1. Introduction

OLAWALE ISMAIL AND ELISABETH SKÖNS

Despite a half-century or more of postcolonial development in Africa, the security policies and activities of African states remain influenced by a range of external actors, including other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private companies. A cursory glance at Africa's security landscape since the turn of the 21st century shows the overarching involvement of external actors in a catalogue of security-related activities across the continent, including funding, training and supporting technical cooperation and assistance; engaging in joint exercises; participating in intelligence gathering and sharing; transferring arms; deploying troops and other personnel; and establishing military presence. Examples abound. In recent years almost two-thirds of the personnel and financial resources for United Nations peace operations have been allocated to peace operations in Africa.[1] China has stepped up its participation in UN peace operations, with the clear majority of its contingents serving in Africa.[2] Russian contributions of personnel and training for peace operations in Africa have also increased markedly since 2000. The European Union (EU) has deployed military forces to Africa since 2003. France continues to maintain permanent military bases in Africa. The United States established Camp Lemonnier, a semi-permanent 'expeditionary' military base, in Djibouti in 2002 and created the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new unified military command for Africa, in 2008. The creation of new or revised policies and institutional mechanisms by long-established external actors, as well as the introduction of new actors, forms the basis for this revival in external security-related activities in Africa.

These developments take place simultaneously with new and increased African efforts to build regional and subregional institutional and operational capacity to address the continent's security and political challenges. Moreover, opportunities are opening up for African civil society organizations (CSOs) to debate and help formulate security policy in their countries

---

[1] In 2010 and 2011, UN peace operations in Africa accounted for 60–65% of approved and actual UN peace operation personnel and 63–69% of the approved budgets. Andrésdóttir, S., 'Multilateral peace operations, 2010', *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011); and Fanchini, C., 'Table of multilateral peace operations, 2011', *SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012).

[2] Gill, B. and Huang, C., *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2009), p. 1.

and subregions, and these CSOs are increasingly gaining the requisite knowledge, awareness and experience to influence security policies. This has added another dimension to the development of security policies and activities in Africa.

Section I of this chapter provides a brief account of the role of external actors in African security affairs during the colonial, cold war and the early post-cold war periods. Section II describes the revived external interest in Africa and some of its motivating factors. Section III presents a short literature background to contextualize the contributions of this book to the field. It also presents the book's aim and its scope. While sub-Saharan Africa is the focus of the studies in this book, the introductory chapter provides the overall African context.

I. The historical context of external actors in African security

The involvement of external actors in Africa's security matters is not new. Such actors have historically played key, and sometimes decisive, roles in the security dynamic of Africa. The composition of these actors and their interests and activities in Africa have evolved over time. Historically, external actors shaped security in Africa by supplying munitions, formally signing security-related agreements (such as protectorate treaties, defence pacts and political alliances), building lucrative trade networks that fuelled conflicts over the control of trading posts and taxes, and conquering African territories leading to colonial rule.

The 1884–85 Berlin Conference and the subsequent partitioning of Africa among European powers continue to have an impact on contemporary politics and the security situation in Africa. The conference defined the borders of modern African states—in many cases splitting ethnic groups into different states and forcing the cohabitation of different ethnicities in a single state—leading to intra- and interstate tensions and conflicts over territory and political control.

Under colonial rule, African territories provided soldiers and material resources for the warring parties in World Wars I and II. On independence, colonial governments bequeathed Western notions and structures of statehood and security and (often repressive) operational strategies to the new African states.[3] A majority of African states remained tied to their former colonial rulers through defence and security agreements, which frequently

---

[3] See e.g. Luckham, R., 'The military, militarization and democratization in Africa: a survey of literature and issues', *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 2 (Sep. 1994), pp. 13–75. See also Williams, R., 'Conclusion: mapping a new African civil–military relations architecture', eds R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams, *Ourselves to Know: Civil–Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, 2002), pp. 265–81.

included the building of military bases by former colonialists, the modelling and training of African security forces on those of colonial powers, and the establishing of the right of former colonial powers to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of African states.

