


Government Communication

2013/14:114



Strategic Export Control in 2013 – Military Equipment and Dual-Use Items

Comm.
2013/14:114

The Government hereby submits this communication to the Riksdag.

Stockholm on 13 March 2014

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(Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Main contents of the communication

In this Communication, the Swedish Government provides an account of Sweden's export control policy with respect to military equipment and dual-use items in 2013. The Communication also contains a report detailing exports of military equipment in 2013. In addition, it describes the cooperation in the EU and other international forums on matters relating to strategic export controls on both military equipment and dual-use items.

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1 Government Communication on Strategic Export Control

In this Communication the Government provides an account of its policy regarding strategic export control in 2013, i.e. the export control of *military equipment* and *dual-use items*. Controlling exports of military equipment is necessary in order to meet both our national objectives and our international obligations, by ensuring that the products exported from Sweden go to approved recipient countries in accordance with established guidelines. Military equipment may only be exported if there are security and defence policy reasons for doing so, and provided there is no conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. Applications for licences are considered in accordance with both the Swedish guidelines on exports on military equipment and the criteria in the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.

The multilateral agreements and instruments relating to disarmament and non-proliferation are important manifestations of the international community's efforts to prevent the proliferation of and uncontrolled trade in dual-use items (DUIs) that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. The objectives behind these efforts are fully shared by Sweden. However, there is also a need for the agreements to be supplemented by strict and effective national export controls to achieve the declared objectives. Export controls are therefore a key instrument for individual governments when it comes to meeting their international obligations with respect to non-proliferation.

This is the twenty-ninth time that the Government has reported on Sweden's export control policy in a Communication to the Riksdag. The first Communication was presented in 1985. Sweden was at that time one of the first countries in Europe to provide a transparent account of the preceding year's export control activities. The aim has always been to provide a basis for wider discussion of issues related to export controls on military equipment and Dual-Use items.

Over the years, the Communication has been developed from a brief compilation of Swedish exports of military equipment without extensive explanations, to a relatively comprehensive account of Sweden's export control policy in its entirety. More statistics are available today thanks to an increasingly transparent policy and more effective information processing systems. The Government continually strives to increase transparency in the area of export control.

This Communication consists of three principal parts and a section on statistics. The first principal part contains an account of Swedish export controls of military equipment (Section 2). The following deals with Swedish export controls of dual-use items (Section 3). The third describes the authorities responsible for this area (Section 4). There then follows a section containing statistics covering Swedish exports of military equipment and dual-use items. At the Government's request, the

Comm. 2013/14:114 Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP) and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) supply data for this Communication. The statistics in this Communication supplement the information available in these authorities' own publications.

Significant events throughout the year

In 2013, work was concluded on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, which will be conducted in accordance with Article 15 of the Common Position.

Negotiations concerning an international treaty on the arms trade – the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – were concluded on 2 April 2013 when the UN General Assembly voted to adopt the treaty by a wide majority. Sweden signed the ATT when it was opened to signatories on 3 June 2013.

The next step was taken in 2013 in the ongoing review of the EU system for export control of DUIs that began with a green paper in 2011. The Commission's working document *Strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world* summarises the results of a wide-ranging public consultation that has taken place. This work paves the way for a communication at some point in 2014, in which the Commission is expected to present a long-term vision and concrete proposals for the future development of export controls.

In October 2013, Council conclusions concerning the continuing effort to implement the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were also adopted.

The Ordinance (2013:707) concerning the control of certain firearms, parts of firearms and ammunition came into force on 30 September 2013, as did certain changes to the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303). The new ordinance and the changes to the Military Equipment Ordinance complement Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012, which regulates authorisation to export civilian firearms, their component parts and ammunition outside the EU and certain import and transit measures involved in such exports.

In December 2013, the European Council discussed common security and defence policy and on that occasion underlined the importance of fully implementing, for example, the Intra Community Transfers Directive, as well as the importance of securing deliveries.

Summary of the statistical data

The account of Swedish exports of military equipment in 2013 is appended to this Communication. Statistics from the last few years are also shown, as individual sales and deliveries of major systems may cause wide fluctuations in the annual statistics. The information in this Communication is based on the statutory annual reports for 2013 made by the military equipment-exporting companies and the relevant authorities, as compiled by the ISP.

In addition to the eleven countries that received hunting and sport shooting ammunition exclusively, 55 countries, as well as UN bodies, received deliveries of Swedish military equipment in 2013.

The value of the exports of military equipment actually delivered over the course of 2013 was just over SEK 11.9 billion. Total exports have thus increased by about 22 per cent compared with 2012 (just under SEK 9.8 billion). It should be noted, however, that of the actual exports in 2013, just over SEK 900 million consists of equipment (technical assistance and armour plate) that was not subject to export controls in Sweden prior to 30 June 2012. Total exports in 2013 are somewhat lower than annual exports in the period 2008–2011. The largest individual recipients of Swedish military equipment in 2013 were Thailand (SEK 3 319 million), the United States of America (SEK 1 206 million), Saudi Arabia (SEK 750 million) and India (SEK 709 million). Exports to Thailand were mainly final deliveries of the JAS 39 Gripen, while the USA received mainly ammunition and naval subsystems (weapons and command and control systems). Deliveries of Combat Vehicle 90 to Norway began. Exports to India were dominated by follow-on deliveries related to previously-exported army equipment, mainly ammunition, but also supplementary orders of replacement parts and components. With regard to Saudi Arabia, the exports largely consisted of continued deliveries of the airborne surveillance system Erieye. When it comes to traditional partner countries, it can be ascertained that there have been extensive exports to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and Finland. Exports to the United Arab Emirates consisted of the Erieye surveillance system and continued deliveries of ships.

The value of the export licences granted in 2013 amounted to SEK 9.8 billion; an increase of 24 per cent on 2012 (c. SEK 7.9 billion). However, this is lower than the annual figure for the period 2009–2011.

The statistical report also contains an account of Swedish exports of dual-use items (DUIs).

Unlike the situation with exports of military equipment, the companies involved do not submit any delivery declarations. The number of cases involving DUIs and sanctions have increased somewhat in 2013. The number of cases concerning financial transaction that affect sanctions has increased by just over 50 per cent (see Table 1 in Appendix 2).

2 Military Equipment

2.1 Background and regulatory framework

Controls on exports of military equipment are necessary to ensure that the products exported from Sweden go to approved recipient countries. The regulatory framework for Swedish export controls consists of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303), as well as the Government's guidelines on exports of military equipment, as approved by the Riksdag. Military equipment may only be exported if there are security and defence policy

Comm. 2013/14:114 reasons for doing so, and provided this does not conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. In addition, the EU's Common Position on Arms Exports (2008/944/CFSP) will also be applied when assessing licence applications nationally. As an independent authority, the ISP is tasked with assessing licence applications in accordance with the regulatory framework.

According to the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), export controls cover the manufacture, supply and export of military equipment, as well as certain agreements on rights to manufacture military equipment etc. In accordance with the same Act, a licence is required to carry out training with a military purpose. The Act applies both to equipment designed for military use and that constitutes military equipment under government regulations and to technical support regarding military equipment that, according to the government regulations, constitutes technical assistance. The list of military equipment and technical assistance in the appendix to the Military Equipment Ordinance is in line with the EU's Common Military List, aside from two national supplements: nuclear explosive devices and special parts for such devices, as well as fortification facilities etc.

Parliamentary committee to review exports controls on military equipment

In the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs' report 2010/11:UU3, the Riksdag expressed its opinion that the Government would have come back to the Riksdag with a proposal for new military equipment legislation aimed at tightening controls on exports to non-democratic states.

On 1 June 2012 the Government decided to appoint a parliamentary committee to review export controls on military equipment. This committee, consisting of representatives of all eight political parties in the Riksdag, is tasked with conducting an inquiry into future Swedish export controls on military equipment and the regulatory framework surrounding these. The main purpose of the inquiry is to submit proposals for new military equipment legislation with the aim of tightening controls on exports to non-democratic countries (T.o.R. 2012:50).

The Terms of Reference are based on the principles underpinning Swedish foreign, defence and security policy and Sweden's international undertakings in the areas of export controls and human rights.

Hans Wallmark, Member of Parliament, a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Defence Commission and a deputy member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, has been appointed chairman.

The committee will, for example:

- examine future Swedish export controls on military equipment and the regulatory framework surrounding these,
- propose the factors that should be taken into consideration in order to establish whether or not a country is a democracy and that should

form the basis for assessing applications for licences to export military equipment from Sweden, and also analyse how consideration of these factors can be implemented in the Swedish export control of military equipment,

- examine how the controls on the export of military equipment to non-democratic countries will be tightened,
- examine what should be considered in the future as follow-on deliveries and what rules should apply to these, in view of the overarching purpose of the inquiry,
- scrutinise and chart export control systems in other partner countries such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA, in particular their controls on the export of military equipment to non-democratic countries, and
- examine the consequences of tightening controls on the export of military equipment to non-democratic countries, for example the impact on Sweden's wider bilateral relations.

The committee is due to report on its remit by 15 December 2014.

Export controls and the Policy for Global Development

Sweden's Policy for Global Development (PGD) (Govt. Bill 2002/03:122, Shared Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development), gives all of the Government's policy areas a remit to formulate and implement policy in a way that strengthens the Swedish contribution to equitable and sustainable global development. Policy must be characterised by a rights perspective and by poor people's perspectives on development.

In recent years, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs' reports on Swedish export controls have taken up the issue of coherence between different policy areas in order to contribute to the PGD's objective of equitable and sustainable global development; most recently in Rep. 2011/12:UU11.

In its most recent Communication concerning the PGD (Comm. 2011/12:167), the Government has touched on the potential conflicts of interest/objective separating the promotion of Swedish exports and the PGD – the export control of Swedish military equipment being highlighted as an example. The Government's desire is to avoid any effects of Swedish exports of military equipment that negatively affect efforts to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development. Certain aspects of the PGD are taken into account in assessments concerning Swedish exports of military equipment, for example through the application of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, the eighth criterion of which highlights the technical and economic capacity of recipient countries and the need to consider whether there is a risk of seriously hampering sustainable development. The Common Position also has a User's Guide that provides more details about how the criteria in the Common Position should be applied. The Government works to ensure that Swedish exports of military equipment take into account the PGD's objective of equitable and sustainable global development. The parliamentary committee reviewing the export control of military

Comm. 2013/14:114 equipment will also take into account the PGD and Swedish export controls. The committee will investigate how this area has been transformed in practice and how changes have taken place over time.

Combating corruption in the international arms trade

The Government take a strong exception to all forms of corruption in international business transactions. Both the giving and accepting of bribes have long been criminal offences under Swedish law. In addition, the reform of bribery legislation that came into force on 1 July 2012 introduced a provision making the funding of bribery through negligence a criminal offence. This provision is targeted, for example, at cases in which a parent company in Sweden creates, through negligence, the conditions under which bribery is committed within the scope of a subsidiary's operations abroad. In various international forums, Sweden actively promotes the effective application of conventions prohibiting bribery in international business transactions. For example, this applies to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions from 1997 and the UN Convention against Corruption from 2005.

The Government urges companies to follow the principles of the UN Global Compact, which addresses human rights, labour law, the environment and efforts to combat corruption, and to apply the OECD's guidelines for multinational companies.

The Government welcomes initiatives taken by manufacturers of military equipment – initially on a European basis through the European trade association, the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), and then jointly with its American counterpart – to develop and apply an international code of conduct, including zero tolerance of corruption (Global Principles of Business Ethics for the Aerospace and Defence Industry). The largest Swedish trade association, the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF), which represents more than 95% of companies in the defence industry in Sweden, also requires prospective members to sign and comply with its Code of Conduct on Business Ethics as a condition of membership.

In 2013, Transparency International (TI) compiled a global index of countries' ability to protect themselves against corruption in the defence sector. This report constitutes a valuable complement to TI's previous work to assess the anti-corruption efforts of over one hundred international defence contractors and provide advice on how these can be improved. The results that have a bearing on Sweden and Swedish companies were presented at a seminar organised by *Folk och Försvar* (Society and Defence), TI, SOFF and the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency (FXM) in Stockholm in November 2013.

2.2 The role of exports from a security policy perspective

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The foundations of the Swedish defence industry's expansion to its present size and level of expertise were laid during the Cold War. Sweden's policy of neutrality, which took shape following the Second World War, required strong armed forces, which in turn required a strong national defence industry. The ambition was maximum independence from foreign suppliers. The defence industry became an important part of Swedish security policy. As civilian-military collaboration increases and new technologies are made available for military applications, both IT companies and companies focussed on high-technology in other areas are joining the defence sector.

In *Choices in a Globalised World* (Ds 2013:33) the Defence Commission maintains that that Sweden's security is built together in solidarity with others and is strengthened through confidence-building measures, joint crisis management and active and credible contributions to Nordic, European and global security. Such collaboration takes place with both civilian and military resources. The new realities of security and defence policy also involve the need to collaborate in the supply of military equipment. The earlier desire to be self-sufficient with regard to military equipment for the Swedish armed forces has been replaced by a growing need to cooperate with like-minded countries and neighbours. In many cases, it is more important that Sweden has equipment that is interoperable with that of its partner countries and that this equipment is technically mature, reliable and accessible, than that the equipment offers the highest level of technical performance. The procurement of military equipment is governed by the principles set forth in the Government Bill *A Functional Defence* (Govt. Bill 2008/09:140).

The interests of Swedish security policy lie in safeguarding long-term, continuous cooperation with traditional partner countries. This mutual cooperation is based on both exports and imports of military equipment.

Among the interests of foreign policy and security policy are Sweden's opportunities to contribute to international peace and security through our effective involvement in international peace-keeping activities, where general similarities between our technical systems and those of our leading partners improves operational effectiveness.

The supply of military equipment, both in Sweden and in other countries, is now based in part on contractual obligations and joint dependency. The cooperating countries are mutually dependent on supplies of components, subsystems and finished systems, as well as products manufactured in each country. An internationally competitive level of technological development contributes to Sweden continuing to be an attractive country for international cooperation. According to the principles for the supply of equipment to the Swedish Armed Forces set out by the Government in the Bill *A Functional Defence*, maintenance and upgrading of existing equipment will be prioritised over the procurement of new equipment, provided this is financially justifiable and operational requirements can be achieved. If it is necessary to procure new equipment, this will primarily involve fully-developed,

Comm. 2013/14:114 proven equipment that is already on the market. Development should only be undertaken when the requirements can neither be met by existing equipment nor with equipment already on the market.

In accordance with the Budget Bill for 2014 (Govt. Bill 2013/14:1) the Government believes international cooperation in general should be directed at the maintenance and procurement of proven equipment and collaboration that improves the prospects of missions, e.g. increased interoperability. The Government understands that the European defence industrial base is best promoted through using general conditions that are built on market principles and having as simple and homogeneous regulations as possible for the industry concerned. Furthermore, cooperation within multilateral European frameworks can create the necessary conditions for a more effective build-up and utilisation of resources and a cost-effective supply of military equipment. Sweden's participation in multilateral forums focusses on, for example, supporting the conditions for a more open and efficient European market for military equipment. Participation in international partnerships aimed at developing new military equipment should continue to be limited.

An internationally competitive level of technological development also implies greater opportunities for Sweden to influence international cooperation on export control as part of an international partnership than would otherwise be the case. This applies principally as part of the EU, but also in a broader international context.

An important issue for 2014 is the follow-up to the European Council's discussion in December 2013, as well as the continuing process surrounding the Communication *Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector*, published by the Commission on 24 July 2013. The Government welcomes the Commission proposal to support the uniform implementation of the Defence Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC) and Directive 2009/43/EC, known as the Intra-community Transfers (ICT) Directive.

Sweden participates in various cooperative projects conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Government's fundamental position is that Sweden should assist in and influence the processes that are getting underway to deepen European cooperation, which also relates to the work as part of the European Defence Agency. Cooperation as part of the EDA has led to an improvement in the Swedish Armed Forces capability and improved prospects for a more effective supply of military equipment. The Government understands that the European defence industrial base is best promoted through using general conditions that are built on market principles and having as simple and homogeneous proposals as possible for the industry concerned.

