The New Security Dimensions
Europe after the NATO and EU Enlargements

Report of the Frösunda Conference, organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College and the Warsaw Centre for International Relations, Frösunda, 20–21 April 2001

Edited by Adam Daniel Rotfeld

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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Preface

This report summarizes the discussions and main findings of an international conference on *The New Security Dimensions: Europe after the NATO and EU Enlargements*, which was held at Frösundavik, Sweden, on 20–21 April 2001. The Frösunda Conference was organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College and the Warsaw Centre for International Relations. It was co-sponsored by the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Poland.

The conference brought together security analysts from more than a dozen countries. Among the participants were academics and practitioners from governments, European Union (EU) institutions and a number of other international organizations; the programme and the list of participants are presented in appendices 2 and 3. The background papers and more than 20 panel presentations facilitated the discussion in the three working sessions of the conference. The position of the Swedish EU Presidency is reflected in the opening address delivered by Sven-Olof Petersson in his capacity as Director-General for Political Affairs at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The working sessions were supplemented by a keynote speech by former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

The main task of the conference was to draw attention to the significance and consequences for European security of the processes of enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, especially for the states which remain outside these security structures (session one). Important contributions were therefore made to the discussions by representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as well as Estonia, Lithuania, other European states and the United States. In the context of enlargement, two critical issues were addressed: the present and prospective impact of the developing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on conflict prevention and crisis management beyond the EU borders (session two) and the redefinition of the transatlantic partnership (session three). The papers provided by the panellists are reproduced in this publication. They are preceded by three sets of questions which were submitted by the organizers of the conference with the aim of focusing the discussion on specific issues. The ‘Summary of the discussions of the Frösunda Conference’, prepared by SIPRI researchers Shannon Kile and Zdzislaw Lachowski, follows the papers of the panellists.

The Chairman of the SIPRI Governing Board, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, chaired the first session, devoted to ‘European security: consequences of
NATO and EU enlargements’; the second session, on ‘ESDP beyond the EU borders: conflict prevention and crisis management’, was chaired by Professor Bo Huldt, Director of the Institute for National Defence and Security Studies at the Swedish National Defence College; and the third session, on ‘Redefinition of the transatlantic partnership: in search of a new grand strategy’, was chaired by Joseph Fitchett, columnist for *The International Herald Tribune*, Paris.

The findings of the Frösunda Conference reflected in this report and in other background materials were presented to the Swedish Presidency with a request to disseminate them to all the EU states and other interested governments.

* * *

There are many people whose collective efforts should be acknowledged. I would like to thank all those who took part in the Frösunda Conference and contributed significantly to its success. My special thanks go to the authors of the papers and to the group of SIPRI researchers—Ian Anthony, Renata Dwan, Shannon N. Kile and Zdzislaw Lachowski—whose assistance at all stages of the work was invaluable. I wish to thank all the other members of the SIPRI staff for their significant support—especially Carol Barta, my secretary, and Marie Alani, Bibbi Henson, Alexander Vetsko and Sten Wiksten—for their assistance in organizing the Frösunda Conference. I am also indebted to editor Jetta Gilligan Borg, editorial assistant Anna Lundeborg and Head of the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department Connie Wall for producing this report so quickly.

Last, but not least, I wish to thank both the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Poland and the Swedish National Defence College, whose generous support made both the Frösunda Conference and the publication of this report possible.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld
Director of SIPRI
June 2001
Foreword

This publication is the result of a conference organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College and the Warsaw Centre for International Relations. The meeting on the New Security Dimensions: Europe after the EU and NATO Enlargements, held in Stockholm (Frösunda) on 20–21 April 2001, gathered prominent politicians, academicians and international experts who are interested in security policy. It provided a valuable forum for intensive and fruitful discussions. Such meetings help to redefine the traditional concept of international security, which is no longer adequate to the new range of threats and challenges we face at the start of the 21st century. These are the reasons why the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Poland decided to co-sponsor this event.

We would also like to thank SIPRI and its Director, Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld, for the work of preparing the conference and all the participants for their competent and creative contributions.

Anna Lindh
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Sweden

Władysław Bartoszewski
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Poland
The SIPRI Frösunda Report on the New Security Dimensions

Introduction

One decade after the end of the cold war and the fall of the bipolar system, the enlargements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) reflect the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe’s security environment. The processes of enlargement are of essential importance to the states which belong to the two organizations and the applicant states. It is also essential that the security interests of the states beyond the borders of the EU and NATO be taken into account. The European Union faces the challenge of determining its new role in the security dimension. This calls for both further institutionalization of its relationship with NATO and redefinition of its relations with the United States. The decisions adopted by the Nice European Council meeting represent a new stage in overcoming the political division of Europe that was established at Yalta in 1945. The reform launched by the December 2000 Intergovernmental Conference opened the way for further enlargement of the EU. It remains an open question whether and, if so, to what extent the new institutional solutions in the security dimension—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)—will shape the future political and military reality in the Union and outside it, in particular in transatlantic relations.

The broadly conceived transatlantic relationship covers three parallel processes: the emergence of Europe as a power; the shaping of a new type of relationship between the EU and the United States within NATO as one of the significant security factors and certainties in the new security environment; and the firm anchoring of democratic values and interlinking of vital interests which have enabled Europe to become a community of democracies. However, nothing is predetermined: the European participants need to go beyond their particular national interests in shaping the common future. An enlarged, integrated and self-assured Europe is becoming a real actor in the search for a common security strategy. The initial steps on the road from the community of values towards a more balanced transatlantic security partnership have already been taken.
Consequences of the NATO and EU enlargements

A common element of the EU and NATO enlargements is the principle of inclusiveness—partnership. Enlargement of the two organizations both provides an opportunity and incurs a risk. The opportunity consists in enlarging the community of democratic states and strengthening security and stability in Europe as a whole. The risk is that enlargement can loosen and weaken the internal structures of the EU and NATO, rendering the decision-making process more difficult and reducing their effectiveness. The enlargement processes are largely positive, but they cannot be seen as mechanical operations, unfolding in accordance with a formal model. They are historical processes of a unique character.

- The enlargements are mutually reinforcing, with the EU contributing to security in a wider sense by promoting political and economic stability.
- The enlargement processes extend a sense of integration in a ‘security community’ to the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
- The enlargements have created a variety of more or less formal relationships—the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)—between EU and NATO member states and non-member states. These relationships have to some extent blurred the distinction between membership and non-membership.
- The NATO and EU enlargement processes require managing the simultaneous tasks of enlarging the alliance and the Union while preserving a viable security partnership with Russia.

The domestic Russian debate about NATO enlargement should no longer be focused on what retribution could be taken against NATO as it accepts new members, but on engagement. In this context, the Russian proposal to create a pan-European non-strategic missile defence system could be a vehicle for engaging Russia in Europe. Russian cooperation with NATO on a theatre missile defence (TMD) for Europe would set the basis for cooperation on strategic defences should the need arise. Rapprochement between NATO and the EU, on the one hand, and between the two organizations and Russia, on the other hand, will be conducive to a more relaxed relationship and enhance the cooperation of non-member states east of the alliance area with both major actors.

On the part of the European Union, a genuine political revolution is needed to deal with the new challenges which accompany enlargement. As a new Europe emerges, with more security responsibilities in all the possible
scenarios, the European Union will have to take seriously the pledge to ‘play its full role on the international stage’. At a time when enlargement will provide Europe with fresh expertise on additional regions, its analysis and initiative capabilities in the East and South-East should be enhanced.

A policy of delaying enlargement could do more harm than good. Expanding the area of well-being, security and stability will benefit the current members of NATO and the EU and the applicant states as well as those which are outside the borders of the enlarged structures. The duty of the politicians and heads of state and government of the members of the two organizations is to convince their societies that a practical realization of ‘a Europe whole and free’, as called for in the early 1990s, is advantageous for all.

**ESDP beyond the EU borders**

The development of the ESDP is a logical step in the European integration process as that process becomes less introspective and less absorbed with internal institution building. The EU and the ESDP are essentially about managing complexity in a changing security environment. This involves both civilian activities and the management of multinational military forces. The ESDP therefore should use combinations of military and civilian instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention. In order to do so, the EU is having to adapt its decision-making processes, better coordinate its activities and develop autonomous planning capabilities.

Europe’s new ‘insecurity’ environment has unfolded against a backdrop of increased impetus in European integration. The accelerated drive towards completion of the Union was partly a function of the changes in the wider environment and was as much a reflection of the fears of many European countries of the implications of the end of the cold war as testimony to a new sense of confidence. The distinct sense that Europe was increasingly responsible for its own security was an important motivation behind the decision to establish a collective crisis management capacity.

- The strength and comparative advantage of the EU lies in the multiplicity of the non-military instruments at its disposal, a resource base that sets it aside from most international organizations. Non-military crisis management cannot be seen solely in terms of development and/or humanitarian assistance but must be a core component of a successful security and defence policy.
- A key issue is the relationship of non-EU European NATO states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) to the ESDP and the extent to which these countries will have a voice in NATO. A
second group to be addressed are the non-NATO candidates for EU accession (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). The structures for consultation between these 15 states and the EU 15 have been the main focus of attention: their implementation will be complex and will raise challenges for practical cooperation. The question of the role of these non-EU states highlights the differing views among the EU 15 as to the ultimate goal of a common European security and defence identity. Consideration of the form and function of the ESDP beyond Europe’s borders may ultimately focus more on the internal than on the external politics of the Union.

Two factors are central to Europe’s military security: the US presence in Europe and the US commitment to the defence of the European continent; and the position and role of the North Atlantic alliance.

Both factors assume cooperation and partnership relations with other security-related institutions within the EU (the ESDP) and within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Because of their nature, both the EU and the OSCE are irreplaceable in conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution, including peace making and peace-keeping missions. Their significance is even more critical in promoting democratic change, market reform and the rule of law. At the same time, however, they cannot substitute in the foreseeable future for either NATO’s infrastructure or its military capabilities. Both current and aspirant NATO members see the alliance as the cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe. This is warranted by NATO’s transformation and the role that it played not only in the cold war period and in stabilizing the politico-military situation on the continent after the cold war, but also in cooperation with partner countries within the EAPC and the PFP. In the wake of its internal reform, its enlargement and the development of new cooperation with Russia and other states of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO today not only discharges defence functions but is also developing an inclusive and cooperative security culture. This concerns particularly the states cooperating with NATO within the frameworks of the PFP and the EAPC.

Currently, the security of European states is based more on cooperation than on military build-up. The foundation of security during the cold war was mutual deterrence. The evolving system of cooperative security in Europe today is increasingly based on mutual reassurance, which requires states to cooperate intimately with erstwhile adversaries in traditionally sensitive military matters. The steady improvement of the relationships between Russia and the USA and NATO and between Russia and the EU are crucial for stability and security in the region as a whole. This requires
not only encouragement and initiative on the part of NATO and the Union, but also the readiness of Russia for security cooperation, departure from the old thinking in terms of a besieged fortress and the elaboration of a partnership strategy in Russia’s relations with the main European actors.

Redefining the transatlantic relationship: in search of a new grand strategy

Transatlantic relations will be affected by the redefinition of the borders of the EU and NATO. Although the final map of Europe ‘whole and free’ is uncertain, both institutions are likely to be substantially larger in 10 to 15 years. The prospect of an enlarged NATO, coupled with an increased US emphasis on Asia, may lead to some strains and tensions. This might be the result of a different US approach: a distinction between the US military structure, designed to conduct military operations with high technological content, and another type of organization, less advanced technologically, for the alliance and the EU, which would be devoted mainly to crisis management.

The fundamental problem in transatlantic relations does not concern specific issues so much as it concerns the structure and style of politics on both sides of the Atlantic. The foundation of a grand strategy for the 21st century already exists. It consists of two main elements: implementation of the post-1990 agreements that established a common security framework in Europe; and the spreading or ‘globalizing’ of the framework to other regions.

The Euro-Atlantic community faces three large tasks in turning this design into reality: (a) bringing Russia into Europe, rather than attempting to exclude it; (b) making the USA understand that staying engaged in Europe is in its own interest; and (c) transforming the European Union into a more accountable and democratically controlled institution.

The transatlantic partnership is more than institutional relations between the EU and the USA or the relations between the EU and NATO—even though these issues are highlighted at present for the understandable reason that they are at a particularly fascinating stage.

Threat assessments differ between Europe and the USA in some areas. Better capabilities for gathering and assessing information on the part of Europe will improve the strategic dialogue between the two partners. Europe’s strategic planning will have to include Central Asia, a particularly unsettled region, with a significant potential for exporting instability. As regards the Middle East, consideration will have to be given to the existence of one of Europe’s borders at the heart of the area if Turkey joins the Union. As the risk that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons could upset the European security environment grows more serious, attention will have to be given to monitoring, early warning and intelligence.

In the absence of a common threat assessment, different states within the transatlantic partnership are likely to respond in different ways. This divergence will, in turn, create conditions in which proliferators find it easier to achieve their objectives than would otherwise be the case.

While many states are exchanging various types of information in different forums, only the central role of the USA provides any kind of order in this activity. Under the current circumstances, in the absence of US involvement there is an increased risk that the people responsible for implementing policies will not have the information they need when they need it.

For the time being and for the foreseeable future the main decision-making authority and the resources required to tackle the problems facing the transatlantic partnership reside at the level of states. In these conditions there are three main priorities.

• First, it is important not to lose sight of the objectives that are shared in the transatlantic partnership. As a first priority the EU and NATO should round up the stragglers and keep the current loose convoy of states moving towards democracy and the rule of law. If the ideas and institutions of democracy and the rule of law are internalized by states, it will be possible to enhance European security with any of the available institutional arrangements. If, on the other hand, states move away from their shared commitment to democracy and the rule of law, then no institutional arrangement will be sufficient to prevent the re-emergence of serious tensions between the different parts of the transatlantic partnership area.

• Second, it is important to move quickly to admit all of the states that wish to become members of the EU and NATO based on an assessment of their commitment to meet the agreed criteria for membership. The level of commitment is a more important indicator than more static assessments based on milestones reached.

• Third, it is important that the architecture of the EU and NATO be open to non-members for relevant types of participation. Any state that wishes to contribute to the solution of a problem and can bring useful assets to bear should be able to do so as a matter of right rather than depending on a political decision.

In the coming 10 years, European military autonomy will not mean much except in limited crises. A European force will require NATO assets during this period. Only the USA currently has long-range airlift, reconnaissance
and intelligence equipment capable of conducting certain military missions. In the long run, however, European unification may produce a fairer transatlantic burden-sharing equation and a more useful and reliable partner for the USA. The time when an increased European defence profile would be in competition with NATO may never materialize, contrary to fears in the USA, but European security and defence policy will eventually create equal relations. Within the European security organizations there will be less reliance on US political leadership. A more cooperative political environment will be needed within NATO. Calling upon Europeans to become stronger partners will require the USA to temper the predominant leadership role it practised during the cold war under extraordinary strategic circumstances.

The debate on ballistic missile defences could evolve in the coming years in accordance with the following parameters:

- A relaxed European position could be the result of a relaxed security environment. A crisis involving weapons of mass destruction might change current perceptions. Meanwhile, is Europe doing what it could and should in order to prevent a more threatening situation in the coming decades?
- The technology may also evolve. If defences eventually work, the paradigm that you are better off when your people are kept hostage to the threat of retaliation may give way to a more humane axiom.
- Europe is heavily dependent on US satellite images, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications. If the European security environment deteriorates, better early-warning capabilities will become essential.
- Defence technologies may proliferate and become more widely available in the coming years. As a result Europe will be encouraged to embark on defensive programmes. Upgrading offensive capabilities would reverse the current trend in Europe towards smaller nuclear forces and would be opposed by a number of European nations. Increasing offensive capabilities would appear justifiable only if the spread of ballistic missile defences significantly reduced confidence in the effectiveness of European deterrent forces. This will probably not be the case in the next 20 years.
- Finally, if a missile defence plan is eventually adopted within NATO, with the allies as an integral part of the system, then ‘extended defence’ might become a supplement to the former ‘extended deterrence’ and a new doctrine would have to be defined.

The temptation on both sides of the Atlantic to protect internal stability and prosperity with relative indifference to the rest of the world might increase with the evolution of Western demography and the significant ageing of the populations of Europe and the USA, but it might be difficult to
escape international responsibilities. The new US Administration came into office determined to concentrate on domestic issues, but it has had to deal with repeated international crises. New institutional ties established between the USA and the EU are helping to reduce transatlantic tensions and encouraging the USA to play a new role in the world that is based on accepted principles, rules and norms.

Conclusions

In the next 10 years the transatlantic relationship will be altered by the enlargements of the EU and NATO, the ESDP and the US ballistic missile defence initiative. NATO will assume a broader European decision-making role and might adopt defences to supplement deterrence based on retaliation. There is a need to redefine the transatlantic relationship to address these changes.

Managing political relations between the EU and the USA involves defining the role of NATO and the EU in the context of the latter’s new role in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Three tasks need to be carried out as a matter of urgency.

• The enlargement process should take place without delay.
• A new relationship should be shaped between the EU and the USA taking into consideration its role within NATO.
• The European states should increase their capacities for gathering and assessing information about security-related developments.

Promoting regional security requires rapprochement and increased cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other states outside an enlarged NATO and an enlarged EU.

In redefining the transatlantic partnership, joint efforts to strengthen democracy and the rule of law should be the main tools to achieve these objectives. Democratic governments, however stable, are not predetermined to last forever. They are part of a process in which norms, tenets, procedures and institutions must be constantly reworked. Democracy as the new organizing principle of global security stands for the kind of relationship between states that takes account of their divergent interests but eliminates, by its very nature, the use of force as a means of settling conflicts of interest.
Opening session
New security dimensions: building security in cooperation

Welcome Address by Sven-Olof Petersson, Director-General for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

It is a great honour, and pleasure, for me to address this distinguished audience today. I would like to express my gratitude to SIPRI, to its Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and to its Director, Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld, for arranging this conference and especially for choosing such interesting topics for discussion, all of which are central in the shaping of the future security architecture of Europe. The key processes, which will be further discussed in the panels later today and tomorrow, are of course: first, the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); second, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Union’s capability for conflict prevention and crisis management; and third, the redefinition of the transatlantic partnership.

These three processes will also be the focal points of my intervention today. I would also like to add another key issue, namely, the strengthened security policy dialogue and cooperation with Russia. Finally, I will make some brief remarks on Sweden’s security policy.

For the first time ever, Sweden these six months holds the Presidency of the European Union, leading the daily work of its 15 member states, representing the Union and its nearly 400 million inhabitants in the vast and complex contacts with the rest of the world. Clearly, this is a great challenge and a tremendous responsibility.

At the European Council in Nice last December, the Union agreed on the necessary adaptations for enlargement of its common structures and decision-making procedures. The Nice outcome was therefore extremely important for the future of the Union.

The Nice European Council also concluded the initial construction phase of the ESDP. The fast development of the ESDP, as well as other examples of deepened cooperation like the European Monetary Union and the increased cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, including the Schengen border regime, shows that the European Union—in all of its three pillars—is capable of enlarging and deepening cooperation at the same time. Together, these mutually reinforcing processes constitute the very essence of the vision of an ‘ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’ as expressed in the preamble of the Rome Treaty. This is of course the most fundamental
contribution of the European Union to peace, security and stability. It is hard to think of any more efficient conflict prevention measure than the creation of the European Union itself, in that it unites the peoples of Europe in a shared endeavour built on common values and interests. In the same way, the enlargement of the Union is—as we see it—the best way of increasing our common security and putting a definite end to the artificial cold war division of Europe. In fact, the very recent Stability and Association Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), is a good example of how this European security and stability could be further extended.

Only a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, we sometimes have a tendency to forget where we started and the long road we have travelled since then. In the past, disagreements in Europe frequently led to crises that developed into conflicts and wars. Today, problems are solved in cooperation and in consensus. This being said, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that there is no such thing as eternal peace. Security has to be built continuously and cultivated cautiously in close cooperation with others.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was born. With the addition of the ESDP, the European Union entered into a new phase. The Union is now taking on a greater responsibility for European security as it develops a common capability for conflict prevention and crisis management in addition to the existing political, economic and social instruments. The ESDP will enable the Union to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), thereby extending its contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management beyond the EU borders. The prompt action of the European Union to the emerging crises in the Presevo Valley and in the FYROM this spring provides good examples of how the Union can react in a resolute and concerted way and thereby contribute to preventing crises from deepening and spreading.

A bit more than halfway through the Swedish Presidency, I would like to give a brief report on where we stand in the development of the ESDP. Obviously, the implementation of the Nice conclusions and the further advancing of the ESDP is a multi-track process. An important task for the Swedish Presidency is to make parallel progress in all those tracks and to integrate the conflict prevention perspective with the civilian and military crisis management capabilities.

Since January, the important Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS) has been permanently established—and permanently busy, I would
like to add. The creation of the PSC, as well as the appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP, is an important step in strengthening the Union’s ability to react quickly and coherently to various situations, crises and conflicts around the world, and in increasing the visibility of the Union on the international arena.

The PSC is supported by a permanent Military Committee, with a newly appointed first Chairman, and a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The EU Military Staff is to become permanent as soon as it moves into its new localities. Some institutions of the Western European Union—namely, the Satellite Centre in Torrejón and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris—are being transferred to the EU.

Meanwhile, military capacity generation continues, building on the important Capabilities Commitment Conference last November, where the so-called headline goal of a minimum of 60,000 troops available before 2003 was attained. Currently, the work is focused on refining the headline goal, identifying shortcomings and developing strategic capabilities. A review mechanism is being defined, in order to allow for a continuous planning and review process. Furthermore, an exercise policy and an exercise programme are currently being finalized with the aim of having a first procedural exercise seminar during the Swedish Presidency.

In the forefront of the civilian capabilities is the development of the police capacity, with the aim of being able to deploy up to 5000 civilian police officers in international missions by 2003. Rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration are other important areas where capabilities are being developed or strengthened. In this context, I would like to stress the importance of the seminar held in Ystad this week, where the civilian–military cooperation in EU-led crisis management operations is addressed.

I would also like to mention that a European Programme for Prevention of Violent Conflicts is being prepared by the Swedish Presidency in order to be endorsed by the European Council in Gothenburg in June.

Together, conflict prevention, military and civilian crisis management form an integral part of the ESDP, which in itself is a part of the overall Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

However, the ESDP cannot exist in a vacuum. It must be developed in close cooperation with other organizations such as NATO, the UN and the OSCE, as well as with partner countries willing to support and contribute to the EU’s crisis management. These include, of course, the United States—to which I will return later—the 6 European NATO-countries that are not members of the EU, the 13 EU candidate countries as well as Canada, Russia and Ukraine. It goes without saying that transparency and dialogue
therefore are other priorities of the Swedish Presidency with regard to the ESDP.

The ESDP is indeed complex and has therefore given rise to some misunderstandings. Moreover, it has stirred up a debate in most member states with a large variation of arguments. This is understandable. Although clearly within the intergovernmental second pillar of the Union—requiring consensus decisions before launching any EU-led military operation—the ESDP deals with core functions of the member states—namely, security and defence. Such issues are always potentially sensitive not least to countries like mine—being outside military alliances. However, the ESDP is potentially sensitive even to those countries belonging to NATO. The notion of a new ‘European army’, although unfounded, is sometimes used to give the impression of the ESDP as a project that could undermine the cohesion of the alliance and weaken the transatlantic link. Other arguments seem to be based on a fear of potential conflicts of interests or even duplication of efforts, structures and costs. There are even those who try to project the ESDP as something threatening to those countries that are not part of the European Union, creating a sense of being left outside, or of losing influence. I will argue that all of those fears are unfounded, misleading and wrong.

First, the ESDP is created in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the European Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and international security. In fact, the development of the ESDP increases the range of instruments available to the international community as a whole for responding to crises around the world. It is therefore a complement and a valuable contribution, not a substitute for existing structures and instruments.

Second, the ESDP is not a military alliance, nor is it a European army. There are no mutual or collective defence guarantees, no special standing forces and no common command system. The ESDP is limited to crisis management and conflict prevention; it is not about territorial self-defence. Indeed, through the Swedish–Finnish initiative at the last Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union, the tasks of the ESDP were clearly defined in the Treaty of the European Union as the full range of the former Petersberg tasks (i.e., humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making). As for collective defence, NATO remains the basis for the allies, while the militarily non-aligned countries like Sweden continue to rely on their independent, national defence capabilities.
Third, the ESDP is inclusive, not exclusive. Although the member states decide in consensus on the very launch of an operation, partner countries have already announced their willingness to contribute resources to the EU’s crisis management. Before an operation is launched, extensive consultations will take place with partner countries. When the operation is launched, a special Committee of Contributors will be set up, in which partner countries deploying significant military forces to an EU-led operation will have the same rights and obligations as the member states in terms of day-to-day management of the operation. In addition, they have the possibility of appointing liaison officers to the EU Military Staff.

Fourth, the commitment of national resources by member states to crisis management operations is based solely on national, sovereign decisions on a case-by-case basis.

Fifth, a well-functioning cooperative relationship between the EU and NATO in the area of crisis management is an essential element for the Union to become fully operational. Assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities and presumed availability of NATO’s collective assets and capabilities, as envisaged in the documents from the respective summits of Washington and Nice, are therefore key elements in the new European security architecture. Commitments undertaken in the EU and NATO, respectively, or—for non-NATO members like Sweden—in the framework of NATO’s Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace must be compatible.

The agreement between the EU and NATO on the permanent consultation and cooperation arrangements reached during the Swedish Presidency in January was an important step. However, a large part of the so-called ‘Berlin-plus-package’ remains to be sorted out. This includes the definition of the necessary arrangements for the Union’s recourse to NATO’s operational planning, assets and capabilities, and the identification of European command options. The Swedish Presidency of the EU is firmly committed to do what it can to reach a comprehensive agreement between the EU and NATO on ‘Berlin-plus’ by the European Council in Gothenburg in June. We strongly believe that such an outcome is within reach. The evolving cooperation within the framework of the ESDP will lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO regarding crisis management.

Let me now for a moment touch upon the role of NATO, its enlargement and the significance of the transatlantic link.

During the past decade, NATO has emerged as one of the most important organizations for crisis management and peace support operations in the Balkans, acting together with partner countries like Sweden and Finland, but
also with Russia in the framework of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Next autumn, the alliance will decide on the next round of enlargement. In the candidate countries expectations are high. More than 10 years will have passed since they regained their freedom and opened up to the rest of the world. More than 10 years of transition and preparations. More than 10 years of restructuring of defence forces, Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercises, Membership Action Plans and participation in peacekeeping operations. These countries have made their own choices long ago, they want to become members of the EU and NATO, and they want to continue to develop good-neighbourly relations. None of those countries has made their choice in order to threaten others, but in order to be able to contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

Every country has the right to make its own security policy choices—this is a fundamental and generally accepted principle. As noted in the recent report from the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission, the new European security architecture is still developing. The process of ending the cold war division of our part of Europe will not be finished until Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have reached their security policy goals—being membership of the EU and NATO and good-neighbourly relations. In addition, Russia’s ties with the EU and NATO must develop further. Such development is beneficial to the security of Sweden and of the entire Baltic Sea region.

The prospects for this scenario to materialize are good. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are well under way in their internal preparations and negotiations for membership of the European Union. Considerable progress has been made also during the Swedish Presidency, giving rise to optimism with regard to the prospects for fixing a timetable for accession, hopefully already in time for the European Council in Gothenburg in June.

At the same time, the development of national defence structures in these countries is progressing with the assistance of a large number of partner countries. Strengthening the rule of law, developing a defence capability and maintaining a well-functioning border control are all essential parts of nation-building, necessary to create security and safety, a prerequisite for trust and good-neighbourly relations. This is the reason why Sweden, as one of the main partners, regards the security-enhancing cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a cornerstone of its Baltic Sea policy.

The participation of Russia in the new European security architecture is of key importance. The partnership is based on an open dialogue and respect for common values. The EU’s cooperation with Russia is a priority for the Swedish Presidency, as marked through the contacts at all levels, including
the visit of President Putin to Stockholm and the upcoming EU–Russia Summit in Moscow in a month’s time from now.

The contacts with Russia are developing rapidly through increased bilateral cooperation, through regional formats like the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Barent’s Council, and through a true partnership at the European and Euro-Atlantic level. With the enlarged European Union, Russia will geographically come closer to the Single European Market, giving rise to increased contacts, trade and investments, benefiting from the stable and positive development in its neighbourhood. I would especially like to mention the cooperation within the Northern Dimension, which is one good example of the importance the Union attaches to the cooperation with Russia. Apart from business, trade and investments, the Northern Dimension also provides a good framework for discussing cooperation on energy, transport and technology, environmental issues—especially nuclear waste, and combating organized crime.

The EU and Russia are also developing a political dialogue and cooperation in the field of security policy. Russia has shown great interest in contributing to the evolving European capability for conflict prevention and crisis management within the framework of the ESDP. The Union regards this constructive Russian approach as very positive and as an important sign of a long-term strategic partnership.

I have tried to describe how I see a new European security architecture being formed, built on respect for common values and principles, developed in cooperation, dialogue, transparency, trust and inclusiveness, with old and new structures and organizations complementing and mutually reinforcing each other. I see a key role for a stronger, enlarged European Union, developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the new conflict prevention and crisis management instruments, in close cooperation with NATO, as well as with individual partner countries like Russia, and thereby at the same time contributing to the efforts made by the OSCE and by the United Nations. I also see a strengthened transatlantic link, with a key role for NATO and the partnership arrangements within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the PFP, a continued strong American presence and interest in European security. In short, I see a new strong Euro-Atlantic partnership contributing to peace and stability in Europe and globally.

