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Guide to Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards / Guidelines (RMDS/G) and SALW control measures

Warning

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Foreword

On 08 May 2003 the development of regional micro-disarmament[1] standards and guidelines was discussed during the RACVIAC sponsored seminar on '***SALW - A year after Implementation of the Stability Pact Plan*** '. The consensus was that such standards and guidelines were desirable, and SEESAC agreed to develop a framework and then take responsibility for the future development of regional standards. It was agreed RMDS/G would be designed to support the work at the operational level, and would go further than the more generic 'best practice' documents currently available. After a wide-ranging discussion between stakeholders as to the status of RMDS/G it has been agreed that the term 'standards' will refer to the technical issues, whilst 'guidelines' will apply to 'programme' issues.

This RMDS/G [2] reflects the development of operational procedures, practices and norms, which have occurred over the past four years in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)[3] control. Best operational practices have been identified and reviewed from within the region and beyond, and included as appropriate within this RMDS/G.

SEESAC has a mandate under the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan to fulfil, among others, operational objectives of 1) sharing information on and enhancing co-operation in the establishment and implementation of SALW control and reduction programmes and approaches among regional actors; and 2) providing linkage and co-ordination with the other relevant regional initiatives. The development of RMDS/G is one means of fulfilling that mandate.

The work of preparing, reviewing and revising these standards and guidelines is conducted by SEESAC, with the support of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and consultants. The latest version of each standard, together with background information on the development work, can be found at www.seesac.org. RMDS/G will be reviewed at least every three years to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and to incorporate changes to international regulations and requirements. The latest review was conducted on 01 March 2006, which has reflected the development of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) www.unddr.org, which include RMDS/G as a normative reference in the Disarmament and the SALW Control modules.

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[1] Defined as: 'The monitoring, collection, control and final disposal of small arms, related ammunition and explosives and light weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible weapons and ammunition management programmes'. Often used interchangeably with SALW control in the past, but SALW Control is now the recognised terminology. The term Micro-Disarmament has only been used here to ensure consistency of the RMDS/G concept, rather than renaming the standards.

[2] The layout and format of RMDS/G are based on the highly successful International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The cooperation of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is acknowledged by SEESAC during the development of RMDS/G.

[3] There is no agreed international definition of SALW. For the purposes of RMDS/G the following definition will apply: '***All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability***'

Introduction

There are probably at least five hundred million rifles, pistols and other small arms in circulation in the world, and increasingly, these small arms are playing a large role in conflict and violence. SALW have a huge impact on society in general. They are allegedly used to kill approximately 300,000 people per year in armed conflicts and 200,000 per year in criminal activities.[4] Millions more people are terrorised, wounded, maimed or forced from their homes to lives as refugees or internally displace persons (IDP).

Within South Eastern Europe the impact of uncontrolled proliferation and possession of SALW continues to constitute a major threat to development in the region. They contribute to:

❑   Undermining the rule of law;

❑   Fuelling crime and instability;

❑   Exacerbating tensions;

❑   Negating security confidence building measures: and

❑   Acting as an obstacle to development

The term 'SALW control' refers to '***those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession'***. These activities comprise Cross Border Control Issues, Legislative and Regulatory Measures, SALW Awareness and Communications Strategies, SALW Collection and Destruction operations, SALW Survey and the Management of Information and SALW Stockpile Management.

However, 'SALW control' and its constituent activities cannot be addressed in isolation, as there is significant overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace support operations. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and involves international, national, commercial, NGO and military stakeholders operating under a variety of conditions. Thus it is not possible, nor is it desirable, to establish a unique set of criteria which alone define regional micro-disarmament standards and guidelines. Instead, it is necessary to identify a framework of standards and guidelines which, together, harmonise the manner in which activities and tasks are conducted by the different organisations and agencies involved. *Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines* (RMDS/G) provide this framework of applicable and appropriate international standards and guidelines within the South Eastern Europe region.

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[4] This is a figure that has been widely used by many sources, but has yet to be statistically confirmed. Therefore it should be used with caution, and with an appropriate caveat.

Guide to Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) and SALW control measures

1   Scope

This Guide defines the role of RMDS/G, and establishes the guiding principles for their proper and appropriate use by national authorities, international organisations, donors and organisations involved with the planning and implementation of Small Arms and Light Weapon (SALW) control activities at headquarters and field level.

2   Terms and definitions

In such a potentially complex arena, particularly when combined with the potential problems of an exact technical translation, it is important that the correct terminology is used. All participants in the SALW Control process from the international organisations, through the national authorities to the local population must have a clear understanding of what each term represents. Any confusion will only lead to mistrust, which is probably the major problem that any SALW Control programme seeks to dispel.

The term 'Policy' defines the purpose and goals of an organisation, and it articulates the rules, standards and principles of action that govern the way in which the organisation aims to achieve these goals. Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience. In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and how resources are mobilised and applied. Policy is prescriptive and compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.

