8. ‘Not only, but also Nordic’: the European Security and Defence Policy and its implications for alternative frameworks of Nordic cooperation

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I. Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy and the European Union are now moving at an unprecedented pace along lines that are more militarily activist—as well as integrationist. At the same time, security and defence policies in all the Nordic countries that maintain armed forces—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—are undergoing thorough reassessments in the face of 21st century realities. Change is coming to individual Nordic countries and to ‘Norden’ (that is, the Nordic region) as a whole, and what could or should be the outcome of the European influence on this process is an interesting and important question.

The interplay between the EU’s security and defence policy and Nordic defence policies is a subject as complicated as its description is long. Of primary interest for the purposes of this chapter are the implications of the ESDP for the defence and security political future of Norden as a whole: how will the EU and the ESDP affect the Nordic region? To answer this question, the focus here is on the implications of the ESDP for alternative frameworks of defence cooperation, such as those that Nordic countries might engage in outside the EU structures.

Since the subject of ‘Norden’ as a region, with its identity and security community, is covered elsewhere in this volume, the present chapter focuses solely on the question of frameworks for defence cooperation and uses a specialized theoretical approach. The purpose of this exercise is to show that the ESDP

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raises new questions about the relevance of any alternative Nordic framework for defence cooperation, and that if the Nordic countries want a positive answer to these questions they must offer some variety of added value through a forward-looking ‘dynamism’.

Presuming that alternative frameworks of defence cooperation imply cooperation not directly handled through the EU or the ESDP, the investigation borrows a notion from the realm of conceptual studies. It uses the techniques of the academic discipline of international politics to identify the supporting ‘pillars’ of Nordic security and in the process suggests and explores new conceptual approaches to the changed world and its changing future.3 The chapter thus aims to place itself above the many detailed political analyses of the subject and to seek a possible generic approach to the question of constructing alternative frameworks of cooperation within the present international topography.

The investigation in section II is in three parts. First, the security dynamics of Norden are described. The three analytical handles represented by the ‘pillars’ of history, politics and resources are then used to establish the foundation for the description of possible alternative frameworks. Three ideal frameworks for defence cooperation, called the ‘niche’, ‘clip-on’ and ‘lifeguard’ functions, are then introduced. Finally, in section III, these three frameworks are tested against the growing challenge of relevance posed by the continued evolution of the ESDP and against the present strategic reality as reflected in the changing tasks defined by the armed forces of the United Kingdom. This will lead to the conclusion in section IV that dynamism will be pivotal for any future Nordic network. Overall, the somewhat abstract approach taken is grounded in a wish not to force the subject into previously established categories, but to let it reveal itself in a benign theoretical environment where the possibilities for alternative Nordic frameworks can unfold freely.

II. Understanding Norden: security traditions, characteristics and the three ‘pillars’

Balance and counter-power

To examine the security- and defence-related implications of the ESDP for the concept of ‘Norden’, it is necessary first to review the region’s special relationship to security in both objective and subjective terms. The dominant Nordic security dynamic during the ‘strategic holiday’ between the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 20014 can be restated with words borrowed from Andreas Løvold.5 In a review

4 For the notion of the ‘strategic holiday’ see Lindley-French, J., ‘European defence: the capabilities development process post-September 11—what kind of operational needs for which purposes?’, Speech to the WEU Colloquium on Equipping Our Forces for Europe’s Security and Defence—Priorities and Short-
In these terms, the Nordic security dynamic can be depicted as the interplay among the region’s countries caused by the wish for balance and the practice of counter-power. This interplay gives these countries a collective Nordic appearance even though their actual cohesion may be questionable. Figure 8.1 shows the Nordic security dynamic as consisting both of the pluralistic, multifaceted internal processes in the respective countries and of an external strategy of ‘not putting all your eggs in one basket’ while making the most of what is available.

**Balance**

While the Nordic countries have a long history as balancing powers in international politics, whether in peace-brokering activities or through their efforts not to provoke larger players, the factors most often cited when describing them are their relatively small populations and their limited material resources. The consequence is that their will is often frustrated by a lack of means. This also leads to a permanent dilemma of prioritization, which accounts for a sizeable portion of the internal political debates and characterizes many of their defence and security political actions.

