ARMS FLOWS TO THE
CONFLICT IN CHAD

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I. Introduction

Described as undemocratic and corrupt, the regime of Idriss Déby, President of Chad, has been characterized by bad governance and found guilty of human rights abuses. Since 2003 the armed forces controlled by Déby have fought various rebel factions of loose and frequently changing composition.\(^1\) The violence in Chad is characterized by intermittent short periods of intense fighting and is closely linked to the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. In May 2009 violence flared up along and over Chad’s border with Sudan, and Chad and Sudan remain hostile towards each other.\(^2\)

A relatively small number of heavy weapons are used in the conflict in Chad and the weapons that are used are not technologically sophisticated.\(^3\) Both government and rebel forces in Chad are comprised mainly of infantry who are armed with SALW and use general-purpose four-by-four vehicles, such as Toyota Land Cruisers, for troop transport. Heavy machine guns and light multiple rocket launchers are often mounted on these vehicles. The government forces also use light armoured vehicles, old tanks, small numbers of armed helicopters and combat aircraft. Tanks and combat aircraft played a significant role in government attacks on rebel forces in 2008 and 2009. Thus, small supplies of major arms or of small arms and light weapons (SALW), such as a few second-hand armed helicopters or a thousand rifles, can have a significant impact on the course and intensity of the conflict. Such weapons may provide sufficient incentive for the recipients of them to try to reach their goals via violence instead of dialogue.

This paper discusses the role played by other states in the violence by supplying arms to government or rebel forces in Chad. It provides an overview of the restrictions on arms exports to Chad, outlines the flow of arms to the country and highlights the transparency of the arms transfers policies of the governments that have supplied weapons to Chad.

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1 Due to the multitude of rebel groups and the frequent changes of their names and composition they are referred to as ‘rebel forces’ in this Background Paper.
II. Limiting arms supplies to Chad

Supplying arms to Chad may fuel the conflict there or facilitate human rights abuses. Particularly in the case of SALW, there is a risk that arms may be diverted from Chad to Darfur in breach of a UN arms embargo. For these reasons, some states may choose to restrict arms transfers to Chad.

In similar cases of armed conflict in Africa, the United Nations has chosen to impose arms embargos on some or all of the actors—including on governments or non-state actors that operate from neighbouring countries—but there is no UN arms embargo on any entity or region in Chad. The UN panel of experts to monitor implementation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur has concluded that weapons have reached Darfur via Chad and it therefore recommended that the UN arms embargo on Darfur be expanded to include Chad. However no proposals for such an embargo have been made in the UN Security Council. On the contrary, in reaction to a February 2008 rebel attack on N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, the Security Council ‘called upon Member States to provide support, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, as requested by the Government of Chad’. Even though this statement did not explicitly mention military aid, it could be interpreted as legitimizing arms transfers.

While the primary focus of the World Bank’s efforts is on addressing poverty rather than on resolving the violence in Chad, it has pressured the Government of Chad to limit its military expenditure. One of Chad’s main oil projects is an oil pipeline between Chad and Cameroon, and in 2001 the World Bank agreed to finance the development of the pipeline on condition that substantial oil revenues would be used to reduce poverty and only a limited amount devoted to other activities, including military expenditure. In September 2008 the World Bank ended its support of the pipeline project because the Chadian Government had repeatedly failed to comply with the agreement and had not allocated adequate resources to poverty reduction.

Like the United Nations, the European Union (EU) has imposed an embargo on the supply of arms to several conflict areas in Africa and elsewhere, but not on Chad. Several EU member states apply restrictive arms export policies on conflict areas in Africa and some of these states have denied applications for permission to export weapons to Chad. The EU’s annual reports on arms exports, which are compiled from information submitted by its member states, show that licences for the export of military goods to Chad were refused by EU member states in one case in 2005, in one case in 2006 and in two cases in 2007.


8 A list of EU arms embargoes is available on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme website, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/researchissues/controlling/arms..embargoes>.
case in 2006, and in seven cases in 2007. The states that refused to grant export licences based their refusals on the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that relate to the possibility of the undesired diversion of arms and to the risk of arms contributing to human rights abuses, to internal and regional conflict, and to threats to EU member states and their allies.