The cold war period

During the cold war, many African countries joined with other states in the developing world to establish the Non-Aligned Movement in an effort to avoid open allegiance to either the US-led Western or Soviet-led Eastern blocs. Despite this, through continued political, security and cultural ties with former colonial powers, newly independent African states were drawn into the cold war rivalry by default. Furthermore, Africa was a focal point in the rivalry through superpower support and intervention in African conflicts, coups and counter-coups in bids to install ideologically friendly regimes. African countries were major recipients of armaments during the cold war, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), battle tanks and combat aircraft.[4] The impact of these arms transfers persists, particularly the lingering effect of cold war-era stockpiles of SALW, most especially in the Horn of Africa. The deployment of multilateral peacekeeping troops to Africa—another dimension of external actor involvement in African security—began during the cold war. The UN's first extensive peace operation took place in the former Belgian Congo—later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—between 1960 and 1964.[5] However, this was an exceptional case during the cold war. There was no other similar case in Africa until after the end of the cold war.

Post-cold war expectations

The end of the cold war in 1989 heralded optimism and expectations of a more peaceful world order. This positive outlook was centred on the hope for a 'peace dividend' that would bring about a global consensus on the virtues of democracy and good governance. This was predicated on an anticipated decrease in armed conflict and global reductions in military expenditure that were expected to release more financial resources for development projects through increases in development assistance from external actors as well as through domestic reallocation of resources.

The end of the cold war also brought with it changes in the political and geostrategic value of Africa to external actors. As observed by Ian Taylor

---

[4] Brzoska, M. and Ohlson, T., SIPRI, *Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971–85* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987).
[5] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)', <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm>.

and Paul Williams, while during the cold war, superpower rivalry had 'temporarily magnified Africa's geostrategic value', after the end of the cold war, Africa's strategic value plummeted.[6]

Additionally, there was an underlying assumption by established external actors that Africa was falling behind economically and was on the margins of the global economy. With the intensification of socio-economic processes associated with globalization in the 1990s, countries in Africa (except for South Africa) lacked the economic structures and resources to compete in the global economy: African states had failed to achieve rapid industrialization, high levels of human-capacity development, stable governance systems and resilience to global economic shocks, and they had continued to rely on the export of primary goods (i.e. raw materials, agricultural products or minerals).[7] All of this suggested that Africa was of little political, strategic or economic value to external actors and that the region faced an era of more benign external intervention.[8] The reality turned out to be rather different.

Post-cold war reality

Contrary to expectations, Africa faced a turbulent time with the outbreak of several armed conflicts during the initial post-cold war period. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa were the location of some of the most brutal armed conflicts in African history, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the DRC (then called Zaire), and not least the genocide in Rwanda. Throughout the 1990s the number of state-based armed conflicts in Africa remained high, at a level of 10–17 conflicts each year, accounting for a high and increasing share (25–43 per cent) of the world total.[9]

While as expected, there was a reduction in military spending during the first post-cold war decade (1990–99)—both globally (by 30 per cent in real terms) and in the major donor countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—the hoped-for increase in external financial resources for development projects never materialized.[10] Annual bilateral and multi-

[6] Taylor, I. and Williams, P., 'Introduction: understanding Africa's place in world politics', eds I. Taylor and P. Williams, *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (Routledge: London, 2004), p. 7.

[7] Cornelissen, S., Cheru, F. and Shaw, T. M. (eds), *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2012).

[8] See Akinrinade, S. and Sesay, A. (eds), *Africa in the Post-Cold War International System* (Pinter: London, 1998).

[9] This data refers to armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths. See also Themnér, L. and Wallensteen, P., 'Armed conflicts, 1946–2011', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2012), pp. 565–75; and table A.1 in the appendix in this volume.

[10] SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/>.

lateral financial resources for development projects to sub-Saharan Africa even declined by 34 per cent in real terms between 1992 and 1999.[11]

II. Revived external interests in Africa since the late 1990s

The lack of engagement of external actors in Africa following the end of the cold war was short-lived. Since the late 1990s, Africa's economic and strategic value to external actors has increased alongside its complex security–development failings. Furthermore, in addition to the revived interest among Africa's established external actors, new actors—such as Brazil, China, India and South Korea and, more recently, Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf—have established closer relations with African countries. As a result of continuing armed conflict in Africa, multilateral organizations, such as the EU, have also become more active in the region.

Conflict and instability in the region during the post-cold war period has led to an increase in the deployment of peacekeeping troops to Africa.[12] Since 1999, the number of peace operations and personnel deployed in Africa—by the UN and other external actors such as the EU—has increased steadily.[13] The high number of peace operations in Africa led by external organizations has often involved the active participation of African countries and personnel in those operations (especially UN missions). Moreover, there have also been African-led peace operations. African countries that regularly contribute to UN operations include Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo.

