I. Introduction

Some 95 per cent of all the states that exist today and are members of the United Nations do not possess nuclear weapons, and with a few exceptions they have no ambitions to change this status. This is fortunate since the nuclear non-proliferation regime would otherwise not hold or could be maintained only by strong pressure from the few major powers that (as a matter of fact and irony) already have nuclear weapons. This is not to say that the power of states such as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to dissuade others from acquiring nuclear weapons is not a part of the existing non-proliferation dynamic. These countries play a large role, but they cannot do so without damaging the credibility of the whole system, simply because double standards become blatant when the holders of nuclear weapons try to convince or force other states to accept that they are better off without them. The states on the receiving end of this argument are bound to feel, rightly or wrongly, that they live at the mercy of the states with nuclear weapon.

The non-proliferation regime therefore depends, to a greater degree than is usually acknowledged, on a mixture of the willingness, good faith, activity, enthusiasm, obliviousness, naivety and positive incentives that many Non-Nuclear Weapon States possess and they bring with them into the regime. The importance of these benevolent states is well depicted by Jonathan Schell: ‘The world’s safety ultimately depends not on the number of nations that want to build nuclear weapons but cannot, but on the number that can but do not’.

1 The terms ‘Nuclear Weapon State’ and ‘Non-Nuclear Weapon State’ (with initial capitals) are used in the context of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) and refer to the position of specific states that are party to this treaty. The text of the NPT is available at URL <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/>. All important states without nuclear weapons are also Non-Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., they are signatories to the NPT); the semantic distinction is mainly relevant when distinguishing the classes of states with nuclear weapons and of Nuclear Weapon States. The NPT identifies 5 states as Nuclear Weapon States: China, France, Russia (formerly, the Soviet Union), the UK and the USA. By the final stage of the negotiations on the NPT, these 5 states had conducted nuclear weapon tests. Another 2 states, India and Pakistan, had not carried out such tests at that time but have since done so and are known to have arsenals of nuclear weapons. Israel has not admitted to having tested a nuclear weapon and has refused to confirm or deny that it has such weapons, but there is little doubt that it is the 8th state with nuclear weapons.


* The authors wish to thank Alyson J. K. Bailes for help in the preparation of this chapter.
Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are four such states. They could, most probably, have developed nuclear weapons, but they wisely and for different reasons either never considered the option (Denmark and Finland) or chose to forgo it (Norway and Sweden). Instead, they have invested a lot of capital in convincing others to do the same.

II. Underlying factors in the formation of Nordic nuclear non-proliferation policies

It may seem that the Nordic countries are similar or even identical when it comes to their nuclear non-proliferation policies. There are good reasons for believing this, given that all four countries are long-standing supporters of the UN and of the development of international law and given that they have a general preference for rule-based, multilateral solutions to international problems. A study of their voting record—for example, in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, where inter alia nuclear weapon issues are discussed—strengthens the perception that they generally share the same opinions. However, the four states have different points of departure as regards some of the background factors that influence their political choices and priorities. The most salient factors are: (a) security policy choices—alliance membership versus neutrality; (b) the choice to use or not to use nuclear power as a source of energy; and (c) the extent to which there has been a tradition of nuclear weapon issues influencing foreign policy thinking (and the traditions of openness or, conversely, of elite decision making that surround the issues). It is difficult to separate these factors and to a certain extent they influence each other.

