4. Domestic influences on Nordic security and defence policy: from the perspective of fusion

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I. Introduction

The traditional discourse associated with the Nordic countries in the context of security questions typically emphasizes the importance of domestic factors in the shaping of their policies on the European Union’s security and defence policy and on security in general. In the first place this may simply reflect the fact that the Nordic countries are mature liberal democracies. As such, most of them display strong tendencies towards consensus policy making in the national context, and so the emphasis on seeking domestic consensus will—albeit to a limited extent—spill over into the making of foreign policy. With some simplification, there is a systemic tendency endemic in these open and transparent systems of governance to ensure that the main tenets of Nordic security policies enjoy the broad support of the elite of the mainstream political parties and often of the whole population. Second, the wider political values held by Nordic populations, such as strong attachments to internationalism, peace and security, a liberal view of human rights and moral responsibilities towards developing countries, are consistent features of the Nordic countries’ foreign policies. Of course, many might dispute whether the foreign and security policies of the Nordic countries are influenced by domestic factors and reflect the ‘will of the people’, or whether it is the foreign-policy makers who have been active in shaping the will of the population. This would, however, miss the point and is largely an esoteric exercise in analysis. What is important is to recognize that the domestic background is influential and has a complex inter-relationship with the shaping of Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies.

Furthermore, it can be argued that domestic factors will particularly influence Nordic perspectives towards the evolving European Security and Defence Policy precisely because ‘Europe’ has such resonance and attracts such controversy in Nordic domestic debates. For the domestic populations, and irrespective of whether the country is an EU member or not, discussions on Europe have a comparatively long history dating back several decades. The Nordic populations view the ESDP through the prism of broader, often volatile popular views about the merits of further integration (in Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and EU membership (in Iceland and Norway).
This chapter is not meant to provide a comprehensive case-by-case overview of the specific domestic factors influencing each Nordic country’s perspectives on the ESDP. Rather, it explores from a comparative perspective whether the importance of domestic factors in shaping Nordic attitudes to the ESDP can be explained in conceptual terms. In particular, it is assumed that Nordic policies towards the ESDP are formulated in the context of a wider national discourse on European integration per se. It is further argued that a fusion perspective (described below) can be helpful in explaining how domestic audiences view and ‘value’ the merits of participation in the ESDP. This chapter concentrates on the three Nordic EU members—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—where the national discourse is particularly well developed: domestic actors in these countries have had a substantial period in which to become familiar with the workings of EU membership and may thus be more concerned and involved with the evolution of the ESDP.

II. Strong bonds: Nordic discourse on the European Security and Defence Policy and European political integration

At face value, the external profiles of the three Nordic EU members on European security issues often seem to be rationalized in terms of the domestic debates in these countries. For convenience, the Nordic EU members can be divided into two categories, according to whether or not they are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the ‘non-aligned Nordic EU members’—Finland and Sweden—and the ‘NATO Nordic EU member’—Denmark.

There are many similarities between the two categories and several cross-category characteristics can be identified among the domestic discourses on the European security issues. All show a strong tendency towards internationalism that highlights the importance of international law and of global international institutions, such as the United Nations, as the legitimate regulators of the conduct of nation states. The role of the UN in particular is usually regarded in Nordic countries as being essential for legitimizing peacekeeping operations and humanitarian intervention. Domestic political actors are accustomed to consenting to Nordic participation in operations conducted under the auspices or with the approval of the UN. Leading on from this, the Nordic countries have largely been favourable to notions of active participation in international crisis management. Hence, debates on the ESDP have to be placed in the context of a mainstream Nordic political discourse that favours international crisis management and a primary role for the UN in general terms.

In addition, the discourse in the Nordic countries shows that there is an awareness of regionalism. This reflects not just the countries’ status as small states that are conscious of their dependence on the actions of leading European and Atlantic powers but also the importance of regional questions such as the concepts of ‘the North’ or ‘Norden’ and, more recently, the Baltic Sea frame-
While it is debatable whether a ‘Nordic model’ ever existed or exists today, specific aspects that are widely associated with it still form part of the popular terminology applied by the Nordic populations to discussions of general European security questions. In addition, popular debates on the ESDP in the Nordic countries share a similar starting assessment of the strategic changes affecting northern Europe: that with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the main security issues for Europe have become less ‘hard’ and more fluid. Nordic security debates are conducted against a domestic undercurrent that favours broader ‘soft security’ interpretations of the new security threats, to encompass not just crisis management but also areas such as public health, the environment, civil nuclear power and pollution. In other words, the Nordic political elites, with the support of their domestic populations, are ‘believers in soft security’ and are accustomed to articulate arguments that do not restrict notions of European security to purely territorial or collective defence.

In addition, the two categories have often displayed similar views on the merits of European integration. All three Nordic EU members—at both the political elite and public levels—resist the idea of the EU’s developing into a federal Europe. In other words, the domestic backgrounds are dominated by a strong dose of ‘federo-scepticism’\(^1\). It is from this perspective also that Nordic viewpoints on the ESDP should be interpreted. In particular, the evolving ESDP should not be construed as, or imply a direct integrative impetus towards, the constitutional establishment of a federal Europe. In the case of Finland and Sweden, this may lead the governments, with public support, to uphold the semblance of non-alignment as a bulwark against a federally inclined ESDP or against the Union becoming a collective defence organization like NATO. For Denmark, ‘federo-scepticism’ has created a situation in which only an official opt-out from the ESDP could solve the problem.

The two categories are also faced with similar security challenges affecting not just these Nordic countries but the whole European continent. To the east lies the challenge of maintaining good relations with Russia and, in more recent times, the EU’s pressing challenge of how to engage Russia in managing the wide-ranging ‘soft security’ questions emanating from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Finnish popular security debates, for example, often express public concerns about a potentially unstable Russia. To the west, the Nordic countries face the implications of the events of 11 September 2001, the ‘war on terrorism’, and a more assertive US foreign policy under President George W. Bush that demands more forthright responses from the European allies and partners of the USA.\(^2\) In addition, all—irrespective of whether they are NATO members

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or not—are faced with responding to the changing security agenda of NATO and to the demands for the alliance to redefine its contribution to European security.

