continued existence of nuclear weapons under the Treaty. This cannot continue if nuclear disarmament is to be effectively pursued under the NPT.
Statement by the Brazilian representative
Brazil noted that it cannot accept that the burden of the NPT regime continues to fall exclusively on the NNWS, with the increasing imposition of obligations that affect only those who already faithfully comply with their Treaty obligations. While Brazil fully respects the sovereign decision of those states that decided to sign an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it should be recalled that INFCIRC/540 was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in the understanding of its voluntary nature, a fact that is officially reflected in that Agency’s records. The 2010 Action Plan also recognized that ‘it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol’.
Furthermore, Action 30 of the 2010 Action Plan stated that ‘additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved’. Brazil stated that it has actively participated in the discussions regarding the implementation of a ‘state-level approach’ in safeguards by the IAEA. Brazil added that it understands that the relationship of the Agency with its member states must be guided by existing agreements between both and the commitments derived from them. Objectivity must guide the Agency’s work. Brazil welcomed that the IAEA is engaged in a consultation process with member states on the State Level Approach, whose parameters must be subject to approval by the IAEA Board of Governors.
Statement by the European Union representative
The European Union (EU) strongly condemned the Democratic people’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) for its nuclear tests and satellite launches using ballistic missile technology in blatant violation of its international obligations under various United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The EU remained seriously concerned about the latest developments in North Korea’s nuclear programme, in particular its uranium enrichment programme and the resumption of activities at the Yongbyon site.
The EU stated that North Korea is bound by its international obligations, as set out in several UN Security Council resolutions, and by its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. The EU called on North Korea to return to full compliance with the NPT and to comply with all its international obligations fully, unconditionally and without delay. The EU further called on North Korea to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to refrain from any further provocative actions and statements.
In the case of Iran, the EU's objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term-settlement, which would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, ensuring that Iran is in compliance with all its obligations under the NPT, as well as relevant resolutions by the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, while respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The EU welcomed the agreement on the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) reached on 24 November 2013 in Geneva resulting from talks on the Iranian nuclear programme between the E3+3 and Iran, chaired by the EU High Representative. The measures agreed under the JPA are being implemented as planned, confirmed to date by the IAEA Director General in his monthly reports to the Board of Governors. The EU also welcomed the discussions between Iran and the IAEA under the Framework for Cooperation, aimed at resolving all present and past issues, including those related to the possible military dimensions to the Iranian nuclear programme.
The EU considers the agreement reached at the talks in Tehran in February (on additional seven practical measures to be implemented by Iran by 15 May) to be a further step in the right direction. Resolution of all outstanding issues will be essential to achieve a long-term settlement. The EU stated that it has firmly supported the IAEA Secretariat in its approach to safeguards implementation under the State Level Concept (SLC), which will allow the IAEA to improve its efficiency whilst maintaining and strengthening the effectiveness of its Safeguards Implementation. The EU welcomed the fact that the IAEA continues to undertake technical meetings with member states in order to enable an exchange of views and to provide clarifications on the SLC.
Statement by the Finnish representative
Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland—the Facilitator for the Middle East conference on a NWFZ—noted that, since the second session of the Preparatory Committee held in April–May 2013, he has continued consulting with the states of the Middle East region in support of the implementation of the 1995 Resolution as well as undertaking preparations for the convening of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
Consultations and other meetings have been actively pursued with states of the region and internationally. The Facilitator believes that these numerous consultations and other events have contributed to a better awareness and understanding of the importance of the Conference process, its possibilities and implications for peace and stability in the Middle East region and beyond.
Between October 2013 and February 2014, the Facilitator together with the conveners of the Conference and with the participation of states of the region held three informal meetings in Glion, Switzerland, in order to facilitate agreement among the states of the region on the arrangements for the Conference to be held in Helsinki. The meetings provided an opportunity to exchange views on the Conference and its preparations including discussions on the agenda, modalities and rules of procedure. Participants contributed actively to the dialogue and presented proposals.
The conveners and the Facilitator were impressed by the participants’ readiness to engage, by their wish to make progress and by their open and constructive approach. At the same time, divergent views persist regarding important aspects of the Conference. More work is therefore needed, and all parties are strongly encouraged to engage in it with a continued constructive attitude and readiness to find the necessary compromises.
Consultations with the states of the region will continue. The Facilitator and the conveners will host further informal meetings in order to focus on the preparations for the Conference including its agenda, modalities, rules of procedure and timing. To build on the progress made, active input and contribution by all states of the region are needed in order to arrive at an early agreement on the arrangements of the Conference.
Other statements
Several states took the floor after the Facilitator. In the statement of the Arab Group, delivered by Iraq, the Arab states collectively declared that the Middle East NWFZ conference must be held during 2014, and if the conference is not held by the time of the 2015 NPT review conference, they would reconsider their support for the indefinite extension of the NPT. They demanded that a certain date be set for the conference, blamed Israel for the delay and demanded that Israel accede to the NPT as a NNWS and place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The Russian Federation proposed that the conference be held in Helsinki on 1 December 2014 and that there was sufficient time to complete the arrangements for the conference by then. The United States reiterated its commitment to the conference but noted that in order for the conference to be convened there first needs to be a durable peace in the region, and the non-compliance by Iran and Syria needs to resolved.
Assessment and looking ahead
The statements again showed the divergences in views between the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Western states on IAEA safeguards in NNWS. In general, Western states stressed the need for strengthened safeguards, as well as the need to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an additional protocol the verification standard for NNWS, and supported the IAEA’s effort to implement a state-level approach to safeguards which relies more heavily on information and objective and subjective assessment of proliferation risk.
The NAM states noted that the Additional Protocol had not been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors as mandatory. They rejected efforts to strengthen safeguards further in the absence of more progress in nuclear disarmament by the NWS. The NAM states also cautioned against the state-level approach as it would rely on subjective criteria by the IAEA and information provided to the IAEA by other states.
On Friday, the ‘Cluster 1’ discussions will resume on nuclear disarmament, and it is expected that the statements will show differences between the NWS and some 150 NNWS on the issue of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, among other contentious issues.