

Stability and Arms Control in Europe: The Role of Military Forces within a European Security System

A SIPRI Research Report

Edited by

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sipri

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Abstract

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This report presents the outcome of a project which was initiated at SIPRI in 1987. It was supported by a grant from the *Volkswagen Stiftung* of the Federal Republic of Germany. The introductory chapter by the editors presents a scenario for a possible future European security system. Six essays by active NATO and WTO military officers focus on the role of military forces in such a system. Various approaches to the tasks and size of military forces in this regime of strict non-provocative defence are presented with the intent of providing new ideas for the debate on restructuring of forces in Europe. There are 3 maps, 7 tables and 11 figures.

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Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
The role of military forces within a European security system <i>G. Wachter and A. Krohn, SIPRI</i>	1
The role of military forces within a European security system <i>Z. Zarski, Poland</i>	27
The role of military forces within the ESS 2020: some thoughts on the system, the military doctrines and the force structure <i>C. Meyer-Plath, FRG</i>	51
The role of armed forces in a European security system <i>V. A. Kuklev, USSR</i>	71
Some thoughts on the role of military forces within a European security system <i>M. D. Fry, USA</i>	79
On political and military aspects of a European security system <i>B. Heimann, GDR</i>	87
The role of military forces in a European security system <i>D. Bosserelle, France</i>	101

Preface

East–West relations are going through a period of profound change. Although it is far too soon to talk about the ultimate result of this process, it is clear that negotiations about arms reductions are already playing a crucial role and are likely to continue to do so. However, hopes may run higher than the complexity of the issues might justify. No doubt the tremendous pace at which the process has unfolded has contributed considerably to this situation.

The project from which this research report results bears witness to that fact. When the project was first prepared, during the summer of 1987, it required a major effort to assemble the group. At that time the situation was still such that the 23 NATO and WTO countries had not even agreed on the major components of the mandate for what came to be the ‘Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe’. Today, the negotiations have not only begun, but the political leadership of both alliances agree on the major items to be reduced and on the principles to be applied.

Among other considerations two are of particular relevance here: first, political leadership has asserted its leadership prerogative; and second, the advice of the military experts will now assume a more crucial importance the closer the negotiations move to the question of ‘how much is enough’ to secure defence on the lowest possible level.

It is in recognition of the important, though not decisive role of the military, that SIPRI brought together in one East–West group, for the first time, six military General Staff officers from six countries—the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Soviet Union and the United States of America—to address first, the nature of the mutual security concerns of the alliances; and second, the definition of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ as these terms relate to military capabilities and strategy.

In view of the unique nature of this extremely valuable experiment it will not surprise the reader that not all of the ideas which were exchanged lent themselves to easy translation into the present publication. That was not the prime goal of the exercise, nor should the reader think that the model used in the exercise presents a realistic alternative for the future. In fact the model’s only purpose was to encourage the participants to think about the military aspects of future security free from preconceptions. One of the lessons which clearly emerged from the meetings and the association of the participants was that if political leadership and diplomatic experts are ready to deal with each

other in the same spirit as the six soldiers did, deep force cuts will have a future in the area of conventional arms control in Europe.

Gerhard Wachter and Axel Krohn deserve especially to be recognized for their leadership of the project and for piloting it through all of its different stages. For very good reasons Jetta Gilligan Borg's superb editorial skill is also acknowledged.

Of course, without the generous support from the *Volkswagen Stiftung* of the Federal Republic of Germany, the project would not have been possible.

Dr Walther Stütze
Director, SIPRI

July 1989

Acknowledgements

Conducting this project about the future role of armed forces in Europe has been a complex but interesting task. The project was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation, and we therefore owe them our primary debt of gratitude.

This project took shape over the course of two years and our thanks go to our colleagues who during that period encouraged us in our work with their advice and help. Special thanks go to Dr Walther Stütze, who as director of SIPRI as well as a participant in the conferences, supported this project in many ways.

Many thanks also go to our secretaries, Gaby Bartholomew and Fatima Asp-Barreto, who aided us in all matters of 'logistics' such as organizing the workshops and doing all of the other secretarial work which help to keep one's own desk tidy.

Last, but not least, our deep gratitude goes to our editor, Jetta Gilligan Borg. With skill and humour she considerably supported and contributed to the improvement of this report.

Even though we received help from many different sources, any errors and inadequacies in this publication remain entirely our own responsibility.

SIPRI
July 1989

Dr Gerhard Wachter, Lt-General (Rtd)
Dr Axel Krohn

The role of military forces within a European security system

Dr Gerhard Wachter, Lt-General (Rtd) and Dr Axel Krohn
SIPRI

I. Introduction

Europe as a whole may have reached a turning point, a very rare occurrence in the long alternating history of this continent. Forty-four years after the Second World War, Europe is faced not merely with military problems such as finding a way—via confidence-building measures—to a non-provocative defence as a principle for arms control and as a means of reducing the huge armament force positioned in Europe. Much more important for the next generation are economic and political matters. In this respect the question arises as to what the ‘common house’ of Europe should look like?

The political outcome of further arms control and disarmament agreements could contribute to a new era of détente in Europe. It is obvious that, besides the purely military problems, realization of a common house of Europe will have many political and economic aspects and involve many challenges.

If the primary goal of all forthcoming political and military negotiations is to attain confidence and security in Europe, a situation could ultimately result where threat, deterrence and confrontation in Europe will not exist and the two alliances will not be needed. These are challenges which can no longer be solved by individual states. They can only be realized together. All European states are being asked to leave the post-war situation in the past and find a common path into the next century.

In the general discussion of alternatives to the current European security system, most of the ideas expressed in the past have not dealt with comprehensive models for a possible new security regime but have mainly focused on military details. Without denying the importance of this sub-factor, it is obvious that these models—most of which fall into the category of ‘non-provocative defence’—do not provide a viable approach to the political developments which are likely to occur in the near future.

Many of the discussions under the topics of arms control and disarmament have the goal of finding a path, or at least the first steps, to a reduction of the dangerous military confrontation in Europe. Most of the efforts recently made in

the discussion of non-provocative defence postures, or organizations, confine themselves to the current political situation of an alliance-divided Europe and, from that perspective, focus on military confrontation in central Europe. Among the discussions and proposals we find those which either aim to restructure or reduce conventional forces and which see nuclear forces as deterring the opposing side from offensive actions in Europe. These include proposals for disengagement zones where, for example, offensive forces are prohibited, and also proposals for a restructuring of forces to reflect a primarily defensive posture. A more recent term is the idea of a 'reasonable sufficiency' whereby neither side has the means to launch a successful offensive assault on the other. However, a fully denuclearized Europe is only advocated by some fringe groups.

The idea of common security, which seems to have found acceptance on the political as well as the military level, could serve as a basic tenet for such a 'grand strategy' which allows the addressing and solving of current as well as future problems of the nuclear age.

In the modern age security cannot be obtained unilaterally. Economically, politically, culturally and obviously militarily, we live in an increasingly interdependent world. The security of one nation cannot be bought at the expense of others. The danger of nuclear war alone assures the validity of this proposition, and the additional economic and political interrelationships between different nations and different parts of the world strongly reinforce the point. Peace cannot be obtained through military confrontation. It must be sought through a tireless process of negotiations, *rapprochement* and normalization, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face common dangers and thus must also promote our security in common.¹

It becomes more and more clear that in European politics the political and legal instruments of international relations are on their way to prevail over the instruments of military power. If so, then the level of conventional armaments and the sheer size of military forces in Europe, as well as their share in national budgets, are far too large.

There is no political, territorial or economic goal which can be achieved in the European context through the use of force without endangering the existence of all of the nations on the continent. The demographic, social, economic and environmental conditions of the states of Europe call for increased co-operation across the continent. To achieve the desired level of co-operation that corresponds to the current and growing degree of interdependence, and following the agreements reached in Helsinki and Stockholm, the role of the large armies must be restructured and reduced. The use of military forces is no longer an acceptable means of conflict resolution.

These observations have been true for a decade. They were, however, inconsequential as long as the political conditions of East–West relations were not ripe for common action and made any unilateral initiative a suspect undertaking. Both the East and West have learned valuable lessons in the past few years: security cannot be attained without co-operation with the potential opponent, even in the military domain.

The notion of security consists of many elements, of which at least the political, economic and military aspects must be in harmony. The link between Europe and other regions of the world is seen differently by various states but this has to be taken into account by all parties. From the Chernobyl accident, we have learned of the menace of radioactivity, which would be multiplied by many orders of magnitude in the case of a conflict in Europe. We have also learned of the common fate looming over our forests and rivers if we intend to remain unco-operative and divided.

New opportunities for an improvement in European relations have been created to a large degree by the novel and pragmatic policy of the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev's leadership, including the announced unilateral force reductions. It is up to the West to translate the new opportunities into mutually beneficial practice and make the best use of this 'window of opportunity' for Europe.

The achievement of the Stockholm Conference extended the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process. With its expansion of confidence- and security-building measures, the Stockholm Document proves that there is a genuine interest within Europe for gradually expanding the level of security co-operation between the East, West and neutral and non-aligned countries. However, the CSCE process will sooner or later have to confront more material issues, which influence the perception of security and stability. The existing political, ideological and economic divergencies between East and West are not going to disappear in the near future, and military developments have a momentum of their own. These powerful factors will constantly act in opposition to the results which have been achieved. If the security process in Europe does not continue to progress, it may easily reverse direction.

In order to truly utilize the 'window of opportunity' there is need for a more intensive debate, both officially and unofficially, on the specific purpose of the general European efforts to create more confidence, on the organizational ramification of these efforts, on the interconnection between nuclear and conventional forces and on the military and non-military aspects of European security. One of the main objectives of the forthcoming negotiations has to be the decrease of military threat perceptions on both sides. This perception depends on several factors such as ideological animosity, intensity of conflict between the national interests of different states, the political and military intentions behind the official foreign policy of states, assessment of willingness to use force in pursuance of foreign policy objectives, character of the military doctrines in both their wide and narrow sense and, finally, the perception of stability of the military situation, with assessment of the danger of surprise attack and of the balance of forces as the main yardsticks.

It is obvious that in discussions of the factors listed above the focus is predominantly on those of a political or non-material character, whereas the material factors, the military forces themselves, are only given secondary attention. We ought therefore to concentrate on the material (i.e., military) factors of threat perception, so that ideological antagonism will not be transformed into

tempting military options. The resultant security perceptions will perhaps never be completely satisfactory in such circumstances, but they will certainly be more solid, and bought at a much lower cost.

The negotiations which have been held thus far have addressed the military issues that influence the perception of security although, for obvious reasons, they have never advanced beyond the fringes of the main problems. Instead, as in the case of the MBFR talks, they have become bogged down on the issue of numerical balance instead of dealing with operational and structural factors. It appears that the issue of data collection about military forces became a specific point of disagreement mainly as a convenient excuse for the inability to muster the necessary political will to execute any serious change in existing military postures. Data issues are important, *per se*, predominantly because of verification requirements. Resolution of these issues would still not adequately address the problems of stability, prevention of surprise attack and the technological aspects of the arms race.

II. About the project

This project was initiated at SIPRI in the summer of 1987. It was supported by a grant from the *Volkswagen Stiftung* of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the beginning it was obvious that research on this topic would need to draw upon the experience of military staff officers who deal with security concerns on a day-to-day basis and whose judgement plays an important role in the shaping of views and the decisions taken by their political leadership. At least in its initial stage this research approach was of a somewhat experimental nature, since such an approach had not previously been applied to the problem in question.

In order to achieve a balance between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) we invited an equal number of participants from the two alliances. To provide the opportunity of a round-table discussion, we limited the number of participating countries to six and invited one military expert from France, the FRG, the GDR, Poland, the USA and the USSR through their defence ministries. Two conferences were held at SIPRI. The participants attended the conferences and wrote the papers only in their personal capacities, as representatives from their countries, with no official mission. The participants were:

Commandant Daniel Bosserelle	France
Colonel Michael D. Fry	USA
Colonel Dr Bernhard Heimann	GDR
Major-General Jurij Markelov	USSR (first conference)
Major-General Vladimir Kuklev	USSR (second conference)
Colonel Christian Meyer-Plath	FRG
Major-General Professor Zdzislaw Zarski	Poland

The meetings were characterized by very open and frank round-table discussions from a purely military point of view, focusing mainly on the tactical and operational levels and excluding political arguments as far as possible. The participants agreed that there should be no conference papers or notes at the first meeting.

The discussion focused mainly on solving problems related to the implementation of a non-provocative security system. Among the different and complex questions which arose were two topics of overriding concern. The first was the question of the nature of the security concerns of the alliances, and the second was the matter of the definition of 'offensive' and 'defensive' with regard to military means and strategy. For the establishment of a non-provocative defence system, these two matters seem to be of vital importance. It became clear that the different concerns and threat perceptions of the two alliances will have to be addressed in any alternative security system.

Today, armies differ as regards their quality, size and composition. As a result of this there are asymmetries within alliances as well as between them. Despite the fact that strategic parity between the superpowers is at present still the most important foundation for stability, these asymmetries create one of the major concerns for both alliances. Superficial 'bean counting' will not be helpful in assessing the two sides, but nevertheless the question of necessary quantification for measurement purposes remains. This will, however, have to go beyond mere counting and also take into account non-quantitative factors such as morale and leadership, as well as organizational structure. There was no intent to develop a particular, specified scheme for measurement at these meetings. Work on such a scheme would require the experience of various specialists, and it would certainly require more time than we had at our disposal.

It is obvious that there is a need to elaborate upon the ways and means of counting and comparing. Therefore special attention should also be focused on the quality of weapons and the elaboration of a yardstick for measurement. As there are geographic asymmetries, asymmetries in capability and economy and between the forces themselves, the complexity of this issues is apparent. It must be clear that a reduction and restructuring of forces always needs to bear in mind the security concerns of each side. No one's security should suffer, because confidence can only exist when equal security exists.

When considering criteria for a defensive doctrine and the respective non-provocative force structure, it became clear that a military doctrine consists of different levels, with each level addressing its own particular problems and requirements (e.g., the tactical level for battle, the operational level for the front, and the strategic level for the theatre of war). It was perceived as a problem that the present structure would, even under a reduction of forces, still allow for surprise attack. This is especially the case for long-range systems (i.e., nuclear weapons and space weapons). Because of this it will, for example, be necessary, to abolish long-range strike weapons (i.e., cruise missiles, tactical strike aircraft and tank forces).

As a first step it was felt that the number of battle-ready troops would need to be reduced. In the interest of non-provocative defence the peacetime operational and tactical deployment has to be changed. That means that the concentration of units needs to be decreased—with higher dispersion the situation becomes less offensive. After such changes it is clear that preparation for attack would involve visible movements of units, which would definitely lower the risk of surprise attack.²

As a second step the destruction of military bases and the removal of military presence on foreign soil was suggested as a necessary step for a non-provocative defence structure. All armed forces would have to be stationed within their national borders. Overall, the denial of dominance would be of the greatest importance, that is, no military superiority would or could be achieved.

Non-provocative defence therefore means a change in structure with interlinked limitations. The change in dispersal is an important question. Here zonal solutions might appear to be appropriate as a starting point for a gradual approach to such change.

The question arose as to what kind of military stability is possible at a lower level and how much weaponry is really 'enough' under an alternative European security system? The participants of the first meeting agreed to come together to further discuss this issue at a second meeting, for which they were to prepare preliminary versions of papers, which would then be discussed and later finalized. It was agreed that the participants would receive some basic guidelines as outlined by the project leader, which would then serve as a common framework for the presentation of their own positions in their individual papers. The topic of the papers was to be 'The role of military forces within a European Security System' (ESS 2020).

In order to avoid possible entanglement by the authors in the current negotiations on arms control and confidence-building measures (which we feared would only lead to more or less general statements on 'war and peace', or to reproduction of the official positions of their governments), we developed a scenario which was deliberately distant from the current negotiations and the publicly announced proposals and initiatives. The scenario was to serve only as a tool for the authors in their primary focus on military problems related to the question of 'how much is enough'. The political component of the scenario was intended to avoid the necessity to elaborate on the complex and vague political outline of a future security system, and to allow the authors to focus on the military needs and the shape of a future military security system based on the lowest possible numbers of troops and equipment. We therefore constructed a scenario based upon hypothetical assumptions. The scenario says nothing about gradual steps, that is, how to move from today's situation to that of the future European Security system of the year 2020.

Although the purpose of this study was not to analyse the future political possibilities of Europe, some political assumptions or scenario was needed with regard to the role of armed forces within a future security system. To this end we proposed an outline of the future political situation, the goal or purpose of

the armed forces within the political structure and the numerical size of the forces. Attempting to shape this kind of scenario places one in the middle of the current international discussions about the future of Europe and also in the position of gazing into a crystal ball. No one can predict future events. Even trying to outline the main parameters, which presumably will influence the future, can only be a highly subjective exercise. While the scenario attempts to present a possible future security system in Europe rather distant from that of the present negotiations, it still allows the fulfilment of basic military tasks and vital military needs while avoiding cost-consuming mistakes.

We therefore based our assumptions about the political situation in a future Europe on the declarations which have been made by politicians in both the West and East: Europe of the future will no longer be divided; all nations will be willing to combine their efforts for the benefit of this Europe; and the political structure will be guaranteed by both world powers. (Parts of the following sections III and IV were sent to the authors to provide the framework for their papers.)