To some extent these things are true also of Norden collectively. Even as a group, the Nordic countries cannot carry the same security burdens as, for instance, the UK. On all levels the available muscle has to be applied where it

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6 The total military expenditure of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden was less than one-third of that of the UK in 2004. Stålenheim, P., Omitoogun, W. and Perdomo, C., ‘Tables of military expenditure’,

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counts the most, be it in the realm of security policy or in the prioritization of military deployments. The resulting balancing acts of the respective Nordic countries can result in what look like parallel collective choices, even if not intentional. Whichever way the matter is viewed, it appears that the need to balance can be used in describing a part of the Nordic security dynamic, even today.

The close relationship between internal and external actions in pursuing this process is linked with a predominantly cross-party and pluralistic approach to external policy making which itself forms part of the special Nordic nature under scrutiny here. As an example, parts of the text of the military inquiry of the Norwegian chief of defence were put on the Internet some time before the report itself was completed, thus giving all concerned parties the opportunity to comment on their areas of interest.7 Another example is the agreement in 2004 on a new Danish defence policy platform, in which great pains were taken to include as many Danish political parties as possible.8

**Counter-power**

Historically, the Nordic coutries have worked not just to balance poles of power but also to moderate the way in which power is expressed. This was done by moderating the use of force first among the states of the region themselves and then against others.9 Establishing whether this ‘counter-power’ aim is still significant requires that two separate but parallel paths be explored: the search for counter-power and its application.

Seeking counter-power does not necessarily mean opposing existing powers or creating a special counter-position. Some Nordic countries still remain officially non-aligned or neutral, but all are now firmly situated within ‘the West’.10 Instead, the aim is to create a field of power or ‘clout’ that helps maintain the individual relevance of the small Nordic countries and assists their balancing act in their interaction with the greater powers, be they national or institutional.11 This need not take the form of countering the new US ‘empire’, as


7 Norwegian Chief of Defence, *Forsvarschefens militærfaglige udredning* [Military inquiry of the chief of defence] (Forsvarsdepartementet: Oslo, 2002), URL <http://www.mil.no/fst/mfu/start/delut/>. This report was the precursor to Storting Proposition 42 of 12 Mar. 2004, which led to a decision that Norwegian defence be further modernized in 2005–2008.


11 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 1).
has been suggested, but it does entail keeping the sense of a national self in the face of the pressure of the globalizing world, of which the USA is also a part. This aim is shared by individual Nordic countries and by the region in general, and one of the forms it takes internationally is the provision of counter-arguments to the logic of force, often grounded in the powerful example of the ‘Nordic peace’.

While all the Nordic countries act as though this common Nordic understanding of peace still exists, some now seem to be taking up solo careers. Denmark has been to war in Iraq, and Finland and Sweden are working with the EU battle group project, something that Denmark will not do but which Norway is very interested in doing. All these actions can still be understood as part of a national search for counter-power in the interest of a balanced policy, but they also point towards the dismantlement of the Nordic region as a framework for a cooperative security effort. They hint that something may have infiltrated the ‘commonness’ of Norden and taken over its function: European integration would seem to be that something, and it naturally affects the way in which counter-power is being applied. The consequences of Norden’s ‘common uniqueness’ are being handled differently by the individual countries.

The Nordic region and the individual Nordic countries have tried to use their own history of peace to educate the world, using their model as a kind of soft resource to reach hard targets. One theme of this model as understood in the region could be termed the ‘symmetricalizing’ of the asymmetric. Nordic countries are all the more committed to the strategy of addressing the issues behind the ‘new’ asymmetrical threats, which the major national players at present seem more intent on countering with military means.

Because history supports it, political will dictates it and lack of resources in any event necessitates it, the conviction in the Nordic countries is that the goals of security and many of the goals of defence policy are best handled through various international organizations. That is how counter-power is thought to be best applied in areas beyond the Nordic region. Working in institutions may bring the Nordic countries into contact with different and perhaps more belli-

12 See, e.g., Neumann, I. B., ‘USA er en trussel mot oss’ [The USA is a threat to us], Ny Tid, 23 Aug. 2003.
17 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 10).
18 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 10).
cose mindsets, but they also gain access to a platform for promoting their own agendas, including the search for counter-power. Two paths are thus being travelled at the same time. On the one hand there is the reluctance to relinquish the Nordic style, which calls for a more ‘civil’ counter-power. The other trend is to pursue this ‘not only, but also civil’ counter-power approach through institutions of ‘the common good’, which inherently have a corrosive effect on small-group norms in the sense that their values transcend and penetrate all sorts of borders. What is happening is that states ‘voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves’.19