Nevertheless, the division of these three Nordic countries into two categories in order to examine the domestic background is conceptually useful.

**Finland and Sweden: non-aligned Nordic EU members**

In Finland and Sweden the central issue in domestic debates on European security matters has remained the continuation of their long-standing policies of non-alignment. On the one hand, their official definitions of non-alignment have become more flexible since 1989 and are now largely restricted to the narrow formula of ‘non-participation in military alliances’. On this basis, domestic support for participation in greater EU security cooperation becomes conditional on its not contravening non-alignment. On the other hand, the domestic background in Finland and Sweden is also characterized by a continuing—if declining—degree of public attachment to (the revised form of) non-alignment. This would make it difficult for the governments to abandon it, should they so wish. In the Swedish case at least, and as Lars Trägårdh argues, non-alignment has been an integral part of Sweden’s political culture and one of the tenets of the ‘Swedish model’ that helped to shape the country’s popular, essentially social democrat-inspired political culture. In the Finnish case, and as Toivo Miljan has written, non-alignment has been perceived by most domestic actors as having succeeded in keeping out the troops if not the influence of the Soviet Union and has thus been integral to the post-World War II survival of Finland as an independent sovereign state.

Although there may be some disagreement as to how accurate these statements are today, one thing is clear. Domestic actors in Finland and Sweden, and the populations in general, have been reluctant to give up the non-aligned status that makes these states more distinctive in the international environment and thus makes it easier for them to pursue active internationalism, as well as being ultimately effective in keeping these states out of the major conflicts affecting Europe in the 20th century. Such ‘successful’ non-alignment, when combined with a healthy dose of ‘federo-scepticism’, sets the key parameters for how foreign-policy makers in these two countries perceive existing and future ESDP options.

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3 This is despite the fact that the publics often turned a blind eye to the participation of Finland and Sweden, which is extensive enough to warrant the term ‘semi-alignment’. Miles, L., ‘Sweden and Finland’, eds I. Manners and R. G. Whitman, *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000), pp. 181–203.


Denmark: NATO Nordic EU member

In Denmark (and the non-EU NATO members Iceland and Norway), Atlanticism accompanies ‘federo-scepticism’. The government gained domestic support for participation in NATO by arguing that Atlanticism and a close relationship with the USA were essential prerequisites for the country’s secure future and for the stability of the Nordic region. Of course, the Danish population (unlike that of Norway) has not always unreservedly accepted this, and the government was often keen to stress that Nordic Atlanticism was qualified by an attachment to the key common Nordic internationalist values mentioned above. Hence, for many years Denmark (like Norway) balanced its active participation in NATO with a ‘no foreign bases’ policy that rejected the permanent stationing of NATO forces and any nuclear presence on their territories. Nevertheless, it can be argued that in Denmark (as well as Iceland and Norway) the primacy of Atlanticism was portrayed and largely accepted by domestic actors as the core of successful security policies.

From the perspective of the Nordic members of NATO, the evolving ESDP has been viewed through the prism of Atlanticism: thus, in domestic debates, the Danes, Icelanders and Norwegians have shown concern that the ESDP should not undermine the role of NATO, whose membership they value. When this is linked with widespread ‘federo-scepticism’, national actors are concerned that the ESDP should imply neither a reduced role for NATO nor an integrative move by the EU towards a federal Europe.

In all three Nordic EU member states there is also something of an elite versus grass roots division of emphases as regards Nordic security policy. It would seem that domestic actors and, in particular, the publics are more deeply attached to the ‘theology’ of their respective existing security policies—be it non-alignment or Atlanticism. In contrast, and with some simplification, the diplomatic demands of conducting negotiations on security issues have made the political elites of the countries more pragmatic regarding their existing policy stances and more open to the supranational development of the ESDP.

III. The domestic background: structural considerations

In addition to the general Nordic domestic discourse on the ESDP, it is also important to recognize structural considerations shaping Nordic policy on the ESDP. First has been the capacity of Nordic governments for initiating fresh domestic discussions on Nordic security policy in general and the ESDP in particular. This is an important variable *inter alia* because the propensity for launching public debates is shaped partly by the division of the power to lead security policy. In the Finnish case, for example, formal competence for EU policy and for certain aspects of foreign policy was moved from the president to the prime minister by constitutional reforms implemented in 2000. This change was, in part, in recognition of the wide-ranging impact of the EU on domestic
policy making. Equally, the frequency and diversity of contributions from political leadership has increased in all three countries since the remit of the ESDP covers several policy areas, requiring informal and formal agreements and public commentaries from prime ministers’ offices and ministries of foreign affairs, defence and even justice.

The domestic implications of the ESDP have been recognized by Nordic political leaders. The Nordic prime ministers are progressively assuming active responsibility for coordinating national policy on the EU and, in particular, the ESDP. This is important reassuring domestic audiences as to why the EU has moved, or been perceived to have moved, from its status in the early 1990s as a ‘civilian power’ concerned largely with single market politics towards the Union of today with access to military capabilities. In the Nordic countries, the greater propensity for the prime minister to make leading statements on EU matters not only reflects a government imperative for coordination ‘from the top’, but can also be taken as a message for domestic audiences that the EU is a permanent feature of daily domestic politics.