In the term 'Standard', RMDS/G follow the ISO definition: *'A standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose'.*

Note: RMDS/G aim to improve safety and efficiency in SALW control by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

Note: Within the RMDS/G series, each individual RMDS/G is clearly identified as either a 'standard' (for technical issues) or 'guideline' (for programme issues).

The term 'Standing Operating Procedures' (SOPs) refers to instructions that define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or activity. Their purpose is to establish recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, consistency and commonality within an organisation, with the aim of improving operational effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local requirements and circumstances.

A list of terms and definitions used in this Guide is given in Annex A. A complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the RMDS/G series is given in RMDS/G 02.10.

3   Purpose of regional micro-disarmament standards and guidelines

The purpose of the adoption of RMDS/G is to bring clear benefits to the SALW community in the South Eastern Europe region.   They aim to:

a)   demonstrate agreement and consensus between all stakeholders;

b)   provide common, agreed levels of performance;

c)   facilitate the exchange of information on best practices at the operational level, and lay down detailed technical responses; and

d)   make a contribution to cost effectiveness and the most efficient use of donor resources.

RMDS/G have been developed to improve safety and efficiency by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by referring to other relevant international agreements and specifications. They provide a frame of reference to encourage the sponsors and managers of SALW Control programmes and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed levels of effectiveness and safety.

RMDS/G assists national SALW authorities to establish national standards and national SOPs by establishing a frame of reference, which can be used, or adapted for use, as a national standard. In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all of the functions of a national SALW authority. In such cases, RMDS/G would be the de-facto national standard. RMDS/G also provide a basis for the development of legal contracts between donors and implementing organisations.

RMDS/G provide a suitable medium for informing the SALW community of existing international regulations, conventions, treaties and standards which impact on SALW issues, particularly those referring to basic human rights and general safety issues.

4   Guiding principles

The preparation and application of RMDS/G are shaped by five guiding principles: 1) the right of national governments to apply national standards to national programmes; 2) production of standards to protect those most at risk; 3) emphasis on building a national capacity to develop, maintain and apply appropriate standards for SALW control; 4) maintenance of consistency with other international norms and standards; and 5) compliance with international conventions and agreements.

4.1   National responsibilities and obligations

The primary responsibility for SALW control lies with the Government of the affected state. This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority [5], which should be charged with the regulation, management and coordination of a national SALW control programme. The national SALW authority is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management of SALW. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets of a SALW programme within its national boundaries, including the development and implementation of national SOPs and instructions.

In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the United Nations, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and to fulfil some or all the functions, of a national SALW authority. In such cases, reference to a 'national SALW authority' throughout RMDS/G shall be understood as applying to the United Nations or other recognised international body.

4.2   Humanitarian imperative

The uncontrolled proliferation and possession of SALW are primarily a humanitarian security concern and should be addressed from the humanitarian perspective. In this regard, the framing of standards and their application to national SALW programmes and local SALW projects should reflect the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity so that support is focused on those who are most vulnerable.

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[5] RMDS/G 03.10 provides guidance on the establishment of national SALW commissions.

4.3 Capacity building

In countries with long SALW control action needs, the development of an indigenous capacity should be addressed from the very outset of a SALW programme. Capacity development is the process by which individuals, institutions and societies (individually and collectively) perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives.[6]

At the national level an indigenous capacity is characterised by a state's ability and willingness to develop and articulate SALW policy and direction. It also concerns a state's ability to plan, coordinate, manage and sustain a SALW control programme that is accountable, cost-effective and able to address the humanitarian and socio-economic implications of SALW proliferation and illegal possession, and to provide appropriate (i.e. enabling or authorising) legislation. Such a capacity includes the willingness to promote the formation of a national SALW authority and other operational organisations, be they military or civilian elements, commercial companies or NGOs. It also includes the ability to develop, maintain and apply appropriate national standards and legislation for SALW control.

4.4 Other international standards

RMDS/G are written to be consistent with other international standards, and to comply with international regulations, conventions and treaties. Precedent and norms already exist at international level, mainly through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for safety in the workplace; the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) provides guidance on risk management (ISO Guide 54) and the application of quality systems (ISO 9000 series).

4.5 International treaties and agreements

There are no international treaties that directly impact on the proliferation and illegal possession of SALW. There are, however, a number of agreements and codes of conduct that impact on the South Eastern Europe region:

a) Combating the Proliferation of SALW - Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe, 28 November 2001. (Revised May 2006). (www.stabilitypact.org).[7]

b) UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. (UN Document A/CONF.192/15), 20 July 2001. (http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html)

c) UN, Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of, and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. (The Firearms Protocol).

d) OSCE Document on SALW, 24 November 2000. (www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231.htm.

e) OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, 19 November 2003. (http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379_en.pdf).

f) EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 05 October 2000. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_178/c_17820010622en02730278.pdf).

g) EU, Council of the European Union, Joint Action on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons, (2002/589/CFSP), 12 July 2002.