Additionally, during the 2000s, in contrast to the previous decade, there was a significant increase in external aid to Africa, following the UN Millennium Declaration and formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000.[14] By 2011, the level of external financial resources for development projects (i.e. official development assistance, ODA) to Africa was 105 per cent higher in real terms than in 1999 and ODA to sub-Saharan Africa had increased by 134 per cent.[15]

Broadly speaking, the change in Africa's position in the international geostrategic and economic system can be linked to four developments or processes: (*a*) increased global competition for natural resources; (*b*) economic

[11] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD.Stat Extracts, 'Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]', <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A>.

[12] See individual chapters in this volume for information on involvement in peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa.

[13] Soder, K., 'Multilateral peace operations: Africa, 2009', SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2010, <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=408>; and Williams, P., 'Lessons learned from peace operations in Africa', *Africa Security Brief*, no. 3 (Mar. 2010). See also table A.2 in the appendix in this volume.

[14] UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2, 'United Nations Millennium Declaration', 18 Sep. 2000.

[15] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (note 11).

growth in parts of Africa, making the area an attractive market and economic partner; (*c*) the ascendance of security issues as the foremost challenge to statehood—similar to development issues in the 1960s—in Africa; and (*d*) the radical change in policies to address international terrorism.

Natural resources

The re-emergence and intensification of competition for natural resources is clearly manifested in Africa, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. The region's vast deposits of the mineral resources needed for sustained industrial production; the oil and natural gas needed for energy security; and the land needed for commercial biofuel production have served to resituate Africa in global politics.[16]

The global competition for natural resources has been reinforced by the rapid growth of the economies (and industrial output) of countries such as Brazil, China and India.[17] At the same time, some of the main oil-importing developed countries are seeking to diversify their sources of supply. The increased interest of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa is thought to partly reflect their desire to promote stability in Africa, thereby minimizing disruptions to the supply of resources.[18]

Economic growth

Africa, and in particular sub-Saharan Africa, has experienced strong economic growth during the 21st century. The average annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2000–2012 was 4.9 per cent, well above the world average of 2.7 per cent.[19] Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa increased fivefold between 2000 and 2012, from $9.6 billion to $50.0 billion, and in sub-Saharan Africa there was a sixfold increase, from $6.4 billion to $38.5 billion, accounting for an increasing share of world FDI.[20]

---

[16] Taylor, I., *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Continuum: New York, 2010), pp. 130–144; and Klare, M. and Volman, D., 'America, China and the scramble for Africa's oil', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 33, no. 108 (June 2006).

[17] Taylor (note 16).

[18] Southall, R. and Melber, H. (eds), *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development* (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press: Durban, 2009).

[19] World Bank, WorldData Bank, World development indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>.

[20] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistics Database (UNCTAD Stat), <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sRF_ActivePath=P,5,27&sRF_Expanded=,P,5,27>. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *World Investment Report 2013—Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development* (UNCTAD: New York, 2013), p. 213.

The major drivers of the increased FDI inflow to sub-Saharan Africa are the exploration and exploitation of natural resources as well as, in recent years, the region's good economic performance.[21] Potentially lucrative markets are another reason for investment. With a population of approximately 842 million people in 2012 (12 per cent of the world total) and an estimated GDP growth rate of 5.8 per cent in 2012 (excluding South Africa), sub-Saharan Africa is an important and expanding market for both industrial and consumer goods.[22]

Ascendancy of security issues

Internally, security issues replaced economic interests as the primary driver of regional cooperation and integration in the region, and externally, security became the focus of Africa's international relations. Since the 1990s, security issues have emerged as the most critical challenge to state legitimacy in Africa, including state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, post-conflict recovery problems, spread of SALW, organized crime (such as narcotics trafficking), transnational terrorism and maritime piracy. African states, in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa, have featured prominently at the top of the Failed States Index since the index was established in 2005. In most years, 7 of the 10 highest ranking failed states have been in sub-Saharan Africa. In the index for 2012, the top 10 included Somalia, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic, in that order.[23]

The primacy of security issues in Africa has created opportunities and demands for assistance from external actors. This has resulted in a series of new security-related treaties and institutional mechanisms at the bilateral, subregional (through regional economic communities) and regional levels (through the African Union, AU). Such issues are also at the heart of multilateral peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, there were 25 such operations in Africa: 12 UN operations (including 1 joint AU–UN operation), 10 operations conducted by regional organizations (2 by the AU, 1 by the Economic Community of Central African States, 1 by the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, 5 by the EU, and 1 joint AU–