By participating in the Six-Nation Initiative between the six countries in Europe with the largest defence sectors (Framework Agreement/Letter of Intent, FA/LoI), Sweden influences the development of defence industrial policy and defence export policy in Europe. This will have a major impact on the EU's emerging common defence and security policy, both directly and indirectly.

Cooperation on multilateral frameworks pays dividends in terms of resource utilisation from a European perspective and increasingly harmonising and improving European and transatlantic cooperative

capability. In this context, the EDA and NATO/the Partnership for Peace, together with the FA/LoI and Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO), are vital. Comm. 2013/14:114

Areas of activity

Currently, the most important military product areas for Swedish defence and security companies are:

- combat aircraft: manned and unmanned,
- surface vessels and submarines
- combat vehicles, tracked vehicles,
- short and long-range weapons systems: land and sea-based and airborne,
- small and large-bore ammunition,
- smart artillery ammunition,
- land and sea-based and airborne radar and IR systems,
- electronic warfare systems: passive and active,
- telecommunications systems, including electronic countermeasures,
- command and control systems for land, sea and air applications,
- systems for exercises and training,
- signature adaptation (e.g. camouflage systems and radar),
- systems for civil protection,
- maintenance of aircraft engines,
- gunpowder and other pyrotechnic materials,
- services and consultancy and
- support systems for operation and maintenance.

2.3 Cooperation within the EU on export control of military equipment

EU Common Position on Arms Exports

The EU member states have national rules concerning the export of military equipment. However, the member states have to some extent chosen to coordinate their export control policies. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted in 1998, specified common criteria for exports of military equipment, applicable in conjunction with national assessments of export applications. Member states could, and may still, have their own, stricter guidelines. The Code of Conduct was toughened in 2005, and was adopted as a Common Position in 2008 (2008/944/CFSP). In 2013, work to review the EU Common Position on Arms Exports was concluded in accordance with Article 15 of the Common Position.

The following countries that are not members of the EU have also now officially adopted the criteria and principles of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway.

Comm. 2013/14:114 The first part of the Common Position contains eight criteria that must all be taken into consideration before deciding whether to approve arms exports to a given country. These criteria concern

- the situation in the recipient country,
- the situation in the recipient country's region and
- the exporting country and recipient country's international undertakings.

With regard to the situation in the recipient country, human rights and international humanitarian law must be taken into account, as well as whether there are tensions or armed conflicts in the country, risks of the weapons being diverted or re-exported and whether the export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The situation in the region refers to stability in the area and the risk of the recipient being able to use the weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, the exporting country and the recipient country's international undertakings are to be considered. For example, arms embargoes must be respected, the national security of member states must be considered and the behaviour of the recipient country in the international community is to be taken into account. The latter relates, among other things, to the country's attitude towards terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law. The Common Position's seventh criterion addresses the risk of diversion to an unintended recipient. The Common Position also includes a list of the products it covers (the EU Common Military List), and a User's Guide that provides more details about the implementation of the agreements in the Common Position on the exchange of information and consultations and about how these criteria for export control are to be applied. The User's Guide is continually updated.

Exchange of information on denials

In accordance with the rules for implementing the Common Position, member states must exchange details of export licence applications that have been denied. If another member state is considering granting a licence for an essentially identical transaction, consultations are to take place before the licence can be granted. The consulting member state must also inform the notifying state of its decision. The exchange of denial notifications and consultations on the notifications make export policy more transparent and uniform throughout the EU. The consultations lead to greater consensus on different export destinations. Member states notifying each other about the export transactions that are refused reduces the risk of another member state approving the export. Accordingly, the idea behind the system is that once other member states have been informed of the denial of a certain export, the same export will not be approved by another member state. The ISP is responsible for issuing details of Swedish denials and arranging consultations.

In 2013, Sweden received 262 denial notifications from other member states. Sweden issued 22 denial notifications. These applied to Azerbaijan, Colombia (2), Egypt (3), Equatorial Guinea, the Philippines,

the United Arab Emirates (3), India, Israel (2), Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Russia, Saudi Arabia (3), Serbia and Turkey. Comm. 2013/14:114

As part of the review of the Common Position, the EU's member states agreed in 2013 to share denial notification in more situations than was previously the case. Consequently, the number of notifications in 2013 is not completely comparable with the figures from previous years. The fact that exports to a particular recipient country have been denied in a specific case does not mean that the country is not eligible for Swedish exports in other cases. Swedish export control does not use a system involving lists of countries, i.e. predetermined lists of countries that are either approved or not approved as recipients. Each export application is considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Government for exports of military equipment and the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.

Work as part of COARM

The Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) is a forum in which the EU member states regularly discuss the application of the Common Position on Arms Exports and exchange views on export destinations. An account of this work, the agreements reached and statistics on the member states' exports of military equipment is published in an annual EU report. The latest report was published in the EU's Official Journal (C18) on 21 January 2014. An updated version of the EU Common Military List was adopted on 11 March 2013 (2013/C 90/01), a revised Swedish language edition was published on 20 June 2013 (2013/C 175/02).

Since the criteria in the Common Position span a number of different policy areas, the goal is to achieve and increased and clear coherence between these areas. Sweden actively works to ensure member states adopt a common approach.

Over the course of the year, the group's work has been specifically focused the review of the Common Position on Arms Exports in accordance with Article 15 of the Common Position, more specifically Criteria 7 (risk of diversion) and 8 (sustainable development). The majority of this work has been completed resulting in an update of the Common Position's User's Guide in the form of interim guidelines.

Over the past year, work also started within COARM to adapt the User's Guide to the anticipated introduction of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Guide will be updated with the adoption of the Council conclusions when the review has been formally concluded.

The member states have also decided to systematise their outreach on export control issues to non-EU countries. This work continued in 2013. The purpose is to encourage other countries to develop export control systems in line with the EU Common Position. To systematise these activities, COARM has identified the countries where visits and seminars are appropriate, contacted them and set up a database for these activities – both those that are undertaken jointly by several EU countries or on a bilateral basis between a single EU country and a non-EU country. The aim is to make outreach activities more effective and to enable the EU to

Comm. 2013/14:114 send out a consistent message on export control and the values guiding EU cooperation.

Work concerning EU Directive 2009/43/EC on the intra-community transfer of military material

The European Commission was assisted in implementing by the directive by a committee (Article 14). The committee met three times in 2013. The committee has also held two meetings with experts regarding the online tool CERTIDER. Sweden is represent on the committee by the ISP.

Control of arms brokering

To tackle the problem of uncontrolled arms brokering and avoid the circumvention of arms embargoes, the Council adopted a Common Position (2003/468/CFSP) on the control of arms brokering in 2003. In accordance with this, the member states agree to adopt the measures necessary to control arms brokering within their territory. Control of arms brokering in Sweden was already good due to the provisions of the Military Equipment Act. Work to produce appropriate mechanisms for the exchange of information about registered arms brokers between member states is taking place as part of COARM. In Sweden, some 25 companies are registered as brokers of products classified as military equipment.

Article 10 of the UN Firearms Protocol

Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing Article 10 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition was adopted on 14 March 2012. References to exports in the Regulation indicate exports outside of the EU; as far as Sweden is concerned, this means, on the one hand, exports from Sweden to third countries and, on the other, exports from another member state to a third country in cases where the supplier is established in Sweden.

The Regulation covers firearms etc. for civilian use; in addition to firearms etc. specially designed for military use, fully-automatic weapons also fall outside its scope. Furthermore, bilateral transactions, firearms etc. destined for the armed forces, the police or the public authorities of the member states, collectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of firearms etc., deactivated firearms and antique firearms and their replicas fall outside of the scope of the Regulation.

Those firearms etc. that are encompassed by the EU Regulation are, with the exception of smooth-bored hunting and sporting weapons, also covered by the appendix to the Military Equipment Ordinance. According to Regulation No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, those aspects that are covered by the Common Position must be taken into consideration when assessing licence applications.

The Regulation is valid in Sweden immediately and is applied effective from 30 September 2013. There are provisions that complement the EU Regulation in the Ordinance (2013:707) concerning the control of certain firearms, parts of firearms and ammunition. The ISP is the authority responsible for licences in accordance with the EU Regulation. Thirty-two cases have been received and 18 decisions on export have been issued in 2013.

Arms embargoes etc.

Within the scope of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU implements embargoes adopted by the UN on, for example, the trade in arms and dual-use items. The EU can also decide unanimously on certain embargoes extending beyond those adopted by the UN Security Council. These decisions by the Council of the European Union may be regarded as an expression of the member states' desire to respond collectively to various security policy issues. An arms embargo adopted by the EU is implemented in accordance with each member state's national export control regulations. EU arms embargoes normally also include a prohibition on the provision of technical and financial services relating to military equipment. These prohibitions are governed by Council Regulations under EU law. Embargoes on trade in dual-use items are governed by both Council decisions and EU Regulations. These are normally also accompanied by a prohibition on the provision of technical and financial services relating to these items.

A decision by the UN Security Council, the EU or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to impose an arms embargo represents an unconditional obstacle to Swedish exports in accordance with the Swedish guidelines for exports of military equipment. If an arms embargo also applies to imports, special regulations on the prohibition are issued in Sweden. Such regulations exist for Iran, Libya and North Korea.

There are currently formal EU decisions, either independent or based on UN decisions, that arms embargoes apply to Afghanistan, Belarus, Myanmar (Burma), the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The embargoes vary somewhat in their focus and scope. There are also individually targeted arms embargoes on those named on the UN terrorist list. The EU also applies an arms embargo against China, based on Council conclusions, introduced as a result of the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Sweden does not permit the export of any military equipment to China. In accordance with OSCE decisions, there are also arms embargoes on Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has collated information on what restrictive measures (sanctions) against other countries exist in the EU and thus apply to Sweden. Information can be found on the website www.regeringen.se/sanktioner. This website provides a country-by-country account of arms embargoes or embargoes on dual-use items that are in force. It also contains links to EU legal acts covering sanctions

Comm. 2013/14:114 and, where applicable, the UN decisions that have preceded the EU measures. The Government sanctions website is updated regularly.

A list of all applicable EU legal acts concerning sanctions, including those relating to arms embargoes and embargoes on dual-use items can be found on the website of the European External Action Service.

2.4 International cooperation on export control of military equipment

Transparency in conventional arms trade

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on transparency in the arms trade in 1991. The resolution urges the UN member states to voluntarily submit annual reports on their imports and exports of conventional weapon systems to a register administered by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

The reports are concerned with trade in the following seven categories of equipment: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles/missile launchers. Following reviews by the UN, most recently in 2006, the definitions of the categories have been expanded to include more weapons systems and it is now also possible to report trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Particular importance is now attached to man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), which have been included in the category of missiles/missile launchers since 2003. The voluntary reporting also includes information on countries' stockpiles of the weapons in question and procurements from their own defence industries. In consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the ISP, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs compiles annual data, which is submitted to the UN in accordance with the resolution.

Since reports have been made by all of the large exporters and most large importers, it is estimated that most of the world's trade in heavy conventional weapon systems is covered by the Register.

Sweden's share of world trade in heavy weapons systems continues to be limited. The report that Sweden will make to the UN register for 2013 will include exports to Finland (Advanced Mortar System, AMOS), to France (All Terrain Armoured Vehicle S10), to Thailand (JAS 39 Gripen) and to Germany (Leopard 2 tank).

An annual report on major conventional weapons systems is made to the Organisation for Security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the same way as to the United Nations.

The Wassenaar Arrangement's (WA) reporting mechanism regarding exports of military equipment largely follows the seven categories reported to the UN register. However, certain categories have been refined through the introduction of subgroups and an eighth category for small arms and light weapons (SALW) has been added. The member states have agreed to report twice yearly, in accordance with an agreed procedure, and further information may then be submitted voluntarily. The purpose of this agreement is to draw attention to destabilising

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The UN General Assembly voted to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty on 2 April 2013; there were 155 votes in favour, 3 against and 23 abstentions. The adoption marked the end of a seven-year long, politically complex process to bring about an internationally binding instrument that requires its parties to maintain effective national control of the international trade in defence equipment and sets standards for what this control will entail.

Sweden and the other EU countries signed the treaty when it was opened to signatories on 3 June 2013. At the beginning of 2014, 116 countries had signed and 9 had also ratified the treaty. The number of countries that have ratified the treaty is expected to increase over the course of 2014. On the part of the EU member states, this can take place once the European Parliament has permitted the member states to ratify. The treaty will come into force 90 days after the 50th ratification instrument has been deposited with the UN Secretary-General. This is expected to take place some time during 2014 or the beginning of 2015.

The EU member states are continuing to coordinate their actions concerning the ATT using a special subgroup of the Council Working Party COARM. Significant efforts are made to promote the universal adoption of the treaty in dialogues with other countries and regional groupings. The Council of the European Union has also allocated funding for a three-year programme to support other countries' implementation of the ATT and this their opportunity to adopt the treaty. This support for implementation is expected to begin in the first half of 2014. A fund has also been set up within the UN for cooperation on arms regulation (UNSCAR) to provide funding to projects that support the implementation of the ATT. Sweden is one of barely 10 countries that have contributed to the fund.

Furthermore, an informal effort has been established by interested parties to prepare the first multipartite meeting concerning the ATT and, for example, the establishment of an international secretariat, when the treaty has actually come into force. A continued dialogue on these and other issues is taking place with civil society and representatives from the industry, internationally, at the EU level and in Sweden.

The Government attach great importance to a widespread adoption and effective implementation of the ATT. Sweden has actively contributed to the genesis of the ATT and will continue to support the treaty. The Government's assessment is that a universal, legally binding treaty that strengthens global control of the conventional arms trade is the most effective way of dealing with the cross-border illicit arms trade, which, in many parts of the world, sustains armed conflicts and instability at regional or national levels, causes extensive humanitarian suffering and hampers or thwarts economic development.

The expression small arms and light weapons (SALW) basically refers to firearms which are intended to be carried and used by one person, and weapons intended to be carried and used by several persons. Examples of the former category include pistols and assault rifles. Examples of the latter include machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and portable surface-to-air missiles. Work to prevent and combat the destabilising accumulation and the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons is currently taking place in various international forums such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE. No other type of weapons cause more deaths and suffering than these, which are used every day in local and regional conflicts, particularly in developing countries.

In 2001, the United Nations adopted a programme of action to combat the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. The aim of the UN's work is to raise awareness about the destabilising effect small arms and light weapons have on regions suffering from conflict. Non-proliferation is also important in combating criminality and, not least, terrorism. When the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has come into force and the number of countries that have signed up has increased, the work as part of the UN's programme of action will be able to take place in a climate where there is greater control on the legal trade and focus on measures to combat the illegal trade in SALW. During the year, Sweden has reported exports of SALW to the UN register of conventional arms.

The EU last revised its Joint Action on combating the destabilising accumulation and illegal spread of small arms and light weapons in 2002. Implementation of the EU strategy with an action plan to combat the illegal spread of small arms and light weapons, which was adopted by the European Council in 2005, has continued over the course of the year, as has the Council's conclusions from 2008 concerning the introduction of a special SALW clause in international agreements between the EU and third countries. The Council publishes status reports on the EU strategy and its progress twice a year.

In 2012, an evaluation was made of the OSCE's action plan for SALW from 2010. The main conclusions concerned deficiencies in the reporting of exports and imports of SALW, but also difficulties in funding SALW projects. In 2013, Sweden has reported exports of SALW to the OSCE register of trade in conventional arms. There is also an obligation to report trade in these arms, among others, in the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). Sweden is working towards a situation where every country establishes and implements a responsible export policy with comprehensive laws and regulations. The aim is for all countries to have effective systems that control manufacturers, sellers, buyers, agents and brokers of SALW.