The policies of each of the Nordic states have been shaped by these choices and traditions, and they have developed over decades to meet specific national requirements and preconditions. The results of this development determine what each state has brought and can still bring into the European Union policy context. Denmark has been a member of the European Community/EU since 1973, and it has a long tradition of participation in EU policy work in the framework of the European Political Cooperation, which started in an informal manner in the early 1970s. Finland and Sweden participated in this process in the early 1990s during their membership negotiations and became full members in 1995, by which time the EU’s foreign policy process had been formalized as the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Article J of the 1992 Treaty of

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3 Iceland is not considered in this chapter.
4 The First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which convenes each autumn, is responsible for questions of disarmament and international security. The Nordic states have a long-standing practice of coordinating their positions on these and other issues at the UN.
Security policy: alliance membership or neutrality

The four states’ political choices related to security are easy to define in formal terms, yet beneath these official choices there are further significant differences. Neutrality is not a static condition, just as alliance membership does not dictate what the members must think and do. The Nordic countries have placed themselves at different points along the spectrum of possible positions and have modified their positions from time to time.7

The lesson learned by Sweden in World War II was that it was possible for neutrality to function but that a degree of flexibility towards the prevailing forces was required. In the cold war era, Sweden is reported to have established contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and neighbouring Western powers as a back-up measure in the event that neutrality should fail.8 A strong national defence was established and, until the late 1960s, consideration was even given to making nuclear weapons a part of the defence posture.9

Norway, on the other hand, learned through experience that neutrality did not work during World War II and therefore concluded in 1949 that membership of NATO was its best option. Before receiving formal security assurances from

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7 There are few comparative studies of the Nordic countries concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of monographs addressed issues such as the proposals to establish a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone. For analysis of the broader perspectives and developments see van Dassen, L., Stumbling-Blocks and Stepping-Stones for the Embraceent of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Theory-Based Comparison of Four Nordic Countries, 1945–2001, Doctoral dissertation (Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Uppsala, forthcoming 2006).

8 This has long been suspected but the evidence is limited and for obvious reasons there are few available documents to support this view. Nevertheless, memoirs and interviews with decision makers indicate that such relations with the West existed. See, e.g., Holmström, M., ‘Erlander och Palme misstrodde neutralitet’ [Erlander and Palme mistrusted neutrality], ‘USA:s styrkor garant för både Palme och Carlsson’ [US forces a guarantee for both Palme and Carlsson] and ‘Sovjet trodde inte på neutralt Sverige’ [Soviets did not believe in a neutral Sweden], Svenska Dagbladet, 2, 3 and 7 Aug. 1998, respectively.

NATO and the USA, Norway started an embryonic nuclear weapon programme that survived until the early 1950s.  

Denmark shared Norway’s experience concerning the reliability of neutrality and made the same choice to join NATO in 1949. At no stage did Denmark consider an independent nuclear option. On the other hand, it became a shareholder in the USA’s nuclear deterrent posture when, yielding to US demands during the 1950s and 1960s, it tacitly allowed the USA to station nuclear weapons in Greenland.

Finland was also neutral or non-aligned during the cold war but in a different fashion from Sweden. In practical terms, Finland was under pressure from the Soviet Union because of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance that the two countries signed in 1948. However, Finland was unwilling to accept the existing and potential Soviet influences on its alignment and used the international advocacy of non-proliferation (among other security issues) to remove itself from the Soviet shadow and seek additional room for manoeuvre.

The use or non-use of nuclear power as a source of energy

The choice to develop or not to develop nuclear energy has had and continues to have a significant influence on national non-proliferation policies for at least two reasons. First, as a result of the choice, different degrees of interest are attached to the nuclear fuel cycle, access to nuclear materials, export controls and so on. Second, a nation’s choice to use or not to use nuclear power determines the expertise it has available for international cooperation activities, and to a large extent this influences the contribution it can make to the development

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11 The largest and best study of Denmark’s nuclear weapon policies is Danish Institute of International Affairs, Grønland under den kolde krig: dansk og amerikansk udenrigspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland during the cold war: Danish and American foreign policy 1945–1968], vols 1 and 2 (Dansk udenrigspolitisk institut: Copenhagen, 1997). The study deals with the inconsistencies of Danish nuclear weapon policies, explaining how Denmark declared its unwillingness to allow nuclear weapons on Danish territory in peacetime while allowing the USA to station nuclear weapons in Greenland and to fly over its airspace with such weapons. A number of monographs have been written on Danish policies vis-à-vis the 1979 NATO ‘double-track decision’ on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the following period. These studies are, however, memoirs by decision makers of the time and do not provide solid analysis based on access to official archives. See NATO, ‘Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (the “double-track” decision on theatre nuclear forces)’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 1979, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b791212a.htm>.

