United Nations Arms Embargoes
Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour

Case study: The Taliban, 2000–2006

Paul Holtom

sipri
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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This is one of a series of case studies on United Nations arms embargoes. Drawing on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and other open sources, these case studies analyse arms flows before, during and after a UN arms embargo has been established. These case studies were researched and written by members of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project to inform a report by SIPRI and the Uppsala University Special Program on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2007). This report and the case studies are available at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=356>.

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I. Introduction

The Taliban emerged as a significant military and political force in Afghanistan in late 1994 during the Afghan civil war (1992–2001). By 1996 they effectively controlled Afghanistan. In that year the UN introduced a blanket coverage voluntary arms embargo on Afghanistan. Also in 1996 Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. In the following years, bin Laden’s presence led to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan acquiring a reputation as a haven for terrorists. As a result, in December 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1333, which imposed a mandatory arms embargo on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Following the removal of the Taliban regime, the arms embargo was amended in January 2002 by Security Council Resolution 1390 to apply to al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. Only the mandatory UN arms embargoes imposed on the Taliban are considered here, and not those on al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities.

This case study begins in Section II with a brief background on the circumstances in which the arms embargo was imposed and on the arms transfer relationships between the Taliban and its international supporters and sponsors. Section III considers the targets, scope, coverage and demands of the mandatory UN arms embargoes. Problems with monitoring and enforcing this arms embargo are also discussed, along with suspected transfers to the Taliban during the embargo period. The paper concludes in section IV with some thoughts on the obstacles to achieving the aims of arms embargo as well as the complexities of implementing the arms embargo introduced by UN Security Council Resolution 1390.

II. Background

The Taliban movement was formed in Sunni Islamic madrassas in Pakistan in 1993 by predominantly Afghan Pashtun mujahideen, with the aim of restoring peace to Afghanistan, disarming the population, enforcing sharia law, and defending the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.¹ The Taliban entered the Afghan civil war as a military force in the autumn of 1994, capturing a significant arms dump on the Afghan–Pakistani border and then seizing Kandahar in November 1994. Within two years, they controlled an estimated 90 per cent of Afghanistan, taking the capital, Kabul, at the end of September 1996. Although a number of its ‘victories’ were achieved through bribery and politicking, it has been argued that ‘the rise of the Taliban was first and foremost an

avowedly military enterprise, a crusade sworn to reunify the country by firepower as much as by exhortation'.

A key factor in explaining the Taliban’s military successes is the role of Pakistani covert assistance to the Taliban from the summer of 1994 onwards. Pakistani officials denied assisting the Taliban with arms, ammunition, logistical support and funding, in a manner reminiscent of denials of assistance to the mujahideen in the 1980s. Despite relying heavily on Pakistani support in its military operations and being recognized by Pakistan as Afghanistan’s government in 1997, the Taliban was not Pakistan’s puppet.

The Taliban’s rise caused particular concern to the neighbouring states of Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as India, Russia and Turkey. They provided different warring factions with arms, ammunition and specialists for training, as well as repairing major conventional weapons systems. The threat of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan galvanized these interested parties and played a crucial role in the formation of the United Islamic Front (also known as the Northern Alliance) in October 1996. In autumn 1998 in response to the Taliban’s massacre of Shiites in Bamiyan and the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif, Iran went as far as mobilizing troops on its border and threatening to go to war against the Taliban.

The Taliban was just one of the warring parties that were subject to the blanket coverage voluntary arms embargo imposed on Afghanistan by Security Council Resolution 1076 in October 1996. It called upon ‘all States immediately to end the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan’ with the aim of ending external interference in Afghan national affairs and enabling the warring parties to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The USA formally added Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licences for exports of US defence articles and services in June 1996, and the European Union introduced a mandatory arms embargo in December 1996. The voluntary UN arms embargo was ineffective as India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan continued to supply their favoured warring factions.