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[6] Taken from UNDP Definition at http://www.magent.undp.org/cdrb/techpap2.htm.

[7] Or revised versions.

h)   EU Strategy to Combat the Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition, 5319/06 dated 13 January 2006.

5   SALW control intervention theory

A range of measures should be instigated to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW. These fall under three main headings; 1) Reduction Measures; 2) Preventive Measures and 3): Co-ordination measures. The main thrust of this international effort is to prevent proliferation and control the illicit flow of SALW. Logically, it is too late to prevent internal proliferation following an armed conflict, as the weapons are already present in the community.   However, an attempt can be made to reduce the internal supply and prevent an illicit outflow from the affected country by the instigation of a SALW control programme.

The term 'SALW control', which was previously often referred to as micro-disarmament, refers '*to those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impacts of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession*'. However, 'SALW control' and its constituent activities cannot be addressed in isolation, as there is significant overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace support operations.   Experience has shown that SALW control alone rarely has long-term benefits and must form part of a larger continuum of disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration. This continuum must be integrated and progressive if the long-term aims of sustainable peace and development are to succeed. The component parts of SALW control are:

a)   Cross Border Control issues;

b)   Legislative and Regulatory measures;

c)   SALW Survey;

d)   SALW Awareness and Communications strategies;

e)   SALW Collection operations;

f)   SALW Destruction operations;

g)   Management of Information; and

h)   SALW stockpile management.

A number of other enabling activities are required to support these components of SALW control, including: capacity building, human skills development and management training, coordination measures, information management and exchange, project support and technical assistance and resource mobilisation.

5.1   Aim and operational objectives of SALW control programmes[8]

Confidence and security building measures are crucial to the success of the peace process[9] and SALW control is one of the most visible of measures. Therefore the over-riding aim of any SALW control intervention programme must be

> *'To secure a safer environment and control small arms and light weapons within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalisation'.*

From this aim, operational objectives to reflect the situation within the target community should then be developed as part of the programme planning. Such objectives may include;

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[8] The terms SALW control and micro-disarmament used to be used interchangeably, but most members of the small arms community now refer to SALW Control.

[9] For DDR programmes refer to IDDRS 04.10 - Disarmament. www.unddr.org.

a) the reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals;

b) the reduction in the number of weapon and ammunition accidents;

c) the need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and the amount of violence in the society, (by both national authorities and the civilian population at large);

d) the requirement to build community awareness of the problem and hence community solidarity;

e) the reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons on the black market;

f) the control of legal weapons through national legislation and registration;

g) the recovery of stolen weapons from the community;

h) the reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and addressing the culture of weapons;

i) the development of norms against the illegal use of weapons; and/or

j) the use of SALW control as a launch framework for future capacity building and sustainable development.

5.2   Principles of SALW control programmes

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are 1) **safety**; 2) **control**; 3) **transparency**; 4) **sustainability**; 5) **replicability**; 6) **impartiality** and 7) **legitimacy**. They are, to a degree inter-relational, and can be adopted for any type of disarmament programme.   These principles were developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and were released to the international community in July 2001.[10]

Safety is arguably the most important principle. The nature of SALW control programmes requires that the local population or former warring factions surrender their weapons to some form of lawfully appointed national or international body. Inevitably this also results in the movement of ammunition and explosives. It is necessary to emphasise the threat to human life posed by the movement and handling of potentially unstable or dangerous ammunition and explosives. The international community should have a 'Duty of Care' to the local population to ensure that the programme is conducted as safely as possible, and that the risk to human life is reduced to a minimum. Any loss of life as a result of an internationally mandated or supported programme could be argued to be as a direct result of the establishment of that programme. Such a loss of life will inevitably have a subsequent impact on the way that the programme is perceived by the local population, without whose support the programme will fail.   Should such a programme be conducted in an unsafe manner, then the programme will lose credibility in the eyes of the local community, who may then reduce or withdraw their support.   Therefore it is critically important that the programme has safety as its highest priority. Any attempt to reduce programme operating costs by failing to employ the appropriate safety measures could prove to be a false economy.

The second principle of **control** is also directly related to that of safety. The operational aspects of the programme in terms of collection and destruction must be conducted in a planned and controlled manner. Control must be exerted to ensure a smooth, progressive, safe and secure collection and destruction plan. SALW collection and destruction operations are by necessity a logistic burden, and therefore the resources necessary to support them must be controlled to ensure maximum effectiveness. This principle also applies to the control of arms exports and legal internal arms possession.