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (or international inspection) system applied to nuclear materials in Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

For Sweden, its early ambition to consider developing nuclear weapons paralleled its ambition to develop nuclear energy. The path of development changed when it became obvious that the best option for weapon production was not the most economically efficient technological method for the development of nuclear energy. The nuclear weapon option was abandoned in the late 1960s, and a civilian nuclear energy infrastructure was established in the early 1970s and developed thereafter. Four nuclear power plants were built with a total of 12 reactors.

Norway had early ambitions to develop nuclear energy and was a pioneer in the field of nuclear research. Eventually, its ready access to hydroelectric power, oil and gas—coupled with political and public scepticism about nuclear energy—made it unnecessary to consider further development of nuclear energy. Norway has since expressed varying degrees of scepticism with respect to the international promotion of nuclear energy.

Denmark was engaged at an early stage in nuclear energy research and it possesses large uranium deposits in Greenland. However, in the 1980s Denmark decided that it would not develop nuclear energy. Like Norway, Denmark has questioned whether nuclear energy is a sound option for any country to pursue and this has been reflected in its policies towards the IAEA.

Finland entered the field of nuclear research rather late and slowly. This was both because of the constraints imposed by its relations with the Soviet Union and because Finland chose to await the complete negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) before building nuclear power reactors. Four reactors are now in operation at two nuclear power plants, and the decision was taken in 2002 to begin construction of a fifth reactor, making Finland the only Western country that in recent years has decided to expand its use of nuclear energy.

**National traditions and the discussion of nuclear weapons**

The national settings in which nuclear weapon issues are discussed and in which decisions are reached are important because they indicate the extent to which a certain level of activity can be expected to be short lived or long lasting. It makes a difference whether there are interest groups and movements that force issues onto the agenda and oblige parties and governments to take a certain stand. It also matters whether the government has a tradition of permanent reflection on and attention to nuclear weapon issues and whether there are structures that allow for openness and for broader discussions in the country. In this context there are great differences between the four Nordic countries.

Sweden has the longest and deepest tradition among the four states of discussing nuclear weapon issues at the national level, and it is also a champion of
disarmament and non-proliferation internationally. Many Swedish political and social movements, non-governmental organizations and labour unions have been active in this area, and most political parties have pursued policies that by international standards can be seen as progressive. A policy elite continues to work to keep attention focused on the challenge of nuclear weapons in international settings, thus maintaining nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a prioritized foreign policy issue.

In Norway, nuclear weapons have long been the focus of public attention and this has been reflected in the national debate. Nuclear weapon issues have had a political character that has kept many groups and movements engaged and this, in turn, has led most political parties to keep considerable attention focused on the issue.

In Denmark, on the other hand, the relevant political decision-making processes have been closed and exclusive. The government has had and has frequently used a prerogative to make decisions over the heads of the parliament and the population. The late 1970s and the 1980s were an exception, but in recent years the public attention given to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has all but disappeared again.

Similarly, Finland has had little national debate about its positions on nuclear weapons. This tradition dates back to the 1950s, when the name of President Urho Kekkonen was synonymous with the Finnish foreign policy of adjustment to and balance with external (Soviet) pressures. Public engagement in this issue has generally been limited to rallying in support of the president and the government. Nevertheless, Finland’s dedication to further non-proliferation and disarmament at the international level has remained high and can be defined as an issue that receives particular foreign policy attention.