III. A European security system: factors for assessment and evaluation

The complexity of arms control policies in Europe requires a clear setting of political priorities. Unquestionably the first priority is the establishment of sufficient military stability capable of withstanding even the most serious crisis. This requires reduction of the offensive capabilities of both sides, and of their ability to wage a surprise offensive. Insofar as this affects existing forces, the requirement can only be met by changes in the deployment patterns of the most mobile and most destructive weapons and forces, changes which would gain in credibility if paralleled by a reduction in the size of forces.

The two alliances have not simply expressed the desire for more common security and arms control through their representatives. The idea of common and more extensive collective security has already taken form in the official documents of both NATO and the WTO. For example, the preamble of the WTO calls for 'the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems'.³ However, NATO stated in the Harmel Report of December 1967 that there are two main tasks for NATO: 'to assure sufficient military strength and political solidarity to defend the territory of the member states and to search for developments for stable relationships within which the fundamental political questions can be answered'.⁴

More recently the presupposition for a future security structure was described by the FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher as follows:

Both sides must respect each other's security interests. There must be no hankering after superiority and hegemony. The causes of mistrust must be removed. Countries one has reason to trust are not considered a threat. This goal must be achieved by

means of confidence-building measures and transparency. Disarmament steps are needed to remove superiority and establish equilibrium at a lower level in all military fields. Qualitative changes are needed to the structure of forces with a view to removing the capability for invasion or surprise attack. Effective mechanism of global political crisis management must prevent unforeseen conflicts triggering off a crisis.⁵

Let us take these statements as a sufficient description of goals for disarmament and common security in Europe. In order to restructure the European order, we will have to overcome the hostility and the existence of the divisive military blocs under the leadership of the respective superpowers. Common environmental and economic imperatives will probably influence the process of military disintegration and disarmament, as well as the results of military negotiations, between both blocs.

It is imperative that the military be prepared for the discussions and decisions related to force reductions and a change of the procurement cycle. Within the near future the discussion on military doctrine and related strategic and operational concepts, as well as the organization of armed forces for a defensive posture, will certainly centre around the questions: What are the most effective confidence-building measures? How much weaponry is enough? What are the most effective kinds of reductions, redeployments and zonal arrangements? And both blocs will very carefully analyse their security before they accept force-reducing steps.

What will a European security system have to comprise? Discussion of a European security system has to include the whole of Europe, all European nations: neutral, non-aligned and within the alliances. It must include political, economic, environmental and last, but not least, military aspects. It has to consider specific problems and also the relations between the Nordic countries, those on the Iberian Peninsula, the Balkans and between the East European countries. It needs to include the adjacent waters in the north and especially in the south. It must also consider historical controversies and is faced with various, specific national identities which one or more nations will not wish to give up.

For the purpose of this study the armed forces need not be designed to meet any specific enemy. They will serve to maintain the territorial and political integrity, that is, the sovereignty of Europe. Owing to its political significance, such a Europe will inevitably become involved in world affairs. Therefore the European forces should be able to serve in part as a time-limited peace-keeping force outside Europe.

If the future leads to the reduction of forces within both alliances, one can hardly avoid strengthening the multinational components of the alliances, especially the C³I and logistical aspects. Distances between the military elements will increase and equipment must be much more standardized as, for example, it is today within NATO. Not every country can maintain its own satellite or airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft for surveillance. And if the key roles the Soviet Union and the United States play nowadays in both alliances are transferred to a future European security system, then only multinational armed forces seem able to assume the responsibility.

What is a possible timeframe for negotiations on arms control? A European security system is a distant prospect. The political actors on the stage have only a limited time for their careers. General Secretary Gorbachev has asked to serve for only 10 more years. By the year 2000 we will have passed through at least two US presidential and two national European elections. In each of these elections the public will need to accept the suggested recommendations made by the then prevailing political actors.

It may be true that political, economic, environmental and social problems will come to the fore faster, and be of greater importance, in the foreseeable future than discussions of threat, deterrence and confrontation between the alliances. If this is so, it will signify to the military camp a completely different direction and speed for disarmament and arms control negotiations than that of the present. The responsible military leaders of each country will have to be well aware that military forces are not ends in themselves, but are part of the 'grand strategy' of a nation, and that the politicians are the final masters. The military camps in all nations will undoubtedly not desire to take rapid steps towards a European security system. They will point out the national security problems to their politicians. They will allude to the consequences on defence budgets and on industrial conversion and other difficulties resulting from too rapid changes of doctrine and force structures.

Certainly political leaders will demand answers from the military camp. If they envisage a European security system by approximately the year 2020, one of the many basic questions will be how to avoid 'mis-structuring' the force. There will be many other questions. What will be the consequences on fiscal matters, manpower and public acceptance? What can be changed in the overall force posture; what must be maintained? What is the lowest possible level of efficient armed forces in terms of manpower, armament and structure within a proposed ESS 2020—which by then will have already adopted a defensive doctrine and armed forces with an overall posture capable only of defensive activities?

To answer these questions from the present perspective, obviously presents a considerable number of uncertainties. This is a shortcoming which is inherent in all predictions of developments which are projected quite far into the future. However, without the aid of a crystal ball, we none the less think that even a highly hypothetical scenario can serve as a tool to sharpen our view of military essentials.

The solutions we envisage can, of course, only be based upon present military judgement and experience; they include considerations of foreseeable developments in the organization and armament of the armed forces of all European nations. As outlined above, for the purpose of this exercise we assumed that a European security system could become a reality within one generation. Taking into consideration the length of procurement cycles and the time required for negotiating and changing systems, we arrive at the year 2020. If we rely upon the common sense of all of the nations of Europe and assume a clear political will to find the lowest possible level for armament in Europe, it

seems possible to establish a common European security system by the year 2020.

The hypothetical assumptions of this study encompass mainly the following: a political structure in the Europe of 2020 with no alliances remaining and no threat of internal confrontation; no military threat from outside Europe; a role as guarantor for the Soviet Union and the United States; the creation of multinational, regional armed forces; and a limited and mutually agreed upon presence of nuclear weapons.

A complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons did not seem to be feasible within the assumed timeframe. How to handle nuclear weapons in the light of possible future developments seems to be a study in itself. Because nuclear weapons are political tools and as this problem is not considered to be the most important one for this study, we introduced a two-key solution with France and the United Kingdom in possession of the keys.

Establishing a new European security system is also a long-term goal, because time is needed to influence the minds of the public and politicians. Time is needed for negotiations to step by step come to agreement with these controversial problems. And time is also required in terms of elections and, from them, the creation of a political mandate to change the present situation voluntarily, or as forced by events.

Also the reshaping of armed forces will require time, and the resulting changes will have to remain in force for a long period of time. It is not possible to change structure, organization, armament and doctrine every five years. Military planners cannot follow each new proposal during arms control negotiations. They need a clear political decision of the role military forces will play within the grand political strategy of a nation, or within an alliance. As long as this is not available they will have to follow military security thinking and be prepared for even the worst eventuality.

A military leader is responsible for the combat-readiness of his units and in today's forces this includes the functioning of a very sophisticated spider web involving training, C³I organization and technical capabilities as well as meeting the challenges of national goals and alliance interdependencies. The life cycle of most weapon systems easily bridges 30 to 40 years: 5 to 8 years for planning and testing, 5 to 8 years for production and introduction and 20 to 30 years of utilization in the units, including modernizations. Maintenance costs for personnel, operation and procurement require military budget planning at least 10 years in advance. (Average industrial investment planning is projected approximately 20 to 30 years ahead.) The planning time for manpower, if one considers the boys born in 1989 as future conscripts, extends to the year 2007.

We assumed that the proposals for disarmament and force reductions made by the political and military representatives of both alliances will serve as the basis for forthcoming negotiations, and that all participants at these negotiations will be willing to reach results and decisions within an acceptable period of time. In this case we foresee two different rounds of negotiations which are already embodied in the present discussions and proposals on arms control and dis-

armament. Based on these two steps the third step, the scenario, attempts to outline a possible future situation in Europe around the year 2020.

A possible first round of negotiations

Considering the present political situation it appears realistic to assume a timeframe of three years for the first round. If recent proposals are accepted, the results of this first round could be: equal ceilings for the number of offensive weapon systems (which would be in the vicinity of those presently maintained by NATO, minus 10 per cent) and agreements for a more defensive structure of the armoured forces. To implement the results of these negotiations would require another three years.

For both alliances such an outcome would mean a need to review their doctrines and a restructuring of their forces. NATO would be compelled to give its defence more depth and to reassess the forward-defence posture. A decreased number of major weapon systems (e.g., tanks, artillery) would, however, also influence the procurement cycle and would therefore require the conversion of parts of the military-related industrial production. At the same time, the production of defence-oriented and probably high-technique and electronic systems would open a new, and very expensive, arms production cycle. This would not only be a problem for NATO, the WTO would basically be faced with the same problems. A reasonable sufficiency would have to include a much greater relocation and restructuring of the overall WTO forces, whereas NATO would be faced with a somewhat lesser degree of change.

As can be seen from the present proposals by political representatives from both sides, the political will exists to achieve greater confidence between both alliances and, as a result of that, to attain further progress in the development of greater security in Europe, based on further arms control and disarmament. Therefore a second round of negotiations could be as described below.

A possible second round of negotiations

According to the political statements which have been made, this round would include many decisions combining political, economic and military questions. For example, the reduction of 500 000 soldiers on both sides would present not only the problem of what to do with highly skilled military people in civilian production, but such a cut would also influence the relationship of national forces within the alliances. Last, but not least, the question of burden-sharing on the financial, regional and structural level would be raised. Procurement planning on the domestic, as well as on the alliance level, would have to be rethought. Some nations would have to change their system of military service and choose draftees, volunteers or professionals. Regional and/or zonal agreements would also contribute to a complete reshaping of alliance structures and a more or less total relocation of national forces in combination with new structures and

changed weaponry. The position of the Soviet Union and the United States in their respective alliances would need to be redefined.

The timeframe to negotiate and implement these proposals would need to be at least ten years. Efficient negotiations based upon present official proposals would bring us, via round one and two, to a high degree of security and confidence between both alliances. Beyond the year 2000 the armed forces (and with them both alliances) would be restructured and/or reduced, and their doctrine, training, education and equipment would be changed. After these fundamental changes both alliances would need time for consolidation. Within this process the defence budgets could presumably be reduced by around the year 2010, or maybe even later.

The armed forces of both alliances, which by then would have adopted a purely defensive doctrine and force-structure, would probably remain at this stage for at least 10 years. Is it logically conceivable that such a situation could still be based on confrontational thinking in the military camp? As mentioned above, the military requires long-range planning. Therefore the important question is: what do the politicians foresee for the armed forces in a future Europe? Their perception will probably be influenced to a large extent by the on-going European economic and political process, which is under way now and which will result in the present parts of eastern and western Europe being linked together much more closely.

Is there a danger of divergence between the progress in military negotiations and the political and (perhaps even more so) economic developments, which might proceed at a much faster pace? The present situation is capable of changing more rapidly than military planning and structure can follow.

Possible developments in the political and economic area

The political proposals made today for the future of Europe which address a 'European Security System' or a 'Common House of Europe' are aimed much more at political and economic matters than at military-strategic goals. Greater political self-confidence for the European states has not only to overcome the social and economic structures which have developed and been imposed since 1945, but has also to cope with the continental power of the Soviet Union without losing the bond with the United States of America.

The European Common Market (EEC), which is scheduled to become more comprehensive by about 1992, influences financial planning and also more and more the political thinking of not only EEC members but also that of non-members, especially the United States, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern nations, which are directly affected. Even today it is difficult to survey all facets of regional and national adaptation problems. And one should not underestimate the problems connected with closer co-operation or even partial integration of the Eastern European economies with the EEC. None the less it is now common to read about new instances of interEuropean or international economic

co-operation and collaboration in preparation for the Common Market. The movement is clearly in the direction of closer interEuropean relationships. The EEC is, of course, not the only challenge or task for the nations and their political leaders. Environmental and social problems also demand regional or even global solutions.

Force reductions have a clear military–economic relationship. Here the manifold problems of converting military industries to civilian production would naturally arise. It may be possible to convert some production plants (e.g., those which produce electronic equipment) to civilian production without great unemployment because for them arms production is only a relatively small part of their total production scheme. In other branches, such as ship building and aircraft production, conversion would be far more difficult.

If the allowed number of military weapons or equipment for remaining national armed forces were too small for cost-effective national production and arms production co-operation, the political decision would need to be made as to which nation would instead produce the weapon system. This would be not only a military procurement decision. It would probably also influence the economic competition within the future EEC, which even now has serious problems as regards adaptation and competition in Europe, as well as that between Europe and the United States. These challenges will be much more difficult to solve for the East Europeans faced with their tremendous economic problems.

The future Europe will have to recognize and solve these challenges on its own and take the chance it has been given for greater political self-confidence. The European states can, themselves, no longer handle these challenges individually. Europe can seek its own path when the middle-European questions are not regarded as the only focus of all the problems, but when the other regions are also taken into consideration. At the same time the critical developments in the Near East—a European burden since the First World War—cannot be left unattended. European states will have to reconcile themselves with a multitude of old, unsolved territorial and national questions, some of which have in former times been the object of martial conflicts. These questions will now have to be incorporated in a unified European thinking. In order to solve the urgent political and economic questions, it will be essential to create a political platform which deals with existing or arising national jealousies and which allows major decisions to be made under a common European roof.

If the goal of all upcoming political, economic and military negotiations is to attain confidence and security in Europe—this is the essence of current official declarations and statements—a situation should eventually result where threat, deterrence and confrontation within Europe will not exist, where the two alliances will not be needed and where both world powers must be included as partners as well as guarantors.

Some military factors

For the purpose of this study, we looked only into the problems which would arise for armed forces and their governments if they were required to change their organization, structure, armament and doctrine based on new political orientations, and if they had to reduce their force strengths substantially.

We are well aware of how difficult the road to a restructured European security system will be and of the problems of interrupting the procurement cycle and converting weapon-producing facilities to peace-serving production. But sometimes a crucial point seems to be forgotten: military forces are not ends in themselves but part of the grand strategy of a nation. This means that a political strategy is behind the alliances and that the politicians are the ultimate masters of the doctrines and of the organizations of the armed forces.

Doctrine

Discussion of military doctrine brings up the need to distinguish very carefully between the different levels of doctrine. Each level serves its own particular problems and needs for the responsible military command level: the tactical for the battle, the operational for the front level and the strategic for strategic operations. Overarching these military doctrines is the political grand strategy of a nation or an alliance. The politicians or the governments define the main political goals of the nation, the responsible military leaders have then to transform these goals into military terms. Military doctrines are the principles and views on the use of military forces in war. They provide the basis for weapon procurement, training, education and preparation of the armed forces for combat-readiness. The organization, structure and armament of the armed forces are never static. They must always follow financial and manpower capabilities, technical developments and political intentions. Military doctrines have their roots in historical developments and experiences as well as in political interdependencies.

The armed forces as a whole cannot be structured so as to be purely defensive or offensive. The use of armed forces always includes both offensive and defensive operations. Exclusively defensive weapons do not exist. Military operations which only serve defensive goals could, for example, include military responses to airborne assaults, air aggression over a nation's own territory or against amphibious landing. But even forces which are defensively structured must be able to counter an attack in order to recapture their own occupied territory and restore the status quo. Military operations on the tactical level must always include not only the ability to defend but also the capability to attack or counter-attack.

Public discussion which focuses on the terms 'offensive' or 'defensive' is not in accordance with military realities. Military forces as a whole cover both abilities at least at the tactical level. The ability to defend one's own territory must include tactical offensive capacity, whereas the overall force posture is still purely defensive and no offensive military activities on the operational and

strategic level are possible. The military tasks may themselves provide some clues for defining the quantity and composition of forces.

Threat assessment

Discussion of 'force strength' among military experts has always been less controversial than the public discussion of this topic. Force strength, from the military point of view, is no more than the quantitative counting of weapons or weapon-systems and manpower. What is needed is agreement about the counting rules and the will to open the inventory records.

To define a 'comprehensive force balance' it is necessary to add many other quantitative and qualitative figures or assessments such as: number and composition of units, state of readiness, allocation of troops, mobilization time, skill of the military leaders, tactical and operational doctrine, to name only a few.

Defining and assessing a 'threat' require the addition of primarily qualitative assessments, for example, what are the strategic objectives or intentions? The specification of these political objectives derives from the perception of national or alliance interests, and identification of those interests whose preservation politically require the use of military force. This is more a political than a military task. How is threat defined and assessed? What is meant here is the identification of threats to national or alliance interests, and the evaluation of those threats in terms of both the opponent's capability and intent and one's own areas of vulnerability. The politicians have to do this in their sphere, and the military camp has to define military threat using force strength and force balance.

The more difficult problem is interpretation of capability. There it is necessary to assess the specific missions which the size and quality of the opponent's arsenal enable them to conduct and to speculate as to their chief military mission.

What are the vulnerabilities in a nation's or alliance's strategic objectives? In analysis of an opponent's tactical airpower capabilities in terms of air threat, such variables as the performance of the pilots, aircraft reliability and maintenance cycles must be included. Undertaking a similar analysis of the threat on the ground requires incorporating such variables as overall force level, attrition rates, exchange rates, advance rates in the given terrain and other factors.

Incorporating intention into threat assessment is more difficult than it initially appears to be. Historical studies of threat assessment suggest that intelligence organizations frequently misread the enemy's proclivities, drawing conclusions that they want or expect to see, rather than those based on available information. Moreover, analysts tend to focus on capabilities to the exclusion of intentions, precisely because the former is quantifiable and far easier to assess. Another difficulty arises from the fact that military and political analysts must make assumptions about the strategy which the adversary is likely to use to achieve its objectives. Should force plans be postulated on the basis of the worst threat, the greater than expected threat or the most likely threat? Each scenario produces vastly different assessments of force requirements.