4 For example in Feb. 1995 Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto issued the first formal denial that Pakistan was backing the Taliban. Rashid, A., ‘Pakistan and the Taliban’, ed. Maley (note 1), p. 82.
5 An example of indirect Pakistani recognition of the Taliban is the fact that Pakistan continually lobbied within the UN for a ‘vacant seat’ policy to be adopted with regard to Afghanistan, a move that was seen by other governments as a means of at least removing the Rabbani regime representatives, and therefore a step towards official Taliban recognition. Crist (note 1), p. 5.
10 Council of the European Union, Common Position 96/746/CFSP, 17 Dec. 1996. EU embargoes are of course only binding for EU member states.
Even when other warring factions had been confined to small pockets in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban failed to garner international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government. All three countries are suspected of having provided significant financial resources for the Taliban’s arms procurement (see table 1). Two factors in particular have been highlighted as influencing Western opinion against the Taliban. First, human rights abuses were reportedly perpetrated by the Taliban, particularly against women, for those who failed to adhere to the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic customs. Second, it was argued that the Taliban offered Afghanistan as a ‘haven’ for opium producers and terrorists. Factors such as these quickly dampened the USA’s initial cautious optimism that Taliban-run Afghanistan would be stable and well-ordered.

By 1997 the Taliban had acquired a ‘pariah status’. Although a number of terrorist groups and individuals identified by P5 states were believed to reside in Afghanistan with Taliban blessing, one terrorist group and individual in particular were responsible for the imposition of a mandatory UN arms embargo on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan: al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in May 1996 and initially enjoyed the protection of Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar subsequently became bin Laden’s protector, although there was reportedly tension in the relationship following the al-Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.

The USA significantly changed its position towards the Taliban following the embassy bombings. A variety of avenues were explored to increase pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. A military option was exercised with the launch of missile strikes on ‘terrorist training camps’ in southern Afghanistan. On 4 July 1999 in direct response to the Taliban’s failure to surrender bin Laden and close terrorist training camps, the USA introduced Executive Order 13129, which froze Taliban assets in the USA, prohibited US trade with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and banned Ariana airline flights. Similar demands and sanctions were also contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1267 of October 1999.

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13 US Congress (note 11).
15 ‘Terrorist’ groups given refuge reportedly included: Kashmiri groups such as Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Uighu militants from China; Bangladeshis, Iranians and Chechens and Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s Ayman Zawahiri. Rashid, ‘Afghanistan’ (note 1), pp. 399–400; and Sirrs, J., ‘The Taliban’s international ambitions’, Middle East Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 3 (2001), p. 64.
19 Katzman (note 1), p. 23.
various forums in 1999 and 2000. In July 2000 US officials stated that further options for sanctions against the Taliban were being ‘actively explored’, including the ‘imposition of an arms embargo against the Taliban’. In December 2000 a mandatory UN arms embargo was imposed on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan by UN Security Council Resolution 1333.

### Arms transfers before the arms embargo

Hundreds of thousands of tonnes of arms and ammunition have been transferred to Afghanistan by various states, brokers and other actors since Soviet troops entered the country in December 1979. The Soviet Union transferred significant quantities of major conventional weapons, as well as small arms and light weapons (SALW) and other military equipment from 1955 onwards, with a significant increase in arms transfers during the Afghan ‘civil war’ of 1978–89. During this time, the USA purchased tens of thousands of tonnes of small arms and ammunition from allies and also from Communist bloc states, which were transferred to mujahideen groups via the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The USA’s preferred suppliers were reportedly China, Egypt and Israel—states that produced small arms that were of Soviet origin or design. It has been estimated that the USA provided 400 000 Kalashnikov rifles to Afghan guerrillas via the ISI during the 1980s.