The Six-nation Initiative – Letter of Intent (LoI)

In 2000, the six nations in Europe with the largest defence industries (France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany) signed an important defence industry cooperation agreement at the governmental level, known as the Framework Agreement. This agreement was negotiated as a result of the declaration of intent adopted

by the countries' defence ministers in 1998, the Six-nation Initiative or Letter of Intent (LoI). The purpose of the agreement is to promote the rationalisation, restructuring and operation of the European defence industry – focusing mainly on the supply side, i.e. the states delivering the products. Six working groups have subsequently worked to put the principles of the framework agreement into practice. The areas covered are delivery security, export controls, security, defence-related research and technology, treatment of technical information, harmonisation of military requirements and protection of commercially sensitive information. In 2013, the working group for export control issues, chaired of France, has continued to address issues concerning the implementation and application of the ICT Directive. The working group has, for example, discussed the possibility of harmonising general licences. An ongoing dialogue has also been conducted with the American export control authorities concerning developments in export control mechanisms in the United States, within the LoI circle and in the EU.

3 Dual-use items

3.1 Background and regulatory framework

The issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has long been high on the international agenda. In particular, the focus has been on preventing additional countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but since 11 September 2001 there has also been a strong focus on non-governmental actors.

There is no legal definition of what is meant by weapons of mass destruction. However, the term is commonly used to indicate nuclear weapons and chemical and biological warfare agents. In modern terminology, radiological weapons are also sometimes considered to be covered by the term. In efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, certain delivery systems, such as long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, are also included.

Multilateral measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have primarily been expressed through a number of international conventions and cooperation within a number of multilateral export control regimes.

Dual-use items (DUIs) are items that are produced for legitimate civil uses, but which may also be used for military purposes, for example in the production of weapons of mass destruction or military equipment. In recent decades, the international community has developed a range of cooperation arrangements to limit the proliferation of these products. Export control itself is always exercised nationally, however, extensive coordination also take place through the multilateral export control regimes and within the EU.

EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from 2003 contains a commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of

Comm. 2013/14:114 export control of DUIs in Europe. One fundamental reason is that various sensitive products that could be misused in connection with weapons of mass destruction are manufactured in the EU. The export control measures required in the EU must, at the same time, be proportionate with regard to the risk of proliferation and not unnecessarily disrupt the internal market or the competitiveness of European companies.

Within the multilateral export control regimes, control lists have been developed establishing which products are to be subject to licensing. This requirement is justified by the fact that some countries have weapons of mass destruction programmes, despite having signed international agreements prohibiting or regulating such activities, or that they remain outside of the agreements that prohibit or regulate such activities. Such countries have often reinforced their capacity by importing civilian products that are then used for military purposes. History has shown that countries which have acquired military capacity in this way have imported those products from companies that were not aware of their contribution to the development of, for example, weapons of mass destruction. Often the same purchase request is sent to companies in different countries. Previously, one country could refuse an export licence while another country granted it. Consequently, there was an obvious need for closer cooperation and information sharing between exporting countries. This need prompted the establishment of the export control regimes. The need for control has been underscored in recent years by the threat of terrorism.

The inclusion of a product in a control list does not automatically mean that exports of that product are prohibited. Rather, the listing indicates that the product is sensitive. In the EU, the control lists adopted by the various regimes are incorporated into the Annex 1 to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 and constitute the basis for decisions for granting or denial of export licences.

It follows from the EU Regulation that the member states can use a mechanism that enables products not on the lists to be made subject to controls in the event that the exporter or the licensing authorities become aware that the product is or may be intended for use in connection with the production etc. of weapons of mass destruction or for other military purposes. This is known as a catch-all mechanism, and is also common practice within the multilateral export control regimes.

Much of the work within the EU and the regimes consists of the extensive exchange of information, both internal and in the form of external outreach activities – directed at domestic industry and at other countries – on the need for export control and the development of export control systems.

The export control of DUIs and of technical assistance in connection with these products is governed nationally by the dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064). The most recent amendments came into force on 1 August 2010. The Act contains provisions that complement Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.

It is difficult to provide an overall picture of the industries that work with DUIs in Sweden, since a considerable proportion of products are

sold in the EU market or exported to markets covered by the EU's general export licences. The principal rule is that no licence is required for transfers to other EU member states. The general licence EU001 applies, with some exceptions, to all products in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 regarding export to Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.

In addition, another five general licences were introduced (EU002–006) concerning certain products going to certain destinations, export after repair/replacement, temporary export to exhibitions and trade fairs, certain chemicals and telecommunications. The number of countries covered by licences EU002–006 ranges from six countries in EU002 and EU006 to 24 countries in EU003 and EU004. The purpose of the general licences is to make it easier for the companies, which only need to report to the licensing authority 30 days after the first export has taken place.

Unlike the companies which are subject to the military equipment legislation, no basic licences under the export control legislation are required for companies that produce or trade in DUIs. Nor are these companies obliged to make a declaration of delivery in accordance with the export control legislation. However, a company is obliged to make a fee declaration if it has manufactured or sold controlled products subject to supervision by the ISP. This includes sales within and outside of Sweden.

In the event that a company is aware that a DUI, which the company concerned intends to export and which is not listed in Annex I of the EU Regulation, is intended to be used in connection with weapons of mass destruction, it is required to inform the ISP. The ISP can, following the customary assessment of the licence application, decide not to grant a licence for export (catch-all).

The majority of the DUIs exported with a licence from the ISP are telecommunications equipment, primarily encryption and thermal imaging devices that are controlled in the Wassenaar Arrangement's export regime (WA). Carbon fibre also accounts for a significant share. Another major product in terms of volumes is heat exchangers. These are controlled within the Australia Group (AG). Other products such as isostatic presses, chemicals, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and equipment related to UAVs is, in terms of volume, less extensive, but can place a demand on resources in the assessment of licence applications.

The embargoes on trade in DUIs are in accordance with decisions by the UN and have been implemented and expanded by the EU to encompass Iran and North Korea. Through the decisions of the EU, these embargoes are fundamentally comprehensive, i.e. they cover all items on the EU control list, with some individual exceptions in the case of Iran. Certain other items are also covered by an embargo or licence requirement. In accordance with decisions of the EU, exports of certain DUIs are also prohibited or covered by a licence requirement in relation to Syria.

Cooperation as part of the multilateral export regimes

International agreements

With regard to the international agreements, specific reference should be made to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). Sweden is a party to all three conventions (see SÖ 1970:12, 1976:18 and 1993:28).

Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states undertake not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons, while the five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA) commit themselves to disarmament. Furthermore, the parties undertake not to transfer source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon state, unless the source or special fissionable material or equipment is subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards.

In the BTWC, the parties undertake not to transfer, either directly or indirectly, equipment that can be used for the production of biological weapons.

Similarly, the CWC stipulates that its parties are not to transfer, either directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to any other state.

Although the primary objective of these international agreements is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to promote disarmament, they also require the parties to promote trade for peaceful purposes. The reason for this is that a substantial proportion of the products and technologies concerned are dual-use items.

The multilateral export control regimes

To strengthen international cooperation on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, some forty countries have, on their own initiative, come together in five multilateral export control regimes: the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

The purpose of the regimes is to identify goods and technologies that can be used in connection with weapons of mass destruction and to enhance the uniformity of the participating countries' export control of these. To support this work, each regime has a list of items subject to control. The lists are revised on a regular basis. This work also includes exchanging information on refused exports, proliferation risks and contacts with third countries for the purpose of promoting the regimes' non-proliferation objectives.

Cooperation in the multilateral export control regimes is grounded in a shared political will to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is achieved through national legislation enabling the export control of goods and technologies identified as strategic. Participation in these regimes makes it easier to meet the legally binding international commitments in the above-mentioned international agreements to refrain from assisting other states, directly or indirectly, in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The Zangger Committee

The Zangger Committee, which was established in 1974, deals with export control issues related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Committee defines the meaning of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the production of special fissionable material. Consequently, its responsibilities overlap to some extent with those of the NSG (see below). The NPT stipulates that export of such equipment and material, as well as fissionable material, to a non-nuclear-weapon state is only allowed if the fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards. The equipment and materials are specified in the Committee's control list, which is updated to keep pace with technological developments. The list can be found in the IAEA's Information Circular No 209 (INFCIRC/209/Rev.3).

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has its origins in the "London Club", established in the mid-1970s. The work of the NSG is concerned with the export control of products listed in Part 1 and Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines, including products with nuclear applications and DUIs that can be used in connection with the development or production of nuclear weapons. These products are listed in the IAEA's Information Circular No. 254, which includes two control lists for each group of items (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2).

The NSG's work to review the list was concluded in 2013. A new technical working group, the Technical Experts Group (TEG) was established, initially with a Swedish chair. Serbia was admitted as a member of the regime, which had 48 member states at the close of 2013.

Discussions of the issue of cooperation concerning civilian nuclear technology with India, including the undertakings made by India to make such cooperation possible, continued over the course of the year. The European Commission is an observer in the regime. The Czech Republic took over as Chair of the NSG from the USA in 2013.

The Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG) was formed in 1985 on the initiative of Australia. Its aim is to harmonise member countries' export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Originally, the Group's work only encompassed chemicals and chemical production equipment. In 1990, however, it was decided to expand the

Comm. 2013/14:114 control lists to include microorganisms, toxins and certain manufacturing equipment for biological weapons.

In 2013, the AG continued its outreach work with countries that are not members of the regime. In addition, Mexico was admitted as a new member. One of the AG's working groups is NETTEM, consisting of technical experts whose task is to monitor technological development and continuously review the AG's lists. In 2013, NETTEM's work included discussing pharmaceutical-based agents with dual-use properties and how these might be controlled.

The Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was set up as a result of an American initiative in 1982. It focuses on export controls of complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and other unmanned aerial vehicles (including cruise missiles, drones and reconnaissance platforms) with a range of 300 kilometres or more. Controls also extend to components of such systems and other items that can be used to produce missiles, and also smaller unmanned aerial vehicles designed to be able to spread aerosols.

In 2013, the work within the MTCR included continuing the review of the content of the lists of controlled items, exchanging information on the sensitive spread of rocket equipment, technological development, national weapons programme and procurement strategies and conducting outreach activities with a range of countries. Several EU countries are still not members of the MTCR regime. Their membership continued to be blocked in 2013 for political reasons. Italy took over as Chair of the MTCR from Germany in October 2013. At the plenary meeting in 2011, Sweden was elected Deputy Chair of the Technical Experts Meeting and then became Co-chair of that group in 2013.

The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was formed in 1996 as a successor to the multilateral export control cooperation that had previously taken place within the framework of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). The Arrangement's work covers the control of conventional weapons, as well as dual-use items and technologies not controlled by other regimes. Consequently, it represents an important complement to the work of other regimes that focus exclusively on weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery systems.

The regime's aim is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting openness and responsible action with regard to transfers of conventional weapons and DUEs, thus helping to avoid destabilising accumulations. The basic view taken by the Wassenaar Arrangement is that trading of the items in the control lists should be permitted, but must be controlled.

The Wassenaar Arrangement's broader product focus may be seen in the two control lists attached to the regime's basic document: the Munitions List, which covers conventional military equipment, and the

List of dual-use items and Technologies, which covers products and technologies with both civilian and military uses that are not included in the other regimes' control lists. In practice, the two Wassenaar lists guide the contents of the EU's corresponding control lists.

The Wassenaar Arrangement holds annual plenary meetings in late autumn. This took place in December 2013 with Denmark as Chair. These plenary meetings address matters of fundamental significance to the continued development of this cooperation. On the basis of the ongoing technical work throughout the year, formal decisions on updating the control lists to reflect the technological development of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction.

During the plenary meeting in December 2013, new consensus recommendations describing various aspects of good export control practice were adopted. A decision was made regarding supplements to the control lists to cover a range of new areas such as digital surveillance and intelligence-gathering tools. At the same time, the control requirements on certain types of computer were eased.

Consular vigilance

One element of the work to limit the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is what is known as consular vigilance. Sweden has both legally binding commitments, in the form of sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU, and political commitments, within the scope of the export control regimes, aimed at limiting the spread of sensitive information and technologies. One such way of spreading sensitive information is through knowledge transfer. This issue becomes relevant when assessing applications for admission or residence permits for studies relating to such sensitive information and technologies. Cooperation between the authorities concerned, which aims, for example, to increase awareness of proliferation risks with regard to sensitive university study programmes or research partnerships, continued in 2013. For example, a seminar for educational institutions was organised with this very aim.

3.3 Collaboration within the EU on dual-use items

The export control regimes and the EU

Work within the EU on the export control of dual-use items (DUIs) is closely associated with the international work that takes place as part of the export control regimes. Work within the EU is coordinated most closely by two working groups – CONOP (Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation), which deals with non-proliferation issues in general, and the WPDU (Working Party on dual-use Goods), which focuses on policy issues and updates the control list of DUIs that are covered by Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. The following section addresses the work of the WDPU.

In accordance with the EU's strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the member states have to work towards becoming leading cooperative partners in the export control regimes by,

Comm. 2013/14:114 for example, coordinating the EU positions within the regimes. The EU has long held the view that all EU member states should be invited to join all of the export control regimes. The main reason is the desire to ensure that all EU countries maintain harmonised and effective national export controls based on the regimes' control lists, guidelines for export control and exchange of information on proliferation risks. The EU constitutes a common market for the vast majority of dual-use items. A similar situation is emerging in the defence industry in the internal market through ever closer cooperation within the EU. Trade within the EU is not export. However, transfer of goods and technologies to a third country does constitute export. EU member states are thus dependent on one another's export control systems. This is an additional reason why the issue of membership in the export control regimes is a substantial one.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG) have decided that all EU countries are now members of these regimes. Equivalent decisions have not yet been made in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with regard to Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. The same applies to Cyprus with regard to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

The year's work on the control lists

The changes made to the regimes' control lists over the course of the year are detailed in Annex I of the Council Regulation named above and thus become legally binding for EU member states. Annex I was most recently updated through Regulation (EU) No 388/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Legislation that aims to delegate the authority to update Annex I to the Commission is currently being drawn up. (See the next paragraph.)

The work of the WPDU

The work of the WPDU in 2013 has comprised coordination between the member states with regard to managing the control of DUIs not on the control list. This primarily relates to the shape of closer cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear products and missile products to Iran.

Discussions concerning the Commission's proposal from 2011 to amend the DUI Regulation have continued. The proposal in question involves the authority to amend Annex I to the DUP Regulation in accordance with the changes continuously made to the control lists in the multilateral export control regimes being delegated to the Commission and the adoption of legislation to swiftly exclude recipient countries from the EU's general export licences. In 2013, the European Parliament discussed proposed changes to the Commission's proposal. Agreement in principal was reached in December 2013 and it is hoped that the proposal will be adopted in the first part of 2014.

The aim of the Coordination Group is to coordinate the application of the Regulation. Over the course of the year, this work has included preparing guidelines for consultations.

3.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004. The Resolution, supported by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obliges, through binding decisions, all UN member states to prevent non-state actors (terrorists) from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and items connected to such weapons. It set out, among other things, that all states are to establish effective national controls on exports, brokering, transit and transshipments. The Resolution also contains provisions on assisting other countries with the implementation of the obligatory measures.

It was also decided through Resolution 1540 to establish a committee tasked with reporting to the Security Council on the Resolution's implementation. The UN's member states are urged to report to this committee on the steps that they have taken to implement the Resolution. The 1540 Committee's mandate was extended in April 2011, with the new mandate period running until April 2021.

An international initiative that has a number of interests in common, and partly overlaps, with Resolution 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This initiative, supported by the EU and Sweden, aims to prevent the transport of weapons of mass destruction and their components to unauthorised recipients within the framework of international and national law. The Swedish authorities concerned are coordinating their work in this area and held a seminar in 2013 to develop their national preparedness and cooperative capability.