---

[21] UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2013* (note 20), p. 40.
[22] United Nations Populations Fund (UNPFA), *The State of World Population 2012—By Choice, Not By Chance: Family Planning, Human Rights and Development* (UNFPA: New York, 14 Nov. 2012), p. 114; and World Bank, *Africa's Pulse*, vol. 7 (World Bank: Washington, DC, Apr. 2013), p. 3.
[23] Fund for Peace, 'The Failed States Index 2012', <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sort able>. This index has some conceptual and methodological limitations and is used here only in an illustrative sense.

ECOWAS operation) and 3 operations conducted by ad hoc coalitions.[24] All but 2 of the UN operations were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa.[25]

Change in policies to fight global terrorism

The transnational and interconnected dimensions of some security issues have interlocked Africa's security interests and processes with those of major powers. Perhaps the most important factor was the change in the global security landscape following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on US cities, which had major implications for Africa. The USA's sub-sequent 'global war on terrorism' altered geopolitics in ways that contrib-uted to the redefinition of national security and national interests of major powers. Part of this redefinition saw a shift from deterrence and reaction to pre-emption, involving efforts to address the sources of terrorist activities, including the operational bases of terrorist groups abroad, through their disruption, destruction and defeat. The realization that facilities in Africa could be proxy targets for those seeking to attack Western interests (e.g. the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998) elevated the strategic relevance of Africa among some countries and intergovernmental bodies outside the region. The possibility and reality of some African states (e.g. Sudan in the 1990s and Somalia since 1991) providing safe havens from which terrorist groups could plan and initiate attacks or recruit, train and move personnel, money and weapons undetected further reinforced this approach to Africa. More importantly, the 'global war on terrorism' brought increased attention to the growing interconnection of security threats and challenges between the Global South and the Global North.

III. About this book

The developments described above have all contributed to a renewed external interest in sub-Saharan Africa, which is manifested in increased external activities in the region, including by national governments, multi-lateral organizations, the private sector, financial institutions and humani-tarian organizations. Against this background, it has been observed that in order for future research to keep pace with the evolving competition among external actors in Africa,

First of all, we need to know more about what China, India, Russia, the United States, and other external powers are doing in Africa. Second, we need to learn more about what impact this is having on particular African countries. And third,

---

[24] SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>.
[25] The 2 UN operations in North Africa were the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

we need to determine what can be done to help shape these developments and what can be done to avoid or mitigate its negative effects in the future.[26]

As such, it is of great importance to map and develop an understanding of the extent, nature and purpose of external actors' interests and activities in Africa. It is within this context that this study has been undertaken, with the purpose to map out part of this landscape, namely the security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa of seven of the major external actors in the region, and to analyse them in the context of their policies and strategies towards Africa.

Previous studies and gaps in the literature

The security-related component of Africa's international relations has attracted much attention for a variety of reasons. Africa has been the centre of global peace and security challenges for much of the post-cold war period, as illustrated by the 'new wars' theories.[27] According to Mary Kaldor, the ways in which 'new wars' differ from 'old wars' include the impact of globalization, the importance of identity politics, the means of finance, the use of private armed forces and the pattern of violence.[28] Similarly, the World Bank describes violence as interconnected and fragmented, sometimes referring to it as '21st century violence', which is linked to organized crime, drug and human trafficking and violent radicalization.[29]

The increase in, and to some extent the changing nature of, the security-related activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa is renewing the debate about extra-African influences and considerations in the study of African security and international relations. Most existing studies have focused on a specific external actor or on a particular thematic issue as it relates to security (such as peace operations, terrorism, piracy or the arms trade). Until recently, only a few studies have analysed the extra-African influences and dimensions of the security dynamic in Africa, often tangentially. In the mid-1990s, Christopher Clapham explored the survival tactics and strategies of African states in the context of globalization, including the

---

[26] Volman, D., 'China, India, Russia and the United States: the scramble for African oil and the militarization of the continent', *Current African Issues*, no. 43 (2009).

[27] See e.g. Kaldor, M., *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford University Press: Palo Alto, CA, 1999); and World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2011).

[28] Kaldor (note 27). For critiques of this discourse see Mello, P. A., 'In search of new wars: the debate about a transformation of war', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 16, no. 2 (June 2010), pp. 297–309; and Ritter, D., 'New wars: critics and queries', Global Policy, 10 Dec. 2010, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/10/12/2010/new-wars-critics-and-queries>.