In 2007, the year that it became a member of the EU, Romania’s national arms export report noted that it had refused one licence for the export of military goods to Chad in 2006 on the basis of criteria 3 of the EU Code of Conduct, which relates to the risk of arms fuelling conflicts in the country of their final destination. This was a change from earlier practice as Romania had allowed ammunition worth €543 000 to be supplied to Chad in 2004 when the conflict was already ongoing.

In 2006 and 2007 the German Government reported that it had denied licences for the export of military goods to end-users in Chad, and in 2007 the Czech Government reported on its denial of licences for the export of arms to Chad. In 2004 the Government of Bosnia, not an EU member state, also refused a licence for the export of military goods to Chad, reportedly because of pressure by EU officials.

III. Arms supplies to the Government of Chad

On the basis of SIPRI’s trend-indicator values for the volume of transfers of major arms, it is estimated that arms imports by the Government of Chad were five times higher in 2004–2008 than in 1999–2003. These major

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weapons as well as other arms and military equipment came from a wide range of countries.

In 2004–2008 Ukraine was apparently the most significant arms supplier to Chad. According to the Ukrainian Government’s detailed public submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and Ukraine’s annual reports on arms exports, it supplied Chad with two Mi-24 combat helicopters in 2007, two Mi-24s, three Su-25 combat aircraft in 2008, 80 BMP-1 armoured personnel carriers, eight BTR-3E armoured personnel carriers in 2008 and 12 000 rifles in 2006–2007. Additionally unofficial sources reported that Chad received unspecified ammunition from Ukraine to Chad in 2008 and would receive three more Su-25s in 2009. The Su-25 aircraft, in particular, were a significant addition to Chad’s military capabilities because they are more capable than the combat aircraft that Chad previously possessed. In May 2009 these aircraft were used to attack rebel forces inside Sudanese territory.

France has maintained strong relations with Chad since its independence in 1960. In 2008 the French military presence in Chad was around 1200 troops, supported by combat aircraft. Reportedly, the French military has provided reconnaissance, intelligence and logistical support to the Chadian Government.

Despite its military presence in Chad and its backing of the Déby Government, France reported no arms exports to Chad for 2003–2005 in its annual arms export reports. For 2006 France reported Chadian orders for military goods from France as valued at €3.2 million and deliveries of military goods to Chad valued at €100 000; and for 2007 Chadian orders for military goods from France were valued at €11.2 million and deliveries at €5.4 million. The delivery value for 2007 may include 40 armoured vehicles and 45 machine guns supplied to Chad that France reported in its submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. However, the armoured vehicles were probably actually supplied by Belgium via France, as discussed below. In 2009 France reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms the delivery in 2008 of 25 VAB wheeled armoured personnel carriers. France has also acknowledged that it played a facilitating role in the emergency supply of ammunition from Libya and other unnamed countries during the fighting in

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21 UN Register of Conventional Arms (note 16).

22 UN Register of Conventional Arms (note 16).
N’Djamena in February 2008. Unofficial sources have reported that Chad ordered 100 Milan anti-tank missiles from France in late 2007.

Unofficial sources also report that Libya actively supports the Government of Chad, including by supplying military aid. In 2006 two Chadian SF-260 light aircraft that Chad has used for ground attacks were overhauled in Libya. During the fighting in N’Djamena in February 2008 Libya also sent emergency supplies, including ammunition for T-55 tanks and rockets for use on Mi-24 combat helicopters.

During 2007–2008 Chad received an estimated 82 upgraded AML-90/Eland MK7 armoured vehicles with 90-mm cannons from Belgium via France. The Sabiex company in the Belgian region of Wallonia had bought the vehicles in 1999 from South Africa’s army surplus stocks to upgrade and subsequently resell them. In 2003 there was intense political debate in Belgium when it supplied machine guns to Nepal for use in the government’s fight against Maoist rebels, but the sale of the armoured vehicles to Chad received little attention. Official information about the Chad deal is limited. Although Belgium reported the import of 115 Eland armoured vehicles from South Africa in 1999 to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, it did not report the re-export of the vehicles to either France or Chad in 2007. It remains unclear if the policy process and motivations that led to the granting of an export licence for the deal were adequately informed. The general director of Sabiex stated that the government of Wallonia permitted the sale of the vehicles to France, but the Directorate for Arms Licences of Wallonia insisted that it had not issued a licence for the export of arms to Chad and did not know that Chad would be the end-user of the vehicles.