Even more arms and ammunition were brought into Afghanistan during the civil war that followed the ousting of the Najibullah regime in 1992. Although Russia stopped supplying large quantities of major conventional weapons to Afghanistan in 1992, along with India and Uzbekistan it supported the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as well as the Northern Alliance with economic and military aid. Although the exact types and quantities of arms and ammunition remain unknown, Iran was thought to be the main arms supplier to Northern Alliance forces during the UN voluntary arms embargo in the late 1990s. The Taliban also claimed that France and Tajikistan had been involved in arms transfers to the Northern Alliance. However, in contrast to the pre-1992 period, the main military equipment transfers carried out in the
1990s consisted primarily of SALW, various calibres of ammunition, fuel, spare parts and other military services.\(^{30}\)

**Table 1.** Summary of possible/suspected sources and support for arms transfers to the Taliban before the mandatory arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Source of arms</th>
<th>Secondary Support</th>
<th>Non-state actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>China, Pakistan, Ukraine</td>
<td>Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE</td>
<td>Victor Bout, Vadim Rabinovich, Flying Dolphin company, dealers based in Dubai, Hong Kong and UAE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Arms transfers to the Taliban**

According to a UN Panel of Governmental Expert’s report from 1997, there were ‘at least 10 million’ small arms unaccounted for in circulation in Afghanistan.\(^{31}\) Although the Small Arms Survey has revised this figure to between 500,000 and 1.5 million small arms,\(^{32}\) it is clear that the Taliban did not have to rely on transfers of arms into Afghanistan to be able to conduct its military operations during the civil war of the 1990s. One of the most significant moments for arming the Taliban was the seizure of an arms dump at Spin Boldak in October 1994, during which Taliban fighters, with alleged assistance from Pakistani artillery, seized a significant quantity of Kalashnikov rifles, 120 artillery pieces and other SALW and ammunition.\(^{33}\) The Taliban’s arsenal was significantly upgraded following the capture of Kandahar airport and Shindand airbase, which gave the Taliban access to MiG-21 combat aircraft, Mi-17 transport helicopters and artillery.\(^{34}\) The victories over Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami forces were thought to be the most significant in terms of the volume of armoured vehicles and artillery captured by Taliban fighters.\(^{35}\) At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that this arsenal of major conventional weapons systems was not fully utilized.

As well as taking advantage of the large quantities of different types of arms already in use in Afghanistan, there is evidence that the Taliban intercepted shipments of arms being supplied to Rabbani and Northern Alliance forces from East European stockpiles via West European-based brokers.\(^{36}\) For example, one of Victor Bout’s Belgian-registered Trans Aviation Network Group flights of small arms and ammunition for an

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\(^{33}\) Matinuddin has stated that 80,000 Kalashnikovs were seized at Spin Boldak, while Rashid has argued that 18,000 were seized. Pirseyedi has cited Rashid’s figure of 18,000. Davis, A., ‘How the Taliban became a military force’, ed. Maley (note 1), p. 49; Matinuddin (note 1), p. 61; Pirseyedi (note 26), p. 21; Rashid (note 4), p. 81; and Rashid, *Taliban* (note 1), p. 28.

\(^{34}\) Davis (note 3), p. 316; Davis (note 33), p. 48; Matinuddin (note 1), p. 76; and Rashid, *Taliban* (note 1), p. 29.

\(^{35}\) See e.g. Davis (note 33), pp. 50–3; Matinuddin (note 1), p. 50; Rashid, *Taliban* (note 1), p. 35; and Moore (note 30), p. 8.

\(^{36}\) Matinuddin (note 1), p. 50.
anti-Taliban faction was intercepted by a Taliban combat aircraft and forced to land in Taliban-controlled territory. However, it has also been suggested that from 1996 onwards Bout’s companies also knowingly transported arms to the Taliban on behalf of Pakistan, including a consignment of 150 to 200 T-55 and T-62 tanks from Ukraine, arranged by Vadim Rabinovich, an Israeli citizen of Ukrainian origin, and a former director of the Ukrainian secret service.