As Cynthia Kite illustrates in chapter 5, other structural considerations include the characteristics of the countries’ party systems, the configuration of governing party coalitions and parliamentary alliances, and the degree of effort made by the parties to handle ESDP-related issues without provoking inter- and intra-party divisions. These factors are important since they affect the effectiveness of transmission channels between the governing political elite and wider domestic audiences in the Nordic countries. Several observations are worth making here. First, domestic party attitudes towards the ESDP are influenced by the parties’ orientation towards EU membership in general and are affected by the degree of EU participation and Europeanization of the respective party organizations. In general, the parties on the centre-left and left of the political spectrum are those where opposition to EU membership remains strongest (as in Denmark and Sweden), Europeanization has been slowest and the converse attachment to Nordic welfare models remains strong. The centre-left parties are usually influential players—and sometimes ‘natural’ parties of government—in the party systems of the Nordic countries and, as Kite argues, the level of intra-party division on security issues can be significant. For example, in the Swedish case, the popularity of non-alignment among members of the Social Democratic Party has been important in ensuring the government’s continuation of this policy and its consequently selective enthusiasm for the evolving ESDP. Sweden has had only minority Social Democrat governments since its accession to the EU, and this has contributed to a remarkable consistency in the evolution of Swedish policy towards the ESDP. In addition, the role of the agrarian-based Centre parties has been influential in the Finnish and Swedish party systems, where these parties have been a domestic reservoir of continuing support for non-alignment.

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6 It should, however, be noted that opposition to EU membership can be found on the right of the political spectrum as well.
The stability of the party system, which affects the durability of governing coalitions, is also a factor and in this respect the domestic experiences of EU membership have differed across the Nordic EU members. Denmark joined the EU in 1973, around the same time as a fragmenting of the Danish party system that has sometimes made the building of cross-party accords on EU matters difficult. In contrast, Finnish governmental policy making on the ESDP was facilitated by the ‘rainbow coalition’ government (1995–2003) that ensured general accord across the Finnish political spectrum for the basic tenets of Finnish EU policy during the critical early years of Finnish EU membership.7 As Kite highlights, none of the political parties represented in the Finnish Parliament opposes full Finnish membership of the EU and there is strong elite support for the ESDP.

The existence of durable cross-party elite consensus is a significant domestic background factor since it can influence the likelihood that key aspects of EU policy will be subject to further approval by public referendum. In Denmark, for example, where there are party divisions on the future of the opt-outs on the ESDP and other areas, participation in the ESDP will require de facto public approval through a referendum either on removing the relevant opt-out or on acceptance of the ESDP as part of any proposed EU constitution. In Sweden, where there are also party divisions on the EU, a referendum on the abandoning of non-alignment cannot be completely ruled out, although it is rather unlikely in practice. In Finland, where there is strong cross-party consensus behind existing Finnish EU policy, resort to public referendums is very rare.

IV. The fusion perspective and the European Security and Defence Policy

This chapter argues that domestic viewpoints on the evolving ESDP can be interpreted through the application of a fusion perspective. Based on the work of Wolfgang Wessels,8 the fusion perspective is used here to explain the formulation and implementation of national EU policy that lies at the nexus between the national and supranational levels of the EU policy cycle.9 A fusion perspective can provide valuable insights into how the national political elites...

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7 The ‘rainbow coalition’ government, led by Paavo Lipponen of the Social Democrats, included the Social Democrats, the conservative National Coalition party, the ex-communist Left Alliance, the Swedish People’s Party and the Green League.


value membership of the European Union and may accurately describe the ways in which governments tend to view the benefits of the ESDP.

Two caveats should be noted. First, aspects of the fusion thesis, as articulated by Wessels,10 must be applied selectively since the main focus of this study is on domestic discourses on the ESDP—a micro-perspective in terms of the whole domestic interface of national EU policy. Second, the micro-level fusion perspective largely focuses on using fusion as a ‘set of values’ that underpin the domestically derived assumptions of national policy makers when devising and implementing national EU policy. It may more accurately be described as a perspective than a thesis when addressing the domestically influenced values of policy makers developing national approaches to the EU. It also has much less to say about the effectiveness of the national strategies that they adopt. National policy makers view European integration in different yet complementary forms—defined here as ‘performance fusion’, ‘political fusion’ and ‘compound fusion’.

Performance fusion: an output-related integration mentality

The fusion perspective adopts a particular view of how and why states want to participate in European integration. Government perceptions of European integration, ever conscious of domestic viewpoints, remain largely rational and ‘state-centric’ in orientation. Domestic elite support for full membership status is based on the perceived benefits that European integration brings in terms of both domestic and international policy solutions. States favour the gradual ‘pooling’ of sovereignty with a view to joint problem solving in the EU largely because of the needs emanating from domestic politics and the imperatives set by interdependence.

Most importantly, fusion stresses that—in relation to EU matters—national elites are concerned with the relationship between the role of the nation state, as a welfare and service provider for its citizens, and the implications of interdependence.11 The elites are concerned that national policy makers find it increasingly hard to meet their citizens’ expectations—in this case in the realms of security policy—because interdependence limits the effectiveness of domestic policy instruments if they are used alone. In order to improve practical capabilities, national political elites—with the conditional support of their domestic populations—are receptive to integration while also trying to counter any negative consequences through the greater use of shared policy instruments. According to the fusion perspective, national policy makers adopt a performance-related integration mentality that links European integration processes to the evolution of the nation state and the effectiveness of policy instruments. This implies that most national actors view European integration on the basis of ‘performance-related criteria’. They are willing to accept deeper Euro-

10 Wessels, ‘An ever closer fusion?’ (note 8).
pean integration provided that the Union delivers political and economic results
that can no longer be produced using traditional national strategies and policies.
Domestic support for the Union—and for development of the ESDP—is not
based primarily on commitment to a vision of an integrated Europe. Rather, it
arises largely because being part of the Union (and having the ESDP) and the
selective use of supranational policy making are seen to provide substantial
‘output’ benefits.

Nevertheless, EU members also have to accept that EU participation will lead
to the transformation of the role of the nation state in those policy areas where
the Union has competences. Popular support for the Union—according to
performance fusion—is output related. Citizens accept perceived reductions in
national autonomy provided that such constraints are balanced by benefits
deriving from membership of the Union. If these are not delivered, they may
question the advantages of European integration in general and of developing
the ESDP in particular.