Let me conclude with a couple of words on the core of Sweden’s own security policy choice. As a means to fulfil our security policy objectives—indeed, peace and stability in Sweden and its vicinity—we have chosen to remain outside military alliances and maintain strong and modern national defence forces, but participate actively and constructively in a political alliance—the European Union.
In December last year, the government invited the political parties to discuss a new formulation of our security policy doctrine, mirroring the actual development of the European security architecture that I have tried to explain today. As these talks are still not concluded, it would be wrong to prejudge the outcome, but let me underline that the aim of the current talks between the political parties is not to change Sweden’s policy of military non-alignment.

This policy enables us to participate fully in joint efforts to promote peace and security internationally within UN peace support operations. It enables us to participate fully in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It enables us to contribute to EU-led crisis management operations and, as currently, to maintain around 1000 Swedish soldiers serving under NATO command—and side by side with Russian soldiers—to secure peace and stability in the Balkans. It gives us freedom of action within the framework of our commitments to the UN and to the EU and to other international organizations. In short, it is in line with our security policy objectives and allows us to successfully export not only cars, mobile phones and pop music but also security and stability.
First session

European security: consequences of NATO and EU enlargements

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)
John Roper (UK)
Walther Stützle (Germany)
Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)
Janusz Reiter (Poland)
Bo Huldt (Sweden)
• What role is played by the EU and NATO in the shaping of a transatlantic security community?

• What are the expectations regarding NATO and the EU by states which are not and/or will not become members of both organizations in the near future?

• To what extent do the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) meet the needs of the inclusive security concept? Do the scope and potential of cooperation between NATO and Russia, as contained in the 1997 NATO–Russian Founding Act, satisfy the expectations vested in it? What optimal forms of cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states are feasible?

• What, if any, are desirable limits of further enlargement for the EU and the NATO?

• What are the consequences of enlarging NATO and the EU for European security?
ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD  
SIPRI

Introduction

Critics of the enlargement of NATO claimed several years ago that extending it eastward would be, in the words of George F. Kennan, ‘the most fateful error’ in the entire post-cold war era. Events have not supported that view. Despite such Cassandra-like scenarios the enlargement of NATO has had a beneficial impact on stability and security in Europe. The enlargements of NATO and the European Union should be seen as natural processes and as an adequate response to new needs and challenges.

As a rule, the debate on the consequences of the enlargements of NATO and the EU treats both institutions as static. The assumption is made that the mandates of both organizations and their structures and functions were defined in different circumstances in a security environment that differs from that of today. In other words, structures, by their very nature, are static, while international security is a dynamic process. In effect, the existing organizations are not adequate to the new challenges for and needs of the international community.

In political reality and practice, however, the matter is much more complex. There are organizations such as the Western European Union (WEU) that have never played a major role in resolving the issues that they were called upon to deal with. The mandate of other organizations, like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), is evolving with the changes in the political environment and the needs of the members of such institutions. NATO is an example of an organization which retains its essential function as a defence alliance while undergoing an essential transformation. In the wake of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2000 Treaty of Nice the EU has considerably expanded its mandate in security affairs, reaching into defence issues.

We can safely assume that the process of enlargement of the two organizations will continue. The politicians in power in the member states, in the candidate states and in those countries that will join neither of the structures in the foreseeable future attach crucial weight to the questions of which states will be admitted to NATO and the EU and when. However, in the deliberations on the new security dimension the question of the consequences of NATO and EU enlargement is of far greater importance. In this context, three related questions are crucial:
1. What role is played by both organizations in the shaping of a new security community?
2. What is the attitude to and what are the expectations for NATO and the EU of states which are not and most probably will not become members of both organizations in the near future?
3. What are the consequences of enlarging NATO and the EU for European security?

The role

Since the disappearance of the external threat to NATO, its main future tasks have been reoriented from deterrence or the defence of Western nations against aggression from the East to stability in Europe and cooperation between the United States and European states on broader security matters. The new challenge for NATO is cooperation among its member states and with those states which wish to join it as well as between the alliance and those states which wish or will have to remain outside it.

The nature and aims of the EU and NATO enlargements are quite different. However, in the post-cold war period, as a result of their internal transformations and expansion, both organizations have acquired a new function in the shaping of European security. NATO—together with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and its bilateral security arrangements with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states—has become more than just a defence alliance: it is now the centre of gravity in the search for a new security order in Europe. The EU faces the challenge of creating new capabilities within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and of moving beyond rhetoric and declaratory policies towards implementation of the vision of a common ESDP.

The NATO enlargement decisions are basically expressions of political will, while the EU requires its new members to undergo far more complex adjustment processes. In NATO the external and internal adaptations of the structure of the alliance are seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing processes, but in the EU tension and contradictions have continued to permeate the ‘widening versus deepening’ dilemma.

By its very nature, the enlargement of NATO affects the security interests of members and applicants as well as the interests of countries outside the alliance. This was the rationale behind the documents that define the new relations and cooperation between NATO and Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. The implications of EU enlargement are of a different nature and call for different solutions. In the historical perspective, both processes
will overcome the division of Europe and enhance stability throughout the continent. Russia, which perceives NATO’s eastward enlargement as a new threat, has not voiced fears concerning EU enlargement and has officially declared its interest in promoting it.

The fundamental role of NATO in the evolution of the politico-military integration of Europe had been confirmed by the admission of three new members, the establishment of cooperative relations with Russia in the field of military security, the taking of military action to curb the armed conflicts in the Balkans, the facilitating of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the search for political solutions and a new status for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO’s role in the development of Europe’s security system is determined by: (a) its trans-atlantic character and the military power connected with the presence and role of the USA, (b) the combination of political and military functions, (c) the cooperative attitude towards those European states that are not members of NATO, and (d) the capacity to make effective contributions to crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. Enlargement of the alliance is seen by both NATO members and aspirants as an extension of the zone of stability.

The political debate during the process of admitting new members has resulted in a specific dual strategy for further enlargement: to reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership, on the one hand, and to slow down the enlargement process so as not to alter the political and military character of the alliance, on the other hand.

The main political implication of the new EU security dimension is connected with, on the one hand, relations between Europe and the USA, and, on the other hand, the need to elaborate the principles and regulations of the NATO–EU relationship.

Expectations

It remains an open question whether and, if so, to what extent the new EU solutions will shape a new political and military reality within the Union and outside it in transatlantic relations. One common element of the EU and NATO enlargements is the principle of inclusiveness. The intention is to adapt the alliance to deal with new threats on Europe’s periphery and beyond its borders. The formulations which NATO has used with regard to further enlargement express the general philosophy of inclusiveness but are cautious and balanced, and make no specific commitments. In line with its policy of inclusiveness NATO has focused more on its practical activities in strengthening the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and the PFP
than determining who will receive the invitation to join the alliance and when. For Europe’s security, the enlargement of the EU is as important as, if not more important than, hammering out the questions of NATO–EU relations and the establishment of a European force.

Union enlargement is meant to overcome the old divisions imposed on Europe by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945 and obviate the need for new ones. None of the Union documents delineates the borders of the new expanding Europe. Its dimensions are determined by common history, tradition, culture and values supported by economic, political and military integration rather than by geography. The Nice meeting decided that if the aspirant countries satisfy the relevant criteria they can look forward to membership in the next three years, and their citizens will be able to participate in the next European Parliament election, in 2004.

There are two main reasons for NATO’s self-restraint as regards enlargement.

First, it is an evolutionary process intended to stabilize security in Europe rather than lead to tensions and increased confrontation, particularly in relations with Russia. On the issue of enlargement, Russia has applied the oft-proven tactic of not approving but maintaining dialogue. At the moment its opposition is related particularly to the former Soviet Baltic republics. Russia’s views on that issue are not being ignored; however, its position should not be allowed to influence the decision on whether these or other states are or are not to be admitted to the Atlantic alliance. Concerns that Russia may perceive the enlargement of NATO as a threat and that this will increase nationalist sentiment, and consequently strengthen the hand of the anti-Western and non-democratic opposition, have proved to be unfounded. Nationalism and anti-democratic attitudes in Russia are confined only to attempts to rebuild an imperial Russia and recover lost spheres of influence. Russia’s relations with the new NATO member states have in fact improved. Since Vladimir Putin was elected president, relations between NATO and Russia have been characterized by pragmatism and NATO is seen as one of the major elements, although not the only one, of the new security architecture.

Second, the next round of enlargement will depend far more on the applicant states’ readiness and ability to meet the criteria for NATO membership and on the situation in the particular region (for example, the Balkans) than on Russia’s reaction. The decisive factor, however, will be not so much theoretical considerations as the concrete politico-military situation in Europe, in general, and in South-Eastern Europe, in particular. For this reason, in the political deliberations on the future of NATO an increasing role is being ascribed to such institutions as the EAPC and the PFP, which
are designed to address political cooperation and are identified with the concept of inclusiveness, and to the relationship with institutions outside the NATO structures.

The consequences

Three groups of states have different perceptions of the process of enlargement of NATO and the EU:

1. The first group consists of the members of both NATO and the EU.
2. The second group is composed of the states aspiring to join both organizations.
3. The third category are those states which do not intend to or will not join either of the security bodies in the foreseeable future.

The positions of the member states and the candidates are either convergent or identical. Leaving aside the issue of which states will be admitted to NATO or the European Union and when, they have one thing in common: they believe that enlargement is bound to consolidate the security and enhance the stability of Europe.

The opponents of further enlargement fear that swift movement to a larger alliance could alter the political and military character of NATO and could make consensus building and decision making significantly more difficult. In short, it might erode the effectiveness of the military alliance. Critics claim that the nine countries which aspire to NATO membership would, if admitted, weaken the alliance rather than enhance security. The opponents of further enlargement demand that the standards and criteria should be subordinated to the strategic goals so that the door is kept open but that new members are admitted only when this step makes strategic sense and furthers NATO security interests. This means that certain standards should guide further enlargement so that new members would be admitted only when: (a) admission directly supports NATO interests, strategy and security goals; (b) NATO can effectively absorb and integrate new members and truly provide them with collective defence protection; (c) candidates can ‘produce security for NATO, not just consume it’; (d) the cohesion of the alliance, its decision-making process and military effectiveness in carrying out old and new missions are enhanced, not diminished; and (e) admission will meaningfully enhance Europe’s stability rather than trigger instability.

From NATO’s perspective, the decisive criteria for further enlargement are the costs and politico-military interests. As for Russia, the arguments
against further enlargement of NATO have been more emotional than rational. The character of its relations with NATO is of much more practical importance for Russia than the debate on alliance enlargement. Russia’s relations with the new NATO members have clearly improved. NATO enlargement is still severely criticized in Russian statements and analyses, but the role of NATO as one, although not the sole, pillar of security in Europe is acknowledged. The role of the European Union is unambiguously appreciated in the basic Russian security policy documents. A pragmatic and businesslike approach to both security structures prevails in Russia.

Conclusions

Of key importance to the future of European security is not only the further enlargements of NATO and the EU as the main structures of political, military and economic stability in Europe, but also an appropriate rapprochement between them. On the European security agenda, there is a need to institutionalize these relations on three planes: (a) between the Atlantic alliance and the European Union in the context of the EU’s new role and tasks in the field of security and defence; (b) in the context of regional security, as laid down in the United Nations Charter, in cooperation with the United Nations and other regional organizations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe; and (c) further rapprochement and cooperation between Russia, Ukraine and other states and the Union and NATO within the PFP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Security is determined by real threats and threat perceptions. Currently, the real threat in Europe is ethnic conflicts, various types of nationalism and the lack of effective crisis management. Expanding the European Union and its institutions and procedures as well as consolidating the norms and standards of the rule of law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities provide new security foundations which are adequate to the new security environment.

In summary, the processes of enlargement of NATO and the European Union open new prospects for integrating Russia and Ukraine into an equitable structure of inclusive security and cooperative regional security. The difference in security terms between the members of both organizations and the states outside NATO and the EU is increasingly narrowing because of the multitude of links between the non-member states with both the alliance (various agreements, the Membership Action Plan, the PFP and the EAPC) and the Union (bilateral agreements and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).
JOHN ROPER

UK

Introduction

The last decade of the 20th century, the first after the end of the cold war, saw enlargements of both the European Union and NATO. The EU was enlarged in 1995 to include three countries—Austria, Finland and Sweden; NATO was enlarged in 1999 to include three post-communist members—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The first decade of the 21st century sees NATO with nine countries with Membership Action Plans (MAPs)¹ and the EU with 12 active candidates.² In both cases there are further candidates in waiting; in the case of the EU, Turkey being explicitly recognized, and for both NATO and the EU the other countries of South-Eastern Europe. There is always the possibility that by the end of the first decade the four members of the EU not belonging to NATO will have applied to join NATO and that the remaining two European members of NATO—Iceland and Norway—will have applied (for the third time in the case of Norway) to join the EU. Switzerland could also have become a candidate for either or both organizations.

Most analysts expect that the process of further enlargement would in both cases extend beyond the current decade; indeed it might well continue until at least 2015.³ While some attention is therefore being given to possible NATO and EU decisions in 2002 that could lead to a next round of members being admitted to the two organizations in 2004, enlargement should be seen in the context of security as much as a process as a series of specific events. It is therefore not particularly easy to talk of the situation ‘after enlargement’, for in practice there will be a string of events that will stretch over some 20 years. This paper therefore examines the consequences for European security of the enlargements of the EU and NATO that took place in the 1990s and the process of the further enlargement of both bodies. Developments in European security may conversely have consequences for both processes of enlargement, in particular in the case of Cyprus for the enlargement of the EU and more generally in the case of developments in

¹ Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
² Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
the Russian Federation as far as both the tempo and composition of NATO enlargement are concerned.

**Enlargement 1990–2000**

It was argued by some that the enlargement of the EU in 1995 to bring into membership Austria, Finland and Sweden would be a restriction on the development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and particularly its putative defence dimension. In practice this was far from the case. It was Finland and Sweden which, within two years of becoming members of the EU, pressed for the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks as Article 17.2 of the revised Treaty of European Union (Amsterdam Treaty) at the Intergovernmental Conference which concluded its work in June 1997 at Amsterdam. This incorporated ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’ explicitly into the Treaty of European Union. The outgoing British Conservative Government had strongly opposed this, but it was accepted at the Amsterdam meeting by the then recently elected Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Indeed this provision was to provide the foundation for his own initiative 18 months later at Saint Malo in December 1998, which has led to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

It is not possible to attribute similar direct consequences for European security to the enlargement of NATO in 1999 to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Its coincidence with NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia certainly created an environment which was not anticipated in any of the new members at the time of their original application. All three are now making significant contributions to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and thereby indicating their acceptance that the NATO they have joined has very different functions from the NATO of the cold war. The fact of the 1999 enlargement has, however, had an important consequence for European security. It has shown that enlargement of NATO is possible and therefore given a greater credibility to the continuation of the process of enlargement. The fact that it has not led to significant expenditures by those states which were members of NATO has removed an important argument against further enlargement, although some dimensions of their performance have not helped the case for further enlargement. It has been argued that the prospect of NATO membership (as well as the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria) provided an important motivation for the signing of the 1996 Hungarian–Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborhood, as well as the evolution of Polish
civil–military relations that took place in 1996–97. Thus this first round of enlargement already reflects the two motivations of NATO enlargement in extending the area of security in Europe eastwards and in reinforcing the democratic institutions of the post-communist democracies.

The process of NATO and EU enlargement 2000–2020

As argued above the next two decades are going to see a continuing process of enlargement of the two organizations. Before examining the implications of this process for European security it is useful to examine the differences between the two processes. Accession to the EU is very largely an endogenous process in that the factors taking the process forward are almost exclusively the decisions made by the institutions of the European Union, its member states and the candidate countries. It is unlikely that actions taken by external states or the attitudes of member states to other problems outside the Union are likely to have a significant effect on progress. The wider strategic environment does have an impact on the decision-making process of NATO enlargement and these can be seen as exogenous factors. In particular, developments in the Russian Federation and the relationship to other issues between NATO and its member states and Russia are likely to have an effect, direct or indirect, on enlargement. In a different way developments outside Europe will have an effect on the strategic priority the United States gives to Europe and therefore also to NATO enlargement. In a recent paper for the Atlantic Council of the United States Lawrence Kaplan argues that:

[C]onvincing an entanglement-wary Senate to take on an obligation to treat an attack on London like an attack on New York was difficult even in the face of a clear Soviet threat to major US interests. Convincing today’s Senate to consider an attack on Riga, Latvia, equivalent to an attack on New York in the absence of a compelling threat could be equally contentious. Just as the debate of [19]48–49 did, putting the enlargement question to the Senate will probably result in a thorough evaluation of the role of the United States in Europe, the extent to which such treaty obligations are necessary, and the extent to which the United States can reasonably make such promises.5

In such a debate the exogenous effect of the competing security challenges of North-East Asia and South-West Asia would play a part.

The process of enlargement of both bodies has security implications in three ways. First, by extending to countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe a sense of integration in a ‘security community’ of the Deutschian type, this will itself be a process with some of the benefits accruing once a country’s candidate status is recognized. This certainly creates an increased area of stability in Europe.

The second effect is related to this; it is that the creation of a variety of more or less formal relationships between the EU and NATO and the other European countries, EU candidates, NATO MAP countries, EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe partners, NATO Partners for Peace and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) has created a whole series of variegated grey areas in Europe. While grey areas were seen to be a negative in the early 1990s the new use of the term seems a good deal more positive. They have to some extent blurred the distinction between membership and non-membership of NATO and are considered by some to have provided various sorts of implicit security guarantees. In his RAND study Szayna goes as far as to argue that EU membership ‘in practice grants non-NATO countries a virtual presence in NATO through what is a deep level political and economic integration with the NATO Europe states’. He goes on to suggest that some form of guarantee is extended by including a country in the MAP programme:

[T]hus, for example, because there is a consensus opinion among EU members that Latvia is part of the vision of the ‘united Europe’ being constructed by the EU, and because the EU and NATO have agreed to keep membership in the two organizations largely coterminus, NATO sees its security interests closely intertwined with those of Latvia. This has led to Latvia’s being placed in MAP, and MAP is simply a mechanism for preparing Latvia for accession to NATO at some indeterminate point in the future. If a threat to Latvia were to develop prior to Latvia’s becoming a NATO member, then, subject to the specific circumstances and nature of the threat, NATO would be likely to assist Latvia. The very act of putting a country on track to NATO membership is meant to deter threats from arising in the first place.

The third security consequence of the protracted process of enlargement is that it may complicate NATO’s relations with Russia. The 16 original NATO members wish to have, if possible, a constructive engagement with Russia, but this desire is not necessarily fully shared by the former communist countries which have joined NATO or which aspire to join NATO

7 Szayna (note 3), p. 27.
membership. There will be a continuing problem to manage the simultane-
ous tasks of progressive enlargement and the security partnership with the 
Russia. Although an attempt has sometimes been made to resolve this with 
the suggestion made from time to time by members of the last US Adminis-
tration that eventual Russian membership of NATO was not excluded, this 
has never been accepted by the European members of NATO and may not 
be maintained by the current US Administration. The members of the Euro-
pean Union will for the next 10 to 15 years benefit in that their neighbours 
to the east and south-east will be candidates for membership and therefore 
susceptible to pre-accession leverage. The relations they establish during 
this period, with those other countries which will become their neighbours 
when the process of enlargement is concluded but for whom membership is 
unlikely, will do much to determine the longer-term prospects for European 
security.
Introduction

More than a decade after the end of the cold war Europe has changed its face fundamentally. Confrontation has been widely replaced by cooperation. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the European Union. These accessions were part of the building up of Europe as a unified region of security and stability, and this process has not been finished yet. Today, NATO as well as the EU are again considering to extend their membership. These future enlargements, although being decided independently in both organizations, have one common aim: that is, to contribute to security, stability and prosperity in Europe. With the Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999) declarations NATO has committed itself to ‘keep the door open’ for the accession of additional members. Today, there are nine countries which are knocking at NATO’s door. At the next alliance summit meeting in late 2002 the enlargement question will be considered again. A decision on whether there will be invitations to membership is still pending, but there is consensus among the member states that the next summit meeting has, in an appropriate way, to give a clear signal to support the credibility of NATO’s open door policy. Currently, the NATO countries are developing their national positions, and alliance consultations will take place subsequently. In my view, it is reasonable to take the time to develop a well-balanced strategy within NATO, taking into account the interests of NATO, its members, the aspirants and Europe as a whole.

Collective defence

As declared in the Strategic Concept of 1999, collective defence based on Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty remains the core function of the alliance. Therefore, enlargement must not have a negative impact on NATO’s ability to fulfil this task because of the military or political weaknesses of new member states. In this context, we will have to assess what newly invited countries will be able to contribute to NATO’s military effectiveness because, at a time when NATO and the EU are engaged in enhancing their capabilities for crisis management operations in the framework of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the European Head Line Goal, respectively—and, I may add, not without considerable financial chal-
It would seem counterproductive to invite new members with limited or no capabilities to contribute to NATO’s core functions. In the end, this could reduce NATO’s credibility and its function as the anchor of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, thus calling into question the aim of enlargement altogether. As a consequence, the quality of military performance should play a more prominent role than during the first round of enlargement, although any enlargement decision will predominantly remain a political one. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) provides NATO with the opportunity to evaluate the status of preparation for NATO membership more precisely than in the first round. Reports on implementation of national programmes show differences in the degree of progress in the reform processes. Therefore, aspirants have to be looked at individually on the basis of their achievements. Another question to be answered is whether NATO itself will be ready to admit additional members. The alliance agenda is charged with the ongoing Balkan engagements, working out the NATO–EU permanent arrangements and implementing the results of the NATO force structure review. The final decision is one between NATO and the respective candidate. No third partner/country will sit at the table.

Relations with Russia

With a view to enhancing security and stability in Europe, the relations with Russia are of particular significance. It is necessary to maintain an intensive dialogue with Russia and to explain the cooperative character of the alliance. This is a task of unique historical dimension: the new Russia is invited to recognize and accept that a stable European neighbourhood serves its interest best in terms of stable foreign relations in view of the much needed support for the fundamental reform which Russian society is meant to undergo. However, it is equally important that members of the Euro-Atlantic stability zone carefully guard the principles on which the alliance rests. The Atlantic alliance does not invite new members in order to confront others; it invites ‘any European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty’ (Article 10, North Atlantic Treaty). Hence there is no need to constantly emphasize that there is no Russian right to veto NATO membership; Russia does not claim one. We should support change in Russia from a still widely confrontational to a cooperative attitude towards NATO. This will be successful only if Russia has the impression that it is being taken seriously. Any other approach might have serious repercussions with a view to the overall aim of NATO enlargement.
EU enlargement

This leads me to the aspect of EU enlargement. The EU also stands for security and stability in Europe. In fact the main motive in broadening the list of candidates is ‘to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the European continent’;\(^1\) that is to say, EU enlargement is based on much the same principles as is the Atlantic alliance. Although, unlike NATO, the EU does not provide an Article 5 security guarantee, the Union provides for security and stability in a wider sense. The EU stands for political stability, democracy and human rights. The process of European integration has guaranteed Europe an unprecedented period of peace and stability by integrating countries and their interests, thus overcoming the nationalism of the past. With the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the Union becomes a strong element for stability in and around Europe. The ability to act in conflict prevention and crisis management encompasses the whole range of necessary means—political, economic, civil and military. The Petersberg tasks, as outlined in the Treaty of Nice, are quite demanding, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement. The role the Union plays in restoring and stabilizing the war-shattered countries of the Balkans is remarkable. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is having an effect, although in my view the process is too slow.

The next round of enlargement of the EU will further expand the area of stability towards the East and the South. Its effect is obvious. Nice has opened the door for enlargement towards the new democracies in the East. First of all, candidate countries have to meet criteria for accession (the ‘Copenhagen criteria’) which, inter alia, include democracy and the rule of law, respecting human rights and protecting minorities. Hence, a country striving for accession is given a strong incentive to eliminate these prominent sources of instability. Some of these countries will look quite different once they have achieved the standards set by the Copenhagen criteria. The Union also sets standards for candidates’ economies. Candidates will have to develop their economic systems so as to be compatible with those of the current members and to be able to meet the challenges of competitiveness. It is obvious that economic aspects form an important part of modern security policy. It is also in the Union’s interest to help these countries to meet the required standards. Hence, the Union provides particular assistance in the process, including a substantial amount of financial aid. The assistance bud-

get amounts to more than 3 billion euros (3.12 billion) per annum. The enlargement of the EU therefore goes even beyond the scope of NATO enlargement because it requires the development of almost all aspects of a candidate’s society in a way which serves the enhancement of stability in general.

At present, the list of candidates includes 13 countries, which is also a challenge for the Union as accession will influence many aspects of the societies of the current members (e.g., the labour market). In theory, there are no limits for EU enlargement on the continent of Europe. In practice, the preparedness of the particular country to meet the criteria sets the pace for further accessions. Some European countries still have quite a way to go. In terms of stability, it is also in the interest of the European Union to provide assistance to those countries which are unlikely to be granted candidate status in the near future. The recent agreement on association and stability with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia may serve as an example. European integration and the further development of the ESDP do not diminish transatlantic security and transatlantic partnership. On the contrary, the EU’s strategic partnership with the United States provides for a network of consultation arrangements. The EU and NATO complement each other. The EU will act militarily only if NATO as a whole does not want to act. In turn, NATO will provide its assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, including the planning capacities of NATO’s command structure. On the other hand, current EU efforts in the Balkans provide an excellent example of how the non-military capacities of the Union complement NATO’s actions. Last but not least, accession to the EU will also increase a country’s prospects for accession to NATO.

Conclusions

I put forth four observations for discussion:

1. Enlargement is not an operation of a mechanical nature; it is a truly historical process of unique dimension that will succeed if promoted with patience, prudence and principles.

2. The two enlargement processes are mutually reinforcing. It is essential to understand, as a guiding principle, that membership in the Union also pays a security dividend while membership in the alliance does not pay a Union dividend.

3. The EU runs a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, with the Helsinki decision of December 1999, has also managed to enter the process of an ESDP. Fifty-five years after the European Defence Community
(EDC) failure in the Assemblé Nationale, Europe has begun to seriously correct a major deficiency. True, a European army is not on today’s agenda, but it is equally true that, one day, the Union will have a constitution, a currency and a concept for defence—or it will not acquire true Union status.

4. Given the global developments, a strong Union is in the interest of both the United States and Russia. To fail to recognize this and act accordingly would cause more harm than good—the key damage clearly being that Europe could neither play the role of the USA’s single most important partner nor serve as the most important source for helping Russia’s reform efforts (as prescribed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe) to succeed—which is, after all, the single most important security project in and for Europe.
ALEXEI G. ARBATOV
Russia

Introduction

Most people in the West see the extension of NATO and the European Union as complementary processes, paving the way for stability, prosperity and security in post-cold war Europe. In contrast, most people in Russia see the two developments as contradictory and leading to very different, even opposite, consequences.

The Russian view of the enlargement of the EU and NATO

As seen from Moscow, the extension of the EU is a natural process of European integration, driven by the genuine and understandable economic, social and political interests of the European nations and transnational entities. This process has accelerated after the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire in the aftermath of the end of the cold war and the division of Germany and Central Europe. European integration, enveloping more and more countries of the former Soviet empire, is a powerful centre of gravity deeply affecting Russian national interests and foreign policy. Already about 32 per cent of Russian exports and 35 per cent of Russian imports are tied to the EU countries, which receive about 40 per cent of their energy imports from Russia. (In contrast, only 15 per cent of its foreign trade is associated with the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS.) In 10 years, with another dozen states joining the EU, as much as 60 per cent of Russian foreign trade may be connected to the EU. Extension of the EU to the nations neighbouring Russia (including Lithuania with the Russian enclave Kaliningrad) may create many economic, social and political problems for Moscow.

However, most of these problems are ones that Russia will have to resolve anyway in the course of its own economic reforms. Thus, moving closer to the EU may accelerate the process of reforming the Russian economy. Be that as it may, the problems stemming from the extension of the EU are on the economic, social and legal planes, and hence they do not touch the extremely sensitive and ideologically loaded sphere of the military security of Russia.

In contrast, NATO expansion to the East is perceived by the overwhelming majority of the Russian political elite, strategic community and public at large as a direct threat to national security. NATO remains an alliance pri-
marily designed for collective defence, so the only potential opponent against which NATO might want to defend collectively, employing its huge military power, is Russia. Such implied mistrust, even if seldom expressed openly in official Western quarters, is deeply offensive to Moscow. After all, it was Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin’s Russia which made the greatest contribution to ending the cold war, which voluntarily disbanded the Warsaw Pact and then the USSR itself and which drastically reduced its military power—providing China, Japan, Western and Central Europe, and the USA with unprecedented security for hundreds of years of their history.