III. General policy outcomes and ‘national nuclear styles’

Any brief depiction or synthesis of national styles for handling, pursuing and deciding on nuclear non-proliferation issues is bound to attract criticism and there will always be exceptions that do not fit into the general pattern. Such a description may, nevertheless, furnish a meaningful starting point for studying the way in which national views have moulded or been moulded by, or have been reconciled or failed to be reconciled with, the collective policies of the relevant international organizations.

The basically anti-nuclear or nuclear-sceptical stance of the two Nordic NATO members, Denmark and Norway, may seem to sit uncomfortably with membership of a collective defence alliance relying on the US (and British)
nuclear umbrella.\textsuperscript{14} The basic and still extant ‘fix’ for dealing with this tension was the agreement made at the time of Danish and Norwegian entry into NATO that neither state would have any nuclear objects or forces stationed on its territory in peacetime. Norway subsequently tended to play down the overall imperative of nuclear disarmament but—not surprisingly in view of the enormous concentration of Soviet nuclear assets just across its border on the Kola Peninsula—was repeatedly tempted to pursue de-nuclearization or at least the limitation of nuclear confrontation in its backyard. The temporary Norwegian interest in the 1980s in the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone—anathema to the rest of NATO under the notion of indivisible security—was a case in point.\textsuperscript{15} During the run-up to and implementation of NATO’s 1979 double-track decision on deploying new intermediate-range missiles, Denmark and Norway repeatedly vacillated in their support for the missile deployment, showing particular concern to avoid the programme’s encroaching on its own region. More recently, Norway has settled into a less controversial combination of a ‘transatlantic’ strategic philosophy\textsuperscript{16} with ‘universalistic’ touches. This is manifested in a strong sense of responsibility to support the global non-proliferation regime (i.e., by strengthening export control regimes) and a special interest in practical measures to reduce nuclear dangers in its neighbourhood (see below).

The Danish policy tradition was very similar to Norway’s at the end of the cold war, and in fact Denmark went further in registering its concerns about nuclear innovations. Denmark became NATO’s most persistent ‘footnote state’ in 1982–86, when a left–centre majority in parliament forced the liberal–conservative government at the time to add footnotes to NATO communiqués to mark dissent from statements supporting the deployment of intermediate-range missiles and the USA’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or Star Wars).\textsuperscript{17} Since 1990, however, a new focus has brought Denmark closer to the USA and thus to the mainstream of NATO in its security policy thinking and actions. In this purely ‘transatlantic’ orientation, nuclear disarmament is no longer given specific consideration as part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Denmark supports improved export control systems and improved safeguards but does so without contributing significantly, for example, to technical assistance. The new transatlantic alignment—symbolized in another context by Denmark’s prominent and lasting role in the coalition operation in Iraq in 2003—was underlined


\textsuperscript{15} Honkanen (note 14), p. 56.

\textsuperscript{16} It might be argued that Norway’s inclination to question the basis of US deterrent cover for the northern region has declined as its fears grow that the US commitment might be weakened and that NATO generally might move away from its traditional territorial defence functions.

\textsuperscript{17} Honkanen (note 14), pp. 53–54. Danish government representatives were bound to follow mandates on international issues given by the Danish parliament. For a full treatment of this policy and its context see Petersen, N., Europevæksk og globalt engagement 1973–2003 [Europea and global engagement 1973–2003], Dansk Udenrigspolitiske Historie vol. 6 (Gyldendals Følag: Copenhagen, 2004).
by the way in which the Danish Government in 2004 agreed to allow the USA to upgrade its radar systems in Greenland in connection with the development of the US national missile defence system. Many experts both in Denmark and abroad, as well as residents of Greenland, have criticized this decision out of concern that the US missile ‘shield’ could drive the world into a new nuclear arms race and aggravate rather than reduce proliferation risks.