Pakistan’s ISI reportedly transferred large-calibre machine gun ammunition and artillery shells to the Taliban prior to their successful attacks on Herat in September 1995, Kabul in September 1996 and the general offensives of 1999. Human Rights Watch has stated that there is strong evidence to suggest that private companies in Pakistan, run by former army and ISI personnel, have purchased and shipped ‘considerable quantities’ of ammunition and spare parts for the Taliban from Chinese arms and ammunition manufacturers through dealers in Hong Kong and the UAE. They reportedly took advantage of the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement to move sealed containers of arms and ammunition by truck from Karachi port in Pakistan into Afghanistan without inspection.

Pakistan also reportedly served as a transit point for the Toyota Land Cruiser light 4 x 4 vehicles delivered to the Taliban—which proved effective in their mobile military operations when mounted with various machineguns and light anti-aircraft guns—as well as 50 shipments of arms and ammunition flown from Ukraine via Peshawar to Taliban forces in Kabul in 1997–98, which were paid for by Saudi Arabia. Eyewitnesses also reportedly observed a Saudi Arabian C-130 Hercules transport aircraft delivering ammunition to Taliban soldiers in 1996. Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE also reportedly provided financial support for Taliban arms acquisitions in the 1990s, but the smuggling into Afghanistan of a variety of commodities, in particular cars and drugs, is considered the primary way in which the Taliban was able to fund its arms acquisitions.

III. The arms embargoes

On 19 December 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1333 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, with the aim of compelling the
Taliban to stop giving haven and support to internationally recognized terrorist groups. It went into effect on 20 January 2001 and prohibited the sale and transfer of arms and related materiel of all types, as well as ‘technical advice, assistance, or training’, by states and individuals to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The arms embargo was imposed in response to non-compliance with demands contained in earlier Security Council resolutions, as well as concerns regarding women’s rights, drug production and trafficking, the murder of Iranian diplomats, and the sheltering and training of terrorists. Resolution 1333 demanded that the Taliban: (a) surrender Osama bin Laden; (b) end sanctuary for terrorists; (c) close all terrorist training camps; and (d) halt illegal drugs activities.

The arms embargo’s demands are comparable to those directed at Libya in 1992 by Security Council Resolution 748. However, the Committee of Experts monitoring the Taliban arms embargo stated that the embargo was also intended to limit the Taliban’s ability to fight a civil war, with others arguing that it represented an attempt to stop Pakistan aiding the Taliban. Therefore, it has been argued that the arms embargo on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1333 was not only aimed at achieving the stated end goal of increasing global security but also aimed at achieving a political settlement to the civil war. The fact that the arms embargo applied only to part of Afghanistan raised a number of implementation challenges that are also evident in the later territorially specific arms embargoes imposed against Darfur in Security Council resolutions 1556 and 1591 and the Kivu regions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Resolution 1493.

The arms embargo had been in place for less than a year before the US-led coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom attacked Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The Taliban were quickly driven out of Afghanistan and a new interim administration was in place by December 2001. Speaking before a US Senate hearing in July 2002, US General Tommy Franks confidently asserted that ‘today the Taliban have been removed from power and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan has been destroyed’. In more sober tones, the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that ‘Our goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that the country does not again become a training ground for terrorists. That work is, of course, not complete. Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives are still at large. Some are in Afghanistan. Others are just across the borders, waiting for an opportunity to return’.