Transparency is an important principle in terms of gaining and maintaining the support of the local population or former warring factions. They should be allowed complete visibility of the process of

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[10] 'Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes - A proposal for practical technical measures', Adrian Wilkinson and John Hughes-Wilson, UNDP, New York, July 2001.

collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They must be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. To ensure fairness and natural justice it is important that all parties to the conflict are adequately represented in the decision making process. Such involvement also helps to ensure that all interests and concerns are adequately addressed. Transparency is also an important principle in the verification of the final disposal of the recovered weapons and ammunition.

The **sustainability** of the programme is also related to the principle of transparency. For operational reasons it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at some point in the community and then expand into other areas. Sufficient financial and logistic resources must be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one element of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals in the region will not have to surrender theirs. The argument that it is better to get some weapons out of the community than none is spurious and divisive, especially if it leaves one element of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. Unless a secure environment can be created and maintained the SALW control operation will fail, as individuals will retain weapons for 'self protection'. In the past, the lack of resources has been identified as a limitation in the weapons surrender process[11], which has placed programmes at risk. It is therefore important that programmes are ideally not started until all necessary resources have been, and have been seen to be identified. This statement does not necessarily preclude 'pilot' projects or 'preparatory assistance'; but no firm commitments to support a national programme should be made until resources have been identified.

The principle of **replicability** ensures that a similar operational methodology can be used throughout the programme. This confers advantages in terms of training, use of resources, safe collection and destruction, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting and easily understood operating procedures. As such, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme.

The final principle of **legitimacy** is important to the development of a secure environment and the provision of resources to support a SALW Control programme. The organisation responsible for the programme must be legitimate, and operate to a national or international mandate given by an appropriate body. This mandate could come from the United Nations Security Council, a regional organisation or the recognised national government of the country. An un-mandated programme is very unlikely to succeed, as it will fail to attract the donor resources necessary, or the support of the community it is trying to disarm.

5.3 Types of SALW control programmes

The debate on how to categorise the different types of SALW control programmes is still ongoing. Categorisation has so far been based on the experience of programmes over the last ten years, which have indicated that there is no one 'template' solution. For the purposes of RMDS/G it is suggested that there are three main types of programme:

a)   Directed programmes;

b)   Co-operative programmes; or

c)   Nationally controlled programmes.

To an extent the decision as to which type of programme to adopt will depend less on the political situation within a society than on the impetus towards peace, the peacekeeping operations and the resources available.

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[11] In Mozambique the disarmament mandate placed all weapons under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed as 'the mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor could be found to fund the programme'. Workshop on Small Arms, 18 - 20 February 1999, Geneva, Herbert WULF, BICC.

Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed it should be designed to:

a)   DETER individuals, groups and organisations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW;

b)   DENY access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;

c)   DISRUPT criminal operations, the movement of SALW and the storage of SALW; and

d)   DESTROY surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.

5.3.1.   Directed programmes

The concept of a 'Directed' SALW control programme allows for the categorisation of more options. It covers the use of UN Security Council mandates, Military Technical Agreements and legislation passed by UN Transitional Authorities or national governments to disarm warring factions. It recognises that the initial aim of a SALW control programme should be to assist in the establishment of a secure and safe environment, rather than political stability, which can only survive in a secure environment. It is not envisaged to use 'rewards' under this type of programme, as in 'Co-operative' programmes, although there are occasions when it may be possible to run a 'Directed' programme in parallel with a 'Co-operative' programme.

The danger with this approach is that without co-ordination between the physical disarmament of each warring faction there is a risk of creating a weapons imbalance. Should one party surrender a large proportion of their arms without the other reciprocating then it becomes highly vulnerable in the event of a breakdown in the peace process. This is particularly important if there are no external or international guarantors of security, as the role of such guarantors is been seen to be very important in such situations.

5.3.2.   Co-operative programmes

This concept proposes the use of rewards or incentives to disarm, and it can be operated in tandem with a 'Directed' programme if the appropriate mandate exists. The concept accepts the complexity of operational environments for SALW control and therefore the potential future need to rapidly instigate a 'Directed' programme if necessary.

A major issue in the context of Co-operative or voluntary disarmament is the type of incentive concept to be offered in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons. It is now generally accepted that four criteria are important in this regard;

a)   the 'target' community, (see clause 6);

b)   the effectiveness of the incentive in achieving the immediate objective of disarmament;

c)   their contribution to long-term programme objectives; and

d)   the cost.

Compromise between these four criteria is inevitable, but it is clear that incentive concepts must be attractive to the target community in order to ensure the success of the programme; yet they should always be less than the market value of the weapons themselves.

