Scenarios for South Sudan in 2020

Peace: the only thing worth fighting for
Colophon
January 2016
Author: Dr. Jaïr van der Lijn
Graphic design: Het IJzeren Gordijn
Editing: Frances Ellery

PAX Netherlands Peace Foundation (PAX)
PAX works with involved civilians and partners in areas of war to protect human security, to prevent and end armed violence, and to build peace with justice. PAX operates independently of political interests.
www.paxforpeace.nl / P.O. Box 19318 / 3501 DH Utrecht, The Netherlands / info@paxforpeace.nl

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.
The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.
www.sipri.org / Signalistgatan 9 / SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden / sipri@sipri.org

This report is the copyright of SIPRI and PAX. It may be reproduced in any form without written permission provided the integrity of the text remains intact and it is attributed in the correct way.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and acronyms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Compensation and Reparation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRH</td>
<td>Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSS</td>
<td>Hybrid Court for South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMEC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFSS</td>
<td>National Defence Forces of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA-IG</td>
<td>SPLA - in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA-IO</td>
<td>SPLA - in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-AIO</td>
<td>SPLM - Again in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-DC</td>
<td>SPLM - Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-FD</td>
<td>SPLM - Former Detainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-IG</td>
<td>SPLM - in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-IO</td>
<td>SPLM - in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface
This report about possible developments in South Sudan up to 2020 is based on a study by Jaïr van der Lijn of SIPRI, commissioned by PAX. Its purpose is to contribute to the debate about how to stimulate peace, security and development in South Sudan, and to present implications for (inter)national action.

The material presented in the report is based on input gathered from scenario workshops and interviews with a range of South Sudanese civil society organisation representatives, religious leaders, academics and others from different ethnic and social backgrounds, and in their individual capacities. They came together and participated with the sole purpose of using this process for the betterment of the South Sudanese people. We are thankful for their insights, dedication and patience, but especially for their open sharing of views on the challenges the country is facing, which was a hard task.

We would also like to thank a number of key stakeholders for their reflections and input, and a variety of referees for their critical comments and feedback.

The author is grateful to all who contributed to the process. The scenarios sketched in this report are essentially theirs and without their input this report would not have been possible.

We hope the report provides useful analysis for further discussion and look forward to any comments or suggestions for follow-up.

Jaïr van der Lijn, Head of SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Team
vanderlijn@sipri.org

Kathelijne Schenkel, PAX Head of Programme South Sudan
schenkel@paxforpeace.nl

Andrea Minalla, PAX Project Manager South Sudan
minalla@paxforpeace.nl

January 2016
Although a peace agreement that includes important steps to build a stable and peaceful South Sudan was signed in 2015, the future of the country remains highly uncertain. Violent confrontations and human rights abuses continue and frequently it appears that parties have more faith in victory after a renewed offensive, than in peace. Yet, although implementation of the peace agreement is lagging, talks progress, albeit painfully slowly and with few results. In this environment, future scenarios are useful as they gather thoughts on possible long-term developments, stimulate open debate and may assist in policy planning.

The scenarios described in this report are intended to give a picture of how South Sudan might look in 2020, determined by three key uncertainties:

1. Will life in South Sudan be dominated by war and armed political conflict or will there be predominantly peace – or at least the absence of large-scale armed political violence?

2. Will South Sudan make progress towards good governance or will the country face a further downturn towards bad governance?

3. Will governance in South Sudan be further decentralised (by design or violently) or will there be no further decentralisation and central governance is perhaps strengthened even further?
The five scenarios presented in this report are:

1. **United in diversity**: The 2015 peace agreement holds and the peace process leads to a further decentralised federal system and better guarantees for good governance. The organisation of free and fair elections is one of the first steps in a long and difficult process towards sustainable peace.

2. **Divided leadership**: After the opposition rejects the election results, its forces occupy part of the country, effectively splitting the country in two. The war stabilises along a frontline and consequently some of the improvements that had been made in good governance and development are maintained.

3. **Fragmentation**: After the peace agreement breaks down, slowly the government collapses and opposition groups fragment. South Sudan lacks any form of national governance system. Politics is local and about the highest price: life and security.

4. **21 Kingdoms**: After a bloody victory of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), South Sudan is divided into 21 states based on ethnic power divisions. Some states do reasonably well, while others face ethnic conflicts and autocracy.

5. **Dictatorship**: With the SPLM-IO reduced to a low-level insurgency, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) embraces anyone willing to return back to the party. The new 28 states do not lead to further decentralisation as the SPLM-IG leadership reduces the political space for any remaining opposition and dissent.

The first main message from the scenarios is that there is hope. If the parties stick to the 2015 peace agreement and implement, consolidate and deepen the peace process, slowly South Sudan may be on the road towards a positive future: the United in diversity scenario.

The second main message is that, if this is not the case, the 2015 peace agreement does not hold and the peace process is not opened-up, the future is far less hopeful. Broadly speaking, the scenarios show that the alternatives to the scenario United in diversity, as portrayed in the four other scenarios, entail horrible devastation and/or repression.

**Policy implications**

The main policy implications of the findings of these scenarios for the South Sudanese parties to the 2015 peace agreement, as well as for (inter)national civil society and the international community are:

First, the critical difference between a successful and unsuccessful outcome will to a large extent be determined by South Sudan’s leadership. Above all, these scenarios therefore call on the wisdom of all leaders of South Sudan.

Second, if the parties do not choose peace, the scenarios show that the cost of victory, if feasible
at all, will be impossible for South Sudan to bear. For this purpose, it is essential that the parties stay on the path of peace.

It will be a formidable task indeed as they have to: (a) continue a process of dialogue; (b) make the peace process inclusive; (c) find an answer to the Equatorian calls for more influence; (d) establish multiparty democracy in South Sudan; (e) further decentralise the country on the basis of principles of good governance, while preventing federalisation on the basis of ethnic power divisions; (f) demilitarise South Sudanese politics and society; (g) guarantee acceptance of the free and fair election results; and (h) start developing a vision for South Sudan beyond the implementation of the peace agreement.

Third, as these tasks will be challenging, continuous national and international assistance, mediation and pressure is needed to support all parties to continue implementing the 2015 peace agreement. Valuable time has already been lost, while deadlines in the peace agreement were already very ambitious. Therefore, the parties to the agreement may need to extend the time horizon for the implementation of the peace agreement and postpone some of the deadlines, or, less preferably, specific sections in the agreement need to be prioritised.

Fourth, it would be wise for (inter)national civil society and the international community to follow a two-pronged strategy in which (I) all efforts are directed at ensuring the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement and preventing a relapse into war, while at the same time (II) preparations are made for the worst that may happen if the peace process breaks down. Such a strategy would benefit from the following elements:

(I) Policy implications to reach the most positive scenario: (1) actively guarantee the peace agreement; (2) end foreign military assistance; (3) continue mediation; (4) set conditions to keep the peace process on track; (5) support development and governance to ensure a peace dividend; (6) support local peace building initiatives to prevent local tensions from sparking conflicts on a national level; (7) demand and support multiparty democratisation, opening political space, good governance, rule of law and human rights, including beyond the transitional period; and (8) build civil society capacity.

(II) Policy implications to be best prepared for the worst: (1) start contingency-planning regarding: (a) humanitarian aid and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; (b) defending Protection of Civilians (POC) sites under attack; (c) humanitarian military intervention; and (d) potentially even a trusteeship. A truly forward-looking strategy of the international community and (inter)national civil society would invest in local peace building organisations and initiatives, as particularly in the Fragmentation scenario there will be a need for bottom-up processes.
1. Introduction

In 2009, IKV Pax Christi (currently PAX) and Cordaid commissioned the development of scenarios for the future of Sudan in 2012. These scenarios described many of the mechanisms that determined how events have since unfolded. They included the warning that an independent South Sudan, without northern Sudan as a common and unifying enemy, ran the risk of major fragmentation and civil war and that South-South dialogue was essential for a stable and peaceful South Sudan. In 2015, PAX decided to commission a follow-up scenario process, aimed at contributing to discussion on the future of South Sudan.

Scenarios for the future of South Sudan continue to be relevant:

1. When thinking about the future of South Sudan in order to prepare for what lies ahead, it is helpful to collect thoughts on possible long-term developments by identifying various potential scenarios.

2. Scenarios stimulate open debate about the future of South Sudan. They allow a more structured way to discuss what future developments may mean and how these should be addressed and influenced.

3. Such an exercise may assist policy planning. Planning for several different scenarios increases organisational strategic agility. As Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, ‘Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.’

In order to contribute to these purposes, scenarios need to be both creative and plausible. They should be internally consistent and thought provoking.

This report does not predict the future of South Sudan. Rather it provides five scenarios of what the country may look like depending on certain developments, based on diverse South Sudanese input. The future as it unfolds in reality will not look exactly like any of the scenarios described below, but is likely to include some features from some or all of them. As these scenarios aim to provide a 360-degree view of all alternative futures, they cover the widest variety of potential futures. It shows the need for the South Sudanese leadership to choose peace, while allowing (inter)national civil society and the international community to embrace uncertainty and be prepared for the different futures that may arise. As such, it aims to stimulate debate on how to move ahead.