As long as arms control negotiations centre on military ‘bean counting’, without any change in the overall political threat assessment, they can hardly be effective. As long as the political dialogue is hostage to military confrontational thinking negotiations on disarmament or force reductions will also not be effective. New political threat assessments and a new long-range political grand strategy for Europe are a precondition for the new tasks of the military leaders, that is, the substantial changing of structure, organization and doctrine of the armed forces.

Force reductions

At present the mandates for negotiations and public discussions contain proposals for substantial force reductions, far beyond simple changes in forces organization, structure, armament and doctrine.

Armed forces are a mirror of the political grand strategy of a nation or military alliance. Efficient and decisive negotiations about arms control or substantial force reductions therefore require, first, a new overall political grand strategy for Europe or for both alliances. The military planner has to know the politicians’ vision of future political developments. If politicians are willing to talk seriously about a purely defensive structure for both alliances, then they must bear in mind that ‘defensive’ means something different at the strategic, operational and tactical level for the forces, and within the forces for the army, air force and navy. For both world powers it also means including their total armed forces in negotiations about Europe or excluding, for example, their own air force and navy, at least in part. The different geopolitical realities demand the latter.

Negotiations about force reductions are a military problem only insofar as numbers and weapons are concerned. If the two alliances discuss a future European security system, political and economic problems will be much more important than military ones. Very soon decisions will need to be made by the political leaders such as, for example:

Which forces in which country in the alliance should be reduced first?

What is the lowest force strength the member nations of the alliances are willing to accept to retain their sovereignty?

Are the forces of the two world powers included in force reductions and, if so, at the beginning or at the end?

What does a substantial reduction mean for the structure and the political background of both alliances?

What is the future role for military forces within the alliances under changed political conditions?

Is there ultimately a need for the military alliances as they are now; is there any need at all for armed forces in Europe within a future ESS 2020?

The present military confrontation in Europe must and will be reduced, but this reduction will scarcely go to the zero level. Neither the two alliances nor a

new ESS 2020 can relinquish armed forces. However, how much is enough? Force reductions not only mean taking out one or the other weapon system. Together with the weapon, all supply and maintenance lines must be cancelled. Present forces are shaped for an optimum weapon mix at different command levels within the alliances. Substantial reductions would require a complete restructuring of remaining forces and a sharing of military tasks within the alliance. This could be done on a national basis within the alliance or within zones which still preserve a vertical division of Europe.

Substantial changes within this structure would require careful planning and preparation and have a great impact on the procurement cycle, the internal composition and cohesion of forces and on military expenditure. Such changes may, in the initial phase, be more than the military budget can handle. Group or unit cohesion, the exercise of leadership on each command level to form a combat-ready unit, is essential for armed forces. Training with reduced equipment under the new doctrine is essential. Without a carefully stocked logistical pipeline not even a motor car will run, not to mention complex electronically equipped weapon or communication systems which sometimes have more than 10 000 parts. Additionally there is the undeniable need for highly skilled military maintenance experts.

Force size

To exclude national influences as far as possible and to stick to military problems only, we made the assumption of having multinational forces. In order to still meet the key problems with which military forces are faced, we assumed a reduction from present strengths by approximately 90 per cent. We also had to make basic assumptions about the necessary number of troops. 100 000 soldiers seems to be the smallest military body where it is possible to integrate all three services, C³I installations and training and administrative facilities.

Considering the size of the European continent, we assumed that the remaining forces would be distributed within four regions, with each region having 100 000 soldiers. 100 000 soldiers divided among three services would mean approximately 40 000 army soldiers. Based on today's structure they would be adequate for 8 to 12 brigades or 3 or 4 divisions. As a fifth region we added the European part of the Soviet Union also with 100 000 soldiers, and with the same equipment and structure. This fifth region would not be included in the European armed forces and would not be part of a European security system.

IV. The scenario

Assumptions for ESS 2020

It seems appropriate to define 'Europe' as a region from the Urals to the Atlantic, from the North Cape of Norway to the southern tip of Italy. All 36 nations (35 of

which participated in the CSCE negotiations in 1975 in Helsinki, and Albania) will have accepted the political framework. Obviously this system requires a far higher level of trust and confidence between East and West in this region, as well as between both superpowers, than that which exists in 1989. It will therefore require an extraordinary act of faith for former adversaries to have confidence in such a system without prior proof that it will work. And in both halves of Europe, some states will be even more suspicious of former allies than of former adversaries.

When discussing Europe we must recognize that this area does not constitute a homogeneous geographic region, but must be looked upon as at least four different regions. From this perspective we can describe a northern, central and southern region, the last comprising a western and an eastern part. Nevertheless it is obvious that these four regions do not present a comprehensive picture of the political and geographic diversity of Europe.

This new system of European security is also based on defence and security policy arrangements, while it continues to focus on what Galtung has called 'negative peace', that is, absence of war.⁶ Even if we in this study focus on the military level we must consider that such a regime does not confine security needs only to this narrow level. It must also address the socio-economic and socio-political factors in the countries involved. This means that, to the greatest possible degree, the security system has to ensure public safety and economic security for the peoples as well as provide guarantees for the territorial integrity of their countries.

All member states will have accepted that armed conflict is an unacceptable method of settling disputes among themselves, and will have agreed to adopt national military doctrines and force postures that make offensive operations impossible. Thus conflicts will first have to be solved by political means. The use of military means will only be possible after a common decision taken by all members. ESS 2020 will fulfil the objective of securing peace by collective means against anyone who threatens that peace, irrespective of whether the threat comes from outside or inside the system.⁷ It must also be made clear that this peace-keeping function within the security system is neither intended to be, nor capable of being used in a way similar to a kind of 'Brezhnev doctrine'—which seems to have been abandoned by the Soviet Union. The measures that could be taken for keeping peace against a possible threat would thereby vary from diplomatic activities and economic measures to a collective military response. These decisions should be taken by a majority vote.

The collective forces would have to be superior only in the sense of defensive denial, therefore they could not be perceived as a military threat. Irrespective of different social and political systems and possible on-going differences, all members of the security regime would make clear that they do not pose a threat to any other state or community and that war as a general means for conflict determination would no longer be a valid option.

As the described system comprises more than purely military aspects, changes would have to occur mainly on the following four levels: (a) on the domestic

level, which would mean establishment of structures to solve ecological problems and social imbalances; (b) on the defence policy level, which would mean establishment of a collective security system to secure peace on domestic, intrasystemic and international levels, without establishing structures which could be perceived as threatening; (c) on the level of East–West relationships, which would mean the development of a network of links and interdependencies between the small countries in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, with the obligation to overcome the present bloc confrontation; and (d) on the level of North–South relations, which would mean co-operative assistance for the development of Third World countries, with the obligation to support peaceful development of the Third World.⁸ ESS 2020 would also include a progressive programme of foreign aid.

In defining the basic assumptions of this scenario, the underlying presumption is that the political will would exist to find the highest possible level of disarmament and security in Europe and to install a common security system in all European countries as well as in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, we would define the basic assumptions for the new European security system as follows: (a) to avoid war, military means would still play a role for denial; (b) the present military strategies in the alliances would not be capable of sustaining an on-going peace-keeping situation within such a future system; and (c) the present military structures would have to be changed owing to developments in the political and technical environment as well as the development of demographic and financial restraints.

We would describe the general setting for Europe as follows. A European security system should serve as a system of collective security with the following three basic objectives:

1. Following a defensive military doctrine, the military forces would serve a reactive-defensive posture by means of equipment, armaments, structure, organization, logistics and training. They should be unable to carry out territory-seizing operations.
2. They should be able to prevent a possible enemy attack by effective means of denial and defence.
3. They would have to follow the principle of damage-limiting to avoid ‘self-deterrence’.⁹

Europe would have its own political responsibility. All member states would accept the political and territorial status quo, so that none would strive to change either the borders or the political system of the others. No single nation would dominate the others. ESS 2020 would be a confederation of all European states with one trading market, one common currency and a European central bank. The central institutional structures would be located in Berlin. We will not here introduce more detailed assumptions. However, we presume that the central institutional structures would be similar to those of the United States of America

or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both world powers would guarantee ESS 2020, and there would be no post-war responsibilities left. ESS 2020 would have four regional centres.

1. The North Region with headquarters in Stockholm would include: Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

2. The Central Region with headquarters in Strasbourg would include: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the German Democratic Republic, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland.

3. The South-west Region with headquarters in Rome would include: the Holy See, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino and Spain.

4. The South-east Region with headquarters in Budapest would include: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

From the military point of view, each of the regions would have special problems for ground, air or naval forces. The regions would also combine nations that are today members of the WTO or NATO, and those which are neutral or non-aligned.

With regard to global responsibilities we define the following set of assumptions:

1. There would be an outright ban on all chemical and biological weapons and all existing stockpiles would be destroyed.

2. We assume that it would be impossible to ban nuclear weapons within the set timeframe. However by the year 2020 all nuclear powers would have adopted unconditional no-first-use policies and nuclear forces would serve a strictly retaliatory function.

3. All nuclear powers would also have accepted an international regime that would reduce all nuclear arsenals to minimum dissuasion forces. The assumption is that China, the USA, the USSR and Europe would be allowed 200 single-warhead submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on 15 to 20 submarines. To stay within the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the European Nuclear Force (ENF) would remain the responsibility of Britain and France and not devolve to any non-nuclear weapon powers (as defined by the NPT). The creation of an ENF would in effect have a 'de-proliferating' effect from five to four nuclear powers—as the independent British and French weapons would form the ENF. We assume nuclear policy would ultimately be decided by a central European Security Commission in Berlin. Each nuclear-armed submarine could be manned by a multilateral crew with a special nuclear custodial team on board, consisting of a French and a British officer. Both of these officers would be required in order to authorize the release of a nuclear weapon.

4. There would be an agreement about the use of European waters (the Barents Sea, North Sea, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea) by the Soviet and US fleets.

For the aims and tasks of the armed forces within the ESS 2020 we make the following basic assumptions:

1. The states themselves would need police forces for their internal security to deal with crime, traffic, tax and so on. For the purpose of this study we assume mutually accepted police forces, equipped only with firearms. Due to regional and geographic circumstances, police forces would have unarmed control and rescue helicopters, and also coastal water vessels.

2. We assume a non-confrontational relationship with all other nations around Europe. Therefore there would be no need for special border police to protect national borders. There would also be no need for militia-type or national reserve forces.

3. No Soviet, US or Canadian troops would be stationed within ESS 2020. We assume that both world powers would serve as guarantors for the system by giving negative security guarantees. The two superpowers and Canada would be represented by liaison teams in the supreme ESS 2020 command.¹⁰

4. Some European countries may still have responsibilities outside Europe. Having accepted that an armed conflict is an unacceptable method of settling differences between nations, we assume the central authorities of ESS 2020 would prepare and launch appropriate contingency plans. This might also include use of ESS 2020 forces outside the borders of ESS 2020. Therefore we suggest that some units of the ESS 2020 military forces in the regions must be able to serve as a peace-keeping force outside Europe. This does not mean some kind of special standing force; the units would only be ready for action after some preparation time.

5. We assume that the USSR would have accepted to maintain, in its region west of the Urals, the same size and quality of armed forces that the European regions would maintain. The forces that the USSR would need to fulfil its obligations as a world power, as agreed upon with the USA, would be stationed beyond the Urals.

For the organizational structure of ESS 2020 armed forces, we presuppose the following:

1. There would be a supreme headquarters in Berlin and subordinate headquarters in the regions. There are no assumptions about the type and number of command levels and structures under the regional command. The supreme headquarters would have the final responsibility for organization, equipment and training. It could be organized in a fashion similar to that of the WTO or NATO supreme command.

2. We assume the strength of the forces in each region to be 100 000 soldiers. This is in the vicinity of one-tenth of the present available forces. The total

strength would include ground, air and naval forces. The forces would be basically organized and equipped according to the situation prevailing in each region.

3. In logistic terms as much civilian support as possible should be planned.

4. The military structure would have to anticipate and consider possible developments on the military-technological level and the probable introduction of new weapon systems within the next 30 years.

5. The armed forces would be multilateral forces with volunteers from each nation in the region. Depending on their rank, the individual officers would have a limited service time of about 10 to 20 years to allow for a slow but continuous change in the composition of the armed forces.

V. The participants' papers

The participants were given the following guide-lines for their contributions:

Structure of the paper

The first part was intended for the giving of personal comments. Here it was possible to express concerns about and/or support for the proposed ESS 2020 as the hypothetical final step to materialize present political statements and official proposals.

The second part was to convey the authors' thoughts about the 'criteria for a defensive military doctrine' and was to cover: (a) a theoretical discussion on defensive doctrine in general, (b) doctrinal problems which arise under the assumptions of a European security system in the strategic, operative and tactical level, and (c) doctrinal problems which might occur in the view of the two world powers.

The third part was to convey the authors' thoughts about the 'criteria for a defensive military force posture' and was to cover: (a) proposals for structure, organization and equipment under the given assumptions, including all three services, (b) problems related to regional dispersal, (c) problems related to total strength of forces, (d) C³I problems, and (e) the possible influence of technical evolution.

General remarks

The authors were free to elucidate and exemplify their thoughts within the accepted framework and from a purely military point of view. The structure was to serve only to make the papers comparable.

VI. Concluding remarks

Two alliances and the military competition of two world powers have governed the post-war situation in Europe. It now seems to be in the common political interest of both East and West to reduce military confrontation to the lowest agreed-upon level, and finally to reach stability and security for a Europe without threat. This could then open the way in the future to the solving of the political, economic and environmental problems with which the continent is faced.

Dismantling the huge structure of military confrontation which was built up in Europe after the Second World War is a central part of all of the proposals designed to deal with the present political situation in Europe and that between the alliances.

During the nearly two years we have worked with this study the European issues have evolved very fast. East–West relations have gained new momentum. With the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty the first disarmament accord—modest as it may be—became reality. The ongoing negotiations in Vienna present a unique opportunity to reach an agreement on conventional weapons and forces and also open the chance for political solutions for a European security system, involving both alliances and the neutral and non-aligned nations in Europe. This will basically change the security policy in Eastern and Western Europe, and between the superpowers.

There is no doubt that the military camps in both alliances are faced with substantial future force reductions. However, no one can forecast the speed of the political negotiations or the direction the decisions resulting from them will take. It is also impossible to today predict the political developments within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the future relationship between the leaders in the Soviet Union and the new administration in the United States. Changes of such a structural nature must necessarily include a revision of existing military doctrines since the connection is organic. The forces and weapons of the future can only be dealt with by gradual steps to attain the final political goal.

The political decisions which affect Europe may come much faster than the military camp can follow. Nevertheless politicians must consider the acceptance of their decisions by the public and avoid time- and cost-consuming detours on the road to the reduction of armed forces. In this way tricky problems connected with reduction, redeployment, withdrawal or destruction of weapons already in use could be solved before the new weapons are deployed or, even better, before they get into the procurement pipeline. Needless to say this last proposal concerning the changes in procurement policies has rarely been a subject of negotiation and, at present, could most probably be implemented only on a unilateral basis. This subject should be given greater attention, otherwise the rapid technological expansion of modern conventional weapons may soon undermine the existing military equilibrium, and thus disturb the negotiations.

The military topics of the arms control negotiations will, in the future, run parallel with or even be influenced by the economic developments in Europe. We can see the growing number of transnational companies in Europe preparing their

positions within the European Common Market. They are not much influenced by the nature of the security policy of their nations as neutral, non-aligned or alliance members. They wait for the chance a more liberalized Eastern economy could offer them, and they prepare themselves for harder international economic competition. It is easy to foresee that ultimately the long-range planning decisions which are made by transnational companies, with their huge financial capacities and unconfined by national borders, will have impact on political decisions.

The goal of this project was to bring together high-ranking officers from the West and the East and to have them assess the possible role of military forces within a future European security system. The exercise showed the complexity of the subject. As expected it was very difficult to separate military problems from political and economic interdependencies. The papers elaborate on these issues in varying depth and focus individually on specific topics. In this respect the papers of the participants also mirror the present challenges and the ongoing developments and difficulties resulting from them. It becomes clear, that a substantial reduction of armed forces is, however, not possible without a political grand strategy for Europe. As long as no European political body which is able to make decisions for Europe is available, the discussion of force reductions will be governed more by the political and economic goals of the world powers than by taking into account the needs of Europe.

Military planning requires clear political leadership. As regards the 'peacefulness' of armed forces, some of the authors expressed very clearly that the keystone for measurement is not military doctrine, it is the 'shaping and the scope' of the forces. The authors have elaborated on the relationship between the lowest possible strength of forces and the mission they must fulfil, and they have also discussed the task, composition and equipment of the remaining forces. These forces, which would cover a huge area, would need operational units capable of acting independently and also in larger formations. They must be prepared for different kinds of missions, including peace-keeping missions outside their territory. Even when they are structured under an overall purely defensive military doctrine they will retain the character of 'rapid deployment forces' with highly skilled combat-ready soldiers, a high degree of mobility of equipment and logistics, and a high level of fire-power. There may be a number of intermediate steps taken but finally one will arrive at a small rapid deployment force of great efficiency. This seems today not to be seen clearly enough in many quarters.