From defence dynamic to Nordic ‘pillars’

The balance–counter-power dynamic shown in figure 8.1 thus offers one generic way to define the Nordic attitude for the purpose at hand. It is the result of a need to tightly manage both cultural and historical predispositions and scarce resources in order to act in the general international as well as security and defence political domains. Both forms of ‘counter-power’ discussed display a close link with the aim of ‘balancing’, and both these elements of the security dynamic in turn seem to be built on what can be pictured as three pillars: history, politics and resources. Norden has previously handled the three pillars well, maintaining a strong international profile. However, the extension of traditional methods now seems to be leading individual Nordic countries to work more for their individual interests and to expand their room for manoeuvre. The paradox is that their attempts to do this often carry the risk of being absorbed into another, larger community with ‘European’ values akin to the historical Nordic ones. The Nordic nations thus face a friendlier version of Nietzsche’s warning that ‘he that fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster’.20 The next step is to ascertain what implications the Nordic countries’ enhanced interaction with this friendly monster carries for alternative frameworks of defence cooperation.

Three pillars of Norden

In the introduction of The NEBI Yearbook 2003, which covers integration in northern Europe and the Baltic region, it is stated that: ‘The background is as simple as it is self evident: the realization that deep integration requires a minimum of commonality in respect of legal, institutional and political con-

This is a comment on the integration associated with the EU enlargement process but can also be used in the investigation of other frameworks of cooperation. Instead of understanding integration via minimal criteria of legal, institutional and political conditions, the categories can be switched and other avenues investigated. Thus, in the case of Norden, even if it may be true that ‘the continued level of Nordic value cohesion cannot be attributed to conscious efforts to align Nordic positions’,22 the categories of history, politics and resources can be used to identify and explore the possible alternative frameworks for cooperation.

History

Any alternative mechanisms for cooperation will have to be established within a defence political geography that applies to the whole Nordic area, regardless of individual alliance statuses. They must knit together the institutional roles of the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, and acknowledge domination by the USA and Russia. A special question that follows is: how much common Nordic identity remains after the fall of the USSR and the Berlin Wall? Did the avenues of cooperation close down between 9 November 1989 and 11 September 2001? In other words: can Norden remain clearly demarcated in the absence of the USSR?23 Whatever the answers to these questions may be, it is useful to pursue the issues concerning the shadow of Russia because they illustrate the transition to new and perhaps more complex, as well as integrative, times.

In the globalized world, Norden’s geography plays a changed role. This may be exemplified by what Russia represents now, as opposed to what the USSR represented. Before, strength characterized the nature of the opponent; now, the dominant characteristics are Russia’s weakness and the consequences of that weakness. The danger is still one of invasion, but not a conventional military one.24 Issues such as cross-border crime and terrorism, which are not new but are now moving to centre stage, are presenting new threats (or challenges) for old borders.25 This situation translates into a continued awareness of the need

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23 Huldt (note 9), p. 306.
24 See, e.g., Hopkinson (note 13).
for national defence—especially for Finland—albeit of a transformed nature.\textsuperscript{26} Whereas some Nordic countries, as in Denmark, seem to be following more activist lines,\textsuperscript{27} stretching all the way to Iraq, others demarcate their security and defence policy closer to home by developing a new outlook within the previous geographical frame of northern Europe.\textsuperscript{28} Both schools are acting out their version of the Nordic defence dynamic, while redefining Norden by way of their own interaction with their surroundings. The Finnish and Swedish initiative that led to the Petersberg Tasks being taken on by the EU can also be seen as a new way of living out the logic of Nordic history.\textsuperscript{29} However, as the limited number of countries behind that initiative indicates, it had nothing to do with a common Nordic identity. These complexities indicate how what may have seemed a tightly knit Nordic region under the pressures of bipolarity has reacted since 1989: new renderings of Norden are being made or, as the case may be, old ones are being set free.