The Union’s future success becomes an infused part of a state’s national
interest. Consequently, domestic actors have a stake in ensuring that the Union
succeeds in the future, in order to enhance domestic policy outcomes, even if
this meanwhile affects and complicates daily politics back home.

Turning specifically to the ESDP, and regardless of whether any given
Nordic country is a non-aligned or a NATO EU member, domestic actors prefer
their governments to be actively involved in European security issues with an
emphasis on achieving a concrete performance output and contribution to Euro-
pean security operations and frameworks. At a rather simplistic level, the pre-
ferred output remains the avoidance of Nordic involvement in European wars.
Whether their country is non-aligned or a NATO member, the ‘soft security’
and internationalist preferences of the Nordic populations have at their heart a
desire for the Nordic region to remain a ‘zone of peace’. Thus, the ESDP is
judged against general criteria that gauge its success in conflict prevention, both
close to home in the Nordic region and around the Baltic Sea and on the wider
borders of the Union.

There are three more specific performance-related outputs that reflect
common Nordic preferences among domestic actors. First, performance fusion
implies that the Nordic populations will show a special interest in foreign
policy actions that enhance crisis management, since this is often regarded as
the key to wider regional peace and stability. Nordic domestic actors have
consistently focused on the practical mechanisms for achieving crisis manage-
ment, while still showing a strong identification with the traditional foreign
policy orientation—be it non-alignment or Atlanticism—of the country con-
cerned. This should be reflected in a habitual focus by Nordic domestic actors
on delivering crisis management effectively. Second, there is a widespread
Nordic view that crisis management functions should not be exclusively ‘West-

2003), pp. 1–23.
ern’ operations and, above all, prominent domestic actors often advocate the active involvement of Russia. This is partly for domestic consumption in those countries where the inclusion of Russia in operations is viewed positively. Third, there is a common Nordic view that the performance outputs of the ESDP should not be restricted to military affairs. In particular, the ‘soft security’ preferences of Nordic actors have led them to argue for extending performance goals to include civil crisis management.\(^{13}\)

**Political fusion: a ‘third way’ for European integration**

The micro-level fusion perspective further holds that policy makers, with domestic support, also adopt a position towards European integration per se and, in particular, on the path they would like to see the Union take in its future evolution.

Domestic actors perceive that, in order to lessen the potential erosion of statehood arising from performance fusion, there are two alternative ‘exit’ strategies for EU policies: strengthened intergovernmental cooperation and the construction of a federal state. In practice, however, domestic actors are dissatisfied with both. They dislike the limitations of intergovernmental cooperation because the effectiveness of common decisions is reduced by the lack of mechanisms to ensure universal compliance. On the other hand, national elites and publics are wary of federal solutions since they are perceived to threaten the existing constitutional and national character of West European states. As part of political fusion, domestic actors perceive integration as a ‘third way’ between intergovernmentalism and federalism. The future path of the European Union can be seen as ‘pro-integration’ and ‘supranational’—accommodating the domestic actors’ rejection of the limited effectiveness and ambitions of pure intergovernmentalism on the one hand and, on the other, their general dislike of the negative implications of constitutional federalism in terms of national sovereignty.

In the domestic context, most member states see a qualitative difference between ‘supranationalism’ and ‘federalism’, even if the implications in practice are less clear-cut. EU supranationalism is often regarded by member states as, to some extent, more performance-related, piecemeal and flexible than a federal model, and domestic actors feel that they have the ability to restrict how far supranationalism is extended in the EU—something that goes down well with national voters. In addition, supranationalism can be portrayed in domestic debates as being less ‘symbolic’ and thereby less ‘threatening’ to national sovereignty since governments often rationalize it as a means to deliver national goals. Supranationalism enjoys a broader range of domestic support as it fits with the widespread view of the Union as a largely elite-dominated system of shared management, with an agenda-setting (and supranational) technocracy at its centre. In contrast, federalism is considered to be constitution-orientated, pri-

\(^{13}\) See chapter 11 in this volume.
marily concerned with democratic legitimacy and consequently highly ‘symbolic’. Federalism, rightly or wrongly, is broadly interpreted by member states as requiring a final pooling of sovereignty.

This does not mean that domestic actors possess a detailed vision of how the Union should be configured—apart from the recognition that it may include (selective) supranational characteristics. Clearly, many do not; but they are certain of one thing—what they do not want to see the EU evolve into. For the vast majority of domestic actors, this means a ‘federal Europe’ that has substantial constitutional implications for the existing nation states.

In essence, people are searching for a ‘third way’ for European integration in which a more ambitious policy agenda can be embraced through supranational decision making. This third way would secure the benefits of performance fusion without resorting to a radical new constitutional arrangement for Europe that would not be popular domestically. It amounts to a process of fusion with an undecided finalité politique.14

Nordic domestic attitudes should display an implicit and sometimes explicit preference for a third way for the evolving ESDP. First, Nordic domestic discourse may indicate that, although crisis management is desirable, it must be compatible with general domestic preferences for European integration. Purely intergovernmental crisis management is no longer regarded as being especially effective. This is particularly so given the logic of Nordic ‘internationalist’ preferences that require any crisis management intervention to have the support of the international community through the UN. The selective use of supranational organizations is regarded as beneficial, as they are multinational and often have established, integrated command structures. Nevertheless, any supranational development of the ESDP to facilitate crisis management should not imply or be construed as leading to major domestic constitutional reform, nor should it lead to further pressure for movement towards a federal Europe. In short, the common Nordic domestic background to the ESDP sets parameters for this policy’s development that are more or less reminiscent of a ‘third way’, balancing demands for effective crisis management with the caution typical of Nordic ‘federo-scepticism’.