4 Responsible Authorities

4.1 The Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls

The Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP) is the central administrative authority for cases and supervision pursuant to the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the dual-use items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064), provided that, in the latter instance, no other authority has this task. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has the same responsibility with reference to particularly sensitive nuclear technology products.

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) assist the ISP by providing

Comm. 2013/14:114 specialist technical expertise and organisation including the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (Must), the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) and FRA supply the ISP with information. The ISP also has an established partnership with Swedish Customs. Some of the ISP's supervisory inspections are carried out jointly with Swedish Customs and the authorities also exchange information on export licences.

The Government has appointed the ISP as what is known as the competent authority, responsible for executing certain duties stipulated by Council resolutions concerning sanctions decided by the European Union. The ISP also has supervisory duties in relation to special prohibiting regulations issued by the Government with the support of the Act (1996:95) on Certain International Sanctions.

In addition, the ISP is the national authority under the Chemical Weapons Convention from 1992 and performs the duties pursuant to the Act (1994:118) concerning inspections in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, as well as the associated ordinance. This aspect of the ISP's activities is not dealt with in more detail in this Communication.

From 30 September 2013, the ISP is the licensing authority for cases in accordance with Regulation No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2013, regulating licences to export civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition outside of the EU and certain import and transit measures.

The authority's responsibilities are set out in the ISP's instructions (SFS 2010:1101).

Contacts with companies

The ISP maintains regular contact with the companies whose exports are subject to control. The companies' obligations are governed by the Military Equipment Act and the Military Equipment Ordinance. With regard to military equipment, companies have to report regularly to the ISP on their marketing activities abroad. These reports form the basis for the ISP's periodic briefings with the companies regarding their export plans. In conjunction with this dialogue, the ISP may issue positive or negative advance decisions to the companies concerning destinations that are sensitive or have not yet been assessed. In addition to processing export licence applications, the ISP reviews the notifications that manufacturers of military equipment are obliged to submit at least four weeks prior submitting tenders or signing contracts concerning exports of military equipment or other cooperation with foreign partners in this field. At this stage, the ISP has the opportunity to provide notification that the measure they were informed of in advance is prohibited. Finally, exporters of military equipment must report the deliveries of military equipment that are made under the export licences issued to them. In its supervisory role, ISP carries out compliance visits to companies to monitor their internal export control organisations.

Unlike military equipment, no licence is required to manufacture dual-use items (DUIs). Furthermore, as a general rule licences are not required

for sales within the EU (a licence is only required for what are referred to as Annex IV items). The control lists that are drawn up in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 state which categories of items require licences to be exported outside the EU. When classifying whether a product is to be considered a DUI or not, it is primarily the companies that classify their own items. When a company is unsure whether its item belongs to the controlled items category, the company can submit an enquiry to the ISP. In the light of this, ISP's contacts with DUI companies are different than is the case with regard to military equipment. With the exception of a few companies, the ISP meets with DUI companies on more an ad hoc basis.

In its supervisory role, ISP carries out compliance visits to companies to monitor their internal export control organisations. In 2013, ISP carried out 29 compliance visits.

Funding

Rules concerning the ISP's funding are detailed in the Ordinance (2008:889) on the financing of the operations of the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP). A large proportion of the authority's activities are funded by fees. The Ordinance stipulates that the fee structure is broken down into three categories: military equipment, dual-use items and the Act Concerning Inspections in Accordance with the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

When the Ordinance (2013:707) concerning the control of certain firearms, parts of firearms and ammunition handed the ISP the task of assessing export licence applications in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 258/2012, the ISP was also given the right to charge licence application fees.

Parts of the ISP's international operations and work related to international sanctions are funded by appropriations through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The ISP's exports of services must be primarily funded by parties other than the ISP.

The Export Control Council (ECC)

In 1984, on the basis of Govt. Bill 1984/85:82, proposing greater transparency and consultation on matters relating to exports of military equipment, the Riksdag decided to establish an advisory board concerned with exports of military equipment. The Government reorganised this board into the Export Control Council (ECC) in connection with the establishment of the ISP in 1996. The rules governing the composition and activities of the ECC are included in the ISP's instructions. All parliamentary parties are represented on the ECC. It is chaired by the Director-General of the ISP. A list of the Council's members in 2013 appears below.

The Director-General of the ISP is responsible for selecting those cases that will be subjected to consultation with the Export Control Council. Consultation often takes place before a company is informed of an

Comm. 2013/14:114 advance notification. In addition, the Director-General has to consult the Council before the ISP submits an application to the Government for assessment under the Military Equipment Act or the dual-use items and Technical Assistance Control Act.

At meetings of the Export Control Council, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents assessments of the relevant purchasing countries and the Ministry of Defence provides assessments of the defence policy aspects of the applications. The Director-General may also summon other experts. One task of the Council is to interpret the guidelines and the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in specific cases, in order to provide further guidance to the ISP.

The members have unrestricted access to the documentation of all export licence application proceedings. The Director-General reports all export licence decisions continuously, as well as advance decisions that have been ruled on, but not previously reported to the Export Control Council and applications decided upon in accordance with guideline practice (tender notifications and cooperation agreements). Effective from 2005, the ISP has also reported all preparatory proceedings for dual-use items to the ECC.

All in all, this system ensures parliamentary insight into the application of the export control regulations.

The intention of the Swedish system, uniquely in international terms in that representatives of the political parties can discuss potential export transactions in advance, is to build a broad consensus on export control policy and promote continuity in the conduct of that policy. Unlike in many other countries, the Export Control Council deals with cases at an early stage, before a specific transaction comes up. Since it would harm the exporting companies commercially if their plans were made known before they had concluded a deal, the Export Control Council's discussions are not made public. Apart from this, the assessments of individual countries are normally subject to confidentiality in relation to foreign affairs.

The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, and not the Export Control Council, is still consulted in cases where this is prescribed by the Instrument of Government. The Export Control Council met eight times in 2013.

On 3 March 2011, the Government decided to appoint the following to the Export Control Council. These appointments are valid until further notice, although not beyond 31 December 2014:

Torbjörn Björlund, Member of Parliament (Left Party)

Carina Adolfsson Elgestam, Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party)

Annicka Engblom, Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)

Mikael Jansson, Member of Parliament (Sweden Democrats)

Lars Johansson, Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party)

Ann-Charlotte Hammar Johnsson, Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)

Kerstin Lundgren, Member of Parliament (Centre Party)

Valter Mutt, Member of Parliament (Swedish Green Party)

Caroline Szyber, Member of Parliament (Christian Democrats)

Göran Lennmarker, former Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)
Lennart Rohdin, former Member of Parliament (Liberal Party)
Tone Tingsgård, former Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party)

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The Strategic Cooperation Council (SCC)

The Strategic Cooperation Council is a forum attached to the ISP for cooperation on issues related to non-proliferation. It consists of a Director-General and members from the cooperating authorities appointed by the ISP.

The Technical-Scientific Council (TSC)

In connection with matters concerning the classification of military equipment and dual-use items, the Director-General of the ISP is assisted by a Technical-Scientific Council attached to the Agency. This consists of representatives of institutions with expertise in the technology's civilian and military applications.

4.2 The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

In accordance with the Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is the central government authority for issues relating to the protection of human health and the environment against the harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising radiation, security and physical protection in nuclear and other activities involving radiation and nuclear non-proliferation.

The SSM's non-proliferation remit in connection with exports of nuclear material and nuclear technology products is stated in the Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Ordinance (2000:1217). This states that the SSM decides whether or not to authorise exports to a country outside the EU or for transfers within the EU of nuclear material and nuclear technology products, except in certain special or fundamental cases where the Government is the decision-making body. The items are specified in Annex I, Category 0 and in Annex IV of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. SSM is also the national supervisory authority with regard to compliance with these provisions.

On 19 April 2012 the Government gave the SSM expanded tasks regarding consideration of applications linked to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against North Korea.

In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the SSM, in accordance with the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, is the national supervisory authority ensuring that Swedish nuclear activities are conducted in accordance with the obligations resulting from the agreements to which Sweden is party that aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The SSM is also the national contact point for the IAEA database

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The SSM cooperates with other authorities on export control matters, in particular the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP) and Swedish Customs. The SSM is also supported by the specialist technical expertise of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), but does itself have a high level of specialist expertise in the field of nuclear technology.

Control of nuclear exports

Nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) and nuclear technology products are classified as DUIs; consequently, their export is governed by Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Exports to countries outside of the EU require licences, but the EU's general export licences do not apply to these items. In addition, transfers within the EU involving several products, including particularly sensitive nuclear materials and nuclear equipment, also require licences.

When an application for a licence to export nuclear fuel is submitted, the SSM assesses, in parallel, the issue of the possible transfer of the nuclear material in accordance with the Act (1984:3) and Ordinance (1984:14) on Nuclear Activities. In the case of spent nuclear fuel, the SSM also investigates the issue of the materials final disposal. With regard to spent nuclear fuel originating from nuclear activities in Sweden, the application has to include an assurance that the exporter will recover the material if it cannot be disposed of in the intended manner. Furthermore, the SSM decides how nuclear material will be transported with the aim of preventing radiological accidents and to ensure that there is adequate physical protection.

The conditions imposed in decisions concerning export licences are based on the guidelines agreed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These include obtaining certain specified assurances from the government of the recipient country before an export licence can be granted. These assurances will state that the items are for peaceful use, that the IAEA have full safeguarding rights in the country and that nuclear material has adequate physical protection in the country. In addition, there must be a guarantee that re-exportation will not take place without corresponding assurances. The SSM does this in the event of repeated transactions with one country. The SSM is tasked by the Government with obtaining these assurances from the government of the country in receipt of exports of nuclear technology, as well as with drawing up and submitting Swedish assurances to exporting countries when Sweden imports such material. However, in the case of initial transactions, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs obtains the assurances for exports or provides assurances for imports.

All EU member states have ratified the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Treaty), one purpose of which is to establish a common market for special materials and equipment in the field of nuclear energy and to guarantee that nuclear material is not used for anything other than its intended purpose. All the EU member states have also ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

and have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA with associated additional protocols. The Government is of the opinion that the existing licensing procedure for trade within the EU, in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 and the commitments of the member states within the scope of Euratom, normally provides sufficient safeguards in the transfer of nuclear material and nuclear technologies between EU member states and are in accordance with the NSG Guidelines.

Within the scope of the Euratom Treaty, the EU to enter into agreements with third countries. Bilateral agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy have been entered into between the EU and the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. An equivalent agreement between the EU and South Africa is expected to come into force in 2014.

All EU member states have undertaken to report all exports of nuclear material and nuclear technologies to the IAEA, under the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, in the case of Sweden INFCIRC/193/Add.8. For Sweden, this means that the European Commission, through its safeguards under the Euratom Treaty, reports all exports of nuclear material to the IAEA and that the SSM reports all exports of nuclear technologies to the IAEA. As opposed to the case with other DUIs, the SSM must be notified of exports of nuclear technologies listed in Annex 1, Category 0 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 for this reporting to take place.

The number of applications for export licences has been relatively constant in recent years, while the number of companies applying for licences has increased. SSM handled over 40 applications for export licences in 2013. One third of these consisted of nuclear material and about half were zirconium components. Details of the export licences granted by the SSM are found in Table 5 of Appendix 2.

The SSM makes contact with the companies affected by its safeguarding activities when necessary. In its supervisory role, the SSM carries out compliance visits to companies to monitor their internal export control organisations. Two visits took place in 2013.

5 Statistics and Terminology

The Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls continuously monitors the marketing and export of military equipment and dual-use items, supplying the Government with the statistical data for the report on Swedish exports of military equipment and dual-use items.

Companies licensed to manufacture and supply military equipment – currently c.130, of which over 50 are active exporters – are required to submit reports concerning various aspects to the ISP.

The report on Swedish exports of military equipment in 2013 is appended to this Communication. Statistics from the last few years are also shown, as individual sales and deliveries of major systems may

Comm. 2013/14:114 cause wide fluctuations in the annual statistics. The information in this Communication is based on statutory annual reporting from the military equipment-exporting companies and authorities for 2013 compiled by the ISP.

The SSM monitors the development of nuclear technology in Sweden and provides statistical data to the Government concerning exports of dual-use nuclear technologies. The report is appended.

Categories of military equipment

As a result of the implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC the Swedish list of military equipment is now identical to the EU Common Military List, with two national supplements (nuclear explosive devices and fortification facilities). The EU Common Military List does not differentiate between military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME). The Swedish military list is therefore complemented with a division into MEC and OME. This Communication presents the breakdown into MEC and OME, as well as the military list designations (ML) and national additions (NL) where applicable. The MEC category includes equipment with a destructive impact including sights for such equipment and fire control equipment. The OME category includes parts and components for MEC, as well as equipment that does not have a directly destructive impact in a combat situation.

Where a table states that export licences have been granted or that exports have been made within a particular category, this refers to one or more items in that category or components thereof. However, this does not mean that export licences have been granted for or that there have been exports of every one of the items in each category.

It should also be noted that as the EU Common Military List contains some categories which have not previously been subject to control, therefore the statistics are not entirely comparable from year to year.

Actual deliveries

Export statistics from the ISP are based on the export companies' and authorities' statutory reports of the invoiced value of the equipment and technical assistance delivered.

Changes in the statistics reported from year to year do not, in themselves, constitute the basis for a more long-term assessment of any trends. As mentioned previously, an single major delivery in one year can have a considerable impact on the statistics.

Swedish exports of military equipment are also reported in the general statistics on foreign trade, which are based on the data submitted to Statistics Sweden by Swedish Customs. However, the statistics from Statistics Sweden differ from those reported by ISP. Statistics Sweden's statistics under the heading of "Arms and ammunition" include items classified as both military equipment and civilian products. Military aircraft, vehicles and vessels are reported under other headings. Furthermore, Statistics Sweden's statistics include items that crossed the border to be repaired in Sweden or abroad. In the ISP statistics, these are

not reported as exports for sale. Consequently, Statistics Sweden's figures are not comparable with the ISP statistics and, accordingly, are not reported in this Communication

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Follow-on deliveries

It can sometimes be interesting to study in greater detail what proportion of export licences for sales to a particular country involve follow-on deliveries. The statistical report provides such an account for countries outside the EU/OECD. This also indicates the type of equipment covered by new licences.

Leasing

In recent years, the Swedish defence industry, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency (FXM) have increasingly been entering into various forms of leasing agreements with foreign customers. The background to this can be sought in international developments in recent years whereby international operations frequently entail immediate operational needs for equipment where normal forms of procurement are inadequate in terms of the time frame.

Modern equipment manufactured for the Swedish Armed Forces has also become available as a consequence of organisational downscaling and a changed threat scenario involving no immediate threats against Sweden. One example was the leasing to the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy of artillery localisation radar.

In 2005, FMV delivered fourteen JAS 39 Gripen aircraft to the Czech Republic as a consequence of the leasing agreement for 2005–2015 signed between Sweden and the Czech Republic in 2004. In 2012, the FXM initiated final negotiations with the Czech Republic aimed at extending this agreement.

In 2007, the FMV completed its delivery of fourteen JAS 39 Gripen to Hungary. The leasing agreement with Hungary as regards the JAS Gripen was renegotiated in January 2012, extending it until 2026, when the agreement becomes a purchase.

No applications were received and no licences granted in 2013.

Leasing agreements with foreign customers are not currently included in the export statistics data.

Transfers of manufacturing rights, cooperation etc.

Fourteen licences for the transfer of manufacturing rights to countries outside Sweden have been granted in 2013.

Furthermore, 43 cooperation agreements concerning the provision of technical assistance, joint development or production have been assessed and approved over the course of the year. The stricter criteria applied to exports of military equipment for combat purposes are applied to assessments of cases involving the transfer of manufacturing rights or cooperation with foreign partners, irrespective of the type of equipment. This is because this type of cooperation normally results in more long-term ties than is the case with regular exports. The scope of such

Comm. 2013/14:114 agreements, their duration, re-export clauses etc. are examined in detail in such cases.

