

Introduction

Global security governance: a world of change and challenge

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I. Introduction

In the world today, good solutions have been found for practically every extant variety of security problem. The real difficulty lies in replicating, generalizing and, ideally, universalizing such solutions. At the same time, because of the march of globalization and the increasingly complex codependencies it creates, it is becoming more and more a dictate of necessity to make good security practice and experience equally global. Enhancing security for one group in the world at the expense of another, or without the others, has always been inherently discriminatory and unfair. Now it is starting to look more like a contradiction in terms.

The vision of coherent, comprehensive and even-handed global security management has never been more relevant, yet its difficulties can rarely have been so clearly exposed and so widely taken to heart as during the past decade. One difficulty is the necessity to design an enforceable system of global governance that can both serve and constrain sub-state, trans-state and traditional state players. Another is the breadth and variety of the contemporary notion of security, covering not just matters of conflict and armaments but also the need to defend against terrorism, crime, disease, natural disasters and environment damage; interruption of vital services and supplies; and, many would add, socio-economic phenomena such as poverty, exclusion, and underpopulation and overpopulation. A third problem is more historically contingent but probably has the strongest impact on day-to-day world politics: the fact that both the world's strongest power (the United States) and those most generally identified as 'problem' states (such as North Korea) have reasons to resist approaches to solving these challenges that rely on binding and universally applicable global regulation. A law-abiding world security community could not be hurt much by the defection of marginal actors. It is profoundly challenged when not only the entities causing problems but also the player with the greatest *prima facie* power to solve problems seem determined not to be co-opted.

These challenges have been widely discussed and documented, *inter alia* in previous SIPRI Yearbooks. This edition was prepared at a time when general issues of global security have been pushed to—and held in—the forefront of world attention, but when few thinkers can claim to have even as much confi-

dence in the success of any given prescription as they had two or three years ago. Experience has highlighted the meagre and bitter harvest that can follow both from taking up arms against security troubles (as in Iraq) and from trying to end them quickly without violence (as in Iran or North Korea). The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change set up by the United Nations Secretary-General to reflect on these and other challenges of global governance has presented its report¹—the synopsis of which is reproduced in the appendix to this Introduction—to an audience that knows that a better way forward is needed, but that cannot be relied on to find the imagination, energy and solidarity required to make good use of even the best of road maps.

This Introduction attempts neither to reiterate nor to second-guess the High-level Panel's reasoning. Rather, it offers some complementary reflections on the problems of establishing a global security order today and on ways to distinguish the good options from the bad for addressing these problems. Without making any claim to completeness, it deals with changes in the nature and balance of power between security actors (section II); with differences in security 'agendas'—of geographical or other origin—that add to the difficulty of finding global solutions (section III); with the pros and cons of three different generic modes of security action (section IV); and, in the concluding section, with some thoughts on the UN's own role.

II. Power and influence in the 21st century

The notion of power has become ambiguous, elusive and a subject of lively debate in recent decades. Some thinkers have elaborated the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' power, where the first term refers mainly to military strength and the will and capability to use it coercively.² 'Soft' power may reside in non-military dimensions, such as cultural strength, or in legitimacy ('right' rather than 'might') and the power of example and attraction; but in general it implies getting results by persuasion and negotiation rather than by compulsion. This second kind of power has obvious limitations in an imperfect security environment where less principled actors can ignore its moral authority, exploit its weaknesses and profit from its self-restraint. The limitations of hard power have, however, also been recognized for a long time. In an analysis still to be bettered, Paul Kennedy shows how excessive reliance on it may lead a strong state to lose authority, room for manoeuvre and even the essentials of its own strength in the longer run.³ Today, there is also high awareness of what have come to be called asymmetric threats from intrin-

¹ United Nations, 'A more secure world: our shared responsibility', Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN documents A/59/565, 4 Dec. 2004, and A/59/565/Corr.1, 6 Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/ga/59/documentation/list5.html>>. For the synopsis and recommendations of the report see the appendix to this Introduction.

² See, e.g., Nye, J. S. Jr, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Books: New York, 1991); and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Affairs* (Public Affairs: New York, 2004).

³ Kennedy, P., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Random House: New York, 1987).

sically weak actors, such as terrorist groups who have the power to do disproportionate damage to the strong; and a fast-growing realization that trying to defeat these actors by applying power in the traditional style will often only make things worse.

Cutting across these complexities is another set of issues about the *type* of actors who hold and can wield power in international affairs. A debate developed in the early 1990s over the alleged ‘death of the state’, based on the view that traditional state authorities were losing control of many global processes either ‘upwards’, to international or supranational organizations which had taken over elements of former national competences; ‘sideways’, to different sectoral actors such as transnational companies or civil society organizations; or ‘downwards’, to sub-state and individual actors who had started doing things previously supposed to be reserved to states, such as waging war.⁴ In recent years it has become clearer that, while all three of these things were indeed happening, a number of the *solutions* for sub-state, trans-state and non-state challenges can still only be found through formal international legal procedures or by types of active intervention (e.g., international peace missions) of the sort that only nation states can conduct. The present state of affairs is therefore perhaps best seen as one of increasingly diffused *power* but without, so far, a similar multiplication and reinforcement of *authority*. It is a situation that creates a mismatch between traditionally designed solutions and actual challenges and—most observers would say—also leaves the world with a certain security deficit. This is what commentators mean when they talk about the breakdown of the ‘Westphalian order’⁵ (the historical system of international regulation by agreement among nation states), and it is what underlies the useful concept of the ‘postmodern state’ that still carries unique responsibilities and potentials but has to find new ways to realize them in a fundamentally changed environment.⁶

One further point worth noting about ‘power’ is the essentially subjective nature of the concept in modern international life. Over the second half of the 20th century, the number and severity of interstate conflicts declined sharply, the number of intra-state conflicts is now declining more slowly, and it has become unusual for any one country to seek to resolve the latter on its own. In consequence, international players have fewer chances to test each others’ power in the most extreme and direct way possible, through a contest of arms. Most of the time, countries (and other players) enjoy power and influence in proportion to their *perceived* power and influence. Once this is realized, it becomes clear that the perception of power can diverge from objective reality for many reasons. Several varieties of national behaviour can be explained as

⁴ Guéhenno, J.-M., *The End of the Nation-State* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, Minn., 2000).

⁵ See, e.g., Solana, J., Secretary General of NATO, ‘Securing peace in Europe’, Speech at the Symposium on the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, Münster, 12 Nov. 1998, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm>>.

⁶ See, e.g., Cooper, R., *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (Atlantic Books: London, 2003). Cooper’s work builds on terminology developed by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.

an attempt by the countries or regimes concerned to appear more powerful than they really are. Other actors' power may be underestimated because it is underused and under-advertised, or because of out-of-date conceptions about the kinds of power that are relevant and fungible today. If subjective distortions of this kind affect the assessment of such familiar international players as nation states and multi-state institutions, they are very much more likely to occur in relation to newer types of actor, such as transnational companies, the media or campaigning non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As a topical case, it could be argued that the power of international terrorist groups was seriously underestimated before 11 September 2001 but has quite probably been overestimated since then.

Power among states

With these caveats in mind, the present pattern of power in the *state-based* dimension of the international system can be described as combining features of both concentration and diffusion. The most obvious case of concentration lies in the military dimension, namely, the emergence of the USA as a 'single superpower'. In terms of spending on military assets, the USA now exceeds not just its traditional Soviet/Russian rival but also the collective spending of the 32 next most powerful nations, in terms of the level of military expenditure and the qualitative value of military assets.⁷ Its superiority in these dimensions is rapidly growing—the increase in US military spending accounted for 75 per cent of the total world increase in 2002 and for 88 per cent in 2003.⁸ At the same time, the USA represents one of the world's highest concentrations of economic power, with the world's highest national gross domestic product, which is more than one quarter of the world total.⁹ Because of its key place in the world trading system, notably as a result of the role of the US dollar, it has a great influence on the way in which the economic cycle—and business confidence—develops in the global market. In the context of the debate about globalization, it has been argued that the development of world communications, media and entertainment systems, as well as trade and travel, has allowed elements of US culture and lifestyle to spread around the world in a way that was previously unknown in history and to the detriment of local traditions. The growing dominance of the English language, especially in cyberspace, can be seen as a special illustration of this.