The double shock of the first stage of NATO expansion and the alliance’s large-scale military action against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 provoked an explosion of genuine outrage and anti-Western feelings in Russian public opinion, unknown even in the worst years of the cold war. The Russian strategic community drew its own conclusions about the changing nature and transformation of NATO: during the cold war the alliance was militarily inferior to its main opponent; it was deployed for defensive operations; it planned combat actions within its area of defence responsibility; and it always acted strictly within the bounds of international law and the United Nations Charter. A decade after the end of the cold war NATO has acquired a clear-cut military superiority over Russia, and it has started to plan and employ military power in offensive operations out of the area of its responsibility and with disregard for international law (in particular the Russian–NATO Founding Act of 1997) and the UN Charter. In addition, NATO’s expansion has started an open-ended process, which apparently excludes only Russia and implies a final isolation of Russia from Europe. Brussels’ rejection of Moscow’s proposals of 1997 to ban nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states or drastically cut the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) levels for offensive conventional arms further exacerbated Russian concerns about its security in the Euro-Atlantic zone.

This could not but tangibly affect Russian foreign and domestic politics. In particular, there has been a profound shift in Russian public opinion in favour of a ‘strong hand’ in the Kremlin, establishing ‘law and order’ at home and restoring Russia’s ‘prestige and influence’ abroad.

**The domestic and foreign policies of the Putin Administration**

Such was the political environment which delivered a landslide victory to Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections of March 2000. President Putin’s strategy, as it is emerging during the first year of his term, consists of three
basic elements: ‘liberal economy’ and ‘manageable democracy’ at home and pragmatic pro-Western foreign policy abroad.

In the domestic political environment there is a trend of curtailing the democratic freedoms and institutions which have been emerging since Gorbachev’s perestroika (the subjugation of Media Holding and the NTV television company being the most glaring examples). In general, there is a tangible de facto and de jure shift in the division of power in favour of the executive branch and to the detriment of the legislative and judicial branches at all levels of the state, as well as in favour of the federal authorities at the expense of regional and local self-government. There is an expansion of the rights and activities of various law-enforcement agencies (including the tax police), which increasingly affect the economic and civil life of the society. Nonetheless, the popularity rating of President Putin remains very high (about 70 per cent) and political opposition either from the left or from the right remains weak, split and disoriented.

The new administration’s foreign policy clearly differs from that of President Yeltsin in its less pronounced fixation on relations with the West (foremost with the United States). Putin’s diplomatic activities have enhanced Russia’s relations, in particular in the area of arms sales and nuclear energy exports, with China, India and Iran, as well as reopened the doors to cooperation with Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, the Palestinians and Viet Nam.

Nonetheless, Putin’s top priority, apart from Russia’s neighbours, still lies with Moscow’s economic, political and security cooperation with the West, although this no longer implies the United States, but rather the European Union, Western and Central Europe (foremost Germany) and Japan. Russian relations with its partners in the South and East are apparently motivated by pragmatic financial interests, as well as by the desire to send a signal to the West to treat Russia with more respect in view of its broader freedom of manoeuvre in choosing foreign partners. At the same time Putin’s hopes for economic growth are entirely dependent on the prospects of massive investments from the EU nations and Japan. It is not by accident that on a number of occasions Putin has lamented the fact that Russia has not been invited to join NATO as a full member. In January 2001 the Russian leadership made a decision to deeply and unilaterally cut its strategic nuclear forces (from 5000 to 1500 warheads by the year 2010) and to reallocate resources to build up forces for employment in local conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Most importantly, Putin has officially proposed to develop and deploy a joint NATO–Russian theatre ballistic missile defence (BMD) system to defend all of Europe against the short- and medium-range missiles of the
nations which are called ‘rogue states’ in the West. This initiative was obviously designed to provide an alternative to the US plan to develop a national missile defence (NMD) programme and withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and thus to drive a wedge between the NATO allies on this sensitive issue. However, there is more to this initiative than meets the eye. Indeed, if taken seriously by the West this idea could not but drive Russia into a crucial new venue of cooperation with NATO, with enormous political and strategic implications—developing and deploying a joint BMD system is nothing less than pursuing a full-scale military alliance between Russia and NATO. Russia would have to curtail its arms sales, in particular in the area of dual-purpose and sensitive technologies, with China and the ‘rogue states’. A joint theatre BMD system may turn out to be not an alternative but a first stage, leading eventually to a joint global strategic BMD system protecting both Russia and the West.

In the above outline of President Putin’s domestic and foreign policies there are two fundamental discrepancies. First, the development of a liberal market economy in Russia would hardly be compatible with the enhancement of the powers and expansion of activities of the executive bureaucracy—foremost its internal security and law enforcement elements—into all areas of the economic, social and political life of the society. Second, the curtailment of democratic freedoms and institutions in Russia above a certain threshold would hardly be compatible with any genuine integration with the West, which is implied by Putin’s plans for economic and security cooperation with the EU, Japan and NATO.

**Conclusions**

The key question for Russia’s future evolution and its relations with the outside world is: which of the above contradictory policies will eventually take the upper hand? Will it be the development of a liberal economy in Russia—or the construction of a huge and intrusive authoritarian state machine? Will it be the imposition of the so-called ‘manageable democracy’ at home—or economic, political and military integration with the West?

Once again Western policy will have a crucial impact on the interplay of these conflicting trends. In fact, after all the calamities of the 1990s, for the time being there is no serious party or social group within Russia to check the drift towards an authoritarian regime. This drift may only be stopped by the broadening integration of Russia into Western economic, social, political and military institutions. In order to involve Russia more deeply in cooperation with the West, a number of immediate steps may be proposed for the new US leadership and the Western and Central European policy makers:
(a) resume cooperation with Russia on its debt restructuring and provide credits for annual payments as a powerful lever to support the Russian democratic achievements of the 1990s; (b) postpone further NATO expansion towards Russia’s borders and instead accelerate the extension of the EU and its cooperation with Russia (and some other post-Soviet nations); (c) begin serious negotiations on the joint NATO–Russian theatre BMD programme; and (d) invite Moscow to start high-level consultations on the desirability, possibility, conditions and time-frame of Russia’s eventual membership in NATO.

Judging by the current policies of the new US leadership and the Western European governments the above proposals may look like a tall order indeed. However, taking into account what is at stake, they seem not too excessive in their demand for wisdom, knowledge and political will.
Introduction

Throughout its history the European Union has always been not only about European prosperity, but also about its security. It was established as a reaction to the experiences of World War II, and it has been, as especially German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand have noted, a community of peace. The Union has in fact guaranteed peace but only on its own territory. War between its member states has become unthinkable. However, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has shown that war is still thinkable and possible in Europe. For many in the European Union this fact was very shocking.

NATO provided the Western community with security from outside threats, but the alliance has also made a significant contribution to the EU as a community of peace. NATO has been the key element of mutual reassurance in Europe. It helped to prevent a renationalization of security policy in Europe. For the generation of Kohl and Mitterrand, despite the French objections, this mission of NATO was unquestionable.

The post-cold war perception of security

In Europe after the cold war the perception of security needs has changed dramatically. The external threat from the East has subsided. The need for mutual reassurance has also weakened. When Kohl talked about the euro as a matter of war and peace a European newspaper accused him of threatening war. This was an amusing misconception, namely, that which has been interpreted as a threat to Europe was thought of as a manifestation of German self-restraint.

Three factors have thus influenced the thinking about security policy in the European Union: a lack of a clear external threat; a deeper mutual trust between EU members; and an awareness that war is, in fact, possible in Europe and that the EU is unable to prevent or put an end to it. These changes have encouraged some leading EU countries to more self-confident security policies.

All three factors have had relatively little influence on security thinking in Central and Eastern Europe. At least some of the countries of the region, particularly those close to Russia, are more sceptical about the lack of potential external threats or risks. They also tend to more conservative thinking
about European emancipation in security policy. In the Polish perception, a strong US presence is an indispensable part of the European equilibrium and thus still an important contribution to European integration. Most Poles do not see any reason to test whether Europe can maintain internal balance without or with a diminished US presence. It would be, they believe, like destroying a wall in a house just to see whether it remains as stable as before. Consequently, the Central and Eastern Europeans do not draw exactly the same conclusions from the lesson of the wars in former Yugoslavia. The enlargement of the EU is close. Soon, a decision will be made by NATO about which of the candidate countries to admit. The more both enlargements are coordinated the better they will serve European security. Even the non-NATO countries which will probably join the EU within the next few years do not intend to give up their efforts for membership in the alliance. Why do they insist on it, ask some Europeans, if the EU takes responsibility for their security even more effectively, without antagonizing Russia? This statement is not very convincing. First, one can hardly assume that living in Paris, Berlin or Stockholm one knows better how to provide security for Slovakia, Estonia or Romania. Second, there is no country in Europe which has voluntarily let its security be guaranteed solely by the EU. Even the neutral countries have in fact relied on NATO’s security guarantees.

Could future EU members also count on the alliance’s guarantees while not being part of it? Theoretically, yes; however, such guarantees would carry an element of risky ambiguity.

The EU and NATO enlargements

Parallel enlargement is, it appears, in the self-interest of the European Union. This issue also concerns the Baltic countries. Should the Union take the responsibility for the security of these countries, or should it instead avoid any commitments which may be difficult to realize?

Is it possible and reasonable to point out the final borders for both enlargements? Russia is a specific problem. Dealing with Russia is more a problem of defining the rules than of defining the structures. Ukraine and Belarus are a different case. The latter appears to distance itself from Europe instead of moving towards it. If this changes in the future, which seems unlikely, Belarus could be granted the so-called European perspective.

Ukraine has declared its pro-Western orientation, but its actions are unfortunately often not in accordance with this declaration. Nevertheless, Ukraine remains a potential candidate for membership in NATO and the EU. It is, however, perhaps the only country in the region that because of its
size and potential influence could realize its aspirations in Europe without membership in NATO and the EU but through close cooperation with them. The decision is Ukraine’s to make. Europe’s interest is simply to ensure that the country is not excluded from the European security system.

South-Eastern Europe is a less complicated case. The borders for enlargement in the region are determined by the ability and willingness to meet the membership criteria for NATO and the EU. There is a feeling in Europe that it is becoming more and more difficult for a country to find an appropriate place in the continent without being anchored in at least one of the Western institutions: the EU or NATO. Thus, no country that does not exclude itself on grounds of its behaviour should be excluded from both organizations.
Introduction

Many factors have contributed to the dramatic changes in the strategic situation in the Baltic Sea region: the Soviet Union vanishing into a historical Russia recalling the borders of the early 1700s, the unification of Germany, the second restitution of Poland, and the resurrection of the three Baltic states. Others factors are: the new policies being pursued by the former neutral Nordic states, Finland and Sweden, which are still ‘militarily non-aligned’ but now also members of the European Union, a political alliance.

Their decisions, taken in 1990–91, to depart from their cold war strategies of ‘Alleingang’ and outsidership were variously motivated with arguments that were somewhat different on the respective sides of the Gulf of Bothnia: in the Swedish case with strong emphasis on economic factors, on the Finnish side also with implicit or even explicit references to security. In both cases, however, there was a strategic argument, recognizing that the situation had now changed to such an extent that national interests would not be met through the old policies. Alleingang had worked during cold war stability but would not function with the former front line from the Arctic to the Black Sea transformed into a zone of dramatic political, social and economic change and reorientation—with potential instability the result. In order to handle this new situation, which would inevitably involve the Nordic neighbours in the Baltic Sea region, an element of backup, anchorage and support would be needed—something beyond what Nordic cooperation or individual Nordic initiatives and ingenuity could provide. This situation thus made for the third enlargement of the European integration process—involving Austria in Central Europe and Finland and Sweden in the North.

Nordic involvement in regional peace building and stability creation

While the argument that the European Community (EC), to become a Union, was above all a peace project had not dominated the Nordic debates in 1991, it gradually became all the more relevant to the political elites in the countries concerned. The realization that the Nordics, and the Finns and Swedes in particular, were actively involved in regional peace building and stability creation, for the first time really since Napoleonic times, gradually
dawned as the necessity to manage Russian–Baltic relations and Russian–European relations was understood.

One early issue was the evacuation of the territories of the now sovereign Baltic states by the ex-Soviet armed forces, a project in which the Swedish Administration of Prime Minister Carl Bildt (1991–94) became deeply involved within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework. This process was ultimately completed in 1998, but long before this the Nordic states, jointly and individually, had become involved in a number of infrastructure and sovereignty support projects in the three Baltic states. In the Swedish case, these Baltic efforts became combined with an ambition to assist in the development of ‘North-West Russia’—the vast territory stretching from the Arctic and Murmansk via Karelia, St Petersburg, Novgorod and Pskov to Kaliningrad—and where all the Nordic countries (and Russia’s neighbours) had interests.

In 1990, through modest (and ‘non-political’) beginnings at a Baltic conference on environmental issues held in the Swedish town of Ronneby on a Polish and Swedish initiative, a process was set in motion that in 1992 produced the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), launched on a Danish and German initiative in Copenhagen. Hereby, a regional (or subregional) forum for cooperation was created which straddled NATO and EC/EU boundaries, thus creating possibilities for the articulation of regional ‘security’ concerns in terms of the ‘new dimensions of international security’, if not yet ‘security building’. With the Visby summit of the CBSS in 1996 under Swedish chairmanship an effort was made to take this a step further by trying to mobilize the full potential of the European Union for a long-term Baltic regional development and infrastructure project which the Nordic states themselves thought was beyond their own resources. Again, this was a project within the realm of low rather than high politics, but the engagement of the Union (and the European Commission) in this European region would inevitably give a political weight of great potential to this enterprise.

When in 1997 a Swedish Government-commissioned report was published under the title Larger EU—Safer Europe the full logic of the strategy since 1991 seemed obvious. The regional security challenges produced in the Baltic Sea region by the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet empire were to be handled through ‘Europeanization’; from the Swedish point of view, an enlargement of the Union, as far-reaching as possible given the Copenhagen (and other democratic and stability promoting)

\[1 \text{ Större EU—säkrare Europa [Larger EU—safer Europe], SOU 1997:143.} \]
criteria was the instrument—as regional stability and security could not be guaranteed through regional means alone. The Union was the instrument.

The fact that regional or subregional solutions were unacceptable, at least in the shaping of special relations between the smaller states in the region on the one hand and the major regional power, Russia, on the other, became obvious in December 1997 when Russian President Yeltsin on a visit to Stockholm offered a ‘zone of confidence’ pact between Russia on the one hand and a group of five states on the other: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. The proposal was rejected by the Group of Five, refusing to be recognized as such.

From a Swedish (and more general Nordic/Baltic small state) point of view, enlargement of the Union to include both Poland and the three Baltic states has thus become a sine qua non for security, in the wider context, in Northern Europe. It is also remarkable to note that in the North there is almost no trace of the worries about invasions of cheap labour that colours much of the debate in Germany and Austria with demands for transition regimes of several years. One concern in the North, however, is likely to be the ‘tightness’ of the borders of the Union to the East—with heavy burdens laid on the four prospective candidates.

Already during the Swedish Bildt Administration, the prime minister made repeated references to a Nordic identity within the Union that Sweden was going to join. With this he seems to have meant a possibility for the Nordic three (or, hopefully, four) to press their own regional agenda upon the Union—the North would not allow itself to be overlooked among the Union concerns over Central Europe or the Mediterranean. With the launching by the Finnish chairmanship in 1999 of the ‘Northern Dimension’ the Bildt concept was not only resurrected but also greatly expanded. The Northern Dimension provides a framework for thinking long term and strategically about European–Russian relations—a necessity forced upon the Nordic and Baltic states not only by the inescapability of neighbourly relations but also through the development already today of a state of economic and infrastructure interdependence through Russian trade through the Baltic (and Finnish) ports. This is where Russia’s ‘Rotterdam’ is situated today.

Again, thus, ‘Europeanization’ is a way to handle regional complexities—and EU enlargement as well as ‘engaging’ Russia in the way to proceed. No doubt, both Finland and Sweden, the former, as usual, more low key than the latter, see themselves having a historical role here as Euro-regional bridge and stability builders, but it is a role that would have been impossible without the backup of the Union—just as their particular variants of neutrality during the cold war would not have been feasible without NATO.
To sum up, the consequences of EU enlargement, involving the Baltic three as well as Poland, are expected to be wealth, welfare, strategic stability and additional opportunities to involve Russia with Europe—to open the ‘Russian market’, over which Finns, Swedes, the Baltic peoples, Russians and Germans as well as the former ‘maritime powers’ have shed so much blood during their histories. The benefits to Russia are supposed to be understood in Vladimir Putin’s Moscow, even given the now launched ‘militarization’ of the Union through European crisis management. The window of Tsar Peter will thus supposedly become a ‘European highway’. Swedish (and regional) concerns over this producing a ‘thinner’ and less ‘deep’ Union are not very prominent.

Reactions to the EU and NATO enlargement processes

The two enlargement processes are linked and also so understood in the North. The EU process, which is the one on which Swedes think of themselves as having a right to speak freely, is more difficult as it involves a host of issues and competencies that applicants must be able to master in matching their whole societies with the Union. NATO requirements are far less specific—but all questions of ‘high politics’.

Swedish attitudes to NATO enlargement have undergone considerable evolution. There was in Sweden widespread belief in the late 1980s that with the cold war ebbing out the alliances would be replaced by the CSCE as a United Nations of Europe; therefore, it took some effort to adjust to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the rejuvenation of NATO in a new role and the EU as the ‘future Europe’. Reactions to NATO enlargement thus tended to mirror a certain strategic myopia during the early 1990s; a turnabout was indicated in 1996, with Prime Minister Göran Persson while on a visit to Riga announcing Swedish sympathy for the ambitions of the Baltic states in their aim for NATO membership. Today, despite occasional murmurings from diverse military and other experts about a security sum-total negative for Sweden as the result of NATO Baltic enlargement, the official position is firmly based on the right of every state to choose its own security solution.

Poland joining NATO in 1999 was greeted as a contribution to improved security and stability in the region. The relief was no doubt considerable over the relatively relaxed attitude taken in Moscow to NATO’s first enlargement round. The Baltic problem, however, tends to be one of all or none. It also tends to involve less the gains of inclusion than the dangers of exclusion once a serious debate has been conducted on the subject; rejection
after thorough consideration is worse than never having brought up the issue at all.

It should be observed that in 1996 proposals were made by Western analysts—British and US—about an interim arrangement involving the Nordic states, primarily the two non-aligned states, as a sort of security caretakers for the Baltics while all were waiting for EU (and possibly later NATO) enlargement. Neither the Baltics nor the Nordics wanted anything of this. At the time, the Baltics, as well as the Nordics, regardless of not being members of NATO, were clearly Atlanticists in their orientation when it came to the ultima ratio. That assumption still holds today even with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) evolving.

Conclusions

The inclusion of one or two Baltic states and the exclusion of one (or two) is not a desired outcome of the present enlargement debate. A desired outcome would also have to involve confidence- and security-building measures vis-à-vis Russia: What of the long-term relationship between NATO and Russia? On the one hand, it is difficult for any small state to question the free rights of individual states to choose whatever solution they want and thus imperative to reject any veto claim from a regionally dominant power. On the other hand, the long-term relations with Russia must remain at the centre of the thinking about security in the North.

Thus, it is the opinion of the present author that the Baltic states’ eventual NATO membership will increase both stability and security in the Baltic–Nordic region. It will also give an additional momentum to the development of regional and subregional cooperation across a wide field of issues. That should also be welcomed.
Second session

ESDP beyond the EU borders: conflict prevention and crisis management

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Photo from left to right: Lars-Erik Lundin, Jan Zielonka, Bo Huldh, Anders Bjurner, Renata Dwan, Vladimir Baranovsky, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Marc Otte
• Should the ESDP mandate be confined to the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, crisis management, including peace making) or exceed it; and, if so, in what areas?
• How will non-EU states be engaged in ESDP prevention and crisis management activities? To what extent is current crisis management development concentrated on the EU’s immediate neighbourhood or international in scope?
• Is the ESDP a first step towards capacity for autonomous EU operations or a tool at the disposal of the multilateral security organizations (UN, OSCE)?
• To what extent are current EU crisis management developments focused overly on military capacity? Is this where the EU’s added value lies?
• To what extent will the ESDP shape a new political and military reality among the EU members and in the transatlantic relationship?
Introduction

This paper briefly examines three questions: what is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) intended to address; where is it intended to be applied; and to what extent are states that are not members of the European Union to be part of this process? In exploring these interrelated issues it is important to bear in mind that the ESDP, since Helsinki, is more properly known as the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). The ‘common’ is a useful reminder that we are not talking about a single instrument but the product of the interests, values and views of 15 diverse states. The CESDP is, as a result, as much a process as it is a set of policies and an increasingly dynamic one at that.

What is the ESDP supposed to do?

The first step in trying to identify what the ESDP is at present is to remind ourselves of what it was. The EDSP is a subset of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and addresses the use of military force in its pursuit. The ESDP did not begin life, however, within the European Union but within the context of the Western European Union (WEU). In 1992 the WEU member states agreed on the contexts in which their military forces could be collectively engaged: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. The Petersberg tasks, named after the German town in which the Council meeting took place, were subsequently incorporated into the EU in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty of European Union.

The context in which the Petersberg tasks were elaborated is crucial to understanding why the WEU, and subsequently EU, states opted to define the scope of their military cooperation around crisis management tasks. The WEU member states took this decision against a backdrop of crisis in their immediate neighbourhood. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union, as well as the fragility of the post-Warsaw Pact environment in Central and Eastern Europe starkly underscored the need for the West European states to rethink the cold war fundamentals on which European security had been based and negotiate intra-state as opposed to interstate conflict as the primary security threat. Europe’s new
‘insecurity’ environment unfolded against a backdrop of increased impetus in the European integration project. The accelerated drive towards completion of the Union was partly a function of the changes in the wider environment and was as much a reflection of the fears of many European countries of the implications of the end of the cold war as a testimony to a new sense of confidence. Nevertheless, the distinct sense that Europe was increasingly responsible for its own security was an important motivation behind the decision to establish a collective crisis management capacity.

A third factor playing into the calculations was the attitude of the United States and the intense debate on its continued role as Europe’s security guarantor. This debate has been and remains an argument about burden sharing grounded in the US demand that Europeans take on more financial and resource responsibility for the provision of alliance security. The fourth interrelated factor for the WEU states was the insistence by the USA and most European NATO allies that a European military capacity should not duplicate the functions of the Atlantic alliance. If collective defence was the exclusive domain of NATO, collective security through crisis management would be the particular, albeit overlapping, contribution of a European security and defence policy. Notwithstanding the diversity of the 15 EU states, this division of labour remains the essential cornerstone of the ESDP.

The crisis management tasks listed in Petersberg amounted to an ambitious agenda in 1992. The potential use of military force in peace making, particularly, was a significant advance beyond the cold war concepts of United Nations peacekeeping enshrined in UN peace operations. Yet almost a decade later the limitations of the use of military force for crisis management have been evidenced in the Balkans and beyond. The Petersberg tasks stop short at either end of the crisis management spectrum, and it is precisely in these two areas—conflict prevention and what might be called peace establishment and/or maintenance—that the greatest needs have been identified.

The use of military force for the purposes of conflict prevention was successfully initiated in the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) during the period 1995–99. Current tensions in Macedonia raise questions as to how the international community may have contributed to longer, structurally directed prevention, had UNPREDEP’s mandate been extended (as the Macedonian authorities had requested). The recent deployment of additional Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops to the Presevo Valley is an attempt to use military force to prevent Albanian guerrilla attacks leading to the outbreak of violent conflict in Macedonia and beyond.
The EU has placed considerable emphasis on conflict prevention within the context of the CFSP and is one of the champions of prevention within the UN and other international forums. Yet prevention is not listed in the Petersberg tasks and EU efforts to develop coherent preventive strategies have paid little attention to the use of military force for prevention. The EU’s preference for a ‘development’ approach to conflict prevention rightly emphasizes long-term structural processes and the need to tackle the root causes of conflict. Repeated occurrences, however, have demonstrated the need for such measures to be accompanied by shorter-term preventive capacities, the instruments of which can, if necessary, replace long-term policies in times of acute tension. Nascent EU military thinking does not yet appear to have incorporated preventive capacities into its planning process.

At the other end of the spectrum, yet closely connected to prevention, is the challenge of peace establishment. Peace making, included in the Petersberg tasks, is not a rigidly defined term. In practice, however, it has tended to revolve around the procedures and negotiation leading to the end of actual fighting. External peace making in this context ends with the signing of a peace agreement and/or the formal end of violent conflict between belligerent parties. In the past year the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone have each demonstrated the fragility of peace making and the need for the vigorous pursuit of a follow-up peace establishment process. This phase of a crisis is usually described as reconstruction and rehabilitation and perceived as a largely non-military task. Yet what we have seen in Kosovo is that reconstruction and rehabilitation can only take place within an environment of established peace, the provision of which may well depend on the use of military force. Clearly, the extent of the military force required differs from crisis to crisis and must be employed in the context of a transitory process. Nevertheless, the successful use of military force to establish and shore up post-conflict peace necessitates substantive strategic thinking and planning on the role of military force in this crisis phase.

A wider scope in the use of military force for crisis management tasks reflects, ultimately, the need for a more comprehensive approach to the constituents of a security and defence policy. The Petersberg tasks’ emphasis on the military component of crisis management risks undermining the significance of non-military crisis management strategies for a successful ESDP. This in turn, takes attention away from one of the most important challenges to contemporary crisis management, namely, interaction and coordination between the military and non-military aspects of crisis management, ranging from command and control, to strategic and practical synchronization, to public perception and cooperation in the field. An ESDP focused on the
Petersberg tasks will be, at best, a blunt instrument. A CFSP built around the ESDP will be even more unwieldy. The crisis and non-crisis situations to which EU member states may be called upon to respond will require diverse and wide-ranging responses. Moreover, the strength and comparative advantage of the EU lies in the multiplicity of non-military instruments at its disposal, a resource base that sets it aside from most international organizations. It is arguable, however, that, in the rush to develop EU military capacity within the ESDP, sufficient strategic attention is not being given to the precise area in which the EU is potentially strongest. Non-military crisis management cannot be seen solely in terms of development and/or humanitarian assistance but must be a core component of a successful security and defence policy. The articulation of such capacity requires, in turn, a strategic vision of the ends of such a policy.

Where is the ESDP supposed to operate?

The EU leaders have been careful not to establish geographical limitations on the implementation of the ESDP. Repeated references to the potential deployment of EU crisis management capacity at the request of the UN (or other international organizations) have drawn attention to the potential of non-European crisis management operations. This is underscored by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat, who are keen to ensure that increased capacity does not lead to increased European insularity. There is some merit in the EU’s broad approach. The economic reach of the EU and the range of its partnerships and dialogues have established the Union as a global actor. The values the Union represents and the international image it has sought to portray further militate against geographical delimitation.

Despite the political and strategic wisdom of this open-ended policy, a number of indicators point to a geographical focus on crisis management around Europe’s borders. These include the immediate motivating factor behind the Cologne and Helsinki Council decisions to establish a European rapid-reaction capacity, the Kosovo crisis, as well as US demands for Europe to take a greater share of responsibility for stability in its region. Nascent planning for the EU force is, perhaps inevitably, focusing on areas closest to home: French Defence Minister Alain Richard specified to his fellow EU ministers at Ecouen in September 2000 that the EU force would

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have a range of 4000 kilometres. The sensitive issue of the potential use of NATO assets in EU-led crisis management operations is another consideration. Finally, European public opinion is another factor shaping a neighbourhood orientation among EU governments.

A regionally focused ESDP, however, makes surrounding non-EU states as much potential targets as partners for EU conflict prevention and crisis management. Is this dual status a problem? Some may regard it as an advantage as it demonstrates the interdependency of European countries and thus establishes a potential permanent basis for cooperation. As Javier Solana declared in Moscow in February, ‘We cannot have a secure Europe without a secure Russia’. EU enlargement, in establishing a common border with Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and, in time, the southern Caucasus, will only reinforce the security interdependency of EU and non-EU states. The fact that EU enlargement is taking place alongside the more controversial—for Russia at least—enlargement of the Atlantic alliance potentially places the EU in an advantageous position to negotiate with these states. The panoply of instruments at its disposal, particularly financial and technical assistance, gives it distinctive bargaining powers. In this perception, therefore, the EU is in a unique position among international organizations to engage in both long-term and short-term conflict prevention and crisis management in its neighbourhood.

Such an optimistic scenario ignores, however, the challenges posed by non-EU states as simultaneous targets and partners in conflict prevention and crisis management. The tension and ambiguity surrounding EU policies in the Caucasus are but one manifestation of this problem. Russia’s importance to the EU (and, even more, to NATO) as a partner in peace operations in the Balkans has placed the EU in an exceedingly delicate position in the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. Russian considerations are arguably the principal reason why the EU has been so slow to engage in the southern Caucasus. The first ministerial troika visit to the strategically significant region took place only in February and was careful to avoid giving any impression of future activism. The EU’s apparent preference to maintain the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as the lead institutional actor in crisis management in the Commonwealth of Inde-

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The potential role of non-EU states in the ESDP

The dual identity of non-EU states for the ESDP also complicates the question of their potential engagement in EU crisis management. Although the EU has made repeated reference to cooperation with Russia and Ukraine in security and defence matters, there has been little elaboration to date of the ways in which the Union’s eastern partners could contribute to the ESDP. Clearly, the nature and extent of practical cooperation must be developed on a case-specific basis. A cursory consideration of what Russia, Ukraine and other CIS states might bring to the ESDP, however, suggests that this contribution might be limited primarily to the military domain, namely, the provision of military personnel for EU-led operations and certain logistic resources in which the EU is currently deficient, for example, strategic airlift capacity. It is difficult to see how Russia and Ukraine at present could make substantial practical contributions to EU non-military crisis management operations (apart from, potentially, police personnel), the very area in which a distinctive EU contribution to international crisis management is most feasible and the most likely type of activity the EU would undertake in its neighbourhood.