**Methodology**

The scenarios in this report have been built using the Shell scenario methodology.² The data gathering to build the scenarios is based on desktop research; two multi-day scenario workshops organised in Nairobi, Kenya, in May and July 2015 with various South Sudanese civil society and faith-based organisation representatives and academics who built the scenario outlines. This was followed by interviews with a number of key stakeholders – representatives from the international community and South Sudanese civil society and faith-based organisations representatives, politicians and academics – in Juba, South Sudan. Further data collection in South Sudan was limited due to the security situation in several parts of the country, and restricted freedom of assembly and speech. Subsequently, the draft scenarios were further tested and strengthened by reviewers, both in review meetings in the Netherlands and Juba as well as by email.

The scenarios were created in a three-step process. First, the time-setting horizon had to be set. The year 2020 was chosen because it allows sufficiently differentiated futures to fully develop but is close enough to keep the scenarios relevant to today’s policy planning. By the time the first traits of the scenarios have developed, these can be monitored and current policies potentially adjusted. The second step was to identify which developments are very likely to happen (‘probabilities’), and which developments are uncertain (‘uncertainties’). While the uncertainties determine the differences between different scenarios, the probabilities determine what they have in common. The uncertainties and probabilities are equally important for the scenarios. Wrong assumptions about the probabilities may lead to criticism that the scenarios are unrealistic. The third step was identifying key uncertainties that form the basis for the scenarios, followed by the actual designing of the scenarios.

**Probabilities and uncertainties for the future of South Sudan**

When imagining South Sudan in 2020, it is important to be aware of what is very probable. The country will still be landlocked and very likely still underdeveloped, with many of the problems it has faced during its recent history. Structural change will take time, beyond the scenarios’ five-year horizon. It is very probable that South Sudan’s infrastructure will still be very limited in

---

five years’ time. Given that it covers an area of 644,329 sq. km, roughly the size of France, and is lacking all aspects of physical infrastructure, large parts of the country will remain isolated and inaccessible for up to six months of the year due to the rainy season and poor road conditions. Water and sanitary infrastructure will remain very limited – currently 80% of the population has no access to a toilet – so diseases will likely continue to spread easily.

Despite the country’s vast untapped resources, South Sudan’s economy will remain largely undeveloped, and will still depend on oil production and subsistence agriculture, while most consumer products will still need to be imported. Its population will remain very young. Currently over two-thirds are under the age of 30, and only 27% of the population aged 15 and above are literate. By 2020 the education rate might only have improved a little.

As South Sudan hosts more than 64 ethnic and 50 linguistic groups, and because many South Sudanese identify primarily on a tribal basis, the development of a national identity will still be relatively weak. Since it takes many years to build a functioning well-trained civil service, by 2020 core administrative structures and mechanisms of political representation may only be in their emerging stages, while the government may just be beginning to provide basic services to its population.\(^3\)

Similarly, even if the main political conflicts are ended through, for example, the implementation of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (hereafter called the ‘2015 peace agreement’), it is unlikely that all wounds will be healed, posing challenges to national cohesion. Many of the traditional structures to control local violence have been broken down by the history of violent conflicts and may never be repaired. As governance and rule of law will still be absent in large parts of the country, it is likely that cattle raids and more localised conflicts will continue at many levels, and that weapons will continue to be used for self-protection. The majority of the population is traumatised and easy to mobilise for violence, while power brokers are most familiar with exploiting and marginalising the governance system inherited from the Turco-Egyptian conquest.\(^4\) In addition, the patronimial system is likely to continue to determine to a large extent the relationship between the South Sudanese power brokers and the population, meaning that they will be able to mobilise groups of supporters for their own personal gain, but which they are also expected to represent and secure the needs of. The rules of the political marketplace are likely to play a determining role as provincial elites seek to maximise the price of their loyalty to the government, while the latter seeks to minimise these costs. Both have tools at their disposal, such as votes, extending or withdrawing economic cooperation and the use of violence.\(^5\)

Apart from the probabilities above, much in South Sudan can change within the time span of five years. This includes, for example: the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement; better political cooperation and enlarged democratic political space; an end to the main armed political conflicts; processes leading towards nation and institution building; and progress towards improved economic, social and good governance. Leaders may step down. Further serious conflicts may take place. And, it is unknown what the international community will do.

---

4 Gerard Prunier, ‘Why did South Sudan blow up in December 2013 and what is likely to happen as a result?’, Sudan Studies No. 51, 2015, pp.7-22.
Box 1

Examples of important uncertainties for South Sudan

♦ Will there be chaos or will there be a process towards sustainable peace?

♦ Will a process of (civilian) disarmament be started?

♦ Will there be a process towards a professional democratically-controlled national army rather than the military wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)?

♦ Will there be further federalisation or decentralisation of the country? If so, in what form?

♦ Will there be increasing rule of law?

♦ Will there be a more level playing field and political space for multiparty democracy?

♦ Will the contested political models drive the country into conflict?

♦ What will happen with the current political leaders?

♦ What will happen with the SPLM? Will it be united? Will it still be the ruling party?

♦ What will be the role of tribalism?

♦ Will the country start a process towards economic, social and other forms of development?

♦ Will a process of institution building start to become effective?

♦ Will the neighbouring countries continue their proxy wars?

♦ What will the international community do?
Will it remain committed, with donor support and peace operations? Will the neighbouring countries continue to be directly involved in the conflict, and/or will they strongly support the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement? Box 1 gives an overview of some of the uncertainties discussed in the workshops and interviews.

**Key uncertainties**

Based on the above probabilities it is unlikely that South Sudan in 2020 will be a completely peaceful country governed following the principles of good governance. Having said that, the workshops determined that key uncertainties are the extent to which:

1. Life in South Sudan is dominated by war and armed political conflict, or there is predominantly peace – in terms of the absence of large-scale armed political violence. This definition means that in a ‘peace’ scenario, local conflicts, low-intensity insurgency conflict and cattle raiding may continue.

2. Governance in South Sudan is making progress towards good governance, or the country faces a further downturn towards bad governance. This is defined in relative terms to the situation as it is now, and therefore a good governance scenario will not be perfect and may also see elements of bad governance.

3. Governance in South Sudan is further decentralised by design or violently, or there is no further decentralisation and central governance is perhaps strengthened even further (albeit in contradiction of the 2015 peace agreement).

**The scenarios**

The above identified key uncertainties have been displayed in a simplified manner in the scenario grid in Figure 1. The x, y and z-axes represent the above three key uncertainties. Each of the eight corners of the cube represents a potential scenario.

In this scenario report, the five scenarios at the corners of (1) peace, decentralisation and good governance; (2) war, decentralisation and good governance; (3) war, decentralisation and bad governance; (4) peace, decentralisation and bad governance; and (5) peace, no decentralisation and bad governance, were further developed.

Considering that having more than five scenarios does not generally contribute to a stronger analysis, and because the other corners produce scenarios that are either not very different or are internally inconsistent, the other three scenarios were not further developed. According to workshop participants and interviewees, a ‘no decentralisation and peace’ scenario would only be plausible if it is enforced by bad governance (ruling out a ‘no decentralisation, peace, good governance’ scenario), while the ‘no decentralisation and war’ scenarios that were not further developed are expected to consist of elements of the other scenarios.
Reading guidance

Each of the five scenario descriptions starts with a future history of South Sudan up to 2020 and describes the developments leading up to that scenario. These are written in the past tense to emphasise that they are looking back from 2020. They are followed by a description of what, in broad strokes, the specific scenario of South Sudan in 2020 looks like, in the present tense. Some lessons on promoting positive developments and mitigating negative ones are given at the end of each scenario. The report concludes with some of the scenario findings and what participants in the workshops argued should be done in order to support a peaceful future.
Following a bumpy start and a number of further negotiations, the cessation of hostilities as agreed on in the 2015 peace agreement finally held, albeit behind schedule. The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was established. Other key provisions of the agreement, such as the demilitarisation of Juba and the withdrawal of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), were also implemented. Nonetheless, the agreement was not the end of negotiations and the country’s transformation; it was just the beginning, as it served as a roadmap for a further peace process in which negotiations and renegotiations continued through talks. The cessation of hostilities provided the required breathing space, allowing room for a national dialogue to continue. This allowed the peace process to move beyond just dealing with the political questions and to start addressing the root causes of the conflicts, including at the local level, and permitting other actors such as civil society and churches to enter the process.

Based on a nationwide consultation with the South Sudanese people, the reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission redrafted the national constitution, further transforming South Sudan’s governance structures and institutions, strengthening on paper the rule of law and reforming the security sector, including by demilitarising politics and separating the SPLMs In Government (SPLM-IG) and In Opposition (SPLM-IO) from their respective Sudan People’s Liberation Armies (SPLAs). This Permanent Constitution would eventually be adopted by the Constitutional Conference. However, the actual implementation of the many reform processes required to ensure that practice matched the constitution on paper would last for many more years. Both in the nationwide consultation and the actual implementation next to the SPLM-IG, SPLM-IO and the SPLM-Former Detainees (SPLM-FD), involvement was also strong from other...
political parties (such as SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC)), civil society and the churches.