There are many examples of incentive concepts used to support the voluntary surrender of SALW in co-operative type SALW control programmes[12];

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[12] There has been a tendency to label the whole micro-disarmament programme or SALW control intervention by the type of incentive concept used to support the programme. This should be resisted, as the success of a programme is not necessarily dependent on the success of the voluntary surrender component. For example, weapons registration may be just as effective as collection and destruction, as at least the weapons are under some form of legislative control.

a)   the '**Buy Back**' [13] concept has been used in at least nine previous programmes around the world, with at least two of these operated in tandem with a 'Directed' programme. There are disadvantages to a 'Buy Back' concept. Cash incentives can lead to arms proliferation with the cash being used to purchase other weapons at more attractive prices elsewhere; thereby instigating an unwanted illicit trade in small arms. The economic effects of relatively large amounts of cash being injected into a fragile economy must also be considered. UNDDA considers that the disadvantages outweigh the potential benefits, and does not therefore recommend 'Buy Back' incentives in post-conflict environments. From March 2002 UNDP BCPR will not participate in such programmes. They do, however, have their place in weapons amnesty programmes in more developed countries;

b)   other programmes have used the '**Guns for Food or Goods**' concept, which is more popular with donors who may feel that individuals should not be provided with cash rewards for the surrender of weapons. This has a more moral and symbolic value than a pure cash reward, can assist in ensuring that the community has the food and resources necessary for short-term survival, and can reduce the resources required by other humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme. Care must be taken within this concept; but, for example, the provision of tools to assist in the redevelopment of agriculture or housing is a very constructive approach. This approach has recently been taken further, with some success, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002) and Macedonia (2003)by the use of a lottery to recover weapons; this incentive should use prizes that have an educational or developmental component. This type of approach should in future be referred to as the '**Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI)**' concept;

c)   a recent approach has been the evolution of the '**Weapons in Exchange for Development**' (WED) concept. This rewards the community as a whole with infrastructure development and an improvement in public security. Various models have been applied and advice on the most appropriate one for a particular situation can be obtained from UNDP BCPR SADU or SEESAC;

d)   a further development of the WED concept is that of '**Weapons in Competition for Development**' (WCD).   This is an innovative approach that uses the principle of conditionality, which until recently was not popular within the UN. Yet WCD has proved to be effective in areas where significant development work is already taking place.   Smaller rewards, shared between communities on a competitive and proportional basis, have proved to be attractive to communities; and

e)   a long term concept has been proposed, but not yet implemented, which is '**Weapons Linked to Development**' (WLD). This involves the integration of SALW control measures to already ongoing development projects. This has the advantage of being cheaper than the other options, but problems such as negotiation with the local community who are already receiving development assistance and cooperation between a wide range of development agencies would have to be resolved before this concept could be effective. It is an area that requires more research, but could be the most promising long-term strategy as donor funding for the other options becomes scarcer.

Whatever approach or concept is used to support the programme, it will only succeed if there is a real desire on the part of the whole community to participate in the process. If the co-operation of the community can be gained and retained then there is a real chance of success in this type of programme. Whilst the aim should always be to remove or legally register all weapons in society, the reality of gun culture and the desire for self-protection should always be recognised. In many societies gun ownership has always been acceptable within the community, therefore perhaps a more realistic aim could be to recover the military style weapons that form an imbalance with neighbouring communities, or those that could be used for trade. If the community could accept that weapons in open sight should be legally held and recorded, then ownership could be controlled, and criminal investigations into weapon misuse could be simplified.

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[13] Defined as: *'The direct linkage between the surrender of weapons, ammunition and explosives in return for cash'.*

A factor that must be considered during the planning phase of 'Co-operative' SALW control programmes must be what the desired national position towards weapons is going to be at the conclusion of the programme. If there is a national move towards weapon control, for instance by the framing and adoption of national legislation, this must be developed concurrently with the programme. The national legislation should ensure that the population fully understands the penalties for the unauthorised retention of weapons at the conclusion of the SALW control programme.

5.3.3.   National control programmes

The previous concepts do not take account of scenarios in those post-conflict and general environments where political stability and local security exist, but there is still a significant amount of illegally held weapons, or in cases where the national government wishes to downsize its security forces in order to improve regional stability. In this case the desired results are either stock reduction or the prevention of crime.

The concept recognises the need for legislative support for an amnesty programme to include the use of punitive measures for those failing to comply. In effect, this concept is a combination of the 'Directed' and 'Co-operative' concepts, which are more specifically targeted at immediate post-conflict environments.

National control programmes attempt to target criminal elements, who try to retain weapons for criminal purposes. The development of legislative measures then allows for the implementation of 'search and seize' style operations against criminal elements, whilst maintaining the principle of legitimacy for the remainder of the innocent population. Previous criticisms of voluntary surrender programmes were that they never target criminals; the development of the concept of this type of programme recognises this criticism and attempts to develop a framework to address the problem. Where strict national legislation is in place, and the local population are in no doubt of the legal consequences of illegal possession and use, the weapons will be either surrendered or less frequently used and most importantly the public perception of safety will be improved.