Significant challenges will have to be met on the level of command, control and communication. The amount of information available and the need for it to be distributed to the right level and to the units in 'real time' demands the most modern electronic equipment. This satellite-based C³I system may be the most cost-effective aspect of the forces.

No one can today predict with accuracy what the road to a European security system will look like. There will probably be different intermediate steps along the way such as maintaining multinational forces of the East and West at a low level. What one can predict is that it will be a long and thorny road. It is

obvious that we first need a European political and economic structure before we, in a second step, can establish some kind of new European security system, and this is an important outcome of the study. A drastic reduction of forces can only be executed within a framework of political and economic restructuring, with clear political decisions as a prerequisite.

Within the political, economic, social, environmental, religious and, not least, the military area the cards will be reshuffled not only in Europe and between the two powers which have governed post-war politics. Within many nations the political strategy must be adjusted mainly due to economic challenges and the internal social problems associated with them.

As far as Europe is concerned, and seen in a long-term perspective, the need for a new European security order is evident. This would mean more than just the sum of the neutral and alliance-member countries in Europe. It could instead mean the development of a European structure which in the end could make the confrontational bloc system superfluous and could lead to a peaceful and co-operative 'Europeanization of Europe'.

Notes and references

¹ Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (Pan Books: London, 1982), p.12.

² In this context the Stockholm Document must be mentioned. It implemented a regime which gives both sides the right to inspection on demand. Under such an inspection and observation regime, operational surprise would therefore not be so threatening because it would be easier to detect.

³ *Preamble to the Warsaw Treaty*, 14 May 1955, reprinted in United States Congress, *Documents on Germany 1944–1961* (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, Dec. 1961), pp. 175–78.

⁴ See text in Schubert, K. von, *Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumentation 1945–1977* (Wissenschaft & Politik: Cologne, 1978), p. 362. Also NATO defines itself as a collective security system within the alliance under Article 5.

⁵ See Genscher, H.-D., Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in a speech delivered at the Conference of the Institute for East–West Security Studies in Potsdam, 9–11 June 1988, in *Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Informiert*, 'Mitteilungen für die Presse', no. 1140/88, 11 June 1988, pp. 14–15.

⁶ The establishment of 'positive peace', which would mean the absence of structural violence, could be the next and final step in socio-political development. For the definition of these terms, see Galtung, J., *Strukturelle Gewalt Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* (Rowohlt: Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1975).

⁷ We are well aware that under the League of Nations such a system did not work, but for us this fundamental difference between a collective security system and present military alliances seems to deserve further consideration. Even if we have no answers at hand today, this topic should be kept in mind and possibly clarified later, for example, by national lawyers.

⁸ See also Lutz, D. S. (ed.), *Kollektive Sicherheit in und für Europa: Eine Alternative? Beiträge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neueren Friedens- und Sicherheitsprogrammatis: Pro und Contra* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1985), pp. 22–23.

⁹ See Böge, V. and Wilke, P., *Sicherheits-politische: Alternativen. Bestandsaufnahme und Vorschläge zur Diskussion* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1984), pp. 178 ff.

¹⁰ By including the United States as a political guarantor, we avoid the possible 'over-dominance' of the Soviet Union owing to geographic asymmetries.

The role of military forces within a European security system

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I. Remarks on the concept of a European security system

The problem of military security is crucial today when the outbreak of war could pose the threat of annihilation of biological life on our planet. This issue is of top priority owing to the potentially great risk of military conflict in Europe. This is a fact of which the Polish people are fully aware.

Poland was a promoter and is an active participant of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process. We believe that the CSCE should facilitate the development of co-operation among the European states as well as the establishment of a system of military security on the European continent. The 1987 Polish plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe, known as the Jaruzelski Plan, constitutes a logical and coherent continuation of Polish policy. It is a proposal to gradually disperse nuclear and conventional military potential in the zone of contact between the two opposing military and political alliances and to elaborate both military doctrines which are defensive in nature and a new set of confidence-building measures (CBMs).

As described in the introductory chapter of this volume the basic assumptions of the scenario under consideration—the future European Security System (ESS 2020)—are that all states have agreed that armed conflict is an unacceptable means of settling disputes and have expressed their willingness to adopt national military doctrines and force postures that make offensive operations impossible. In my opinion this scenario is a proper starting point for our discussions.

I find the entire ESS 2020 concept to be very interesting, especially as it concerns the role, specific tasks and possible use of military forces. Despite these interesting aspects of ESS 2020 there are other aspects which are quite unclear, or even controversial. Some of them are worth noting.

According to commonly recognized principles, the functions of military forces are subordinated to political objectives. The organization, armaments and equipment of the military should serve such political ends but are simultaneously dependent upon economic, scientific, technical and technological developments.

These problems should therefore also be taken into account when considering the structure of military forces. Without comprehensive analysis of all factors, any possible recommendations may turn out to be of an abstract nature.

One should also examine the difficulties arising from the fact that the military system to be established under ESS 2020 would be comprised of contingents of troops from states with different social and political systems. In particular, questions should be answered concerning the ways and means of overcoming ideological divisions. This is also linked to the decision-making process regarding the use of military forces. According to the scenario, only a common decision by all the partners would authorize the actual use of military forces. This consensus would be quite difficult to achieve since politicians would represent different socio-political systems.

I can hardly agree with the notion that nuclear weapons should continue to exist if threat, deterrence and confrontation in Europe no longer exist. Apart from other threats there is that of the possible use of such weapons by a small group (for example, terrorists), which could cause nuclear disaster. Elimination of nuclear weapons is an essential condition of strengthening security and lessening threat perception.

Several questions are not adequately clarified in the scenario. These include: the role of the superpowers (the USA and the USSR) as guarantors of European security; the question of foreign troops being stationed on the territories of future ESS 2020 states (for instance, British troops on the territory of FR Germany); the involvement of the Soviet Union in ESS 2020 ('Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals') while at the same time acting as a guarantor of European security; and the matter of this future United Europe's relations with non-European states. These issues, particularly that of the relations with the Middle East, African and Asian states, may have a decisive impact on the tasks foreseen for military forces, and thus on their organizational structure, equipment and deployment. The above remarks may be summarized in the following way:

1. The idea of creating a United Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, while at the same time assuring the inviolability of the existing borders of the current socio-political systems, is an interesting one.

2. It would be a fruitless exercise to separately study different, selected aspects of European security. First, a comprehensive concept of economic and socio-political solutions ought to be elaborated, and military factor should then be addressed on this basis.

3. The question of nuclear-weapon reduction should, in my opinion, be given priority and greater importance.

4. More attention should be given to elaborate, in detail, the role of the superpowers as guarantors.

5. Measures aimed at strengthening European security would obviously require a greater convergence of views from the different countries concerned than now exists. Thus it seems advisable to consider establishing international fora (committees, commissions) to discuss and negotiate suggested solutions to

this problem, so that individual states may accept both the content and organizational principles of mutually agreed-upon measures.

From these remarks the conclusion may be drawn that only the criteria for a defensive military doctrine—including an elaboration of the concept of the defensive structure of military forces—can be seen to correspond to the present political realities in Europe, and throughout the world. This, however, is not the case for the organizational structure of the military forces within ESS 2020. In my view, the European political and economic structure would first need to be established; upon that basis a military structure could then be built. Until the political and economic issues are resolved, it seems only possible to *strive* to decrease the number of armed forces to the levels proposed by the scenario.

Apart from these doubts and eager to examine all the aspects of our subject, I will now try to look into the future and suggest possible solutions to the problems, including the structure of military forces within ESS 2020.

II. Defensive character of doctrine

Military doctrine is the officially adopted view, within a given state system, of the nature, objectives and character of a future war; the ways of preparing the political and decision-making apparatus and the military forces of a state for such a war; and of the manner in which military activities are to be conducted. Military doctrine has two aspects: socio-political and military-technical. The first aspect concerns the objectives of war and comprises methodological, economic, social and legal issues connected with the central problem of the prevention of war, or effective defence in the case of aggression. The wartime tasks of organs of the state, of its military forces and of its citizenry are influenced by this aspect. The second aspect, the military-technical components of a doctrine, includes the rules guiding the preparation of a state and its military forces for a war, particularly their organizational structure, equipment and training.

This definition of military doctrine encompasses different elements. It is possible to examine these elements in order to discover how a change in their nature would influence a doctrine as a whole, and thus which elements might be changed, and in what fashion, so that evolution towards a defensive military doctrine might take place. Such elements include officially adopted views concerning: (a) the essence of war, (b) the objectives of future war, (c) the character of war, (d) the manner of carrying out military activities, (e) the preparation of the state and society, and (f) the preparation of military forces.

The essence of every phenomenon is usually included in its definition. Therefore the essence of war—as an element of doctrine—is covered by the definition of war officially adopted by a given state or alliance. However, there are many such definitions and the concept of ‘war’ is interpreted in different ways. Most often ‘war’ means armed conflict, but the term is also commonly used to describe other conflicts such as, for example, ‘psychological war’ or ‘cold war’.

I do not consider it necessary to define the different kinds of war and to examine in detail these definitions. In my opinion, it will in the future be necessary to standardize the definition of war in order to avoid misunderstanding in international relations. However, the official acceptance in a given state or alliance of one or another definition of war does not influence the character of military doctrine unless, of course, we adopt the Orwellian approach to reality, according to which, for instance, attack is the best form of defence.

The second element of doctrine, that is, the officially adopted views in a given state or alliance concerning the aims of future war, has considerable impact on the formulation of a doctrine.

The aim of war is defined by the political leadership. War between two opposing states or alliances may be either offensive or defensive. It is offensive if one party to a conflict intends to interfere in the internal affairs of another by the threat or use of force. The scale of such interference may range from attempts to impose unfavourable economic or political relations to forced changes of the legal or political system or of the ruling groups or even to seizure and suppression of part or all of the territory of a state. Defensive war is constituted by the readiness to resist by military means the realization of the offensive aims of an enemy.

The officially adopted views concerning the supposed character of war constitute the third element of military doctrine. The questions here are: what will the nature of the war be; what will be its beginning, its course and its end?

War is usually started by one side's putting the other in a situation where a response is unavoidable. War may start immediately or after a period of escalating tension and a series of confrontations, including armed ones. War may involve two states and gradually expand to other countries, or it may involve several states from the very beginning. In looking at the course of a war and taking into account various criteria such as the time, place and intensity of engagement, the type of military involvement, the manner of fighting, the moral assessments made and so on, it is possible to differentiate the following types of wars: short- and long-term, local and world, limited or total, conventional and non-conventional (nuclear, chemical, biological), aggressive and defensive, just and unjust, regular or guerilla warfare, inter-state or internal, positional or manoeuvring war and so on. The way in which a war terminates (immediately, gradually, preceded by cease-fire and negotiations, conditional or non-conditional surrender) apparently depends on the course of the war and is closely linked to its objectives.

As seen from these considerations, the character of war may, but does not necessarily, influence the character of doctrine. In particular it cannot serve as the basis for an assessment of a doctrine, especially if it is limited to the evaluation of the other side's intentions and foreseen activities.

A three-element approach—an officially adopted view concerning the manner of carrying out military activities—has considerable impact on the overall character of doctrine. It applies to the same elements examined above, namely the beginning, course and termination of war, however, not in terms of reality (which is not always as we would like it to be) but in terms of our intentions.

An *offensive* doctrine means that there are officially adopted views on the inevitability of war and the necessity of pre-emptive strikes, the carrying out of surprise attacks and offensive operations on the territory of the other side, the forcing of an adversary to make concessions, or the striving for certain changes in the structures of a state. A *defensive* doctrine means that the use of the military is possible only in the case of the initiation of military activities by an adversary. The intention is to carry out military activities exclusively on the defender's own territory and to terminate them when an adversary gives up its intentions.

Official views about the preparation of the state and of society also influence the character of a doctrine. The problem is not limited to this but includes also different practical political, social and economic aspects. Detailed analysis of these issues is not possible within the scope of this chapter, however, one aspect of this issue is worth noting. Despite easily discernible preparations in the economic field, there are rather important—though obviously underestimated—non-material aspects which affect the character of military doctrine. For instance declarations of intentions to preserve peace, policies of non-use of force in international relations, and peace education of societies should be assessed positively. Conversely, claims upon other states and the stimulation of chauvinism, hate and mass threat neurosis should be assessed as negative and dangerous.

The last and most important element of doctrine is that of the preparation of military forces for war. An offensive doctrine is reflected in the preparations of military forces to carry out offensive missions, whereas preparations to carry out defensive missions indicate a defensive doctrine. Offensive military missions may be described as those which aim to defeat armed forces, to destroy other elements of an enemy's military potential and, foremost, to seize its territory. The missions of military forces may be viewed as defensive when they constitute a reaction to aggression, are aimed at preventing the military forces of an enemy from invading the defender's territory or are attempts to recapture lost territory.

Preparations for carrying out certain kinds of military missions may be reflected in the organizational structure, arms, equipment and training of military forces. The defensive character of a military doctrine is evident in all its elements, including the organizational structure of the military forces, weapon systems and training. I will focus on the possibility of distinguishing between defensive and offensive organizational structures and weapon systems. The character of the training seems to be easily judged by observers and inspectors during military exercises, and such exercises afford an opportunity to assess the kind of missions for which military forces are being prepared.

The term 'organizational structures' includes numerical strength, organization and the command structure of the armed forces. For the sake of clarity let us look at the organization of armed forces at the highest level, according to the different kinds of forces found in the majority of modern military armies: ground forces, air forces, air-defence forces and the navy. In most countries there are special military units to protect borders, to ensure internal security and to fight against diversion and landing operations deep within the territory of the

country. These are usually called border police, internal troops or known as a territorial army. They will be referred to here as 'general internal forces'. In addition to these general internal forces, nuclear powers maintain strategic forces (strategic rocket forces), and some states consider the so-called rapid deployment forces as a separate category.

All or some of the following types of military forces are represented in the armies of modern states: strategic forces, ground forces, air forces, air-defence forces, naval forces, internal forces and rapid deployment forces. Military forces as a whole may carry out both offensive and defensive missions, though some types of military forces are assigned to operations on enemy territory, while others are designated to operate on their own territory. This is a criterion for the comparison of different types of military forces from the point of view of their defensive or offensive character (see table 1). The methodology of this comparison is as follows:

1. Table 1 presents a five-degree scale of the assessment of the defensive or offensive character of military forces with the following gradations: $O =$ purely offensive; $O > D =$ more offensive than defensive; $O = D =$ equally offensive and defensive; $O < D =$ less offensive than defensive; and $D =$ purely defensive.

2. In light of the criterion adopted, there are two types of military forces, which may be assessed as strictly defensive or offensive. This does not mean that, under certain circumstances, these military forces cannot fulfil quite different missions.

3. An assessment of the character of the different types of military forces has been made by the author according to his own views, based on the following assumptions:

- Strategic forces may, in peacetime, have been assigned to targets on the territory of a hypothetical enemy. First strikes can be carried out with these forces. According to some concepts in the West, such an action could also be characterized as a 'pre-emptive strike'. All of the targets for these forces are located outside their own territories, and for this reason they have been assessed as strictly offensive forces.

- Air-defence forces have the opposite character. These forces would fight against airborne assaults, those crossing the borders or reaching the borders in order to make an airborne assault. Therefore they have been assessed as strictly defensive.

- Ground forces have been placed in the middle of the scale as they comprise troops of both offensive (for example, tank forces) and defensive (for example, anti-aircraft forces) character. In my opinion, they are as equally offensive as defensive.

- Air, naval and rapid-deployment forces are assessed here as more offensive than defensive owing to their capacity to undertake missions far from their own territories.

- Internal forces have been assessed as more defensive than offensive because they fulfil missions exclusively on their own territories.

Obviously within these types of military forces one may differentiate units of strictly offensive or defensive character. For instance the missions undertaken by bombers, attack fighters, submarines, marine forces and tank forces are of a more offensive than defensive nature. Special forces should be assessed as particularly threatening (O , $O > D$, $O = D$). Both offensive and defensive missions may be accomplished by aviation and ground forces as exemplified by conventional naval aviation, surface combatant ships, motorized infantry, some conventional artillery, communication and chemical units ($O > D$, $O = D$, $O < D$).

This analysis points out that the evolution of the organizational structures of military forces towards that of a strictly defensive character may be a process of gradual, mutually agreed-upon reductions accompanied by a reorganization of those units which are to maintain an offensive capacity. Such changes, including the reduction of manpower, should guarantee the parity of military potential at all stages of the reorganization.

The technical equipment of modern armies includes armaments, the technical equipment of ground, air and naval forces, different tools, instruments and devices which are indispensable in military operations. Technical equipment may be classified according to the type of military force (the arms or combat equipment of rocket, ground, naval, air forces, etc.) or kind of troops (arms and combat equipment of motorized infantry, artillery, etc.). Table 2 presents a comparison of the offensive or defensive character of the technical equipment of ground forces.

Because these armaments and combat equipment are not used by all types of military forces, one must make subgroupings to reflect these obvious differences, in accordance with the criterion adopted. Therefore certain subgroups have been differentiated (excluding topographical equipment) and the general assessment derives from evaluation of these subgroups. The methodology of comparison is the same as for the type of military forces.

An analysis of table 2 shows that the evaluation of the offensive or defensive character of technical equipment is a very complicated task, and conclusions are not so obvious, and may even be disputable. Nevertheless, the general conclusion may be drawn that there are certain groups of armaments and technical equipment which can be assessed as clearly offensive or defensive. Therefore, evolution of the technical equipment of military forces towards a strictly defensive character should lead to the elimination of offensive types of equipment. The following conclusions may be drawn from the remarks made thus far:

1. It is possible to assess the defensive or offensive character of military doctrine. In order to do so one must evaluate its separate elements. The evolution of military doctrine towards a defensive character may result from changes in the character of those separate elements.