In 2002–2003, when the USA was reacting forcefully—using military but also financial and diplomatic means—against the terrorist attacks it had suffered and the imminent dangers it perceived from Iraq, the realities of US strength tended to dominate debate. The policy options for other international

⁷ US military expenditure in 2004 was \$455 303 million at 2003 prices and exchange rates. The combined spending of the next 32 countries was \$454 869 million at 2003 prices and exchange rates. See also table 8.3 in chapter 8 in this volume.

⁸ See chapter 8 in this volume.

⁹ World Bank, 'Data and statistics', Quick reference tables, URL <<http://www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html>>.

players were portrayed in terms of whether to ally with and be protected by that strength or whether to resist and look for ways to balance it. Because of the way in which the Administration of President George W. Bush chose to articulate its policies,¹⁰ some analysts linked the prospect of increasing dominance (or even ‘hegemony’) of US national power with a new world order (or ‘disorder’) in which direct force, rather than law or institutional constraints, would play if not a ubiquitous then at least a frequently decisive role.¹¹

Already, from the perspective of 2004, some of these theses look too simplistic and some of the associated fears exaggerated. Factors that appear, in the present environment, to have a limiting effect on the concentration of power in any one country’s hands include: (a) the increasing availability of asymmetric techniques; (b) the generic limitations of military power; (c) the generic limitations of unilateral action; and (d) changes in political relationships and forms of organization. Each of these is discussed briefly below.

The best known example to date of an asymmetric attack was the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA. A small group of terrorists using non-military assets (hand weapons and aircraft) were able to inflict thousands of casualties and immense economic damage in the core territory of the world’s single superpower.¹² As often happens in the context of terrorism, the psychological impact went far beyond the material losses. The sudden consciousness of vulnerability prompted both the president’s call for an active ‘global war on terrorism’ and the creation of an ambitious new ‘homeland security’ programme with associated funding.¹³ The Bush Administration concluded that only the direct and forceful elimination of its terrorist enemies (and those who harboured them) would solve the problem. As subsequent events years have shown, however, the real ‘bad guys’ are hard to find and kill. Attempts to do so may turn them into martyrs, alienate wider popular constituencies and thus create new ground for terrorism to spread in future. More generally, military force appears inadequate to control and transform the conditions that breed terrorism—and asymmetric resentments in general—within distant and diverse societies. Moreover, the range of asymmetric adversaries, and of the weapons available to them, seems likely to grow with the further march of globalization, of technology diffusion and of multiple codependencies (of which more is said below) within international society. The world is still searching for

¹⁰ A new US strategy to combat asymmetric threats, if necessary by pre-emptive intervention, and to preserve the USA’s military dominance was set out in the US National Security Strategy of Sep. 2002. It provides the conceptual basis notably for the non-internationally mandated invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002–2003. The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, Washington, DC, Sep. 2002, URL <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

¹¹ See, e.g., Glennon, M. J., ‘Why the Security Council failed’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003), pp. 16–35.

¹² See Rotfeld, A. D., ‘Introduction: global security after 11 September 2001’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 1–18.

¹³ Anthony I. *et al.*, ‘The Euro-Atlantic system and global security’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 47–78; and Dunay, P. and Lachowski, Z., ‘Euro-Atlantic organizations and relationships’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 31–66.

better answers to these challenges, but it seems clear that modern conditions now provide a permanent constraint at least on the *way* in which the power of the nation state can be used—and perhaps even on its inherent value.

There are other, more general limitations on the use of military power in the present environment. It can destroy enemies but cannot coerce friends. It can win a conflict but cannot build or rebuild peace afterwards. It can temporarily discipline societies but not transform them. It is at best a double-edged weapon as a conveyor of values, since the targets of the force are more likely to react to the force itself than to the good intentions and beliefs of those wielding it. On reflection, most of the great victories for progressive values in the 20th century—the reunification of Germany and Europe, the fall of the majority of Communist regimes, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the rehabilitations of Viet Nam and Cambodia, and the virtual elimination of interstate conflicts in Latin America¹⁴—were brought about not by direct external force but, in the last analysis, by the internal weaknesses of authoritarianism and the appeal of freer ways of being. At most, other players' military power could be said to have deterred and contained the negative forces involved so that the vectors of change could take their course. In sum, it seems not more but less correct today than in the 20th century to state that—at least in terms of ultimate effect—'power comes from the barrel of a gun'.

Military instruments seem to work better when used either in combination with others—political, economic, civilian and humanitarian—or sequentially as a first step to suppress violence so that more constructive forces can come into play. Similarly, there seem to be almost no circumstances today (except, perhaps, within its own borders) in which action by a single nation can solve a security problem for good. The transnational nature of many threats—terrorism, proliferation, crime, disease, illegal migration, violent climate and environmental change, problems of energy supply and the supply of other vital resources—self-evidently makes it necessary to tackle them in similar transnational style, ideally through the setting of universally applicable goals and common efforts. Interdependence within the global economy allows no state to guard and strengthen its social and economic welfare alone. The policy experiment made by the Bush Administration was not actually a unilateral one: in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also in Haiti, US troops acted with a number of other nations at their side. What the USA did try to do in the years after 2001 was to choose its allies freely each time and avoid being bound by the fixed membership, procedures or rules of any given institution.¹⁵ In the event, the institutions took their 'revenge' within a remarkably short time—demonstrating how reliant even the most powerful nation has become, in reality, on attracting larger numbers of supporters and being able to draw on institutional competences. Within one month of deposing Saddam Hussein the USA was

¹⁴ See chapter 6 in this volume.

¹⁵ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in a speech that 'the mission must determine the coalition and not the coalition the mission'. 'Secretary Rumsfeld speaks on "21st century" transformation of US armed forces', Washington, DC, 31 Jan. 2002, URL <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef2.html>>.

seeking UN authority for regulating the questions of sanctions against Iraq and Iraqi debt. By early 2004 it was pressing the UN Secretary-General for help in designing Iraq's new political regime. By the middle of 2004 it was calling on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not only to take full responsibility for the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, but also to consider supporting military reconstruction and eventually perhaps the deployment of the Multinational Force in Iraq itself.¹⁶

Dependency, however, works in both directions: institutions are nothing without their member nations. Up to the present, no institution has acquired the means to coerce or punish a nation state (or similar offender) except by using other nation states as its instruments.¹⁷ However, to stop the analysis at this point would be to miss some very important changes in the nature of modern institutional groupings compared with, for example, the alliances and treaty settlements of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The latter could never have more power than the sum of their parts. During the 20th century, in a variety of contexts and conditions, states began to experiment with granting their joint institutions, on the one hand, *legislative* and *normative* powers and, on the other hand, 'supranational' ownership and use of *resources*, including the resource of operational authority. The supreme example of the former trend is the post-1945 United Nations Organization, which from the very beginning was endowed with guardianship of certain universal values, including those of peace and security, and the right to authorize the use of force across the boundaries of traditional state sovereignty in the case of severe threat to these values. The archetype of *supranationality* is the European Union (EU), which evolved out of the European Communities, designed for common management of European coal and steel resources and a common free trading area. Today, the EU's unique system of collective governance places in the hands of a supranational executive body—the European Commission—substantial 'own resources' in cash and the right, for example, to negotiate trade and aviation agreements on behalf of all member governments. The EU also has a uniquely well-developed and permanent function of collective legislation—the ability to pass laws that are directly applicable within all members' jurisdiction and to enforce them through a supranational court. It does not, however, claim the right to exercise these powers beyond its own territory, or indeed to establish its own 'norms' for intervention.¹⁸

Views have differed since 2001 on whether events are promoting the further development of this new style of institutionalization, or whether—as a result

¹⁶ See, e.g., Evans, G., 'When is it right to fight?'; and Berdal, M., 'The UN after Iraq', *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 3 (autumn 2004), pp. 58–82 and 83–102, respectively.

¹⁷ NATO, the most strongly integrated defence organization in the world, still needs an ad hoc political decision by its members to activate their mutual aid in the event of an attack. Repeated efforts to endow the UN with 'stand-by forces' ready to move at the Secretary-General's command have foundered.