The peace process and the redrafting of the national constitution in particular was not an easy process, but rather a bumpy road on which there were many fights and a lot of renegotiating, which took much longer than originally planned in the 2015 peace agreement. After initial careful progress on the restructuring of the national army, political discussions over positions and how to decentralise were especially difficult. There was even an increase in local-level violence for a while surrounding the elections as several political power brokers started to jockey for positions. Additionally, a number of tribal groups felt they needed to make themselves heard to ensure their share in the country’s wealth. However, the key stakeholders kept their heads and did not return to the gun, despite sitting on a volcano of frustrations in their patrimonial networks. President Salva Kiir and first Vice-President Riek Machar in particular were scrutinised by the international community and, due to this pressure, persistent international mediation, and internal mediation by the churches, became instrumental in ensuring other power brokers also continued with the peace process.

In the meantime, the TGoNU had already encouraged an independent process of national reconciliation and healing among and between communities, aimed at reducing tribal tensions and conflicts. The churches and faith-based organisations, particularly, played a leading role in this second process, which was only the beginning of a long process to de-traumatise South Sudanese society.

The international community committed to the peace process by keeping pressure on the parties to implement the 2015 peace agreement and stick to the Permanent Constitution. It played an
important role in the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). The international community also provided financial support, including through debt forgiveness, and technical support to, among other things, a comprehensive demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process and security sector reform. It supported, for example, the integration of the SPLA – In Government (SPLA-IG) and SPLA – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) into the National Defence Forces of South Sudan (NDFSS). Independent technical experts also assisted the TGoNU and the different audit and oversight mechanisms to manage government funds more transparently.

With the peace agreement signed and implemented, slowly refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) started to return home. By 2017, the economy had started to pick up as full oil production came online again and South Sudan managed to benefit from rising oil prices. With a large part of the peace agreement implemented and development having picked up, both Kiir and Machar decided not to run for the presidency. In 2018, reasonably free and fair multiparty elections were organised according to the new constitution, which led to a newly-elected government in 2019 in which the SPLM was still dominant but which more political parties had joined. At the local level, the election results were not always accepted without a gunshot being fired, but Kiir and Machar were instrumental in reducing tensions. Both were praised by the South Sudanese population and the international community for addressing the differences in their own constituencies, while at the same time working for unity.

### The situation in 2020

Under the Permanent Constitution, South Sudan has further decentralised and has become a confederation of three regions: Greater Upper Nile, Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Equatoria. The three regions are further subdivided into 25 states based on effective service delivery rather than ethnic divisions. Although these three regions have a lot of autonomy, the outcome of the national dialogue was that, in order to avoid returning to a similar situation as under the Kokora decentralisation policy, they also need to cooperate closely and work together on issues of overarching national interest. A variety of issues, including the newly-created NDFSS and foreign policy, for example, are still dealt with at the national level.

In the devolution of power, the different regions and states have gained a much greater influence over their finances, taxes, governance, internal affairs and, last but not least, development and reconstruction. The distribution of national income between the regions, in particular oil income, has been fixed in the Permanent Constitution. Spending has been further decentralised and, as a consequence the fight over power in Juba, has become much less relevant as decisions on the distribution of wealth are made elsewhere in a decentralised and more democratic manner. A large-scale civic education programme on the new constitution was rolled out in all states before local leaders were elected by their constituencies, which has strengthened citizens’ participation in decision making. The position of President of South Sudan is primarily a ceremonial role, representing the country abroad, rather than making decisions in domestic politics. The further decentralisation of the country has increased the number of important positions, so all power

---

6 Rens Willems & David Deng, The Legacy of Kokora in South Sudan: Intersections of truth, justice and reconciliation in South Sudan – Briefing paper, NP: November 2015, South Sudan Law Society, UPeace The Hague and PAX. The principle of Kokora was misused by Khartoum to divide southern Sudan and led to internal displacements and social and political grievances.
brokers are guaranteed a position and are therefore less disgruntled.

Although these developments mean that many actors, particularly at the local level, have remained the same during and after the 2018 elections, space has opened up for new political actors. Civil society is able to hold the different levels of government slightly more accountable since it is now closer to the people. Despite increased spending at regional and state levels, the national government still has sufficient funds and the debt burden accumulated during the war has been reduced to acceptable levels due to high international oil prices and international debt forgiveness as an incentive for peace.

The SPLM still dominates in all three regions, but the regional SPLMs are sometimes at odds with each other as they now focus more on the interests of their own region. The Dinka are the largest group in the Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal region and the Nuer have most influence in Greater Upper Nile, while the Equatorian tribes struggle to find a new equilibrium among the different ethnic groups in their region. In the first two regions, the majority group is not united either. Each region has large minorities, which means that, in order to prevent conflict, ethnic domination and marginalisation need to be avoided. However, minority rights are in fact improving as minority tribes that are strong in one region know that they are weaker in the other regions. There is a mutual understanding that minority rights need to be respected, partly to protect ethnic kin living as a minority outside their majority region. Aware that federalisation on an ethnic basis may produce more border and ethnic conflicts, South Sudanese leaders have decided to focus on federalisation based on service delivery. In addition, border commissions have been established to deal with intercommunal tensions and there is sufficient international funding to make the system work.

Confederalisation of the country also has disadvantages. Coordination between the three regions is difficult as each develops its own regional laws and policies and there is little cross-pollination. Juba’s influence is relatively weak as the three regions are inward looking at the cost of building a strong South Sudanese national identity. In addition, Greater Equatoria is closely connected to Uganda and Kenya, and to a lesser extent to Ethiopia, while Greater Upper Nile has strong connections with Sudan and Ethiopia. Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal has the least cross-border international cooperation.

As South Sudan moves slowly towards peace, many IDPs and refugees have returned to their former lives. The country is in a protracted process of demilitarisation as ex-combatants are slowly reintegrated into alternative livelihoods and a comprehensive process of civilian disarmament is prepared across the three regions. All-encompassing plans to deal with renegade youths, including by developing economic livelihoods, are also in the making. The economy has improved as foreign investment in the country has become more attractive and oil is flowing again. Local agricultural production is slowly increasing with the help of foreign assistance and investors. In addition, as the national defence budget is decreasing, regional and state government budgets have increased. Nonetheless, there are regional differences. The Greater Equatoria region in particular has attracted foreign investment, while Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile are still focusing on reconstruction.

Although progress has been made in 2020, South Sudan still has a long way to go. Poverty and underdevelopment remain a defining factor of the economy. With implementation of the DDR process underway, crime has increased as many demobilised young men do not know how to make a living without a gun. Nepotism and corruption remain, but it is decreasing as a result
of stricter enforcement of regulations and power brokers benefiting from the ‘peace dividend’ of their economic investments.

All progress was made at the cost of justice for past crimes. The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing collects stories and forensic data, while the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and the Compensation and Reparation Fund (CRF), which were agreed on in the 2015 peace agreement, remain on the agenda. Politicians do not consider the time ripe yet for the HCSS and CRF, while the latter also lacks funding. Consequently, implementation of Chapter V of the agreement is lagging behind.

Negative tribalism also remains problematic and old tensions continue in pockets of tribal conflict, albeit with less violence. Warrap, Lakes, Unity and Jonglei states in particular continue to face insecurity due to cattle raids. Greater Equatoria also sees some local violence as it tries to establish a new equilibrium between the different ethnic groups in the region.

The country manages to make progress, as, forced by the international community, the power brokers largely respect the 2015 peace agreement and the Permanent Constitution. In addition, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) continues to monitor the agreements, while it is also once again heavily invested in institution building, and gives particular attention to rule of law and community policing.
Main policy lessons of the scenario United in diversity

Ensure the implementation, consolidation and deepening of the peace process

♦ The continuation of the current peace process will require continuous renegotiation and mediation. It will therefore demand international pressure on the parties to continue implementation and mediation from the international community and inside South Sudan from organisations such as the churches.

♦ Current delays in the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement adding to the already ambitious deadlines of the agreement will require renegotiation of the agreed deadlines, within acceptable time limits.

♦ Exemplary and uniting leadership of both Kiir and Machar will be instrumental in reducing tension and guiding the nation through the peace process.

Think beyond keeping the peace process on track

♦ In order to prevent further conflict, any further decentralisation has to take place on the basis of service delivery and not on an ethnic power basis.

♦ As progress in the peace process may come at the cost of justice for past crimes, attention from the international society and South Sudanese civil society to reinforce such justice will be important.

♦ Minority rights in the three regions need to be protected to ensure federalisation does not end in marginalisation.

♦ The need for crime prevention is likely to increase as many demobilised young men will not know how to make a living without a gun.
During the transitional period after the peace agreement was signed in 2015, SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO cooperated in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), in spite of their differences. Many analysts compared the situation to the interim period after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLM. Like the CPA, the 2015 peace agreement brought stability for a while, but implementation did not focus on addressing the root causes and, as such, sowed the seeds for the next conflict. Both parties had felt forced to sign by the international community, but expected that they could change the status quo in their favour either by winning the elections or through renewed conflict.