Elaboration of the potential contribution of non-EU states to the ESDP is further complicated by the way the issue has so far been framed. Discussion has revolved around the relationship of non-EU and non-NATO states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) to the ESDP and the extent to which the six countries will have a voice therein. A second group to be addressed are the non-NATO candidates for EU accession (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). The structures for consultation between these 15 states and the EU 15 have been the main focus of attention: ongoing negotiations over arrangements for their involvement in EU’s headline goals and capacity elaboration indicate how complex and difficult practical cooperation will be to implement. The fact that these negotiations have proved as difficult as they have does not bode well for the extension of comprehensive coordination processes to states such as Russia and Ukraine.

Finally, the question of the role of these non-EU states highlights the differing concepts among the EU 15 as to the ultimate goal of a common Euro-
ean security and defence identity. For those states, principally France, which see the ESDP as a step towards an independent European defence, the participation of non-EU states in crisis management may well be a disadvantage insomuch as it weakens the integrated nature of the endeavour. For states opposed to this vision, the participation of non-EU states in EU-led crisis management could serve as a useful brake on federalist ambitions. As with so many of the EU’s policies, consideration of the form and function of the ESDP beyond Europe’s borders may well end up being a story about the internal, rather than the external, politics of the Union.
JAN ZIELONKA

Italy

Introduction

The rationale behind the European Defence Project seems plausible. The military potential of Europe is not negligible, but because of practical and procedural constraints the European Union is currently unable to conduct any military operations. Moreover, Washington often indulges in unilateral policies and sometimes has a peculiar understanding of European interests.

A European force that stands apart from the United States and which is able to perform peacekeeping operations in volatile parts of its neighbourhood seems to be a well-conceived proposition. However, proponents of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) tend to emphasize its beneficial aspects while ignoring the potential risks. This paper identifies some of those risks. The risks are largely of a political rather than a technical or even strategic nature. Moreover, what now seems to be the greatest advantage of the ESDP may turn out to be its greatest weakness, depending on circumstances partly beyond the EU’s control. In other words, there might be many unintended implications of the new defence initiative, and there is no reason to assume that most of these implications will have a positive rather than a negative effect.

Determining the role of the ESDP

The European Security and Defence Policy project has been interpreted differently throughout Europe. There is great confusion concerning the EU’s medium- and long-term policy aims in the defence field. There is a danger that the project will raise public expectations that cannot be matched by capabilities. There is also a danger that symbolic politics will leave little room for realism—not in the sense of the muscle-flexing of some of the early announcements of the Bush Administration, but in that of living in the real rather than the ideal world. In the context of peace and security, these dangers should be taken very seriously.

First, there is confusion concerning the range of tasks to be performed by the newly created military units. Are these units to perform only peacekeeping operations or should they also take on the much more ambitious task of peace enforcement? The Petersberg tasks may easily be interpreted in a way that would allow peace enforcement, and one can argue that it is better to decide a unit’s tasks in the context of a particular situation than a
priori and in general terms, but the question then arises whether the envisaged forces are really up to performing peace-enforcing tasks and who is going to issue the necessary authorization.

Second, the geographic scope of the ESDP is unclear. The European Union’s economic and diplomatic links are truly global. Does this mean that its security and defence commitment is also to be global? Can the Union turn its back on the kinds of atrocity that were committed in Rwanda? Will one day the EU’s political and financial involvement in the Middle East result in the EU’s military involvement?

Third, is the ESDP a surrogate for or a prototype of a European army? So far, the official rhetoric implicitly denies any ambition of creating a European army: national units are not to be transformed into European ones for the time being. Yet, those who argue in favour of a European federation clearly hope that the Union with its central government, common currency and common external borders will one day also create a common European army. Even those who fiercely oppose the creation of a European super-state dream about a European superpower in the making. Consider, for instance, the following quotation from Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 6 October 2000 speech in Warsaw: ‘Europe’s citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power. . . . Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower: a superpower, but not a superstate’.¹ If this indeed is Europe’s ambition, what is the challenge before the ESDP?

**European defence efforts**

The decision to create European military capabilities, however modest, is truly historic. There have been several efforts aimed at creating some sort of European defence since the early 1950s, and all of them have failed. In fact when the Amsterdam Treaty included some vague provisions on the ‘progressive’ framing of a common defence policy, few observers really believed that it would actually lead to the creation of independent military units within a short period of time.

The decision is also quite radical because it breaks with Europe’s long-standing civilian power status. One can only hope that shifting from a civilian to a military power status will solve some existing problems for the EU. However, it will also certainly create some new ones.

Because the Union’s current power is not military and hegemonic in nature it does not drive other states out (through balancing mechanism) but instead attracts them. That is, its civilian power attracts; it does not repel. Acquiring a military status may help the Union to cope with local violence, but it may also raise suspicion and induce balancing efforts. From now on, both internal and external actors will watch the EU’s policies as never before. To have a ‘gun at hand’ not only widens opportunities for action; it also imposes much greater responsibility for one’s actions. It is unclear whether the Union is ready to shoulder that kind of responsibility.

Proponents of the ESDP usually assume that because the EU’s political objectives are noble—promotion of peace and democracy—external actors do not need to be concerned about increasing the EU’s military power. This is wishful thinking, especially if the ESDP is to be robust (as we all hope for). If the Union indeed has power ambitions, can it avoid all the traps of power politics? Why should a kind of United States of Europe be seen differently in power terms than the United States of America? Americans also claim that their security and defence policy is guided by noble rather than selfish aims. The very nature of international actors (civilian or military) is probably more decisive in shaping perceptions than are declarations of intention, however genuine.

Nor would it be easy for the Union to ignore the historical legacy of its individual parts. German soldiers in Serbia or Dutch soldiers in Indonesia are likely to be seen through historical lenses even if they were to wear European uniforms and march under a European flag. Even if the EU’s objectives were truly and visibly unselfish, violent conflicts with their complexity and brutality make it difficult for any actor to remain truly innocent and impartial. Consider the disgraceful behaviour of some French and Belgian soldiers in Africa or of the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica.

A common defencepolicy

The fact that the ESDP project stems from the weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rather than from its strengths also presents a problem. One cannot help but ask whether a common defence policy of the Union is possible without a workable common foreign policy. After all, it is important to know how, when and for what purposes the Union is going to use its soldiers. If a common foreign policy is often in a state of paralysis, especially when faced with a crisis, how can a common defence policy ever work? It is precisely in a crisis that one thinks about using soldiers.
Of course, one can argue that the creation of a common defence identity may itself improve the functioning of the CFSP. In other words, there might be a positive spillover from the defence field into the field of diplomacy. The history of integration shows that European cooperation in various fields proceeds at different speeds without any given sequence or logic. For instance, the development of an independent military capability could make it more difficult for the Europeans to wait for US leadership in a crisis. Cooperation in the field of defence intelligence might also help the Union to make decisions of a diplomatic nature (which might have been difficult in the past without such intelligence). That said, it is hard to agree with the kind of reverse determinism popular in some European circles which says that European cooperation in the defence field must work because Europe has utterly failed to cooperate in the field of diplomacy and can hardly afford another failure.

In addition, there might also be a negative spillover. When soldiers’ lives are at stake, the decisions are not easier but more difficult to make. If it was difficult to reach the required political consensus under the CFSP, why should it be easier to reach it under the ESDP, and would such consensus arrive in time during a crisis? Politics aside, decisions about the use of force will probably require solid legal structures, and these tend to make the decision-making process less rather than more flexible (and also more time-consuming).

Institutional reforms

For a common foreign and defence policy to work smoothly it would be necessary to implement serious institutional reforms within the Union. The most important priority is to find effective ways of formulating the Union’s basic political and operational will. There are three major solutions for helping the Union accomplish this task:

1. The first solution could be called ‘majoritarian’ because it advocates institutional reforms that would increase the Union’s capacity for internal conflict resolution.

2. The second could be called a ‘conflict-avoiding’ solution because it advocates a search for substantive and procedural strategies that will reduce conflict within the Union to more manageable levels.

3. The third solution could be called a ‘selective involvement’ solution. It advocates reforms that would allow some Union decisions and actions to be taken only by those members that are willing and capable of doing so.
It is clear that each of these proposals would go beyond procedural and organizational readjustments to touch upon the difficult subjects of sovereignty, identity, legitimacy, the scope of commitments and membership rights. It is far from certain that the Union is ready to embark on such a project.

**Democratic control of decision making**

When considering defence policy, it ought to be remembered that issues of cultural identity and democracy are especially salient, and here the European Union’s credentials are especially weak. The EU does not need any particular kind of legitimacy when sending electoral observers to trouble spots, but sending soldiers is another matter. Before asking EU soldiers to risk their lives, Europeans should have more democratic control over the defence decision-making process and, at the very least, there would need to be some instinctive trust in EU institutions.

**A European police force**

It is unclear whether there is a genuine market for a European military force. Kosovo has shown that NATO can do the military job relatively well. What is missing, however, is a European police force to keep order after the soldiers have removed the major perpetrators. In other words, what is needed is probably a sort of European carabinieri, rather than a force of European soldiers. Paradoxically, however, efforts to create European police units for external purposes are much more modest than the ESDP project.

**Defence of vital interests**

Those who believe that the Helsinki Declaration should be the first symbolic step towards a genuine European common defence policy must realize that such a policy can hardly be confined to the peacekeeping tasks identified in the Western European Union (WEU) Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. A common defence policy must also include the defence of vital interests against direct attack, as envisaged by Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It should probably also address the issue of Europe’s nuclear defence capability. For example, are Britain and France prepared to extend their nuclear umbrella to other European countries? Are the EU’s citizens ready to undertake the financial burden of the defence task? Are they ready to accept casualties in case of conflict?
The ESDP and NATO

Development of the ESDP will continue to produce concerns in the USA about the undermining of the role of NATO as a major European defence pillar. This may well be the most difficult challenge for European decision makers and it deserves in-depth analysis in a separate paper. Although Europe may well have misgivings about the ways in which the USA exercises leadership within NATO, the fact remains that NATO is the best defence institution Europe has and it would be a very serious matter to undermine it before creating anything comparable. So far, the ESDP is not being seen as a surrogate for NATO even by the most anti-American observers, but if mishandled, the ESDP could well lead to the dissolution of NATO.

The role of NATO

Competition between the EU and NATO may produce not only transatlantic frictions but also intra-European ones. New EU members from Eastern Europe will be particularly displeased with any effort to undermine NATO’s role in Europe. This is not because these new democracies from Eastern Europe have recently been Americanized in cultural and political terms, as some would argue. It is because NATO has treated them more seriously than the EU has. More importantly, their current threat perceptions make them very concerned about their own territorial defence and in this respect the role of NATO remains crucial. (However, one should distinguish here between threat perceptions and real threats.)

Policy recommendations

The above catalogue of dangers and risks does not suggest the abandonment of the ESDP project, but it does suggest a more modest policy agenda and less triumphant political rhetoric. The following list of proposals emerge from this paper:

1. Strengthening the existing CFSP system is necessary before putting the ESDP fully in place. The Union must acquire the capacity to reach collective decisions especially in a situation of crisis. This requires further institutional reforms. A simpler and more integrated institutional structure can reduce the costs of international transactions, aggregate the Union’s political leverage and enhance its legitimacy. Simplification of the European institutional structures related to foreign and defence policy (by merging the WEU and the EU, for instance) is especially needed. However, the Union also
needs to spell out more clearly its basic policy aims, geographic reach and ways of engagement. The current ambiguity concerning the Union’s scope and functions is hampering the impact of its policies abroad and makes it difficult to acquire broad public backing at home.

2. Europeans should strive for a more concerted position within and vis-à-vis NATO. However, it is advisable to see the ESDP project as complementary to rather than competitive with the role of NATO. Some duplication is unavoidable, of course, but the Union would be well advised to limit the ESDP’s functional scope so as to allow NATO to remain the prime actor in Europe in the field of defence and peace enforcement.

3. Limiting the geographic scope of the ESDP is also advisable. A European military peacekeeping operation somewhere in Africa rather than somewhere in the Balkans might be not only easier but also politically more tempting, but for an ESDP success at this early stage a clear set of priorities in terms of geographic scope is required. A broadly defined Europe represents the most natural and legitimate area of engagement for the Union, and therefore the ESDP’s geographic scope should initially be confined to the old continent. (One should also keep in mind that the EU already has a border with Russia and it may soon have a border with Serbia or even Iraq).

4. Separating peacekeeping from peace enforcement is easier in theory than in practice. Nevertheless, it would be better to confine the ESDP mandate to the Petersberg tasks and to interpret these tasks in a narrow rather than broad sense. There is a demand for paramilitary forces to police the newly established peace or to perform humanitarian and rescue operations. NATO is not necessarily well suited to do these jobs and the Union’s new military force—if properly designed, equipped and trained—can nicely complement NATO. Moreover, conflict policing and humanitarian operations may enhance the Union’s already important civilian forms of engagement in terms of financial and technical aid to troubled regions.

5. The ESDP can also prove useful in conflict prevention but, again, some modesty is advisable in this respect. The EU’s enlargement and programmes, such as the pre-accession Phare Programme or the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, are likely to play a much more decisive role in conflict prevention than the ESDP as such. In other words, a skilful application of soft power remains crucial in conflict prevention. When it comes to hard power deterrence seems most important, but the credibility of the ESDP is still to be tested. Besides, it is difficult to imagine the EU, with its lack of strategic compass and Byzantine decision-making procedures, sending soldiers to places where there is only a hypothetical possibility of violent conflict.
6. Unilateralism is seldom cheap and legitimate. Therefore the Union must always strive to conduct its military operations within a framework of broader international security organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This will not always be possible although confining the ESDP functions to peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations will make it easier. This does not mean, however, that the UN or the OSCE should be allowed to use European forces at will. The political decision concerning the use of these forces should in principle be entirely in the hands of the European Council.

7. The EU member states do not necessarily need to spend much more on defence and security than at present. However, they can spend their money much more wisely. Better coordination and rationalization of defence procurement and spending within the EU would be a very positive development. In fact, this might well be the area where the ESDP ‘spillover’ can be the most beneficial with few if any risks attached.
Introduction

The development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) is a matter of considerable interest in Russia. One might even argue that there is more interest than the CESDP deserves, and that there is something irrational in this interest. Indeed, on the one hand, the CESDP does not touch upon the most important aspects of Russia’s foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, Russia is not a member of the European Union and will probably not join it soon. In any case, the CESDP does not concern Russia directly. Nevertheless, on the political level and within the professional community there are numerous manifestations of Russia’s interest (statements, interviews, articles in newspapers, seminars, discussions, and so on).

The CESDP and Russia

There may be three major reasons to explain this phenomenon.

The first one is obvious: the EU is a ‘big partner’ of Russia, both economically and politically. Furthermore, there is a feeling that the EU is turning into a more significant actor in the international arena, not least because of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CESDP. In Russia’s perspective, the EU is becoming even more important against the background of the considerable cooling of Moscow’s relations with Washington (or, to put it in a more correct way, of Washington’s relations with Moscow).

The second reason concerns NATO: the CESDP is perceived as an attractive alternative to it. Whether this perception is correct or incorrect is not the issue. The issue is that it is considered in the context of Russia’s attitude towards NATO, even if only because the latter has been in the focus of Russia’s nervous and over-dramatized attention during recent years. Paradoxically, Russia’s attitude towards the EU has become a profiteer of Russia’s negativism towards NATO.

Finally, the CESDP is regarded as a possible means of Russian engagement in Europe. Russia definitely wants to be in Europe; it is disappointed that the main lines of the European developments seem to pass somewhere away from Russia. Worse, the central role is increasingly played by those structures to which Russia does not have access (NATO and the EU),
whereas those to which it does have access fail to meet its expectations. Indeed, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (where Russia is a full-fledged participant) does not appear to be a particularly impressive actor; the idea of ‘privileged relations’ with NATO was destroyed by the campaign in Kosovo; Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe is questioned by its Parliamentary Assembly; and the Contact Group operates only sporadically and selectively. All this, in combination with the painful obsession of not being taken into account (as in the case of NATO enlargement), creates a feeling of a certain de-Europeization of Russia. The CESDP might be a project that would allow Russia to return to the European track.

**Russian reservations about the CESDP**

However, Russia’s interest is paralleled by a number of reservations, ambiguities, complexes, illusions and uncertainties.

First, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding with respect to the character and the actual size of the CESDP project. Even experts are not very well aware that nowadays it is only about crisis management. Many think that the EU has engaged in building a European army (which is reminiscent—to those who know the post-World War II history—of European Defence Community plans in 1952–54).

Second, Russia’s obsession with NATO could create a distorted picture of the CESDP. It could generate ungrounded (and erroneously oriented) hopes about the extent to which the EU is moving away from the USA. It could produce the wrong criteria for evaluating the CESDP. Some high-ranking military officials put it in a very straightforward way: we are ready to cooperate with the CESDP, but not with the one that is emerging now. If the CESDP is built up as something within, linked with, or additional to NATO, we cannot accept it. In other words, the problem is whether and when the CESDP moves out from under NATO’s umbrella. (A parenthetical observation: there is an amazing parallelism with the uneasiness of the United States about the CESDP. In Washington, there is also an inclination to assess the CESDP according to NATO-related criteria. In this respect, the Russian and US approaches have different vectors, but the methodology seems to be almost the same.)

Third, there are some questions to which Russians do not have answers—no more than Europeans do:

Will the CESDP retain a crisis management function, or should it be considered a first step towards collective defence?
To what extent will it be autonomous from NATO—both politically and in terms of fulfilling its own missions (strategic planning, intelligence, infrastructure, and so on)?

Will it increase the role of military factors in European developments?

Will it promote an arms race (or, at least, the increase of military spending in the EU states)?

To what extent might it change the character of the EU (turning it from a civilian actor to a military one)?

What could it mean for the status of ‘neutrals’ (or ‘ex-neutrals’) within the EU?

Where and how is it going to operate? In order to be credible, it will soon have to prove its validity—where could this happen? If the area of operation of the CESDP is defined as covering an area with a radius of 4000 kilometres from Brussels, then it might reach not only the Balkans or North Africa, but also post-Soviet territories, and this is a sensitive issue for Russia.

Finally, there is the question of whether the CESDP will always be in accordance with international law. Some analysts, although not those in the mainstream of Russian thinking, express concerns that the CESDP will be ‘even worse than NATO’ and might become a tool for multiplying ‘Kosovo models’.

Prospects of cooperative Russian–CESDP interaction

Answers to the above questions do not depend on Russia. What Russia must do is to prevent its own excessive obsessions with such problems—so that they do not undermine the prospects of cooperative interaction between Russia and the CESDP.

Such prospects do exist. They have been strongly endorsed at the highest political level, especially at the Russia–EU summit meeting in Paris in October 2000, but this is not the only reason for considering cooperative interaction between Russia and the emerging CESDP as quite realistic. The most obvious reason is the fact that there could be a common interest in developing such interaction.

Russia might offer the EU a certain potential to assist in the CESDP missions in, for instance, such areas as transport aviation or satellite communication, observation and navigation. The decision of the EU to promote a non-military component of crisis management opens one more area for cooperation with Russia—during the past 10 years its special Ministry for Emergency Situations has acquired considerable experience that could be of use for CESDP rescue operations. For Russia crisis management in its vicin-
ity is becoming increasingly relevant. Even more meaningful are the political aspects of such a cooperative endeavour. In this respect, two points seem essential.

First, the area of crisis management opens the way for truly equal cooperation, and this might be politically and psychologically important for overcoming some of the residual instincts inherited from the period of the cold war. Indeed, it is something relatively new; there is no burden of the past; and the agenda is less controversial (if compared with the task of transforming common defence into a different pattern). Furthermore, the fact that it is not yet defined completely might be a positive element in terms of mutual accommodation (which would be easier to accomplish than after the ‘rules of the game’ have been already established). In order to proceed in this way it seems imperative for Russia to overcome the inertia and the temptation to consider the problem exclusively or predominantly in the context of relations with NATO.

Second, the possibilities and implications of CESDP–Russia interaction should be considered in terms of longer-term prospects. From this point of view, such interaction could be the nucleus of a globally oriented mechanism of crisis management that functions well beyond Europe. Indeed, while thinking about the challenges of the future (and putting aside some small problems—such as that of NATO enlargement—which in a couple of decades will seem insignificant), it is the broader management of the international system that has every chance of being the issue of the 21st century. Cooperation between the EU and Russia might be essential in addressing this issue.
New security challenges in Central and Eastern Europe

In recent years a catchphrase in academic and political debates on European security has been ‘the threat of emergence of new dividing lines in Central/Eastern Europe (CEE)’. It can hardly be disputed that concerns in both the West and the East about the possibility of a new confrontation in post-cold war Europe reflect at least a potential for conflict, if not the real trends. Since the time when this presumption was taken up as a counter-argument against the first wave of NATO enlargement, it has not been elaborated much farther. Yet the geopolitical ‘fault line’ dividing the new Western Europe (being enlarged to encompass the former Warsaw Pact countries) and the new Eastern Europe (the new independent states of the former Soviet Union) is clearly taking shape. NATO enlargement has already generated challenges, primarily in the military–political sphere. As for the European Union, although its enlargement is still in process and has not formally taken place, already at this point in time tensions have started to transpire with a potential for further spillover into ‘soft security’ areas. These developments are not only of a cognitive political character. The CEE region has become a venue of both imminent and actual tensions and conflicts. They are manifest in:

(a) the protracted domestic political conflict in Belarus between the opposition and the authorities and an international political conflict between the official Minsk and European institutions and with the whole of the transatlantic community, including the United States;

(b) the juxtaposition of integration/enlargement processes in Western (first of all NATO) and Eastern Europe (the creation of a Belarus–Russia union, in particular) because of an investment in the union by Belorussian and Russian political elites with the intent of creating a ‘counterbalance’;

(c) the dilemmas of pursuing ‘micro-security’ for EU members and applicants by means of acquis frontalier, or common border policies, at the cost of ‘macro-security’ (i.e., broader regional integration and stability through cooperation with non-applicants on such security issues as migration, international terrorism, cross-border crime, traffic in people, drugs and goods,
minority relations, development of local economic infrastructure and institution building, etc.);¹

(d) the absorption of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU, which together with a military component will add to the prominence of its ‘hard security’ aspects (furnishing Russian ‘eurosceptics’ with another argument in defence of independent great power status);² and

(e) the ensuing close interaction between the EU and NATO in the military–political sphere and the possibility of ‘morphing together’ European institutions, which is likely to provoke further concerns on the part of Russia and its ally Belarus.

Today’s potential for tensions and the real security challenges in the CEE can be analysed not only as a consequence of the geopolitical reconfiguration of the continent, but also as a nascent new generation of conflicts evolving in the context of a new post-post-cold war Europe.

The way EU/NATO eastern enlargement proceeds and its interaction with ‘outsiders’ will shape the European security architecture for years to come. Therefore, even at this stage it is helpful to trace the emerging security trends and project them into the future and identify the emerging tensions and conflicts between the prospective EU members and their eastern neighbours and the possibilities for their prevention and resolution.³ It should also be stressed that enlargement of the EU and NATO does not bring any threat closer to their eastern neighbours. It brings the EU and NATO eastern neighbours closer to these organizations and to the possibility of closer cooperation with them. To paraphrase the title of Alexander Wendt’s famous article, fear, mistrust and threats are what states make of them.

A substantive analysis of the complex regional security dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe would be helpful for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to include approaches to mitigating disputes, defusing the sources of new tensions, building cooperative relationships and thus contributing to the consolidation of European security. Some of the issues currently being discussed are the following:


³ The existing literature on the issue of EU eastern enlargement—in contrast to NATO—has so far concentrated mainly on the accession process of the new members. On the other hand, the study of the new EU borders and relations among the ‘new frontier states’ is only in the initial stage.
1. CEE security is currently challenged by new types of international conflict: ‘soft’ non-military tensions caused by controversial new EU external border policies. The paradox is that such policies work against their intended goals, run counter to the changed functions of borders in the new Europe, and create tensions rather than strengthen regional cooperation and promote security.

2. Another major ‘soft security’ conflict in the region, also characteristic of a new definition of borders and sovereignty in Europe, is an ‘inside/out’ conflict between the political practices in Belarus and the democratic norms of the greater Europe. Unlike the cold war and post-cold war periods, this is a conflict between the majority of European states, united by common democratic values, norms and institutional memberships and a country whose policies defy them. From this perspective Belarus figures as a geopolitical ‘peninsula’, wedged between the other states of the region which have opted for European integration.

3. The new ‘soft security’ challenges are being complemented with ‘hard security’ issues that are epitomized by the shaping of the EU military structure and NATO eastward enlargement. These processes have far-reaching geopolitical consequences and need special attention. There is a risk that their negative cumulative effect may result in the formation of two opposing security spaces in Europe and a new division.

The emerging new types of conflict necessitate a search for viable strategies and instruments to prevent and manage such conflicts as well as close cooperation on the part of pan-European, regional institutions and national governments.

A new dimension for the ESDP?

The ESDP has several important security implications for EU members, applicants and ‘outsiders’:

1. For all European and global players the EU is being transformed into a key international security actor per se.

2. Consequently, the EU and its members are putting greater focus on the shape of their strategies with regard to various groups of states.

3. For the current and prospective EU applicants this implies the possibility of extended membership criteria. Since, in practical terms, the ESDP is a recent development, there have been no EU-specific accession criteria in the security field. However, it seems that they may become necessary in the near future.
4. At the same time, the ESDP needs measures to prevent the exclusion of EU ‘outsiders’ (i.e., countries whose membership in the EU is not imminent) on its eastern border by engaging them in a constructive dialogue on security issues and neutralizing the possible negative effects of enlargement. In other words, a key question is how to consolidate the ESDP so as to mitigate its EU-centric character.

Useful groundwork is provided via EU programmes of assistance to the countries in transition, its Common Strategy on Russia, as well as the cooperation programmes of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and other regional institutions. Nevertheless, the ESDP does not yet comprehensively address the security aspects of relations between the EU and its close neighbours in Eastern Europe. Meeting these new challenges may require particular attention to ‘soft security’ challenges on the eastern border and necessitate the development of special mechanisms within the framework of the ESDP—similar to those of the Partnership for Peace programme. Adding such a dimension to the ESDP would address not only practical issues, but also the general political climate. Relations in Central and Eastern Europe would be improved, helping to turn the new EU eastern border into a zone of cooperation and confidence rather than another line of division.
Introduction

The search for answers to the question of why, where and how must take account of the dynamic environment in which the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) is being developed.

The three main engines of the CESDP

The enlargement of the EU

For the first time in history the peaceful unification of Europe has become possible. Once it becomes possible, it is also unavoidable. For moral and political reasons, first, it would be inconceivable not to extend the political stability and economic prosperity provided by European integration in Western Europe to the countries further East that have been deprived of its benefits against their will for so long.

Second, creating new dividing lines would simply threaten the long-term survival of the integration process itself by fostering a grey zone of instability in Central and Eastern Europe.

The nature of this phase of enlargement also creates a radically new situation. It confronts the European Union with new responsibilities. As it brings the EU closer to unstable regions and will ultimately fundamentally reshape its external borders, it requires the EU to acquire the means to defend a growing mass of common interests and to safeguard optimal conditions for the further development and deepening of the integration process.

The logic of European integration: towards a political identity

The CESDP is part of this project. For a long time European leaders have stated that European integration would remain incomplete as long as it does not extend to security and defence. The CESDP is a necessary link in the process of building a political identity for the EU and enabling it to defend the common interests of its member states. It is an essential foundation on which to build Europe as a political power in the globalized world of the post-cold war era.
**The changing strategic environment and its impact on transatlantic relations**

The evolution of the strategic context after the end of the cold war has a direct impact on transatlantic relations. Europe is no longer threatened by global aggression or annihilation. This has changed the conditions and the nature of the engagement of the United States in European affairs. Preserving the alliance and the US commitment to European security demands that Europeans assume a larger share of the burden of the security of their continent. It is a matter of precaution in view of the possible evolution of global US strategy. As NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated recently, Europeans do not want to be confronted with the alternative of NATO or nothing.

**Challenges facing the EU**

The EU’s stated ambition is to acquire the ability to manage crises as part of an efficient and credible foreign and security policy. One of the main challenges in that respect is to prove its ability to manage complexity at several levels:

1. The first is that of multinational military operations. Even NATO, in spite of its experience in the Balkans, has not found all the answers.
2. The second is that of combining civil and military instruments, as part of a concept of global crisis management. There is little relevant experience in that field within multinational organizations.
3. The third is that of using all these instruments in a conflict prevention perspective.

Resolving these complex issues has profound implications for the EU decision-making system. It requires new concepts of planning and a carefully conceived exercise policy.

**Conflict prevention**

The renewed emphasis put on conflict prevention by the Swedish EU Presidency is most welcome. Sweden can boast of strong credentials and experience in that area.