Sweden has such a long and uninterrupted tradition as an ‘activist’ and ‘universalist’ in international settings that it was always inherently unlikely that its EU membership would have much of a dampening effect on this tradition. Indeed, on the eve of membership in 1995 Swedish representatives voiced some of the most outspoken criticism anywhere of the decision by France—its new partner in integration—to persist with nuclear testing. This was only one instance of many harsh and direct Swedish judgements on the Nuclear Weapon States and their lack of demonstrated progress in nuclear disarmament. Sweden takes seriously Article VI of the NPT on the obligations of the Nuclear Weapon States to work for nuclear disarmament and works actively to promote strengthened international safeguards, export controls and the establishment, for instance, of regional nuclear weapon-free zones. It is one of the few European states (sometimes together with Finland) to have persisted in drawing attention to the unregulated problem of tactical nuclear weapons stationed by Russia and the USA on European soil. Within the EU framework, however, Sweden has had to face the reality that it cannot single-handedly initiate discussion of or judgement on British and French nuclear weapons. It has chosen to push hard for progressive joint positions in those areas where an EU consensus is attainable, such as the strengthening of international legal instruments and the increase of EU material aid for disarmament and weapon disposal, while expressing the more rigorous and idealistic aspects of its own anti-nuclear policy in purely national initiatives.

Finland’s approach constitutes a fourth, different style that can be labelled as ‘bridge-building’ and ‘European’. In the cold war conditions Finland used non-proliferation, like other arms control and confidence-building initiatives, as a tool to reduce the distance between the Soviet Union and the USA—thus giving itself more room for manoeuvre. Whenever the East–West climate was harsh, the Soviet Union tried to drag Finland closer to the East. In this sense, non-proliferation and disarmament were measures that served Finland’s national interests. Even after joining the EU, Finland has tended to view non-

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19 See the statements by Swedish officials at Greenpeace, ‘Government and opposition statements on the resumption of nuclear testing’, URL <http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/rw/pol26.html>, E.g., ‘Sweden deeply regrets that France has decided to resume its nuclear tests. We have also conveyed this directly to the French government, says prime minister Ingvar Carlsson’ and ‘“I wish to reiterate that it is deeply regretful that France insists on its decision to conduct new nuclear weapons tests, even if it is for a limited period. The growing criticism and indignation about the French decision expressed in all EU states and in many other countries, is damaging to the stability and credibility of the European Union as a foreign political and security political actor . . .”, Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen’. 
proliferation in a pragmatic manner. Despite occasional joint statements of a more ambitious kind with Sweden, Finland’s efforts in the arms control and disarmament field have generally been directed at maximizing European outputs on a basis of consensus and cooperation with other EU partners.

IV. Policy issues and inputs in recent years

Since 2000, Nordic contributions in the context of disarmament and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation have increased as a function of the generally increased international activism in this context. Examples of recent global WMD-related endeavours in which the Nordic countries have taken a standpoint or an active role are the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the work of the New Agenda Coalition.

Sweden was, in general, pleased with the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Anna Lindh, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in her statement at the conference drew attention to four areas of specific concern: reducing nuclear weapon arsenals, bringing into force the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), halting the development of new weapon systems and reducing the risk of use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. In


22 The Global Partnership was initiated by the G8 nations at the 26–27 June 2002 summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada. It aims to prevent terrorists and those who harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons, missiles or related equipment and technology. Its operational activities are heavily focused on destruction of surplus WMD materials, following the earlier US-led Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. See G8 Kananaskis Summit, ‘Statement by G8 leaders: the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’, June 2002, URL <http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/glob part-en.asp>.


24 The New Agenda Coalition was announced through a 1998 Joint Declaration by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden to put more focus on nuclear disarmament. So far the First Committee of the UN General Assembly has adopted 5 resolutions (in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003) as a consequence of the New Agenda Coalition. On the New Agenda Coalition see URL <http://www.acronym.org.uk/nac.htm>.

the light of these concerns the Swedish Government welcomed Russia’s ratification of the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and of the CTBT on the eve of the review conference. One area where the conference ultimately failed, as seen from a Swedish perspective, was the continuation of US plans for a national missile defence system, which Sweden feared might restart the nuclear missile race. Another disappointment was the unwillingness of the US Senate to approve ratification of the CTBT, which has not entered into force.