**Compound fusion: the European Union as a ‘compound polity’**

The fusion perspective assumes that domestic actors regard the European Union as a ‘compound polity’. From a fusion perspective, the EU encompasses a process in which political institutions have fused their competences and powers—on a broadening scale and with growing intensity—for preparing, making, implementing and controlling binding decisions for public policies through the use of state-like instruments. The Union is thus viewed as a kind of state-like

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politico-administrative system that works in conjunction with, rather than serving to replace, the existing nation states. This is called ‘compound fusion’, in which governments, administrations and actors increasingly pool and share public resources from several levels to attain commonly identified goals. Compound fusion also envisages the participation in this EU core network of a wide array of actors outside the central government administrations. The Union continues under compound fusion to be regarded as a fused organization of member states and supranational elements.

Selective extensions of the supranational powers of the EU are sanctioned by the member states, leading to a mix of policy instruments. The system of mixed competences in the present Union enables domestic actors to ‘value’ the compound nature of the EU polity, since it allows integration to take place without its being perceived in domestic circles as damaging other key ‘national interests’.

Any attempts to make once-and-for-all, clear-cut divisions of competence between the national and EU level (as in federal models) are deemed politically sensitive. In reality, the EU plays an important role in the processes that lead to the adoption of national decisions and standpoints, as much as vice versa. Compound fusion does not envisage any strict division between the national and the European. Resources are merged so that the accountability and responsibilities for specific policies are diffused.\textsuperscript{15}

The fusion perspective suggests that the Nordic domestic discourse actually envisages the ESDP as delivering a kind of compound crisis management. In particular, Nordic populations would prefer the ESDP not to focus on hard security and territorial defence mandates, since these either are incompatible with non-alignment or are an aspect of security already provided through NATO. Instead, ESDP personnel should be dedicated to wider ‘soft security’ roles such as crisis management. Hence, the Nordic populations will not oppose—although support will sometimes be reluctant—the idea of Nordic military officials working in or for EU or NATO crisis management command structures or of those structures being part of EU- or NATO-led peacekeeping operations that place Nordic soldiers at the disposal of NATO or EU commanders. In essence, then, the ESDP has become a merged compound of national and EU personnel, of EU and non-EU roles, and of EU–NATO processes mediated through, for example, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.\textsuperscript{16}

V. Empirical evaluation

This chapter does not attempt to give a wide-ranging empirical analysis. Instead, this section provides an illustrative overview of the domestic discourse

\textsuperscript{15} Wessels, ‘An ever closer fusion?’ (note 8), p. 274.

\textsuperscript{16} The ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements were made in Apr. 1999 between the EU and NATO and deal primarily with the EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities but also with other assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
common to the Nordic non-aligned and NATO EU members from a fusion perspective.

**Finland and Sweden: non-aligned Nordic EU members**

*Performance characteristics*

As noted above, non-alignment in Nordic countries has always been somewhat flexible and the task of interpreting its parameters has largely been in the hands of the foreign policy elite whose task is (with domestic support) to translate non-alignment into practice. Hence, there have been subtle differences even between Finnish and Swedish non-alignment. Changes made to both Finnish and Swedish security policy since the 1990s, however, have made it less doctrinal and thereby increased the weight attached to performance criteria, helping non-alignment to survive the fact that a bipolar Europe has ceased to exist. Non-alignment has also been interpreted more flexibly by domestic opinion. After the events of 11 September 2001, while governments emphasized that ESDP actions must be compatible with international law, domestic discourse has broadly accepted the need for participation in key activities and downplays the need for formal membership of organizations. The stress is on delivering results through cooperation rather than on the question of membership status.

Here, too, however, there have been differences in emphasis between the Finnish and Swedish cases. In 1995–96 Finland embarked on an open debate about the future viability of NATO membership, and the issue has returned intermittently to the fore of Finnish domestic politics ever since. In contrast, the Swedish debate has been more constrained and the issue of NATO membership remains a sensitive undercurrent in domestic politics. In general, Finnish domestic actors can be said to be more advanced in their deliberations on NATO, less convinced of the long-term viability of non-alignment and more likely to consider NATO membership as attractive.

However, neither the Finnish nor the Swedish domestic debate is primarily focused on NATO, at least in the context of crisis management roles. Rather, the governments have used performance-related arguments to highlight the advantages of the emerging ESDP, while arguing against the EU developing a ‘hard’ defence dimension. The Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, in a key speech in February 2003 outlining governmental views on the future of the EU, highlighted a ‘practical mentality at work’. Persson stated that, ‘Should a member state fall victim to an international terrorist attack, the other member states would come to its assistance if the attacked state so requested’ and that he had ‘nothing against committing this solidarity to a treaty’. However, he was

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equally insistent that ‘it must not take the form of a common defence’. Nevertheless, the Swedish public also regard it as crucial that international approval for such activities is maintained and that military operations are sanctioned by the international community and the UN.

In Finland, the discourse contains more prominent and traditional preoccupations with hard security. On the one hand, Finnish domestic actors and the public are more comfortable with the European integration process in general than are their counterparts in Sweden. As Pernille Rieker observes, EU membership has been ‘seen as a way for Finland to confirm its long repressed Western identity, and not as a threat to national sovereignty and freedom of action’. Hence, in the Finnish case, the ESDP seems to be more readily, if not universally, accepted as a possible future substitute for non-alignment and as an integral part of the EU as an existing security policy actor. However, the Finnish domestic discourse on security matters is still shaped by traditional security considerations and by the country’s long border with Russia.

Performance characteristics have been invoked to rationalize retaining non-alignment. The Swedish and, to a lesser extent, Finnish publics largely hold the view that non-alignment has a good track record and has delivered direct benefits. For the Swedes, it is widely perceived to have enabled their country to avoid involvement in wars since 1814, while the more pragmatic Finns universally regarded non-alignment following World War II as the only viable policy—other than being subsumed into the Eastern bloc—that could balance Finnish preferences with Soviet security concerns. Thus, any new arrangements must be seen as delivering equivalent or improved benefits in terms of Finnish and Swedish peace and security. As Anders Bjurner comments, Swedish security policy ‘has to be based on popular support and the view of the majority of the people has to be respected’.