[29] World Bank (note 27).

simultaneous acquiescing to and manipulation of external actors' interests, activities and influence.[30]

Similarly, Jean-François Bayart has examined the intricate official–unofficial dimensions of the interactive relationships and mutually beneficial exchanges between African states (or rather heads of government) and foreign governments. In doing so, he dispelled the notion of Africa's marginality in international relations and claimed that Africa and world politics are organically intertwined.[31] The most comprehensive studies on external actors include a 2004 volume edited by Taylor and Williams and a 2010 study by Taylor.[32] The former analysed the post-cold war African policies of major external actors (including Canada, China, France, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA, as well as the EU, the UN and international financial institutions). It focused on how states interact with the global political economy (driven by non-state actors and processes) to influence African affairs. The latter study continued the analysis of Africa's place in the world based on an analysis of the combined effect of state–society relations, the society of states, the non-state world, and global economic structures and processes on Africa. These two volumes provide an excellent overview of the role of external actors in Africa and enable a comparative perspective.

Despite the growing literature on African security and international relations, there are two significant gaps. First, there is a serious lack of data and information on the activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa, and this lack is particularly pronounced in the field of security. This is related to the sensitivity and the political and politicized nature of security issues, which make it difficult for researchers to obtain information. Second, there is a lack of analysis of the available data within the context of the relevant policies of the external actors. In addition, only a few publications have attempted to analyse external actors as a collective. This makes it impossible to make comparisons between the external actors or to analyse the dynamic produced by the similarities, differences, changes and continuities in the policies and activities of external actors, and the reactions to these of other actors within and outside Africa.

The aim, approach, scope and organization of this book

The studies presented in this volume—and the broader project of which they form a part (see below)—were conceived to fill some of these gaps.

---

[30] Clapham, C., *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996).

[31] Bayart, J.-F., 'Africa in the world: A history of extraversion', *African Affairs*, vol. 99, no. 395 (2000), pp. 217–67.

[32] Taylor and Williams (note 6); and Taylor (note 16).

They are intended to provide detailed data, descriptions and analysis of the security-related policies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa. Together, they provide empirical data and analysis of which actor is doing what, where, when and why in sub-Saharan Africa. As a compendium of data and analysis of external actors' security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa, this volume is intended to be a resource for civil society organizations, policymakers, researchers and educators, both within and outside Africa.

The studies presented in this volume are part of the SIPRI project 'Security, democratization and good governance in Africa: the impact of external actors' sponsored by the Open Society Foundations, which operated in partnership with CSOs across sub-Saharan Africa. The project's research component included a series of country case studies undertaken by the African CSO partners to examine a security problem of relevance for their work, which were then published in the respective countries.[33] One of the objectives of this project was to support the African CSOs in their efforts to conduct empirical research as a basis for their activities to raise awareness on security-related issues in their respective countries. The studies presented in this volume were part of this objective.

Aim and approach

The aim of this book is to provide data and analysis of the official security-related activities and policies related to Africa of seven major external actors—China, France, Russia, the UK, the USA, the EU and the UN. It represents an effort to collate as much comparable data as possible on the security-related activities of each of these external actors and to analyse these activities within the framework of the actor's official policies and strategies. Provision and analysis of data on security-related activities as well as knowledge of the main sources of data and information of policy frameworks for these are important for an understanding of the policies and strategies of external actors, but such data is often hard to find and often difficult to interpret. This volume provides a resource for information and understanding of the broader picture of contemporary external activities in Africa as well as for further research and analysis of these developments, not least for civil society in African countries.

The approach of the study is pragmatic. While compiling data on activities is a core aim, in order to identify the most important security-related activities of each external actor and understand their purpose and meaning it is necessary to identify and examine the policies and strategies within which these activities are developed and conducted. The existence of

---

[33] SIPRI, 'Africa Security and Governance Project', <http://www.sipri.org/research/security/africa>.

explicit policies and strategies for Africa vary between actors. Some actors have developed a specific policy on Africa; others have a more fragmented set of policies directed towards Africa; and still others may have no official or declared policy towards Africa—in which case Africa-relevant policies must be deduced from more general policies. Furthermore, in addition to specific policies on Africa, the actors have more general policies that have implications for Africa. In particular, since many of the security-related activities are based on national security and defence policies and strategies, such activities must be understood primarily in relation to these.