In the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Laila Freivalds, Swedish minister of foreign affairs, expressed concern over the poor results in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament since the 2000 NPT Conference. Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway have all warned in recent years that the NPT is facing a series of challenges, from both inside and outside the treaty regime, which threaten to undermine its effectiveness and future viability. This was repeated by all the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs at the conference. For this reason, none of the countries wanted to raise new questions at the conference but emphasized instead the need to implement previously agreed measures to reinforce and strengthen the NPT.

The Swedish Government supports the PSI, the Global Partnership and the implementation of Resolution 1540. The Swedish Government perceives these three initiatives inter alia in the context of reducing WMD-related threats posed by non-state actors.

The initial Swedish total pledge of funds to the Global Partnership, made at the G8 Global Partnership summit in Sea Island in 2004, was approximately $32.2 million. At the following summit in Gleneagles in June 2005, an additional funding commitment of $7.2 million was made for 2005 and a further €6 million ($7.2 million) for the period of 2006–2008. The Swedish contributions were committed mainly for the nuclear ‘window’ of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) Support Fund ($5.7 million to nuclear safety in 2005 and $1.5 million to nuclear security in 2005). In the biological area the Swedish contributions are spent on bio-safety and bio-security projects (approximately $135 700). Finally, €220 000 ($264 000) will be contributed to a Green Cross project on chemical weapons destruction sup-

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29 Hellström, E., Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Personal communication, 11 Oct. 2005. The NDEP was created in 2001. It aims to coordinate international support for tackling the legacy of environmental damage, from nuclear pollution and other sources, in the area covered by the EU’s Northern Dimension. The NDEP Support Fund has 2 ‘windows’: 1 for nuclear safety and 1 for environmental projects. See the NDEP’s website at URL <http://www.ndep.org/>. 

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port.\textsuperscript{30} Sweden is the only Nordic country contributing to bio-safety and biosecurity projects within the Global Partnership framework.

As noted above, Sweden has sometimes taken national initiatives (or joined in multilateral ones) that go beyond the limits of EU common policies for the reduction of WMD threats. Its membership of the New Agenda Coalition since 1998 can be seen in this light: Sweden joined with progressive states from other regions to push demands for disarmament (and other matters) which at that time were not even the subject of explicit EU policies. As a recent example of Sweden’s action in this area independent of the EU, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference it used its membership of the New Agenda Coalition to insist that the Nuclear Weapon States make concrete progress towards fulfilling their legally binding commitment in the NPT to work towards complete nuclear disarmament. Later in 2005, at the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, Göran Persson, Swedish prime minister, complained about the lack of recent progress in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.\textsuperscript{31}

In the EU context, in early 2003 at a time of general European concern about the destabilizing effects of proliferation, Sweden pushed for the Union to develop its own, first-ever strategy on WMD. The initiative quickly led to guidelines and an Action Plan on the subject (adopted in June 2003) and, in December 2003, to a WMD strategy formally adopted by the European Council.\textsuperscript{32} These documents were, however, still of a moderate and pragmatic nature, skirting around the sensitive issues of disarmament. This may explain why Sweden reverted in December 2003 to a unilateral initiative to establish the WMD Commission, which has nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation on its agenda.\textsuperscript{33}

Norway generally shared the views of the Swedish Government concerning the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. However, the Norwegian Government added an emphasis on the environment to the agenda of the conference when Thorbjørn Jagland, Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, spoke about Russia’s need for international assistance to secure radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, in particular that stored on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arkhangelsk district.\textsuperscript{34} Norway had already in 2000 taken steps towards negoti-

\textsuperscript{30} Green Cross International was founded in 1992, at the suggestion of Mikhail Gorbachev, as a ‘Red Cross of the environment’. It helps to deal with damage caused by industrial and military disasters and with cleaning up contaminated sites from the cold war period.