Recent reports by the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy have established the groundwork for a renewed and comprehensive debate within the EU.
Nobody is against conflict prevention. Governmental and non-governmental organizations have extensive knowledge about the instruments needed in that respect. The crucial issue is rather to know why this does not happen more frequently and more systematically, why too many crises result in soul searching about what could have been done to avoid them, and why, with all that was known about a situation, nothing was done until it was too late.

So what we need at this juncture is not new academic debates, not too much theoretical work about refining the tools, but an action plan and a calendar to implement it. This action plan should involve a better system to evaluate the impact of past and present policies. SIPRI has done pioneering work in that respect.

Public opinion

If the CESDP is to enjoy continuing support in our parliaments and public opinion, governments will have to send a clearer message about what it means and engage in a wider public debate. There are reasons of principle, transparency and democratic control to begin with. There are also practical reasons. Additional resources will be needed to sustain the development of the military and civilian capabilities to fulfil the CESDP’s ambitions.

European citizens are confronted with competing notions of security and preservation of the model of society they want to live in. Threats to their health, because of environmental or food safety problems, or social disturbances created by uncontrolled immigration are as important to them as threats from terrorism or violent conflicts abroad.

A better job needs to be done of explaining the interdependence of security risks in the globalized world. Governments also need to be aware of and ready to manage contradictions in public opinion: (a) between short-term emotional reactions to violence and abuse of human rights (the ‘CNN effect’) and the acceptance of the need for long-term commitments to avoid the recurrence of such situations; and (b) between the urge to act and support for the practical consequences (tolerance of the use of force and of casualties, and support for the financial burden of peace-support operations).
Introduction

A recent futures study published by the intelligence community of the United States makes two pragmatic forecasts for the year 2015:

EU enlargement, institutional reform, and a common foreign, security and defense policy will play out over the next 15 years, so that by 2015 the final contours of the ‘European project’ are likely to be firmly set. Having absorbed at least 10 new members, the European Union will have achieved its geographic and institutional limits.

By 2015, NATO will have accepted many, but not all, Central/Eastern European countries. European Security and Defense Policy will be set in terms of partnership with, rather than replacement of, NATO.¹

Assessing the European Security and Defence Policy

This illustrates the urgent need in the current debate about the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to normalize threat perceptions about how the ESDP is developing. Many assertions are being made in the public debate on the ESDP. That debate corresponds to a number of questions put by SIPRI to the panellists in this seminar:

1. Some argue that exaggerated attention is being given to the threat to NATO’s role by the military build-up of the ESDP.
2. Others argue that the current emphasis on civilian crisis management and conflict prevention is diverting attention to the military side of the ESDP.
3. Some argue that not enough effort is being put into the development of relations with partners, ranging from non-European Union NATO members to Russia to Australia.
4. Others believe that not enough attention is being paid to the development of cooperation with partner organizations, starting with the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

5. In EU candidate countries the worry has been expressed that the ESDP may be perceived as a substitute for NATO enlargement and, in fact, make more difficult the enlargement of both the EU and NATO.

I do not agree with the above assessments for the following reasons:

1. On the first issue, it should be noted that the current emphasis in the internal EU debate on military aspects of the ESDP is a natural one. The military headline goal focuses on something that the EU lacks. This is also true of the first concrete target for the police, which was adopted at the EU’s Feira European Council 2000. As the EU proceeds, it is identifying other deficits, which may result in the formulation of additional headline goals and concrete targets.

2. On the second issue, it is also quite natural to devote considerable attention to the civilian aspects of conflict prevention and crisis management. This is not a new area for the EU, but there is a need to strengthen the civil–civil coordination between the European Commission and the European Council and, not least, to put in place new civil–military coordination as the EU military structure is built up.

3. As regards the third issue, the EU already maintains an extensive network of contacts, dialogue and cooperation with third countries. It is now vital to develop the quality of this cooperation. In order to do so, the EU needs time to enhance its various interfaces with partners and to develop ideas inside the Union which can usefully be implemented in partnership with others.

4. Again, the EU is not starting from scratch. There is already extensive cooperation with the UN and the OSCE, and the need to develop this cooperation further is clearly stated by the EU. This will be necessary, not least, in Petersberg task missions. It is known that several member states of the Union have clear constraints as regards being involved in higher-level Petersberg operations without a UN and/or an OSCE mandate.

5. The ESDP is not a substitute for NATO; there is no territorial defence commitment in EU treaties. The ESDP is also not a substitute for enlargement but rather an important contributing factor towards making EU enlargement possible by encouraging stability around the enlarged EU both regionally and globally. Whenever and wherever possible (NATO does not have a global mandate) this will be done in cooperation with NATO. Most importantly, when did US policy makers argue that the ESDP could be a substitute for NATO enlargement?

The ESDP is not an isolated policy. There is wide agreement that the ESDP must be seen in the context of overall Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) objectives. The ESDP should therefore not only be a part of the CFSP but also serve CFSP goals. The EU is not building a European army—it is responding to the need to fulfil the Petersberg tasks. There is wide agreement now that the ESDP encompasses conflict prevention and civilian and military crisis management. This helps to define the scope of the ESDP and its unique range of EU capabilities on the civilian side. In the transatlantic partnership the ESDP should be seen as an EU contribution towards a more sustainable partnership which is perceived as reasonable burden sharing on both sides of the Atlantic.

**The role of the European Commission**

What are the role and position of the European Commission? I see a strong engagement in areas where the Commission has competencies and a strong political support to the ESDP on military issues where the Commission is not in the lead.

The role and engagement of the Commission embrace many fields of relevance to the ESDP from conflict prevention—where an important Communication has just been presented—to civilian crisis management—where the European Council has recently approved a rapid-reaction mechanism (RRM).

It goes without saying that the role of the European Commission is particularly important *before* a crisis. In this spirit, an overall reform of the Commission’s aid programmes is now being undertaken in order to speed up delivery as has already been done in Kosovo and, generally, to enhance the impact of the EU’s position as the largest aid donor in the world also in support of the ESDP goals.
Third session

Redefinition of the transatlantic partnership: in search of a new grand strategy

Ian Anthony (SIPRI–UK)
Steven E. Miller (USA)
Thérèse Delpech (France)
Charles A. Kupchan (USA)
Raimo Väyrynen (Finland)

Photo from left to right: Rolf Ekéus, Steven E. Miller, Charles A. Kupchan, Roman Kuzniar, Joseph Fitchett, Ian Anthony, Thérèse Delpech, Raimo Väyrynen
- What should be the security priorities of the transatlantic partnership? How would you define the catalogue of these priorities?
- What is the future role of the United States and Europe within the transatlantic community in the conflict prevention and crisis management process?
- How can the EU mobilize the resources to address European security questions?
- What is an optimal vision of the future transatlantic partnership?
Introduction

The process of redefining the transatlantic partnership is a permanent work in progress if seen from the very wide perspective of Grand Strategy—a concept that has historically been reserved for policies pursued by states rather than groups of states. The ‘transatlantic’ region is defined here as covering the territories of the members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The transatlantic community is wider than the membership of NATO and wider than the combined membership of NATO and the European Union.

An existing collective Grand Strategy—to replace the bipolar, adversarial cold war system with an alternative based on multilateral cooperation—is already in place. This strategy is contained in the agreements made after 1990 and is intended to lead to the development of a common security system within Europe. Beginning with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990 states elaborated many principles and tasks which would, if implemented and respected, lead to the development of a community of democratic states based on the rule of law.

The institutional elements of this transatlantic partnership have also changed in important ways in the past 10 years to reflect the fact that the partnership is no longer synonymous with the management of relations within the group of states traditionally defined as ‘the West’.

While the community of states that have accepted western values has grown, it is often through international organizations that states seek policy coherence, mobilize resources and test one another’s commitment to implement agreements. Harmonizing the membership of organizations that are active in the discussion of security within the list of states that populate the transatlantic region will take considerable time.

At the same time many security problems need to be managed or, if possible, resolved immediately. Events will not wait for the completion of the process of institutional development in Europe (assuming that this process itself has an end point).

Any ‘new’ Grand Strategy would require consideration of how far it ought to depart from or modify the current arrangements. This departure could take place in one of several ways. First, the process of harmonizing membership of organizations could be accelerated through rapid expansion—the so-called ‘big bang’. Second, the achievement of a common
European security system could be abandoned in favour of a new arrangement based on a division of Europe.

What if neither of these logical alternatives is considered desirable or feasible? My argument presented here is that the Grand Strategy as practised until the late 1990s was the correct one. Through many intertwined processes a loose convoy of states has been kept moving, under the leadership of the United States, towards democracy and the rule of law. Don’t mess with success!

To the extent that the existing strategy needs to be modified, it should be expanded to include cooperation between Euro-Atlantic states in extending the principles on which their common security system is based into other parts of the international security system. In particular, the principles should be advanced by providing assistance and encouragement in those countries (of which there are a significant number) that have expressed a clear interest in adopting them.

**Defining transatlantic partnership**

The transatlantic partnership is more than institutional relations between the EU and the United States or the relations between the EU and NATO—even though these issues are highlighted at present for the understandable reason that they are at a particularly fascinating stage.

The group of states that adopted common security principles after 1990 as the basis on which they would conduct their national security policy was wider than the membership of the EU or NATO. Not all states seek membership of the EU and NATO. Therefore, even if a new round of enlargement were to admit all of the states that seek membership in the respective organizations, some states that are undoubtedly part of the transatlantic partnership area would still be non-members. However, most analysts believe that the further enlargement of the EU and NATO will not include all of the states that seek membership. Under any scenario that we could expect, a significant number of European states will continue to be non-members.

In many important cases the security problems of concern (including both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security problems) would either benefit from or, in some cases, require the participation of states that are not now and are not likely to become members of the EU or NATO.

In addition—because states have one budget, one diplomatic corps and one set of armed forces that are subordinate to national legal and political authority—achieving the objectives agreed within the EU and NATO requires those organizations to bring about effective cooperation between the states that form their membership.
The defence management challenge

In current conditions there has been a need for states to make a review of the purpose and organization of their military establishment, including the armed forces.¹

While armed forces have existed primarily to protect the territory of a state, few countries within the area of transatlantic partnership currently face external military threats. The question of how to harness the assets that the military (and other paramilitary power structures) possess in the service of a positive political agenda is an important element of implementing the common security principles across the transatlantic partnership.

The main instrument to bring about a positive evolution in the role of the military in service of shared values is to enhance the political and administrative accountability of the range of military and paramilitary organs of state. Although all states face the need to evaluate the relationship between their armed forces and wider society, such a discussion cannot reach its full potential if it is confined only to the states within the EU or NATO.

At a more technical level, NATO has agreed Collective Capability Goals as part of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). One aim of the DCI is to address the recognized need for an enhanced European contribution to collective actions—the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI). The EU has defined Headline Goals as part of the process of creating its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Against this background, a coherent European approach to military reform might be expected. However, it is more likely that European countries will take different national approaches.

Some countries will try to make a change in their defence forces to facilitate participation in military operations alongside the United States. Whether these European countries will manage to mobilize sufficient resources to implement this change is a different (and still open) question that depends on the spending priorities in the states concerned (which in turn depends on their domestic political and economic environment).

Other European countries are likely to decide that they would prefer not to make the changes required, either because they regard this type of military engagement as lying outside the scope of their national security interests or because they are not willing to accept the resource implications in the face of alternative calls on their public finances.

¹ As soon as conditions permit, a multilateral discussion of the current and future role of other parts of the military establishment (including the national intelligence services of states) would also be beneficial.
The Collective Capability Goals established in the framework of the DCI and the Headline Goals established in the framework of the ESDP are in essence the same and will be met by reorganizing existing forces and not by creating new forces.

Historically, NATO has experienced difficulties in persuading its members to allocate the resources needed to meet agreed force goals. In a benign security environment and with other calls on resources, European countries have all found it difficult to sustain defence spending.2

As conceived in 1996 the ESDI was an effort to mobilize the political will to meet force goals connected to the transformation of the defence establishments in European countries. The ESDI was intended to mobilize national resources that would be applied through NATO structures (even in cases where the United States did not participate in the conduct of operations).

The discussion of the ESDP was originally intended to reinforce the implementation of the ESDI. Subsequent decisions (taken during the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 and afterwards) emphasize that the ESDP aims at providing the EU with an autonomous capacity to take and implement decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the so-called Petersberg tasks). This capacity will be used through consultation and cooperation with NATO.

The result of this process has been the elaboration of new political and military structures within the EU that are intended to give expression to the ESDP.

Some of these new EU structures (a Political and Security Committee and a Rapid-Reaction Mechanism) have no existing counterpart and could be expected to enhance the effectiveness of EU contributions to European and international security.

In the case of other new EU structures (a Military Committee and Military Staff) the terms of reference written for them during the Nice European Council make it difficult to assess whether they have any meaningful role to play in enhancing European contributions to security building.

After the Helsinki European Council the interim military bodies created within the EU had terms of reference that were written in very general terms. In essence, they were to give military advice to the Secretary General/High Representative on matters that would be determined by the High Representative himself. In Nice these flexible and pragmatic arrange-

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2 Spending on defence has declined continuously across the 1990s in real terms in almost all European countries. This trend has changed among NATO countries in the past 2 years for which data are available (1999 and 2000). This has largely reflected increases in defence spending in the southeastern part of Europe, notably in Greece, Italy and Turkey.
ments were replaced by permanent military structures whose terms of reference were much more elaborate.

Based on the documents that emerged from Nice, the Military Committee and the Military Staff have exact analogues within NATO. The functions allocated for the Military Committee and the Military Staff are divided into three general types: those that will be undertaken as routine, those that will be undertaken in crisis management situations and those that will be undertaken during an operation. Without exception they are functions that NATO is already engaged in.

With the new EU structures these activities will take place in isolation from the experiences gained by NATO throughout almost a decade in South-Eastern Europe and without the information and resources that the United States contributes to NATO.

Arrangements for managing relations between the EU military bodies and their NATO counterparts are proposed in the documents that emerged from Nice. However, the arrangements are complex. There must be a temptation for governments to bypass them in favour of direct contacts with the national capitals of states that provide the most significant capabilities.

In order to be most effective, the higher management of European defence operations should harness intelligence information, troop contributions, facilities, infrastructure and equipment resources from the widest possible group of states that are able and willing to participate.

For example, when an EU member state is considering intervention in a crisis in Africa, would that state gain more from the EU permanent structures (that have yet to be developed beyond an embryonic stage) or from the assets of the US European Command provided through NATO command structures (both of which already exist)?

In another example, when an EU member state is considering intervention in a crisis in the Caucasus or in Asia, would that member state gain more from the EU permanent structures or from cooperation developed through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) framework with states that have deep local knowledge as well as infrastructure and other assets in the region where the crisis is taking place?

The exclusion from the Nice framework of national capacities of states that have made major contributions in different contexts within the European security system will complicate rather than facilitate common action. Rather than being a flexible resource providing expertise on an as-needed basis, the Military Committee and Military Staff risk, over time, bringing about both duplication and decoupling within the transatlantic partnership.


Responding to weapon proliferation

It is agreed that a degree of threat does exist as a result of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons along with delivery systems for these weapons. At present different states attach a different value to the probability that such capacities will threaten their national security.

As a result, there is no common threat assessment among the countries that populate the transatlantic partnership area. At the same time, there is an emerging consensus that there is a need to respond to the threat created by proliferation of different kinds.

In the absence of a common threat assessment, different states within the transatlantic partnership are likely to respond in different ways. This divergence in response will create conditions in which proliferators find it easier to achieve their objectives than would otherwise be the case.

The recognition that uncoordinated national approaches would defeat the policy objectives of all states opposed to proliferation has led to the creation of a series of different mechanisms to facilitate cooperation during the 1990s. Cooperation has encompassed arms control, export control and the use of sanctions as an instrument of security policy. The cooperation has been carried out in a range of different international forums in which the states that make up the transatlantic partnership community are strongly represented.

The specific mechanisms to improve information sharing can be sorted into three groups presented below along with illustrative examples of each type:

(a) initiatives in international organizations (e.g., the revised approach to safeguards within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the proposed establishment of a strengthened sanctions unit within the United Nations, the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre within NATO, and notification of export licence denials within the EU);

(b) initiatives within informal export control arrangements (e.g. notification of export licence denials within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement); and

(c) bilateral information exchanges (e.g., US–Russia dialogue on proliferation and export control issues and the EU–US discussions as part of the transatlantic agenda).
While many states are exchanging information of different kinds in different forums, what is lacking at present is any kind of order in this activity. Under these conditions there is an increased risk that the people responsible for implementing policies will not have the information they need at the time they need it.

The logical way to proceed in these conditions would appear to be for each country to consider how to make its own national intelligence system more effective. This would include evaluating the resource base, the tasking priorities and the mechanisms for intra-government cooperation in gathering and assessing information. This would prepare the way for an intergovernmental discussion about how the national intelligence structures could cooperate more effectively with one another.

Exactly such a process of evaluation and cooperation is being considered separately in various forums. However, the ‘geometry’ of the membership of these international cooperation arrangements is even more diverse than that of the EU and NATO.

One thing that almost all of the arrangements have in common is a strong reliance on US engagement since the United States, through its large investment in maintaining various national intelligence assets, provides the lion’s share of the information that is exchanged.

While US leadership has proved indispensable, the development of something approaching a common threat assessment across the transatlantic partnership that was linked to information sharing would make it extremely difficult for states to conceal illegal weapon programmes or programmes of concern.

Final observations

For the time being and for the foreseeable future the main decision authority and resources required to tackle the problems facing the transatlantic partnership reside at the level of states. At the level of states there is still strong resistance to increasing the autonomous decision authority of international organizations.

Consequently, placing too much emphasis on the development of organizations alone runs several risks. This emphasis might lock attitudes into a zero-sum defence of existing organizations that perceive themselves to be under threat from elsewhere. There could be a dilution of resources or a diversion away from tasks that need to be performed and, seen from a net perspective, this emphasis could be a barrier rather than an aid to mobilizing new resources.

In these conditions there are three main priorities.
First, it is important not to lose sight of the objectives that are shared across the transatlantic partnership. As a first priority the EU and NATO should round up stragglers and keep the current loose convoy of states moving towards democracy and the rule of law. If the ideas and institutions of democracy and the rule of law are internalized by states then it will be possible to enhance European security with any of the available institutional arrangements. If, on the other hand, states move away from their shared commitment to democracy and the rule of law then no institutional arrangement will be sufficient to prevent the re-emergence of serious tensions between the different parts of the transatlantic partnership area.

Second, it is important to move quickly to admit all of the states that wish to be members of the EU and NATO based on an assessment of their commitment to meet the agreed criteria for membership. The level of commitment is a more important indicator than more static assessments based on milestones.

Third, it is important that the architecture of the EU and NATO be open to non-members on the basis of relevant participation. Any state that shares wishes to contribute to the solution of a given problem and that is able to bring useful assets to bear should be able to do so as a matter of right rather than conditional on a political decision.

The task in front of governments and others during the next decade is one of implementing an existing framework of agreements through the arrangement of effective cooperation between states. The common security system in Europe has not yet been developed. Achieving this objective is a strategy that is grand enough!
Introduction

NATO has outlived its opponent, outlived its primary cold war purpose, and outlived the large threat that bound it together so tightly for so many years, and yet NATO has endured. More than a decade after the end of the cold war it not only still exists but is expanding. Its current members remain, apparently without a single exception, committed to the alliance, while numerous European states which are not yet members are clamouring to join. NATO has proven to be a remarkably durable institution.

Why is this the case, and how long can this last? Can an organization whose main raison d’être has disappeared survive indefinitely? There is reason to doubt that NATO’s perpetuation is a stable outcome. Theories on the origins and demise of alliances suggest that large common threats are the powerful glue that holds alliances together. With the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO now lacks this glue, leading to predictions of its disintegration, even if gradually. Moreover, disagreements and frictions within the alliance are sufficient to indicate that the disintegration has begun. Are tensions over the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), acrimony over the Balkans, disputes over Iraq, disagreements over missile defence and even contending visions about the characteristics of a desirable world order signs of NATO’s decline or merely the latest phase in NATO’s friction-laden history?

Whatever its fate in the future, the NATO that has survived so far is both different and less important than was the case during its cold war heyday. It is different in multiple respects, reflecting efforts throughout the 1990s to adapt it to the post-cold war environment. After more than a decade of adaptive effort, NATO has new members, new missions, a new strategic concept, and so on. Yes, some might say, NATO has survived, but it is not the same NATO that was the indispensable protagonist of the cold war.

Perhaps more importantly, NATO (and the transatlantic relationship more generally) is neither as central nor as significant as it once was. A number of

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1 See, in particular, the work of Stephen Walt: ‘The ties that fray: why Europe and America are approaching a parting of the ways’, National Interest, no. 54 (winter 1998/1999), pp. 3–11; and ‘Why alliances endure or collapse,’ Survival, vol. 39, no. 1 (spring 1997).

2 On the notion of NATO in a permanent state of crisis, see Hillenbrand, M. J., ‘NATO and Western security in an era of transition’, International Security, vol. 2, no. 2 (fall 1977), p. 3: ‘As an observer of NATO activities from one vantage point or another since its inception, I have noted that seldom, allowing for interludes of euphoria, has its membership not felt the organization to be at best inadequate or, at worst, in a state of crisis sometimes bordering on threatened disintegration’.
points support this conclusion. First, the United States is increasingly pre-occupied with managing its relations with the rising Asian powers: India and, particularly, China. They are likely to occupy centre stage in US policy in the future. Second, and following from the first point, it seems clear that the focus of US defence policy will more and more be oriented towards Asia. Indeed, this is just the conclusion that is expected of the defence review presently being undertaken by the Bush Administration. Europe is no longer the linchpin of US defence preparations. Third, Europe’s own institutions seem increasingly reliable and durable enough, in this era of low threat, to manage the peace and prosperity of the continent without an overweening US role. Hence, the transatlantic alliance is much less necessary than in the past, even from Europe’s perspective. Fourth, there is a glaring, and perhaps growing, divergence between the USA’s global interests and global involvements and Europe’s largely regional interests. Beyond the borders of Europe—in the crises involving Iraq and North Korea, for example—disagreement is as likely as harmony between Europe and the United States. Finally, the divergence of interests is mirrored in a substantial and apparently growing divergence in military capabilities. The extraordinary US investment in military capabilities has produced a situation in which the European allies are more of a hindrance than a help when actual military operations are required, although Europe’s involvement may be desirable or necessary from a political point of view. As the war in Kosovo demonstrated, when it comes to the application of military power the USA is the indispensable power, but in the future the gap in capabilities may make it increasingly difficult for NATO forces to operate together.

What these considerations suggest is that the answers to the fundamental questions about NATO are different now. How important is the transatlantic relationship? It appears to be less important to both Europe and the United States. Do Europe and the USA still need one another? So far yes, but not as much as they used to. Do Europe and the United States still want each other? So far yes, but not as much as they used to. Will Europe and the USA muster the collective will to identify a genuinely shared and sustainable strategy and to implement that strategy even when this becomes burdensome? Perhaps, but the need to do so seems much less compelling than in the past. In short, one might say of NATO, as of a long-married couple, that the marriage has survived but the passion has gone while the bickering persists.

It is easy to see the centrifugal forces that could lead to NATO’s decline or demise. Yet considerable effort has been expended on both sides of the Atlantic to preserve and adapt the alliance to the new realities of post-Soviet

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Europe. This was not inevitable. No previous alliance has lasted indef-
initely; indeed, no previous alliance has lasted as long as NATO. It was pos-
sible that the transatlantic policy community would conclude that NATO
was no longer necessary once the Warsaw Pact had disappeared and the
Soviet Union had collapsed. Some feared and some hoped that this might
come to pass, but it was not an impossible thought, nor was it a thought that
was completely absent from the policy debate.4

Why was not NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, set aside as an historical
object whose time has past? The answer must be that whatever centrifugal
forces are at work within NATO are still more than counterbalanced by the
ongoing purposes that it serves. This is unlikely to remain true forever, but it
is still true now. NATO may have its post-cold war problems and weak-
nesses, but its members clearly believe that it continues to advance their
interests. What roles does NATO now play and how powerful are these new
purposes it serves?

Roles for the transatlantic partnership

NATO’s durability becomes much more comprehensible when one exam-
ines the multitude of roles that it plays, that it is thought to play or that it
might play in the post-cold war environment. Not all of these possible roles
are equally important, equally suitable for NATO, equally relevant for all
member states or equally compelling as a rationale for perpetuating the alli-
ance. Some of these roles reflect traditional calculations of interests; others
reflect particular post-cold war circumstances and opportunities. However,
the cumulative weight of these various purposes has produced a wide
impression that NATO remains a useful and desirable instrument, even if it
is not as necessary or as pivotal as in the past. NATO persists because its
members—and particularly its leading states—still find utility in it. What
useful purposes might it continue to serve?

NATO as an instrument of US power

NATO rests above all on US power. It certainly could not survive a US
decision to abandon the alliance. Why does the USA remain committed to
NATO? One answer is that it continues to be a useful instrument for
advancing US interests in Europe. It organizes and orders a benign sphere of
influence, preserves a framework within which US leadership can be

4 See, e.g., Steinberg, J. B., ‘The case for a new partnership’, eds N. Gantz and J. Roper, Towards
a New Partnership: US–European Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Institute for Security Studies,
Western European Union: Paris, 1993), pp. 106–13, for a discussion of the case for abandoning the
transatlantic partnership.
exercised, and provides an efficient mechanism for the transmission of US perceptions and preferences. Moreover, the existence of NATO allows the lone superpower to act in league with many of the other rich and powerful states in the international system, none of which can easily or painlessly flout or defy the wishes of their most powerful ally (although they sometimes dissent nevertheless).

Some put the point much more starkly: in Europe, NATO is the tangible expression of US primacy, the instrument through which the USA ensures and perpetuates its hegemony. Chris Layne, for example, has written:

NATO thus serves to advance several interconnected key objectives of America’s post-Cold War European grand strategy: it provides stability for the Continent; it keeps the lid on Europe’s latent geopolitical rivalries; it creates the security environment in which economic interdependence can flourish; and it forestalls the rise of European power centers that could challenge US preponderance. That is, NATO is the instrument through which the United States perpetuates its hegemonic role in Europe.5

Whether one prefers the stark or the more genteel interpretation, the basic point is the same: NATO survives because it is an instrument of US power, and insofar as NATO continues to rest on a solid foundation of US self-interest it is likely to retain its value and durability well into the future.

Europe harnesses US power

With NATO, many European states achieved one of their basic strategic aims throughout the 20th century: linking US power to the security and stability of Europe. The United States is the balance wheel that keeps the European state system from getting out of kilter. The great weight of US power, permanently connected to Europe and tangible in the form of US forces deployed in Europe, has calmed and steadied the European system and helped to prevent the troubles and tragedies that marked the continent in the first half of the 20th century.6

Europe has always been uneasy about the firmness of the US commitment to European security, not least because Washington assumed its European role with great reluctance. Indeed, before World War II it refused any regular role in the European system and became involved only when the exigencies of major war required it, but the USA remained reluctant even after World War II and was drawn in only under European pressure. As

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6 See, e.g., Joffe, J., ‘Europe’s American pacifier’, Foreign Policy, no. 54 (spring 1984), pp. 64–82, which questions whether Europe could stand on its own without US involvement.
Marc Trachtenberg has written about the origins of NATO, ‘The Europeans were constantly trying to pull the United States in—to deepen the American military presence in Europe, to make sure the United States continued to play a fundamental role there, to build a strong NATO structure in which America was the dominant power. . . . But the Americans were wary’.\textsuperscript{7} NATO was, in Geir Lundestad’s famous phrase, an ‘empire by invitation’. Thus, if the United States has an interest in remaining in NATO, Europe has a symmetrical interest in keeping the USA in NATO. It is this mutual interest in preserving a large US role in Europe that constitutes the bedrock of support for post-cold war NATO.

\textit{NATO as insurance against a resurgent and hostile Russia}

The great experiment in Russia remains unresolved. Although the high hopes of the early post-Soviet days have been disappointed, it is still possible that a benign, democratic, market-oriented Russia will emerge from the present time of troubles, but the optimistic result is far from certain. What if the present transition produces a Russia once again hostile and menacing (at least to some European states)? This contingent, residual threat provides a rationale for preserving NATO at least until the outcome in Russia is clearer than it is today. Indeed, for the new and future Central European members of NATO, most of which spent decades if not centuries under Moscow’s yoke, even a smaller and weaker Russia will seem plenty large and strong enough to be troublesome. Moreover, who knows how strong Russia will be in 10 or 15 years. Hence, for NATO’s members from the East, obtaining a security guarantee from NATO, and thereby connecting US power to their security, means above all protection from Moscow if necessary.

For Western Europe, this would seem to be a weak though plausible concern. The new Russia, even if hostile, is smaller, weaker, more distant and lacking allies. Moscow’s forces are no longer deployed in the heart of Europe. Moscow no longer fields numerically superior forces. Moscow’s ability to project military power westward into Europe has greatly diminished. For the foreseeable future, it is hard to imagine that the states of Western Europe will be greatly animated by concern over the Russian military threat. Still, for some within the alliance—the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czechs today, the Balts and perhaps others tomorrow—NATO’s traditional purpose retains great relevance and very much serves their self-defined national security interests.