2. The particular definition of war and of its character, which is officially adopted in a given state or alliance, does not influence the character of military doctrine to a meaningful degree. In this regard a decisive role is played by such

elements as the officially adopted policies concerning the aims of war and the manner of carrying out military activities and by the views and actions regarding preparation of the state, society and military forces for a war.

3. Evaluation of military forces as to the kind of missions for which they are being prepared plays a decisive role in the process of assessing the character of military doctrine. Military forces may be assessed by analysis of their organizational structure, armaments, equipment and system of training.

4. We have no clear and effective methods, or unequivocal criteria, for the assessment of military forces. It is relatively easy to evaluate a system of training, however, it is much more difficult to assess organizational structure and armaments. Armaments, in particular, may have a universal character and be capable of use in both offensive and defensive operations. My method of evaluating the character of the organizational structure and the armaments of military forces is of limited value as it allows only a subjective comparison of these elements. It does not serve as a universal model. With the right choice of experts it may, however, be helpful while searching for solutions to the problems under consideration.

III. Military forces within ESS 2020

In this section I will examine the structure of military forces within ESS 2020, their deployment in Europe, their equipment, the concept of how they are to be used and the system of command on the basis of the scenario concerning the purpose, missions and activities of military forces.

The purpose of military forces within ESS 2020 stems from the aims of war and the concepts of carrying out military activities included in the military doctrine, and thus from the defensive character of the whole system. The purpose of the military forces is to repel aggression and to guarantee the sovereignty of Europe as a whole and of its individual administrative centres and states. Additional purposes would include participating in measures for the provision of internal security and assisting in the case of emergencies such as natural disasters.

The missions of the military forces may be defined more precisely based on an examination of the possible threats from the supposed enemy, and of the conditions under which such an enemy would operate. For different reasons one cannot, at the current stage of political development and balance of power in the world, 'name' such a possible enemy. Therefore we must deal with a rather abstract enemy. An assumption should be made, however, that the enemy will be strong and capable of manoeuvring operations and surprise attack.

The directions, means and manner of aggression may differ. It would not be wise to expect dramatic or novel changes here. As is the case today, the threat may come from the air (including space), the land or from the sea. Consequently the means of aggression could include airborne assault or the use of ground or naval forces. One can anticipate that ESS 2020 and its regional

centres might be threatened by two basic types of aggression: territory-seizing operations (though it is unlikely that the whole ESS territory would be captured); or a kind of ‘stand off’ operation against important targets and regions. A blockade of Europe must be excluded since it would be a difficult operation to carry out. Based on analysis of an enemy, the purpose of military forces and their missions may be described as follows:

1. To deny an enemy the advantage of a surprise attack through reconnaissance and the maintenance of troops at a state of combat readiness, including effective command systems.
2. To effectively defend Europe from attacks from the air (space), ground or sea under a common plan and command.
3. To effectively defend the individual regions by using their own troops, with the possibility of reinforcements from the central level, and to carry out defensive operations in the interests of neighbouring regions.
4. To conduct limited but effective and active offensive operations organized by the central level using local forces and reserves within the framework of defensive operations.
5. To carry out safe-guarding and police operations aimed to guarantee internal security.
6. To carry out preventive and rescue operations connected with natural disasters.

As mentioned above attacks may come from three directions—the air, the ground or the sea. This applies to the majority of the ESS 2020 countries, since 26 of the 34 countries participating in the ESS 2020 have ground and sea borders, and only 8 have exclusively land borders. Geographic and climatic conditions underline the considerable variation of individual regions as far as the possibility of carrying out military operations is concerned. From the north, west and south Europe is guarded by the sea; only from the east is there direct access to land. The ESS 2020 territory includes all the different types of terrain—lowlands, upland and mountains. The climate in Europe is rather temperate, though it is more severe in the north and less so in the south.

The ESS 2020 North Region is composed of islands, peninsulas and those parts of the continent having the most sophisticated configuration of shoreline. It is a typical naval theatre of operations with easy access from the sea and favourable conditions for naval bases. Operations involving large formations of ground forces are difficult to carry out in this region owing to the topography and, to some extent, the climate.

The ESS 2020 Central Region constitutes a large entity, running along a line of latitude. Its lowland, upland and mountain terrain is also oriented in this direction as are the courses of many of the rivers. It is a typical land theatre of operations. The topography and the mild climate allow for military operations involving large army formations, mainly along lines of latitude. These forma-

tions should have bridging and amphibious assault equipment at their disposal since rivers are natural lines of defence for defenders.

The topography of the ESS 2020 South-west and South-east Regions can be placed somewhere between that of the North and Central Regions. The use of large army formations would be difficult, but possible. The mild, mediterranean climate would facilitate the carrying out of ground military operations.

The scenario assumes one basic requirement for the ESS 2020 military forces: that there will be 100 000 soldiers in every region, and thus military forces will have a total of 400 000 soldiers. It is also assumed that civilian personnel will be employed in logistics. However, four more requirements may be formulated on the basis of analysis of the military forces' missions and operational conditions.

1. The ESS 2020 military forces should comprise ground, air and naval forces as well as special and logistic units. The army should comprise: mechanized infantry, combat helicopters, airborne rapid-deployment forces, local air defence, artillery, special and logistic units. The air force should comprise: aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles and anti-missiles, early warning and target-guidance units, special and logistic units. The navy should comprise: combatant ships for different purposes (reconnaissance, submarines for reconnaissance-protective missions and surface ships), aircraft for different purposes, off-shore artillery, special and logistic units. Special and logistic units should include: mountain infantry, marines, airborne-assault units, engineering units, technical, quartermaster and other units.

2. All of the above types of military forces should be represented in every regional centre. However, their deployment need not be balanced in terms of numerical strength or presence in the different regions. In all the regions air-defence forces should be given priority, and in individual regions preference should be given to particular types of forces.

Moreover, in the North Region the Navy should constitute the majority of the forces deployed whereas ground-forces should be in the majority in other regions. Despite the regional forces, the ESS 2020 Headquarters (HQ) must have strong reserves.

3. All types of forces within ESS 2020 should be highly mobile, so that they can be easily transferred by air over long distances, and by ground transport over shorter distances. They should have the capacity to fight in different conditions, and the reserves, in particular, must be highly mobile and prepared to fulfil different kinds of missions.

4. The ESS 2020 military forces should have a multi-level and hierarchical structure. Separate formations and units are to be subordinated to an allied command, with precisely defined authority.

Owing to the above, it seems advisable to maintain one-quarter of the total 400 000 soldiers as reserves. These 100 000 soldiers would be at the disposal of the central HQ and might be used as reinforcements in the regions or for separate missions outside the regions as required. The other 300 000 soldiers would be

divided among the regions, taking into account the priorities of each region. In order to facilitate this division of manpower into the different types of forces, one should assume certain organizational units. Let us assume that these would be as follows: brigades (5000 soldiers), regiments (2000 soldiers), battalions (500 soldiers), squadrons (200 soldiers) and companies (100 soldiers).

Using these criteria I have tried to outline the structure of the ESS 2020 military forces (see tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). In order to illustrate the division of manpower among regional centres and reserves, I have prepared a scheme composed of similar divisions of ten to fifteen thousand soldiers.

These data, though based on certain assumptions, are mainly estimations. They are not free of simplifications (as, for example, the assigning of the same organizational units and numerical strengths for ground, air and naval forces). Only this approach seems plausible at this stage of rather general considerations.

The technical equipment of the ESS 2020 military forces appears to be an important issue. This equipment should serve, first of all, to fulfil defensive missions. There should therefore be no arms and equipment with the character of special 'strike' capabilities (armoured) or with long-range capabilities (missiles for attacking ground targets, bombers, certain types of surface ships, submarines, and so on). Preference should be given to armaments and equipment with protective and defence capabilities—air defence, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, engineering equipment, and the like.

Within the framework of defensive and protective operations—especially in the case of infringement on the ESS 2020 territory—there must be the possibility to carry out highly mobile and active operations based on offensive forms of fighting, such as strikes, attacks and firing. For this reason I have also included units which would be equipped with the appropriate equipment for meeting these demands of mobility and firepower, namely mechanized infantry, combat helicopters, airborne rapid-deployment groups, airborne assault forces, artillery and so on.

As history shows, we usually associate the least capable and the worst equipped forces with the defence of countries. This should not be the case with the ESS 2020. Since all the 'armed' activities are aimed at the defence and protection of the community of European states (there are no offensive aims), the equipment of the armed forces should be on the highest technological level. The small (purposely limited) size and the defensive nature of these military forces should be compensated by their high quality.

Use of the ESS 2020 military forces should be subordinated to political doctrine and, in the military sphere, to the defensive character of the system and its military forces. Military forces are to operate exclusively on the territories of their respective regions or, in an emergency, on the territories of other regions but, under no circumstances, outside the system. The manner of their use should be carefully defined in advance, taking into account the most likely threat scenarios or those activities which might be undertaken by an 'enemy'. The

possible use of different types of military forces against threats from the air, ground or sea ought to be considered, and their interaction must be stressed.

The key element of ground defence may relate to the deployment of forces at the communication centres and also to the most likely direction of an attack. This kind of defence cannot rely on the principle of continuity, that is, long lines of shoulder-to-shoulder defence; this would be an ineffective use of forces and resources. The characteristic feature of a defence strategy which is based on the maintenance of certain important regions and points should be one of keeping the majority of forces in reserve. They would be used for active missions—defending threatened directions, carrying out counter-attacks and counterstrikes, deepening of the line of defence, fighting against the enemy deep in the territory (airborne assaults), and the like.

The basic principles of use and operation of ground forces that must be observed are the following: the ability for rapid concentration on threatened areas, the capability for surprise operations, and great air and ground mobility. The army should avoid long, decisive fights and battles. This is connected with its organization, combat equipment and defensive character. A much more effective approach may be to engage the enemy in a series of battles or even to use guerilla warfare.

The tasks of the air force are to protect and support operations on land and sea and to deprive an enemy of the possibility to infringe upon the air space of the system (region) or to carry out attacks on important military targets or political, administrative and economic centres. The air force should be assigned permanent tasks in certain zones (zones and object defence), on the most threatened positions.

The navy fulfils its missions in the territorial waters, coastal air and land areas. It organizes anti-landing-operation defence (airborne and naval landing operations) and carries out defensive-protective operations. It interacts closely with ground forces in providing anti-landing-operation defence.

Special and logistic units are assigned their own missions, supporting other types of defending forces. They may serve as support or reinforcement units to formations carrying out important regional missions or missions of value to the entire ESS 2020 confederation.

The system of command of the ESS 2020 military forces must be based on stationary and field (mobile) command posts in the following numbers:

(a) on the ESS 2020 level: 3 stationary command posts (1 main and 2 supplementary) and 3 field command posts (1 main, 1 supplementary and 1 air command);

(b) on the level of regional centres: 2 stationary (1 main and 1 supplementary) and 3 field command posts (1 main, 1 supplementary and 1 air command);

(c) on the level of different types of military forces: 3 field command posts (1 main, 1 supplementary and 1 air command); and

(d) on the level of formations and units (tactical level): 2 field command posts (1 main and 1 supplementary).

For the command system at the level of ESS 2020 Regional Centres, peacetime communication networks and special stationary and field communication networks (operational in case of aggression) should be used. It seems advisable that on the tactical level, including units and command posts, mainly field communication networks should be used. Until these are functional stationary networks can be utilized.

These considerations concerning the operational conditions and structure of the ESS 2020 military forces lead to the following conclusions:

1. Individual regional centres will differ in terms of: the military threat from the possible enemy; the geographic–military characteristics of their territories; the strength and capabilities of the economic potential at their disposal; and the political, cultural, demographic and other conditions. As these considerations make clear, different criteria (approaches) will have to be adopted when deciding upon the composition and numerical strength of the military forces of the individual regions.

2. The most dangerous threat today, and probably in the future, comes first from the air and only secondly from the land or sea.

3. Because of the ESS 2020's defensive military doctrine, priority should be given to defensive and defensive-offensive units, with a deliberate lack of offensive and offensive-defensive forces.

4. It seems advisable to differentiate the structures of the defence forces in the different administrative centres (in terms of quality and quantity), in conformity with their characteristic features. This is also valid for the proposed reserves at ESS 2020 Headquarters.

5. The equipment of the ESS 2020 forces should be predominantly defensive, but it must have considerable combat capabilities such as reliability, mobility and effectiveness. Attention should be focused on the air-defence equipment, the light fighting vehicles of the army defence units, the surface ships and submarines used for protective and support missions in the coastal areas, the short-range artillery, the radio-electronic protective means, the airborne assault and engineering equipment, the communication network and so on. In the light of the defensive character of the military forces the following arms and equipment must be limited to the lowest possible level, or eliminated: missiles for ground-target strikes, reconnaissance and strike equipment, heavy armoured vehicles (including main battle tanks), strike aircraft, long-range surface ships and submarines.

6. Defensive forms of combat should dominate the thinking about the use of the ESS 2020 military forces, including active offensive operations designed to achieve defensive goals.

7. The ESS 2020 system and the regional centres should have separate but linked command units, based on the existing (stationary) communication network and supplemented by a special system of field communication networks.

IV. Final remarks

To conclude my considerations concerning the role of military forces within a European Security System I would like to stress that Poland is not only interested, but also a reliable participant in all the efforts aimed at lessening tension in international relations, limiting the threat of war and making Europe a safe place in which to live.

I have tried to point out that, at the present stage of development of international relations, considerations concerning the defensive character of military doctrine and military forces are not so far from reality. The conclusion may be drawn that the possibility exists to evaluate the defensive or offensive character of military doctrine and to direct its evolution. An assessment of doctrine means an assessment of its elements. These elements, in particular the structure and equipment of military forces, can be changed only as a result of negotiations carried out in good will and at a certain level of mutual confidence. The final goal of making the initiation of war impossible may be attained only gradually. First of all the threat of nuclear conflict should be removed; only afterwards can the possibility to initiate war be gradually limited, and ultimately eliminated. During this process attention must be focused on maintaining parity of military potential between the opposing socio-political systems on even lower levels.

As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, the establishment of the ESS 2020 organizational structure is far from the current reality in Europe and throughout the world. My efforts here have, however, aimed to address all aspects of the proposal. Let me add one remark. I have felt compelled to make this attempt because of the optimism shown by the project leaders and the hopes raised by recent developments in international relations.

Significant changes are occurring in the socio-political and economic situation in the world. Real developments have led to a situation where our complex and differing world has become more interlinked and more interdependent. Under these circumstances efforts aimed at creating a universal system of international security and at finding ways to reconcile the often opposing interests of different states and nations are of crucial importance. This applies also to the military activity of states, particularly those of the opposing politico-military alliances. Recent experience allows us to hope that what now appears to be fiction, may tomorrow turn out to be reality.