5.4   Matrix of SALW collection incentive options

6   'Targets' for SALW control intervention programmes

It is now becoming generally accepted that there are four potential generic targets for SALW control interventions.

a)   individuals;

b)   governments;

c)   criminals and organised crime; and

d)   terrorists or warring factions.

The type of SALW control intervention, and the incentive or punitive option used to support the collection of SALW, will inevitably be different for each type of generic target group. The following matrix is not exhaustive, but it does summarise some potential options:

7 International Organisation for Standardization

The ISO is a worldwide federation of national bodies from over 138 countries. Its work results in international agreements, which are published as ISO standards and guides. ISO is an international NGO and the standards it develops are voluntary, although some (mainly those concerned with health, safety and environmental aspects) have been adopted by many countries as part of their regulatory framework. ISO deals with the full spectrum of human activities, and many of the tasks and processes which contribute to explosive safety during collection and destruction operations have a relevant standard. A list of ISO standards and guides is given in the ISO Catalogue.

ISO has an international reputation for integrity and neutrality, and it enjoys a special working relationship with international organisations including the UN, and with regional organisations including the European Union. RMDS/G have been developed to be compatible with ISO standards and guides. Adopting the ISO format and language provides some significant advantages including consistency of layout, use of internationally recognised terminology, and a greater acceptance by international, national and regional organisations who are accustomed to the ISO series of standards and guides.

8 The application of RMDS/G

RMDS/G have been developed to assist national authorities in the development of national SALW legislation and standards, and have no legal standing except where they have been adopted by a national authority. That said, some RMDS/G address issues such as safety and basic human rights, where there should be absolute agreement on the need to adopt appropriate standards and professional codes of conduct.

9   Quality and Risk Management

RMDS/G have been developed in line with the recommendations and processes contained within the ISO Quality Management systems (ISO 9001:2000) and the ISO Risk Management system (ISO Guide 51).   Elements of these systems are contained within those RMDS/G relating to safety and human security, thereby making the RMDS/G themselves an integrated risk and quality management system.

A guide to the use of risk management in RMDS/G is contained at Annex B.

10   Conformance

In RMDS/G, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to convey the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in ISO standards and guides. 'Shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.   It is used sparingly in RMDS/G. 'Should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications. 'May' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

11   Legal requirements

RMDS/G have no legal standing except where they have been adopted by a national authority as national standards, or where one or more of the specific RMDS/G is specified in a contract or some other legal instrument, (such as a Memorandum of Understanding or a Letter of Agreement). The wording of each contract or agreement should clarify the application of RMDS/G to each proposed project, and should reflect the national and local circumstances discussed in the clauses above; i.e. the local security situation, the authority of government, political will and the resources available. Contracts should be consistent with the laws of the affected state. These may cover general issues such as safety and occupational heath, environmental and employment legislation, in addition to legislation specifically relating to the conduct of SALW control.

12   Continual review of RMDS/G

ISO undertakes a formal review of all of its standards on a three to five year basis. This is to ensure that the standards stay relevant, accurate, achievable and appropriate. RMDS/G will be subject to a similar formal review process, however, due to the dynamic development and potentially hazardous nature of some areas of SALW control, RMDS/G will be formally reviewed on a three-year basis.   This does not preclude essential amendments being made within that period for reasons of operational safety or efficiency.

12.1   RMDS/G Review Board

A formal Review Board will be constituted to undertake this task, with the majority of the work being undertaken by E Mail. The Review Board should rarely have to meet. The formal RMDS/G Review Board should consist of the following members:

a)   Chairman   -   Head, SEESAC

b)   Members   -   Donor Representative x 1
                                   Commercial Representative x 1
                                   NGO Representative x 2
                                   UNDP BCPR Representative
                                   UNICEF Representative (for SALW Awareness)
                                   National Authority x 1
                                   Subject Specialists (As required)

13　　Areas of responsibility

13.1　　United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP has a general responsibility for enabling and encouraging the effective management of SALW control programmes by continuously maintaining an overview of RMDS/G to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and to inform of any changes to international regulations and requirements.

UNDP should apply RMDS/G to its SALW control programmes, activities and contracts within South Eastern and Eastern Europe unless the local situation precludes their effective application. In such circumstances, when one or more RMDS/G is not appropriate, UNDP will provide alternative, specifications, requirements and guidance.

13.2　　Regional organizations

In certain areas of the world, regional organisations have been given a mandate by their member states to coordinate and support SALW control programmes within a states' national boundaries. (For example EUFOR within Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In these circumstances the regional organization should assume many of the responsibilities and roles of the national SALW authority, and could also act as a conduit for donor resources. The responsibilities and roles of regional organizations for SALW control will vary from state to state and may be subject to a specific Memorandum of Understanding, or similar agreement.