27 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 16).
30 France reported the export of 40 armoured combat vehicles in 2007. They were described as ‘VBC’, presumably for véhicule blindé de combat, a generic term that can include AML-90/Eland vehicles. It is probable that the report relates to the delivery via France of armoured vehicles from Belgium in 2007. UN Register of Conventional Arms (note 16).
China’s arms exports to African countries are often presumed to be a component of its efforts to improve political ties with and gain access to the natural resources of these countries. China’s controversial role as one of the main arms suppliers to the Government of Sudan, an adversary of Chad, is often explained in part as related to such efforts. There is evidence that similar motivations also play a role in China’s relations with Chad. In August 2006 Chad formally recognized China and ended relations with Taiwan. Soon afterwards Chinese companies made significant investments in Chad’s oil sector. Military cooperation between Chad and China also developed at the time, and in September 2007 the two countries formally agreed to increase cooperation between their armed forces. In its submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, China reported the supply of 10 light armoured vehicles to Chad in 2007. Unconfirmed reports claim that Chinese military advisors were present in N’Djamena in early 2008 and that in late 2008 a Chinese shipment of armoured vehicles together with 50 containers of arms and ammunition arrived in Cameroon for further delivery to Chad.

The United States has provided limited military support to Chad, mainly in the form of training, military clothing and training ammunition for Chad’s armed forces. The US Government planned to spend $275,000 (€195,000) to train Chadian armed forces in US financial year 2009. The Administration of President George W. Bush publicly explained its military support for Chad: despite concerns about poor governance, the Bush Administration considered the Déby Government to be an ally in the ‘global war on terror’, especially because Chad’s armed forces are fighting elements of the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The USA has provided security assistance and training to Chad’s army under its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme and via the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a US effort whose stated aim is to increase the border protection and counterterrorism capabilities of several North African countries and ‘to promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist ideology’. For US financial years 2008 and 2009 some of the training has been limited to that which promotes ‘democratic values’ and respect for human rights. In 2006 the US Government also allowed the sale

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35 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 16); and UN Register of Conventional Arms (note 16).
38 Ploch, L., Instability in Chad, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RS22798 (CRS: Washington, DC, 19 June 2009); and US Department of State (note 37).
to Chad of a civilian second-hand PC-7 light aircraft that was subsequently used in combat.  

There are strong indications that Israel is a significant supplier of arms to Chad. In 2006 Israel supplied modern small arms to Chad, some of which later turned up in Darfur (see box).  

Pictures in unofficial sources indicate that an unknown quantity of Israeli-made RAM-2000 light armoured vehicles also arrived in Chad around 2006. Some of these small arms later turned up in Darfur. Efforts to reopen diplomatic relations between Chad and Israel began in 2005, and it is possible that the arms supplied in 2006 were not only a commercial deal but also had political aims. Unofficial sources continue to report that Israel is involved with the supervision of telecommunications interception in Chad and that in 2007 and 2008 it supplied Chad with arms and military services, with combat equipment for a light aircraft supplied by a US company and, in November 2008, with additional RAM-2000 light armoured vehicles.

In 2006 the Swiss company Pilatus delivered a single PC-9 light aircraft to Chad’s air force. This minor arms delivery is of particular interest because it provides a lesson in end-use monitoring, public transparency and because the delivery also eventually led to a change in Swiss export legislation. When the Swiss Government publicly announced its reasons for allowing the sale, several political actors, reportedly including the Swiss Foreign Minister, criticized the deal citing the risk that the aircraft would be used in the ongoing conflict in Chad. However, after the Chadian Government had given written assurances that it would be used only for training purposes, the Swiss Government permitted Pilatus to sell the unarmed aircraft. Nonetheless, in early 2008 Chad had armed the PC-9 aircraft and used it to attack rebel forces. In response, Switzerland announced sanctions against Chad. Switzerland also tightened its arms export regulations to prohibit the export of military trainer aircraft to recipients involved in armed conflict or when the risk exists that the aircraft will be used against civilians.