Notes and references

* This paper has been prepared for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The views expressed in this paper are solely the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect any policies or the position of the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

MILITARY FORCES ESS-2020

(400 000 SOLDIERS)




Table 1. Comparison of different types of military forces from the point of view of their offensive or defensive character

Type of military forces	D - defensive character O - offensive character
Strategic forces	O
Ground forces	O = D
Air forces	O > D
Air defense forces	D
Naval forces	O > D
Internal forces	O < D
Rapid deployment forces	O > D

Table 2. Comparison of the defensive or offensive character of ground forces' armaments, combat and technical equipment

	Type of armaments or equipment	O - offensive D - defensive
Armaments	Firearms	O = D
	Cannon artillery	O < D
	Self-propelled artillery	O > D
	Anti-tank artillery	O < D
	Anti-tank self-propelled artillery	O = D
	Rocket artillery	O > D
	Antiaircraft artillery	O < D
	Anti-tank missiles	O < D
	Anti-aircraft missiles	O < D
	In general	O < D
Tanks and motorcars units	Main battle tanks	O
	Infantry Fighting Vehicle	O
	Armoured personnel carriers	O > D
	Motorcars	O < D
	In general	O > D
Communication equipment	Telephone equipment	D
	Radio equipment	O > D
	Radio-line equipment	O = D
	Computer ware	O = D
	Radio-electronic equipment	O > D
	In general	O = D

Engineering equipment	Engineering reconnaissance equipment	O > D
	Camouflage equipment	O < D
	Mining and mine-sweeping equipment	O < D
	Engineer vehicles	D
	Road-building machinery	O > D
	Bridging equipment	O
	Protective shelter and fortification	D
	Field power sources	O = D
	Water supply equipment	O = D
	In general	O = D
Chemical equipment	Contamination detection equipment	O < D
	Contamination protective equipment	D
	Decontamination equipment	D
	Smoke-producing equipment	O = D
	Flame throwers	O
	In general	O < D
Topographical	equipment	O = D
Logistics quatermaster equipment	Food suply	D
	Uniform, service and battle dress equipn.	D
	Quarters (cantonment) facilities	O < D
	Fuel and rease supply	O > D
	Medicial equipment	D
	In general	O < D

Table 3. Types and composition of the ESS 2020 military forces
 The North region - 30 000 soldiers

Types of military forces (numerical strength thousands)	MILITARY UNITS					
	TYPE	Number				
		brigades	regiments	battalions	divisions (squadrans)	companies
ARMY (6)	Mechanized			3		3
	Combat helicopters				6	
	Airborne rapid deployment groups				6	
	Local and defence				3	
	Artillery				3	
	Special and Logistical					6
AIR FORCE (9)	Aircraft		1		3	
	Antiaircraft missiles and antimissiles				18	
	Early-warning and target-guidance			3		4
	Special and logistical					9
NAVY (12)	Ships for different purposes				24	
	Aircraft for different purposes				18	
	Off-shore artillery				12	
	Special and logistical					12
SPECIAL and LOGISTICAL (3)	Mountain infantry			1		1
	Marines			1		1
	Airborne-assault			1		1
	Engineering			1		4
	Technical and quartermaster					3
TOTAL		-	1	10	93	44

Table 4. Types and composition of the FSS 2020 military forces
The Central region - 120 000 soldiers

Types of military forces (numerical strength thousands)	MILITARY UNITS					
	TYPE	Number				
		brigades	regiments	batallions	divisions (squadrous)	companies
ARMY (48)	Mechanized	2	1	4		4
	Combat helicopters				48	
	Airborne rapid deployment groups				48	
	Local and defence				24	
	Artillery				24	
	Special and Logistical					48
AIR FORCE (36)	Aircraft		5		4	
	Antiaircraft missiles and antimissiles				72	
	Early-warning and target-guidance			12		12
	Special and logistical					36
NAVY (24)	Ships for different purposes				48	
	Aircraft for different purposes				36	
	Off-shore artillery				24	
	Special and logistical					24
SPECIAL and LOGISTICAL (12)	Mountain infantry			4		4
	Marines			4		4
	Airborne-assault			4		4
	Engineering		1	2		6
	Technical and quartermaster			2		2
TOTAL		2	7	32	328	144

Table 5. Types and composition of the ESS 2020 military forces
The Southwest region - 60 000 soldiers

Types of military forces (numerical strength, thousands)	MILITARY UNITS					
	TYPE	Number				
		brigades	regiments	batallions	divisions (squadrans)	companies
ARMY (15)	Mechanized		2	1		
	Combat helicopters				15	
	Airborne rapid deployment groups				15	
	Local and defence				7	
	Artillery				8	
	Special and Logistical					15
AIR FORCE (18)	Aircraft		2		7	
	Antiaircraft missiles and antimissiles				36	
	Early-warning and target-guidance			6		6
	Special and logistical					18
NAVY (21)	Ships for different purposes				42	
	Aircraft for different purposes				31	
	Off-shore artillery				21	
	Special and logistical					22
SPECIAL and LOGISTICAL (6)	Mountain infantry			2		2
	Marines			2		2
	Airborne-assault			2		2
	Engineering			3		3
	Technical and quartermaster					6
TOTAL		-	4	16	182	76

Table 6. Types and composition of the ESS 2020 military forces
The Southeast region - 90 000 soldiers

Types of military forces (numerical strength, thousands)	MILITARY UNITS					
	TYPE	Number				
		brigades	regiments	battalions	divisions (squadrans)	companies
ARMY (31,5)	Mechanized	1	2	1		
	Combat helicopters				31	
	Airborne rapid deployment groups				31	
	Local and defence				16	
	Artillery				16	
	Special and Logistical					32
AIR FORCE (27)	Aircraft		4			
	Antiaircraft missiles and antimissiles				54	
	Early-warning and target-guidance			10		5
	Special and logistical					27
NAVY (22,5)	Ships for different purposes				45	
	Aircraft for different purposes				34	
	Off-shore artillery				22	
	Special and logistical					23
SPECIAL and LOGISTICAL (9)	Mountain infantry			3		3
	Marines			3		3
	Airborne-assault			3		3
	Engineering			5		2
	Technical and quartermaster			1		4
TOTAL		1	6	26	249	102

Table 7. Types and composition of the ESS 2020 military forces
Reserves - 100 000 soldiers

Types of military forces (numerical strength, thousands)	MILITARY UNITS					
	TYPE	Number				
		brigades	regiments	battalions	divisions (squadrons)	companies
ARMY (30)	Mechanized	1	2			
	Combat helicopters				30	
	Airborne rapid deployment groups				30	
	Local and defence				15	
	Artillery				15	
	Special and Logistical					30
AIR FORCE (40)	Aircraft		6			
	Antiaircraft missiles and antimissiles				80	
	Early-warning and target-guidance			16		
	Special and logistical					40
NAVY (20)	Ships for different purposes				40	
	Aircraft for different purposes				30	
	Off-shore artillery				20	
	Special and logistical					20
SPECIAL and LOGISTICAL (10)	Mountain infantry			4		
	Marines			4		
	Airborne-assault			4		
	Engineering			6		
	Technical and quartermaster			1		5
TOTAL		1	8	35	260	95

The role of military forces within the ESS 2020: some thoughts on the system, the military doctrines and the force structure

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I. Some personal remarks on the proposed ESS 2020

When reading the introductory chapter of the present publication one is immediately confronted with its rather carefree Eurocentric view of the world. This is both its strong point and, at the same time, its main weakness. It also includes contradictions which, I believe, cast doubt on the value of the whole European Security System, 'ESS 2020', edifice of ideas.

Of course, one can construct a world with a system which is logical in itself, a 'Utopia' within which centres can be created and moved, armed forces can be organized and deactivated, and doctrines can be designed and changed at random. It is such a construction that awaits the reader of the ESS 2020 scenario. Such global playing with ideas becomes critical, however, if one looks, not at the world as a whole, but at only a part of it, with no consideration whatsoever for the other parts.

When thoroughly considering the development of one particular part of the world the serious individual will always have to cope with the uncertainty as to how the rest of the world would respond—perhaps, must respond—to his decisions and to the measures taken. That means that he cannot estimate the impact of his decisions, which is really a less than satisfactory situation.

There is another point of uncertainty inherent in the system. Today, speaking in terms of security policy, we have a bipolar world, even if other centres are beginning slowly to assert themselves.

An absence of war, the so-called 'negative peace', prevails in the 'field of application' of this bipolar world. Within the framework of such a bipolar world it is quite conceivable that all the different fora of arms control and arms reduction will ultimately attain the goal of greater security with fewer armed forces.

ESS 2020, however, approaches this development in a different way. Here there is no 'disentangling' and no keeping-a-safe-distance, but rather a new safe

area is established, which is not meant to be a part—and also cannot be a part—of today's bipolar world, since it is simply too large and too weighty for that.

In fact the Europe of ESS 2020 comprises more than 5 million square kilometres, which is more than 50 per cent of the surface of the USA, with approximately 500 million inhabitants, equivalent to the number of the inhabitants of the USSR and the USA combined. Its gross national product (GNP) is almost as large as that of the USA and more than twice as large as that of the USSR, and its armed forces total 400 000 men and 200 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). This Europe finds itself located between the two superpowers. The military strength of the two superpowers is not known in detail. What is known is that they do not have more than 200 SLCMs, that only 100 000 troops may be stationed in the European part of the Soviet Union and that the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea have a special status, which limits the rights of free shipping. Nothing is said in the ESS 2020 scenario about the region bordering on the south of Europe, that is the Near East and Africa, with the exception that Europe is actively implementing a development programme there.

Thus ESS 2020 creates a tripolar world while at the same time refusing Europe, the third centre of power, the means which it requires to be able (also as a force for preserving peace!) to exist in such a new world. Moreover by weakening the current superpowers ESS 2020 will, in all likelihood, prompt a multipolar world, not only in the economic sense but also in terms of security policy, the possibilities and risks of which are conveniently overlooked by ESS 2020. I also have grave doubts whether a 'power vacuum Europe' could, in the long term, achieve the necessary commonality of interests with both the (more powerful) superpowers and its (possibly also more powerful) southern neighbours. It is this commonality of interests which is the only guarantee for stability in a world without arms.

It is only by ESS 2020's introduction of a 'negative guarantee' for the existence of Europe, safeguarded by the two superpowers, that the old bipolar world is able to be artificially maintained. This construction seems neither to be stable nor meant to last for long.

The terms 'Europe' and 'ESS 2020' and their definitions are not clear-cut, and they are not clearly delineated from one another. Europe comprises the entire land mass between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, between the North Cape of Norway and eastern Anatolia. ESS 2020 terminates at the Soviet frontier. This is where realism and the utopia of the study clash with one another. It is realistic to accept that the Soviet Union cannot be divided at the Ural Mountains merely for the purpose of completing the 'Common House of Europe'. It is utopian to assume nevertheless that the Soviet Union can survive as a superpower although its centre piece, its European part, is subjected to a special, restricting regime. Let me give an example. The three Soviet fleets, with a total of approximately 270 000 men deployed towards the west, are stationed in the European part of the Soviet Union, and thus come under the ceiling of 100 000 men, which has been established for that region. Since they

might be needed to meet the Soviet Union's 'global obligations' of ESS 2020, they would have to be moved to ports in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. (The possible pertinent consequences as regards 'structural violence' in the Asian-Pacific part of the world do not have to be examined here.)

But even the relationship of European nations with one another within ESS 2020 is unclear. On the one hand, the Europe of the ESS 2020 scenario is 'a confederation of all European states with one trading market, one common currency and a European central bank . . . [which] would be similar to those of the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'. On the other hand, that confederation is assumed to be internally so unstable that it must possess collective means 'against anyone who threatens that peace, irrespective of whether the threat comes from outside or *inside* the system' (emphasis added). The reference made to the 'Brezhnev doctrine' shows that there is uncertainty as to the difference between a confederation and an alliance.

A final remark may be permitted on the assumptions regarding weapons of mass destruction.

Since the end of World War II, the two superpowers, and together with them the members of the two defence organizations, have placed their mutual relationship on a more and more rational basis. I have no doubt that this positive development is due, first and foremost, to the existence of nuclear weapons.

War waged by conventional means cannot be prevented from breaking out, neither through disarmament to ceilings of parity (throughout the course of history, attacks have been conducted from a position of military inferiority, and often enough even successfully) nor by measures aimed at establishing defensive structures and doctrines.

It is solely and exclusively political will which, in the ultimate analysis, decides upon war or peace, the observation of treaties or a change of doctrinal principles. ESS 2020 strives to create a Europe, and ultimately a world, where the internal stability of countries and regions is such that all of them consider it advantageous for their own existence to maintain the status quo in the world and remain peaceful. This development may occur, but in light of the history of mankind it appears rather unlikely. If such is the case, conventional forces alone will not provide reliable security capable of preventing the outbreak of war—not even to a limited extent. It is for this reason that the consideration of a complete elimination of nuclear arms, or even the adoption of a no-first-use policy, should include some serious thoughts on the ethical aspects of war-prevention through nuclear weapons.

II. Criteria for a defensive military doctrine

General discussion

The political goals of military doctrines are formulated by politicians, not by the military. They reflect the military-political objectives of a state, or confederation of states, or of an alliance. Whether their alignment is defensive or offensive will

therefore depend on the envisaged military-political goals. Political goals may change relatively fast. Even a change in the alignment of the political power of a state may bring about such a development. This is why the yardstick to be used to measure the peacefulness of a state is not so much the formulation of its military doctrine—provided that such a doctrine is published in its entirety in the first place—but is much more the design and scope of its armed forces. For this reason, an important indicator of intent is whether the military doctrine and the structure of the armed forces of a state correspond. The possibility for one side to verify this correspondence between the military doctrine and armed forces of the other would provide a quite substantial confidence-building effect.

Elements of a 'defensive' military doctrine might include the following: (a) the renunciation of the first use of armed force against any other state; and (b) the renunciation of any definition which transforms the first-use of armed force into a defensive measure. Take, for example, the definition of the term 'aggression' in *Voennyi Énciklopediceskyj Slovar*: 'in accordance with the Charter of the UN, the illegal application of armed power by a state against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or political independence of another state or a people (nation). Serious international violation of peace and security. Includes the characteristic traits of *initiative, the idea of intention* of an aggression . . .'¹ (emphasis added). The renunciation of such 'verbal acrobatics' as regards the definitions used, would simultaneously be tantamount to the renunciation of any kind of pre-emption and prevention.

These elements must be reflected in directives and training as well as in the guide-lines and content of military doctrine, particularly for the cadre of military leaders.

Another element of a defensive military doctrine is the renunciation of any claim to violent expansion of one's own territory at the expense of other states. But, conversely, also included are the right of self-defence, individually or collectively, in response to an unmistakable armed attack and the preparations needed for that; and the justification of the need for armed forces to guarantee the sovereignty of a state or confederation and as the means to exercise the right of self-defence.

In the final analysis, the general criteria which reflect a defensive doctrine also include statements in regard to self-constraint. These may refer to the military potential of the possible adversary (individually or taken together) or to geographical parameters. For example: one's own armed forces should not exceed X per cent ($X < 100$) of the armed forces of neighbour Y; one's own armed forces should not exceed X per cent of the sum total of the armed forces of neighbours Y and Z; and in a strip of x kilometres depth along the frontier with neighbour Y, no more than z per cent of one's own armed forces should be deployed. Armed forces may, however, also be situated without any reference to possible adversaries and geographical parameters. For example, Iceland, which is a member of NATO, does not possess any armed forces of its own. This latter type of self-constraint includes the ESS 2020 proposal that the European armed forces be limited to $4 \times 100\,000$ men = 400 000 men.

Military doctrine should consist of two parts. There should be a political part, describing the nation's or confederation's positions and objectives on: peace, war, the coexistence of the nations and states of this world, arms export and development aid. Furthermore, that part should describe the missions of the forces, including those of the nuclear forces, for safeguarding peace and 'defensive denial' in the event of war, together with any self-imposed constraints. It should also contain the overall manpower strength of the armed forces. There should also be a military part, describing the command structure, the allocation of personnel to the individual services, the organization, equipment and the peacetime deployment

At any rate, the military doctrine of a state or confederation of states or alliance should be unclassified. It goes without saying that defence plans are not a part of the military doctrine and cannot be made accessible as unclassified matter.

Doctrinal problems at the strategic, operational and tactical levels under the assumptions of ESS 2020

ESS 2020 treats threat, an essential basis of the assessment of a situation—even for a defensive military doctrine—rather cursorily. ESS 2020 is described as a 'non-confrontational relationship with all other nations around Europe'. In that context it does not apparently matter how strong, in a military sense, 'all the other nations around Europe' indeed are. It is therefore impossible to approach the problem of defensive doctrine and structure by way of the 'sufficiency of forces to defend'. We must proceed on the assumption that the 400 000 servicemen in Europe—skillfully organized, deployed and equipped—would be sufficient for 'prevention of war by way of effective means of denial and defence'.

With its 400 000 servicemen deployed on an area of five million square kilometres, the European Confederation, as opposed to the Warsaw Pact of today, would not face one problem. It would not need to go to any greater pain to credibly assure the nations around Europe that it had a defensive military doctrine at the strategic level. It could, however, underline that assurance by including in its military doctrine a self-imposed constraint similar to this:

The European Confederation commits itself to deploy in one of its four regions no more than (for example) 50 per cent of its armed forces at the same time. It will deviate from this principle only in a period of crisis or in war as applicable. Should it want to concentrate, as early as in a crisis, more than (for example) 50 per cent of its armed forces in a specific region, it will not fail to inform the two guarantor powers in a timely fashion prior to initiating such a measure.

While at the strategic level of command the enforcement of a defensive doctrine (in the sense of the impossibility of a permanent occupation or conquest of a country) may most easily be successfully accomplished through a numerical restriction of means and through self-imposed constraints of the type mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the operational level of command must envisage a different approach. While in recent history the principle holds true that the

operational level of command alone may indeed carry victory in battles, but not in war, it would certainly be reassuring for all of the neighbours of ESS 2020 if they reliably knew—despite the stated non-confrontational relationship—that the logistics at the operational level, for instance, could not support a deep thrust into their territories. Such a constraint might be formulated as follows:

The European Confederation organizes its armed forces in such a way that they will be capable at any place—even over a longer period of time—to defend and reconquer their own territory. It is ruled out, however, that the logistics can support any combat activities of the armed forces which take place at a distance of 100 kilometres (for example) from the stationary supply network of the armed forces of the Confederation. The verification of that measure is offered as an option to all neighbours and guarantor powers.

The tactical echelon of command would be so remote from the military doctrinal level (ranking above the strategic level) that a direct connection between defensive doctrine and defensive tactics would hardly be feasible. It is well known that there are many ‘alternative strategies’ which almost exclusively manifest themselves at the tactical level of command, and which express their defensive quality, primarily by their near absence of mobility, accompanied by great defensive power. It is not desirable to discuss such strategies here, which are much more tactical principles. They must be excluded from any further considerations to be done within the framework of ESS 2020 because they are based on an area-coverage with as few gaps as possible, for which the 400 000 men cannot be nearly sufficient given the length of the frontiers of the European Confederation (i.e., ESS 2020).

On the contrary, it would be the extremely limited manpower strength, in relation to the extent of frontiers and shorelines, that would trigger the necessity to provide for the employment of forces with the greatest possible mobility, making use of cover and protection and the utmost fire-power.

An ideal typically defensive military doctrine within the framework of ESS 2020 would consequently lead to: (a) a defensive strategic level of command through a restriction of the number of troops as a whole and in the regions; (b) a restricted offensive operational level of command whose offensive-invasive teeth would be extracted as a result of the constraints imposed on its logistics; and (c) a very aggressive tactical level of command which would manifest itself *within the delimitations of the operational level of command* as highly mobile, protected and combat-effective.