¹⁸ The 2003 European Security Strategy does not explicitly set out the conditions for using armed force under the EU's authority; but in general it emphasizes the role of the UN as providing a superior and universal normative framework. Council of the European Union, 'A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf>.

of institutions' perceived failure to block the latest threats and the USA's determination to tackle them in a different way—'deinstitutionalization' will be the trend of the future. The latter thesis is the harder to defend. The legislative–normative experiment is being deepened through a range of new UN enactments and conventions governing security-related behaviour at sub-state and even individual level,¹⁹ which is logical enough given the non-state and trans-state nature of many new threats. The International Criminal Court (ICC)²⁰ is supported thus far by 97 of the 191 UN member states.²¹ Adherence to treaties and participation in such vital functional organs as the World Trade Organization (WTO) are gradually becoming more complete, notably by the inclusion of former Communist states. The EU is extending its uniquely deep and complex *integrative* process to the whole territory of the former Western and Eastern blocs in Europe,²² and it is creating rules and central governing authorities for its nations in new spheres such as border control and internal order, a single currency and military crisis management. It is true that a number of 'rogue' states, with non-participatory internal regimes and a fixation with their own sovereignty, have refused to join in the internationalization process,²³ and that their absence seriously vitiates some of the basic instruments of global security, such as the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). It is also true that the world's sole remaining superpower has stayed outside or withdrawn from some equally critical new global measures, including the ICC, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on limiting greenhouse gas emissions.²⁴ However, the very attention and concern which these examples attract underlines how exceptional they have become, and allows the international community's positive energies to be concentrated against them. There is not a single so-called rogue state that is not currently

¹⁹ Most notably, UN Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 Sep. 2001, which introduced universal rules against terrorist financing; and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004, which did the same for unauthorized ownership and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. UN conventions with individual-level impact have recently been signed against corruption and money laundering. The continued multiplication of agreements universally banning certain 'inhumane weapons' could be seen in the same light. UN Security Council resolutions from 1946 to 2005 are available at URL <<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>>.

²⁰ Wiharta, S., 'The International Criminal Court', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 13), pp. 153–66.

²¹ Guyana became the 97th country to deposit its instrument of ratification of the 1998 Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, on 24 Sep. 2004. ICC, 'States parties to the Rome Statute', URL <<http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html>>.

²² The EU border will extend to the edge of the Middle East if and when Turkey joins.

²³ Such states typically have very low 'indexes of globalization', i.e., openness to and penetration by international cultural, as well as economic and political, influences.

²⁴ The CTBT was opened for signature on 24 Sep. 1996 and will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by the 44 members of the Conference on Disarmament with nuclear power or research reactors on their territories. For the states which have signed and ratified the CTBT see annex A in this volume. The text of the CTBT is reproduced in *SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997), pp. 414–31. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will enter into force on 16 Feb. 2005, following Russia's ratification. For the Kyoto Protocol and a list of the signatories see URL <<http://unfccc.int/>>.

under intense outside scrutiny and pressure of some kind.²⁵ Perhaps most importantly, the majority of the world's regions are now seeking to form *local* multinational organizations that can provide added value in terms of conflict prevention, trade and economics, and the combating of diverse security threats. Although none has progressed as far as the EU in systemic terms—and states in most regions still have problems in accepting socially and politically intrusive common measures—the trend since 2002 in institutions such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia–Pacific Economic Forum, the Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market), the African Union and various African sub-regional communities has been to raise their level of ambition and to introduce the idea of regional security management more explicitly into their agendas than before.²⁶ This could be interpreted not only as a symptom of stabilization and new ambitions within the regions themselves but also as a response to the way in which global evolution is driving such actors to defend their interests. Just as they join forces for the purpose of trade negotiations (notably in the WTO framework), their attempts at greater regional self-management in security can be seen as a hedge against the use of divide-and-rule tactics or violent intervention in their backyards by the USA—or any other large power. The world's worst problem regions are defined today *inter alia* by the absence of such organizations or their failure to make them work: hence the logic of the attempts made in 2003–2004 (whatever their specific weaknesses) to design a regional integration framework for the 'greater Middle East'.²⁷

The power of non-state actors

As the monopoly on power by the traditional nation state has weakened, so has its monopoly on the assets and capacities associated with security transactions and processes, both 'old' and 'new'. The corporate actors of the private business sector, NGOs, other civil society groupings, cultural and religious communities and the media may all seek to influence the state in ways that can more or less be accommodated in traditional power relationships. Today, however, they also possess elements of *independent* power and influence over processes that are highly relevant for security. The case of the private sector is examined here first.²⁸

²⁵ For discussion of a successful example of such pressure, Libya's agreement with the UK and the USA in 2003 to abandon efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, see chapter 14 in this volume.

²⁶ For details and memberships of these organizations see the glossary in this volume.

²⁷ Other problematic regions from this viewpoint are South Asia; the former Soviet space (where the Russia-led framework of integration is rejected or at least mistrusted by some key nations and does not fully deliver the goods in practical terms); and, to a lesser extent, North-East Asia. There has been speculation over whether the Six-Party Talks to discuss the Korean peninsula's problems might turn into a more permanent security-building framework for this sub-region. See chapter 12 in this volume; and Gill, B., 'China's new security multilateralism and its implications for the Asia–Pacific region', *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 207–30. On the greater Middle East see chapter 5 in this volume.

²⁸ For general and specific aspects of this interface see Bailes, A. J. K. and Frommelt, I. (eds), *SIPRI, Business and Security: Public–Private Sector Relationships in a New Security Environment* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).

Ever since the first differentiated human societies developed, warriors have relied on merchants to make or buy weapons and to create the wealth needed to finance armies. In the early 21st century, the interdependence of the private economy and of state-provided security has become far more complex and the balance of power has shifted towards corporate players in many respects. Most technologies that convey an advantage in the defence sphere are now originated as part of general science and technology development, with additional or alternative applications in the civil sector.²⁹ Countries such as the UK and the USA are increasingly outsourcing to private providers many of the services and resources required for security operations, not only at home and in peacetime but also in field operations overseas and sometimes even on the front line.³⁰ Private military and security companies provide services on their own initiative around the world, in ways that are far more diverse than the traditional role of mercenaries in combat.³¹ Private capital and commerce are now recognized as having a critical role in the rebuilding and normalization of post-conflict areas.

The scale of change becomes much clearer, however, when broader dimensions of security are brought into the picture. The most familiar and debated issue is the role that transnational companies play in the globalization process. Many critics would argue that they may damage the security as well as the identity and autonomy of weaker states; that they are the main culprits in the destruction of the natural environment and exhaustion of natural resources, *inter alia* through logging and opencast mining; that they have been known to directly foment conflict or encourage repressive regimes in regions of raw material extraction;³² that they indirectly sustain violence by engaging in or condoning the traffic in 'conflict diamonds' and other 'conflict commodities', and so on.³³ Growing awareness of these problems has inspired corrective efforts, including important efforts by business itself, to ensure that corporate actors in conflict-prone areas avoid the potential pitfalls and where possible achieve a positive and stabilizing effect.³⁴ When it comes to the 'new threats', the help of business is needed not only for blocking terrorist finance but also for developing, updating, applying and enforcing strategic export controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other dangerous goods and tech-

²⁹ Hagelin, B., 'Science- and technology-based military innovation: the United States and Europe', *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 285–304.

³⁰ E.g., during the US military campaign in Iraq in 2003–2004 private security companies provided guards as well as supply and maintenance services in the front line.

³¹ See Black, C., 'The security of business: a view from the security industry', eds Bailes and Frommelt (note 28), pp. 173–82; and Holmqvist, C., *Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 9 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Jan. 2005), URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/publications/policy_papers.html>.

³² Batruch, C., 'Oil and conflict: Lundin Petroleum's experience in Sudan', and Adejumbi, P., 'A view from Africa', eds Bailes and Frommelt (note 28), pp. 148–60 and 242–53, respectively.

³³ See Bone, A., 'Conflict diamonds: the De Beers Group and the Kimberley Process', eds Bailes and Frommelt (note 28), pp. 129–47.

³⁴ Batruch (note 32); and Bailes and Frommelt (note 28), appendices 1 and 2, pp. 261–309. The appendices list organizations that provide suitable codes of conduct for business in this and other security-relevant spheres.

nologies—especially ‘dual-use’ items.³⁵ Private companies are also heavily engaged in cooperative programmes for WMD disposal.³⁶ Last but not least, in the important new field of *infrastructure security*, a combination of privatization and internationalization has placed most developed countries in a situation where the ownership and management of all their vital infrastructures and utilities (electricity, gas and oil, water and waste disposal, food and fuel delivery, transport networks and communications) lie in the private sector and often in foreign hands. Companies now stand in the front line in terms of protecting such systems against both natural forces and possible human attacks, and in ensuring the rapid resumption of service after emergencies.