\textsuperscript{33} See note 13.

ations with Russia and some donor countries that were willing to assist in the project, and the Norwegian Government itself spent more than $100 million on nuclear safety measures between 1995 and 2003.\textsuperscript{35} Norway can claim considerable success in its efforts for bilateral cooperation to help Russia deal with the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel stored within its borders. In 2003 the Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation was signed,\textsuperscript{36} with Norway as the driving force.

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Jan Petersen, Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, expressed concerns similar to those of his Swedish colleague over the recent international setbacks regarding non-proliferation and disarmament.

When determining the size of the Norwegian contribution to the Global Partnership, the calculation depends on whether or not projects initiated by Norway fall within the framework stipulated for G8 projects. Taking advantage of the opportunity for states that are not members of the G8 to contribute to the programme at a level of their own choosing, in 2004 Norway became the largest contributor among such states by pledging approximately €100 million ($120 million) to the Global Partnership. By June 2005 Norway had provided €35 million of this total pledge.\textsuperscript{37} Norway has also supported the PSI since March 2004, and the government has declared its openness to concluding bilateral boarding agreements in accordance with the PSI.\textsuperscript{38}

Neither Denmark nor Finland made an official statement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, although they took part in the preparatory committee meetings. Finland contributed to the Chairman’s paper presented at the conference by introducing a proposal on increased transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{39} Denmark had a lower profile than the other Nordic coun-

\textsuperscript{35} SIPRI and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Northern Region, a Pre-G-8 Summit 2003 Seminar, 20 May 2003, Stockholm, Sweden, URL <http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/sctr_stockholm.pdf>.

\textsuperscript{36} The Framework Agreement was signed on 21 May 2003 by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK, the USA, the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. It aims at providing instruments to cope with radioactive waste, the secure storage of spent nuclear fuel and the safety of nuclear reactors. The text of the agreement is available at URL <http://www.ndep.org/files/uploaded/MNEPRAgreementENGLISH.pdf>.

\textsuperscript{37} G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).


tries—possibly as a symptom of its growing alignment with the USA (see section III above)—while generally supporting the development of the NPT.  

Both Denmark and Finland are contributors to the Global Partnership. Finland joined the programme at the 2003 Evian Summit, while Denmark joined at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. Finland pledged €15 million ($18 million) to the Global Partnership for the period 2004–14, and Denmark announced pledges totalling €17.2 million ($20.6 million) for the period 2002–2004, including a pledge of €1 million made at the Sea Island Summit. These totals were almost unchanged by the summit in Gleneagles in July 2005. By this stage Finland had spent €7.85 million ($9.42 million) of its total pledge. Denmark on the other hand did not report any spending for the period 2002–2004 but did confirm commitments amounting to €17.3 million ($20.7 million).

Finland has, to mention a few examples, provided funds for projects on nuclear material safeguards and waste management totalling €430 000 ($516 000) in the period 2003–2005, and has earmarked €2 million ($2.4 million) of its pledge of €10 million ($12 million) to the NDEP for nuclear clean-up activities. In addition, Finland is providing technical assistance at the Russian chemical weapon destruction facility in Gorny, Saratov oblast, by delivering and installing a technical control system for the safe storage of lewisite and contributes to a Green Cross project on facilitating Russian chemical weapons destruction.

Denmark has committed most of its funds to the NDEP (€10 million) but has in addition spent significant funds on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Chernobyl Shelter Fund (€2.5 million, $3 million) and Ignalina International Decommissioning Support Fund (€2.7 million, $3.24 million).

Both Denmark and Finland support Security Council Resolution 1540. As a current member of the Security Council, Denmark is taking part in the 1540 Committee and will actively work to strengthen the resolution and states’ compliance with it. Furthermore, Denmark is currently chairing the Security Council.