The UN sanctions regime was amended in the light of this change in circumstances by Security Council Resolution 1390, which modified the arms embargo imposed by

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46 UN Security Council Resolution 1333 (note 23). It was passed by 13 votes to 0, with China and Malaysia abstaining. For UNSC voting records see the UN Bibliographic Information System (UBISNET), <http://unbisnet.un.org>.
Resolution 1333 to apply to individuals and entities associated with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The sanctions regime included an annual review process, which has led to Resolution 1390 being modified by resolutions 1455, 1526, 1617 and 1735. This arms embargo raised a range of unique implementation problems because the arms embargo applied not only to non-state actors but was also potentially global in coverage, as it applied to any location in which these targeted actors were based. In the following sections only the application of resolutions 1333 and 1390 to the Taliban is considered for two reasons. First, the fact that the Taliban continue to have a significant negative impact on the security situation in Afghanistan, with Pakistani groups and individuals once again thought to be playing a key role in recent Taliban successes, suggests that the Taliban-related demands of Resolution 1390 have not been met. Second, al-Qaeda as a target for a UN arms embargo merits a separate study and, as is argued in section IV, it should not be dealt with in a comparable manner to the Taliban.

**Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms**

UN Security Council Resolution 1267 established a sanctions committee to oversee the implementation of financial and air sanctions on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for its support of Osama bin Laden. Following the introduction of Resolution 1333, it has also considered violations of the arms embargo. A Monitoring Group was established by Resolution 1363, following one of the key recommendations contained within the May 2000 report of the UN Committee of Experts on sanctions against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It was tasked with not only monitoring the implementation of the sanctions contained within resolutions 1267 and 1333, but also to assist with capacity building in states bordering Afghanistan and to recommend improvements for the sanctions regime.

The Monitoring Group’s first report was published in January 2002, after the Taliban had been removed from Afghanistan. It recommended that the arms embargo be extended not only to al-Qaeda and associates, but also to the whole of Afghanistan. The first recommendation was implemented by the UN Security Council the day after the Monitoring Group report was published. The second recommendation has not been acted upon, although it was once again reiterated in 2005 when it was stated that the

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53 UN Security Council Resolution 1390, 16 Jan. 2002. It also expanded the financial embargo of Resolution 1267 (1999) to apply also to associates of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda members and re-appointed the monitoring group established by Resolution 1363 (2000).
55 UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (note 20). It is now referred to as the ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’.
arms embargo could have a greater impact on the Taliban ‘if all non-State actors in Afghanistan were prevented from buying weapons, with necessary exemptions for humanitarian and other purposes, as authorized by the Government of Afghanistan or the Security Council’. The recommendation for a selective post-conflict arms embargo on Afghanistan was once again ignored.

The Monitoring Group continued to function under Security Council Resolution 1390 and was replaced by an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team following Security Council Resolution 1526. From the beginning of the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1390, the monitors have taken a two-track approach, dealing on the one hand with the Taliban in the Afghan–Pakistani border area and its quest for conventional arms and ammunition, and on the other with al-Qaeda cells located around the world and their attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The monitors give the impression that they feel that they have to monitor two very different sets of targets, and in effect two very different arms embargoes.

The onus on implementing the Taliban element of the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1390 lies primarily with Afghanistan and its six bordering states—China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The capacity of these states, in particular Afghanistan, and the intentions of some officials in others, namely Pakistan, has been questioned by a number of commentators. Although the monitors have recognized that these states have stopped some arms trafficking attempts, the monitors’ reports note that the main problems with implementing the arms embargo remain at the national level. Two key points have been made in this regard. First, it has been noted that ‘while Member States support the validity and importance of the sanctions … where difficulties with implementation exist, they have more to do with the lack of capacity than the lack of will’. For example, no state has reported a failed or successful violation of the arms embargo to the sanctions committee. Second, the monitors suggest that there is also a lack of will on the parts of states to cooperate with efforts to implement the arms embargo. This is because not only have few states given the monitors ‘timely, accurate and detailed information’ on suspected arms embargo violations, but requests for more information from national authorities on seizures that the monitors have found reported in open sources ‘have, for the most part been

63 Pakistan’s efforts to increase border surveillance have been noted, along with continuing suspicions of Afghanistan’s positive relationships with Pakistan’s ISI, military and religious organizations in Fair, C. C., ‘Militant recruitment in Pakistan: implications for al Qaeda and other organisations’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 27 (2004), p. 497; Kronstadt, K. A., and Vaughn, B., Terrorism in South Asia (Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, 8 Mar. 2004); and Norell (note 54).
65 United Nations (note 60), p. 32.
ignored’. Therefore, one of the monitors’ key recommendations is that they be given more authority and powers for investigations.