Given Finland’s and Sweden’s successful histories of involvement in NATO-led crisis management operations, as well as their influence as non-aligned EU members on the emerging agendas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP, the majority of Swedes—and to a lesser extent Finns—are still inclined to feel that their country should abandon non-alignment only if future membership of NATO would discernibly increase the country’s or the region’s security. The ‘burden of proof’ remains with those who want Finland and Sweden to join NATO. The case has so far not been sufficient to convince the publics that NATO membership would bring benefits on the necessary scale.

Nordic publics also seem receptive to arguments that military crisis management must be complemented by EU (and NATO) civil arrangements as part of

practical peacekeeping. Familiar with years of Swedish, and sometimes Finnish, involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, the publics can readily see that crisis management requires not just short-term military intervention, but also medium- to long-term civil cooperation, particularly in building indigenous police forces able to maintain legitimate civil order. Finnish and Swedish security discourse accepts, with qualified domestic support, that crisis arrangements should include a fused compound not just of military and civil dimensions but also of national and EU personnel. Domestically, the EU is now accepted as a leading provider of crisis management capabilities.

The third way for security policy

In terms of domestic discourse, as noted above, the idea that European crisis management can be carried out on a purely intergovernmental basis has long been discounted. As Nordic participation in the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and elsewhere testifies, the publics have largely accepted the merits of multinational and supranational frameworks, provided by the EU and NATO, as being the most appropriate for European crisis management. Indeed, although the general impression is that the Finns and the Swedes favour intergovernmental solutions, domestic actors have actually been receptive to Nordic participation in supranational arrangements provided that these are seen to deliver effective crisis management capabilities.

Just as the governments in broad policy terms have sought a ‘third way’ by retaining a looser loyalty to non-alignment that avoids provoking popular sensibilities over unqualified ESDP participation or NATO membership, domestic actors in both countries have displayed preferences for a ‘third way’ as regards the development of the EU’s capabilities in security and defence. While supporting the extension of the CFSP and the Union’s ‘soft security’ capabilities for meeting wider challenges in Europe, including an effective crisis management apparatus, the publics have been cautious about the Union developing an overt ‘common defence’. As Kite indicates, a majority of both the Finnish (63 per cent) and Swedish (56 per cent) publics believe that decisions on foreign policy should be made jointly within the EU: yet larger majorities are convinced that defence decisions should remain the preserve of the national governments (87 per cent in Finland and 76 per cent in Sweden).21 At least in Sweden, domestic actors have been very wary of the idea that the emerging ESDP might include a common defence provision, which they would see as transforming the Union into a formal military alliance.

From a fusion perspective, this is also significant since many Swedes and, to a lesser extent, Finns view the transformation of the EU into a military collective defence organization as a key indicator of a wider intention to move towards a European ‘superstate’. From the perspective of political fusion, the

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21 See table 5.1 in chapter 5 in this volume.
formal commitment to a defence alliance is avoided in much the same way as ‘constitutional’ arrangements are treated with suspicion in other spheres of EU activity. In Sweden, the Persson government’s policy towards the negotiations on a constitution for the EU throughout 2003 is indicative here. In the run-up to the ill-fated European Council negotiations in December 2003, and alongside general worries that the draft EU constitution should not represent a leap to a federal design, possible reforms of the CFSP and the ESDP were prominently reported in Sweden and debated in the Swedish Parliament. The Prime Minister took a cautious line, arguing that the ESDP could be improved but that it must remain open for all member states and be transparent, in order both to preserve Sweden’s non-alignment and to avert worries about the Union becoming over-involved in defence planning. For domestic consumption, the Finnish and Swedish governments voiced concerns that the ESDP should not be dominated by ‘small clubs’ and that purely EU-led defence initiatives might create tensions between non-aligned countries and those whose security is linked to NATO. They were thus mistrustful of some larger EU countries’ support for ‘structural cooperation’ provisions in the ESDP that would leave room for bilateral or multilateral defence initiatives that might take the EU further into the realms of common defence. The publics also saw such initiatives as possibly leading the EU to compete with or duplicate roles currently provided by NATO.

Looking forward, the domestic discourse in Finland and Sweden increasingly revolves around two issues. The first is whether the ESDP—through, for example, the proposed EU constitution may conceivably lead to an all-embracing EU provision on collective defence and what this would mean for non-aligned EU members. The second lies in the performance-related desires of EU governments to enhance EU military capabilities through restructuring, and what this means for relations with NATO and for the configuration of national armed forces. Both issues need to be handled delicately by the Finnish and Swedish governments since, regardless of the fate of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, they tend to enhance domestic perceptions of the EU as having negative impacts on national arrangements and existing policy stances. Domestic perceptions, while accepting a ‘third way’ of political fusion that accepts selective supranationalism in the case of crisis management, still maintain a wider suspicion either of a single EU collective defence policy or of comprehensive NATO membership for the whole of Europe.

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23 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume.
Compound crisis management?

The Finnish and Swedish view of European crisis management can also be equated with compound fusion. Both countries’ publics have long accepted the merits of European crisis management, while maintaining a general preference for flexible ‘coalitions of the willing’ using differing multinational organizations after securing international legal approval from the UN. The Nordic view of European crisis management envisages the involvement of a large number of actors and a far from clear division of competence among the multinational organizations engaged in crisis management operations, even within one geographical area. Where possible, the publics of both Finland and Sweden favour wider Nordic cooperation for crisis management solutions and have, for example, welcomed their governments’ establishment of a joint EU battle group as part of their contribution to an EU rapid deployment force. In practice, the EU is seen as the partner organization that can deliver the best results at the right time, using its multifunctional resources. This would not, however, exclude cooperation with any or all of the leading organizations and partners in Europe if the results would be more effective. Two examples are illustrative here. First, in December 2003 NATO chose Sweden as the site for the inaugural meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum, which discusses and encourages multilateral approaches to crisis management. The meeting took place in Åre on 24–25 May 2005. Second, domestic support for Nordic troops working under EU-, NATO-, UN- and Western European Union-led command at various times has been sustained. Finland became the first non-NATO member to assume command of a component of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in the spring of 2003 and has, with public support, also contributed experts and financial assistance to EU peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003.