These currents are reflected \textit{inter alia} in the release of a large number of new defence documents by Nordic governments. For some the focus is still primarily centred on the national arena, such that ‘security and defence policy is aimed at safeguarding the country’s independence and society’s fundamental democratic values’.\textsuperscript{30} For others, the wording of the documents reflects a transitory state where the international and national aspects of security are dealt with side-by-side: ‘The focus must be on carrying out international actions and preserving our territorial integrity.’\textsuperscript{31} This hints at diverging Nordic paths. An alternative reading is that, to different degrees, the region’s states have been reluctant to accept the changing parameters of international politics and are still stuck subjectively in the state-centred cold war models of old.\textsuperscript{32} In objective terms, their new challenges are not so different from those felt by states in many other places, and that may be the very essence of what is new—historically speaking.

Critically, it may be asked whether a special Nordic coherence really exists or whether the actions attributed to coherence are merely the actions of any country with a wish for civil rather than military solutions—a wish that the EU was founded on.\textsuperscript{33} It appears that, for Norden, a collective expression does not


\textsuperscript{27} Huldt (note 9), p. 310; and Holbæk, Henneberg and Sønderskov (note 15), pp. 49 ff.

\textsuperscript{28} Finnish Ministry of Defence (note 26).

\textsuperscript{29} Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 1), p. 22. The Petersberg Tasks were agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union. They were later incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. They include humanitarian intervention and evacuation operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace making. See chapter 6 in this volume.


\textsuperscript{32} Bailes, A. J. K., Preface, Hopkinson (note 13).

\textsuperscript{33} Aalto (note 25), p. 9.
necessarily equate to individual conviction, especially in defence matters. One example might be the large amount of stabilization aid given to the Baltic states in the 1990s. It may be possible to talk about a collective Nordic impression being made on the future of these countries, but it is doubtful whether the Nordic effort can be understood as collective. The Danish position on the Baltic states was expressed through donations en bloc, while the Swedish support was more tangible, in the shape of equipment for rifle battalions in each of the three countries. Overall, the Baltic countries have been strengthened by Norden, but only via a coincidence of the individual contributions.

Whatever the answer to the above questions, the shift between what was and what is makes the question of history, as well as those of resources and politics, a relevant factor in considering alternative methods of Nordic cooperation. A comparison with how Norden has functioned previously may shed some light on, or even influence, the way Norden could be today. From the above it could be concluded that the avenues of cooperation have not been closed down, but for the time being they appear to be empty of travellers, so that ‘what might once have been Nordic is hardly distinguishable from what may today be European’.

**Politics**

Turning to the political framework, the next step is to find out what influence the lattice of UN membership and the varying memberships of NATO and the EU actually has on the alternative Nordic forms of defence cooperation. All the Nordic countries are members of the UN and three—Denmark, Sweden and Finland—are members of the EU. Norway is not a member of the EU and Denmark is not involved in its military aspects. On the other hand, Denmark and Norway are members of NATO, while Finland and Sweden are not. This institutional lattice has many other complexities, and the task here is to understand the possibilities and pitfalls for alternative Nordic frameworks within it.

The Nordic countries still maintain a significant profile as global peace activists through the UN. However, the EU is steadily becoming a more integrated and thus forceful player in this forum, and it is increasingly seen as the main force acting in concert with allies such as the USA in areas of common interest.

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35 See, e.g., Knutsen (note 9).

36 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 435.

37 The Danish defence opt-out is not covered here because the question at hand concerns the implications for alternative frameworks, not involvement in the ESDP as such.

38 See tables I.3 and I.4 in the introduction in this volume.

such as peace, liberty and democracy. Consultations in the Nordic Council have made it possible for all the Nordic countries to continue coordinating their policies, but as an integrated subroutine of the EU rather than as a distinct group. In the defence policy area, the advancement of the EU as a conduit for common European goals and interests was indirectly furthered when NATO troops stepped in on the UN’s behalf in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Europe’s backyard, triggering the dynamics that led to the creation of Europe’s own military intervention capabilities in 1999. Against a background where both the USA’s demand for ‘coalitions of the willing’ and its growing military technical superiority present tough challenges for European states, one of the clear aims of the ESDP was to make the EU capable of acting when the USA does not. The ‘Berlin Plus’ concept for EU–NATO collaboration that was finally activated in 2003 points, however, to a wish for EU coexistence with NATO rather than competition.