Arms transfers during the arms embargo

Following the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, Russian officials openly discussed their transfers of small quantities of Mi-24 helicopters, MANPADS, ammunition for tanks, helicopters and artillery to the Northern Alliance. The USA and Poland are also known to have transferred arms and ammunition to Northern Alliance forces in late 2001, with Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and others donating and selling arms to the new Afghan Government and its security forces.

Even before the arms embargo was introduced, it was widely believed that after more than 20 years of conflict there were significant quantities of SALW units and other conventional arms in Afghanistan (see table 1). The UN Committee of Experts concurred with this view, but argued that due to the amount of ammunition being expended in offensives, ‘to believe that the Taliban are still surviving on former stocks is naïve’. Therefore, they argued that fairly significant quantities of ammunition and fuel were being transferred to Taliban forces in contravention of the embargo.

Table 2. Summary of possible/suspected sources and support for arms transfers to the Taliban during the mandatory arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of arms</th>
<th>Non-state actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola, the Balkans and Black sea regions, Central Asia, China, ‘Golden Triangle’, Horn of Africa, Liberia, Middle East, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South America</td>
<td>Victor Bout; Flying Dolphin; Individuals and groups connected to the ISI and religious movements in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arms transfers to the Taliban

Before Operation Enduring Freedom, it was known that the Taliban air force consisted of 8 MiG-21 and 8 Su-22 combat aircraft, some Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters, 3–4 L-39 light combat aircraft and assorted transport aircraft, and that the Taliban also had a potentially significant quantity of artillery. The Taliban was also in possession of some medium-range Scud-B and short-range FROG-7 ballistic missiles that were considered...
to be potential WMD delivery systems, although there was no evidence that the Taliban possessed any WMD.\textsuperscript{71} Most of the heavy weapons were in bad condition and, when in conflict with coalition forces, Taliban fighters reportedly relied primarily on ‘rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and mortars. Occasionally they used heavier weapons like recoilless rifles, heavy anti-aircraft machine guns, artillery rockets, and shoulder-fired-surface-to-air missiles’.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite outlining a significant arsenal, the monitors stated that most of the Taliban arms caches discovered in Afghanistan contained arms and ammunition that were of poor quality.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, coalition forces involved in firefights concluded that the Taliban fighters must have been receiving supplies from beyond the borders of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{74} The monitors therefore argued that the Taliban must have been seeking and receiving new equipment, and that ‘the arms embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 1390 does not seem to have been entirely successful in achieving one of its objectives’.\textsuperscript{75}

Although appearing to lack any concrete evidence, the monitors have suggested that since the imposition of the arms embargo arms brokers have been involved in arranging for arms and ammunition to be delivered to the Taliban from states and regions that have recently, or still are, involved in conflict or are subject to UN arms embargoes.\textsuperscript{76} The Afghan–Pakistani border area is still considered to be the main conduit for arms brought in from further afield.\textsuperscript{77} Most importantly, the stockpiles of weapons and illegal arms workshops located within the Afghan–Pakistani border region are thought to remain the main source of arms and ammunition for the Taliban.\textsuperscript{78} Some commentators suggest that elements within the ISI and individual Pakistani military commanders continue to support Taliban leaders,\textsuperscript{79} while some go so far as to suggest a relationship between the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal—a Pakistani opposition party—the ISI and the Taliban ‘is becoming increasingly difficult to crack’.\textsuperscript{80} There is a lack of concrete and reliable data on arms transfers to the Taliban in the period covered by the arms embargo imposed by Security Council resolutions 1333 and 1390, thus preventing the monitors from providing more than a speculative picture.
IV. Conclusions

As early as 1998 it was stated that international pressure would be unable to force the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to the USA or other interested parties. Diplomatic and military options before the introduction of the arms embargo failed to push the Taliban to meet the demands of the USA and subsequent UN Security Council resolutions. The impact of the arms embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 1333 was therefore unsuccessful in achieving its aims.