NATO as a solution to the German problem

From the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the end of World War II in 1945, the problem of German power and ambition haunted Europe. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the containment of Germany was the primary thing on most Europeans after World War II (even if the USA rapidly shifted its anxieties in the direction of the Soviet Union). For more than 20 years now, it has been recognized that the problem of Germany played a very significant role in the origins and structure of NATO. The United States could not effectively mobilize its potential European allies against the Soviet threat or get them to accept the necessity of German rearmament without first reassuring them against the German threat, and, as Timothy Ireland has written in his important book, ‘The only way that the United States could provide adequate safeguards against German revanchism was progressively to involve itself in European affairs. It was this goal that did much to determine the scope and structure of the US commitment to NATO’. As Trachtenberg says in the opening passages of his magisterial study, ‘The problem of German power lay at the heart of the Cold War; a resolution of that problem was therefore the key to the establishment of a stable international system in Europe, and ultimately in the world as a whole’. The USA’s involvement in Europe, in short, has provided a reassuring counterweight to German influence in Europe.

Here is a purpose that retains its relevance in the post-cold war era (although it is one that is awkward for those who are bound by alliance to Germany to articulate). As the Soviet Union was dying, Germany was unifying; as Soviet power was shrinking, Germany’s reach was expanding. Should the USA lose interest in Europe, Germany would stand as far the largest, most powerful and most influential state in the region. In the absence of the United States, there would still be checks on German power, but they would probably not suffice to prevent German predominance in Europe.

How much would this matter? No doubt there remains some unease in Europe at the prospect of a unified Germany achieving regional primacy. On the other hand, a common view seems to be that Germany is, to use Peter Katzenstein’s nice phrase, a ‘tamed power’. It is a stable, democratic state. It has situated its power within the European Union in ways that its neighbours find reassuring. It has been a loyal and enthusiastic participant in the creation of a West European system that many believe has made

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9 Trachtenberg (note 7), p. vii.
unthinkable war among the industrial democracies on the continent. One can argue that under these circumstances German power ought not to produce undue concern in Europe. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that NATO was the best solution to the German question that Europe was able to find in the 20th century.

**NATO as a mechanism for policy coordination**

NATO is a convenient institution for facilitating interaction among the great industrial democracies of Europe and North America. These powers have much in common: they share democratic values and often (although not always) identify shared aims in global affairs. Built up over more than five decades, NATO provides well-established mechanisms for communication, discussion, debate and decision. As one study notes, to an unprecedented degree, NATO enables ‘continuous, institutionalized consultations between the parties to the Treaty about the course to follow’.\(^\text{11}\) Accustomed to employing this set of mechanisms in transatlantic relations and accustomed to the advantages of such standing arrangements, the members of NATO may find it hard to imagine how they would manage their collective affairs without the alliance. It would seem sensible to take advantage of the useful features of an existing organization.

This role may in fact be a worthwhile by-product of NATO’s existence, but for several reasons it seems unlikely that this will be a major pillar of the case for prolonging NATO’s life. For one thing, like many large organizations, NATO is known as much for bureaucratic sclerosis and stalemate as it is for the efficiency of its operations. It is not uncommon to find the denizens of Brussels in despair over their collective inability to agree, to decide, to act. Perhaps NATO reduces the transaction costs of interaction among its member states, but this should not be taken for granted. Second, policy coordination is rooted in at least some degree of harmony of purpose, but it is often the case that the USA and Europe seek different ends. When the requisite harmony is lacking, NATO becomes an institution that facilitates bickering and recrimination rather than efficient decision making. Finally, in the post-cold war era, it remains to work out a mutually acceptable understanding of the entities whose policies and activities are being coordinated. Does NATO promote coordination between the lone hegemon and a dependent Europe deferential to the ‘necessary power’, between a rogue superpower and an increasingly autonomous Europe, or between a unilateralist Washington and an increasingly capable European pillar? The

value and attractiveness of NATO as a mechanism for coordination may depend very much on which of these images comes to predominate.

Facilitating European integration

Is NATO necessary for the EU to flourish? Some people think so. In part this is because the US commitment to Europe has produced the stability within which it has been possible gradually to build the EU. In part this is because NATO, and especially US power, has taken care of Europe’s security and allowed much of the European political elite to preoccupy itself with the construction of European institutions, but above all, there is a direct link between NATO and progress in the EU for the simple reason that many European states will avoid any steps in building Europe that might jeopardize the transatlantic link. As François Heisbourg has written, ‘A majority of [EU] members also continue to retain a strong belief in the importance of a continued strong defence relationship between Europe and the United States. These members will oppose any CFSP and EDP [European Defence Policy] that could be seen as endangering the foundations of the transatlantic link’.12

This is, however, a derivative reason for continuing to embrace NATO. It arises because EU members already value the NATO connection so much that they are unprepared to risk harming the transatlantic relationship for the sake of advancing Europe’s institutional development. Should the calculus of interests change in ways that weakened other rationales for perpetuating NATO, this rationale would fade away.

NATO expands democracy in Europe

Another argument adduced on behalf of NATO is that it is a very effective mechanism for promoting democracy in Europe—a significant proposition given that ‘enlarging’ the area of democracy was one of the core tenets of the Clinton Administration’s policy. It is, moreover, an objective that inspires wide support. The core idea here is that the prospect of NATO membership induces candidates from the eastern half of the continent to pursue liberal domestic orders. Any aspiring member must meet the NATO membership criteria. This means that they must follow democratic procedures, respect civil rights, establish civilian control of the military, and so on. The reward of NATO membership is thought to be so enticing that the process of NATO enlargement will promote and consolidate democratic developments throughout the former Warsaw Pact area.

This notion is commonplace, attractive, plausible and controversial. It was one of the more popular foreign policy platforms of the mid- and late 1990s, but there are those who doubt whether NATO is either necessary for or effective at promoting democracy. Most of the states that have asked for NATO membership are at least equally interested in joining the EU, which provides the same set of democracy-related membership criteria and also offers the inducement of possible future membership. Moreover, NATO is a military alliance with no particular expertise or comparative advantage in promoting political reform in non-member states. Further, many of the states that escaped Soviet tyranny were likely to seek democratic governance no matter what NATO’s policy. The fact that NATO only accepts functioning democracies in no way demonstrates that NATO’s policies caused democracy to develop. Whatever the analytic merits of these respective arguments, this role seems to have loomed large, at least in the US Government’s valuation of NATO.

**NATO as a bridge between East and West in Europe**

Some believe that NATO is important as a device for bringing the two halves of Europe together, for building a Europe that is ‘whole and free’. NATO has been a tremendous magnet for the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, even while retaining the loyalty of its Western members. Thus, it is an institution valued from one end of Europe to the other. Other European institutions—the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU), for example—are viewed by many as weak, unattractive or ineffective. NATO seems to be the institution of choice for all those which have a choice. In this argument, NATO can, through its enlargement and via its Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, help to overcome the division of Europe. For obvious reasons, this is another attractive role to envision for NATO.

How effective NATO can be at performing this role, however, is questionable. Members of the PFP have found it frustrating and often unsatisfactory—a limp alternative to full membership of NATO. Meanwhile, NATO’s policy of slow and episodic enlargement has the ironic effect of drawing new lines in Europe, between those which are in and those which are not and between those which may soon be in and those for which membership is

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a more distant prospect.\textsuperscript{14} If NATO’s goal is to overcome the division of Europe, then some of its policies are having counterproductive effects.

\textit{NATO as a collective security system for Europe?}

Another idea that attracted enthusiasm, especially in the first years after the end of the cold war, centred on the proposal that NATO could serve as the foundation for a collective security system in Europe—what one analysis described as a ‘pan-European order predicated on the notion of all against one’\textsuperscript{15}. Often in such schemes NATO becomes linked with the OSCE or the EU and serves as the potential enforcement mechanism for a collective security system. Alternatively, some have suggested that NATO itself could be transformed into a ‘pan-European security organization’\textsuperscript{16}.

NATO might be able to play this role and some analysts are very enthusiastic about exploring this approach. Governments, however, have had little interest in a scheme that could require them to intervene militarily everywhere organized violence erupts. If one assumes that peace will prevail widely and indefinitely in Europe, then collective security may be a cheap and easy option. However, as soon as war or large-scale violence looks like a serious possibility, then collective security becomes a potentially costly and risky exercise, one which depends on the commitment of outside powers to intervene to prevent or end conflict. No government has been eager, or even willing, to cede discretion on crucial matters of war and peace to a collaborative system. This logic helps to explain why collective security has been criticized as unreliable and ineffective\textsuperscript{17}. It also explains why this potential role for NATO has faded with the passage of time.

\textit{NATO as a conflict management instrument for the European periphery (and perhaps globally)}

NATO represents a tremendous amassing of pooled military power that can be applied in various settings for the sake of defending joint interests or to


undertake various peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities. When NATO has the will to act, it can undertake substantial and sometimes decisive interventions, as it did during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Balkans. NATO’s capabilities to engage in such operations are not in doubt so long as the USA is involved, but NATO’s resolve to perform such missions is very much in doubt, as indicated by the protracted indecisiveness about intervention in the Balkans and the protracted debate about the advisability of having NATO undertake ‘out of area’ missions.¹⁸ Many crises involve inherently messy and dangerous situations that may not be particularly amenable to resolution by the application of NATO military power. Moreover, there appears to be a limited appetite among NATO members for undertaking such missions; certainly US enthusiasm is very limited and its participation in crises such as the Balkans was slow and reluctant. Nevertheless, the record suggests that NATO will periodically get drawn into these sorts of situation. On a case-by-case basis, this is one of the roles that NATO is likely to play on occasion in the future.

Conclusions

Although its primary purpose has disappeared, there remain a number of worthwhile roles that NATO is playing or might play in policies of the transatlantic community. Some of these represent the expression of traditional interests and security calculations. Others reflect concerns that have arisen in what was once called the new world order. The most important of these roles are rooted in fundamental geostrategic interests, which is why NATO’s durability seems, for the time being, firmly rooted. Many of the other roles are of debatable importance or feasibility, although they are often congenial to policy makers and publics. It is nice to think that NATO can play such roles, even if it turns out to be not very effective in doing so, but the main point is that this collection of actual or possible roles for NATO is still sufficiently relevant and useful to provide an ongoing rationale for preserving the alliance.

During the cold war, Europe was both the major stake and the most important asset in the global competition with the Soviet Union. This is no longer true. The global order does not pivot on Europe anymore. NATO is still useful and is still in the interests of both sides of the Atlantic—as evidenced by their efforts to adapt and preserve it—but there can be no question that Europe is relatively less important and NATO less central. This is bound to have implications for the future of transatlantic relations. We are

likely to see the emergence of more divergent agendas: Europe is increasingly self-absorbed as it seeks to build its institutions and policies, while the United States increasingly looks to Asia.\textsuperscript{19} There is a higher potential for serious friction (not that it was lacking during the cold war!) because there is no longer a huge external threat that compels restraint in NATO affairs. We can expect more bruising battles over banana imports, subsidies for the Airbus, restrictions on agricultural trade and other such issues. All of this will impose a more complex managerial burden on those charged with responsibility for NATO’s affairs. Issues that once would have been submerged for the sake of alliance cohesion will burn brightly. Agendas that once overlapped substantially will have fewer points of tangency. The relationship that once was the unrivalled core preoccupation of transatlantic policy makers will drop down the list of priorities. Frictions that once would have seemed minor—bananas?—will be much more wounding.

Above all, there now exists a genuine potential to do grievous and potentially mortal harm to NATO if care is not taken to attend adequately to the maintenance of the relationship. None of the plethora of post-cold war roles for NATO, worthy though they be, is as powerful as the binding force of an enormous common threat. The alliance is still together, but the adhesive is much weaker than before. Alastair Buchan, in a prescient essay written some 35 years ago, anticipated just this circumstance: ‘Almost by definition, alliances have a limited life cycle . . . National objectives change, the threat which made it worth while to subordinate some national interests to the evolution of a collaborative policy changes also, and the strains of alliance may become too great to bear. . . . It is bound to develop internal strains once the period of clear and present danger is past’.\textsuperscript{20} The Red Army would have kept NATO together under almost all conceivable circumstances. It is now possible to wreck this alliance, through inattention, complacency, inflexibility, intolerance or ineptitude. If NATO’s member states want to save this instrument, they will have to work at it.\textsuperscript{21}


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Introduction

The aim of the NATO Washington Summit Communiqué, issued on 24 April 1999, was to define ‘an Alliance for the 21st century’, taking into account the major strategic changes of the past 10 years. Since then, defence policies have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic. Only some months later, two European summit meetings, in Cologne and in Helsinki, decided on a new institutional framework for European defence and on significant developments in Europe’s military capabilities. Both moves were confirmed and strengthened in 2000. On the part of the United States, the new US Administration will shortly decide on a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system designed to protect the USA and its allies from the threat of limited attacks. This plan remains controversial in Europe, although criticism has recently been toned down. Both initiatives have the potential to modify transatlantic relations. Finally, critical decisions should now be made on enlargement and further steps will have implications for the security map of Europe. In the coming 10 years, three factors will therefore contribute to altering the transatlantic relationship: the enlargements, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the US BMD initiative. The new alliance will be larger, able to undertake new missions and have a broader European decision-making role. It might also embrace a more defensive posture to supplement traditional deterrence. A redefinition of the alliance will be necessary to address these changes.

A larger alliance

The transatlantic relationship will be affected by the redefinition of the borders of the European Union and NATO. Although the final map of Europe ‘whole and free’ is uncertain, both institutions are likely to be substantially larger in 2015. The consequences for the transatlantic relationship are not easy to predict but the admission of new members is likely to reduce NATO’s military weight while it will enhance the EU’s security responsibilities. At the 2001 Munich Conference on European Security Policy, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated that: ‘As NATO membership is enlarged, it must at least preserve—and eventually enhance—our capacity for future action’, underlining a justified concern. The prospect of a weakened enlarged NATO, coupled with an increased US emphasis on Asia,
may lead to a distinction between the US military structure, designed to conduct military operations with very high technological content, and another type of organization, less advanced technologically, for the alliance and the EU, which would be devoted mainly to crisis management. The enlargement of NATO and the EU may also result in reducing the alliance’s credibility as the main instrument of the transatlantic political relationship. In 15 years, after the enlargements, there will likely be less emphasis on EU–NATO relations, and more on EU–US relations, since the two zones will be comparable in population, resources and wealth.

On the part of the European Union, a genuine political revolution is needed to deal with the new challenges that accompany enlargement. As a new Europe is emerging, with more security responsibilities in all the possible scenarios, the EU will have to take seriously the pledge to ‘play its full role on the international stage’. At a time when enlargement will provide Europe with fresh expertise on additional regions, its analysis and initiative capabilities in the East and South-East should be dramatically enhanced. Although assessments may differ between Europe and the USA in some areas, better analysis capabilities on the European side will improve the strategic dialogue between the two partners. Europe’s strategic planning will have to include Central Asia, a particularly unsettled region, with a large potential for exporting instability. As to the Middle East, consideration will have to be given to the existence of one of Europe’s borders at the heart of the area if Turkey joins the Union. The problems associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles will as a consequence become an increasingly important part of the picture. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons may possibly upset the European security environment, and more serious attention will have to be given to monitoring, early warning and intelligence.

Should the European Union expand much more than NATO, the EU might be compelled to make an even deeper reappraisal since NATO security guarantees would not apply to some EU countries, and Brussels might need to conclude a security agreement directly with Washington. The EU would have to address security and defence issues with a greater sense of urgency and the actual possibility of a common defence policy would then probably become a less controversial issue. However, for such an assessment to be fully plausible, there would have to be a major crisis. Experience has shown that the motivation for Europeans to make significant headway in their security and defence policies has been provided by crises, especially the Balkans tragedy during the past decade.
A more balanced alliance

On both sides of the Atlantic, the main weakness is currently that of politics. Europe is still punching much below its weight on the international scene and the USA has not produced politicians able to match its extraordinary military power. As a consequence, although Europe and the USA are the two most prosperous and stable parts of the world in a particularly fluid environment, they do not fully play their role in enhancing international peace and security. If they looked around, what would they see? They would discern humanitarian disasters in Africa, where the Western contribution to peacekeeping operations is minimal; increased violence in the Middle East with the USA no longer seriously involved in the peace process; the return of an authoritarian regime in Russia—with the West perceived as selling out Russian democracy in exchange for the benefits of stable relations with Moscow—while the main role of Europe and the USA vis-à-vis Russia is its assimilation into the democratic space; instability in Northern Africa in the midst of indifference; and thorny strategic issues in East Asia, a region receiving contradictory messages from Washington and no attention from Europe.

Three main lessons can be drawn from the above:

1. Europe should decisively move in the direction of further political integration and reform of EU governance.
2. The USA should beware of the gap between high technology and mediocre strategy.
3. Both sides should deal with international issues better by sharing power and responsibilities.

Europe’s dependency on the USA tends to narrow its strategic horizon, which is clearly detrimental to the alliance. In addition, Europe’s strategic environment is fluid. Its relations with both the South and the East will remain problematic for at least two decades. It may also have to intervene far away from the European territory. The political vision of its international role should therefore be enhanced in a decisive manner. Following economic and monetary integration, Europe can now only derive its impetus from major advances in political integration. This long-delayed reappraisal is made necessary by the Union’s expansion itself. Using the most familiar European terms, Europe should deepen because it widens. In a tiny Europe, its political vacuum would have been less obvious. Institutional conservatism is sure to be accompanied by political paralysis and lack of vision.

In the defence area, the European Council is committed to acquire the capacity for autonomous military action where the alliance as a whole is not
engaged in the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. This autonomy should be backed up by credible military forces. If the resolve of the European Union is to be fulfilled, the size of the European budgets, all declining with the exception of the British, should be better protected. The allies must now put a floor under falling defence expenditures. The targets set by the headline goals for the troops (a total pool of 200,000 available troops for sustaining 60,000 troops in the field for a year) as well as for command and control, intelligence and strategic transport are ambitious, but European defence resources are still vastly inadequate. Sustained efforts will also be needed to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base and to harmonize military requirements.

In the coming 10 years, European military autonomy will not mean much except in limited crises, and a developing European force will require NATO assets during this period. Only the USA currently has the airlift, reconnaissance and intelligence equipment to make a military mission feasible, reflecting the division of labour between Europe and the United States during the cold war. In the long run, however, the process of European unification may produce a more coherent contribution in the transatlantic ‘burden sharing’ equation and more useful and reliable partners for the USA. The time when an increased European defence profile would be in competition with NATO may never materialize, contrary to fears in the USA, but European security and defence policy will eventually create more equal relations. Within the European security organizations as well as during crises, there will be less reliance on the US political leadership. A more cooperative political environment will be needed within the alliance to draw the necessary conclusions. Calling upon Europeans to become greater partners will require the USA to temper the predominant leadership role that it used to practice during the cold war under extraordinary strategic circumstances.

European defence is also about new diplomatic capabilities. Europe’s ability to deal diplomatically with international crises will improve as its military capabilities expand. As in the famous quotation of the UN Secretary-General, ‘one can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up with firmness and force’. Strategies aimed at preventing conflicts should evolve as well. Non-military dimensions of security are more familiar to the European Union than to NATO, but Europe and the USA could jointly address issues of particular concern, among them Russia’s ecological and public health crisis, which has serious potential security consequences.
REDEFINITION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

A shielded alliance?

The United States spent considerable time in 2000 to convince the European nations of the necessity of BMD and the interest of the allies themselves to follow suit. It claimed that different policies would increase the already large disparity in defence matters between the USA and Europe, and that US and European interests would risk becoming divergent if the USA is protected against small-scale missile attacks and Europe is not. A new US team is initiating consultations in Europe in May, before NATO’s informal summit meeting on 13 June, on a modified ‘multilayered’ plan aimed at protecting the USA and its allies.

With one major exception (US security commitments abroad), Europe appears more exposed than the USA to new threats arising from ballistic missile proliferation, but the Europeans would never ask themselves whether they need missile defences or not if the USA had not embarked on a major BMD initiative. The process of creating a rapid-reaction force concentrates both European energy and European financial means. In addition, Europe has always been more vulnerable than the USA and the idea that offensive means always get through defences is widespread. However, the reservations refer essentially to territorial defence. The need to protect troops in coalition operations or to develop point defences at key locations are less controversial. That defences can be a coupling factor if they create conditions for joint military operations abroad is not challenged.

Reservations have been toned down in 2001 at a time when the US determination to go ahead with the initiative was confirmed, but the project can still divide the allies: Europe is unwilling to open a debate on this subject because of divergent opinions on defence issues and the possible impacts on defence budgets. Most Europeans tend to believe that missile defences are too costly, both financially and politically, without providing an effective protection against missile attacks. In addition, should the new administration proceed with the former project, as part of a wider scheme, two European states, Denmark and the United Kingdom, would be requested to approve the modernization of early-warning radars located on their territories. This would make them active participants in the defence of US territory and, to some extent, in decisions related to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. While leaving the decision to the countries concerned, many Europeans consider that such participation would decrease rather than increase European security. Finally, Europe would not like to be caught again between Washington and Russia in a diplomatic and strategic battle.

The debate on ballistic missile defences could evolve in the coming years according to the following parameters:
The relaxed European position could be the result of a relaxed security environment and a crisis involving weapons of mass destruction might change current perceptions. In the meantime, is Europe doing what it could and should do in order to prevent a more threatening situation in the coming decades?

The technology can also evolve: some decades ago, the advocates of air power also contended that bombers would always accomplish their mission, an assertion radars and missiles proved wrong. If defences eventually work, it might become increasingly difficult to sustain the proposition that ‘killing weapons is bad’, while ‘killing people is good’.

Europe is still deeply dependent on the USA in imagery intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications. If the European security environment deteriorates, better early-warning capabilities might become essential.

Defences may proliferate and become more widespread in the coming years, encouraging Europe to revise its stance and embark on defensive programmes as well. Upgrading offensive capabilities would reverse the current trend in Europe as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned and would meet opposition within Europe from a number of nations. In addition, it would appear justifiable only if the spread of ballistic missile defences would significantly reduce the assurance that European deterrent forces remain effective. This is not currently the case and will most probably not be in the next 20 years.

Finally, if an ‘Allied Missile Defense’ plan is eventually adopted by NATO, with the allies as an integral part of the system, then ‘extended defence’ might become a supplement to the former ‘extended deterrence’ and a new doctrine should be defined.

**Conclusions**

It is undesirable to look for a compromise before the June NATO summit meeting whereby Europeans would acquiesce on missile defence and the Bush Administration would support European military force. Increased European capabilities are a political imperative for both sides of the Atlantic and missile defences should be recognized as useful by the allies only if they increase the alliance’s security.

Similarly, limiting the Europeans to Europe while the USA would take care of the rest of the world would pose a serious risk of decoupling the alliance in the coming decades. Europe should be encouraged to participate in global contingencies via its rapid-reaction force, while the USA should stay in Europe although at a reduced level. The United Nations might need the
Europeans outside Europe and they should be ready to fulfil their role beyond the Balkans.

The road to new EU–US and EU–NATO relations is fraught with many obstacles, but Western partners and institutions should be guided by their main goal: exporting stability. The world evolves more quickly than their internal quarrels, and they need to address these evolutions if they do not want to be overwhelmed by them.

The United States, reluctant today to envisage the ESDP as anything other than a totally reliable adjunct to NATO, might welcome European autonomy in the future if more pressing problems appear in the Middle East and East Asia, where vital US security interests are involved.

The temptation on both sides of the Atlantic to protect internal stability and prosperity with a relative indifference to the rest of the world might grow with the evolution of Western demography and the significant ageing of the European and US populations, but it might be difficult to escape international responsibilities. The new US Administration came into office determined to focus on the domestic agenda, but it is being asked to address one crisis after the other. The votes may be in the United States, but most of the problems are abroad. Europe will probably come to the same conclusion as it expands eastward and southward.
Guiding assumptions

The emerging Atlantic relationship will be quite different from what it was in the past 50 years because of two fundamental changes in the geopolitical landscape. The first fundamental change is the rise of a stronger and more self-confident Europe. The European Union is reaching a new stage in its evolution that will, in my estimation, lead to increased political cohesion, more autonomy and a desire for greater influence in the international arena. I base this assessment on the following observations.

1. The EU has completed the formation of a single market and the introduction of a single currency. The euro declined by roughly 20 per cent during 1999–2000, largely because of the inflow of European capital to the United States. The euro is now likely to strengthen as a result of the slowing of the US economy, gradually establishing its place as one of the world’s major reserve currencies. The EU is also expected to enjoy stronger economic growth than the United States in 2001. The collective gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU will soon surpass the GDP of the United States.

2. The EU is continuing to pursue internal reforms that will provide for more efficient decision making and prepare the way for enlargement. The recent Nice summit meeting fell short of expectations on this front, but the EU is expanding the use of qualified majority voting, strengthening the power of the European Parliament and taking steps to reinforce the identity of Brussels as its collective capital. A debate is also under way on the drafting of an EU constitution.

3. The EU has embarked on a serious effort to forge a common security policy and acquire the military forces needed to back it up. Javier Solana is the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU is in the midst of building a rapid-reaction force of some 60 000 troops. It has also been flexing its diplomatic muscle of late. The EU has offered to step in to facilitate negotiations on the Korean peninsula. It took the diplomatic lead during the recent crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and it is working hard to strengthen its ties to Russia.

4. Great Britain, after decades of keeping its distance from Europe, is gradually becoming one of the EU’s leading members. Prime Minister Tony Blair was a key player behind the new initiative on the defence front. It is
only a matter of time before Great Britain joins the euro zone. The EU will be immeasurably strengthened by strong British participation.

5. The EU enjoys enormous allure among Europe’s new democracies. All the countries of Central Europe are preparing for membership, providing the EU with a great deal of influence throughout the region.

6. European politicians are beginning to use arguments about Europe’s place in the world to legitimate the project of European integration. For the past 50 years, the need to escape Europe’s bloody past was the main justification for integration, but this argument now carries little weight among younger Europeans, who have no past from which they seek to escape. The new legitimating task for the EU is focused on the future and projecting Europe’s voice on the world stage. As Tony Blair has stated, ‘Europe’s citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power’.1

In the light of the maturation of the EU, the United States has in Europe a stronger and more capable partner. At the same time, as Europe seeks a new station and a voice commensurate with that new station, the potential for rivalry with the United States also increases. Both sides will need to work to ensure that partnership prevails over rivalry.

The second fundamental change I foresee in the geopolitical landscape is the emergence of a new and more selective brand of internationalism in the United States. I believe that US internationalism has reached a high-water mark and will be on a downward trajectory in the years ahead. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been the chief guardian and peacemaker in virtually every quarter of the globe—a level of engagement that I do not consider to be sustainable over the long term. From this perspective, the activist and wide-ranging foreign policies of the 1990s are likely to be an aberration, a legacy of the cold war, more than a good predictor of the future. This evaluation is based on the following considerations.

1. The United States today faces no major external adversary or peer challenger. This benign strategic environment, as it cycles through domestic politics, is likely to induce the country to seek to lighten the burden of global engagement.

2. The US economy has begun to slow after successive years of unprecedented growth. The accompanying constraints on resources and political will are likely to produce a somewhat less ambitious brand of internationalism.

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3. President George W. Bush was elected by states in the south and west that have historically been less internationalist than states in the north-east and on the west coast. These states are also some of the fastest growing in the country in demographic terms. Early indications are that President Bush will be pursuing a more selective foreign policy than his predecessors, having already backed off somewhat from mediating conflicts on the Korean peninsula and in the Balkans, Middle East, and Northern Ireland.

4. Americans who came of age after the cold war are now entering the work force and rising to positions of prominence. They will not bring to the table the historical experiences—World War II, the rebuilding of Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall—that have provided a ready foundation for US internationalism over the past decades. Younger Americans, raised in a globalized world, are unlikely to be isolationist, but they may well support a more discriminating brand of international engagement than their elders.

I believe that the forging of a new and more selective brand of internationalism is healthy for the USA. It is not a sign of a worrisome isolationism. Rather, it represents a necessary search for a new level of international engagement that befits a new strategic environment and that is politically sustainable over the long term. Indeed, deliberately crafting a new internationalism is the best way to avoid the isolationism that could potentially result from a USA that overreaches and tries to do too much.

Europe, precisely because of the success of the European Union in bringing prosperity and peace to the continent, is the part of the world that will feel the strongest effects of this new brand of US internationalism. Europe is today no less important to the United States than during the previous half century, but it remains hard to make the case that the United States should remain Europe’s primary guardian when the EU’s collective wealth is surpassing that of the USA and when it faces far more pressing threats in the Middle East and East Asia than it does in Europe. The USA’s reluctant participation in the war over Kosovo and its continuing ambivalence towards the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans are clear signs that the USA is in the midst of altering its strategic priorities and reconsidering its dominant strategic role in Europe.

The rise of a stronger Europe and the evolution of a new and more selective US internationalism promise to have a profound effect on the Atlantic link. Indeed, I believe that the traditional Atlantic bargain—the USA keeps the peace while the EU focuses on economic and political integration—is rapidly coming undone. If the Atlantic link is to remain strong, a new and more balanced bargain is urgently needed, one that will require hard work by both sides.
Europe will have to redouble its efforts to forge a common position on foreign and defence policy. It will also have to devote sufficient political and economic resources to ensure that it builds its rapid-reaction force in a timely and effective manner. The United States will have to make room for a stronger EU and accord it more influence in step with increases in Europe’s collective political will and its military capabilities. If the Atlantic link is to remain strong into this new century, it must evolve into a more mature and balanced partnership. The next few years represent a critical window of opportunity for both Europe and the United States to get right this important transition.