After 11 September 2001 the non-allied EU countries could not have agreed to a putative offer by the EU to support the USA with all their available means, as the NATO members did within the alliance. This brings the EU–NATO question into the Nordic investigation. Given the Nordic countries’ different memberships, Nordic frameworks designed to bridge the divide might seem problematic. However, not even the region’s non-allied states wish to see any conflict between NATO and ESDP projects, and all the Nordic countries would much prefer the development of the latter not to become a wedge between Europe and its allies. The emergence from 2000 of proposals for an EU rapid-reaction force and of the NATO Reaction Force in 2002 may have raised some specific questions about compatibility; however, since the issue is defence

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41 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 428.

42 Holbæk, Henneberg and Sonderskov (note 15).


44 ‘Berlin Plus’ refers to a package of agreements reached in 2002–2003 between the EU and NATO. It gives the EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities and to a certain extent opens the common assets and command structure of the alliance for the EU’s use. See also the introduction in this volume.


cooperation and not defence or regional identity, it seems perfectly possible (for Nordic or any other European countries) to support both these defence structures and indeed to benefit from their synergistic function. Questions about a more existential opposition between the European (or Nordic) defence grouping and NATO remain for the future, making the debate at this stage an essentially academic one about where the ESDP is heading.

Based on the assumption that, ‘In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’, the European Security Strategy of 2003 deals with the dynamic security challenges arising from a globalizing world in the aftermath of 9 November 1989 and 11 September 2001. The strategy aims to reconcile different visions of European security and defence policy, ranging from the territorial horizons of some, through the growing international engagement of most, to the outlook of the more militarily activist states. It also lists most of the security concerns felt by all Nordic countries, among others, in the field of civil or total defence and defines the ‘not only, but also civil’ approach best calculated to achieve a balanced policy for meeting these concerns. Finally, the strategy proposes to pursue these aims in a multilateral framework, including partnership with NATO, whereby all the elements sought in the Nordic defence dynamic seem to be covered. Added to the strategy, the EU’s proposed constitution contains many alternative ways of applying the same balanced counter-power approach. So, although the adoption of the Constitutional Treat has been put on hold, it still functions as an indication of a manifest balanced counter-power approach within the European project.

It would thus appear that the ESDP presents plenty of possibilities for cooperation, but what happens outside the formal policy is perhaps more interesting. The proposed constitution does not explicitly cover third parties, but in the case of Norden even the non-EU member state Norway does not really

52 Council of the European Union (note 50), p. 12. The increasing concern in the Nordic countries in the area of civil defence is shown by the establishment in 2002 of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency and in 2003 of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning; see chapter 16 in this volume.
54 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 40), see in particular Articles III-310–12 on the ESDP and Article I-43 on defence against terrorism.
55 Missiroli (note 51).
represent a different pole, as shown by its strong interest in the EU battle group initiative. As Bjørn Knutsen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment wrote in 2000, ‘Norwegian views now fit into the new policies emanating from the EU integration process’, 56 and thus all the Nordic countries, including those formally outside the EU, are now steadily being absorbed by what can be called the ‘EUequalizer’. The EU and its ESDP, assisted by the Nordic defence dynamic, is in the process of a non-hostile takeover of Nordic issues, making it questionable whether it is relevant or, indeed, possible to remain Nordic without first being European.

At present there appears to be room enough for the UN, NATO and the ESDP within the international political topography. Constitution or no constitution, the EU is engaged in fulfilling a unique role of ‘civil’ or ‘soft’ power that was previously ascribed to the Nordic countries to a large extent, but for which they are now too small. Being part of this process enables the Nordic countries to benefit from the similarity between the goals and methods of their own defence dynamic and those of the ESDP. In this light there appear to be many possibilities for exploring alternative frameworks of defence cooperation, because many of the minimum requirements of Nordic security have already been met. At the same time, however, the realistic alternatives may be limited because ‘the Nordics are no longer an autonomous international actor on the world stage independent of the other states in the EU’. 57 Europeanization may in fact be happening at double pace in Norden because the Nordic defence dynamic is opening the countries to the ‘EUequalizer’ at the same time as it is driving the national security and defence policies towards more integrated measures.