One of the difficulties of relying on an arms embargo as a means of exerting pressure on the Taliban is that significant quantities of conventional arms were already in their hands in Afghanistan. In 1996 one US official argued that, due to these circumstances, any arms embargo imposed against actors in Afghanistan should focus particularly on preventing fuel and ammunition from reaching warring factions. It is therefore interesting to note that the arms embargo monitors have also acknowledged that, although the arms embargo should be broad in scope of goods and services covered, preventing certain types of goods and services from reaching arms embargo targets should be prioritized.

Another point of interest with regard to the monitors’ comments on the arms embargoes imposed by resolutions 1333 and 1390 is that both should have been extended to include other non-state forces within Afghanistan. This could be justified to support the Afghan government’s ‘Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups’ initiative. Going one step further, it could be inferred from the monitors’ reports that they have been calling for two separate arms embargoes rather than the one imposed by Resolution 1390—one for non-government forces operating in Afghanistan and another for global terrorist actors (even if the latter appears to be impossible to either implement or monitor).

While the arms embargo imposed on the Taliban by Resolution 1333 had some peculiarities and demands that made it a global security case, it was comparable in scope and coverage to a number of selective government authority arms embargoes. In contrast, the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1390 introduced a completely new dimension to arms embargoes by targeting a range of non-state actors, wherever they were located. The interests of one P5 member in particular have meant that a lot of attention has been paid to efforts to implement this embargo, in particular its global terrorism element. Despite its considerable resources, the monitors have been unable to uncover any concrete cases of embargo violation and have stressed that ‘the arms embargo is the least transparent of the measures in the sanctions regime against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their associates and appears to be the hardest to implement’.

81 Howard (note 18), p. 16.
Chronology

Dates directly related to UN Security Council arms embargo decisions are highlighted in bold.

14 April 1988  Geneva Accord signals the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
15 February 1989  Last Soviet troops withdraw. War between President Najibullah’s regime and mujahideen continues.
28 April 1992  President Najibullah’s regime ends.
June 1992  Burhannudin Rabbani becomes president; Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar launches attack on Rabbani government forces.
7 March 1993  Islamabad Accord permits Rabbani to remain president for 18 further months.
1 January 1994  Abdul Rashid Dostam attempts coup against Rabbani.
12 October 1994  Taliban seize arms and ammunition in attack on Hizb-i Islami’s Spin Boldak arms depot.
5 November 1994  Taliban capture Kandahar.
February 1995  Taliban start 18 month siege of Kabul.
28 March 1995  Taliban capture Shindand airbase.
April—May 1995  Taliban repelled at Herat, the first major defeat for Taliban.
6 August 1995  Russian cargo plane carrying arms and ammunition for Rabbani/Massoud forced to land by Taliban.
5 September 1995  Taliban capture Herat
14 June 1996  Afghanistan formally added to the list of countries prohibited from importing or exporting US defence articles and services.
27 September 1996  Taliban take Kabul and execute former President Najibullah.
29 September 1996  Pakistani delegation opens official links with Taliban.
19 October 1996  Joint Statement of Presidents Karimov of Uzbekistan and Farooq Leghari of Pakistan calls for an immediate ceasefire, peace talks and an arms embargo.

22 October 1996  UN Security Council Resolution 1076 imposes a voluntary arms embargo and calls on states to stop supplying arms and ammunition to all warring factions in Afghanistan.