Completing the European project

Accordingly, the United States should give Europe an unequivocal green light on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and outline a new Atlantic bargain that consists of the United States granting Europe more influence in return for Europe’s acquisition of military capability. Washington is right to insist on close and transparent defence links between the United States and the EU. Washington is also justified in arguing that NATO should have the right of first refusal and that the EU should act independently only when the United States chooses not to engage. After all, consultation before action is what a mature and balanced partnership is all about.

Most US reservations about European defence are simply misplaced. US officials have told Europeans not to duplicate existing assets, but they must do so if they are to develop the capability to operate without US forces. US officials have told the EU not to caucus and form a collective position, but Europe must do so if it is to act with a single, coherent voice. US officials express concern that Europe will go off on its own when it has the ability to act autonomously, but it is Europe, not the United States, that should be the worried suitor. Europe is building what will still be a small military force and will want US participation in virtually every conceivable operation.

The main threat to the Atlantic link stems from too little Europe, not too much. The United States should welcome, indeed it should insist upon, a robust and effective European defence force.

Allow me to make a few brief remarks about missile defence before turning to the Balkans. If handled correctly, missile defence has the potential to strengthen the Atlantic link. If mishandled, it has the potential to strain the relationship and polarize the debate over the ESDP. The United States should observe three guidelines as it seeks to manage with the EU the ongoing debate over missile defence.
1. Consult early and often. Just as the United States expects and deserves to be fully consulted as the ESDP moves forward, the EU expects and deserves to be consulted as the USA’s missile defence programme develops. The EU has recently changed its position; rather than opposing deployment, it is now prepared to engage the United States in substantive dialogue. The United States should take advantage of this opportunity to work towards a common position.

2. Proceed slowly and deliberately. The Europeans were justifiably concerned by the extent to which the pressures of an election year led to a rushed and incomplete US debate on missile defence. Especially because tests are still proceeding and missile defence technology is still in a developmental stage, the USA should take a paced and measured approach to a decision about both the timing and the nature of deployment.

3. Develop boost-phase technology and focus on multilateral deployment. A boost-phase system, by intercepting missiles soon after launch rather than as they approach a target state, protects all potential target states, not just the one deploying the system. In this sense, its benefits are shared by all and its deployment is therefore more likely to win widespread approval. Boost-phase intercept is also far more difficult to circumvent than intercept later in flight. Deployment of joint, multilateral systems will ease fears that the United States is seeking to protect only itself or gain unilateral strategic advantage, thereby substantially decreasing the likelihood that deployment triggers a new arms race. The United States should explore with the EU and with Russia proposals for sharing early-warning systems and intercept technology.

South-Eastern Europe

In order to ensure that the Balkans have finally experienced their last war, the United States should be guided by three principles:

1. Prepare for a long stay. Integration into Europe’s mainstream offers the best hope for a lasting peace in the Balkans. Although the EU is already playing a leading role in peacekeeping and reconstruction, it will take a long time—perhaps generations—before integration works its pacifying effects. In the meantime, the United States should be prepared to stay the course and keep at least a small contingent of troops in the region. US participation is important for the credibility of and momentum behind the mission. Even after the bloodshed has receded into the past, neither the United States nor Europe can afford to let the region fall off the political radar screen.
2. Keep an open mind on the question of redrawing borders. The United States and its partners in the Balkans have understandably been reluctant to broach the question of redrawing borders; doing so has the potential to provoke a new round of instability and bloodshed. At the same time, the issue will not go away and addressing it sooner rather than later could facilitate efforts to attain a self-sustaining regional order. Kosovo has already achieved de facto independence from Serbia. It is very likely to end up either as an autonomous republic in a very loose Yugoslav federation or as an independent state. Montenegro may ultimately move towards independence. In Bosnia, the Dayton process and years of political pressure and economic assistance from the international community simply have not produced the multi-ethnic integration necessary to establish a self-sustaining, unitary state. If the political stalemate in Bosnia continues, it will at some point make sense for the international community to consider other options, including the redrawing of boundaries.

3. Place more emphasis on rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. Greek–Turkish rapprochement, which gained steam after the devastating earthquake in Turkey in 1999, now appears to be losing momentum. The United States and the EU should urgently press both parties to resume the process of reconciliation. Rapprochement between Ankara and Athens would immeasurably improve the chances for resolution of a divided Cyprus, would facilitate peace efforts in the Balkans and would repair an age-old political cleavage that continues to plague South-Eastern Europe.

**NATO and NATO enlargement**

Now that the first round of enlargement has been completed, I believe that it should continue. NATO has established itself as the main vehicle for establishing a new Atlantic security order and expectations of entry have been raised throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The prospect of membership also provides NATO with a great deal of leverage in these regions; countries hopeful of joining are settling border disputes, proceeding with democratization, protecting their minority populations and undertaking other welcome preparatory steps.

I would, however, predicate the continuation of NATO enlargement on the following important shift in policy—that NATO enlargement becomes a vehicle for Russia’s integration into Europe, not a cause of its alienation and exclusion. Current NATO policy maintains that the alliance is open to all European countries that qualify. I believe it is time to take this statement seriously and to begin laying the groundwork for Russia’s eventual inclusion in the alliance.
I am fully aware that Russia is far from meeting the criteria for membership; indeed, anti-democratic forces appear for now to be on the rise. I am also fully supportive of the desire of all the countries of Central Europe, including the Baltic states, to join NATO. However, I am deeply troubled by the prospect of a continuing process of NATO enlargement that succeeds only in alienating Russia from the West and redividing Europe. To be sure, NATO is a defensive alliance and has no intention of doing harm to Russia, but international politics is very much about perceptions. Russia is justified in feeling uncomfortable with the expansion of NATO towards its borders, just as the United States would be if a third party formed a military alliance with Canada and Mexico.

Based on these suppositions, I would recommend the following approach to NATO’s continuing enlargement. I believe that NATO should proceed with a second wave of enlargement next year. This round of enlargement should keep the process moving forward while buying time for Russian reform to proceed. Concurrent with the second round, NATO should begin a serious dialogue with Russia about its eventual membership. A detailed work plan should be mapped out. A timetable should be drafted; perhaps 2015 would serve as an initial target date for Russia’s accession.

Should Russia ultimately join NATO, the alliance would function quite differently from how it functions today. It would by then have a host of new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than being focused on the territorial defence of members, it would serve as a more informal and flexible vehicle for coordinating military activities and preserving peace across Europe, but this looser and broader NATO would be in keeping with a much more benign strategic landscape and a Europe that is no longer so dependent upon the United States to ensure its security.
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Introduction

There is an air of uncertainty in US–European relations. In material economic terms, the United States and the European Union continue to matter a lot to each other. The EU is the main source of US foreign direct investment and an important buyer of treasury bills. Transatlantic mergers are increasing, and European firms from Bertelsmann to Daimler have become engaged, although not effortlessly, in the US markets. The transatlantic economic problems which exist are linked to ‘hormone beef’ and the like and appear comparatively small now that the ‘big banana war’ is over and the USA has cancelled its ban on importing certain European luxury goods.

If things are all right, why, then, speak of uncertainty? The reason is that the future goals and strategies of the transatlantic partners are poorly defined. Washington has replaced specific strategies by repeated rhetorical references to US national interests. Europe and Japan cannot but notice with concern the statement of President George W. Bush in Quebec that in future the USA will stress its economic relations with the western hemisphere as a counterweight to its other partners.

The goals of the EU are more specific: enlargement, crisis management and institutional consolidation. However, the large problems of the future political shape and the depth of integration remain undecided. Neither can one say that the Union has a clearly defined concept of its external relations and the strategy to conduct them.

The economic future

The economic horizon is misty in many respects; there is an expectation of a stock market verdict that the recession never came after all and that the threat is now surely over. However, the verdict has failed to be made. The economic future of Japan, the EU and the USA are now more interdependent than they have been for a long time. Japan is stuck in a no-growth economy, and there is genuine fear that its stagnation will feed the recession-prone US economy, which is also suffering from a massive trade deficit.

The significant European economic recovery, or rather the expectation of it, lasted for six months at most. The European economy now also seems to be in decline. In this situation, it is vital both for the EU and the USA that
their economic relationship continues to function smoothly. This is important because future problems may be worse than most people believe. Pessimists predict, for instance, a transatlantic banking crisis, possibly also involving the Japanese banks, and one which will require governmental action to bail out failing financial institutions.

However, effective transatlantic action cannot be taken for granted. For instance, the dollar–euro exchange rate is unpredictable. There is uncertainty about whether the Bush Administration will continue to sponsor a strong dollar or whether it will prefer to weaken the dollar in order to encourage export and reduce the trade deficit.

The future of EU–US relations

Politically, it is also uncertain how the Bush Administration plans to handle its relations with Europe. A tough policy towards China and, to a lesser extent, Russia would necessitate a close US working relationship with the EU and Japan. The pressure from Central Europe and the Baltic countries to continue NATO enlargement would also speak in favour of a cooperative relationship.

One would think that the greater readiness of the Bush Administration to confront Russia over a variety of political and military issues, including nuclear and arms exports to Iran, would enhance the prospects of the Baltic countries joining NATO in 2002 or soon thereafter. If this is the case, then Berlin’s attitude becomes pivotal as it is difficult to believe that NATO would expand eastward without Germany’s consent. Such an agreement would, in turn, test Germany’s emerging relationship with Russia.

In practice, obstacles to a good working relationship between the United States and the EU should not be insurmountable. Much has been made of the remark by Bush during the presidential election campaign that US forces should be withdrawn from Bosnia and Kosovo and that they should be earmarked for use in big wars which the Europeans do not have the resources and stomach to fight. The Bush Administration has also continued to express reservations about the new crisis management capability of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is now steadily moving towards implementation in 2003.

Neither of these issues needs to be a serious problem. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, at least, seems to understand that this is not the right time to withdraw US forces from the Balkans. The risk of instability there is too real to warrant such a decision. Montenegro’s potential declaration of independence could exacerbate its conflict with Serbia; slow progress of reconciliation in inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia could again lead to
destabilizing events; and the future of Kosovo and Bosnia remains essentially unresolved. The Bush Administration seems to be covering itself politically by withdrawing a small number of US troops from Sinai instead of the Balkans.

In a situation like this the presence of both European and US peacekeepers is essential for the stability of the Balkans and the continuing viability of NATO. The latter point should not be underestimated; to justify its existence NATO should continue to do practical work. Peace operations are almost the only commonly acceptable practical task it can perform currently. Even then disagreements will arise within the alliance, as recently happened on the issue of whether Serbian troops should be permitted to enter the disengagement zone in the Presevo Valley.

The EU force does not create a significant stumbling block either. The USA is no doubt concerned about its future influence in Europe, while the Europeans have felt, even before Bush, that the US commitment to crisis management on the continent is not altogether credible. In Europe there seems to be a common perception that there is a long-term declining trend in this regard. Therefore, it makes sense to develop a European force that can take responsibility for peace operations when needed.

The preferences of the 15 members of the EU and the 19 members of NATO are not always easy to coordinate, but it is difficult to see how the EU and NATO could ultimately fail to agree on the establishment and employment of a European force. It is difficult to imagine that in the foreseeable future the EU could start an autonomous peace operation without US logistical and political support. Therefore the EU and the USA cannot but cooperate, both in political and military terms, in European crisis management; and both sides know that well.

The ESDP and the US National Missile Defense programme

The only US precondition for its support of the ESDP is that it should not undermine NATO or, as Colin Powell said on 17 January 2001, ‘we will support any effort as long as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it’. In concrete terms this probably means that defence planning should remain NATO’s prerogative, which may be difficult for some EU countries to accept. The reason is that military planning is closely related to military production where a new round of competition seems to be starting between US and European companies. This competition will increasingly have commercial aspects, although the political factor cannot be easily eliminated from defence procurement.
If agreement can be reached on peace operations and the ESDP, is the National Missile Defense (NMD) programme the issue that is keeping the USA and the EU far apart? The answer to this question is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. In some European countries there are profound reservations about the US effort to abandon the policy of mutual vulnerability as regards nuclear weapons. In Europe there is also genuine concern that Russia would react in a strong and adverse manner to Washington’s decision to start deploying an NMD. However, these concerns do not need to lead to the breakup of the transatlantic relationship; much depends on how the Bush Administration decides to handle the NMD issue. In order to address European concerns the Bush Administration has begun to talk about an ‘allied’ missile defence instead of the ‘national’ one.

NMD and the ABM Treaty

In Europe the opinion is growing that it is the sovereign right of the United States to decide whether it wants to deploy an NMD system or not. However, if the decision is affirmative, Washington should move in a manner that does not violate existing treaties, including the bilateral US–Russian 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. If it becomes necessary to withdraw from the treaty to deploy NMD that should be done by renegotiating it with Russia instead of the unilateral abrogation which some key officials in the Bush Administration have called for. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has stated this goal clearly: it is ‘important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’.

The renegotiation strategy would ensure that Moscow’s voice is heard and that Russia thus remains committed to the new treaty. In any case, Russia currently has enough intercontinental missiles to penetrate a US NMD. An important but little discussed issue in this context is the Bush campaign pledge to reduce, even unilaterally, the number of nuclear weapons in a significant way. The fact that reductions are a part of the larger package is seen in the joint statement of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush in February 2001: the optimal strategy would ‘encompass both offensive and defensive systems, continue nuclear reductions where possible, and strengthen WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and missile proliferation controls and counterproliferation measures’.

It will be interesting to see whether the pledge to cut back strategic arsenals holds in the USA despite internal opposition and, if so, how the cut-back would be implemented. One alarming possibility is that the reductions in strategic missiles will be accompanied by the development of small, earth-penetrating nuclear devices that can be used in a limited mode against
‘rogue states’. This would mean the return of the limited-war doctrines to the international vocabulary.

The new US position

If the key problems on the transatlantic agenda—including peace operations, the ESDP and NMD—can be potentially solved by consultation and adjustment of policies, what then is the problem? The problem does not concern so much the issues as the structure and style of politics on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States the new administration and the US Senate are moving towards a position that stresses US sovereignty and unilateral national interests. In this view, these interests can never be subservient to a higher authority even if of a practical nature. Unipolarity may be a fact of life in today’s international relations, but Washington should not practice it too openly. If there is to be a robust transatlantic partnership, it can only exist among political equals.

According to the unilateralist position, only the United States, in practice its president and the Senate, can decide what is good for the country; there is no need to consult the allies. Politically, however, consultation is a key issue; in an alliance, its members have a legitimate right to expect that their views are heard and taken into account in decision making even if the outcome may be different from that preferred by the allies. The ‘consultation gap’ is further deepened by the ‘value gap’ which has opened up between the USA and Europe on such matters as the death penalty, social equity and genetically modified food.

It should be added that the Bush Administration seems to be divided on the style and goals of its foreign policy; it includes both diplomatic conservatives and tough-minded strategists of whom the latter seem to hold more influence. In essence, all the initiatives that Europeans have not liked have come from outside the State Department, either from the White House or from the Defense Department. In a crisis which touches upon vital US interests and not just its prestige, such as the spy plane incident with China has mostly done, there is a real possibility that Washington will react toughly and in a manner that cannot but increase uneasiness and frustration in transatlantic relations.

The European response

On the part of Europe, there is generally no interest in leaving NATO or a collaborative relationship with the USA, although a kind of mental–political autonomy is increasing in Europe. Of the major European countries, this
concerns not only France, but also Britain and Germany. The Blair Government has been ‘more European’ than almost any of its predecessors as witnessed, for instance, by its actions at Saint Malo. It is also unlikely that Blair, if he stays in power, and Bush can develop a rapport similar to that of Blair and former President Bill Clinton, who share similar political beliefs.

In Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder represents a new generation which can act more freely in Europe without needing to fear that old political memories will be invoked to contain the country, although France continues to have its old complexes about Berlin. Germany is even willing to take on the United States, as happened recently in the meeting between Bush and Schröder when the latter lectured Bush on the importance of supporting and moving ahead with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The Bush decision to withdraw from the Kyoto process has been the strongest single reminder to the Europeans that the USA is ready to ride alone.

Conclusions

In summary, the transatlantic relationship will continue to work much as it has in the past. In the economic field, both the USA and the EU will continue to cooperate in the efforts to launch the next World Trade Organization round even though they have deep mutual disagreements on agriculture, services and electronic trade. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that an economic recession and the misalignment of currencies will create tensions that will also have political repercussions.

Politically, most of the issues on the EU-US agenda seem to be capable of resolution. If Washington shows moderation in its approach to NMD (i.e., is ready to talk with Russia and does not plan a truly nationwide system, at least in this phase) even that bone of contention can be buried on the bottom of the Atlantic. However, if in future crises the Bush Administration resorts to measures that are considered excessive in Europe and which threaten to exacerbate the problem, a dent will be made in transatlantic relations. The political impact would be amplified by the fact that, in relative terms, the political and military relevance of the transatlantic relationship is in decline.

Justified or not, Europeans continue to fear President Bush’s lack of international experience and his conservative and unilateral leanings in dealing with countries whose interests and values differ from those of the United States. On the other hand, the calm way in which the Bush Administration handled the spy plane crisis and its apparent caution in delivering weapons
to Taiwan have somewhat eased these concerns and created hope that pru-
dence will prevail in Washington.

The biggest challenge to the EU countries is the need to develop a com-
mon vision, capability and strategy for foreign relations. The international
credibility and internal coherence of the EU cannot stand another debacle
reminiscent of Yugoslavia in 1991. Currently, there is no assurance that the
European inability to act has finally been overcome.

In transatlantic relations, the EU faces a dilemma. If it is too weak and
indecisive, it will be blamed for the human and material costs of inaction in
crises. If, on the other hand, the EU develops an adequate capability and
political commitment to act, then the USA will probably criticize it for
weakening the Atlantic alliance. In this situation, the EU and its member
states must strike a careful balance between its own capabilities and the
management of transatlantic relations. The USA does not face the same
dilemma as Europe and cannot demand from it the same loyalty Washington
expects from its allies. In that political sense, the transatlantic relationship
continues to be fundamentally imbalanced.
Summary of the discussions of the Frösunda Conference
Summary of the discussions of the Frösunda Conference

SHANNON N. KILE (SIPRI–USA) and ZDZISLAW LACHOWSKI (SIPRI–Poland)

I. Introduction

The substantive presentations and discussions at the conference were divided into three sessions. The general aims of these sessions can be summarized as follows:

- to assess the role played by and the consequences of enlarging NATO and the European Union for security in Europe as well as expectations regarding these two organizations cherished by states which are not and/or will not become their members;
- to examine the extent of the emerging role of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an instrument for EU conflict prevention and crisis management efforts or as the inception of a broader European security policy framework;
- to consider the changing nature and security priorities of the transatlantic partnership and the likely future roles of the United States and Europe within that partnership.

A wide range of viewpoints were expressed during the discussions that reflected differing and sometimes rival perspectives on the central security challenges and tasks confronting Europe as it ushers in the new century. The summary presented below attempts to indicate the main contours of the discussions and to highlight some of the principal issues that emerged from them.

II. European security: consequences of NATO and EU enlargements

It was generally agreed that NATO and the European Union have emerged as the twin pillars of political, economic and military stability in post-cold war Europe. In the view of many participants, one of the main European security challenges today is to forge a cooperative, non-confrontational approach to enlarging the memberships of these organizations that does not foment new antagonisms and divisions.
In pursuit of a ‘security community’

Adam Daniel Rotfeld pointed out that as a result of internal transformations and enlarged memberships of NATO and the EU, these organizations have acquired new functions in shaping European security. A key question is how to institutionalize relations between the two as the main structures of political, military and economic stability. This involves three aspects:

• defining the capacities of NATO and the EU in the context of the latter’s new role in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management;
• harmonizing the roles of NATO and the EU with those of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and so on in the context of regional security; and
• promoting rapprochement and further cooperation between NATO and the EU and Russia, Ukraine and other non-member states.

Rotfeld said that one common element of the EU and NATO enlargements is the principle of inclusiveness. NATO has focused more on its practical activities in reducing tension and stabilizing security in Europe through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace than determining who will receive the invitation to join the alliance and when. The enlargement of the EU is finally overcoming the post-1945 division imposed on Europe and will help prevent the creation of new divisions. Leaving aside questions about differences in the scope and timing of new admissions to NATO and the EU, these enlargement processes ultimately share the same aim: to consolidate security and enhance stability in Europe. Regarding Russia’s position on the enlargement processes Rotfeld advised that Russia should stop thinking in balance-of-power terms and instead pursue a more cooperative relationship.

Walther Stützle agreed that NATO has assumed new roles and tasks in enhancing stability in Europe. However, its core task—collective defence—remains unchanged. Hence, applicants for a second round of enlargement must be evaluated in terms of their potential contribution to fulfilling this task; military performance criteria are also important in the light of the alliance’s active engagement in peacekeeping operations, as emphasized in the 1999 NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative.

In Stützle’s view, the enlargements of NATO and the EU cannot be seen as mechanical operations proceeding in accordance with a formal model; rather, they are historical processes of a unique character. These enlargements are mutually reinforcing: the EU, for example, contributes to security in a wider sense by promoting political and economic stability. The EU is
now taking its first steps towards developing a common defence policy within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); this is an ineluctable part of the logic of the integration process without which there can be no real political union. It is in the interests of both the USA and Russia for this enterprise to succeed: for the USA, a strong EU can become a genuine partner; for Russia, it can make a vital contribution to the fitful process of domestic reform.

John Roper saw the process of progressive NATO and EU enlargements as having three main consequences. First, it extends to the countries of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe a sense of integration in a ‘security community’. Second, it is resulting in the creation of a variety of more or less formal relationships (e.g., the EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) between EU and NATO member states and non-member states. With respect to NATO, these relationships have to some extent blurred the distinction between membership and non-membership and are considered by some to provide a sort of implicit security guarantee. Finally, the enlargement process is complicating NATO’s relations with Russia. In this regard, there will be a continuing problem to manage the simultaneous tasks of enlarging the alliance and preserving a viable security partnership with Moscow. Roper noted that EU enlargement is more predictable and more difficult, while NATO enlargement is characterized by less predictability and less certainty.

Borys Tarasyuk said that the enlargements of NATO and the EU were ‘objectively motivated’ by the fundamental geopolitical changes that took place with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The consequences of the dual enlargements have been mixed. On the one hand, they have facilitated positive economic and social reforms. They have also contributed to a shared sense of responsibility for security matters and to resolving disputes between neighbouring states. On the other hand, they threaten to create new divisions and to leave some states isolated on the European periphery. He added that NATO enlargement has also fuelled anti-Western sentiment in Russia (also stressed by Tatyana Parkhalina), which is impeding the process of democratization there.

In Tarasyuk’s view, the concept of inclusiveness is of paramount importance: NATO and the EU must think strategically and not push away states with less than fully democratic regimes. He claimed that the latter states’ weaknesses should be treated with greater tolerance by the West. This will require the development of partnership and other forms of cooperation arrangements not only with states that currently aspire to NATO and/or EU membership, but also with other states as well.
Engaging Russia in Europe

*Alexei G. Arbatov* noted that NATO enlargement is an enlargement of a collective defence perimeter: those countries beyond this perimeter, in particular Russia, cannot help but feel threatened by it. This in turn can lead to new lines of division forming in Europe. One possible Russian response to the Baltic states joining NATO, for example, would be to move to strengthen its union with Belarus, including creation of joint armed forces.

Arbatov proposed an admittedly ‘radical idea’, namely, that the allies should engage Russia in discussion on the possibility of eventual NATO membership. The aim would be to establish a long-term dialogue that would transform the domestic Russian debate about NATO enlargement: that debate would no longer be focused on what retribution could be taken against NATO as it accepts new members. In addition, this dialogue would allow for discussion of other forms and modalities of cooperation between Russia and NATO, if Russian membership is judged not to be a feasible option for the foreseeable future. Arbatov conceded that his proposal would be opposed by most of the Russian foreign policy elite: they would reject it for precisely the reasons that he believes it to be a good idea.

Arbatov also argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to create a pan-European non-strategic missile defence system should be taken seriously by the West, since it is as far as Putin currently can go towards tacitly applying for NATO membership. Putin’s proposal in effect was an acknowledgement that export control and other non-proliferation measures are not enough to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. According to Arbatov, Russian cooperation with NATO on a non-strategic missile defence system for Europe would set the basis for cooperation on strategic defences should the need arise. Another motive for Russia’s pursuit of NATO membership is, in Arbatov’s view, China’s growing assertiveness.

*Andrzej Towpik* gave a positive assessment of NATO–EU cooperation. He asserted that the NATO–Russia ‘difficult partnership’ is not the main item on the alliance’s agenda. Nor is Russia’s NATO membership actual at this time. He pointed out that NATO’s security language has changed a great deal over the past decade, while Russia’s has not.

*Charles A. Kupchan* agreed that a long-term dialogue about possible NATO membership could be a useful vehicle for constructively engaging Russia in Europe. In his view, this should be the West’s foremost priority.
The further NATO enlargement

Kupchan said that he had originally opposed NATO enlargement but now believes that it should be continued with the admission of a small number of new member states in a second round of enlargement. He expressed scepticism as to whether the US Senate will be willing to go beyond this and to extend Article 5 security guarantees to additional states every few years. NATO accordingly needs to be transformed as an organization so that it is looser, with less iron-clad security guarantees.

Several participants concurred that the logic of NATO’s enlargement policy meant that it should not be halted after a single round and that additional members should be accepted. However, according to Rotfeld, this must be done in a credible way; the decision to accept an applicant state should be based on a transparent set of criteria reflecting NATO’s political–military interests rather than on Russia’s likely reaction.

Thérèse Delpech warned that the continued enlargement of NATO could dilute the alliance and alter the political and military character. It might evolve into a crisis management entity, similar to what the EU is trying to create, which will diminish its security importance.

III. ESDP beyond the EU borders: conflict prevention and crisis management

Several participants expressed the view that the development of the ESDP is a logical step in the European integration process as that process becomes less introspective and absorbed with internal institution building. It has also been a natural step in the wake of the ending of the cold war, which has changed the terms of the USA’s engagement in Europe and led it to pressure its European allies to take greater responsibility for regional crisis management. However, there is much uncertainty about what the ESDP involves. Many participants claimed that it is ‘haunted by ambiguity’ (Towpik), is ‘nebulous’ (Anders Bjurner), and so on.

According to Marc Otte, the ESDP essentially is about managing complexity in a changing security environment. This involves the management not only of multinational military forces, but also of civilian activities. The EU’s aim is to use a combination of military and civilian instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention. In order to do so, the EU is having to adapt its decision-making processes, better coordinate its activities and develop autonomous planning capabilities. Otte emphasized that it is important for EU governments to build public support for these efforts. In particular, governments must explain that security challenges in the post-
cold war world are interdependent and require a sustained investment in capabilities to address them.

**Common defence policy without a common foreign policy?**

One of the main issues that were raised in this session was the linkage between the ESDP and the EU’s CFSP.

According to Anders Bjurner, the ESDP must be seen in the wider context of the CFSP. While the ESDP forms part of the latter, its development will also serve to enhance the ‘common’ element of the CFSP and to strengthen the EU as a political alliance.

Jan Zielonka expressed a need for caution in this regard. He doubted that the EU can develop a meaningful defence policy without first having articulated a coherent common foreign and security policy. The former has tended to attract the attention of politicians and experts at the expense of the latter. Furthermore, there is a need to consider measures beyond the ESDP for creating a peaceful environment in Europe. The EU has many possibilities for doing this—the ESDP may not be the right instrument.

Rotfeld agreed that the ESDP may follow a common foreign and security policy. However, he argued that one should not become so preoccupied with formal, academic approaches while ignoring the realities of the present security environment. The EU is a new-quality type of entity: the ESDP will develop in a creative, ad hoc way in response to security challenges that need to be addressed rather than according to strict logic.

Roper similarly argued that the forging of a common security policy in Europe is going to be a ‘learning by doing’ process that will not follow any formal model. It is not yet clear what sort of player Europe is becoming. Is it a simple community concerned with its own security? A regional power? A player on the global stage? This is an issue which is difficult to discuss in diplomatic circles. As far as crisis management missions are concerned, one must remember that NATO has such aims and capabilities as well, so the risk of duplication remains.

In a linguistic aside, Roper observed that there is an important difference between the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (which is ‘common’ in that the members agree to share only parts) and, for example, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (which is ‘common’ in that it is single and united and replaces national policy). Therefore the term ‘common’ is a bit misleading in the case of the ESDP, which does not aim at replacing national policies.

Steven E. Miller argued that the ESDP in fact is not about defence policy, at least as that term is ordinarily understood. It is about providing the EU
with a modest crisis management capability independent of the USA. It does not address the hard question of when to intervene, which is the provenance of foreign policy. In Miller’s view, what is striking about the ESDP is how much vagueness surrounds an initiative which many other participants described as being integral to the future development of the EU. To date, it remains a collection of aspirations which Europe is groping to realize.

**Engaging non-EU states in the ESDP**

Another issue that came up throughout the session was the extent to which non-EU states can be engaged in the EU’s evolving conflict prevention and crisis management activities.