This situation does not have to be inherently dangerous for security, since most companies have the same interest as governments in the safety and smooth functioning of their respective societies. It does, however, demand new forms of public–private sector planning and regulation, dialogue and partnership that the world has so far hardly started to design, let alone implement. Most existing rules and codes of conduct in this area are voluntary and developed by (a limited proportion of) businesses.³⁷ Only recently have enactments such as UN Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540 been designed consciously to govern corporate and individual actions as well as those of state actors, and even they depend critically on national enforcement.³⁸ Moreover, these measures and most of the others undertaken since 11 September 2001 which affect corporate activity—such as tightened export controls and new measures to increase the security of aviation, container traffic and ports—have been imposed without prior consultation with the private sector, although they all create new burdens and costs. This lack of dialogue is anachronistic in an age of interactive and cooperative security, and also inefficient since it makes it impossible to draw on companies’ own considerable experience of risk analysis and risk management. It should be a major aim of analysts and policy makers in the next few years to find better ways to enlist the world of business as a conscious, active and willing partner.³⁹

In the power relationship between state and *civil society* actors, latest trends have not at first sight been favourable to the latter. It is true that terrorists and other extremists⁴⁰ have new openings for action as a result of international and internal mobility, illegal trafficking and finance, and the scope for misuse of the Internet. The peaceful majority of the world’s population, however, find themselves on the receiving end both of threats from these few individuals and

³⁵ On export controls see chapter 17 in this volume.

³⁶ Notably, in the framework of the Group of Eight industrialized nations’ Global Partnership. See Anthony, I., *Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction*, SIPRI Research Report no. 19 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).

³⁷ Bailes and Frommelt (note 34).

³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 Sep. 2001; and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004. Resolution 1540 is reproduced in appendix 11A in this volume.

³⁹ Bailes, A. J. K., ‘Business and the new security agenda: victim, accomplice or ally?’, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, Oct. 2004, URL <<http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/PDF/BondiOpinionsOct2004.pdf>>.

⁴⁰ E.g., those carrying out sabotage in the name of animal rights, anti-abortion, anti-globalization and environmental campaigns.

of other existential dangers involving the breakdown of modern civilized support systems. People's *dependence* on those systems is also proportionally greater than that of the predominantly rural, self-supplying and self-protecting populations of earlier days. At the political level, the developed West's shift towards an action-oriented mode of security excludes the bulk of the Western populations from participation, since an interventionist agenda creates strong pressure for professional armies and militates against democratic control inasmuch as decisions on specific operations generally lie with the executive branch. The tendency towards multilateralization and institutionalization of security activity merely compounds the difficulties for popular control. The EU's European Parliament is not allowed to intervene in European Security and Defence Policy decisions (it does not even control the major part of their financing, whereas national parliaments can at least vote on defence budgets); NATO's Parliamentary Assembly has no budgetary function; and the UN does not even have a 'parliament' equivalent in this context.⁴¹ Analysts have warned that the new focus since 11 September 2001 on tightening internal security against terrorist threats could imperil civil society's rights on several levels—by eroding judicial norms and individual rights within the legal process, weakening data privacy rules, placing new curbs on free speech and freedom of movement, and possibly aggravating inter-cultural and inter-ethnic divides.⁴²

A wider survey of global development since 1989–90, however, would convey a more complex message. The number and proportion of states following some recognized form of democracy have grown steadily over these years. Citizens' rights—and opportunities to exercise them—vary widely within such political systems, but they all imply some degree of influence for public opinion and some limit to the power of a government that forfeits public confidence. The media, meanwhile, have a growing capacity to stir up public opposition and to expose official wrongdoing. They can play a significant role in prompting security interventions, by drawing global attention in real time to civil conflicts, massacres, famines, and the like. (Institutions such as the UN and NATO have acknowledged the force of the media *inter alia* by studying the use of information as a deliberate instrument of conflict management.⁴³) NGOs can exploit the same asymmetric 'force multipliers' inherent in a globalized world system that are open to the terrorists, but for generally more benign purposes such as fund-raising, lobbying, and charitable and humanitarian initiatives. They have, for example, substantially influenced the inter-

⁴¹ For a detailed discussion of the democratic control issue in relation to intervention policies see chapter 4 in this volume

⁴² See, e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen, A., 'Civil liberties and counter-terrorism: a European point of view', Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, 2004, URL <<http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/PDF/articles/Anja.pdf>>; and Caparini, M., 'Security sector reform and NATO and EU enlargement', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 13), pp. 237–60.

⁴³ Since the Rwanda conflict—and also in the light of the experience in the Balkans—it has been increasingly understood that controlling the information available to warring factions and local populations can have a decisive effect on crisis outcomes. Media incitement to genocide can now be punished as a war crime.

governmental arms control agenda both by focusing on certain topics (e.g., in the 1990s, French nuclear testing, landmines and small arms) and by failing to exercise sustained pressure on others (e.g., the size of nuclear arsenals and missile defence).⁴⁴

Non-governmental organizations using state-of-the-art publicity techniques can also steer the decisions of *corporate* actors to a degree that many governments might envy. Environmental lobbies have driven businesses to ‘green’ their image, public attitudes make it hard to market genetically modified food in Europe, and anti-sweatshop campaigning has changed the social responsibility policies of companies using labour from the developing world. NGO agitation has several times forced oil and other extractive companies to withdraw from conflict regions—and further examples could be cited. What underlies all these cases is the rise of consumer power resulting from the sheer scale of consumer spending, the growing internationalization of consumer markets and the accessibility of most developed-world consumers to media and NGO messages. For analogous reasons, ‘shareholder power’ has also become a significant factor in business planning and decisions. If the present debate about corporate governance is in part a reaction to and recognition of the private sector’s growing power, the highly publicized recent cases where business leaders have been caught and punished—and the new government controls which this has prompted—are already helping to constrain the way in which corporate power is used. In sum, civil society actors may rarely succeed in *preventing* wrong actions, whether by governments or corporations; but they are becoming increasingly practised at *exposing* and *punishing* such actions after a lapse of time⁴⁵ and at promoting new advances in state and global legislation to stop further abuses. The outstanding, and very large, question that remains is who can and should regulate the exercise of power by civil society entities themselves.

III. Shared challenges: diverging agendas?

The world has never been free, and is never likely to be free, of diverging and sometimes clashing security interests. Differences of interest may pit state against state, but also bloc against bloc, non-state actor against non-state actor, business against business and one ‘historical’ or ‘functional’ constituency (notably in the case of belief-based groups) against another. These phenomena need not of themselves do damage to international security. Some types of difference may result in useful checks and balances, thus promoting healthy competition and helping to deter excess. Security problems do arise, both for

⁴⁴ Kile, S. N., ‘Ballistic missile defence’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 647–58. On the nuclear arsenals as of Jan. 2005 see appendix 12A in this volume.

⁴⁵ Recent examples are the exposure by the media and parliaments of the misuse of intelligence by members of the US-led coalition that overthrew Saddam Hussein, which took a little over 1 year after the invasion, and the success of private actors in getting the US Supreme Court to rule against the detention of prisoners from the Afghanistan conflict and elsewhere at Guantánamo Bay, which took 2 years.

the parties themselves and for other stakeholders, if they are unable—for whatever reason—to manage their differences in a non-violent manner.

In the early 21st century, the major industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere (including China and Russia) no longer regard each other as strategic adversaries in any ideological, existential or permanent sense. This does not mean that there are not conflicting interests and elements of competition, even between the USA and its military allies in Europe. Some relationships such as the China–USA one are still highly ambivalent, retaining features of dispute on issues of both principle and practice. Potential ‘hot spots’ include those between China and the USA over Taiwan, and between Russia and the Western powers over the handling of new crises on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For all this, most analysts and policy makers would agree that open military conflict between any of these powers is unlikely in any short-term future. The chance that a conflict elsewhere in the world will draw two powers from the North into intervention on different sides is also quite remote, compared with cold war times. The growing attention to transnational and non-military security challenges has highlighted reasons for solidarity among this group of actors: they all have more to lose than gain from terrorism, would prefer not be challenged by emergent nuclear weapon powers, and benefit from stable energy flows and prices. Overall, and especially when economic transactions are brought into the picture, the trend in the major part of the northern hemisphere seems set towards greater interdependence, more widespread acceptance of joint frameworks of regulation, and the sublimation of remaining elements of competition and conflict to the political or legal level.