In line with the logic of ‘fusion’, Finnish and Swedish participation in European crisis management has facilitated further re-thinking of Sweden’s own security planning and defence forces, with substantial domestic repercussions. In general, the Swedish Government has been quicker than its Finnish counterpart to argue that the ESDP and crisis management will lead to national defence reforms. In terms of popular support for the ESDP, however, the perception that Europe is helping to transform the national defence apparatus cuts both ways. The Swedish and—to a lesser extent—Finnish populations have both liked and disliked the idea of forging more flexible national military structures that can be used for both national and international contingencies (and that enhance the professionalism of the armed forces). Popular caution reflects, not least, the fact that for Sweden the defence reforms made since 1999–2000 represent the start...

of the biggest transformation of national defence forces in the post-cold war period and that they demand unpopular defence cuts and base closures.26

The domestic debate in Sweden also seems to be more advanced, at least at elite level, as regards the civilian aspects of security and combating terrorist attacks.27 As Bengt Sundelius argues, Sweden needs to replace the tradition of ‘total defence’ with what he calls a ‘societal defence’ that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of civil society; and there has been a growing domestic debate both on this idea and on the possible evolution of an EU internal crisis management capability. On the whole, the Nordic publics have been receptive not least because fears of terrorist attack have also grown in the Nordic countries. Hence, the Swedes place a greater emphasis on ‘comprehensive security’ or ‘functional security’,28 facilitated by the Europeanization of Swedish security policy. However, Finnish attention to internal security matters is accelerating with the government’s adoption of an internal security programme on 23 September 2004.29 Indeed, the Finnish Government’s 2004 report on Finnish security and defence policy formally states that defence planning now takes place in conjunction with internal security considerations.30

As regards the domestic ESDP debate, the evolution of the ESDP may actually be used by the two governments to constrain the discussion about eventually joining NATO, which is already limited in Sweden but is more open in Finland. There is a popular view among the political elite that the non-aligned countries already enjoy the benefits of a ‘third way’ in the form of the existing ESDP. The ESDP has the major advantage of not having the USA as a participant, whereas NATO is typically seen by Nordic non-members as coming under direct US leadership. Although the Finns and Swedes are mostly happy to see European security efforts led by the USA, they remain anxious about recent trends in US foreign policy that have tended towards a greater reliance upon ‘aggressive unilateralism’. Thus, while the Swedish (and Finnish) view may often be ‘Atlanticist’,31 both countries suffer from bouts of anxiety. If the respective political elites wish to abandon non-alignment, then an ESDP that (so far) encapsulates a softer and more progressive ‘European way’ may be an attractive route for Nordic security policy. The ‘EU-ification’ of Swedish (and Finnish) activism in the defence and security field will thus continue.32

26 See chapter 7 in this volume.
27 Rieker (note 19).
31 Herolf and Huldt (note 24), p. 77.
Denmark: NATO Nordic EU member

Performance characteristics

Given that Denmark is the longest-serving Nordic EU member, it should be easy to find evidence to show whether domestic interests are important for Danish perspectives on European security cooperation. In practice, however, Danish domestic perspectives on the EU per se have always included a substantial performance-orientated element. As Kite shows in chapter 5, while 63 per cent of Danes voted for accession in the 1972 referendum on membership of the European Community (EC), domestic support was largely secured on the grounds that the EC was to remain an essentially economic-orientated ‘Common Market’. For most of the 1970s and 1980s, the Danes resisted any political or institutional reform that sought to extend the supranational (never mind federal) credentials of the EC institutions. However, accompanying the original economic arguments was a so-called ‘security argument’ in favour of Danish participation in European integration that did strike a chord in domestic discourse and provided a persuasive rationale for the domestic actors: that economic and political integration was a precondition for a transformation of the military rivalry between France and Germany.

Danish attitudes towards the question of EU membership have become less hostile over time. Thomas Pedersen argues that from 1990—and in spite of a few serious hiccups on the way such as that in 1992 over the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) and in 2000 over adopting the euro—the Danish elite has become more predisposed to accept EC/EU supranationality. Denmark is no longer an ‘EU-sceptic’ state since there is widespread elite acceptance of the benefits of being a full member. Yet it remains a fervent ‘federo-sceptic’, with the Danish elite and public both expressing major reservations over the direction of further European integration and outright opposition to anything that represents a movement to a ‘federal Europe’.

For the Danish public, not easily predisposed to political integration, the performance case for integration has needed to be particularly persuasive. As Lene Hansen shows, this was the particular problem with the debate over the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992: accepting the case that the treaty would improve performance demanded too great an act of faith on the part of the Danish population when it also included new integrative measures on European Monetary Union, the CFSP and cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. In simple terms, and particularly in the case of the CFSP, the performance case was not sufficiently overwhelming.

It is equally notable that, of the four opt-outs negotiated after the Danish public’s rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht in the June 1992 referendum, the one pertaining to defence policy is expressed in terms that diverge most from the original articles of the Treaty of Maastricht. Making the performance case for the CFSP and the ESDP has thus become more complicated in domestic terms since the formal opt-outs set the parameters of domestic discussion on the ESDP in many instances. Notably, and despite its NATO membership, the ESDP opt-out means that Denmark does not fully participate in EU discussions and decisions on defence matters. Domestic considerations are fundamentally important for Danish national policy on the ESDP since the government has to consider, in addition to the impact of the opt-outs on relations with the EU, the attitudes of the mainstream political parties in Denmark and their relationship with the CFSP and the ESDP. As Kite indicates, Danish public opinion shows strong support (57 per cent) for defence decisions remaining in the hands of the national government, even if it is more sympathetic to decisions on foreign policy being made jointly within the EU (60 per cent in favour). The opt-outs also assuage domestic concerns regarding the impact of European integration on Danish ‘democracy’ and ‘identity’. In sum, to allow the removal of the opt-outs, the performance case would have to be truly overwhelming.