Under the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), the Government requires entities having transferred manufacturing rights for military equipment to a party in a foreign country or having entered into a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner to report on an annual basis whether the agreement is still in force, whether production or other cooperation under such an agreement still takes place and how such cooperation is conducted. In 2013, eight companies reported ownership in 67 legal entities in 34 countries. Twelve companies have reported 77 transferred manufacturing rights in 22 countries. Fifteen companies and one governmental authority have reported a total of 120 cooperation agreements in 23 countries.

Military training

The Swedish Military Equipment Act stipulates that military training of foreign nationals may not be conducted in or outside Sweden without permission from the ISP. This prohibition does not apply to training associated with sales of military equipment for which export licences have been granted.

No permit for military training was issued in 2013.

Exports of Military Equipment

Table 1. Number of applications etc. received concerning the export of military equipment

Type of case	2011	2012	2013
Advance notification	15	19	19
Tender	264	275	313
Export licence	1,306	1,244	1,247

Table 2. Value of export licences granted in 2009–2013, divided up into military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME)

Year	Value at current prices (SEK millions)			Change in per cent		
	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME
2009	11,103	4,252	6,851	+16	-30	+95
2010	13,228	9,501	3,727	+19	+123	-46
2011	10,898	2,960	7,937	-18	-69	+113
2012	7,936	5,147	2,789	-27	+74	-65
2013	9,829	6,339	3,490	+24	+23	+25

Table 3. Value of export licences, divided up into military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME) 2009–2013 (SEK millions)




Table 4. Actual exports of military equipment 2009–2013 compared with total exports of goods

	Sweden's total exports of goods (current prices) SEK millions	Military equipment exports						
		Proportion of exports of goods %	Current prices (SEK millions)			Change in per cent		
			Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME
2009	998 100	1.36	13,561	7,288	6,273	+7	+15	- 2
2010	1 138 900	1.21	13,745	6,747	6,998	+1	-7	+12
2011	1 212 600	1.15	13,914	5,840	8,074	+1	-13	+15
2012	1 168 600	0.84	9,760	3,746	6,014	-30	-35	-25
2013	1 090 500	1.10	11,942	5,554	6,388	+22	+48	+6

Table 5. Actual exports of military equipment 2009–2013 (SEK millions)




Table 6. Categories of defence-related products

EU ML	Products classed as MEC (others are OME)	General scope of weapon category
1	ML 1 a except for revolvers and pistols and weapons designed for hunting and sport shooting. Breeches, barrels, jackets and magazines. ML 1 c)	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
2	ML 2 a except for signature reduction devices. Barrels, mechanisms, ground plates and recoil mechanisms. ML 2 d)	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
3	ML 3 a except for smoke, flare and training ammunition and expanding bullet ammunition of a type employed for hunting or sport shooting. Projectiles, shell bodies, homing devices and warheads.	Ammunition and fuse setting devices, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
4	ML 4 a except for smoke pots, cartridges and simulators. Homing devices, warheads, fuses, proximity fuses, motors, control systems, barrels and carriages. ML 4 b. Only activating, firing, laying, detonating and discharge of MEC defined equipment.	Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other devices and charges with explosive effect and associated equipment and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
5	ML 5 a) ML 5 b only target capture, target designation and target tracking systems.	Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
6	ML 6 with restriction to note 1 a) and b).	Ground vehicles and components.
7	ML 7 a), b) and e)	Chemical or biological toxic agents, "riot control agents", radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials.

EU ML	Products classed as MEC (others are OME)	General scope of weapon category
8	ML 8 a), b) and c)	“Energetic materials” and related substances.
9	ML 9 a) 1, 2a) and b)	Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels.
10	ML 10 a) combat aircraft and c) armed UAVs.	“Aircraft”, “lighter-than-air vehicles”, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (“UAVs”), aero-engines and “aircraft” equipment, related equipment, and components, as follows, specially designed or modified for military use.
11		Electronic equipment, “spacecraft” and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List, as follows.
12	ML 12 a)	High velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
13		Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components, as follows.
14		'Specialised equipment for military training' or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
15		Imaging or countermeasure equipment, as follows, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
16		Forgings, castings and other unfinished products, the use of which in a specified product is identifiable by material composition, geometry or function, and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML4, ML6, ML9, ML10, ML12 or ML19.

EU ML	Products classed as MEC (others are OME)	General scope of weapon category
17		Miscellaneous equipment, materials and 'libraries', as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
18		Production equipment and components, as follows.
19	ML 19 a), b), c) and f)	Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, as follows, and specially designed components therefor.
20		Cryogenic and "superconductive" equipment, as follows, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
21		"Software".
22		"Technology".

Export licences and actual exports in 2013, broken down by recipient country and product category (SEK millions)

Region/ Country	Export licences granted			Actual exports	
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK millions)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK millions)
EU					
Belgium	9	1,2,5,8	2.5	1,2,3,5,8	26
Bulgaria	-	-	-	3,13	1
Denmark	22	1,2,3,5,6,7,8,17,21	29	1,2,3,5,6,7,8,13,17,21,22	211
Estonia	4	3,17	16	3,5,8,11,17	2
Finland	22	1,2,3,4,5,8,14,17,21,22	79	2,3,4,5,6,8,10,13,14,17,18,21	395
France	22	1,3,5,6,8,11,13,22	151	1,2,3,5,6,8,10,11,13,21,22	492
Greece	2	6,8	0.4	6,8,13	4
Ireland	-	-	-	3	9
Italy	15	1,3,5,6,8,11,13,17,21,22	241	1,3,5,6,8,11,13,14,17,22	214
Croatia	-	-	-	3,6	1
Latvia	2	3,17	0.3	3,14,17,22	4
Lithuania	1	14	2	3	1
Luxembourg	2	7,17	0.04	2,7,13,17	31
Malta	1	1	0.1	-	-
Netherlands	11	1,3,5,8,17	3	1,3,5,6,8,13,15,17	200
New Caledonia Fr	-	-	-	3	0.3
Poland	13	4,5,8	13.5	3,5,8,13,22	37
Portugal	1	10	-	3	1
Romania	-	-	-	3	0.4
Slovakia	2	2,8,22	1	2,3,8,13	2
Slovenia	4	13,17	0.2	3,13	1
Spain	9	1,5,6,8	4	1,3,5,6,8,9,10,11,13	31.5
United Kingdom	39	1,3,5,6,8,10,11,13,17,18,21,22	108	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,13,17,18,21,22	605
Czech Republic	4	2,3,8,22	0.7	2,3,5,8	4
Germany	75	1,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,14,17,18,22	177	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,17,21,22	533.5
Hungary	3	5,8,10	0.5	3,5,8,10	3
Austria	5	2,3,7,10,17,22	31	2,3,4,7,8,10,13,14,17	24
Total	268	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	860	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22	2,835

Region/ Country	Export licences granted			Actual exports	
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK millions)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK millions)
Rest of Europe					
Andorra	1	3	3	3	0.2
Georgia	1	13	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	3,8	0.3
Montenegro	1	13	0.06	13	0.06
Norway	51	1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,13,17,21,22	4,838	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,17	961.5
Russia	2	13	0.5	3,13	13
Switzerland	16	1,2,3,5,7,8,10,13,17	74	1,2,3,5,6,7,8,10,13,17	67
Turkey	1	8	0.5	8,13,21,22	21
Ukraine	2	1,13	0.06	1,3	0.5
Total	75	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,13,17,21,22	4,916	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,17,21,22	1,064
North America					
Canada	15	2,3,5,8,14,17,18,22	82	2,3,5,8,13,14,17,18,21,22	349
United States	61	2,3,5,8,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	1,030	2,3,5,8,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	1,206
Total	76	2,3,5,8,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	1,112	2,3,5,8,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	1,555
Central America/ Caribbean					
Guatemala	1	13	-	-	-
Mexico	2	5,8	2	5,8,13	4
Total	3	5,8,13	2	5,8,13	4
South America					
Argentina	1	2,14	8	-	-
Brazil	11	1,2,4,5,8,14,21,22	427	1,2,3,5,8,11,13,14,21,22	106
Chile	3	2,3,17	37	2,3,17	3
Paraguay	1	13	-	-	-
Total	16	1,2,3,4,5,8,13,14,17,21,22	472	1,2,3,5,8,11,13,14,17,21,22	109
North-East Asia					
Japan	19	2,3,5,8,14,22	44	2,3,4,8,9	147
Republic of Korea	7	1,5,8,15,21,22	59	1,5,8,13,21	152

Region/ Country	Export licences granted			Actual exports	
	Num- ber of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK millions)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK millions)
Total	26	1,2,3,5,8,14,15, 21,22	103	1,2,3,4,5,8,9,13,21	299
Central Asia					
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	3	1
Total	-	-	-	3	1
South-East Asia					
Brunei	-	-	-	2,22	16
Philippines	1	13	-	-	-
Indonesia	2	4,13	11	4	9
Malaysia	3	2,3,7,22	366	2,7	8
Singapore	17	5,8,9,13,14,22	353	3,4,5,9,13,22	155
Thailand	8	2,5,11,22	4	2,4,5,10,11,13,14,21, 22	3,319
Vietnam	1	13	-	-	-
Total	32	2,3,4,5,7,8, 9,11,13,14,22	734	2,3,4,5,7,9,10,11, 13,14,15,21,22	3,508
South Asia					
Bangladesh	1	5	0.5	5	0.3
India	11	2,5,14,22	161	2,5,8,9,22	709
Pakistan	1	10	1.5	4,10	1
Total	13	2,5,10,14,22	163	2,4,5,8,9,10,22	710
Middle East					
Bahrain	-	-	-	5	24
Egypt	1	13	-	13	16
United Arab Emirates	5	5,7,11,14	71	5,7,9,10,11,13,14, Dual-22	271
Israel	2	13	-	13	0.2
Kuwait	-	-	-	5	4
Oman	-	-	-	5,21	2
Saudi Arabia	7	3,5,10,11,13,22	1,156	3,5,10,11,14	750
Total	15	3,5,7,10,11,13, 14,22	1,227	3,5,7,9,10,11, 13,14,21,22	1,067
North Africa					
Algeria	2	5,21,22	5	5,17,22	161
Morocco	1	13	-	-	-
Tunisia	2	4	2	4	2
Total	5	4,5,13,21,22	7	4,5,17,22	163

Region/ Country	Export licences granted			Actual exports	
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK millions)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK millions)
Sub-Saharan Africa					
Botswana	1	3	5	3	0.1
Kenya	1	13	-	-	-
Namibia	-	-	-	3	0.3
Nigeria	1	13	-	-	-
South Africa	10	1,3,4,5,8,21,22	11	1,2,3,4,5,10,13,21,22	151
Tanzania	1	13	-	3	0.5
Zambia	2	3,13	1	3	0.1
Total	16	1,3,4,5,8,13,21,22	17	1,2,3,4,5,10,13,21,22	152
Oceania					
Australia	11	1,3,5,9,11,14,17,22	215	1,2,3,4,5,11,17,22	473
New Zealand	3	3,5	1	2,3,5	2
Total	14	1,3,5,9,11,14,17,22	216	1,2,3,4,5,11,17,22	475
UN					
UN United Nations	4	7,13	0.1	7,13	0.4
Total	4	7,13	0.1	7,13	0.4
TOTAL	562	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22	9,829	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22	11,942

Table 8a. Exports of military equipment 2011–2013 distributed by country and region and divided up into MEC and OME (SEK millions)

Value (SEK millions)

Region/ Country	2011			2012			2013		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
EU	1,409	1,363	2,772	931	1,980	2,911	843	1,992	2,835
Belgium	19	5.1	24.2	24	3	27	23	3	26
Bulgaria	-	0.3	0.3	-	1.5	1.5	-	1	1
Denmark	0.8	167.6	168.4	28	218	246	108	103	211
Estonia	0.05	3.1	3.2	0.03	0.3	0.3	0.06	2	2
Finland	92.7	129.8	222.6	320	215	535	81	314	395
France	93.8	319	412.8	264	635	899	135	357	492
Greece	0.2	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	4	4
Ireland	-	3.9	3.9	-	36	36	-	9	9
Italy	2.5	61.7	64.2	5	104	109	124	90	214
Croatia	<i>See</i>	<i>Re-</i>	<i>st of</i>	<i>Eu-</i>	<i>ro-</i>	<i>pe</i>	-	1	1
Latvia	0.005	20.8	20.8	0.02	5	5	0.5	3.5	4
Lithuania	0.04	0.9	0.9	0.005	1	1	-	1	1
Luxembourg	-	5.8	5.8	-	26	26	30	1	31
Malta	-	0.006	0.006	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	543.7	20	563.8	-	148	148	0.3	200	200
New Caledonia, Fr	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.3	0.3
Poland	10.8	19.6	30.4	8.5	4	12.5	22	15	37
Portugal	0.02	1.8	1.9	-	1	1	-	1	1
Romania	-	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	-	0.4	0.4
Slovakia	0.2	0.9	1.1	-	1	1	1	1	2
Slovenia	0.005	0.7	0.7	0.003	0.6	0.6	-	1	1
Spain	0.5	10.7	11.2	2	14	16	4	27.5	31.5
United Kingdom	560.5	193.3	753.8	189	239	428	217	388	605
Czech Republic	1	4.9	5.9	9	3	12	2	2	4
Germany	39.4	382.5	421.9	80.5	314	394	82.5	451	533.5
Hungary	0.5	3.4	3.9	0.6	2	3	0.5	2.5	3
Austria	43	6.6	49.6	0.2	8	8	12	12	24
Rest of Europe	141.7	184	325.7	261	151	412	900	164	1,064
Andorra	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.2	0.2
Iceland	0.01	0.2	0.2	0.04	0.2	0.3	-	0.3	0.3

Region/ Country	2011			2012			2013		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
Croatia	0.003	0.4	0.4	0.0005	3	3	<i>See EU</i>	<i>See EU</i>	<i>See EU</i>
Montenegro	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.06
Norway	137.7	104.1	241.8	261	74	335	900	61.5	961.5
Russia	-	8.9	8.9	-	15	15	-	13	13
Switzerland	0.3	69.7	70	0.4	44	44.5	-	67	67
Turkey	3.7	0.3	4	-	13	13	1	20	21
Ukraine	-	0.4	0.4	-	1.5	1.5	-	0.5	0.5
North America	701.4	480.2	1181.6	389	408	797	779	776	1,555
United States	517.5	235.9	753.4	174	166	340	653	553	1,206
Canada	183.9	244.3	428.2	215	242	457	126	223	349
Central America/ the Caribbean	-	51.6	51.6	-	39.5	39.5	-	4	4
Mexico	-	51.6	51.6	-	39.5	39.5	-	4	4
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South America	28.2	5.9	34.1	10	25	35	6	103	109
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	7	5	12	6	14	20	4	102	106
Chile	21.2	0.03	21.3	4	11	15	2	1	3
Ecuador	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	-	0.4	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
North-East Asia	14.8	28.8	43.6	13	179	192	137	162	299
Hong Kong, China	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	14	16.9	30.9	10	13.5	23	134	13	147
Republic of Korea	0.8	11.6	12.4	3	166	169	3	149	152
Central Asia	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3	-	1	1
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3	-	1	1
South-East Asia	2799.5	451.6	3,251	504	544	1,048	2,563	945	3,508
Brunei	26.5	6.3	32.8	-	0.4	0.4	-	16	16


Region/ Country	2011			2012			2013		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	9
Malaysia	-	14.5	14.5	-	3	3	-	8	8
Singapore	144.9	41	186	383	62	445	2	153	155
Thailand	2,628	389.7	3017.7	121	479	600	2,552	767	3,319
South Asia	1.5	1911.9	1913.3	971	1,082	2,053	24	686	710
Bangladesh	1.4	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3
India	0.01	1049.5	1049.5	805	633	1,438	24	685	709
Pakistan	-	862.3	862.3	166	449	615	-	1	1
Middle East	141.9	3264.3	3406.2	39	1,282	1,321	59	1,008	1,067
Bahrain	-	4.4	4.4	35	5.5	41	24	-	24
Egypt	-	-	-	-	9	9	-	16	16
United Arab Emirates	-	526.2	526.2	-	302	302	-	271	271
Iraq	-	4.3	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3	-	0.2	0.2
Jordan	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.06	-	-	-
Kuwait	0.2	0.8	1	-	46	46	-	4	4
Oman	-	1.1	1.1	-	1	1	-	2	2
Saudi Arabia	141.7	2727.5	2869.2	4	918	922	35	715	750
North Africa	-	198.5	198.5	-	172	172	-	163	163
Algeria	-	197	197	-	172	172	-	161	161
Tunisia	-	1.5	1.5	-	0.3	0.3	-	2	2
Sub-Saharan Africa	511.1	7.2	518.4	362	41	403	-	151	152
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
Namibia	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.2	0.3	-	0.3	0.3
South Africa	511.1	7	518.2	362	41	403	-	151	151
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.5
Zambia	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
Oceania	90.6	127.2	217.8	266	110	376	242	233	475
Australia	87.7	123.3	211	258	105	363	241	232	473
New Zealand	2.9	3.9	6.8	8	5	13	1	1	2

Region/ Country	2011			2012			2013		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
UN United Nations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.4
TOTAL	5,840	8,074	13,914	3,746	6,014	9,760	5,554	6,388	11,942

Table 8b. Exports of military equipment, distributed by region in per cent of the total value in 2013

Region	Proportion of exports (%)
EU	23.7
South Asia	5.9
Middle East	8.9
South-East Asia	29.4
North America	13.0
Rest of Europe	8.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.3
Oceania	4.0
North-East Asia	2.5
North Africa	1.4
Central America and the Caribbean	0.0
South America	1.0
Central Asia	0.0
UN, United Nations	0.0

Table 8c. Exports of military equipment for combat purposes (MEC), other military equipment (OME) and total exports in 2013, distributed by countries grouped according to income



¹ The country groupings are based on the World Bank's synthesis of countries' economic status. A complete list of the country groupings can be found on the website www.worldbank.org. The countries Sweden exports military equipment to or has granted export licences to in 2013 are grouped as follows: **High-income**

Comm. 2013/14:114 **countries:** Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Caledonia (FR), New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the USA. **Upper-middle-income countries:** Algeria, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey. **Lower-middle-income countries:** Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ukraine, Zambia. **Low-income-countries:** Bangladesh, Tanzania.

