
Part IV

Preserving the legitimate economy and critical infrastructure

Editors' remarks

The focus in this part of the volume is on the private sector both as a factor of, and as a contributor to, the security of nations and communities. The first two chapters make the case that business may sometimes be the best judge of the relative importance of threats facing it, and hence of the choice of remedies (many of which are, in turn, available today in the form of commercial services). Hasty or excessive government intervention—in this field as in others—may do more harm than good. Crispin Black goes further, to point out that familiar government institutions of today, such as police and intelligence services, arose out of models first developed by the private sector. He argues that some of the recently revealed deficiencies of governmental intelligence might be remedied (and the cause of transparency and objectivity better served) by drawing business experts and expertise into the assessment process. One might add that certain aspects of the *modus operandi* of modern transnational terrorism are closer to the private sector's way of exploiting the globalized environment than to anything within governments' own experience: it is therefore not illogical to look for help and new thinking from business sources, at the conceptual and analytical as well as the practical level.

The remaining chapters of this part turn the spotlight back on to the vulnerability of a certain class of business assets and actions, namely, those involved in the supply of various forms of energy, other utilities, and information technology and communication services. This subject is currently the focus of growing public and institutional concern and of a growing body of research, under the general heading of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). The authors explore the meaning of this concept and of its important subdivisions dealing with information infrastructure and energy supply infrastructure, respectively. The security significance of CIP is easy to appreciate given the intense dependence of modern armed forces, governments and ordinary citizens on the uninterrupted supply of all the services concerned. At the same time, the increasingly transnational and networked nature of supply arrangements creates a host of new vulnerabilities, by no means originating only from terrorists and by no means affecting only the most high-technology components (*vide* the amount of petroleum products still delivered by ship and barge). Consideration of remedies is still at quite an early stage in the international community, not least because the great part of the operations concerned are now in private hands and no one can believe that simple 're-nationalization' would help. The three authors writing here all review possible ways forward, both practical and analytical—and, in the latter context, Jan Metzger's plea for a new marriage of the social and natural sciences could well be applied to the handling of the whole 'new threats' agenda.