Danish public awareness of being a ‘small country’ is heightened by Denmark’s close geographical proximity to Germany. The domestic discourse on the ESDP in Denmark also exhibits elements that underlie party discourse on the EU in general. The ESDP debate includes echoes of broader Danish concerns that acceptance of further European integration may enhance the influence of the larger EU neighbour, Germany, over Danish affairs.

**Political fusion: a third way**

The path of seeking a supranational Europe that will not require constitutional change leading to a federal Europe is, in many ways, what most Danish political actors want. Certainly, the existence of the opt-outs means that the Danish formal position leans slightly towards the intergovernmental tendency regarding ESDP cooperation. It makes a third-way solution for ESDP attractive as a concept for Denmark but difficult to work for in practice since full Danish participation in the ESDP has integrationist overtones.

Nevertheless, the governing liberal Venstre party has long questioned the viability of the opt-outs, and—since Denmark’s successful 2002 EU Presidency—the government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen has become more assertive in advocating their removal. Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister since 2001, has reiterated his belief that that Denmark ‘must be a full and unconditional part of

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36 Hansen (note 35), p. 74.
37 See table 5.1 in chapter 5 in this volume.
the EU’ and that it ‘should abolish the opt-outs’. 39 There remain political difficulties in overcoming public hesitancy on the matter. These are also well illustrated by the two practical preconditions that the government set in January 2003 for removing the opt-outs: a referendum and the EU’s prior adoption of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, which itself would need to be ratified by referendum in Denmark. 40 Fogh Rasmussen has also shown his attachment to a model of Europe that resembles ‘political fusion’ by his assertions that the future Union should be ‘a community of nation states . . . in which the Member States have decided to carry out a number of task together by leaving the competence to the EU’. 41

While there is some evidence of the Danish political elite promoting a stronger integrationist position, the influence of Atlanticism on public opinion is still notable. Of all the Nordic countries, Denmark has been the most assertive in showing support for the USA since September 2001. The Danish coalition government supported President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, even if this was at the cost of alienating the Franco-German axis in continental Europe. Moreover, since April 2003 the Danish Government—in spite of public opinion polls indicating less than 50 per cent (and declining) approval ratings for such action—has maintained its active role in the reconstruction of Iraq and was, for example, one of the first countries to send civil liaison officers to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority government of Iraq. The Danish Government has been willing to assert and even prioritize its ‘Euro-Atlantic’ credentials and transatlantic ties, even at the cost of undermining the Franco-German axis in continental Europe. Moreover, since April 2003 the Danish Government—in spite of public opinion polls indicating less than 50 per cent (and declining) approval ratings for such action—has maintained its active role in the reconstruction of Iraq and was, for example, one of the first countries to send civil liaison officers to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority government of Iraq. The Danish Government has been willing to assert and even prioritize its ‘Euro-Atlantic’ credentials and transatlantic ties, even at the cost of undermining the Franco-German axis in continental Europe. Moreover, since April 2003 the Danish Government—in spite of public opinion polls indicating less than 50 per cent (and declining) approval ratings for such action—has maintained its active role in the reconstruction of Iraq and was, for example, one of the first countries to send civil liaison officers to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority government of Iraq. The Danish Government has been willing to assert and even prioritize its ‘Euro-Atlantic’ credentials and transatlantic ties, even at the cost of undermining the Franco-German axis in continental Europe.

Compound fusion?

On one level, in spite of the defence opt-out, the Danes have been very active in trying to influence the ESDP—namely, through the elaboration of a European Security Strategy that identifies common threats to European security. 42 In addition, the Danish political elite and the public have been strong supporters of the EU’s developing civil crisis management functions since this can be

41 Danish Prime Minister’s Office (note 40).
more easily reconciled with Danish perceptions of the EU as a ‘civilian power’.\textsuperscript{43}

However, as the Danish role in the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans illustrates, Danish commitments to peacekeeping are much easier to handle under NATO auspices and Danish military reforms have been primarily NATO-driven.\textsuperscript{44} When the EU took over the NATO mission in the FYROM in 2003, Danish soldiers had to be withdrawn since, under the terms of its opt-out, Denmark cannot participate in EU operations involving military capabilities.\textsuperscript{45} This also extends to Danish representatives not participating in the work of EU military structures, such as the EU Military Committee, or in being obliged to finance operations involving military capabilities. Here, domestic constraints are placing limits on the conduct of Danish policy towards the ESDP: it is more convenient for Denmark to be formally part of a crisis management coalition led by NATO than one under the ESDP. Nevertheless, public opinion in Denmark is becoming increasingly aware that the country’s opt-out from the ESDP does have rather bizarre consequences, and this may have implications for the level of party and public support for the continuation of this particular opt-out in the future.

VI. Preliminary conclusions

Denmark, Finland and Sweden, with varying levels of domestic support, may actually be content to see the evolution of a ‘fused’ ESDP with supranational and intergovernmental features. Whether they are non-aligned or NATO members, however, they also seem content to leave the ESDP without a coherent design based on an explicit, ambitious agenda.

Domestic pressures on the respective Nordic policies towards the ESDP can be understood using a fusion perspective. Nordic domestic actors want an effective framework for performing European security and crisis management tasks (performance fusion), based on a selectively supranational, but not federally inclined, ESDP (political fusion) that requires Nordic military involvement on a flexible basis adding to the compound nature of European capabilities (compound fusion). This is close to what already exists in one form or another today in the evolving ESDP. One thing is clear: at least in the case of the Nordic countries, domestic considerations will continue to be important factors in shaping governmental perspectives on the evolving ESDP.

\textsuperscript{43} Rieker (note 19), p. 381.

\textsuperscript{44} Rieker (note 19), p. 376.