Table 9. Follow-on deliveries in 2013

Country	Number of licences	Of which follow-on licences	Of which new licences	Equipment
Algeria	2	2		
Andorra	1	1		
Argentina	1	1		
Bangladesh	1		1	Naval measurement system
Botswana	1	1		
Brazil	11	10	1	Radome
Egypt	1	1		
Philippines	1		1	Armour plate
United Arab Emirates	5	4	1	Protective clothing
Georgia	1		1	Armour plate
Guatemala	1		1	Armour plate
India	11	10	1	Underwater target system
Indonesia	2	1	1	Armour plate
Kenya	1		1	Armour plate
Latvia	2	1	1	Ammunition components
Lithuania	1	1		
Malaysia	3	2	1	Protective masks
Malta	1		1	Collectors' weapons
Morocco	1		1	Armour plate
Montenegro	1		1	Protective clothing
Nigeria	1		1	Armour plate
Pakistan	1	1		
Paraguay	1		1	Armour plate
Russia	2		2	Armour plate
Saudi Arabia	7	6	1	Armour plate
Singapore	17	16	1	Underwater target system
Tanzania	1		1	Armour plate
South Africa	10	8	2	Weapon components, sport shooting weapons
Thailand	8	7	1	Technical assistance, testing
Tunisia	2	2		
Ukraine	2	1	1	Armour plate
Vietnam	1		1	Armour plate
Zambia	2	1	1	Armour plate

Table 10. Agreements concerning manufacturing rights and cooperation

In 2013, the ISP has approved 14 licences for Swedish companies to enter into agreements involving the granting or transfer of manufacturing rights to parties outside Sweden. These licences have concerned the following countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada (2), Germany, Japan, Norway (4), Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the USA.

In 2013, the ISP has approved 43 licences for Swedish governmental agencies and Swedish companies to enter into cooperative agreements with parties outside the country to jointly with said parties or on their behalf provide technical assistance to parties abroad, develop military equipment or methods for the manufacture of such material or to jointly manufacture military equipment. These licences have concerned the following countries: Australia (2), Brazil, Canada, Canada/the Netherlands (2), EDA (European Defence Agency) (5), Estonia, France/Germany, Germany (3), India, Italy, Norway (4), Poland, Republic of Korea (4), Singapore (5), Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom (6), the USA (3).

Table 11. Swedish exports of small arms and light weapons in 2013 (as defined in the UN Register of Conventional Arms ¹)

Categorised in accordance with the UN Register of Conventional Arms	
Small arms	
1. Revolvers and self-loading pistols	No exports
2. Rifles and carbines	No exports
3. Sub-machine guns	No exports
4. Assault rifles	No exports
5. Light machine guns	Export of the machine gun Ksp/58 to Norway.
6. Other	Small-bore ammunition has been exported to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. Equipment for manufacturing ammunition has been exported to Finland and the USA.

¹ This report does not include an account of hunting and sport shooting weapons and ammunition for these.

Light weapons	
1. Heavy machine guns (12.7 mm)	Export of ammunition to Norway.
2. Hand-held underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers (40 mm)	Export of ammunitions to Australia and components to Austria and Germany.
3. Portable anti-tank guns	No exports
4. Recoilless rifles	Rocket-propelled grenades have been exported to Austria and the USA. Spare parts, training equipment, components and ammunition have been exported to Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, India, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia and the USA.
5. Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	Anti-tank missile launchers have been exported to Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France, Latvia, Luxembourg and the USA. Spare parts, training weapons and components have been exported to Austria, Brazil, France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA.
6. Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm	No exports
7. Other	No exports

Table 12. Swedish exports of MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems) in 2013 in accordance with the definition in the UN Register of Conventional Weapons

No sights have been exported Missiles, spare parts, training equipment etc. with a value totalling SEK 15 569 000 has been exported to Australia, Finland, Indonesia, Pakistan, Singapore and Tunisia.

Table 13. Approved re-exports in 2013Comm. 2013/14:114
Appendix 1

Application from	Equipment concerned	Destination
Australia	Missiles for destruction, ML4	Sweden
Australia	Soft- and hardware 9LV, ML5	India
Estonia	Demilitarised vehicles, ML6	Estonia
France	Explosives, ML8	Japan
Norway	Truck, ML6	Latvia
Norway	Cannons, ML2	Iceland
Norway	Small-bore ammunition, ML3	Sweden
Norway	Tracked vehicles, ML6	Finland
Singapore	Tracked vehicles, ML6	Germany
Singapore	Ammunition for destruction	South Africa
South Africa	Aircraft components, ML10	Sweden

Table 14. Exporting companies and authorities in 2013

Companies and governmental authorities involved in exports worth over SEK 10 million.

Company	MEC	OME	Total
Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV)	2 412 000 000	662 439 341	3 074 439 341
BAE Systems Hägglunds AB	758 153 026	645 672 413	1 403 825 439
Saab AB, Electronic Defence Systems	302 397 474	913 500 089	1 215 897 563
Saab Dynamics AB	616 618 125	502 941 897	1 119 560 022
Saab AB, Surveillance Systems	0	784 930 518	784 930 518
BAE Systems Bofors AB	383 339 939	372 491 877	755 831 816
Saab AB, Security and Defence Solutions	239 276 888	383 065 135	622 342 023
FFV Ordnance AB	15 577 835	564 143 529	579 721 364
Nammo Vanäsverken AB	470 346 054	39 586	470 385 640
Saab AB, Aeronautics	64 224 197	320 015 501	384 239 698
Norma Precision AB	21 118 740	207 615 393	228 734 133
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AB	0	224 399 298	224 399 298
EURENCO Bofors AB	194 735 274	0	194 735 274
SSAB EMEA AB	0	174 457 064	174 457 064
Swede Ship Marine AB	0	159 080 824	159 080 824
Åkers Krutbruk Protection AB	0	148 277 559	148 277 559
Saab Barracuda AB	0	116 354 181	116 354 181
FLIR Systems AB	72 040 735	0	72 040 735
GKN Aerospace Sweden AB	0	54 454 000	54 454 000
Saab AB, Training & Simulation	0	39 633 173	39 633 173
BAE Systems SWS Defence AB	0	35 331 623	35 331 623
Saab AB, Support and Services	0	23 569 402	23 569 402
Polyamp AB	0	13 822 881	13 822 881

The following companies and authorities exports were valued at between SEK 1 million and SEK 10 million in 2013:

Taiga AB, Airsafe Sweden AB, Aimpoint AB, Comtri AB, Deform AB, GKN Aerospace Applied Composites AB, Schill Reglerteknik AB, Spuhr i Dalby AB, Nammo LIAB AB, New Pac Safety AB, ECAPS AB, the Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency (FXM), MSE Weibull AB, Exensor Technology AB, Befyraem Technologies AB (B4M).

A number of companies and authorities exports were valued at less than SEK 1 million in 2013:

Ekenäs Mekaniska AB, Swedish Space Corporation (SSC), Waltreco AB, Nammo Vingåkersverken AB, AimSport Sweden AB, VO Vapen AB, Karlskoga CNC Quality AB, Amlab Elektronik AB, Hillberg The Tentmaker, My-konsult System AB, Ex & Plose AB, Promoteq i Sandviken AB, Clustertronix HB.

Table 15. Private brokerage licences granted in 2013

Number	Value	ML categories ²	Countries
10	It is not possible to provide a list as the ISP does not always ask for this data.	ML 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 14, 18, 21, 22	USA Australia Canada Denmark France India Norway Poland Switzerland United Kingdom Thailand Germany

Companies licensed to supply military equipment in 2013

BAE Systems SWS Defence AB, BB Avionic System AB, Centric Labs AB, Defendor AB, Ex & Plose AB, Exova AB, FFV Ordnance AB, Gripen International AB, Gripen International KB, Grontmij Installationspartner AB, Hilleberg the Tent Maker, MP-SEC International AB, Naverviken Logistic AB, Neptunus Hav och Land, Promoteq i Sandviken AB, Saab Underwater Systems AB, Sako Oy Finland Filial, Scandinavian Risk Solutions AB, Swedish Space Corporation (SSC), Thales Sverige AB, W.L. Gore & Associates Scandinavia AB, Venatio AB, Volvo Defence AB.

² The equipment in question is mainly component parts, primarily for subcontractors in collaborative projects.

Table 16. The implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on the intra-community transfer of military material

A change in the Military Equipment Act came into force on 30 June 2012 as a result of Directive 2009/43/EC (the ICT Directive). There follows an account of the practical consequences this has had in 2013.

Introduction of general licences

The ISP has made decided on five general licences. These are published in Swedish Customs' statute book (TFS) and also on the ISP website www.isp.se. Each general licence has an appendix describing the military equipment and technical assistance it covers.

TFS	Scope
2012:7	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to armed forces or a contracting authority in a country within the European Economic Area (EEA)
2012:8	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a certified recipient in a country within the European Economic Area (EEA)
2012:9	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) for demonstration, evaluation and exhibition
2012:10	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) for maintenance or repair
2012:11	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) following maintenance, repair or demonstration

One condition of the use of these general licences is that the company in question register that they plan to make use of them at least 30 days in advance of the initial use.

Four companies have registered to make use of the following general licences in 2013:

TFS 2012:7	TFS 2012:8	TFS 2012:9	TFS 2012:10	TFS 2012:11
3	0	2	3	3

The companies in question only need to register once. The accumulated total number of registrations for each licence since 2012 are provided below.

TFS 2012:7	TFS 2012:8	TFS 2012:9	TFS 2012:10	TFS 2012:11
7	2	10	8	9

Comm. 2013/14:114 Delivery of the following invoiced and delivered military equipment has
Appendix 1 been declared for 2013.

TFS	Category	Item	Value (SEK thousands)	Recipient country
2012:7	ML 5	Warning equipment	344	Germany
2012:7	ML 10	Aerial drop equipment	3,304	Finland Norway
2012:7	ML 14	Simulator equipment	3,945	Finland Norway Germany Austria
2012:7	ML 22	Technical assistance, tracked vehicles	255	Latvia

Certification as a recipient of military equipment and technical assistance

A company can apply for certification as a recipient of military equipment and technical assistance and thus receive components sent from an EEA country via general licences.

No Swedish companies have been certified in 2013. In total, EU10 companies in 5 countries have been certified in 2013. Up-to-date information is available on the European Commission's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider>.

Proportion of global and individual licences to EEA countries

In addition to general licences, the introduction of the ICT Directive also introduced global and individual licences. Given that the tone of the Directive indicates that general and global licences should be used primarily, the current situation may be of interest.

In the second half of 2012, since the Directive came into force, the ISP has granted a total of 362 transfer licences to EES countries, of which 20% were global and 80% individual.

In 2013, the ISP has granted a total of 642 transfer licences, of which 15% were global and 85% individual.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the information above, as well as from the number of companies that make use of general licences and the number of certified companies, is that the practical introduction of the directive is still in its early stages.

Table 17. Article 10 of the UN Register of Conventional WeaponsComm. 2013/14:114
Appendix 1

Ordinance (2013:707) tasks the ISP with the role of licensing authority for cases in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 258/2012.

The table below contains details of the licences granted in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 and the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) (smooth-bored weapons are exempt with reference to the Military Equipment Act).

Recipient country	Number of licences	Scope
USA	4	17 hunting/sport shooting weapons, 3 antique weapons, 30 shotguns and weapon components.
Norway	11	52 hunting/sport shooting weapons, 2 shotguns and weapon components. Note 2 licences revoked.
New Zealand	1	26 pistols.
South Africa	2	1 hunting/sport shooting weapons, 1 shotguns and weapon components.

Table 1. Number of export cases etc. received concerning dual-use items (DUIs) 2011–2013

Export cases	2011	2012	2013
Total	1,150	1,089	1,123
Export licences, global and individual, of which:			
Wassenaar Arrangement	602	583	702
Missile Technology Control Regime	6	10	7
Nuclear Suppliers Group (Part 2)	20	19	11
Australia Group	342	325	316
Sanctions	180	152	87
Non-controlled items	0	0	0
Sanctions against Iran – financial applications	2011	2012	2013
Total	649	249	392
Cases concerning the transfer of assets and financial services			
Notifications	194	80	189
Licences	455	169	185

Table 2. Number of advance decisions, enquiries about non-controlled items relating to DUIs 2009–2013

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total number of advance decisions issued	89	205	222	141	115
Of which, number of enquiries about non-controlled items	57	173	164	109	66

Table 3. Number of resolved cases affecting applications for advance decisions – controlled and non-controlled items – 2013

Non-controlled items				Controlled items		
Country	No reason to apply catch-all	Catch-all negative	Catch-all	Listed item, positive	Listed item, denial	Total
Algeria (via Italy)	1					1
USA	1					1
Azerbaijan					1	1
Burma	1	1		1		3
Colombia				1		1
Egypt	1			1		2
Equatorial Guinea					1	1
People's Republic of China	1			6	2	9
United Arab Emirates				3		3
India		1		4	1	6
Indonesia				1		1
Iraq			1	1	1	3
Iran	46	1	1	1		49
Israel	1					1
Kyrgyzstan	1					1
Kuwait				1		1
Lebanon				1		1
Libya	1			1		2
Norway				1		1
Pakistan	1					1
Russian Federation (Russia)	1			10	1	12
Saudi Arabia				2		2
Sudan	1					1
Turkey	1			3		4
Germany	1					1
Ukraine	1					1
Venezuela				1		1
Vietnam				1		1
Belarus				1		1
Zimbabwe				1		1

In 2012, the EU introduced further general licences in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1232/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The companies in questions are obliged to register with the ISP that they plan to make use of these at least 30 days in advance of the initial use.