Scope

Security-related activities are defined here to be activities that are used as instruments of foreign and security policies. However, to map all activities in that category would be an immense task. This study places emphasis on conventional, 'hard' security activities (e.g. military presence, arms transfers, military assistance and training of security forces, and military exchanges). In addition to the traditional security activities of external actors, this study also includes the activities that they undertake to strengthen the security sector of African countries, such as assisting security sector and justice reform programmes. Moreover, the authors of the individual studies have been given the liberty to include other, non-conventional (or 'soft') types of activity—such as diplomacy and development cooperation—that illustrate the extent and nature of the respective actor's foreign and security policies towards Africa. Given the diversity of external actors and their respective interests and policies, the coverage of conventional and non-conventional security activities varies across the chapters.

   The primary focus of this volume is sub-Saharan Africa—although this focus has sometimes been difficult to strictly implement since for some external actors it has not always been possible to cover and analyse sub-Saharan Africa separately. The focus on sub-Saharan Africa offers analytical simplicity and clarity as it reflects the broad similarities in the history and socio-economic, political, cultural and security conditions of states south of the Sahara, which differ somewhat from North African countries. Moreover, some external actors tend to include North African countries in their Middle East policies, not least due to their cultural affinity with other Arab states and membership of pan-Arab organizations (e.g. the League of Arab States). Nevertheless, the focus on sub-Saharan Africa acknowledges overlaps between the socio-political and security realities of sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, and the AU membership of countries across the continent. For example, political uprisings, rebellions and regime change in North Africa have implications for the stability of sub-Saharan Africa states through the presence of contiguous borders and the spread of SALW.

This book focuses on the policies and activities of state actors: governments and intergovernmental organizations. It thus leaves out important unofficial and non-state dimensions of Africa's relations with the outside world. While the focus on state actors may only illuminate official aspects of external actors' security-related engagement with sub-Saharan Africa, it nonetheless offers considerable advantages. In particular, the limitation of the coverage to state actors facilitates comparisons as well as data gathering. Potential insights can be gleaned from examining what is publicly declared as official policy alongside the actual activities undertaken by external actors. This makes it possible to highlight strategies and activities that are contrary to official policies.

Among all the external actors in Africa, those included in this volume play some of the most important roles. In the case of the five countries, this is not least because of their major power status, permanent membership to the UN Security Council, capacity for and history of unilateral military operations, and overall historical ties with sub-Saharan African countries. The EU and UN are important multilateral intergovernmental organizations in socio-political and security terms, especially as it relates to funding, assisting, deploying and providing political legitimacy for peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in addition to the seven external actors covered in this volume, a significant number of other external actors are directly or indirectly involved in various security processes and activities in sub-Saharan Africa. These include other states, such as additional European countries, Arab countries, Brazil, Canada, India, Iran, Pakistan and South Korea; international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); international financial institutions; humanitarian organizations; and private-sector actors, such as private security companies. Analysing these other external actors is a potentially crucial area of research for students and analysts of African security.

Finally, the focus on the security-related policies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa should not be taken to suggest that African governments, institutions and citizens are passive recipients, observers or victims of external actors' policies and manipulations. On the contrary, Africa engages with and shapes external actors' security-related policies and activities. The upsurge of external actors involved in security-related interests, policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa parallels a profound expansion in intra-African institutions, initiatives and treaties, and the related building of norms, designed to tackle the continent's security challenges—'African solutions to African problems'. At no point in the postcolonial history of Africa has there been greater emphasis on and coordination and institutional capacity building at the subregional and continental levels when responding to security threats. Similarly, since the

1990s, CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa have been gaining more capacity—through knowledge, awareness and experience—and increasing their participation in security-related policy debates and formulation. The parallel increases in intra- and extra-African security-related policies and activities underscore the primacy of security challenges in the developmental aspirations of Africa since the end of the cold war.

Organization

This book has nine chapters and a data appendix. Following this introduction, chapters 2–6 provide the mapping studies of five countries—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—and chapters 7 and 8 feature two intergovernmental actors—the EU and the UN. These chapters vary in focus and timeframe depending on the respective turning points in policies and activities. Chapter 9 provides the synthesis and conclusions from the individual mapping studies, making comparisons between the external actors and abstracting overall trends and patterns in their security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The appendix provides comprehensive data of relevance for the topic of this volume.