Vyacheslav E. Paznyak warned that the development of the EU is already leading to the creation of new divisions in Europe. This is likely to be exacerbated by the EU’s creation of a new instrument for crisis management, if non-EU states are treated as the potential targets of its activities rather than as potential partners. He expressed concern that a ‘desperado environment’ was taking shape among those states which have no hope of joining the EU or NATO in the foreseeable future. In the case of Belarus, the current regime is not sympathetic to the enlargement of the EU and the realization of the ESDP, which the opposition hopes will force the government to undertake democratic reforms. This represents a possible schism in the rapprochement between Belarus and Russia.

Vladimir Baranovsky observed that there is considerable interest in the EU as Russia’s partner, where it is seen as both an alternative to NATO and as a possible means for Russia’s integration into Europe. There is little understanding, and at the same time many illusions, in Russia as to what the ESDP is about. Many Russian experts tend to evaluate the ESDP in terms of NATO-oriented criteria; that is, Russia should cooperate with the ESDP to the extent that it detracts from NATO’s cohesion and readiness to act. In Baranovsky’s view, this is an inappropriate criterion and could lead to distorted expectations of a growing rift between the EU and the USA.

He noted that there are many uncertainties surrounding the future development of the ESDP: whether it will remain a crisis management mechanism or evolve into a collective defence system. From Russia’s perspective, a key question is where the ESDP will operate. If it does indeed cover an area with a radius of 4000 kilometres from Brussels, this will include post-Soviet territory, which is highly sensitive for Moscow. Another question is whether the ESDP will always operate within international law (i.e., with the approval of the UN Security Council). There is a minority view in
Russia that the ESDP could become even worse than NATO in terms of multiplying the ‘Kosovo model’.

Baranovsky saw realistic prospects for cooperation between Russia and Europe within the ESDP framework; for example, Russia can contribute usefully to the fulfilment of the ESDP/Petersberg task missions. This has two potentially significant political consequences. First, it would involve practical cooperation, based on an equal approach, that could constructively engage Russia in the European integration project. Second, over the long term, it could form the nucleus of a crisis management partnership for areas outside of Europe.

Kupchan pointed out that Washington, like Moscow, tends to evaluate the ESDP in terms of its perceived impact on NATO cohesion and capabilities. He argued that the USA should be unequivocally supportive of the ESDP in the light of Europe’s rising power and its declining internationalism.

### IV. Redefinition of the transatlantic partnership: in search of a new grand strategy

There was a general sentiment that there are currently no major forces at work pushing Europe and the USA violently apart. However, a number of the participants argued that the transatlantic relationship is no longer as important as it was in the past and is likely to grow less so in the future.

Janusz Reiter observed that the European Union is a ‘peace community’ but one which exists under NATO’s collective defence umbrella. The USA’s presence in Europe continues to play an indispensable role, since the EU alone cannot secure the balance of power necessary for further enlargement and integration. He warned against an emerging division of labour in which the EU would be responsible for security in Europe and the USA is responsible for security elsewhere. A genuine security partnership must be established, even though doing so will require an adjustment of the USA’s approach to Europe.

According to Miller, most of the cold war justifications for the transatlantic partnership are gone, although some remain valid (e.g., providing a counterweight to Germany). The US–European relationship is not as central as it was during the cold war. This is due in part to the greater importance given to emerging powers such as China on the US foreign policy agenda. It also reflects the fact that European institutions are proving to be both reliable and durable, with the result that the transatlantic dimension is diminishing in relative importance. In addition, the relationship is becoming more
complicated owing to diverging security perspectives and military capabilities.

Miller argued that, with the end of the cold war, solidarity is no longer as highly valued in transatlantic relations. This increases the potential for friction and poses a more complex managerial burden. We must attend collectively to the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship; otherwise there is a real risk of damaging that relationship. While Europe and the USA still need each other, the situation today is similar to a ‘marriage which has survived but from which the passion is gone’.

Raimo Värynen identified three principal issues that are currently generating tension in transatlantic relations: peace operations in the Balkans, the new capabilities of the ESDP, and US plans to develop and deploy a limited national missile defence (NMD) system. Although contentious, these issues are not major stumbling blocks; they can be resolved through consultation and mutual accommodation. The economic factor in transatlantic relations is of greater importance. In Värynen’s view, the fundamental problem in transatlantic relations does not concern so much specific issues as it does the structure and style of politics on both sides of the Atlantic. This is particularly true since the election in the USA of an administration which seems to favour unilateral responses to security challenges. Despite these differences, the transatlantic relationship is likely to continue to function in much the same way as before, since neither partner is interested in abandoning a collaborative security relationship with the other.

Towards a new grand strategy?

A question which had been posed at the outset of the meeting was whether there is a need to define a new approach to the security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community. The general sentiment among the participants was that the development of a new ‘grand strategy’ for transatlantic relations is either unnecessary or unfeasible, although some dissenting views were expressed.

According to Ian Anthony, a grand strategy for the 21st century already exists. This consists of two main elements: implementation of the post-1990 agreements that established a common security framework in Europe; and spreading or ‘globalizing’ this framework to other regions. A key question is how to organize relations between states, including states currently outside security-related organizations and institutions, to facilitate efforts to solve pressing problems. In this regard, an informal, flexible approach based on ‘relevant partnership’ in problem solving is likely to be more useful than a formal one based on universal inclusion. Although institution building will
continue to be a priority task in the transatlantic context, it is important that
this does not distract attention from solving real-world problems.

Stützle shared the view that a transatlantic grand strategy is already in
place, although it could be more accurately described as a ‘grand design’.
Among other elements, this design is composed of the 1997 NATO–Russia
Founding Act and the often-forgotten 1990 Charter of Paris for a New
Europe. The Euro-Atlantic community faces three large tasks in turning this
design into reality: (a) bringing Russia into Europe, rather than attempting
to keep it out; (b) making the USA understand that staying engaged in
Europe is in its own interest; and (c) transforming the European Union into
a more accountable and democratically controlled institution.

By contrast, Kupchan argued that there is a clear need for a new grand
strategy. The traditional transatlantic ‘bargain’ is coming undone with the
rise of Europe as a more self-confident actor and the decline of US inter-
nationalism, especially with regard to its growing ambivalence over its role
as Europe’s protector of the last resort. However, the Bush Administration is
split between neo-conservatives (more internationally oriented) and trad-
tional conservatives, which will limit the extent of US unilaterlalism.

According to Kupchan, the European integration process is approaching a
watershed. It hitherto has focused on internal developments and institution
building. Now it is taking on an increasingly important external dimension,
with Europe starting to move—albeit slowly—into defence and security
affairs. In part, Kupchan claims, the CFSP stems from the fear of US
ambivalence vis-à-vis regional conflicts. In addition, a generational change
is taking place in the ‘dialogue’ that connects the national state to the EU:
integration is no longer an attempt to escape from the past; the EU is
becoming a future-oriented enterprise that is aimed at projecting European
influence. In the light of these changes, Kupchan argued that there needs to
be a rebalancing of the transatlantic partnership, with Europe assuming a
relatively greater weight of responsibility.

Delpech argued that there is a need to redefine the existing transatlantic
relationship. Today we have a situation in which Europe sends ambivalent
and contradictory signals about the need for a continued US presence and
engagement in European affairs. For its part, Washington calls for increased
European autonomy while at the same time expressing concern about its
consequences. She is sceptical, however, that a new transatlantic ‘grand
strategy’ will emerge. This is in part due to the natures of the two partners,
which are not amenable to formulating grand ideas and then implementing
them, and in part due to uncertainties about the scope and pace of European
integration.
Appendices

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Anna Lindh and Former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
Appendix 1

European Integration: An American Perspective
Keynote speech by former US Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott

I. Europe and the international systems

Europe—with all its debates and disputes, its imperfections and exasperations—is at the cutting edge of a phenomenon that is spreading—to use Euro-jargon, that is broadening and deepening—around the word. It is what might be called a benign form of proliferation: the proliferation of inclusive, integrative, cooperative structures that are working to overcome the divisions of the past and lay the predicate for collective prosperity and collective security in the future.

To illustrate the point, let me take a quick glance around the horizon. In the western hemisphere, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the Rio Group, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and other groupings have been making progress in the direction. In Africa—a continent that too often figures, simplistically and inaccurately in gloomier visions of both our present world and our future—there are actually a number of favourable and admirable institutional trends. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), has gone from being an alliance of the so-called Front-Line States, united in their determination to oppose and isolate apartheid South Africa, into an organization dedicated to cooperation among all the states of the area.

In East Asia, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have helped bridge the divides between states and systems that were on opposite sides of the cold war—and the hot wars—in that region. They are punching through the remnant of the Bamboo Curtain.

Different as these various organizations are, they are similar in a respect that is, I believe, germane to our discussions today and tomorrow: they have helped move the international community at every level—subregional, regional, transregional and global—away from the preoccupation with what we are against, and towards the promotion of what we are for, which is a worldwide consensus in favour of open societies, open borders, open markets and, of course, open minds.

In this afternoon’s session, my candidate for the leading Euro-optimist, or actually globo-optimist, was one of the Russian speakers, who looked beyond the debates and frustrations of the day and the immediate region to see the emergence of a new international system. He is right, I think. The organization chart of the world today might be a complex set of Venn diagrams—overlapping organizations and groupings, different in their missions and memberships, but sharing an under-
lying premise of openness to each other and to the task of making a virtue out of interdependence.

In all the geographical areas I have just mentioned the western hemisphere, Africa, East Asia—there is also something that all of those bodies—OAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), SADCC and ASEAN—do not have and that they do not do: none of them is very far along in becoming a well-developed, effective collective security organization. When faced with outbreaks of conflict and political violence, their capacity for action—whether it is for peacemaking or for peacekeeping, or what one of the panellists has taught me to call peace development—is severely limited.

In that respect, those regions are, objectively, behind Europe and the Transatlantic Community. To travel elsewhere in the world and then to come to Europe is to be reminded that this region is institutionally, or structurally, unique and path-breaking.

That’s true in two respects. First, thanks primarily to the European Union, this continent is the laboratory for the single most successful, advanced, and promising experiment in transnational integration and supranational governance on the planet today.

Then of course there is the other institution, unique to this region, also attended by controversy, criticism and self-criticism, angst and apprehension, but also the object of justifiable pride and the source of great promise. That is NATO, and not just NATO alone, but NATO and its new family of partnerships. Because of what might be called NATO-Plus, the Euro-Atlantic community has the wherewithal to defend the interests and values that increasingly bind it together.

NATO is expanding. (That is why the title of our conference really should substitute the word ‘during’ for ‘after’ enlargement.) Let me offer a few thoughts on expansion.

II. Enlargements

I would add my voice to the several that have already expressed the hope that the process begun four years ago in Madrid will continue next year in Prague. The strongest argument for opening NATO’s door again is implicit in what I was saying at the outset about emerging international structures. Those regions in the world that will be safest, most peaceful and most prosperous will be those that do three things at once: first, sponsor and institutionalize rule of law, democracy and respect for diversity and minorities; second, pursue the free movement of people, goods and ideas; and third, create and extend mechanisms for collective security and defence.

For a regional grouping to be a building block for the kind of international system foreseen by one of the Russian speakers, it must be more organic than mechanical. It is like a human body: it needs a head, it needs a heart, but it also needs muscle if it is going to defend what binds it together and deter, or if necessary defeat, the forces that would tear it apart.
In this region of the world, NATO provides that muscle. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has the potential to do so in the future, but everyone here seems to agree that that future is quite a way off. Meanwhile, there are problems to be dealt with today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Indeed, there were problems to be dealt with yesterday.

In key respects, NATO did work with Russia—on the ground in Bosnia, in the diplomacy that ended the war in a way that permitted the international community, including Russia, to step in and save Kosovo from murderous chaos.

Now, looking to the future, let me offer my own hope for the NATO summit in Prague next year. In my view, it is important that in Prague the alliance not set off any explosions of the sort suggested by the phrase Big Bang, but rather, that it move forward with enlargement in a deliberate, step-by-step way that preserves the momentum, the credibility and the strategic rationale of the policy.

That means, to my mind, beginning the process next year of admitting, in addition to the obvious candidates Slovakia and Slovenia, at least one Baltic state. I say ‘at least one’ Baltic state in part because I would not want to exclude two or three, but also because, as they themselves keep reminding us, our Baltic friends—and I hope future allies—are different countries, deserving differentiated treatment. That is to say, the three of them may, or may not, be judged ready to be net contributors to the alliance at the same time, but I find it hard to imagine that any equitable, rational application of that criterion would exclude all three in 2002.

I know there are some, in Western Europe, who advocate letting the EU lead the way in the next stage of Baltic integration into the structures of the West. Sometimes this argument is extended not just to the Baltic states but to a prospective second tranche as a whole. My principal concern with this line of argument is that it means that the NATO summit in Prague will end not with a bang but with a whimper. It will produce a so-called postponement that will be a euphemism for inertia, the opposite of momentum, and, on the part of the Central Europeans, it will create a sense of promises not kept and even of betrayal.

I gather from my own friends in the Baltic states that they in particular are hearing advice that they should wait for the EU to take them first, NATO later. I also gather they are hearing this more often than not from Germans. I find this a bit ironic. Only four years ago, I heard Helmut Kohl press eloquently for, as he put it, using NATO to extend the eastern boundary of the West eastward, so that Germany was not itself on the outer edge of the West. Why should not that same logic apply to Poland today as an argument for Baltic membership sooner rather than later?
III. NATO enlargement and the Russian objections

Now let me, very briefly, address the Russian objections that we have heard during the course of the day. Not all Russians have identical or even compatible views on this subject, or any other—after all, Russia is a pluralistic society today. In the world of big pictures, let us not forget that one. Particularly representatives of the Russian Government and the Russian political elite seem to be closer to unanimity on NATO enlargement than just about anything else. I have listened to Russian colleagues argue the point for more than seven years, and I have tried not just to rebut, but to listen. What I hear in essence is the view, the fear, that NATO is what it was: an anti-Russian alliance. Its continued existence is a threat and perhaps an insult to Russia, and its expansion is inherently a political and strategic problem for Moscow because it is potentially an enemy, and that requires a buffer between Russia and NATO. In other words, contiguity between NATO and Russia automatically brings with it disadvantage for Russia and the potential of confrontation with NATO.

That is a faulty premise, and it is one that is already well on its way to being disproved, including, I believe, in the experience of many Russians, right here in this very region of Europe, the Nordic–Baltic area. Russia today shares a border with one member state of NATO, Norway, and the Russian Far North has benefited directly, in practical ways, through the combination of the Northern Dimension of the EU, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and other regional and subregional bodies that have reopened this region. I say ‘reopened’ because, of course, it was open before.

In the immediate past century, the Baltic Sea went from being a gateway to the maritime equivalent of the Berlin Wall. I remember when I first visited Stockholm, in late 1981. A local friend took me to the waterfront and pointed into the mist to show me where the Soviet Whisky Class submarine had run aground while prowling in Swedish waters. Two decades later, those cities along the Baltic littoral that I mentioned a moment ago are in contact with each other again.

Now that I am out of government, I can admit to occasionally having fun in my work on behalf of the State Department. I did so annually when I represented the United States at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which, as you all know, is in the habit of holding its meetings in lovely cities near the Arctic Circle in the dead of winter. My first such experience was in Luleå. What was most memorable about that meeting was the participation of the governors of Archangel and Murmansk. Yevgeny Primakov was also there. He got an earful from his countrymen from Archangel and Murmansk about how they wished they were getting more help in dealing with the problems of their region from Moscow—more help of the kind they were getting from Stockholm, Oslo and Helsinki.

NATO was not on their minds as a threat. Regional integration was on their minds, including integration of the sort sponsored by NATO and its partnership
councils. Recalling my visit to Luleå, I can easily imagine Governor Yegorov of Kaliningrad attending—and benefiting from—a similar such gathering in Visby.

IV. NATO and North-Western Europe

Let me say a bit more about the salutary role of this region’s two neutral, or non-aligned states, Sweden and Finland. Neither this country nor Finland is an applicant for membership of NATO, yet both have played an instrumental role in enabling NATO to take on new missions with new members and new partners and thereby in helping the alliance and its associative bodies to take on the supplementary function of collective security. Just as the USA will be on the sidelines as EU enlargement goes forward in the years to come, so Sweden and Finland will be on the sidelines of the next round of NATO enlargement in 2002. I believe—and certainly hope—that the signals emitted from Stockholm and Helsinki in the months ahead, especially the signals directed towards Moscow, will increase the chances of a relatively smooth second round of new admissions to the alliance, including for the Baltic states.

While maintaining the continuity and integrity of their own security policies, Sweden and Finland have lent credence to the idea that NATO has become something new, just as Russia has become something new, and they now have important work to do together.

The prime example, of course, is in the Balkans, where NATO troops, Russian troops, Ukrainian troops, and Swedish and Finnish troops all serve together today. The Swedish Parliament’s decision last month to extend the mandate for the Swedish contingent in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to operate beyond the borders of Kosovo is a welcome development for four reasons. First, at the most concrete level, Swedish peacekeeping troops are good at their jobs and are a significant asset to any operation. Second, given Sweden’s long-standing and universally respected position of non-alignment, its willingness to work with NATO and indeed to put its forces under NATO command for specific operations should make it easier for other countries with heavier historical baggage to make a similar adjustment and accept the need for operations like the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and KFOR in the future. Third, as a nation in North-Western Europe, Sweden is demonstrating its active commitment to peace and stability in South-Eastern Europe, and thus to indivisibility of the continent’s security as a whole. You cannot, over the long haul, have integration in one part of the continent if there’s disintegration in another. Fourth, by agreeing in advance to support an extension of the scope of KFOR if the threat to peace escalates or spreads, Sweden is telling the world that it is prepared to stay the course in the Balkans, wherever that course leads and however long it lasts.

Sweden, in short, is looking for a sustainable solution to the problem—not looking for an exit or a pretext for disengagement. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a signal that I hope is not just received loud and clear in my own hometown of
Washington, DC, but a signal that the Bush Administration should start sending on its own, about US policy and strategic interests.

V. Europe and missile defence

While I am on the subject of my own government’s policy let me say a word about missile defence, a subject introduced earlier today and that will figure on our agenda tomorrow. This issue brought me to Europe more times than I can count in 1999 and 2000. You all know the subject issue very well. The world has changed a lot in the 29 years since the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed. It has changed for the better, in that the cold war is over and the Russian and US arsenals are greatly reduced.

It has changed for the worse in that nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile technology has proliferated, ending up in some very dangerous hands. That means we need to look hard at ways to address new threats with active defences, including in ways that might require amendments to the ABM Treaty, an eventuality that the Soviet and US authors of the treaty foresaw and wrote into the text of the treaty itself.

President Clinton grappled with this issue in the framework of four criteria: first, whether the threat, particularly North Korea’s Taepo Dong programme, justified deployment of new defences; second, whether the system in question would work; third, whether the USA could afford it; and—last but by no means least—if the answer to the first three questions was ‘yes,’ whether deployment of the system would be consistent with our overall national-security objectives.

It is this last, so-called fourth criterion that relates to the theme of our conference. Just as European security is indivisible, so is transatlantic security. An anti-missile system that makes some Americans feel less vulnerable against some new threats but that makes our allies in Europe (or, for that matter, in Asia) feel more vulnerable to other threats is, ipso facto, not a good idea; it flunks by the fourth criterion. It is up to any administration to be sure that we not let a zero-sum tension develop between one dimension of our national security and another, that is, between defence of our homeland and the solidarity of our alliances.

It is also important—crucial, I would say—that any attempt to substitute a new system of strategic nuclear peace for the old one be a genuine improvement. We have lived for decades with MAD—mutual assured destruction. It is a deliberately sardonic acronym. No one can be entirely comfortable with the idea of preserving the peace through a mutual suicide pact. MAD—or what we more politely call ‘strategic stability’ between the USA and Russia—calls to mind something Winston Churchill famously said about democracy: it is a terrible system until you look at the alternatives. I hope the Bush Administration will look very carefully indeed at the alternatives before it throws out mutual deterrence. I also hope it will listen carefully to its allies, not to mention to the Russians themselves and others.
VI. US–Russian relations

Now I would like to conclude with a few words about US–Russian relations more generally. That relationship is strained these days. In fact, it has been strained for several years now. The presidential transitions that have occurred in Moscow and Washington—first, from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin, then, from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush—have slowed down and even threatened to reverse the progress that was made between 1992, under George Bush Senior, and that continued and intensified under President Clinton through 1999, as long as he had Boris Yeltsin as his counterpart in the Kremlin. The dynamic now operating between Washington and Moscow might be called mutual standoffishness, or unconstructive disengagement. US–Russian relations have the potential to become, in their essence and in their consequences, more competitive than cooperative.

All this constitutes an ominous trend, not least because it could jeopardize the process of European, and Euro-Atlantic, integration that is not only the topic of this conference but perhaps the single most positive and important development in international politics today. All three of the specific issues I have touched on this evening—reconciling NATO enlargement with NATO–Russian partnership, maintaining NATO–Russian peacekeeping in the Balkans, modifying the ratio between strategic offence and strategic defence in the international arms control regime—are contentious in US–Russian relations, and all three could become more so in the weeks, months and years ahead.

As you can perhaps discern, I have a few sceptical, even critical questions about the policies—or the hints of policies to come—of my own government on some of these matters. None of these problems, challenging as they are to statesmanship in Washington, Moscow or any other capital, goes to the heart of what has changed for the better between Russia and the USA, and between Russia and the West, over the past decade and a half. The core issue is not European security structures or war and peace in the former Yugoslavia or strategic nuclear stability; rather, the core issue is Russia’s emergence from dictatorship to democracy. It is that internal transformation that made possible the end of the cold war and that makes it possible for Americans, Russians and other Europeans to talk about partnership and integration when we meet in diplomatic encounters or international conferences even if we debate the ramifications of those words.

I agree entirely with one of the Russian speakers that we should give more credit to the Russian people and leaders—and to the other peoples and leaders of the former Soviet Union—for bringing about the changes inside that country, now those countries (plural), that ended the cold war. We should not speak of faceless historical forces, but of real people, and individual leaders.
VII. Concluding remarks

That brings me to my final point. Exactly one month ago, Prime Minister Göran Persson, representing the Swedish Presidency of the EU, invited President Putin here to Stockholm for a meeting with the leaders of the Union. President Putin used the occasion to use some powerful words himself. He affirmed his country’s desire to be part of the great experiment of making Europe what he called a ‘model of civilization’ based on the shared commitment of all European states to the principles of democracy.

I would submit that the biggest question facing all of us—bigger than any of the individual issues I have covered in these remarks, and directly affecting all of them—is the question of how Mr Putin, in his exercise of presidential power, will define and apply the principles he hailed in Stockholm to the next phase of Russia’s evolution. That question has become more acute in the months since he was here. In fact, it has become more acute in the past week, with the continuing, and intensifying, crackdown on Russia’s independent media and with new signs that Russia may, as a matter of official policy, narrow or even close the portals that have opened it to the outside world through cyberspace. One of the Russian speakers noted the Duma’s ratification of the Open Skies Treaty. Current initiatives by the executive branch of the Russian Government suggest that the Duma should push for an Open Web treaty—a refutation of the premise of the so-called ‘information security’ regime.

Today the Swedish presidency of the EU released a statement expressing concern about the trends I am referring to, especially the application of pressure on the independent media in Russia. There is something eerie about the statement, because several of its passages sounded as though they could have been uttered by Mr Putin himself. He has repeatedly said that Russia cannot make it as a modern, normal, civilized, prosperous country, at peace with itself and with the world, integrated into the Europe he spoke of in Stockholm, unless it has a vigorous and genuinely free press.

What we have here, ladies and gentlemen, is a growing disconnect between words and policies—between professions of principles and reality, or as our Russian friends say, life itself.

I would hope that in the EU’s welcome and continuing dialogue with Russia, this issue would be front and centre.

I realize that this is a melancholy note on which to end. I also realize that it is always awkward to put issues of internal governance and of civil society on an international agenda, whether a conference or a summit. Rolf Ekéus will be doing precisely that in his next job for the OSCE, and I am sure that under his able chairmanship, we will find a way of doing so under his current leadership of SIPRI.

Thank you for the chance to offer some of my views, and I look forward to hearing more of your own.
Appendix 2

Programme of the Frösunda Conference on The New Security Dimensions
Organized by SIPRI in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College and the Warsaw Centre for International Relations

Opening session
Friday, 20 April 2001
Welcome address by Sven-Olof Petersson, Director-General for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

First session
European security: consequences of NATO and EU enlargements
Panel discussion
Panellists: Adam Daniel Rotfeld (SIPRI), John Roper (UK), Walther Stützle (Germany), Borys Tarasyuk (Ukraine), Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia), Janusz Reiter (Poland), Bo Huldt (Sweden)
Discussion:

Second session
ESDP beyond the EU borders: conflict prevention and crisis management
Panel discussion
Panellists: Renata Dwan (SIPRI–Ireland), Anders Bjurner (Sweden), Jan Zielonka (Italy), Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia), Vyachaslau E. Paznyak (Belarus), Marc Otte (EU–Belgium), Lars-Erik Lundin (EU–Sweden)
Discussion
Keynote speech by Strobe Talbott: European Integration: An American Perspective

Saturday, 21 April 2001
Third session
Redefinition of the transatlantic partnership: in search of a new grand strategy
Panel discussion
Panellists: Ian Anthony (SIPRI–UK), Steven E. Miller (USA), Thérèse Delpech (France), Charles A. Kupchan (USA), Roman Kuzniar (Poland), Raimo Väyrynen (Finland)
Discussion
Concluding remarks by Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director of SIPRI
Appendix 3

List of the participants of the Frösunda Conference on The New Security Dimensions

Birgitta Alani (SIPRI–Sweden), Deputy Director

Dr Ian Anthony (SIPRI–UK), Project Leader, Internet Database on European Export Controls

Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia), Deputy Chair of the Defence Committee, State Duma, Member of the SIPRI Governing Board

Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia), Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Ambassador Anders Bjurner (Sweden), Political and Security Committee of the EU

Ambassador Agneta Bohman (Sweden), Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Dr Gennady Chufrin (SIPRI–Russia), Project Leader, The Evolving Security Setting in the Caspian Sea Basin

Thérèse Delpech (France), Director Strategic Affairs, Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA)

Dr Renata Dwan (SIPRI–Ireland), Project Leader, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Magnus Ekengren (Sweden), Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Rolf Ekéus (Sweden), Chairman of the SIPRI Governing Board

Lt. Col. Klas Eksell (Sweden), Swedish National Defence College

Arita Eriksson (Sweden), Swedish National Defence College

Ragnhild Ferm (SIPRI–Sweden), Project Leader, Arms Control and Disarmament Documentary Survey

Joseph Fitchett (USA), Columnist, The International Herald Tribune

Jan Foghelin (Sweden), Head of Division of Defence Analyses, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

Dr Anatoliy Grytsenko (Ukraine), President, Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies

Gerd Hagemeyer-Gaverus (SIPRI–Germany), Project Leader, Integrating Fact Databases in the Field of International Relations and Security

Gunilla Herolf (Sweden), Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)

Prof. Bo Huldt (Sweden), Institute for National Defence and Security Studies, Swedish National Defence College

Lt. Col. Tommy Jeppsson (Sweden), Swedish National Defence College

Shannon N. Kile (SIPRI–USA), Researcher, Military Technology and International Security

Toivo Klaar (Estonia), Diplomatic Counselor to the President

Ambassador Adam Kobieracki (Poland), Director, European Security Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Leonid Kozhara (Ukraine), Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration

Dr Charles A. Kupchan (USA), Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC

Prof. Roman Kuzniar (Poland), Director, Policy Planning Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Dr Zdzislaw Lachowski (SIPRI–Poland), Project Leader, Conventional Arms Control
Dr Lars-Erik Lundin (EU–Sweden), Head of Security Policy Unit, European Commission
Prof. Steven E. Miller (USA), Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Ambassador Mathias Mossberg (Sweden), Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Assoc. Prof. Bertil Nygren (Sweden), Swedish National Defence College
Marc Otte (EU–Belgium), Head of ESDP/Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union
Dr Tatyana G. Parkhalina (Russia), Head, Centre for European Security Studies
Dr Vyacheslav P. Paznyak (Belarus), International Institute for Policy Studies
Sven-Olof Petersson (Sweden), Director-General for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Janusz Reiter (Poland), Director, Warsaw Centre for International Relations
Lord John Roper (UK), University of Birmingham
Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (SIPRI), Director
Captain Sven Rudberg (Sweden), Swedish National Defence College
Dr Taylor Seybolt (SIPRI–USA), Project Leader, Conflicts and Peace Enforcement
Brooke Shearer (USA), International Fellowship Program, Yale University
Dr Stanislaw Shushkевич (Belarus), former Chairman of Supreme Soviet
Academician Nodari A. Simonia (Russia), Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Elisabeth Sköns (Sweden), Project Leader, Military Expenditure and Arms Production
Dr Walther Stützle, (Germany), Secretary of State, Deputy Minister of Defence
Strobe Talbott (USA), former Deputy Secretary of State
Borys Tarasyuk (Ukraine), former Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ingrid Tersman (Sweden), Eastern and Central European Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Andrzej Towpik (Poland), Representative of Poland to NATO
Brig. Gen. Karlheinz Viereck (Germany), Chief of Staff, Joint Headquarters North, Stavanger, Norway
Dr Gediminas Vitkus (Lithuania), Institute of International Relations and Political Science
Prof. Raimo Väyrynen (Finland), Professor of Government and International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
Connie Wall (SIPRI–USA), Head of Editorial and Publications Department
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