It is natural, therefore, to see the main opposition of interests in the world today as separating the ‘North’ from the ‘South’, or the developed from the developing group of nations. Both terminologies are of course open to manifold objections and must be used with caution. The ‘South’ includes nations such as Australia while geographic trouble spots such as North Korea and the notorious ‘arc of conflict’ from the Arab regions to Central Asia lie well north of the equator. The category of ‘developing’ nations contains everything from the world’s smallest and poorest states to leading regional powers such as Brazil and India, which have become important centres of economic and strategic influence, technology and service provision. It is not without reason, however, that the term ‘North–South’ has become common parlance when addressing global challenges in the fields of trade, finance and sustainable development. Here, the interests of North and South can be seen as an inter-linked circle where the acts of one party—for instance, keeping down certain commodity prices, keeping up domestic subsidies or withholding oil supplies—are liable to damage the other party in zero-sum fashion unless win–win management solutions can be found.

In the field of security, the relationship between North and South has also often taken a zero-sum form, notably during the colonial period. The use of developing countries as proxies by the Western and Eastern blocs in the cold war was a more complicated case, but this still more often hurt than helped the

client states involved, given the costs, burdens and local vendettas that it drew them into. By the end of the 20th century, however, the very animus that built up over the North's impact on the South in *non-military* dimensions—ill effects of globalization, the debt issue, destruction of the environment, and so on—hinted that the zero-sum picture had become less obviously applicable on the military front. The great majority of new conflicts after 1990 were South–South, or more rarely North–North (e.g., in the Balkans and Caucasus), and almost exclusively intra-state.⁴⁶ Major powers in the North became engaged predominantly in the context of multilateral peace operations, and there were cases where former colonies actually invited the former colonial power to help them.⁴⁷ If security interests in the North and the South still diverged, therefore, it was not so much because of zero-sum feedback loops as because of diverging needs and priorities: leading the North in particular to pursue security agendas that were, at best, unrelated to requirements in the South and, at worst, unhelpful to them.⁴⁸

Put briefly, this 'agenda gap' arises because the South is currently much worse hit than the North by phenomena at two different ends of the security spectrum: by armed conflict and other forms of physical force (lawlessness, crime, and intra-familial and gender-related violence), and by 'human security' challenges such as poverty, hunger, disease, accidents and natural disasters, exhaustion of natural resources and environmental damage—together with the forced migration to which all these factors may contribute. The world community has not failed to recognize this, in the first instance by the growing focus on conflict management in all the major security institutions after 1990, and in the second case most notably by the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN on 8 September 2000, which set goals for the alleviation of poverty, illiteracy and other human scourges.⁴⁹ However, even before the sharp agenda shift caused by the events of 11 September 2001, there was reason to doubt whether the North was devoting sufficient energy to the task to overcome or even significantly narrow the North–South 'security gap'. The North's peace-making capacities were devoted preferentially during the 1990s to conflicts within its own area (the Balkans and, in Russia's case, conflicts on post-Soviet territory) and to cases elsewhere that directly engaged the North's own interests, such as the 1991 Gulf War. Resources for South–South conflicts of lesser strategic importance were increasingly provided by the South itself, or not at all.⁵⁰ On the human security front, statistics point to a growing

⁴⁶ All of the 19 major armed conflicts ongoing in 2004 could be defined as intra-state, involving disputes over the control of government and/or territory. See chapter 2 and appendix 2A in this volume.

⁴⁷ On the case of Sierra Leone and the UK see chapter 8 in this volume. (2 Fns added)

⁴⁸ On the negative effect this has on the security of the North see chapter 7 in this volume.

⁴⁹ United Nations, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 8 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>>.

⁵⁰ In Dec. 2004 the top 20 troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations were all developing nations. Among the developed nations, only the UK and the USA remained on the list of the top 30 contributors. It is fair to add that funds provided by developed nations through their contributions to the UN helped to finance many developing country deployments. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Ranking of military and civilian police contributions to UN operations',

diversity of experience among actors in the South, combined with an actually widening gap between the world's richest and poorest states.⁵¹ Progress reports on the Millennium Declaration have been a litany of under- or unfulfilled commitments—to the point where the UN Secretary-General has found it necessary to plan for a major relaunch of the millennium initiative in 2005 in combination with follow-up to the 2004 report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.⁵² At the same time, the growing dangers to mankind from human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), other epidemic diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and—potentially—avian influenza, the destruction of natural habitats and resources, and longer-term climate change all stand to hit the world's poorer populations much harder than its richer ones, at least in the short and medium terms. Particularly sinister is the feedback loop between such dangers to human life and their impact on the world's developing economies, which threatens to widen the North–South gap in both dimensions at once. It was recently estimated that by 2025 deaths from AIDS, and the related medical costs, could slow Chinese and Indian economic growth by 33 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively, and cause the Russian economy to shrink by 40 per cent.⁵³

Some security challenges, however, have been aggravated by parallel rather than divergent trends in the North and the South. The end of East–West confrontation has freed actors in the North and the South to pursue their security interests more actively *inter alia* by armed intervention, because the danger of escalation (or retaliation against the intervener's homeland) has been so greatly reduced. In developed nations, the case for 'humanitarian intervention' was pushed during the 1990s by thinkers of the Left as much as the Right. The 'peace dividend' that members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty

31 Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>. See also chapter 3 in this volume.

⁵¹ Statistics on the incidence of poverty in the world's nations, measured by the number of persons living on less than \$1 or less than \$2 per day, are published by the World Bank. World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2004* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2004). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) monitors countries' performance under a similar 'poverty index' but also under a Human Development Index based on a combination of life expectancy and access to education, literacy and income. The UNDP report calculates that 323 million people are living on less than \$1 per day in sub-Saharan Africa and 432 million in South Asia. It shows the Human Development Index as having *fallen* for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Zambia in the period 1980–90, and for as many as 20 states in 1990–2002, of which 13 were in sub-Saharan Africa. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2004), URL <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/>>.

⁵² The basis for the relaunch is expected to be the lengthy report unveiled on 17 Jan. 2005 by an expert group led by Dr Jeffrey Sachs in the framework of the Millennium Project at the UN University. This exposes the lack of progress on specific Millennium Goals adopted in 2000 and calls for a fresh effort to halve world poverty by 2015, which could require an estimated \$50 billion of additional aid per year. UN Millennium Project, 'Investing in development: a practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals', Overview report, 2005, URL <<http://unmp.forumone.com/>>.

⁵³ Behrman, G., 'The cost of AIDS in Asia', *Newsweek*, 19 July 2004, p. 51. The total number of people living with HIV/AIDS is currently estimated at 39.4 million. There were an estimated 4.9 million new cases of infection and 3.1 million deaths in 2004, of which 2.8 million were in the southern hemisphere. Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, 'AIDS epidemic update: December 2004', URL <<http://www.unaids.org/wad2004/report.html>>.

Organization took in the form of defence cuts in the first part of the decade was soon succeeded by exhortations to NATO and EU members to build up their *deployable* defence capabilities again. Non-European governments have been subject to similar pressures, not only because of the diversion of sales efforts by West-based defence producers, but also because of continuing tensions and strategic competition in some regions and the interest in developing new joint capacities for local peacekeeping in others. The need which the established nuclear weapon powers apparently feel to retain (and to continue, at least qualitatively, enhancing) their nuclear capacities has been matched by—and some would say has added to—the nuclear proliferation trend in parts of the developing world. The traditional, cold war disarmament agenda has been largely squeezed out between these forces operating in both hemispheres. Significantly, new arms control initiatives in the late 1990s addressed items—such as anti-personnel mines and small arms—which the powers in the North had no strong self-interest in retaining and which, even in the South, figured more as a humanitarian scourge than as a primary determinant of conflicts won or lost.⁵⁴

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it was possible to hope for a new convergence between the North's and the South's semi-detached agendas. Al-Qaeda's transnational style of terrorism patently could not be tackled except by worldwide action. The revealed vulnerability of the world's single superpower could have created new fellow-feeling with the challenges faced by weaker communities. Several world leaders argued for greater efforts to tackle not just terrorism but also 'the causes of terrorism', which they saw as linked with underdevelopment, the distribution of resources, and problems of alienation and exclusion that also exist in the developed West.⁵⁵ The EU collectively warned against any over-simple labelling of the 'enemy', and in particular its identification with the international community of Islam, that would risk a descent into religious intolerance and racism.⁵⁶

In a sequence of events which future historians may look back on as tragic, however, the particular forms of response chosen by the USA—and supported by various of its partners—produced a cumulative effect that, at least in the short term, only widened the North–South gap. The new doctrinal focus on asymmetric threats implied seeing weaker, smaller and less conventional players (including 'failed states') not as people to be helped or at worst marginalized, but as a source of deadly threat. The new readiness to use force against such threats took an inherently discriminatory form since the targets chosen

⁵⁴ These challenges for the arms control agenda are explored at more length in Bailes, A. J. K., 'Arms control: how to move from the cold war legacy to the needs of a globalized world?', Proceedings of the Bonn International Center for Conversion 10th Anniversary Symposium, Apr. 2004, URL <<http://www.bicc.de>>.