Resources

The Nordic countries do not possess any natural, economic, military or other conventional resources on a scale big enough to have any influence on the level of engagement where NATO, the EU and countries such as the USA and Russia operate. Instead, a kind of resource may be noted here that the Nordic countries do possess and may be able to aggregate as a kind of force multiplier for any future initiatives.

Where other European nations may experience strategic alignment problems in areas outside NATO, one comparative advantage where the Nordic countries can bring to the field is their long experience of working together, or at least on parallel lines. This cooperation has been global as well as regional and has used a wide catalogue of tools to solve complicated problems. The collective experience of the Nordic countries, if harnessed somehow, could in theory become a very valuable resource giving any alternative Nordic framework a running start, even in the face of the ‘EUequalizer’. That, however, depends on how any future

56 Knutsen (note 9), p. 34.
57 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 434.
possible framework of Nordic cooperation allocates the scarce conventional Nordic resources available.

**Generating the ideal frameworks**

When the three pillars of the Nordic system are considered together, scaffolding appears, as shown in figure 8.2, from which alternative frameworks for cooperation can be seen. Connecting the three pillars produces three ideal frameworks, which together represent the space for potential action. However, the presence of the ‘EUqualizer’ poses a challenge to the relevance (or ‘added value’) of any of these frameworks, whether in pure form or in combination: a framework that is ‘nice to have’ for the Nordic countries need not be ‘necessary to have’ in the light of the EDSP. In other words, can any one framework or combination of frameworks attempt to bind together Nordic history, politics and resources in a way that will remain relevant in the face of the ‘EUqualizer’?

**Framework 1** could be the developing of a more specific and collective ‘niche’ function for the Nordic forces, focusing on airlift capacity, information operations, policing actions, and so on. The focus might also be on other, more combat-related tasks, the main point being the prioritization of certain specific capabilities.

**Framework 2** would be a ‘clip-on’ function based on the established branches of the Nordic military—the air forces, navies and armies—and including as many as possible of their various usual functions. This would preserve something like the present-day national defence structures and a fuller catalogue of
capabilities. Any Nordic force deployed as a result would, however, be of such a limited size that it would need to be co-opted as a part of the operations of bigger units in order to function.

Framework 3 could be described as a ‘lifeguard’ function to ensure the survival of the Nordic ‘idea’, or ‘profile’, embodying the region’s historical sense of community in a cooperative framework. In terms of overall security policy this might result in a Nordic caucus in international politics, which in terms of defence policy would require the re-styling of structures in accordance with the chosen policy theme. Expanded intra-Nordic collaboration in training and education might be an example of this.

III. Testing alternative frameworks against real-world conditions

At this point the test of relevance must be applied, bringing the conceptual back into contact with the real world. The EU will undoubtedly gain much new experience from the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which commenced in December 2004, and as the ESDP thus presumably gains momentum it will be increasingly hard to see the relevance of any alternative frameworks. Since the general perception is that the future tasks and challenges of the EU will be similar to those defined in the UK’s national defence doctrine, lessons from the latter may offer guidelines for any alternative Nordic frameworks for maintaining a distinct profile in the future.

A July 2004 report by the British Ministry of Defence contains suggestions for preparing the UK’s defence for the 21st century. These suggestions provide a shortcut to defining the requirements that any Nordic cooperation will have to meet. In short, the report assumes that:

the most complex large scale operations will only be conducted as part of a US-led coalition. Our primary goal is to maximise our ability to influence at all levels the planning, execution and management of the operation and its aftermath in support of our wider security policy objectives. Our force structure at large scale should therefore


focus on those capabilities which add real weight to the campaign and hence the UK’s ability to influence its outcome.61

The rest of the report spells out the consequent goals of British forces being able to connect, integrate and synchronize in order to launch and support operations and, in that context, to sense, engage, destroy and assess. Any military contingent or structure must be agile enough to adapt to multiple, diverse levels of engagement both with potential allies and with potential enemies. The focus is on obtaining hard power through organizational ability in both types of interaction.

The question is whether the Nordic countries wish to aim for similar capabilities in a self-sufficient manner or to contribute with certain elements to the collective efforts of others. Both avenues could generate alternative frameworks for cooperation, but with quite different contents and consequences.