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44 Official in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Personal communication with the authors, 15 Feb. 2005.
45 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
46 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
47 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, a position which Denmark uses to prioritize cooperation between the Security Council subsidiary organs dealing with aspects of terrorism.49 Neither Denmark nor Finland is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, but both countries support the PSI and take part in PSI exercises and unofficial expert meetings.

V. Conclusions: Nordic traditions and priorities in the EU context

Nuclear issues are a clear case of an area in which common Nordic ‘values’ exist at both the elite and popular levels and where Nordic moral and practical considerations appear to coincide. The whole Nordic region remains particularly vulnerable, if less so than during the cold war, to the consequences not just of an actual nuclear exchange between the great powers but also of nuclear accidents, leakages and pollution. The contamination carried to the north after the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union (now in Ukraine) and the consequent social, economic and environmental damage remain a potent memory throughout the region and have strongly marked these countries’ general thinking about emergency risks and management. This line of common interest and experience helps to explain the parallel and (by general European standards) substantial efforts made by Finland, Norway and Sweden to directly reduce the threat from ‘loose’ WMD materials in their region.

Nonetheless, the broader conclusions drawn by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for their national and international policies, and their ‘style’ of handling nuclear issues domestically, exhibit striking differences that seem to reflect different governance traditions as well as geographical and historical factors. Longer-term practices of intra-Nordic consultation have, consequently, been limited to a rather specific range of (notably UN) issues where the countries’ own policies are not directly at stake and it is rather a matter of passing judgement on and influencing other states’ behaviour.

Has entry into integrated European institutions brought Nordic positions closer together? The only possible answer on the above showing is ‘Yes and No’. Denmark and Norway reacted in parallel ways, but to different degrees, when their interests and public attitudes were placed under stress by NATO’s nuclear policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the end of the cold war, however, their policies have begun to plainly diverge on nuclear matters as, indeed, on other aspects of alliance policy and European–US relations more broadly—with Denmark moving into the NATO mainstream or even somewhat ‘to the right’ of it. A rough parallel might be drawn between this and the respective experiences of Finland and Sweden within the EU. These two countries have

often found their positions coinciding when they have pressed for positive pro-
arms control developments in EU common policies, rather as they made 
common cause at key points in the development of the European Security and 
Defence Policy. Their underlying motivations and priorities have, however, 
remained somewhat different. Sweden has frequently reclaimed its freedom to 
adopt more ambitious and idealistic positions outside the EU framework, while 
Finland has preferred to stay within (or, indeed, help consolidate) the European 
mainstream. Moreover, while the three Nordic EU members now have a prac-
tice of regular top-level consultations before European Council meetings, there 
is no evidence of this leading to joint positions à trois on WMD issues. Rather, 
there is reason to believe that the discussions of the leaders of these three coun-
tries on security-related matters often turn on how to minimize the fallout from 
irreducible Nordic differences.

Last, but not least, have Nordic values and objectives influenced EU policies? 
In the case of the EU’s 2003 WMD strategy\(^50\) and its follow-up the answer is 
clearly ‘Yes’, and in many other instances Finnish and Swedish inputs have 
helped to goad the EU into maintaining a positive and proactive role on arms 
control and proliferation-related issues. There are further openings for them to 
play their role as the EU starts to plan for the next phase of development of the 
WMD strategy and its associated funding in the medium-term budget period 
from 2007 to 2012. The limiting factor on Nordic influence is simply that ‘the 
smaller states propose, the larger dispose’, particularly on an issue as sensitive 
within the EU’s membership as the possession of nuclear weapons. The 
interesting question for Sweden, in particular, will be how long the limited 
ambit of collective EU policies will leave it free to promote its own higher-prin-
cipled views outside them. Neither large nor small states in the European Union 
can ultimately escape from the logic that the strengthening of common pos-
tions is bought at the price of national particularities.

\(^{50}\) Council of the European Union (note 32).