⁵⁵ The EU's European Security Strategy, when addressing the causes of terrorism, states that 'this phenomenon is also a part of our own society'. Council of the European Union (note 18).

⁵⁶ Council of the European Union, 'Conclusions and plan of action of the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001', SN140/01, Brussels, URL <<http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/140.en.pdf>>.

were all non-Western ones at lower levels of development—Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen, where the USA carried out a precision strike with the acquiescence of the local government. The freedom which the Bush Administration granted itself to act, where necessary, unilaterally and without a UN mandate, made it much harder for the broader community of states to share ownership or to import shared norms into the process. Other measures taken in the name of the ‘global war on terrorism’ had discriminatory effects, whether wished or incidental, either against developing-world travellers and businessmen (e.g., the USA’s new visa procedures and the strengthening of West-based export control groupings) or against citizens from minority ethnic groups in developed states. The USA’s increased security assistance to countries seen as combating their own ‘terrorists’, and its withdrawal of military aid from those who refused to sign exemptions for US personnel from the jurisdiction of the ICC,⁵⁷ risked dividing and polarizing both the states concerned and their regions.

Meanwhile, the military burdens placed on the states which joined the USA’s coalitions, and the strain placed on Euro-Atlantic relations by disputes over these same issues, inevitably distracted attention from other regions’ non-terrorist-related problems and aggravated the problem of getting support from the North for intervention in other conflicts.⁵⁸ In the new military peacekeeping operations launched under UN command in 2002–2004, NATO and EU members contributed only token numbers of personnel.⁵⁹ For all the talk of combating the causes of terrorism, the 5 per cent real-terms growth in the official development assistance given by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) between 2002 and 2003 was lower than the 7 per cent growth achieved between 2001 and 2002, and eight EU members showed negative growth (although mainly for technical reasons connected with the phasing of payments).⁶⁰ The USA did achieve a further real growth of 16.9 per cent in its development aid in 2003, but this included payments to Iraq,⁶¹ while comparable or higher rates of growth in its defence-related assistance ensured that there would be no overall switch from ‘harder’ to ‘softer’ methods for

⁵⁷ Wiharta (note 20).

⁵⁸ *Vide* the difficulty experienced in persuading the USA to intervene, when invited, in Liberia, and the reluctance of most leading powers to recognize the situation in the Darfur province of Sudan in mid-2004 as constituting genocide (or to accept any other compelling justification for using their own resources there). The general issue of how to define cases for ‘humanitarian intervention’ is addressed below.

⁵⁹ Five new operations were launched in 2002–2004. Total personnel contributed by all NATO and EU states in 2004 were as follows: UNMISSET (East Timor), 55 out of 619; UNMIL (Liberia), 810 out of 15 788; UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), 238 out of 6215; MINUSTAH (Haiti), 424 out of 7406; and ONUB (Burundi), 9 out of 5454. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Monthly summary of contributors of military and civilian police personnel’, Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>.

⁶⁰ OECD, Aid from DAC members, Statistics, data and indicators, ‘Final ODA data for 2003’, URL <http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_495602_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>. The EU states with some measure of real decrease were Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Overall, DAC countries’ aid as a proportion of their gross national income is calculated by the OECD to be lower in 2005 (0.25%) than the average for the years 1980–92 (0.33%).

⁶¹ US payments to Iraq in 2003 were estimated at \$1.9 billion. OECD (note 60).

promoting security.⁶² Meanwhile, the global flow of arms transfers was higher in 2003 than any year since 1999, with developing countries such as China and India among the largest recipients.⁶³

One of the most serious challenges facing any attempt, today, to relaunch movement towards a working system of world security governance is to overcome the divisive legacy of these developments. Reputable opinion polls have shown a marked shift of opinion against the USA and its policies—and to some extent against its coalition partners—even in developing countries that are traditionally tough on terrorism.⁶⁴ The reasons for the developed world to work actively to reverse this growing North–South polarization are by no means limited to charity and justice. Precisely because the asymmetric threats are real, it can make no sense for the richest countries that are most exposed to these threats to behave in a way that drives new state and non-state recruits to the terrorist cause. The deliberately induced conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown clearly enough that the use of force alone against a chaotic or deviant state risks merely increasing the chaos and planting seeds for future deviance. As some Europeans stressed in the specific context of learning lessons from 11 September 2001,⁶⁵ any conflict anywhere—even if initially unrelated to terrorism and with no anti-North agenda—creates a hole in the fabric of international order and a new environment for breeding transnational threats. There is no convincing prescription for curbing these effects that does not involve active and *voluntary* cooperation between the North’s strongest security providers and the widest possible range of partners in other regions. The creation of a few—probably embattled—Western proxy states in strategic areas showed itself to be a thoroughly bad solution in cold war conditions, and is more plainly inadequate and counterproductive today. Holding other states hostage to possible unilateral attacks from the North can only motivate them

⁶² The US Department of State military assistance budget rose from \$24 billion in financial year (FY) 2002 to \$25.4 billion in FY 2003, of which \$5 billion was earmarked for terrorism-related partnerships. The Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign Military Financing budget (linked to the purchase of US defence equipment) rose from \$3.6 billion in FY 2001 to \$4.1 billion in FY 2003. The DOD budget for International Military Education and Training rose from \$58 million in FY 2001 to \$80 million in FY 2003.

⁶³ Hagelin, B., Bromley, M. and Wezeman, S. T., ‘International arms transfers’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 447–74.

⁶⁴ In 2 Pew Research Center opinion polls—with findings from 2002 and 2003, and from Feb. to March 2004—the former poll reported ‘favorable’ feelings towards the USA declining between 2002 and 2003 from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% in Nigeria, while respondents in Indonesia, Jordan Morocco and Pakistan put Osama bin Laden among the top 3 people in whom they would have confidence to ‘do the right thing regarding world affairs’. According to the 2004 results, a large majority of respondents in Jordan and Morocco thought suicide attacks against the coalition powers in Iraq were justifiable, and the percentages of respondents believing that the USA was ‘overreacting’ to terrorism were: Jordan 76%, Pakistan 66% and Turkey 55%. Pew Research Center, ‘Views of a changing world 2003: war with Iraq further divides global public’, 3 June 2003, URL <<http://www.people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>>; and ‘A year after Iraq war: mistrust of America in Europe ever higher, Muslim anger persists’, 16 Mar. 2004, URL <<http://www.people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>>.

⁶⁵ According to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, ‘We should work hard to broker peace where conflict threatens a region’s stability because we know the dangers of contagion’. Directgov, 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister’s speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, 7 Apr. 2002, URL <<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1712.asp>>.

more strongly to defend themselves, *inter alia* by asymmetric means, and makes it harder to build the North–South trust required to achieve timely and united UN decisions when military intervention is truly needed.

On 26 December 2004, the world was given a harsh reminder of the reality of interdependence between the conditions of human existence in North and South. The huge tsunamis that struck coastal areas around the Indian Ocean killed many hundreds of tourists and an estimated 300 000 local inhabitants. The event acted, literally, as a common shock to world society: calling forth in the first instance an unprecedented outpouring of private as well as official aid, and driving policy makers of the North into some major shifts of approach to issues ranging from developing-world debt to the construction of disaster warning systems and the handling of ongoing conflicts within affected states such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka.⁶⁶ It seems not overoptimistic to hope that the consequences will improve the political climate for readdressing the broader ‘millennium’ agenda discussed above, and perhaps even for more universal acceptance of the UN’s indispensable role, in 2005.

