The independent resource on global security

8. Nuclear disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and security

Contents

I. Introduction

II. Nuclear arms control involving China, Russia and the United States

III. Multilateral nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes

IV. Regional disarmament and non-proliferation dynamics

V. Nuclear safety and security during armed conflict

VI. Conclusions

Nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are replete with challenges. By the end of 2024 nuclear dis-armament appeared more elusive than at any point since the end of the cold war, especially since strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States has effectively ceased. There were more positive develop-ments in the engagement between China and the USA, but dialogue on nuclear weapon-related issues was undermined by tensions over the USA’s support for Taiwan as well as its economic sanctions against China. The looming expiry of the 2010 Russia–USA Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) in 2026, combined with arguments in the USA for strengthening deterrence to counter China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, raise the prospect of an unregulated nuclear arms build-up in the future. The growing nuclear risks and ten-sions between great powers also continued to cast a shadow over key multi-lateral nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation frame-works in 2024.

 

The NPT review cycle

The abbreviated review cycle of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continued with the second preparatory committee meeting held in Geneva in advance of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Dissatisfaction with the pace of nuclear disarmament, concerns over the increased salience of nuclear weapons in international politics, and disagreements over a slew of other issues demonstrated that reaching consensus in this review cycle will remain difficult.

 

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

When, and if, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, it will ban nuclear weapon tests, and all other nuclear explosions, every-where. Papua New Guinea ratified the CTBT in 2024, bringing the total number of ratifying states to 178. After revoking its ratification of the CTBT in 2023, Russia signalled its readiness to resume nuclear tests if the USA were to do so. From its side, the USA, which has signed but not ratified the treaty, continued with its policy of increasing transparency by organizing a visit by a delegation of international officials to its nuclear test site facilities.

 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) aims to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. It continued to garner international support from non-nuclear weapon states in 2024, with ratifications by Indonesia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Solomon Islands bringing the number of states parties to 73. A further 25 states had signed but not yet ratified the treaty as of the end of the year.

 

In preparation for the third Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW in 2025, informal working groups continued the intersessional process. Some of the focus areas of the process were reflected in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, including a resolution establishing an independent scientific panel to study the effects of nuclear war. The resolution was approved with the support of 144 states, including nuclear-armed China, with only three states voting against (France, Russia and the United Kingdom). The last such UN-mandated study on this topic was issued in 1988.

 

Regional disarmament and non-proliferation dynamics

The tense security situation on the Korean peninsula highlighted escalation risks amid continuing diplomatic deadlock in addressing the challenge of nuclear disarmament in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). It also contributed to proliferation concerns by fuelling the debate within the Republic of Korea (South Korea) on the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons in response to the perceived threat from North Korea.

 

In the Middle East, Iran’s political calculus regarding its nuclear status was increasingly affected by its escalating conflict with Israel during 2024. Domestic debates considered the potential benefits of a nuclear deterrent in addressing military vulnerability, while the Iranian government continued to signal readiness for nuclear restraint through negotiations on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, from which the USA withdrew in 2018.

 

Arab states and Iran also reiterated their commitment to the norm against nuclear weapons at the fifth UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which took place in November 2024. As in previous years, Israel—the region’s only nuclear-armed state—was invited but did not participate. The participants (22 Middle Eastern and African states) identified Israel’s absence as a key challenge.

 

Attacks on Ukrainian nuclear sites

The repeated attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants in 2024 underscored the absence of normative frameworks to address challenges to nuclear security and nuclear safety in conditions of a major armed conflict. Russia’s continued targeting of critical infrastructure in Ukraine added to the nuclear safety, security and safeguards challenges in 2024. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintained a consistent presence in Ukraine throughout 2024.

Dr Wilfred Wan, Vladislav Chernavskikh, Dr Tytti Erästö and Vitaly Fedchenko
English