13.3　　SEESAC

SEESAC shall provide operational assistance, technical assistance and management information in support of the formulation and implementation of SALW co-ordination, control and reduction measures, projects and activities in order to support the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan.

As part of this mandate SEESAC shall be responsible for the development and maintenance of RMDS/G.

13.4　　National SALW authority

The national SALW authority should be responsible for ensuring the conditions that enable the effective management of national SALW control projects. The national SALW authority is ultimately responsible for developing and managing the SALW control programme within its national boundaries.

The national SALW authority should be responsible for establishing and maintaining national regulations and procedures for the management of SALW control operations. These national regulations and procedures should be consistent with RMDS/G, and other relevant national and international standards, regulations and requirements. They should also appoint an appropriate national organisation to be responsible for:

a)　　the co-ordination or planning of all SALW activities in their area of responsibility;

b)　　the provision of technical advice to the national SALW authority; and

c)　　the maintenance of SALW records and databases.

In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all the functions, of a national SALW authority. (For example UNMIK in Kosovo).

13.5   Intra-national authorities

Authorities that exist within nations introducing SALW Control operations and legislation are responsible for ensuring that their members recognise, respect and comply with such legislation, and support the national government in its introduction and implementation.

13.6   SALW Control organisations

NGOs, commercial companies and other organisations involved in SALW activities shall establish SOPs, instructions and procedures which enable SALW Control operations to be conducted effectively, efficiently and safely.   These SOPs should be based on the appropriate national regulations, or in their absence RMDS/G.

13.7   Donors

Most SALW Control operations are funded by donors – mainly governments and regional organisations.   Donor agencies are part of the management process, and as such have a responsibility for ensuring that the projects they are funding are managed effectively, and in accordance with national and/or international standards.   This involves attention to the writing of contract documents, and ensuring that SALW Control organisations chosen to carry out such contracts are competent.   This responsibility and accountability is even greater when the national SALW authority is in the process of formation, and has not had the opportunity to gain experience.

Annex A
(Informative)
Terms and Definitions

A.1.1
Buy Back
the direct linkage between the surrender of weapons, ammunition and explosives in return for cash.

Note: Buy Back schemes have been practised in the past, but the concept is often unacceptable to international donors.[14] There is a perception that such schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide the opportunity for an individual to conduct low level trading in SALW.

A.1.2
demobilisation
the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace'. [15]

Note: Typically, demobilisation involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration, registration, profiling and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation to encourage their transition to civilian life.

A.1.3
demilitarisation
the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. [16]

Note: Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as critical to achieving the final result.

A.1.4
destruction
the process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state that can no longer function as designed.

A.1.5
disposal (logistic)
the removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile by the utilisation of a variety of methods, (that may not necessarily involve destruction). Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of Render Safe Procedures.

Note: There are five traditional methods of disposal used by armed forces around the world, some of which are obviously not suitable for SALW Control programmes. These are; 1) sale; 2) gift; 3) increased use at training; 4) deep sea dumping; and 5) destruction or demilitarisation. [17]

A.1.6
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include the rendering-safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance, which have become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of those personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal. [18]

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[14] As of March 2002, UNDP-BCPR will no longer support such schemes.

[15] Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, UNDPKO, December 1999.

[16] IMAS 11.10.

[17] This is an obvious area where confusion can be caused due to the use of incorrect terminology or translation. One party may assume that when the other mentions disposal they are really talking about destruction. This may not be the case!

[18] UN Guidelines for Stockpile Destruction, June 2000.

Note: The presence of ammunition and explosives during SALW Control operations will inevitably require some degree of EOD response. The level of this response will be dictated by the condition of the ammunition, its level of deterioration and the way that it is handled by the local community.

A.1.7
firearm
a barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet or other projectile can be discharged and that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death to a person, and includes any frame or receiver of such a barrelled weapon and anything that can be adapted for use as a firearm.[19]

A.1.8
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.9
harmful event
occurrence in which a **hazardous situation** results in harm. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)].

A.1.10
hazard
potential source of **harm.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.11
hazardous situation
circumstance in which people, property or the environment are exposed to one or more **hazards**. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)].

A.1.12
intended use
the use of a product, process or service in accordance with information provided by the supplier. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.13
micro-disarmament
the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

A.1.14
munition
a complete device charged with **explosives**, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in military operations, including **demolitions**. [AAP-6].

Note: In common usage, 'munitions' (plural) can be military weapons, ammunition and equipment.

A.1.15
national authority
the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in a country charged with the regulation, management and coordination of **SALW** activities.

A.1.16
reasonably foreseeable misuse
use of a product, process or service in a way not intended by the supplier, but which may result from readily predictable human behaviour. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

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[19] Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 'Interpretation' Paragraph 2.

A.1.17
reintegration
assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families' economic and social reintegration into civil society. [20]

Note: Reintegration programmes could include cash assistance, or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training, income generating activities and participation in sustainable development programmes. In some UNDP SALW programme, reintegration could include individuals who return munitions.