Doctrinal problems which might occur from the viewpoint of the two world powers

Just as today, there will continue to be two global powers (the USA and the USSR) after the year 2020 and after a possible implementation of ESS 2020. No other individual state will be able to match their military potential. These two global powers would also be assigned ‘global obligations’ by ESS 2020,

and they would need to keep the necessary means available to accomplish these goals. Unquestionably such global obligations would include the security guarantee which the two global powers must each accept for the existence of the European Confederation. Even if one assumes that such global obligations would be carried out in a spirit of co-operation, in the common role of a sort of world police or world peace corps, the scope of these obligations would nevertheless be quite substantial.

In some aspects, the means to fulfil these obligations would be restricted by ESS 2020. Neither global power would be allowed to possess more nuclear arms and warheads than the other nor than the European Confederation (although nothing is said about the possible nuclear potential of China). The USA (and Canada) would not be allowed to keep armed forces in Europe. The USSR would not be allowed to deploy more armed forces in its European part than the European Confederation in one of its regions, and a restricting special status with reference to the maritime forces of *both* global powers would be applied to the European seas bordering the oceans and the European land-locked seas.

ESS 2020 would indeed cause doctrinal problems for one or the other of the two superpowers as a result of their global obligations and the aforementioned limitations. In this connection, the difficulties of the Soviet Union would be clearly greater than those of the United States.

While the United States—taking into account the aforementioned limitations—is completely free in the formulation of its military doctrine and the structure of its armed forces, the Soviet Union might be confronted with the need to develop two different doctrines for its armed forces: one for Europe and another, entirely different one, for the Far East and the Near and Middle East. In an ESS 2020 Europe with a contractually assured parity of armed forces, including the doctrinal obligation to preserve the status quo and adopt a purely defensive posture, the USSR would need to safeguard against the possibility—which can never be ruled out even from a doctrinal viewpoint—that, for instance, China or the neighbours to the South will grow stronger and stronger. Thus the Soviet Union would be required to maintain a two-pronged ‘sufficiency of forces’ at all times. The two different Soviet military doctrines would not, however, have anything to do with the global obligations. For that area yet a third military doctrine would be required.

It is evident that it would be an extremely complex matter to translate such a tripartite military doctrine (or even three *different* military doctrines) not only into the appropriate structures but also into the training and education of the armed forces.

III. Criteria for a defensive military force posture

General discussion

When considering the structure of its armed forces, the problems of the European Confederation lie first of all in the disproportion between the scope of its

armed forces (4 x 100 000 men) and the size of its territory, particularly the length of frontiers and shorelines to be protected.

As stated in section II, at the strategic level the European Confederation would not be in a position to use its armed forces for anything but defensive action. Nevertheless, the possibility referred to above of self-imposed constraint with a view to the total number of its armed forces in one of the four regions is to be accepted as binding. Consequently, the Confederation would never have more than 50 per cent (2 x 100 000 men) of its armed forces in any one of its regions. At the strategic level of command it would need to be capable of exercising its command responsibility. Despite the exceptionally limited number of armed forces, this level of command would comprise the Confederation itself as a whole and the four regions. The individual states of the Confederation would not be a part of any of the levels of command since, as individual states, they would not exercise the power of command over their military contingents.

Again, in light of the Confederation's territorial size, the lengths of its land and maritime frontiers and the limited number of its armed forces, an effective reconnaissance, control, warning and barrier system would be of paramount significance. The development and operation of that system would be the responsibilities of the Confederation and would, as such, be incumbent upon the strategic level of command. In its basic parts, the system might be operated by civilian personnel.

In its structural considerations, the Confederation would need to concentrate on the operational and tactical level of command. These considerations should be based on the criteria discussed in the latter part of section II above.

The strategic reconnaissance, control, warning and barrier system

As pointed out above, as a result of the exceptional weakness of its armed forces the European Confederation would need a reconnaissance and warning system permitting it to alert its forces, including its nuclear potential, in a timely fashion and, above all, to arrive at the theatre of action with its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in time. Only that capability has a war-preventing effect. In addition, the system should enable the Confederation to inform the guarantor powers, the USA and the USSR, or one of the two, about approaching crises so early that they have an opportunity to make use of diplomatic (or even military) means of crisis management and take the necessary action.

The system would consist of four parts, two of which ('satellite reconnaissance' and 'control at exit-entry points', or EEP) would be designed to 'top-down' systems. This means that the information collected would be available at first to the military and political authorities at the Confederation level (strategic level of command). The arrangement does not preclude the possibility that at least the regional headquarters and the RRF command would be provided these reports for information without delay. The other two parts of the system ('warning system close to the border' and 'barrier system') would work in

accordance with the 'bottom-up' principle. Their reports would first be passed to the local commanders.

Satellite reconnaissance system

A satellite reconnaissance system would have to cover the European sphere of interest on a sufficiently frequent and regular basis so as to permit any countermeasures to be initiated in a timely fashion. That sphere of interest comprises: the east coast of North America and the Caribbean; the North Atlantic; Africa to the equator; the Arctic Zone and the Arctic Sea; and the Soviet Union and Asia to 70° eastern longitude.

EEP

A control system at exit-entry points would be needed along the border between the European (force-limited) and the Asian parts of the Soviet Union, as well as at the seaports and airports of the North American south and east coasts. The reconnaissance and control system would serve to alert friendly forces, and to advise both superpowers (or the one concerned) of possible crisis-type developments in a timely fashion.

Warning system close to the border

An electronic warning and reporting system close to the border would be optimized to detect the movements of armoured combat vehicles, and would be placed along European land borders primarily as regards Iran, Iraq and Syria. Its purpose would be to quickly alert the armed forces.

In view of the weakness of the European troops and the predominantly great distances to their sites of employment, a system of barriers, partly completed and partly under preparation, would seem to be essential. This would include terrain fortifications and prepared positions close to the border, and at high-risk coastal areas.

Structure of the armed forces

Although more than 60 per cent of the total armed forces of the European Confederation would be employed for the control and protection of the offshore waters and national frontiers, the principal task of 'prevention of war by effective means of denial and defence' would lie in the combination of strategic reconnaissance, nuclear deterrence and extremely flexible, lightly armoured Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs) possessing great fire-power. The RRFs would be the means available to the operational level of command.

Allocation of armed forces to the respective regions in terms of numbers and weight (see annex 1)

In the North Region (Stockholm) together with the South-west Region (Rome) a total of 100 000 men would be stationed. The emphasis in both regions would be on maritime forces and thus on the control and protection of adjacent waters. In the South-east Region (Budapest), 150 000 men would be stationed, with the emphasis on ground forces. In the Central Region (Strasbourg) at least 150 000 men would be deployed. In this region the accent would be on highly flexible RRFs.

Structure of the armed forces in the regions

North Region (Stockholm) (see annex 2). Altogether the North Region would have fewer than 50 000 men. In addition to the responsibility of border protection at the Finnish–Norwegian–Soviet frontiers, for the accomplishment of which land and air defence forces would be available at Frontier Command North, the region would mainly control and protect the Baltic Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea, as well as the offshore areas of the West Atlantic to the Straits of Gibraltar. The point of emphasis within this region would lie in the Baltic Sea and thus in the area of responsibility of the Nordic and Baltic (NORBAL) Fleet.

Genuine combat vessels (sophisticated missile-equipped fast patrol boats, i.e., FPBs) would only be available in the Baltic Sea. The remaining flotillas would be equipped with lightly armed 5000 ton sea-area surveillance ships of commercial-type construction, carrying helicopters.

South-west Region (Rome) (see annex 3). The overall strength of armed forces in this region would be clearly below 100 000 men. Their principal task would be the control and protection of the entire Mediterranean. To that effect, it would maintain the Mediterranean Fleet with a balanced mix of combat vessels and sea-area surveillance ships. The Iberian Peninsula and Italy would be protected by weak air defence and ground forces. Both regions (North and South-west) would have a land-based, long-range reconnaissance component.

South-east Region (Budapest) (see annex 4). With an overall strength of 150 000 men in the region, the emphasis would be on Command Turkey which would have at its disposal land and air defence forces, and a flotilla of combat vessels (of FPB type) to control the Black Sea. Protection of the border with the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania would be the responsibility of Frontier Command South-east; the protection of the coastal areas of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia would be carried out by the Balkan Command.

Central Region (Strasbourg) (see annex 5). With the exception of the Frontier Command Centre, protecting the Polish frontier with the Soviet Union, the armed forces in this region would generally be structured differently than in the other regions of the European Confederation.

The emphasis in this region would be on the RRFs and would consist of three to four air mechanized divisions, proportionate air transport forces (airplanes and helicopters), as well as air support forces (fighter bombers, fighters and combat helicopters).

The RRFs can be committed both *en bloc* and as combat task forces of different size and composition. To that effect, operations plans are being developed and tested as early as in peacetime, with the points of main effort in Finland, southern Sweden, east Poland, north-eastern Romania, east Anatolia, the Turkish–Syrian border region, Peloponnisos, Sicily and Gibraltar. Logistic support to be provided in support of these plans would be static and prepared in such a way that the RRFs could operate over a period of approximately two weeks in the scheduled areas, without, however, being in a position to join operation-sized formations able to wage battle deep into the enemy's territory.

Frontier commands (FCs)

The three frontier commands, North, Centre and South-east, would be largely structured alike. They would have an air-based reconnaissance capacity, combat helicopters and an air defence capacity and would operate, as a general rule, with patrols consisting of three combat vehicles—1 tank, 1 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and 1 anti-aircraft (AA) armoured vehicle—which, in turn, would be stationed as companies in areas near the frontier. Each FC would have several RRF battalions as reserves.

The equipment of the companies (patrols) and battalions as regards combat vehicles would be the same, namely (a) (wheeled) battle tanks, the main gun of which can fire both armour-piercing ammunition of the most sophisticated version over a distance of up to approximately 4000 metres, and fragmentation shells against soft-skin targets over a distance of up to 2000 metres; (b) (wheeled) IFVs, the main weapon of which is a modern 40-mm automatic cannon and an anti-tank guided rocket, and with a mounted infantry squad consisting of 1 non-commissioned officer and 5 men; and (c) (wheeled) AA armoured vehicles capable of bringing to bear the most modern-type cannons and rocket weapons against air and ground enemy forces. The same combat vehicle would be used by the RRF battalions.

In addition to the AA armoured vehicles used by their combat troops, the air defence capacity of the FCs would consist of ground-based mobile air defence (AD) systems to protect command centres, and an AD belt designed as a system covering all flight altitudes and providing the greatest possible degree of automation, yet absolutely reliable in the identification of airborne friend and foe (IFF).

Land commands (LCs)

The land and air defence forces of the four land commands (LCs) (Balkans, Iberia, Italia and Turkey) would be similar to those of the FCs. Depending on the geographical location of the command area, their strengths would vary. Because of the size of the area and the distance from the stations of the RRF, LC Turkey would have its own air mechanized brigade plus the proportionate air transport and close air support components.

Command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) problems

The most important task to be accomplished by European armed forces in peacetime is the reconnaissance, control and *reporting* activity. Serving that purpose would be the two strategic systems (satellite reconnaissance and control at EEP), the maritime forces and, in conjunction with the 'warning system close to the border', the FC and LC patrols. The communications belonging to these elements are redundant and designed in a way that each report and each order can be received in real time at each echelon of command. The installation of filters safeguards that only those reports and orders are actually received and stored or displayed which are of relevance to the responsible level. This is the only way to make sure that intermediate levels of command can exercise their right and comply with their obligation to evaluate and assess the contents of reports and implement their orders. The reporting and ordering echelon of command may, however, deactivate a filter on a case-to-case basis as needed for all or specific addresses so as to achieve a skip-echelon-effect.

Due to the distances in the European Command, all communications, except the tactical networks, would be satellite links. It would therefore be a part of the guarantee agreement made between the two superpowers and the European Confederation that satellites, irrespective of their tasks, must not be disturbed or destroyed in a crisis or in war.


IV. Conclusion


In the development of a structure for the weak armed forces of the European Confederation of 2020—despite an honest attempt at a defensive military doctrine—some of the essential parts (RRF) of the organizational forms have turned out to be not so very different from the armed forces of today. The reason for this may, of course, be inherent in the fact that after 30 years as a career serviceman I am lacking the fantasy to think of other structures. But the reason may also be that—because of that long professional experience—the ever-existing function of the relation between forces, space and time did not leave me any other option, given the requirement to make the utmost use of a minimum of forces.


Armed forces are not an end in themselves. Even in the European Confederation of ESS 2020 they would have a mission to accomplish. They are to be designed as the adequate means to avoid war by defensive denial. They can only accomplish that mission if—despite their numerical weakness which makes them unsuitable for any aggression—they are trained so well, are so flexible and well armed that any potential adversary (except the two guarantor powers) would have to expect to be confronted with *superior* European forces at the point of his attack. The armed forces depicted in the above scenario should be in a position to meet that challenge.


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
¹ *Voennyi Énciklopediceskyj Slovar* (Moscow, 1986), p. 20.











The role of armed forces in a European security system

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I. Remarks on the European security system model

The problems of security in the development of international relations are currently acquiring great importance. A persistent search is under way to find the ways and means to make a transition from confrontation to mutually beneficial co-operation and from the arms race to political interaction. In solving the problem of the survival of humanity in our nuclear and space age—a global task of providing ‘life-support’ for the civilizations of earth—Europe must play a key role.

Our common European history is quite complicated and instructive, both great and tragic. It deserves thorough study and its lessons should be learned. Europe is in fact our ‘common home’, where geography and history have closely connected the destinies of dozens of countries and nations. Each nation has its own problems, wants to live its own life and maintain its own traditions. But all of this does not, by any means, run counter to the concept of a ‘Common European home’ or to the assurance of joint security, the preservation of common cultural, historical, social and other values of European nations, the gradual dismantling of the bloc structure in Europe and the constructive co-operation of the states of the continent.

The ideal of the ‘European home’ is the creation of an integral entity of equal partner-states with different social systems, but enjoying the commonality of European civilization and having some shared historical background. The main road to our ‘European home’ as a community of ‘sovereign, different but peace-loving states’, stresses Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘lies in ridding Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—of the explosive burden of armaments’.¹

In this connection a question may arise: do any of the actual conditions necessary for the realization of the idea of a ‘Common European home’ exist? One can answer with full confidence that they do.

Europe has weathered the fire-storm of two devastating world wars. That is why, of all the nations of the world, those of Europe are so firmly convinced that a new world war, especially a nuclear war, is unthinkable. Political life in

Europe is characterized by very sophisticated traditions of conducting international affairs, including the fields of disarmament and security. Europe has an established system of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, negotiations and consultations as well as contacts at different levels. No less important for Europe is the Helsinki process—a unique achievement in the history of international relations.

Europe's gigantic economic, technological and scientific potential plays a special role in the building of new relations. However, we must admit that Europe is divided; forces repelling the Eastern and Western parts of the continent are contending with those attracting them. There are none the less real indications that it is feasible to find ways to a mutually beneficial integration of the economic processes in both parts of Europe. Finally one cannot fail to mention that the European continent—from the Atlantic to the Urals—is historically and culturally integral, united by the common legacy of the epochs of the Renaissance and Enlightenment and the great philosophic and social teachings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This legacy provides a huge potential for a policy of peace and good neighbourliness.

There are thus more favourable conditions for the building of a 'common home' in Europe than in any other region of the globe. The new political thinking here on the European continent is making headway more actively than anywhere else. Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that the idea of a 'Common European home' has been regarded with sympathy by the leaders of the major West European states, such as Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain, President Mitterrand of France, President von Weizsäcker and Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, and by other prominent West European political and public figures. Discussion of the way to build the 'common home' is currently a subject which features prominently on the agenda at top level meetings in the East and West. This, in turn, testifies to the extreme political significance and vitality of this concept.

Seen from this perspective, the initiative taken by SIPRI deserves attention. SIPRI proposed an unofficial meeting of military experts of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to discuss the role of armed forces within a European Security System 2020 (ESS 2020). The Institute suggested some considerations pertaining to the main conceptual and organizational principles of ESS 2020, which aims to predict the future of Europe by attempting to look beyond the horizon of today. In other words, the proposal was to discuss the situation in a Europe devoid of military deterrence and confrontation.

Analysis of the proposed model leads to the conclusion that this Europe of the future should represent a community of independent and equal peoples, co-existing on the basis of economic internationalization and political independence, freedom of choice, non-use of force, mutual respect and useful co-operation. It is only under such conditions that stable and mutually trusting ties and relations would be created among the European countries, and the barriers separating them overcome. In this respect the division of Europe into four regions—

northern, central, south-western and south-eastern—appears to be questionable. One can make assumptions from a geo-strategic viewpoint, but these are likely to yield some negative effects in interstate relations. In this context one should also take into consideration the Europe of today which is divided into two alliances of states with differing socio-political systems. This difference is likely to remain in any case. The goal is to prevent the ideological, economic and humanitarian contradictions, which spring from this difference, from translating onto the plane of interstate confrontation and from bringing about narrow egotistical stimuli for suppression of some countries by others. In other words the participants taking part in the construction of the security system will have different ‘characters’, which will vary not only in terms of geography but also in their approaches which must be recognized and respected by all.

Objections must be raised concerning the unequivocal assumption that nuclear weapons, and consequently their role as instruments for ensuring security, would remain under ESS 2020, as well as globally. We clearly should not close our eyes to the historical fact that the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear states has cleaved the very notion of the security of states. However, for human civilization security is indivisible. Thus in thinking of a better alternative for the Europe of the future it would be more reasonable to presume it nuclear-free.