Both parties had no real interest in transitional justice. Consequently, for example, the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and the Compensation and Reparation Fund (CRF) never really got off the ground, and the work of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing was made difficult as it did not get enough political support. Structural reforms to improve future good governance were more successful. The reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission redrafted the national constitution and, under international pressure and continuous vocal support from civil society and religious institutions, reforms were introduced to improve the rule of law and restructure the security sector. Very slowly the constitution was amended to reflect citizens’ wishes and the government made steps towards good governance, democratic policies and an improved justice system.
However, the government institutions implementing the new governance policies remained weak. Even though much looked good on paper, in practice the ability and capacity to deliver was absent. There were simply not enough well-trained judges, inspectors, lawyers and so on, while the police were also not sufficiently trained and capable of enforcing the rule of law. At the same time, crime surged as the economy was unable to provide all ex-combatants and renegade youths with alternative livelihoods. Some financial oversight over the state budget was realised through the setting up of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). However, the economy was unstable because huge loans had to be repaid and the government apparatus, including the military, still absorbed most government spending.

Development projects relied on international support, which was smaller in scale than before 2013. This absence of sufficient peace dividends meant that, in spite of some progress, dissatisfaction remained among parts of the South Sudanese population. In practice, the political landscape did not really open up as it proved hard to change the attitude among those in power that those ‘entitled’ to the most influential political positions were those who had fought the Khartoum government until 2005. Moreover, many of those who had remained faithful to the Juba government argued that they should have the lion’s share of positions, arguing that rebels should not be rewarded for their actions. Although some smaller political parties were able to come to the fore, they continued to play a role in the margins. Politics continued to take place mainly within the SPLM rather than in a multi-party system. This was exemplified further by the fact that the SPLM ran with two presidential candidates in the March 2018 elections, while other parties were not able to organise strong constituencies. Following the elections, many claimed instances of fraud and vote rigging, particularly regarding the presidential and state governor positions. Members of both the former SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO had their doubts about the
results but, although the situation was very tense, it remained calm until after the results were announced.

When the National Election Commission publicised that Kiir had won 51% of the vote, Machar 23% and other candidates 26%, it stated that this outcome was ‘broadly reflective of the will of the electorate’. The international community concurred with this assessment. From Addis Ababa, the opposition declared that this was a lie, that the elections had been rigged, and that opposition leaders were not willing to accept the proclaimed results. Some of the former SPLA-IO forces that had been integrated and unified into the National Defence Forces of South Sudan (NDFSS) quickly defected again and took control of large parts of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states. However, the government remained in control of most of the oil fields, including Melut in Upper Nile state. The fighting continued in a more conventional manner with a relatively clear frontline between the government-held territory and the ‘liberated territories’ held by the SPLM - Again In Opposition (SPLM-AIO). Although the international community, including South Sudan’s neighbours, agreed not to intervene militarily, Ugandan forces stood ready to return to South Sudan upon Kiir’s request. Moreover, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), being not appreciative of the SPLM-AIO restarting war, chose to assist the SPLM-IG and not to stop engaging with the government as they did in 2013.

Despite the relative calm of the transitional period (2016–17), renewed conflict in 2018 again developed along the tribal lines of Dinka versus Nuer. Most Nuer rallied behind their nationalist cause in face of the common enemy. Dinka were less united, but Bahr-el Ghazal Dinka ‘nationalists’ dominated the Dinka discourse, while others remained silent. Killings led to revenge killings and slowly it became impossible for Nuer commanders to stay with the SPLA-IG as they were mistrusted, while Dinka were also marginalised in the SPLM-AIO. Consequently, almost all Nuer left the SPLM-IG and switched sides to the SPLM-AIO, while Dinka in the SPLM-AIO generally left the organisation but did not join the SPLM-IG.

What had never been foreseen before it happened during 2019 was that violence against Dinka in the SPLM-AIO-held areas escalated, with survivors having to flee for their lives. At the same time, out of fear of retaliation, most Nuer fled the rest of the country to SPLM-AIO-held ‘liberated territories’ in Greater Upper Nile, dividing the country into two.

The situation in 2020

The intensity of the conflict has decreased as the parties have reached a stalemate. Sometimes skirmishes flare up, but in general the situation has stabilised to low-level conflict along the border. However, neither party sees the current division as an acceptable outcome. Both sides aim to control the whole of the country, not ‘just’ their own parts. Therefore they have not given up looking for ways to defeat their opponent.

Due to relative improvements in the field of good governance that largely remain in place except inside the conflict zone, Kiir has broader support beyond his own Dinka constituency. His strategy has been to ensure that any argument of Dinka domination can be disproved, and he has given many key positions to non-Dinka. This in turn has caused some Dinka ‘nationalists’ to question the extent of Kiir’s ‘Dinkaness’ and to attempt to undermine his position. Most Equatorians, although perhaps generally not happy, have accepted the situation that the
government provides them with sufficient stability to improve their living conditions. On the other hand, the SPLM-AIO has united most Nuer leaders, and appeased the Shilluk and some Murle leaders. Although the increased ethnic character of the war has led to a decrease in intra-Dinka and particularly intra-Nuer fighting, cattle raiding remains rife. Small-scale local conflicts also continue in large parts of the country. Since these conflicts are sometimes exploited by both the SPLM-IG and SPLM-AIO, there are occasional spikes of violence.

The Juba government’s budget is suffering as a result of the renewed increase in defence spending but the South Sudanese economy is more stable than during the 2013-15 war. This time the government is in control of most of the oil fields and on the whole the international community sticks with the Juba government. Moreover, the fact that the price of Dar Blend oil went back up to US$110 a barrel after the 2015 low during the Chinese crisis, and because the compensatory package of US$3 billion to Sudan is now fully paid, Juba’s oil revenues have again increased.7

SPLM-AIO has strengthened its governance structures in the territories under its control. It has established its own government in anticipation of the ‘liberation’ of the rest of the country. Despite United Nations (UN) sanctions against SPLM-AIO and its leaders, the structures of these ‘liberated territories’ have enough funds to operate due to a diaspora and alleged Sudanese support.

Nonetheless, in spite of the Juba government’s and SPLM-AIO’s well-meant intentions in the field of good governance, transparency, accountability and human rights, budgets and capacity for service delivery in, for example, health and education are limited by the war expenditures of both sides. The country therefore remains dependent on international humanitarian assistance and on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing services, particularly in the SPLM-AIO-held territories.

---

Main policy lessons of the scenario Divided leadership

Increase the sustainability of the peace process by dealing with the root causes

- For peace to become sustainable, the conflict parties need to embrace the peace process and give up their intentions to change the political status quo through violent means.

- In order for the peace process and constitutional review to become sustainable and deal with the root causes of the conflict, it needs to open up to other political stakeholders and groups beyond the current parties to the agreement.

- The political landscape also needs to open up beyond the SPLM, allowing other constituencies to be represented by government.

- There is a need to start an independent process of national reconciliation and healing among and between communities, a process that will take many years to be completed.

- Continuous international pressure and vocal support from civil society will be required to ensure reforms to improve the rule of law, ensure good governance and restructure the security sector.

Take measures to prevent a relapse into war

- Investment in a free and fair electoral process and acceptance of the results is essential to prevent a relapse into war.

- The restructuring of the NDFSS into a truly national rather than a patchwork tribal force is a high priority to avoid it potentially breaking up again. This requires a DDR process and sustainable alternative livelihoods.

- Peace dividends tied to the peace and reconciliation processes, in terms of education, employment and economic development, are required to remove incentives for rebellion, especially for youth. International financial and technical support will be essential for this purpose.
A future history

After initial relief over the signing of the 2015 peace agreement, the first ceasefire violations made it apparent that the peace process would become very difficult. Nonetheless, in spite of the troubled start, by and large the peace agreement held for months and steps were taken to de-militarise Juba, reform the army and prepare for the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). Also the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) withdrew largely from South Sudanese soil. Yet implementation of the peace agreement lagged behind from the start and there was still much distrust between the two parties. Skirmishes and serious confrontations continued to take place and it was rumoured that elements within the national security apparatus planned to assassinate prominent SPLM-IO leaders, including Machar. At the same time, both Kiir and Machar did their utmost to keep their often more radical officers and supporters in line with the needs of the peace process, and made statements that they had a strong commitment to the agreement. However, they were still after opportunities for an all-out victory.

The international community tried to pressurise the parties into implementing the peace agreement and, for example, to form the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). Within the country, religious leaders and civil society continued to call for peace. However, the hatred and distrust at both national and local levels proved too strong. As a result, within the first year the war continued with no end in sight.

During the second half of 2015, the first signs of further fragmentation of South Sudan had already been visible. In July, Peter Gadet and a number of commanders defected from the
SPLM-IO. The SPLM-IG also faced internal challenges. In December, president Kiir warned that further splits in the SPLM were likely as there were factions within SPLM-IG that wanted to take over the leadership and remove him. At the same time, conflicts intensified in regions that had previously been perceived as relatively quiet. In Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, tensions rose between Dinka, who dominated the state government, and Fertit and other communities. West Equatoria State saw increasing levels of violence as conflicts between local youths and predominantly Dinka SPLA-IG units escalated into insurgencies against the government. Eastern Equatoria witnessed the establishment of a new armed group originating from Torit county, which called itself the South Sudan Armed Forces. In 2016, and particularly after the restart of the war, these conflicts, tensions and insurgencies escalated further.

