I. Introduction
II. Missile and armed UAV developments in Europe
III. Use of missiles and armed UAVs in armed conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East
IV. Transparency and confidence-building mechanisms
V. Conclusions
Developments in 2024 again confirmed the high-profile role of missiles and armed uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in modern security and military strategies. The develop-ments during the year were shaped both by the continued and extensive use of such weapons in conflict—especially in the Russia–Ukraine war and in Iran’s missile attacks on Israel linked to the Israel–Hamas war—and by the underlying and explicit use of missiles for signalling and leverage in these conflicts and elsewhere. Together with the need to replenish stock-piles, states’ perceptions of the military value and utility of missiles, air and missile defence systems and armed UAVs are contributing to growing demand for current missile and UAV types and the development of a new generation of both technologies.
Russia continued to use conventionally armed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs in large numbers against Ukrainian forces, critical infra-structure and civilians in 2024. Between January and September 2024, Ukraine reported that almost 5500 such systems were launched at Ukraine, averaging more than 20 launches every day. In November 2024 Russia tested the new dual-capable intermediate-range Oreshnik missile with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles in a strike against Dnipro. Even though Ukraine struggled to acquire the desired quantities of missiles, its use of missiles and long-range UAVs also shaped the conflict. In November 2024 the United States authorized Ukraine to use US-supplied systems to strike targets deeper inside Russian territory. This enabled Ukraine to hold Russian infra-structure, logistics and military assets at risk.
There is a growing demand for missiles in Europe to replace those supplied to Ukraine as well as to expand stockpiles in line with the prevailing threat environment and to address perceived gaps in capabil-ities through the development of new offen-sive and defensive systems. This, in turn, risks triggering a new missile arms race in Europe, especially in the class of missiles previously banned by the now defunct 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Evidence for a ‘missile renaissance’ in Europe came in two separ-ate but related developments in July 2024. During that month, Germany and the USA agreed on the stationing in Germany from 2026 of various US ground-launched mis-siles, while France, Germany, Italy and Poland signed a letter of intent, later joined by Sweden and the United Kingdom, on joint production of medium-range
missiles under a new European Long-range Strike Approach.
The spillover of the war in Gaza in 2024 to involve Iran and several of its allied militias, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, saw the continued use of rockets, UAVs and—to a lesser extent—missiles. Such weapons were used in attacks on Israel and on shipping in the Red Sea, while Israel used them in its bombardment of Gaza and attacks against Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and other non-state armed groups in Iraq and Syria.
The use of armed UAVs has been confirmed in at least six conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa—in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan—leading to more than 940 civilians being killed between November 2021 and November 2024. Use of UAVs by non-state armed groups in the region is still at an early stage, but is reportedly increasing in both frequency and geographical scope, especially in armed conflict settings in border regions in West Africa, such as the Liptako–Gourma region (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) and the Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria), as well as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Somalia.
Global regimes and norms governing missiles and armed UAVs remain under-developed. Since the collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019, the remaining missile arms control instruments are transparency and confidence-building mechanisms, such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and non-proliferation measures, including strategic trade controls. In January 2024 Qatar became the 145th state to subscribe to the HCOC, making it only the fourth state to do so in the Middle East.
There is no dedicated multilateral process on the regulation of armed UAVs. To address some of the concerns over increasing use of UAVs, in March 2024 a group of 21 states published a joint statement on the issue. The statement reiterated the need to intensify the debate about ways to improve transparency, oversight and accountability in the acquisition, transfer and use of armed UAVs, and proposed a multilateral exchange of views.