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39 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 16).
41 Several of these vehicles appear on photographs taken in the second half of 2007 of Chadian armed forces units. The RAM-2000 has been available since 2004; thus the vehicles must have been supplied between 2004 and mid-2007 when the pictures were taken. ‘In pictures: Chad battle aftermath’, BBC News, 29 Nov. 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/in_pictures/7118788.stm>.
Several other countries are known to have supplied arms to the Government of Chad. Bulgaria reported that in 2006 it exported ammunition and SALW to Chad (see box) and that it had granted licences for the further export of military goods worth €1.1 million. In its submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2008 Bulgaria reported the delivery of two 2S1 self-propelled howitzers. Serbia reported exports to Chad of SALW and ammunition in 2004 and 2006 (see box). Portugal reported exports to Chad of military goods related to aircraft that were valued at €2.6 million in 2003–2005, and it reported that it licensed the export to Chad of military goods related to aircraft valued at €0.6 million in 2007. In 2006 Chad also received at least two Mi-171 armed helicopters from an undisclosed ‘East European’ supplier.

IV. Arms supplies to rebel forces

The rebel forces in Chad have sustained their military activities with weapons acquired from the Sudanese Government, with captured weapons, and with weapons that have been obtained from the large pool of weapons that are available throughout Chad and the neighbouring countries. Despite denials from Sudan, the available evidence indicates that the Sudanese authorities host Chadian armed groups and supply them with SALW and multi-barrelled rocket launchers. However, it is impossible to determine the extent of the Sudanese support (see box).

In April 2006 an African Union fact-finding mission investigated Sudan’s links to the rebel forces in Chad. It interviewed rebel prisoners, inspected rebel arms captured by the government and reportedly found that many of the arms were new and of Chinese origin. China is one of Sudan’s main arms suppliers, and there is widespread suspicion that Sudan diverts weapons from China to the rebel forces in Chad. Since the inception of formal relations between Chad and China, the Chadian Government has discussed the issue of Sudan’s support for these rebel forces with China. President Déby has stated that: ‘It used to be that when we had problems with our neighbor sending mercenaries to invade us that none of our complaints before the United Nations would pass, because China blocked them’ but, since opening the door to Chinese investment, ‘we have been able to raise our concerns without taboo’.

The flow of arms between Sudan and Chad goes both ways. The UN panel of experts investigating the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Darfur was told by a number of governments that some of the weapons found in Darfur had been supplied from their countries to the Government of Chad.

48 UN Register of Conventional Arms (note 16).
49 See Council of the European Union reports (note 9).
50 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 16).
53 French and Polgreen (note 32).
Box 1. Monitoring the flow of small arms and light weapons

A key problem in analysing arms flows to countries in Africa is the lack of verifiable, accurate and detailed information about transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which play an important role in violent conflicts in Africa. SIPRI has therefore explored the feasibility of monitoring transfers of SALW to these countries in order to complement the existing SIPRI database on international transfers of major conventional weapons.

In the case of Chad the only detailed information about SALW supplies is that which is presented in official government reports on arms exports. However, the accuracy and completeness of these reports cannot be assessed because information from other sources is not available for comparison.

In its annual arms export report Ukraine stated that it supplied 10 000 automatic rifles or submachine guns to Chad in 2006 and 2000 more in 2007. Bulgaria’s annual arms export report stated that in 2006 it delivered to Chad SALW or SALW components worth €208 125 and ammunition, possibly for SALW, worth €588 895. Bulgaria’s annual arms export report for 2006 listed the delivery of military goods, including small arms and ammunition, via Israel to a number of countries including Chad. Additional details were provided in a report to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE): in 2004 Serbia exported $379 148 worth of small arms ammunition, and in 2006 it exported $873 168 worth of small arms ammunition. In 2008, in response to an inquiry by the UN panel investigating the UN embargo on Darfur about Serbian ammunition found in Darfur, Serbia provided information that it had supplied 4 million rounds of 5.56-mm ammunition for Galil rifles to Chad.

France’s submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms reported the delivery of 45 machine guns in 2007. Israel does not regularly report on its exports of small arms. However, when the UN panel investigating the embargo on Darfur requested information about Israeli-made rifles observed in Darfur, Israel reported in 2008 that these weapons were part of a batch of Galil and Tavor rifles which an Israeli company had supplied to Chad in July and September 2006. The number of rifles was not disclosed. Already in 2006 photographs of Chadian soldiers holding recent-model Galil rifles were published, but details about the rifles, such as the year of delivery and the supplier, could at that time only be guessed.