A.1.18
Render Safe Procedure (RSP)
the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components to prevent an unacceptable detonation. [21]

A.1.19
residual risk
in the context of SALW control, the term refers to….. the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks inherent in all collection and destruction activities, and SALW stockpile management. [Modified from ISO Guide 51:1999]

A.1.20
risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of **harm** and the severity of that **harm.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.21
risk analysis
systematic use of available information to identify **hazards** and to estimate the **risk.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.22
risk assessment
overall process comprising a **risk analysis** and a **risk evaluation.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.23
risk evaluation
process based on **risk analysis** to determine whether the **tolerable risk** has been achieved [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

A.1.24
risk reduction
actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular

A.1.25
tolerable risk
risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society. [ISO Guide 51: 1999 (E)]

A.1.26
safety
freedom from unacceptable **risk**.   [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

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[20]Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, UNDPKO, December 1999.
[21] NATO Definition.

A.1.27
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.

Note: There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. For the purposes of RMDS/G the above definition will be used.

A.1.28
standard
a standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.

Note: RMDS/G aim to improve safety and efficiency in SALW Control by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

A.1.29
stockpile management
those procedures and activities regarding SALW safety and security in accounting, storage, transportation and handling.

A.1.30
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been dropped, fired, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. [22]

A.1.31
Voluntary Surrender
the physical return by an individual(s) or community of small arms and light weapons to the legal government or an international organisation with no further penalty.

A.1.32
weapon
any thing used, designed or used or intended for use:[23]

a)   in causing death or injury to any person; or

b)   for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

A.1.33
Weapons in Competition for Development (WCD)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

A.1.34
Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) (WFD)
the indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

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[22] NATO Definition.

[23] Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 'Interpretation' Paragraph 2.

A.1.35
Weapons in Exchange for Incentives (WEI)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

A.1.36
Weapons Linked to Development (WLD)
the direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

Annex B
(Informative)
Guide to risk management and RMDS/G

1   Scope

This Annex provides guidance on risk management and its application to SALW Control operations.

2   The concept of safety

Safety is achieved by reducing risk to a tolerable level, which is defined as **tolerable risk**.   There can be no absolute safety; some risk will remain and this is the **residual risk**.   [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)].

Therefore, in the context of SALW Control operations, the collection and destruction of SALW and their associated ammunition can never be absolutely safe; it can only be relatively safe.   This is an inevitable fact of life, which just means that we cannot prove, with 100% confidence, that a particular procedure or operation is absolutely safe.   The risk and quality management systems recommended in RMDS/G aim to be as close to that 100% ideal confidence level as is realistically possible, whilst allowing national SALW authorities to determine what is the **tolerable risk** that they are prepared to accept in their particular environments.

4   Risk management

4.1   Determining tolerable risk

Tolerable risk is determined by the search for absolute **safety** contrasted against factors such as:

a)   available resources;;

b)   the conventions of society;

c)   cost effectiveness; and

d)   the technical threat (a combination of hazard and risk).

It follows that there is therefore a need to continually review the tolerable risk that underpins the concept behind demining operations in a particular environment.

4.2   Risk assessment and reduction

Tolerable risk is achieved by the iterative process of **risk assessment (risk analysis and risk evaluation)** and **risk reduction**.

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└───────────────┘   │foreseen misuse       │     │ ANALYSIS │  │ ASSESSMENT   │
        ▲           └─────────────────────┘      │          │  │              │
        │                      │                  └──────────┘  │              │
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        │           │Hazard identification│                     │              │
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
4.3   Achieving tolerable risk

The following procedure should be used, in conjunction with RMDS/G, to reduce risks to a tolerable level:

a)   identify the likely group at risk during a procedure or operation, (for example individuals voluntarily surrendering ammunition);

b)   identify the **intended use** and assess the **reasonably foreseeable misuse** of the procedure, (for example the method of transport that the individual is likely to use);

c)   identify each **hazard** (including any **hazardous situation** and **harmful event**) arising in all stages of the process, (for example the potential instability of the ammunition, or its design);

d)   estimate and evaluate the **risk** to each identified user or group;

e)   judge if that **risk** is **tolerable** (e.g. by comparison with other risks to the user and with what is acceptable to society);

f)   if the **risk** is not **tolerable** then reduce the risk until it becomes tolerable, (for example by providing Safety Cards and Explosive Ordnance Disposal support to the collection process).

When conducting the risk reduction process, the order of priority should be as follows;

a)   inherently safe design;

b)   protective equipment;

c)   information for users

5   Conclusion

It must be emphasised that quality management will **NOT** alone create safety, and consequently the respective roles of quality management and risk management should not be confused. The success of SALW Control operations is dependent on the integrated application of both quality management and risk management principles and procedures.