The UPDF did not intervene in this poisonous witch brew. This was partly because Kampala did not feel secure about the right line of action. Would it end up in a protracted war it could never win in a country which it could never control? It was also not comfortable supporting the SPLM-IG that was widely believed to have restarted the war. Renegade SPLA-IG officers, those who felt that Kiir’s signing of the peace agreement had been a mistake and who did not want to see the return of Machar to Juba, were generally seen as the culprits. It was also no longer internationally acceptable for Museveni to openly support Kiir’s government. At the same time, Juba’s ability to financially compensate for the UPDF’s support diminished. The SPLA-IG was, however, sufficiently able to defend Juba on its own and the SPLA-IO and the White Army did not attempt to force their way directly to Juba. Yet, the elites and educated people foresaw what was coming. They left the country, which consequently suffered from a brain drain and related capital flight.

In spite of the high costs of the ongoing war and low oil prices, and consequently limited govern-
ment revenues, the Juba government was able to sustain itself much longer than many had expected, until October 2017. The collapse of the government was a slow process as the treasury started to dry up. Slowly commanders started to break away, often forming their own groups, and banditry driven by the ever-growing numbers of deserting soldiers continued to rise in rural and urban areas. In October 2017, with no new loans available, the Kiir government was no longer able to buy allegiances and the last essential bits of the patrimonial network of the government collapsed. Since the state was the SPLM, the SPLM was the SPLA, and the SPLA was basically a tribal patchwork army, the system fragmented. One could argue that historically large parts of the country had never seen much governance, but now the influence of Juba, and the link between the national government and whatever form of local governance, completely evaporated.

The SPLM-IO was, however, unable to fill this gap and to benefit from the collapse of the SPLM-IG. Exhausted by the war, it would only have been in the position to take control of Juba and the government structures if it had remained united. Controlling and dealing with all fragments of the former SPLM-IG would have been a formidable task, but in the subsequent chaos local SPLA-IO commanders deemed it more important to protect their own local power bases and interests. Moreover, in the absence of SPLM-IO’s common enemy, internal divisions and infighting prevented it from fulfilling its aims.

The limited rule of law collapsed as the South Sudanese security sector split along different ethnic, tribal and political lines, and some police and military personnel joined the highest bidder. This fragmentation was certainly not only along ethnic, tribal or sub-tribal lines, but tribal relations became the only guarantee of security for the average South Sudanese. At this stage the international oil companies temporarily abandoned their investments.

The entire country got embroiled in poisonous waves of killings and revenge killings based on both ethnic and political historical feuds mixed with social and criminal violence. In fact, in the absence of rule of law and with an abundance of weapons in the country, extortion, theft and robbery became the single easiest way to make a living. Juba particularly bore the brunt of this toxic mixture of violence, but the UNMISS Protection of Civilians (POC) sites were also flashpoints of mass violence, predominantly of Equatorians against Nuer and Dinka, and Dinka versus Nuer. The result was that large groups of people fled particularly the capital, either to their tribal home areas or abroad. And the international community did not know what to do. No one was really willing to risk potential failure and losing the lives of their own nationals. Everyone pointed at the other and nothing happened. UNMISS, unable to protect the POC sites, withdrew temporarily to Entebbe. The Security Council stated that ‘under the current circumstances the peace operation no longer has a role to play’. Although the neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Sudan and Kenya each had their own interests, they saw intervening in such anarchy as far too risky.

### The situation in 2020

South Sudan is a fragmented country lacking any form of national governance system. The state has collapsed, together with all government functions, and many different conflicts are fought for. As the oilfields have been closed down, the country is largely dependent on humanitarian assistance. Perhaps more than ever before, politics has become local and about the highest price: life and security. How this plays out on the ground differs per region.
Broadly speaking, Equatoria is best off. After the 2017–18 violent expulsion of non-Equatorians and the displacement of many of them, the situation has largely settled down. However, conflicts between pastoralists (including IDPs) and farmers remain common and the region is destabilised by the chaos in the rest of the country. Although local conflicts between different tribes in greater Equatoria have increased and local leaders are sometimes using tribal identities to mobilise support for conflicts among Equatorians, this is only done on a minor scale. In fact, the region as a whole is discussing how to reunite and traditional tribal structures effectively provide some form of governance, while international support provides some basic services.

The situation is far worse in the rest of the country, where warlords roam the land for spoils, territorial control, resources and humanitarian assistance. They exploit the youth in their armies, who have no alternative ways to make a living. The gun is what people live by, and what provides their livelihoods. The complete breakdown of rule of law and high insecurity have staggering human costs in terms of deaths, human rights abuses, hunger and disease. There is no incentive for the population to start building an alternative lifestyle or living because they know that any form of successful development will be destroyed, hijacked or stolen by someone more powerful.

In large parts of the country, tribal and sub-tribal mobilisation is the name of the game, as people have to fall back on their tribal and sub-tribal kin for protection. Old tribal and sub-tribal conflicts have reignited and are completely out of control as revenge upon revenge continues to escalate further. Mistrust among groups is so great that groups prefer self-reliance and if alliances exist at all they are mostly short lived. There is no clear-cut Dinka-Nuer conflict as in practice the subtribes have been used by warlords to mobilise fighters. Consequently, while throughout the greater Upper Nile region there is fighting between Dinka and Nuer groups, Dinka and Nuer sub-tribal groups also fight among themselves, while Shilluk are in conflict with both Dinka and Nuer groups. In Jonglei State, the situation is even more complex as there are also Jiye, Anyuak and Murle militias, among others, to add to the mix. Intra-Nuer clashes dominate the violence in Unity State, while the conflicts in Warrap and Lakes States are predominantly intra-Dinka power conflicts and cattle raiding.

The country is slowly getting emptier. Some 55% of the population has fled their homes. Of about 12 million South Sudanese, some 3 million live abroad as refugees, mostly in Sudan and Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent in Kenya and Uganda. Some 3.5 million IDPs live in camps, many of which are located in the Equatorian states, as these are the most stable. Having so many IDPs is, however, a burden on the Equatorian states, not only in terms of more mouths to feed, but also in having more cattle and weapons around. Estimates of the number of people killed in these wars vary widely, but run into hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

In this anarchy, Kiir and Machar are still relevant to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN. Although both organisations are aware of the limited influence of the two leaders, the South Sudanese establishment has splintered to the extent that the international community sees no other option than to hope for a new government with both leaders. Such a government might serve as a starting point for reuniting and rebuilding the country. Some critics argue, however, that building stability starting from Equatoria is a better option.
Main policy lessons of the scenario Fragmentation

Take measures to prevent a relapse into war

♦ The longer the war continues the greater the chance that it runs out of control and governance collapses. An end to the war and all hostilities is needed now.

♦ Trust and confidence building is essential to ensure that the leadership of SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO regain some basic common understanding.

♦ A dialogue is required at local levels for leaders to reconcile with different communities, and among communities at grassroots level to prevent conflicts running out of control and to stimulate peace processes. Local-level peace processes are of utmost importance to prevent renewed mobilisation for war and require investment in local peace brokers.

♦ The restructuring of the NDFSS into a truly national rather than a patchwork tribal force is a high priority to avoid it potentially breaking up again. Strategies have to be developed to ensure that the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO structures do not fragment further.

♦ Peace dividends in terms of education, employment and economic development are required to take away incentives for young disgruntled men to join a rebellion.

♦ Investment in governance capacity at state and local levels is required to deal with the rule of law, criminality and human rights abuses by the security apparatus, particularly in the case of renewed conflict, to relieve the suffering and maintain incentives for development.

Be prepared for the worst

♦ Once the situation has run out of control there is only a very limited role for the international community as it is likely to regard a ‘humanitarian’ peace operation or intervention as too risky and an arms embargo would be very difficult to enforce. However, contingency-planning is important, particularly regarding: (a) violence at UNMISS’s POC sites; (b) hosting and sheltering large numbers of IDPs and refugees; and (c) the provision of humanitarian assistance.
A future history

Both SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO saw the 2015 peace agreement primarily as an extended ceasefire that needed to be signed to appease international pressure and to recuperate from the preceding 21 months of conflict. During the transitional period, little progress was made on the implementation of the transitional aspects of the agreement. The timeframe was already very ambitious but, on top of that, implementation lagged behind from the start. The Kiir government did not want to relinquish power to Machar, while SPLM-IO still had hopes that it could win the war once the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) left South Sudan. Consequently, every step of the 2015 peace agreement was continuously renegotiated and delayed.

In the meantime, tensions in the three Equatorian states increased as many Equatorians claimed that they had gained too little from the 2015 peace agreement, while tensions between local youths, and SPLA troops and Dinka cattle keepers increased. Many Equatorians claimed that the government in Juba was mishandling these problems as it would side with the SPLA troops or Dinka cattle keepers rather than the local Equatorians. Equatorian tensions built on the land conflicts and other incidents that preceded the 2015 peace agreement in, among other places, Mundri, Maridi and Yambio. Its origins could also be found in the smaller insurgency attacks in Eastern and Western Equatoria, the killing of the Western Equatoria State Speaker, James Bage Elisa, and the sacking of four state governors, most notably Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro in August 2015. Slowly, like a pressure cooker, forces started to build up, ready to explode. Local militia activity grew, which the SPLA was unable to deescalate. Whispers of ‘cleaning up the house’, ‘fighting Dinka domination’ and ‘let the Nilotic Dinka and Nuer fight their battles on their own soil’ became more frequent.
Despite the questionable commitment of the parties to the peace agreement and the Equatorian discontent, under international pressure the delayed withdrawal of the UPDF was completed at the end of October 2015, and in early 2016 the demilitarisation of Juba was completed. In fact, the demilitarisation of Juba only worsened Equatorian discontent, as the SPLA soldiers deployed outside Juba harassed local Bari and Mundari villagers.