However, the resulting policy impulses and attitude changes will be incomplete if not accompanied by realization that the South is more than just a ‘weak link’ in the chain of global human security. It is not just that citizens in the North could be hit (on a much worse scale than by the tsunamis) by the South’s failure to contain new disease outbreaks, mismanagement of remaining natural resources or pressures leading to sudden large-scale migration. Developing and non-Western nations also hold positive instruments of power and can place the North in a situation of ‘reverse dependence’, most obviously when it comes to the ownership of oil and gas and other scarce natural resources and proximity to key delivery routes. Notoriously, the USA can only maintain its current massive deficits in the national budget and in foreign trade because Asian investors, in particular, are willing to continue buying dollars.⁶⁷ China’s foreign investments are growing: it bought out IBM’s computer-producing business in December 2004,⁶⁸ and its oil companies (like those in several other nations in the South) are making an ambitious entry to the overseas contracts market.⁶⁹ The rise in outsourcing of commercial services from developed to developing countries makes the former increasingly dependent on the functioning of infrastructures, and on the probity and good security practices of corporate partners, in the South as well as the North. As argued above, the diffusion of key security-related technologies (for conventional as well as potential mass-destruction weapons) makes it impossible effectively to prevent their misuse without active support from developing-world producers.⁷⁰ These last few points also underline a lesson that needs greater attention

⁶⁶ On this last issue see chapter 2 in this volume.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Munter, P., ‘US rates in thrall to foreign central banks’, *Financial Times* (US edn), 27 Nov. 2004, p. 11.

⁶⁸ ‘Lenovo buys IBM’s PC unit for \$1.75 billion’, *Financial Times*, 9 Dec. 2004, p. 15.

⁶⁹ Boxell, J. and Morrison, K., ‘A power shift: global oil companies find new rivals snapping at their heels’, *Financial Times*, 9 Dec. 2004, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Mallik, A., *Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Demand-side Perspective*, SIPRI Research Report no. 20 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004). See also chapter 11 in this volume.

in both research and policy making. Non-state as well as state actors in the developing world are now a necessary part of any comprehensive security solution. Frameworks, principles and motivations are urgently required to allow these actors to be mobilized for positive ends.⁷¹

IV. Modes of security action: intervention, the legislative method and integration

Among the many tendencies to oversimplification in the security debate of the past three years has been the inclination to argue for or against one mode of security action (e.g., military force) in isolation, or to argue for one mode as a preferred alternative to another. In reality, whether in the general pursuit of security, in combating new threats or in the specific field of arms control and non-proliferation, a mixture of means is the only thing that works. This section briefly discusses three different approaches that could contribute to such rational combinations (although reducing them to three is already an oversimplification): (a) intervention; (b) the legislative method; and (c) the historically novel method of integration.

Intervention

Intervention should not be interpreted only as the use of military force. As a generic approach it may include outside attempts at mediation and negotiation; the provision of humanitarian relief; non-military deployments (police and civilian experts); the use of economic sanctions, incentives and aid; and perhaps other, even more indirect, uses of ‘carrots and sticks’ to produce leverage. Intervention may be mandated by a more than national authority or not mandated at all: it may be consensual or non-consensual. What it always implies is the application of tangible or intangible resources that belong to outside actors, remain essentially under the control of those actors, and are designed to alter the given situation in a way not to be expected from the play of internal dynamics alone.

Motives to intervene are many, and the world is unlikely ever to wean itself from this method entirely. Easing human distress, including the impact of natural disasters (which are likely to increase in future), is *prima facie* the purest motive—although it has become linked with thorny questions about the international community’s right to come to the aid of suffering populations without their own governments’ consent.⁷² Another common and relatively

⁷¹ Private-sector movements for corporate responsibility (including security-related codes of conduct) have so far been strongly West- and North-dominated, and all the largest global campaigning NGOs are of developed-world *origin*. The recent initiatives (see note 19) to create universally applicable codes in the UN framework on subjects such as terrorist finance and WMD trafficking (and also money laundering and corruption) offer a regulatory framework for non-state actors in the South as well as the North, but make no, or inadequate, provision for assisting and ensuring implementation.

⁷² I.e., in cases of genocide, other severe abuses of human rights, famine or other widespread death and distress caused by ‘weak’ or collapsing government. For earlier proposals on codifying this responsibility see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Respon-*

altruistic motive is the wish to prevent, contain and end armed conflicts and to rebuild after them. Many states would recognize the rationale for joint action to keep open international trade routes—especially at sea—and to protect international rights of passage, if necessary by de-mining. Beyond these motives of common interest lies the territory of ‘extended’ self-defence: full of pitfalls that have been well illustrated by events since 11 September 2001, but nevertheless based on an acknowledged right of nations under Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁷³

There are, in fact, difficult issues attached to any kind of intervention, no matter how ‘clean’ or ‘soft’. There are resource costs and rarely any prospect of profits to balance them in the short term. There are risks in inserting a new element into a situation that by definition is imperfect and unstable. It can never be known what forces and consequences the intervention will unleash, and the interveners’ hopes and aims can be subverted in many ways. Humanitarian refugee camps have been exploited as bases by combatants, and negotiated settlements have led directly to a break-out of conflict elsewhere.⁷⁴ A successful intervention itself becomes part of the problem if it leads to ‘aid dependence’ or goes too far in relieving local actors of their political and moral responsibility.⁷⁵ A particularly crucial question for post-conflict evolution is whether the intervention has liberated local forces for positive change or whether it leaves behind a negative dynamic and a body politic lacking vital organs. Beyond these tangible indicators lie the complex issues of legality and legitimacy—which are not always the same thing. These are generally cited in relation to cases of armed and coercive intervention, but they should apply to any type of interference liable to have security consequences. Any situation where a stronger power makes use of its superior resources—or greater freedom of action—to influence a weaker one on the latter’s own territory gives rise to questions of motive and fairness and of taking continuing responsibility for the results. Since even the strongest nations and institutions have only a limited exportable surplus of security, the *choice* of where and when to intervene, and where and when not to intervene, is also a delicate matter and may be, in itself, an important determinant of legitimacy.

At least four contemporary lines of soul-searching and debate provide the background to the attention which Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel devoted to the intervention issue. The most prominent challenge is that of trying to construct or reconstruct a shared international understanding (in whatever form it might be recorded) on the circumstances in which coercive military intervention is justified; covering not only the familiar ‘conflict’ agenda but also

sibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre: Ottawa, 2001), URL <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp>>.

⁷³ The 1945 Charter of the United Nations outlaws the use of force in situations not covered by self-defence under Article 51 or collective security authorized under Chapter VII. For the UN Charter see URL <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>>.

⁷⁴ See Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M., ‘Major armed conflicts’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 113–21.

⁷⁵ For evidence of this in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo see Caparini, M., ‘Security sector reform in the Western Balkans’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 13), pp. 251–82.

situations involving or connected with the new threats of transnational terrorism and proliferation. The importance, and difficulty, of achieving rules that can convince and control both hemispheres (and all the different types of actor involved) was stressed in section II. Perhaps equally important is to recognize that the turbulence and damage caused by the introduction of new threat-linked intervention doctrines after September 2001 could be repeated in future, unless the solutions proposed now can be applied widely enough to cover even newer potential triggers for ‘extended self-defence’.⁷⁶ The second and closely related set of issues refers to *who* can and should intervene: the vertical division of labour between the UN and security-capable regional organizations in Europe and elsewhere; the horizontal division between organizations coexisting in the same region (such as NATO and the EU); and the conditions under which action by a coalition or individual state may be justified and worthy of UN recognition and support.

The third set of issues concerns the current inadequacy and suboptimal use of intervention resources, where a very important question is *what kind* of resources (and what combinations of them) should be preferentially developed. Accident and design have combined over the past decade to focus the attention of developed and developing countries on deployable military capabilities, now being belatedly supplemented by measures to enhance non-military capabilities such as police and system-building expertise. Other means that might be used both as carrots and sticks—including political and economic as well as traditional diplomatic resources—have received patchier attention and even the most self-consciously multifunctional institutions such as the EU are still some way from being able to combine smoothly their military instruments with the full range of others at their disposal. This helps to explain the lag in follow-up to the talk about tackling ‘causes’ of terrorism, as well as the international community’s long-term performance gap in conflict prevention.