15 May 1997  US State Department designates Afghanistan as a state that was not cooperating with anti-terrorism efforts.
April—May 1997  Initial Taliban victory at Mazar-i-Sharif turns into defeat.
25 May 1997  Pakistan recognizes Taliban government.
26 May 1997  Saudi Arabia recognizes Taliban government.
27 May 1997  UAE recognizes Taliban government.
15 June 1997  Anti-Taliban forces declare establishment of government in Northern Afghanistan.
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9 September 1997  Taliban capture Mazar-i-Sharif.
7 October 1997  Northern Alliance forces recapture Mazar-i-Sharif.
April 1998  US Ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, asks the Taliban to hand bin Laden over to the USA.
20 July 1998  UN-supported 6+2 meeting in Tashkent, attended by Taliban and anti-Taliban representatives ends in deadlock.
8 August 1998  Taliban capture Mazar-i-Sharif, during which Iranian diplomats are killed.
20 August 1998  In retaliation for the US embassy bombings, the US fires Tomahawk cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden training camps.
September 1998  Iranian military build-up on border leads to fears of Iranian military intervention in Afghan civil war against Taliban.
9 December 1998  UN Security Council Resolution 1214 calls up Taliban to stop fighting, stop shielding terrorists and enter into peace talks with the opposition.
February 1999  US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, visits Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban into handing over bin Laden.
10 April 1999  Mullah Omar announces that the Taliban cannot share power with those who have ‘destroyed the country’.
4 July 1999  Because the Taliban hosted bin Laden, US President Bill Clinton issues Executive Order 13129, which imposes a ban on US trade with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and blocks and freezes Taliban assets in the USA.
15 October 1999  UN Security Council Resolution 1267 bans Ariana Airlines flights and directs UN members to freeze Taliban assets, demanding bin Laden’s surrender.
7 April 2000  UN Security Council presidential statement condemns Taliban behaviour and threatens further ‘unspecified sanctions’ if the Taliban do not extradite bin Laden.
30 May 2000  US–Russian joint statement calls for terrorist camps to be closed and bin Laden extradited.
26 February 2001  EU Common Position 2001/154/CFSP amends the EU arms embargo on Afghanistan to bring it into line with UN Security Council Resolution 1333—therefore applying only to Taliban-controlled areas.
22 May 2001  Committee of Experts issues report.
30 June 2001  UN Security Council Resolution 1363 calls for a monitoring mechanism for sanctions imposed by resolutions 1267 and 1333 to be established.
9 September 2001  Massoud assassinated.
September 2001  Pakistan’s ISI Director Lt Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Mullah Omar twice to try to persuade him to hand over Bin Laden.
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5 November 2001  EU Common Position 2001/771/CFSP amends the EU arms embargo on Afghanistan to apply only to Taliban-controlled areas.

17 January 2002  UN Security Council Resolution 1390 modifies the arms embargo to apply to al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated groups and individuals wherever they are located.

22 May 2002  EU Common Position 2002/402/CFSP repeals earlier arms embargoes on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and introduces an arms embargo that is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1390.

2 June 2002  US formally permits arms and military equipment sales to the new Afghan government.


22 December 2003  Kabul Declaration signed, in which China, Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan vow not to interfere in Afghan internal affairs again. Indian, Russian and Saudi officials also present.


22 December 2006  UN Security Council Resolution 1735 extends term of arms embargo.

Glossary

EU  European Union
ISI  Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
MANPADS  Man-portable air defence system
P5  Permanent five members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Soviet Union/Russia, UK, USA)
SALW  Small arms and light weapons
UAE  United Arab Emirates
UN  United Nations
WMD  Weapons of mass destruction
Register of arms transfers

This register lists a selection of reported transfers of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to the Taliban between 1995 and 2006.

Table 3. Transfers prior to the UN arms embargo, 1995–December 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>No. delivered</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Year(s) of deliveries</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Table 4. Transfers during the UN arms embargo, December 2000–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient/supplier (S)</th>
<th>No. delivered</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Year(s) of deliveries</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: Pakistan</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Small arms/amunition/artillery shells</td>
<td>2000–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>