In August 2016, the situation in Yambio exploded after SPLA soldiers killed 16 civilians in the local market. Local Arrow Boys took up arms and unrest spread to other towns in Equatoria. In Juba, small gangs of young men torched Dinka-owned houses, claiming they would ‘give them a bloody nose’. Initially these attacks only took place at night, but as civilians started fleeing to the UNMISS Juba POC site and other areas of the country, and the government’s control diminished, these attacks became more open and organised. UNMISS was unable to maintain order and security at its Juba POC site, as the new IDPs were not welcomed by those already staying there.

The resulting Juba massacres were the sign for the SPLA-IG troops to re-enter the Juba demilitarised zone. That in turn triggered the SPLA-IO together with the White Army to launch an offensive on the city. Without the UPDF based in Bor, the road to Juba was open and within days they took the city. Machar ousted Kiir and declared himself the new interim president of South Sudan, while Kiir fled to Uganda. Remnants of forces loyal to Kiir withdrew to the Uganda-South Sudan border and a multiplicity of disconnected military groups from the Greater Bahr El Ghazal area and parts of Upper Nile and Jonglei states who still saw President Kiir as their leader fought a low-level insurgency using guerrilla tactics in their local areas.
The international community responded in horror to the killings in South Sudan. After Rwanda and Srebrenica, this was yet another example of the United Nations failing to keep the peace. Yet very little happened. Even Uganda’s response was limited as president Museveni, despite his distrust and dislike of Machar, did not dare to redeploy the UPDF and enter an unpopular war at the height of his presidential election campaign. Instead, Kampala decided to give financial support and provide arms and equipment to the SPLM-IG insurgency.

After the victory of SPLM-IO, a federal system of 21 states was rolled out in South Sudan. This decentralisation was supposed to lead to devolution of power. At the same time, it was also a way for SPLM-IO to ensure support from the Equatorians. Relations between the Equatorians and Machar were an uneasy marriage, based mainly on the temporary common enemy. Machar hoped to gain their support as many of them had always been in favour of further federalisation. However, since there had been no process of reconciliation among the peoples of South Sudan, many supporters of further federalisation in the Equatorias were not driven by devolution of power but by the ethnic homogeneity of their states and ensuring that strangers from other tribes and ethnicities would go to their own areas.

As in 1983 when the re-division of southern Sudan became an important reason for the renewed civil war, the redrawing of the borders started new conflicts. As the 21 new federal states were eventually drawn up on an ethnic basis rather than on the basis of service delivery, a second round of violence and ethnic migration took place. This time, however, it was less fierce. Dinka and Nuer, in particular, were no longer welcome in the Equatorian states and the majority left for safer areas. Many of the Dinka either fled to join the SPLM-IG insurgency or became refugees in Uganda or IDPs in one of the ‘Dinka’ states. Most Nuer became IDPs in one of the ‘Nuer’ states. The introduction of the 21-state federal system also led to problems in the northern states, as conflicts over borders erupted. Such violent border conflicts took place, for example, in some of the places where the 21 states of Machar and current state boundaries diverged. In addition to the border conflicts, the new states also created new demographic tensions as they created new minorities and majorities, and a number of these tensions also turned violent.8

The situation in 2020

The situation has largely settled as the violence has created a number of relatively ethnically homogeneous territories and balanced out borders. A number of other states are multi-tribal, but there also the situation has reached a more peaceful equilibrium between different groups. The creation of the 21 states system has the advantage that new offices have been created and consequently the appetite of more and new leaders can be accommodated. This also allows for a new Dinka leadership to rise and govern the ‘Dinka’ states. At the same time, not every state has enough qualified people to fill these newly-created positions.

In the 21 states federal system the SPLM, as a national political party, has lost a lot of its relevance as each state is governed by a governor who has his own political system and who has limited

---

8 For a good overview of the different proposals and the effects they have on the ethnic balances in the newly projected states, including maps, see: Radio Tamazuj, ‘Map analysis: Ethnic balance to change if 28 states approved’, 22 Nov. 2015, <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/map-analysis-ethnic-balance-change-if-28-states-approved>. 
responsibilities to the central government. As the president, Machar is in a position to appoint and discharge governors, but has given up a lot of power to buy allegiances from local strongmen. Apart from maintaining this network, his executive task of president is therefore mainly focused on external defence and foreign affairs. Like the SPLM and the presidency, cross-state tribal formations have also become less relevant, as the politics and division of wealth are done at the state level.

There are large differences in how the 21 states are governed and how they fare. In some, the devolution of power works very well, as local communities have a greater say in governance. In those states governance is now closer to the people and leaders are forced to be more accountable. In most states, however, power is concentrated in the hands of the governor. In some of those states, such autocratic leadership works relatively well as some basic services are provided for, while in others the local population is held hostage to the vagaries of the local strongman or commander ruling his personal ‘fiefdom’ based on the looting of resources and the population rather than on his merits. Each of the governors maintains his own militia to guarantee his personal security and that of his state. As a consequence, disarmament appears very difficult.

The Equatorian states profit a lot from trade and their closeness to Uganda and Kenya. At the same time, Central Equatoria and Juba in particular suffer a big economic backlash as a result of the loss of the central institutions and the income these generated for local citizens. Moreover, the Equatorian states have lost access to oil wealth. Some of the states in the greater Upper Nile area, on the other hand, still lack the necessary laws to manage oil production, but may be on the way to becoming small petro states. Some of the states in the greater Bahr-el-Ghazal area are less fortunate. In spite of their great agricultural potential, insufficient or non-existent infrastructure prevents development. As a consequence of these differences, the first indications of renewed migration patterns appear in which people from poorer states move to richer states, likely reversing some of the 2016–18 rounds of ethnic migration and segregation.

As Machar’s position is relatively weak, he is unable to control the most important negative impacts of the federalisation. In the new system there is less national cohesion and unity, as the different states focus primarily on the wellbeing of their own constituencies. States share less of their wealth with other states and consequently poorer states have less chance to develop, while richer states get richer. The system of 21 states has also created interstate competition, which is economically beneficial to some but detrimental to others. In fact, in a number of cases state governors are in conflict with neighbouring state governors.

South Sudan’s neighbours use the divisions between the states to gain influence in the country. Broadly speaking, Sudan has influence over the more northern states and Ethiopia over the eastern states, while Uganda and Kenya have a lot of interests and investments in the Equatorian states. Kampala, particularly, has managed to regain a great deal of influence over local power brokers to protect its interests in the Equatorias. These regional influences further divide the country as they undermine a national South Sudanese identity and bring with them regional proxy conflicts. However, they are also beneficial to some states as neighbouring countries invest in those states within their spheres of influence. Such regional investments are desperately needed as the EU and US have severed all ties with the South Sudanese government, demanding justice for ‘the impunity during the war that brought the current government to power’. 
Main policy lessons of the scenario 21 Kingdoms

Choose peace, as the cost of victory, if possible at all, will be too high

- Any victory is likely to come at the cost of many lives while the winner may lose support from the international community if it is reached at the cost of gross or large-scale human rights violations. An end to the war and all hostilities is therefore needed now.

Give attention to the Equatorian states

- Finding an answer to the Equatorian calls for more influence, and decreasing tensions between local youths and SPLA troops and Dinka cattle keepers is essential to prevent a further escalation of the conflicts in the Equatorias.

- Demilitarisation of Juba has to be implemented carefully. Otherwise it may increase Equatorian discontent if SPLA troops are not controlled in their new areas of deployment.

Ensure a vision on further decentralisation and federalisation

- Further decentralisation or federalisation has a lot of potential for positive change: (a) it may bring the government closer to the population and therefore improve service delivery; and (b) increasing the number of states creates new offices and consequently the appetite of more and new leaders may be accommodated.

However, a vision on further decentralisation or federalisation is needed. Implementation on the basis of ethnic power divisions instead of service delivery should be avoided in particular, but federalisation may also come at a high price in terms of lives and welfare for some states, and will not necessarily lead to a more peaceful, independent, equal, legitimately and better-governed South Sudan.