Another set of issues refers to the non-state actors addressed above: whether and how to regulate the roles they play in crises, how to exploit their potential, and how to coordinate state and non-state inputs in any given case.

Legislation

The legislative method is also a very old one, used in nations for millennia and since the late 19th century increasingly in the international context. Its essence is to create explicit rules governing everyone within the sphere of application, with obvious benefits in terms of fairness, transparency and predictability, and in almost all cases also a function of restraint (rules limit the freedom of those subject to them by prescribing what must, as well as what must not, be done). These normative advantages are matched by practical ones, including the

⁷⁶ Possible motives for military strikes could be created, e.g., by conflicts over shrinking energy and other natural resources, including inhabitable or cultivable territory, or by perceived damage to a state’s vital interests from migration, disease, pollution, infrastructure sabotage, cyber-sabotage, etc., initiated from the territory of another state.

value of clear benchmarks for identifying and correcting unacceptable behaviour. Since the legislative method can be used at intra-state, interstate and supranational level; can bind non-state as well as state subjects; and can take many different forms, including looser and fuzzier commitments as well as legally binding obligations, it is *prima facie* much better matched than forceful intervention to the challenge of dealing with today's multiplicity of security risks and security actors.

It is argued in section II above that the world today is not necessarily moving away from the legislative method, and that it would be wrong to do so. However, the method has patent limitations and raises numerous problems. First is the question of who should be bound by a particular legislative instrument. For some security purposes the adoption of shared rules by a limited group may work well, whether or not the rules are then extended to others. The present structure of arms control and proliferation-related obligations and commitments has grown up in such a way that participation in key agreements such as the NPT remains voluntary, most controls on trade in strategically sensitive goods and technologies are administered by small groups of mostly developed nations,⁷⁷ and the only constraints on major conventional weapons that have achieved their set purpose are ones entered into at local or regional level. The optimality of this pattern is now being questioned by many who argue that certain obligations (notably connected with WMD) should be universal and compulsory, and that there should be wider ownership of controls on weapon-related and dual-use technologies.⁷⁸ At the same time, however, new initiatives with an exclusive membership, largely from the North, have come into being, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.⁷⁹ These different methods and preferences persist partly because of the lack of a solution to two further challenges, amply illustrated by the Iraq episode: how to define and judge *compliance* with legislative-type undertakings (with the necessary transparency and accuracy),⁸⁰ and how to *enforce* corrective action in the case of non-compliance. The USA and—to a lesser extent—other developed powers have—in very broad terms—tended to give priority to enforceability and enforcement over universality in regulatory solutions. It is they who have typically decided when to act coercively on perceived cases of non-compliance, and when not. States of the South are more likely to point out the objections to a situation in which a limited number of countries appoint themselves policemen, without necessarily obeying the laws in question themselves, or necessarily wielding the right truncheons to do the job.

If the use of the legislative method is to be protected and perhaps even extended in future, its proponents must address these difficulties. One chal-

⁷⁷ These groups include the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, for WMD-related exports; the Wassenaar Arrangement for exports of goods and technologies related to conventional arms; and the Missile Technology Control Regime for missile-related exports. See chapter 17 and the glossary in this volume.

⁷⁸ Mallik (note 70).

⁷⁹ See chapter 18 in this volume.

⁸⁰ See chapter 13 in this volume.

lenge is to update legislative instruments at all levels to deal with new realities, including the lessons of failure to detect and correct cases of non-compliance in the past. Measures enacted at different levels and in different domains that are, in practice, bearing on the same type of security challenge need to be better linked and conflicts between them resolved. Sometimes, simplification will be a better response than elaboration. Sometimes, at least as an initial approach, looser, fuzzier and more partially applicable instruments will be what works best. Where logic calls for wider, perhaps universal, participation and application, ways will have to be found to reconcile different constituencies' interests, to promote equal ownership and to ensure that all participants entering the system are equally ready both to obey the rules and to help enforce them. Finding the right legislative instruments to cover all relevant non-state actors as well—not just in relation to conflict but in all dimensions of security—is a particularly tough but fascinating challenge.

Integration

The method of integration as applied to security challenges has much in common with the legislative approach, but as practised in the EU it goes much further. The founders of the European Communities designed them to make war impossible between their members by turning the capacities needed for war-making into a shared, interdependent and supranationally administered resource.⁸¹ They succeeded from the outset in Western Europe, and the recent enlargement of the EU has extended the same effects to practically the whole European continent, with further applicant states already demonstrating, to various degrees, the 'contagion' of self-restraint as they vie to reach the standards for membership. Other *prima facie* advantages of the EU method are that: (a) EU competence covers virtually all spheres of governance relevant to handling the new threats; (b) it can create laws equally capable of governing state, private sector, civil society and even individual behaviour; and (c) it allows EU member states to maximize their 'export of security' by both easing their own security needs and combining their resources more effectively.

The EU is still far from realizing its full potential in this last regard, however, and its methods only secure their results at a heavy price. Governments have to surrender large parts of their sovereignty, the minority or smaller states often see their own preferences being overruled, the EU governance mechanism brings enormous process costs, and the way it works primarily through elites—with the concomitant problems of democratic participation and control⁸²—risks alienating precisely those populations whose interests it should serve. In the given historical setting the EU has also grown lopsidedly, acquiring economic power ahead of political power and creating exposure to new threats for people living in its frontier-free single market long before it thought about collective policies to combat those threats. More generally,

⁸¹ This was achieved through the European Coal and Steel Community.

⁸² See chapter 4 in this volume.

Europe only achieved what it did after plumbing the depths in two terrible wars—not a sequence which imitators elsewhere will wish to follow. For this and other reasons, large questions remain over how far the full-blooded integrative approach of the EU can be extended beyond the present members and applicants, for instance in its ‘new neighbour’ areas of the former Soviet Union, in the Middle East and in North Africa. This has not, however, stopped independent groups of countries in other regions (as mentioned in section II above) from developing their own versions of the method. It should not stop the EU itself from striving to explore the unique security-related benefits of integration more fully, and to remedy its weaknesses notably through better internal and external coordination, better adaptation to the demands of dealing with a harsher world outside, and greater attention to problems of popular alienation and legitimacy.

V. Closing thoughts on the United Nations

The UN has properly remained at the centre of the past years’ debates on security governance, and no better institution could be imagined either to have commissioned the High-level Panel report or to lead the responses to it. In terms of the analysis developed above, the UN qualifies itself to meet the security challenges of both the 20th and 21st centuries by virtue of its universal membership, its capacity and legitimacy to define norms embracing different continents and cultures, its multifunctional competences and its ability to work—notably through its agencies—with all types of non-state as well as state actors. Pragmatism should lead the world’s large developed powers to recognize its merits as a way of managing interdependence, and of seeking non-zero-sum interactions between themselves and the developing world. Modesty and insight should make them see that they have need of its norms, guidance and restraint on their own account as well.

The UN has, however, never sought or possessed authority over all security-related transactions in world governance: and one of the most insidious ways of attacking it is to pretend that it does. The global regulation of commerce and the free market is in the hands of the WTO, while the Group of Eight industrialized nations often takes the lead on issues bridging the economic and security dimensions. More broadly, the UN itself (as distinct from its agencies) can very rarely fulfil a positive and active security function in the same direct way that it applies rules and sanctions for purposes of restraint. It does not have the resources in the first place and, by their very nature, the positive and interactive modes of security building (including integration) must start in a specific geographic location with interaction between one party and another. To take an example from the world of arms control, the UN may enact new rules to stop WMD materials being trafficked, and it may inspect the results of actions taken to corral and destroy such materials, but it cannot finance or carry out the collecting and destroying itself.⁸³

⁸³ See chapter 16 in this volume.

For all these reasons and more, the true challenge of security governance in the next decades is to achieve the right *synergy* and *complementarity* between the UN and those other security-relevant processes and actors that relate to it horizontally (i.e., in other dimensions) and vertically (i.e., regional and specialized functional organizations, states and sub-state constituencies). That challenge is in itself an enormously complicated one that cannot be further analysed here. It means, however, that the ultimate benefit drawn from the recommendations of the High-level Panel will not depend only—or, perhaps in the last analysis, mainly—on things done by the UN or in the UN context. The Panel’s message is addressed to everyone in the world and ‘the buck stops here’.