The number of companies have registered in 2013 is as follows:

EU 001	EU 002	EU 003	EU 004	EU 005	EU 006
18	1	1	1	0	0

As the companies in question only need to register once, there follows a report of the accumulated total number of registrations since 2009 (EU 001) and 2012 (EU 002–006):

EU 001	EU 002	EU 003	EU 004	EU 005	EU 006
88	1	2	2	0	0

Table 5. Export licences granted for dual-use items (DUIs), belonging to Category 0 in Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, from companies in Sweden (source: SSM)

Activities at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)

In the nuclear area, licences are obligatory not only for exports outside the EU, but also for a large proportion of trade between EU countries. The relevant products and technologies are listed in Annex IV, Part 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. General licences may not be used for these products. A total of 43 licences were granted for exports or for transfers within the EU in 2013.

Recipient country	2011 Exporting company number of licences	2012 Exporting company Number of licences	2013 Exporting company number of licences
EU		Westinghouse, 1	Areva NP Uddcomb, 1
Argentina		Westinghouse, 1	
Finland	Westinghouse, 1	Westinghouse, 3	Westinghouse, 1
France	Westinghouse, 2		
Iceland	Svenska Tanso, 1		Svenska Tanso, 1
Japan	Westinghouse, 5	Westinghouse, 1	Westinghouse, 3 Sandvik, 1
Canada			

Recipient country	2011 Exporting company number of licences	2012 Exporting company Number of licences	2013 Exporting company number of licences
Kazakhstan		Westinghouse, 1	
China, People's Republic of	Svenska Tanso, 2 Sandvik, 1	Sandvik, 1	
Korea, Republic of	Westinghouse, 1		
Malaysia	Svenska Tanso, 1		Svenska Tanso, 1
Norway	Westinghouse, 1 KWD Nuclear Instruments, 2	Westinghouse, 4 Studsvik, 2 KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1	Westinghouse, 1 Studsvik, 1
Poland		Sandvik, 1	
Russia			Westinghouse, 1
Switzerland	Westinghouse, 1	Westinghouse, 4 KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1	Westinghouse, 4
Spain	Westinghouse, 1 Sandvik, 2	Westinghouse, 1 Sandvik, 1	Westinghouse, 1, Sandvik, 1
South Africa	Westinghouse, 1	Westinghouse, 2	Westinghouse, 1
Taiwan		Westinghouse, 1	
Czech Republic			Westinghouse, 1
Germany	Westinghouse, 1 KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1 Rinhals AB, 2	KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1	Westinghouse, 2 Areva NP Uddcomb, 1 KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1
Ukraine	Westinghouse, 1	Westinghouse, 1	
USA	Westinghouse, 7 Sandvik, 2 Areva NP Uddcomb, 1	Westinghouse, 16 Studsvik, 1 Vattenfall Nuclear Fuel, 1	Westinghouse, 17 incl. 1 to Taiwan. Vattenfall Nuclear Fuel, 3
Vietnam		KWD Nuclear Instruments, 1	

Comm. 2013/14:114 **Table 6.** **Membership of multilateral export control regimes in 2013**
Appendix 2

Country	ZC	NSG	AG	MTCR	WA
Argentina	x	x	x	x	x
Australia	x	x	x	x	x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x
Brazil	-	x	-	x	x
Bulgaria	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus	-	x	x	-	-
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x
Estonia	-	x	x	-	x
Finland	x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	x
Iceland	-	x	x	x	-
Italy	x	x	x	x	x
Japan	x	x	x	x	x
Canada	x	x	x	x	x
Kazakhstan	x	x	-	-	-
China	x	x	-	-	-
Korea (Rep.)	x	x	x	x	x
Croatia	x	x	x	-	x
Latvia	-	x	x	-	x
Lithuania	-	x	x	-	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x
Malta	-	x	x	-	x
Mexico	-	x	x	-	x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	x	x	x	x	x
New Zealand	x	x	x	x	x
Poland	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x
Romania	x	x	x	-	x
Russia	x	x	-	x	x
Switzerland	x	x	x	x	x
Serbia	-	x	-	-	-
Slovakia	x	x	x	-	x
Slovenia	x	x	x	-	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x
South Africa	x	x	-	x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	x	x	x
Turkey	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Ukraine	x	x	x	x	x
Hungary	x	x	x	x	x
USA	x	x	x	x	x
Belarus	x	x	-	-	-
Austria	x	x	x	x	x
TOTAL	39	48	41	34	41

The European Commission participates as a member of the Australia Group and as an observer in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zanger Committee.

Table 7. Global licences for permanent exports granted in 2013

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
All countries with the exception of embargo countries/sanction countries	9	5A002,5D002,5E002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Several countries with the exception of embargo countries/sanction countries	6	3E001,5E001,5E002,6A003	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Afghanistan	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Armenia	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Brazil	1	3A001,3A002,5A001,5A002	Electronic components	428/2009	WA
Burundi	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
People's Republic of China	7	3A001,3A002,5A001,5A002	Electronic components	428/2009	WA
Greenland	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Guinea	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
India	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Iraq	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Jordan	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Kenya	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Kuwait	1	5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Lebanon	1	5A002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Libya	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Malaysia	3	3A001,3A002,5A001,5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications), electronic components	428/2009	WA
Morocco	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Mexico	1	3A001,3A002,5A001,5A002	Electronic components	428/2009	WA
Norway	1	6D003	Technology for acoustic	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			underwater communication		
Pakistan	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Republic of Korea	1	3E001	Technical data for electronic components	428/2009	WA
Rwanda	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Russian Federation (Russia)	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Serbia	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Singapore	1	3E001	Technical data for electronic components	428/2009	WA
Taiwan	1	6A005	Laser system	428/2009	WA
Thailand	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Belarus	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (data/telecommunications)	428/2009	WA

Table 8. Individual licences for permanent exports granted in 2013

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Afghanistan	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Algeria	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
USA	1	1C351	Bacterial strain	428/2009	AG					
Angola	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Syrian Arab Republic	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Argentina	5	2B350,5D002, 1C202,7A002	Information security (telecommunications), plate heat exchangers, flow-through filtration equipment, aluminium alloy, gyro	428/2009	AG, NSG, WA					
Azerbaijan	3	5A002,1A004	Information security (telecommunications), Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA					
Bahrain	10	6A003,5A002, 5D002,2B350	Information security (telecommunications), heat	428/2009	AG, WA	2	5A002, 5D002,	Information security (telecommunications),	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			exchanger plate, IR cameras				6A008	radar components (magnetrons)		
Bangladesh	1	2B350	Heat exchangers	428/2009	AG					
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Brazil	30	2B352,5A002,5D002,5E002,2B350,9A012,1C010,6A003	Information security (telecommunications), flow-through filtration equipment, heat exchanger plate, UAVs, valves, IR cameras	428/2009	AG, WA					
Burkina Faso	1	2B350	Heat exchanger plate	428/2009	AG					
Burma	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Chile	5	2B350,5D002,6A003,1C010	Information security (telecommunications), carbon fibre fabric, valves, IR cameras	428/2009	AG, WA					
Colombia	3	5A002,2B350,9A012,6A003,5D002,6A004	Information security (telecommunications), heat exchangers, IR cameras, UAVs	428/2009	AG, WA	1	6A003	IR cameras	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			EO sensors							
Costa Rica	2	5A002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Curaçao	1	5A002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Democratic Republic of the Congo	4	2B350,5A002, 5D002	Information security (telecommunications), spare parts for heat exchangers	428/2009	AG, WA					
Dominican Republic	1	6A003	IR cameras	428/2009	WA					
Egypt	11	6A003,5A002, 5D002,1A004, 2A101	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, chemical protection suits, ball bearings	428/2009	WA, MTCR					
Philippines	3	6A003,5D002, 3A001	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, Radiation hardened integrated circuits	428/2009	WA					
People's Republic of China	138	5A002,5D002, 6A003,3A001, 2B350,2B230,	Information security (telecommunications), carbon fibre fabric, microwave or	428/2009	AG, MTCR, NSG,	2	6A003	IR cameras	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		1C002,2B352,6A008,7A003,1A004,1C111,9A012,1C010,2B104,3A002	millimetre wave equipment, IR cameras, flow-through filtration equipment, titanium powder, temperature resistant microprocessors, heat exchangers (incl. plate), chemical protection suits, centrifugal separator, LIDAR, fermentation vessels, inertial navigation systems, valves, polymeric substances, data gathering cards, UAVs, microwave amplifiers, pumps, isostatic press		WA					
United Arab Emirates	13	6A003,5A002,5D002,1C202,1A004,9A012,2B350,9D004,2A226	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, chemical protection suits, valves, aluminium alloys, UAVs, pumps	428/2009	AG, WA, NSG	2	5A002, 5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Guatemala	2	2B104,2B350	Heat exchangers, isostatic press	428/2009	AG, MTCR					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Guinea	4	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Guinea-Bissau	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Honduras	1	2B350	Heat exchangers	428/2009	AG					
Hong Kong, China	10	5A002,5D002, 6A003,3A001	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, temperature resistant microprocessors	428/2009	WA					
India	27	6A003,5A002, 5D002,2B352, 3C005,1A004, 1C010,2B350	Information security (telecommunications), flow-through filtration equipment, carbon fibre fabric (incl. tape), pumps, heat exchangers, substrate, IR cameras, fermentation vessels	428/2009	AG, WA					
Indonesia	21	5A002,5D002, 2B352,2B350, 6A003	Information security (telecommunications), spare parts for heat exchangers, IR cameras, valves, centrifugal separator, flow-	428/2009	AG, WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			through filtration equipment							
Iraq	7	5A002,5D002,1A004	Information security (telecommunications), chemical protection suits,	428/2009	WA					
Iran	84	III.A9.002,III.A1.003,III.A2.010	Spare parts for dairy equipment (seals, gaskets), heat exchangers, pumps	267/2012	Sanctions					
Iceland	1	5A002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Israel	42	2B350,3A001,2B352,6A003,1A004,6A002,3A002,5D002	Heat exchangers (incl. plate), flow-through filtration equipment, pumps, chemical protection suits, IR cameras, microwave or millimetre wave equipment, information security (telecommunications), data gathering cards	428/2009	AG, WA					
Jordan						6	5A002,5D002,6A003	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Kazakhstan	1	1A004	Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA					
Kosovo	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Croatia	1	2B104,1C010	Carbon fibre fabric, isostatic press	428/2009	WA, MTCR					
Kuwait	2	9A012,9D004, 2B350	Heat exchangers, command and control equipment (UAV)	428/2009	AG, WA	1	1A004	Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA
Lebanon	11	5A002,5D002, 1C002	Information security (telecommunications), aluminium alloy,	428/2009	WA					
Libya	4	6A003,5A002, 5E002,1A004, 2B351	Information security (telecommunications), IR camera, chemical protection suit, monitoring system for poisonous gas	428/2009	AG, WA					
Macau	2	1A004	Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA					
Malawi	1	5A002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Malaysia	20	2B350,5A002, 6A003,3A001, 1A004,1C010	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, heat exchanger	428/2009	AG, WA	1	1A004	Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			plate, pumps, valves, chemical protection suit, FPGA, carbon fibre fabric							
Morocco	1	2B352	Flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG	1	5A002, 5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Mauritius	1	1A004	Chemical protection suits	428/2009	WA					
Mexico	30	2B104,2B350, 5A002,2B352, 6A003,1A004, 2B204	Heat exchangers, Flow-through filtration equipment, information security (telecommunications), chemical protection suits, isostatic press, IR cameras, fermentation vessels	428/2009	AG, MTCR, NSG, WA					
Mozambique	1	5A002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Moldova	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Montenegro	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA	1	5A002, 5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Niger	1	2B350	Heat exchangers	428/2009	AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Oman	1	5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Pakistan	5	5A002,5D002,2B350	Information security (telecommunications), heat exchangers,	428/2009	AG, WA					
Panama	1	5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Peru	1	2B350	Pumps	428/2009	AG					
Qatar	10	5A002,5D002,2B350,6A003,1A004,1C010	Heat exchanger plate, IR cameras, chemical protection suits, carbon fibre fabric, information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	AG, WA	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA
Republic of Korea	18	6A003,1C350,9A012,3A001,5A002,9D004,6A002,2B352,2B350,2B204,6A008	IR cameras, bacterial strain, UAVs, solid-state power semiconductor switches, pumps information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, fermentation vessels, isostatic press, heat exchangers (incl. plate), LIDAR, navigation and	428/2009	AG, WA, NSG	2	6A008	Control unit for radar systems, radar component (magnetron)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			control equipment for UAVs							
Rwanda	1	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Russian Federation (Russia)	79	5A002,2B350, 6A003,3C005, 2B204,6A002, 1A004,2B352, 2D002,3C006, 3A001,6A008, 3A002,5D002, 2B350	Information security, IR cameras, heat exchangers (incl. plate), chemical protections suits, substrate, flow-through filtration equipment, software for CNC control, fermentation vessels, isostatic press, microprocessors, LIDAR, data gathering cards, pumps	428/2009	AG, NSG, WA					
Saudi Arabia	10	5A002,5D002 6A003,2B350, 1A004,9A012, 6A008	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, heat exchangers (incl. plate), chemical protection suits, UAVs, radar component	428/2009	AG, WA	5	5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Information security (telecommunications), IR cameras	428/2009	WA
Senegal	1	5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Serbia	14	5A002,5D002, 6A003,2B001	Information security (telecommunications),	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
			IR cameras, machine tool							
Singapore	15	5A002,2B350,1A004,3A002,6A003	Information security (telecommunications), heat exchangers (incl. plate), pumps, systems for the detection and identification of explosives, chemical protection suits, IR cameras, data gathering cards	428/2009	WA, AG					
Sudan	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
South Africa	20	2B350,6A003,5A002,1C010,9A012,9D004	Information security (telecommunications), heat exchangers (incl. plate), IR cameras, carbon fibre fabric (incl. tape), command and control equipment for UAVs, valves, flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG, WA					
South Sudan	2	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Taiwan	29	2B350,5A002, 6A005,3A002, 2B352,1A004, 2B352,3A001, 1C010	Information security (telecommunications), pumps, heat exchangers (incl. plate), laser systems, carbon fibre tape (incl. fabric), chemical protection suits, fermentation vessels, flow-through filtration equipment, data gathering cards, microwave amplifiers	428/2009	AG, WA					
Tanzania	5	5A002,9A012	Information security (telecommunications), UAVs	428/2009	WA					
Thailand	29	6A003,5A002, 5D002,2B350, 3A001,1A004, 9D004,9A012, 1C010	Information security (telecommunications), heat exchangers (incl. plate), pumps, chemical protection suits, IR cameras, carbon fibre fabric, flow-through filtration equipment, microprocessor, control and navigation equipment for UAVs	428/2009	AG, WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Trinidad and Tobago	1	3A201	Electronic component (capacitor)	428/2009	NSG					
Tunisia	2	2B352,2B350	Heat exchangers, flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG					
Turkey	12	1C010,6A003,5D002,2B350,5A002,9D004,2B352	Heat exchangers (incl. plate), carbon fibre fabric, information security (telecommunications), IR cameras, control and navigation equipment for UAVs, flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG, WA					
Uganda	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					
Ukraine	13	2B350,2B204,6A003,2B352	IR cameras, heat exchanger plate, spare parts for isostatic press, flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG, WA, NSG					
Uruguay	3	5D002,9D004,9A012,1C350	Information security (telecommunications), hydrofluoric acid, UAV (incl. software)	428/2009	AG, WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use					Military end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Venezuela	1	2B352	Flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG					
Vietnam	10	6A002,6A008, 2B350,5A002, 5D002,2B352, 1A004	Information security (telecommunications), chemical protection suits, flow-through filtration equipment, IR cameras, EO sensor, radar system (SLAR), heat exchangers, flow-through filtration equipment	428/2009	AG, WA					
Belarus	7	3A002,5D002, 1A004,2A226, 5A002	Information security (telecommunications), chemical protections suits, valves, data gathering cards	428/2009	AG, NSG, WA					
Zambia	1	9A012	UAV	428/2009	WA					
Zimbabwe	3	5A002,5D002	Information security (telecommunications)	428/2009	WA					

The Military Equipment Act

The production and export of military equipment are governed by the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303). Both statutes came into force on 1 January 1993.