Information about the supplier, type, number and delivery date of SALW used by rebel forces is scarce and unreliable. While it may be possible to identify the producer of a weapon pictured in a photograph, identifying the immediate supplier is more difficult. For example, in February 2006 a Chadian rebel was pictured carrying a Chinese-made QLZ87 automatic grenade launcher, a weapon that had only been on the market since 2003. China supplies arms to Sudan, and this led to speculation that Sudan had supplied the QLZ87 grenade launcher to the Chadian rebel forces. There was, however, no evidence for that assumption and, considering that Chinese arms are widely used, the grenade launcher could have been supplied by or via other actors. Such a weapon could also have been captured from government forces or other armed factions in Chad or Darfur or taken by defectors from the Chadian armed forces.


United Nations (note e).


Although the UN panel could not determine how these weapons had made their way from the arsenals of the Chadian Government to Darfur, it was established that close relations exist between the Government of Chad and the main rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The panel concluded that Déby’s half-brother, Daoussa Déby, played a central role in providing support to rebel groups in Darfur, including by facilitating the provision of or directly providing weapons and military vehicles and it recommended that Daoussa Déby should be subject to UN sanctions for violating the arms embargo on Darfur.

V. Conclusions

The information that is available from open sources, both official and unofficial shows that the Government of Chad has been able to acquire both major arms and SALW from a broad range of suppliers. The diverse rebel groups in Chad have also managed to obtain sufficient weapons to continue their military operations. However, publicly available information is not adequate to determine what proportion of their arms has been captured from government forces, what has been obtained by other means and the identity of the suppliers of such arms.

The availability of official information about the type, number and year of delivery of arms supplied to the Chadian Government varies significantly. Romania and Ukraine have supplied detailed information about the type and number of their exports of major weapons and SALW in their annual national arms export reports and in their reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The reports are examples of ‘best practice’ in this context.

The decisions by EU member states about whether or not to supply arms to Chad have not been consistent, even among those EU members that have agreed to comply with common export guidelines for arms exports. While the governments of some EU states have explicitly refused to permit arms to be supplied to Chad, other governments have permitted such exports.

The reasoning behind the USA’s decision to supply military assistance to Chad and Switzerland’s decision to allow the export of one PC-9 light aircraft was made public. In other cases it remains unclear whether and how governments have assessed the effect that arms exports could have on prolonging or aggravating the violence in Chad and, through the diversion of SALW especially, in Sudan. It is also unclear whether Belgium, Bulgaria, France and Portugal have considered how their arms export to Chad could affect their credibility as neutral participants in the EU and UN-sanctioned multinational peacekeeping forces in Chad.

Some countries may consider arms supplies to be in keeping with the UN Security Council’s admonition to support the Government of Chad or as a means to prevent increased rebel activity or victory—which could lead to even greater chaos. The countries that have supplied arms or that have

allowed them to be supplied to Chad may have focused more on their own interests than on the peace and security of Chad. Among the benefits to be gained from supplying arms are direct revenues from arms sales, better relations with the regime controlling Chad's oil fields and political influence in Northern Africa.

Adequate information about what actual end-use demands have been made, about monitoring of end-use and about sanctions in response to breaches of end-use agreements is lacking in official reporting on arms transfers. The Government of Chad's use of the Swiss PC-9 aircraft in combat missions, in contravention of end-use agreements, illustrates the need to exercise caution when accepting promises from recipients and the need for proper end-use monitoring of exported military items. It is questionable whether any supplier has tried to monitor the whereabouts of the most difficult to monitor type of weapons: small arms and light weapons and the related ammunition. In the light of the need to prevent the diversion of arms to Darfur this is particularly important. An encouraging development in this regard is the increasing willingness of states to provide detailed information about arms exports to UN panels that investigate arms diversions.

Publicly available information about the flow of arms to the conflict in Chad demonstrates how arms reach conflict areas despite a lack of clarity about the costs and benefits of enabling such supplies. Increased accountability and further research and debate on the effect and desirability of supplying arms to a country in conflict is needed and would be facilitated by greater openness and transparency on all aspects of arms transfers.
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SIPRI BACKGROUND PAPER

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