The overall lesson is that there may be alternative defence frameworks for Norden, but that their relevance is questionable—and rapidly becoming even more so. From the analysis thus far it seems that, confronted with the ‘EUqualizer’, ‘the lack of a self-evident institutional context is the main obstacle for potential Nordic cooperation with respect to the ESDP’.62 In order to establish such a context, any of the above frameworks or some combination of them would need to first address the challenge of relevance.

A cooperation framework containing elements from all three of the above frameworks may be the most congenial for the Nordic countries themselves, but it may not prove very integration-friendly nor represent a responsible use of resources. A pure ‘clip-on’ or ‘niche’ framework could probably appeal to larger partners, but only on the grounds of its practical value, rather than of any specifically Nordic quality. If, on the other hand, the Nordic countries adopt a framework overly geared to preserving their existing traditions and force structures, it is questionable whether the relevance criterion can be fulfilled. Even if the ‘Nordic lifeguard’ framework is ‘nice to have’ for Norden, its closed nature makes it unlikely that it will be able to find a place in the globalized world.

Examination of the three pillars of Nordic defence identity shows that, while the EU may have helped to illuminate and even further develop what is Nordic in all of the pillars, it has done so by a process of steady encroachment. To say that Norden only comes into being at the time of its death is perhaps an overstatement; but as the EU takes over more and more Nordic hallmarks in the handling of security, it would be a fitting description to say that Norden may be choking on the fruits of victory.63 The incorporation into a collective EU culture

61 British Ministry of Defence (note 60), p. 3.
63 See also Laatikainen (note 22), p. 437.
of, for example, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession\textsuperscript{64} and the Petersberg Tasks as a programme for crisis management can only be seen as a good thing, but in doing so the ‘EUqualizer’ is steadily narrowing the space for alternative frameworks by taking over both their role and their content.\textsuperscript{65}

For any alternative framework to remain relevant, it must be dynamic enough to cater for the coming, perhaps even unforeseen, needs of the EU (or, indeed, of NATO). Coupling the knowledge gained from the history, politics and resources pillars with the experience of the UK, it appears that dynamism is the key to any attempt to institutionalize Norden in an alternative framework of defence cooperation. Norden needs dynamism in order to succeed in simultaneously mirroring the historical Norden, working within the given political situation, deriving guiding principles for administering resources, and acquiring and positioning capabilities. Unless they are more dynamic than the structures surrounding them, alternative frameworks will in time become irrelevant or be taken over and swallowed up.

IV. Conclusions

The prima facie influence that the European Security and Defence Policy has on the concept of ‘the Nordic’ is to force it into spaces not yet covered by this and other EU policies. Even with the EU constitution on hold for now, the ‘EUqualizer’ will slowly but certainly continue to erode the ground available for a specifically Nordic expression of defence or security identity. This will happen not just because of Norden’s inhibiting lack of resources, but because most elements of the Nordic defence dynamic are already contained in the forces driving the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its ESDP.

Because the defence and security political area is in such rapid transition, and important developments in the ESDP, such as the commencement of EUFOR Althea, are still fairly recent, it is not really possible to determine what works and what does not in the short and middle terms. In the long term, any attempts at constructing alternative frameworks will have to work within the institutionalized testing ground demarcated by the interaction of the ESDP both with larger frameworks such as the UN and NATO, and with the specifically Nordic or Nordic–Baltic space. In practice, the scope for such attempts will become narrower, and their appeal for the Nordic countries themselves may also be in doubt. At present, as shown in this chapter, the desire to remain Nordic (especially in terms of balance and counter-power) is already driving the countries along separate paths at a good pace because what could be called Nordic qualities and contexts are now found in many places beyond the Nordic region. Should this divided region want to coalesce at some point, to retain a sense of a distinctly Nordic nature in a way that does not deny this positive


\textsuperscript{65} Rasmussen (note 45), p. 48.
European development, a proactive, forward-looking dynamism seems to be the key condition for overcoming the problem of relevance and allowing the three pillars of Nordic identity to hold their own against the ‘EUqualizer’ (the friendly monster of integration). Only then, in European security and defence policy as such and also in the broader interactions of the EU, NATO and the UN, could the specifically Nordic (or, indeed, Nordic–Baltic) framework prove to be rejuvenating, bringing Norden to the forefront of the present strategic reality.