The Military Equipment Act stipulates that military equipment may not be produced without a licence. The term international cooperation denotes export sales or other forms for the provision of military equipment or services (including transfers and brokering). The term also covers the granting or transfer of production rights, agreements with parties outside the country to jointly with said parties or on their behalf provide technical assistance to parties abroad, develop military equipment or methods for the manufacture of such material or to jointly manufacture military equipment. Finally, with certain exceptions, a licence is required to carry out military training.

Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology requires, in certain cases, export licences for products that are not encompassed by the term *military equipment*, but which are associated with exported military equipment.

Swedish guidelines for exports of military equipment and other foreign cooperation

Under Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), licences for exports of military equipment may only be granted if they are justified for security or defence reasons and do not conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. The principles applied when examining licence applications have been established through government practice and are detailed in the Government's guidelines for the exportation of military equipment and other foreign cooperation, approved by the Riksdag (cf. Govt. Bill 1991/92:174 p. 41 f., Govt. Bill 1995/96:31 p. 23 f. and report 1992/93:UU1). The complete text of these guidelines is provided below.

Overriding criteria and assessment criteria

The guidelines have broad parliamentary support and are used by the ISP when assessing export licence applications in accordance with the Military Equipment Act and the Military Equipment Ordinance.

The EU Common Position on Arms Exports is applied in parallel with the Swedish guidelines.

The guidelines contain two overriding criteria under which licences may legally be granted; partly that the foreign cooperation is required to meet the Swedish Armed Forces' requirements for equipment, expertise or is otherwise desirable for security policy reasons and partly that the cooperation does not conflict with the principles and objectives of Sweden's foreign policy. These overriding criteria may be regarded as

constituting a clarification of Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act.

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Appendix 3

The guidelines also define the factors that should be taken into consideration in the assessment of individual applications. A basic requirement is that all relevant circumstances in a particular case are to be considered, whether or not they are expressly included in the guidelines. These assessment criteria also apply to cooperation with persons or companies abroad relating to the development or manufacture of military equipment.

The guidelines particularly emphasise the importance that must be attached to the respect for human rights in the recipient country when assessing each export application in terms of foreign policy. The human rights situation in the recipient country must always be taken into consideration, even in cases involving equipment that in and of itself cannot be used to violate human rights.

Unconditional obstacles to exports

The guidelines state three types of unconditional obstacle that, if present, are considered to make exports impossible. These three are: decisions of the UN Security Council, international agreements to which Sweden is a party (e.g. EU sanctions) and export bans imposed under international legal rulings concerning exports from neutral states to those in a state of war.

Military equipment for combat purposes and other military equipment

In 1993, the term *military equipment* was broadened to also include certain equipment with civilian or partly civilian uses. The broadening of the term resulted in exports that were previously uncontrolled being made subject to political assessment and to their inclusion in the military equipment export statistics. This broadening was accompanied by the separation of military equipment into two categories with guidelines that differ in certain respects.

For the category of military equipment for combat purposes (MEC), the presumption is that export licences should not be issued if the recipient is a state involved in armed conflict with another state, a state embroiled in an international conflict that is in danger of becoming an armed conflict or a state where there is internal armed unrest. A licence should be withdrawn if the recipient state becomes involved in armed conflict or internal armed unrest. However, the revocation of a licence may be forgone if this is consistent with international law and the objectives and principles of Swedish foreign policy. Furthermore, licences should not be granted for exports to a state in which there are widespread and serious human rights violations. These are the same requirements that were applied prior to 1993; the difference being that, previously, it was only necessary to take human rights violations into consideration if the equipment itself could be used to violate human rights. For exports of other military equipment (OME), which consists largely of products that were not considered to be military equipment

Comm. 2013/14:114 Appendix 3 prior to 1993 (e.g. reconnaissance radar or training simulators), an export licence should be granted to countries not engaged in armed conflict with another state, that do not have internal armed unrest and where there are no widespread and serious human rights violations. Accordingly, the risk of armed conflict is not a specific criterion applied when assessing exports of other military equipment.

The different guidelines for military equipment for combat purposes and other military equipment mean that a greater number of countries may be considered as potential recipients of other military, i.e. non-destructive, equipment, than as recipients of military equipment for combat purposes.

Follow-on deliveries and “Swedish identity”

With regard to follow-on deliveries, the guidelines state that “licences should be granted for exports of spare parts for military equipment exported previously with the requisite licence, provided there are no unconditional obstacles. The same should apply to other deliveries, e.g. of ammunition, linked to previous exports, or where it would otherwise be unreasonable to refuse a licence”.

In the case of cooperation with foreign partners, exports to third countries should be assessed in accordance with the Swedish guidelines if the item has a predominantly Swedish identity. If the item has a predominantly foreign identity, or if Sweden has a strong defence policy interest in the partnership, the export rules of the partner country may be applied.

Full text of the Swedish guidelines

Licences for exports of military equipment or for other cooperation with foreign partners involving military equipment should only be granted where such exports or cooperation:

1. are judged to be necessary to meet the Swedish Armed Forces’ requirements for equipment or expertise or are otherwise desirable for reasons of national security and
2. do not conflict with the principles and objectives of Swedish foreign policy.

When considering a licence application, the ISP will make a complete assessment of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the basic principles mentioned above.

There are no obstacles in terms of foreign policy to cooperation with, or exports to, the Nordic countries and the traditionally neutral countries of Europe. In principle, cooperation with these countries may be considered consistent with Sweden’s security policy. As cooperation with the other countries in the European Union develops, the same principles regarding cooperation with foreign partners and exports should be applied to these countries.

Licences may only be granted to governments, central government authorities or government-authorised recipients; an end-user certificate or an own production declaration should be presented in connection with

exports of military equipment. A state which, despite undertakings given to the Swedish Government, allows, or fails to prevent, unauthorised re-export of Swedish military equipment will not, as a rule, be eligible to receive such equipment from Sweden as long as these circumstances persist.

In accordance with the Military Equipment Act, licences for exports or for other cooperation with foreign partners must not be granted if this would contravene an international agreement to which Sweden is party, a decision of the UN Security Council or international legal rulings concerning exports from neutral states during a war (unconditional obstacles).

Licences for exports of military equipment or for other cooperation with foreign partners concerning military equipment should not be granted where the recipient country is a state where there are widespread and serious human rights violations. Respect for human rights is an key condition of the granting of licences.

Licences for exports of military equipment for combat purposes or for other cooperation with foreign partners concerning military equipment for combat purposes or other military equipment should not be granted if the state in question is involved in an armed conflict with another state, regardless of whether or not war has been declared, is embroiled in an international conflict that is in danger of becoming an armed conflict or is the site of internal armed unrest.

Licences should be granted for exports of equipment classified as other military equipment, provided that the recipient country is not involved in an armed conflict with another state, is not the site of internal armed unrest or widespread and serious human rights violations and that there are no unconditional obstacles.

An export licence that has been granted should be revoked not only if unconditional obstacles to exports arise, but also if the recipient state becomes involved in an armed conflict with another state or becomes the site of internal armed unrest. Exceptionally, revocation of a licence may be foregone in the latter two cases if this is consistent with international law and the principles and objectives of Swedish foreign policy.

Licences should be granted for exports of spare parts for military equipment exported previously with the requisite licence, provided there are no unconditional obstacles. The same should apply to other deliveries, e.g. of ammunition, linked to previous exports, or where it would otherwise be unreasonable to refuse a licence.

With specific reference to agreements with a foreign partners on the joint development or manufacture of military equipment, the basic criteria mentioned above are to be applied when licence applications are assessed. Exports to the partner country under the agreement should be permitted unless an unconditional obstacle arises. If a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner is dependent on exports from the partner country to third countries, the issue of such exports should, insofar as the end-product in question has a predominantly Swedish identity, be assessed in accordance with the guidelines for exports from Sweden.

As regards equipment with a predominantly foreign identity, exports from the partner country to third countries should be considered in

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accordance with the export rules of the partner country. If Sweden has a strong defence policy interest in cooperation taking place and the partner country's cooperation is conditional on certain exports being allowed to take place from that country, then, depending on the circumstances, exports to a third country within the scope of the partner country's export rules may, in general, also be permitted.

In cases involving more extensive and, for Sweden, more important cooperation with a foreign partner in the field of military equipment, an intergovernmental agreement should be concluded between Sweden and the partner country. The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs should be consulted before such agreements are concluded.

Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items

Common EU legislation

In 2009, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use products (Recast). The Regulation came into force on 27 August 2009, replacing an EU regulation from 2000, Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000. Unlike the multilateral export control regimes, the Regulation is legally binding for Sweden and all other EU member states. The purpose is to, as far as possible, establish free movement of controlled products within the internal market while reinforcing and harmonising the various national systems for the control of exports to third countries.

The Regulation unites member states' undertakings within the scope of the multilateral export control regimes with the greatest possible freedom of movement of goods within the internal market. Developments within the regimes are taken into account through regular amendments and updates of the item lists included in the Regulation. The annexes to the Regulation are determined within the framework of first pillar cooperation within the EU, meaning they have a direct effect at the national level. In accordance with the Regulation, the annexes are to be updated annually.

The Regulation facilitates the assessment of licence applications by including common criteria that member states have to take into account in their assessments. However, licences are granted at the national level (see below). In addition, there is a general community licence for exports of certain products to certain specified third countries. This type of licence facilitates the work of exporting companies in that the same licence can be invoked regardless of where in the EU the exports originate. This has also led to increased consensus in the EU on exports of this kind.

Swedish legislation

In Sweden, the EU Regulation is complemented by the Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064) and Ordinance (2000:1217). Both statutes came into force on 1 January 2001.

In contrast to the military equipment legislation, where export licences represent exceptions to a general prohibition on exports, the reverse is true under the regulations governing the controls on dual-use items. In this case, the basic premiss is that an export licence will be granted as long as this does not conflict with the interests of foreign or security policy as these are described in the EU Regulation.

Licences are required for exports, transfers and brokering of dual-use items. The ISP is the licensing authority. However, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) provides licences that apply to nuclear materials etc. included in category 0 in Annex I of the EU Regulation

Like its predecessor, the dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act lacks specific rules regarding opportunities to receive advance decisions regarding whether or not an export licence will be provided for any potential export of dual-use items to a specific destination. However, a practice has been developed that involves the ISP providing companies with advance decisions.

The catch-all clause

Under Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, a licence may also be required for exports of items that are not specified in the annexes to the Regulation (non-listed items) if the exporter has been informed by the Swedish authorities that the item is or may be intended to be used in connection with the production of weapons of mass destruction or missiles that are capable of delivering such weapons. This catch-all clause has been included to prevent the regulations from being circumvented due to the fact that, on account of rapid technological developments, the lists are seldom completely comprehensive.

For the catch-all clause to be applicable, the exporter must have been informed of the item's area of use by the Swedish authorities. However, if the exporter is aware that an item is entirely or partly intended for uses regulated in Articles 4(1) to 4(3) of the EU Regulation, they are required to report this to the Swedish authorities. The ISP or the SSM will then determine whether a licence is required for the export.

In certain cases, the catch-all clause also contains special licensing requirements for exports related to military end-use or military equipment and for exports of non-listed items that are or may be intended for military end-use in a country subject to a UN, EU or OSCE embargo, as well as for non-listed items that are or could be intended for use as parts or components for illegally exported military equipment.

Denial. A negative decision by an authority regarding an application for a licence to export military equipment or dual-use items to a certain country. A member of a multilateral export control regime is expected to inform the other members of the negative decision. In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the relevant authorities in the EU member states have to inform one another and the Commission of denials.

Export control regimes. The Zangger Committee (ZC), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The aim of the multilateral regimes is to identify goods and technologies that should be made subject to export controls, to exchange information about proliferation risks and to promote non-proliferation in their contact with countries that do not belong to the regimes.

Catch-all. This term refers to the opportunity to subject dual-use items that are not included in the export control lists to export controls. An exporter has to advise the export control authority if that authority has informed it that the item the exporter wishes to export may be intended for the production etc. of weapons of mass destruction. The authority determines whether it is appropriate to require a licence for the export. The same applies where the exporter is aware that the item is intended for use in the production etc. of such weapons.

Non-proliferation. Measures that are implemented at both national and international levels to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This has mainly taken the form of a number of international agreements and cooperation in several export control regimes.

Intangible transfers. Transfers of software or technology by means of electronic media and from person to person from one country to another.

Weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction also address certain delivery systems such as long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

No-undercut. When a denial is issued, the other members of the multilateral export control regimes are expected to consult the state that has issued this denial before deciding whether to grant an export licence for an equivalent transaction. The purpose of this is to prevent the buyer that has been denied from finding a supplier in another country and to avoid a situation where different countries' export controls distort competition. In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the relevant authorities in the EU member states have to inform one another and the Commission of denials.

Outreach. Providing information and support to states, authorities, companies, etc. in export control contexts.

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Export licenses. In accordance with Section 6 of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), military equipment may not be exported from Sweden without permission, unless otherwise stipulated by the Act or another statute. A company applies for an export licence for the amount agreed in a contract with a particular country. Deliveries are then usually conducted over several years and seldom commence in the year in which the contract was signed. Consequently, export licences are not the same thing as an actual delivery; they merely indicate the volume of orders for controlled products won by Swedish companies in the international market in a given year.

Abbreviations

AG	Australia Group
ASD	AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BTWC	Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
COARM	Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CONOP	Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EDA	European Defence Agency
EC	European Community
EKR	Export Control Council
EU	European Union
FA	Framework agreement
FMV	Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
UN	United Nations
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
FRA	Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment
FXM	Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency
GTRI	Global Threat Reduction Initiative
CFSP	EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISP	Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls
MEC	Military equipment for combat purposes
LoI	Letter of Intent
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence systems
ML	Military List
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
Must	Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Directorate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETTEM	New and Evolving Technologies Technical Experts Meeting
NL	National additions, where applicable
NPT	Non-Proliferation treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DUIs	Dual-use items
PGD	Policy for Global Development
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SCB	Statistics Sweden
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOFF	Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association
SSM	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Säpo	Swedish Security Service

SÖ	Swedish Treaty Series
TI	Transparency International
TSC	Technical-Scientific Council
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WPDU	Working Party on Dual-Use Goods
ZC	Zangger Committee
OME	Other military equipment

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Appendix 5

Source references in alphabetical order

The Australia Group: www.australiagroup.net

The European Parliament: www.europarl.europa.eu

Council of the European Union: www.consilium.eu

The European Union: www.europa.eu

The Export Control Council: www.isp.se/sa/node.asp?node=1057

The United Nations: www.un.org

The International Atomic Energy Agency: www.iaea.org

The Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls:

www.isp.se

The Missile Technology Control Regime: www.mtcr.info

The Nuclear Suppliers Group: www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons:

www.opcw.org

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: www.osce.org

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: www.sipri.org

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority: www.ssm.se

The Swedish Export Control Society: www.exportkontrollforeningen.se

The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: www.ud.se

The Wassenaar Arrangement: www.wassenaar.org

The Zangger Committee: www.zanggercommittee.org

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Excerpt from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting on 13 March 2014.

Present: Prime Minister Reinfeldt, chair, and Ministers Björklund, Bildt, Ask, Erlandsson, Hägglund, Borg, Billström, Adelsohn Liljeroth, Björling, Ohlsson, Norman, Attefall, Engström, Kristersson, Elmsäter-Svärd, Ullenhag, Ek, Löf, Svantesson

Rapporteur: Minister Björling

The Government approves Communication 2013/14:114 Strategic Export Control in 2013 – Military Equipment and Dual-Use Items