- When federalising, further particular attention needs to be paid to: (a) solving land and border conflicts to avoid further violence in the process; (b) investing in governance capacity at state and local levels to ensure sufficiently strong subnational entities; (c) guaranteeing accountability and transparency of governance to ensure legitimacy among the population; (d) maintaining national cohesion and unity as
states may put their own interests first, and neighbouring
states may seek to gain influence

Be prepared for the worst

In this scenario, contingency planning is also important,
particularly regarding: (a) violence at UNMISS’ POC sites;
(b) hosting and sheltering large numbers of IDPs and refugees;
and (c) the provision of humanitarian assistance.
A future history

As already known before its signing, the SPLM-IG did not have much faith in the 2015 peace agreement as a viable way to end the war. Initially Kiir backed out of a ceremony to sign it and, when he finally did, he continued to express ‘serious reservations’ as it had ‘so many things we have to reject’. The fact that Gadet and Gathoth Gatkuoth dismissed the agreement showed that within SPLM-IO there was also sufficient resistance. Machar was not able to control all his commanders, and when some of them launched a large-scale attack on SPLA-IG positions near Malakal, some within the SPLA-IG gladly embraced this opportunity to show that ‘enough is enough’. Initially disobeying orders from President Kiir, they felt that they could end the war by winning it and reopened the offensive against the SPLA-IO. As a consequence, implementation of the 2015 peace agreement broke down completely before issues such as reintegration and transitional justice could even be initiated. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) stopped meeting and both sides accused the other of having restarted the war. In effect, it meant the war returned in all its intensity by mid-2016 and the 2015 peace agreement died.

Although SPLA-IG would eventually not win the war outright, it did come close. During 2016–17, SPLA-IO started to crumble. Remembering Machar’s relationship both with Khartoum and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Museveni feared Machar might come to power and decided to reinforce the SPLA-IG with new UPDF troops. IGAD was divided on the issue and was unable to put the genie of war back in its bottle. The start of the dry season in November 2016 marked the beginning of large-scale operations, with the combined forces of the SPLA-IG and the UPDF battling the SPLA-IO. More and more SPLA-IO commanders broke away and defected as they
saw increasingly that the opposition was losing, preferred to be on the winning side and returned to the government. Moreover, while the SPLM-IO had hoped that the majority of Equatorians would join its struggle, most decided to stay with the SPLM-IG because they realised that the presence of the central government in Juba might also bring in a lot of money to the capital and consequently to larger parts of the region. In which case, why would they kill the goose with the golden eggs? Besides, the newly-created 28 states sufficiently satisfied the Equatorian call for federalisation, while Machar had already lost credit during the 2013–15 war.

The fighting further intensified towards the end of the dry season and by June 2017, when the rainy season began, the SPLA-IO was no longer in a position to continue its more conventional military strategy. Subsequently the SPLA-IO took up guerrilla tactics, after which it continued a low-level insurgency in greater Upper Nile and occasionally into Western Equatoria. Juba was unable to defeat the insurgency, as SPLM-IO, with the financial support of Khartoum, was able to pay an army of poor and uneducated youth and sometimes buy allegiances from disgruntled groups.

Kiir opened up his ‘big tent’ further and embraced anyone who had deserted but was willing to return back to a town hall style political system. At the same time he clamped down on and reduced the political space for any remaining opposition and dissent. Consequently, the SPLM remained the one dominant political party and decisions were made at the SPLM political marketplace, rather than following from the people’s election choices. As a consequence, the newly-created 28 states did not lead to further real decentralisation as the SPLM-IG leadership reduced the political space and ensured that state governors follow central party leadership.

Having brought more stability, in 2019 Juba felt that elections could be organised to confirm the status quo. Kiir campaigned based on a style of discourse used by president Kagame in
Rwanda: a vote for him was a vote for stability and development; a vote for anyone else would be a vote for chaos. No real opposition was able to participate in the elections and the result was that 83% of the votes were supposedly in favour of Kiir’s re-election. The international community was clear that it considered the elections not free and fair.

The situation in 2020

The SPLM and the government are still one and the same. South Sudan remains basically a one-party state with internal SPLM jockeying and so-called primaries determining who will take which position rather than the official elections. In addition, tribalism, nepotism and corruption continue to determine governance. As politicians are military and military are politicians, those in government are not hired for their skill sets and merits but for the stability they bring to the system. Also, as security sector personnel are hired primarily to ensure they are not causing trouble outside the system, the government is highly militarised, inefficient, unaccountable and non-transparent. The government is mainly directed at ensuring the position and the needs of the elites and does not take into consideration the needs of the broader population beyond the level needed to ensure that they do not rebel against the elite. Grievances among the general population over the events and losses in the war are also ignored by the elites. In many ways the system is not directed at power sharing but at loot sharing. Governance is further determined by heavy-handed repression. Human rights are regularly violated, there is no right of assembly or freedom of speech, and democratic access remains problematic.

Perhaps this repression is the price South Sudan has to pay for its relative peace/stability based on the big tent system. Although the insurgency continues and frustrates travel in parts of the country, as the war has largely ended oil has started flowing again. This, combined with increased oil prices in the global market, means the general economy is improving. Business opportunities open up and the country increasingly attracts investors from neighbouring countries. The government is in a position to spend more on services such as health and education, and reconstruction. At the same time, the largest part of the government budget is not directed at development. As all the militias and defected SPLA-IO troops have to be integrated into the National Defence Forces of South Sudan (NDFSS), the defence budget remains high. Additionally, victory came at a high price and therefore parts of the government budget have to be used for debt repayment and covering the Ugandan military support. Consequently, although the economy is improving, it is still held back.

Internationally, in addition to South Sudan’s close ties with Uganda, since its relations with the West have broken down with the restart of the war, Juba is heavily dependent on China. Not only are donor funds withheld because of the South Sudanese human rights situation and the lack of democratic governance, the EU and the US also have personal sanctions out against the most important members of the regime. On the other hand, the government is no longer willing to cooperate with the West as it argues that the EU and US have meddled too much in the internal affairs of the country and indirectly supported a ‘rebel’, Machar, against a ‘democratically elected leader’, Kiir. Sudan manages an ambiguous relationship with Juba, combatting international sanctions with the government while also passing arms to armed opposition groups.
The humanitarian situation and people’s livelihoods have improved in the areas without insurgency. Refugees and IDPs return home and pick up their lives again. Apart from the areas of the insurgency, South Sudan is relatively stable. However, tensions are high in some of the areas where the newly-created 28 states have changed the ethnic power balance. Moreover, incidences of revenge spike as, once again, conflict has been settled through elite compromise rather than solved through applying justice and addressing grievances. The security sector is not ready to deal with increased homicide rates and social violence, and is also unable to deal with increasing crime rates. There is no form of reconciliation and impunity continues. Additionally, local, land and tribal conflicts persist. In short, the situation is not ‘positive peace’; it is forced stability, likely to once again break down before real peace is reached.
Box 6

Main policy lessons of the scenario Dictatorship

Choose peace, as the cost of victory, if possible at all, will be too high

♦ Any victory is likely to come at the cost of many lives while the winner may lose support from the international community if it is reached at the cost of human rights and good governance. An end to the war and all hostilities is therefore needed now.

♦ A complete victory of either of the parties is unlikely as a low-level armed opposition will probably continue to be supported from abroad. Such a continuation of conflict prolongs harm to the social and economic development of the South Sudanese people. Therefore, the country is also likely to require humanitarian relief and assistance for IDPs in the future.

Do not confuse short-term stability with long-term peace

♦ Closed political space and elite pacts may lead to short-term stability, but this is likely to be only temporary if underlying grievances are not addressed, and if there is no form of reconciliation and impunity continues. It is therefore essential for peace in South Sudan that the root causes of the conflict and grievances are addressed, political space is opened up, nation-wide reconciliation is started and impunity is ended.

♦ Similarly, ‘big tent’ policies and elite pacts require an accompanying long-term investment in governance capacity at the state and local level, demilitarisation, strengthening of accountability, efficiency and transparency of governance at all levels, and a lot of funding. Stability is not ‘peace on the cheap.’
The five scenarios described above are intended to give a picture of how South Sudan might look in 2020 in five corners of the cube (see Figure 2) determined by the three key uncertainties:

1. Will life in South Sudan be dominated by war and armed political conflict or will there be predominantly peace – or at least the absence of large-scale armed political violence?

2. Will South Sudan make progress towards good governance or will the country face a further downturn towards bad governance?

3. Will governance in South Sudan be further decentralised (by design or violently) or will there be no further decentralisation and central governance is perhaps strengthened even further?

**Main findings**

The first main message from the scenarios is that there is hope. If the parties stick to the 2015 peace agreement and implement, consolidate and deepen the peace process, slowly South Sudan may be on the road towards a more positive future: the United in diversity scenario.
The second main message is that, if this is not the case, the 2015 peace agreement does not hold and the peace process is not opened up, the future is far less hopeful. Broadly speaking, the scenarios show that the alternatives to the scenario United in diversity, as portrayed in the four other scenarios, entail horrific devastation and/or repression.

Development towards one of these five scenarios argues on the answers to and trends regarding the following four questions:

1. Will the 2015 peace agreement hold?
2. Will the peace process deal with the root causes of the conflict and open up to other tribal or regional groups, and include civil society and religious leaders?
3. Will the election results be widely accepted, particularly by the main power brokers?
4. Will Equatorians choose sides and if so support SPLM-IG or SPLM-IO?

If the answer to the first three questions is yes, South Sudan may go in the direction of the United in diversity scenario.

If the 2015 peace agreement holds and the peace process is dealing with root causes and is further opened up but the election results are not accepted, the Divided leadership scenario is more probable.
If the 2015 peace agreement does not open up and remains a CPA model of power sharing rather than dealing with the root causes of the conflict, the peace process is ultimately likely to derail and backslide to a second main pathway in which there is no longer a peace agreement.

In this pathway, in which the 2015 peace agreement has broken down, the question is whether Equatorians – based on whether they feel equitably treated – predominantly choose sides in favour of the SPLM-IG or SPLM-IO, or do not choose sides or even decide to fight both conflicting parties and ‘clean up their house’. In the first case, the Dictatorship scenario becomes probable, in the second the 21 Kingdoms scenario becomes more likely, while in the last, Fragmentation, the most unpleasant scenario, is most likely.

These pathways are projected schematically in Figure 3. Of course, reality will be much more complex. There are many more possible pathways and the future will, of course, be a hybrid of the different scenarios.

**Reflections on the scenarios**

Reflecting on the different scenarios, Fragmentation is the worst-case scenario that no one would prefer and which should be prevented at all cost. However, many of the workshop participants and interviewees see it as likely if the 2015 peace agreement breaks down.

The 21 Kingdoms and Dictatorship scenarios show what may happen if the war is won by,
respectively, the SPLM-IO or the SPLM-IG. Descriptions of both scenarios show that there are considerable problems in both the projected situations in 2020 and the paths towards them. They show that victory is likely to come at the price of many lives and many people being forced to flee. Moreover, the final outcome in both scenarios will probably see a continuation of some form of low-intensity insurgencies, local conflicts and cattle raiding, while the population of South Sudan will probably suffer as a result of repression, elites that focus predominantly on their own interests and other forms of bad governance. Both scenarios are seen as possible, but less likely than the Fragmentation scenario.

The Divided leadership scenario is seen as not unlikely in 2020, but as a temporary or intermediate situation. As none of the leaders see a divided country as a preferred solution to the problems of South Sudan, in this scenario they will probably try to change the circumstances by either violent or peaceful means. Consequently, after 2020 the Divided leadership scenario is likely to revert eventually to one of the other scenarios depending on the steps taken.

Last, but certainly not least, is the United in diversity scenario. This is a best-case scenario and a variation on the scenario strongly advocated for by religious leaders since the start of the war. Although almost all participants and interviewees see it as by far the preferred outcome and advocate for it, it is not considered the most likely scenario.
The main policy implications of the findings of these scenarios for the South Sudanese parties to the 2015 peace agreement, as well as for (inter)national civil society and the international community, are:

First, the critical difference between a successful and unsuccessful outcome will to a large extent be determined by whether South Sudan has a stable, cooperative and confident leadership willing to act for the general good of all citizens. Above all, these scenarios therefore call on the wisdom of all leaders of South Sudan.

Second, if the parties do not choose peace, the scenarios show that the cost of victory, if feasible at all, will be impossible for South Sudan to bear. For this purpose, it is essential that the parties stay on the path of peace, however difficult, because following the temptation to go for victory will not ultimately lead to a better future.

Third, as these tasks will be challenging, continuous national and international assistance, mediation and pressure is needed to support all parties to continue implementing the 2015 peace agreement, to end the war and to reach the most positive future. Valuable time has already been lost, while deadlines in the peace agreement were already very ambitious. Therefore, the parties to the agreement may need to extend the time horizon for the implementation of the peace agreement and postpone some of the deadlines, or, less preferably, sections in the agreement need to be prioritised.

Fourth, although in theory all five scenarios are equally likely, the only one that promises a more peaceful future – United in diversity – does not appear to be the most probable. It would be wise
for (inter)national civil society and the international community to follow a two-pronged strategy in which (a) all efforts are directed at ensuring the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement and preventing a relapse into war, while at the same time (b) preparations are made for the worst that may happen if the peace process breaks down.

More detailed policy implications below are arranged in two groups, implications for:

- the South Sudanese parties to the 2015 peace agreement; and
- (inter)national civil society and the international community.

**Policy implications for the South Sudanese parties**

On the basis of the five scenarios explored, workshop participants stressed that in order to reach the most positive scenario, United in diversity, the parties to the 2015 peace agreement, with the support of South Sudanese civil society and the international community (international, governmental and non-governmental organisations) should take the following steps:

- Uphold the 2015 peace agreement and continue a process of dialogue;
- Make the peace process and constitutional review inclusive, open up the process beyond the current signatories and address the root causes of many of the conflicts through national dialogue;
- Find an answer to the Equatorian calls for more influence;
- Establish multiparty democracy in South Sudan, organise free and fair elections, and avoid the trap of repression as a short-term solution to achieve stability because it will only be achieved at the cost of peace in the long-term;
- Further decentralise the country on the basis of principles of good governance, aiming to improve service delivery by the government and strengthen its ties with the population, while preventing federalisation on the basis of ethnic power divisions which may only cause further conflict;
- Demilitarise South Sudanese politics and society by implementing processes of security sector reform and separating the SPLM from the national army, while starting voluntary civilian disarmament;
- Guarantee acceptance of the free and fair election results and develop a joint strategy to deal with discontented power brokers to ensure they do not become spoilers; and
- Start developing a vision for South Sudan beyond the implementation of the peace agreement.
Policy implications for (inter)national civil society and the international community

As described above (inter)national civil society and the international community can best follow a two-pronged strategy, therefore the policy implications are arranged accordingly.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS TO REACH THE MOST POSITIVE SCENARIO
The following policy implications for the international community and (inter)national civil society to reach the most positive scenario in 2020, United in diversity, the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, were prioritised by the participants in the workshops:

♦ **Guarantor of the peace agreement:** The international community needs to live up to and fulfil its role as guarantor of the 2015 peace agreement. It has to act if the agreement is violated.

♦ **End of foreign military assistance:** All foreign allied forces need to withdraw from South Sudan and the international community needs to end the armament of all warring parties.

♦ **Mediation:** The international community has to continue its mediation in the form of the IGAD+, as long as there are parties that can meet. Mediation has to take place to end the armed conflict, but remains also important during the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement.

♦ **Conditions set by IGAD and the international community:** Such conditions will be required to keep the peace process on track. These may entail positive conditions such as loan restructuring and economic investments, but also possibly financial sanctions and travel bans directed at spoilers.

♦ **Support development and governance capacity:** The international community and (inter)national civil society need to assist and invest in development, reconstruction and governance programmes in South Sudan. The overall aim is to ensure a peace dividend and to increase the government’s capacity to plan, implement, deliver and monitor programmes of service delivery to the population and to reform the civil service.

♦ **Local peace building initiatives:** Local civil society and faith-based organisations, with international support and, where possible, in cooperation with the government and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), need to redouble local peace building initiatives. Such efforts are not only essential to address local tensions, but also to prevent local tensions from sparking conflicts on a national level and vice versa.

♦ **Demand and support multiparty democratisation, opening political space, good governance, rule of law and human rights, including beyond the transitional period:** Assistance and advocacy in the broader field of good governance by the international community and (inter) national civil society will be important as South Sudan is likely to continue to face enormous challenges in this field.
Civil society capacity building: Investments in civil society capacity building is likely to pay off as local civil society will likely be required to hold the government to account, to stimulate local peace processes, and to assist and represent otherwise weak communities. This is likely to be important in all scenarios, but particularly in those scenarios in which the trend of shrinking political space continues and most of all in the Fragmentation scenario.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS TO BE BEST PREPARED FOR THE WORST

It would be imprudent for the international community and (inter)national civil society to build a strategy only on the preferred scenario of United in diversity, particularly as the peace agreement implementation faces many challenges and the peace process runs the risk of breaking down. As its implementation faces many challenges and the peace process runs the risk of breaking down. For this reason, it would be wise to monitor the developments in South Sudan and track the direction of which scenario the country is heading towards, using the four determining questions provided in the Conclusions (p.50). The more a scenario description resembles reality in South Sudan, the more its policy lessons become relevant – see box 3 (p.30) for Divided leadership; box 4 (p.36) for Fragmentation; box 5 (p.42) for 21 Kingdoms; and box 6 (p.48) for Dictatorship. In addition, it would be prudent to think ahead and imagine what may be required, not least in the Fragmentation scenario, to start the contingency-planning process. The following policy implications to be prepared for the worst featured high among participants in the workshops:

- **Humanitarian aid and assistance to IDPs and refugees:** Humanitarian assistance will be required in all scenarios. However, location and scope varies from ‘everywhere’ in the Fragmentation scenario, to ‘in the frontline region and to IDPs’ in the Divided leadership scenario, and only ‘in pockets of violence’ in the other scenarios.

- **The POC sites:** As the POC sites in which UNMISS currently provides security to IDPs may become the flashpoints of some of the worst violence, contingency-planning for such developments is of utmost importance.

- **Peace operations:** The international community may be required to create stability or to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance particularly in the Fragmentation scenario. In the Divided leadership scenario UNMISS or another peace operation is likely to be requested to intervene and establish a buffer zone. Also in other scenarios the continued presence of a peace operation is likely. Therefore, preparing for different kinds of peace operations is of utmost importance.

- **Trusteeship:** Although highly controversial, a majority of participants claimed that a trusteeship by the international community would be helpful to guide South Sudan in the right direction, particularly when the conflict continues.

- **Local peace building initiatives:** A truly forward-looking strategy of the international community and (inter)national civil society would invest in local organisations and initiatives. As, particularly in the Fragmentation scenario, there are too many groups to talk with on a national level, making regular diplomacy less suitable, there will be a need for bottom-up processes started by local civil society and faith-based organisations.