There is no need to prove specifically that no kind of nuclear weapons is defensive by nature. The very existence of even minimal stockpiles of nuclear weapons would invariably stimulate the arms race, undermine the confidence of non-nuclear states in the nuclear powers and encourage the drive for nuclear weapon possession. In other words without the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, one should not expect the creation of a reliable and effective system of European and international security. That is why the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on our planet is in the interest of all of humanity.

The proposed plan for ensuring European security, which excludes the Soviet Union and the USA and assigns them only the role of guarantors, seems to be unrealistic. There is no doubt that it is impossible to create a practicable future security system in Europe without the participation of the USSR and the USA.

II. The defensive military doctrine

The core of the political aspect of a state’s military doctrine within the ESS 2020 framework must evidently be the renunciation of war as a means of achieving political aims (excluding defence against aggression on a strictly defensive, retaliatory basis), the prevention of war and the promotion of European security. These principles would be realized by the commitment of every state not to initiate military actions against any other state or states unless subjected to aggression, by the giving up of any territorial claims as regards other states, and by the readiness to build relations with other states on the basis of equality, regard for mutual security interests and peaceful coexistence. The

military and technical aspects of military doctrine should include measures which ensure the reliable defence of a country and yet which are non-provocative and do not threaten other states.

In what way will the defensive military doctrine of a state affect the construction of its armed forces?

First, the structure and stationing of the armed forces as a whole should be in line with the defensive nature of the military doctrine. In their composition the units and formations which, compared to other units, possess enhanced offensive capability and the ability to deliver powerful surprise attacks (e.g., tank, bomber and ground attack aircraft, airborne, air mobile, amphibious and marine corps) should be reduced to a minimum. In the areas adjacent to the border, units and formations should be located which possess explicitly defensive potential (e.g., motorized rifle units with a minimum amount of heavy armament, anti-tank, air defence, obstacle-erecting engineer units, etc.). Capabilities for concealed and rapid transportation of forces and armaments, especially to the border areas, should be eliminated.

Second, the structure of units and formations should be rendered purely defensive. To this end it would be necessary to limit the current mix of armaments which would add to their offensive potential. It also seems expedient to limit to a certain extent the mobility of troops and their capability for rapid transportation over extended distances. This would lessen the risk of the concentration of troops tailored for offensive strikes within a short period of time in certain areas.

Third, within the framework of the ESS 2020 it would be necessary to adopt measures to reduce the possibility of a relatively rapid buildup of military potential by a state through mobilization activities. These measures should, obviously, address the regulation of the number of trained reserves and the issue of stockpiled armaments and material, as well as their manufacture. The issue of defensive and offensive types of weapons and equipment also demands detailed discussion. For example, how can a clear delineation be made between such categories, what kinds of armament should the armed forces have, and so on.

Analysis of the history of weapon development demonstrates that there has never been a weapon which could only be used for either defence or attack. All types of weapons can be employed in both offensive and defensive combat. At the same time, it is obvious that some kinds of armaments are more effective in defence, others in offence.

Let us take the example of tanks. No one would deny that they are suited for employment in various types of operations, both offensive and defensive, but there is one certain 'rule'. In minimal quantities (e.g., 1 to 2 tanks per 1 kilometre of front line) they can only be used in defensive combat for armoured fire. With an increase in quantity (e.g., 10 tanks per 1 kilometre of front line) the tanks definitely acquire the quality of an active and mobile means of attack.

Strike aircraft possesses a great offensive potential. In terms of employment, speed, manoeuvring and strike capability air forces are superior to ground

forces. Strike aircraft is capable of delivering a strategic surprise attack; within a few hours after the beginning of a military conflict it can attack targets up to 1000 kilometres inside another country's territory.

What about the strike power of aircraft carrier task forces? Each US attack aircraft carrier deploys up to 100 combat aircraft, of which 40 are nuclear-capable. Aircraft carriers are capable of conducting active offensive operations in practically any part of the world's oceans, as well as operating against ground objectives including those deep in the territory of the potential enemy. A modern aircraft carrier is actually a sea-based air division, capable of delivering pre-emptive, surprise strikes.

Or let us take the marines. These are offensive troops trained to perform sea-landing operations, and then seize objectives within enemy territory.

All of these considerations should, no doubt, be taken into account when considering the composition, organization and equipment of the states' armed forces, as well as the organization of military production.

III. Some principles for the creation of ESS 2020

In a nuclear-free and non-violent world, security would be insured politically rather than militarily, but this would definitely require the creation of an appropriate mechanism which would allow the peoples of Europe to closely cooperate in the interest of strengthening peace. At the present time it is difficult to provide any specific recommendations on its format and structure. It might be an Organization of European Nations with the necessary working bodies such as, for example, a military staff committee, a military risk reduction centre in Europe, and so on.

It seems important here to outline the general contours, the 'supporting foundation', of a future system of all-European security and to define its role and place in the system of international security. In this connection the issue of the armed forces is of decisive importance—the question of their strength, mix, structure and weaponry, the orientation of their combat training, military activities, verification and the like.

To answer such questions it is necessary to make a thorough analysis of the level and probability of military threat which any particular state, or Europe as a whole, might face. Of course the ideal scenario of the future of humanity is one without wars and armed forces, without the arms race, threats and violence. In the near future, particularly by the year 2020, it does not, however, appear feasible to attain such a state, though new political thinking will attain a prominent place and permeate international relations. Under these conditions some vestiges of the 'position of force' policy might recur which will necessitate retaining the armed forces at a level of defence sufficiency capable of serving as a vehicle of defence against aggression, although the probability of such aggression will apparently be small. And here arises a dilemma: what legal status should the armed forces have—national or all-European?

It appears that national armed forces, at least at the initial stage of building the 'Common European home', are more preferable. First, in this case each state will retain its uniqueness—national sovereignty and independence. Its rights will not be infringed. Second, any particular state will be able to build its armed forces based upon its national traditions, taking into account its geographical position in Europe and the political realities affecting the state. At any time a nation's armed forces must be built proceeding from the principle of defence sufficiency, ensuring reliable defence of the nation and ruling out the possibility of a surprise attack and offensive operations. In practical terms it will require: making the armed force structures non-offensive; limiting the number and mix of strike armament systems; tailoring the armed force groupings and positioning to accomplish strictly defensive missions; and organizing military production at the lowest possible level.

In this connection some doubts can be expressed as to whether in some aspects of its armed forces the defending side might be inferior to the potential aggressor. It is obvious that such concern is groundless. First, for the reason that in the future security will be mostly ensured not by military but by political means. Furthermore, we are speaking about a system in which the security interests of each and every participant-state are secured by a collective effort. We proceed from the assumption that the principle of defence sufficiency in military construction will be implemented simultaneously in a majority of the countries of the world and first of all in the most economically, scientifically and technically advanced countries.

Since the system of European security will embrace all countries of the continent without exception—from the Atlantic to the Urals—it must be characterized by a high level of trust among the countries including those with differing socio-political systems. In the interest of enhancing trust between neighbouring states (and all other European states), ruling out mutual suspicions and enhancing a better understanding of each other's intentions in the military sphere, it seems appropriate to establish border zones free of armed forces and armaments.

Of vital importance in the context of ensuring European security will be a reliable and efficient international monitoring of the state of the armed forces, their activities, the volume of military production and the import and export of weapons and equipment. It will be possible to fully exploit the experience of implementing the document resulting from the Stockholm Conference on confidence-building measures, the Soviet–US Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the possible Soviet–US agreements on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons and on a considerable reduction in Europe of armed forces and conventional armaments, as well as other international treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament.

Proceeding from the assumption that within ESS 2020 the military doctrines of all states must be based on defensive principles, it can be surmised that those types of armament with explicitly strike or offensive capabilities (such as aircraft carriers, battleships, nuclear submarine cruisers, long-range aviation, tacti-

cal strike aviation, long-range self-propelled artillery and other means) will be excluded from the armed forces. It appears that light tanks might be used instead of medium; army aircraft could also be retained. Meanwhile there are no definite answers to the questions about the composition of the armed forces a particular country will need in the future, about the required types of armament and equipment or their quantity and quality. The military-political situation in the world as a whole as well as that of individual, strategically important regions will be of significant importance, too.

Looking into the near and distant future of European security one cannot but realize that its foundation needs to be laid today by a joint effort of all European states. The USA and Canada should also take part in this historic process. Today there is too much 'inflammable' material, both nuclear and conventional, concentrated on the European continent, which is capable of setting off a world war. Hence the concept of a 'Common European home' is first and foremost a concept of its demilitarization.

The WTO member states have proposed a balanced three-stage program to realize this concept.

The ultimate goal of the first stage is the achievement of balanced collective levels of the strength of the armed forces and the quantity of armaments of the WTO and NATO member states. What is worth noting is that these levels would be lower than those which now exist in either alliance. Such a state would be achieved by the mutual elimination of disparities and asymmetries in specific types of conventional armaments as well as in the armed forces of the two military alliances in Europe. At the second stage the NATO and WTO armed forces could be reduced by approximately 500 000 men with their armament and combat equipment. At the third stage further reduction of WTO and NATO armed forces and armaments would render them purely defensive in character.

Measures to reduce and eliminate the threat of surprise attack would be an integral part of the process of lowering the level of military threat in Europe. For this purpose, even at the first stage, it appears possible and necessary to establish zones with reduced armament levels from which the more dangerous destabilizing types of conventional armaments would be withdrawn completely or partially. A stricter regime could be introduced to limit military activities. A zone of reduced armament levels could serve as a 'proving ground' for testing and elaborating the concept of defence sufficiency of armaments, for research on the basics of 'non-provocative' defence, that is, the structure and deployment of armed forces for the purpose of defence.

The Soviet Union and the other member states of the WTO consistently pursue the course of practical implementation of the principles of its defensive military doctrine. Further evidence of that are the recent decisions to unilaterally reduce within two years the strength of WTO armed forces in Europe by a total of 296 300 men, and to cut the number of conventional armaments by 12 000 tanks, 9130 artillery systems and 930 combat aircraft. Other types of armaments are also to be reduced. Soviet forces deployed on the territories of

Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary will be reduced by 50 000 men and their armament by 5 000 tanks. Six armoured divisions will be withdrawn from these countries and disbanded. Also withdrawn will be assault-landing units and a number of other units, including river-crossing and landing units with their armament and equipment. Under way is a large-scale removal of tanks from the Soviet divisions still remaining on our allies' territory, after which the structure of those divisions will become unequivocally defensive. The structure of the armed forces of all of the Warsaw Treaty States is rendered defensive.

We hope that such an act of good will, a kind of advancement of trust, will have a positive impact on the beginning and progress of negotiations between the WTO and NATO on a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, and that our example will be followed in the Western countries. For it is only by practical deeds—by moving from solving relatively simple problems to more complex ones—that reduction of tensions and mutual trust can be enhanced, the process of demilitarization of international relations can be rendered irreversible and a qualitatively new model of ensuring security in Europe and on the whole of our planet can be formed.

Notes and references

* This document has been prepared for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and is exclusively a reflection of the author's personal view, and not of the official position of the Government of the USSR.

¹ *Pravda*, 8 July 1986.

Some thoughts on the role of military forces within a European security system

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It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.¹

Carl von Clausewitz

This fundamental principle, that ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other means’, is perhaps one of the most widely quoted but, unfortunately, least fully appreciated principles of strategy. All true strategists, both civil and military, have recognized that failure to follow this principle in the development and employment of armed forces risks catastrophe. The principle is usually associated with Clausewitz, because he understood and described it so well, but military historians can find examples, covering thousands of years up to the present day, of strategists who understood and followed this basic tenet. The surprising thing is not that appreciation of the principle goes back so far; what is noteworthy is the degree throughout history to which it has been ignored, or to which lip service is paid but not practical attention. This author believes that the European Security System (ESS) 2020 may be guilty of paying too little attention to this principle.

It is clear that the principle that war, the means, must remain consistent with the political objective, the goal, applies equally to the specific employment of military forces within the war (at least on the strategic scale), *and* to the development of those forces both in peace and war. It is an obvious corollary that if war is to serve political ends, the forces that wage the war must be constructed and employed in a manner that, by their very nature, they are not incompatible with those ends. Valid in the past, it will undoubtedly be valid in the future for scenarios such as the ESS 2020.

Discussing possible future approaches as alternatives to the current European security order, even those approaches based on a radical restructuring of the

current order, is a valid and helpful method. By laying out where we might want to be, we can better consider different paths to get there, particularly in the areas of military force development and arms control. The authors of ESS 2020 recognize the highly optimistic nature of their assumptions, some of which are quite breathtaking. Therefore, this paper will not look at the likelihood of achieving the proposed system. It accepts the system as described. However, we have to be especially careful in describing the patterns of the future security system, because, as Clausewitz would surely agree, they have fundamental implications for the means of war which would be relevant to them.

Turning to ESS 2020, the first question which arises is would any military forces at all be necessary? The scenario posits a Europe 'with no alliances left and no threat of confrontation inside; no threat from outside Europe'. It assumes that all states have truly accepted the view that 'armed conflict is an unacceptable method of settling disputes', and have adopted 'national military doctrines and force postures that make offensive operations impossible'. If this is the situation that exists, we must ask ourselves the fundamental question of what purpose military forces would serve, what policy objectives of states or the system could they further? The answer would seem to be: None. The primary purpose of military forces today is providing for the relative security and independence of a state or alliance. Different strategists seek to do that in different ways, depending on the objectives they think are essential to protecting their security and independence. Some believe they must be stronger than all their neighbours or potential adversaries. In some cases actual domination and occupation are sought. Others believe that merely allying with a strong partner is sufficient. Some have sought to erect barriers or even to withdraw from the international system. There are still other approaches. But, in each case, a military capability is essential, or at least complementary, to achieving strategic objectives that are laid out in the broader policy framework. However, in a situation where threat and confrontation in Europe, and with nations around Europe, do not exist, the strategic role of military forces is questionable. Indeed, if military doctrines and force postures make offensive operations impossible, and if the 'use of force requires common decision', then there is no possibility of a threat and there is *no possibility of the use of force*. This would be a highly desirable situation, but not one for which military units would be relevant, except as palace guards or supplements to the police.

This is no mere quibbling over assumptions or postulated patterns. The scenario raises the basic question of the relationship of political goals and military means. The latter have no meaning in a political system that precludes their use as a 'true political instrument'. There is no doubt that the circumstances which would permit such a political system are greatly to be desired. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that such a system might evolve in Europe or some part of it by the year 2020. But this author believes that ESS 2020, as described, fails to appreciate the apparent contradiction in a system which contains both substantial military forces and political structures which deny a role for military force.

Aside from the issue of the fundamental strategic purpose of military forces in ESS 2020, there are some technical problems, almost inherent contradictions, within the concept. A few illustrative examples deserve mention. First, the basic method for preventing possible enemy attacks is 'defensive denial'. By this it is understood that defensive forces (in terms of strategic mission) achieve their purpose by merely stopping the attacker and denying him the objectives he seeks in the defensive country/region. Thus, they could be considerably smaller than attacking forces, and, in fact, would clearly be unable to overwhelm the adversary's forces. Denial as a form of deterrence is sometimes seen as the preferable form because it is based on structures which are supposed to have no 'offensive' capability. However, this is the least effective form of deterrence, because the threat of pain to the aggressor is relatively low and limited to his armed forces (he faces no threat to his social and economic values). More important, it is not a stable form of deterrence because it allows the aggressor to predict and to manage the type and amount of pain he will suffer. Therefore, it is doubtful that 'defensive device' imparts the stability which is to be a cornerstone of ESS 2020.

A second contradiction of the scenario is its attempt to define defensive forces as those unable to carry out 'territory-seizing operations'. But any organized armed body with a significant portion of its troops contained in army units is inherently capable of seizing and holding territory. Only forces dominated by air or naval components lack this capability to a meaningful degree, yet these would be inconsistent with the ESS 2020 for other reasons.

Another question relates to capacity and potential. This is the question of the military *potential* of regions within ESS 2020 with respect to other European regions and actors elsewhere. Even if the system operates as planned and actual force levels are equal in all regions, the economic/social/industrial capacity of regions provides military potential that varies greatly. Such potential has always had a major impact on international relations in the past; why would future leaders not take it into account? For example, the central region contains enormous potential compared to the others, especially if military history and tradition are considered (as they must be?).

Finally, there is a major question of ESS 2020 that is insufficiently addressed: What is the specific relation of the USA and the USSR to it? Is the USSR in the system or not? If the system extends to the Urals, presumably the Soviet Union is in. If the Soviets are allowed a force west of the Urals equal to each region's, then it appears they are outside the system and 'in addition' to it, and apparently not constrained by the procedures that apply to regions. If there are no US forces within the system, then the USA is clearly external to it, and of what value are US security guarantees? The scenario assumes away the current geographical asymmetry question, but it does not solve it. As a related issue, if the possession of nuclear weapons is based solely on the criterion of their possession in 1988 as it appears, does this mean that major new US and Soviet security guarantees were given to parties in other regions, such as Israel, Iraq, Pakistan and India, which convinced them to forego the acquisition of

nuclear weapons? If so, those guarantees and the forces to implement them would have tremendous implications for Europe.

These few, illustrative questions are meant only to demonstrate that there can be no arbitrarily designed security system which is not based on a political framework. The point of this discussion is not to disparage the attempt to describe in general terms a security system model which can be used to define a supporting military structure. The point is to emphasize the supporting nature of that military structure and the fact that strategically it must reflect the political structure which creates it. Otherwise, it makes no sense; in such a case it will either fail to achieve the purpose of the political structure, or in the extreme it could even undermine the political structure. It must be stressed that where political objectives are ill-defined or contradictory, military forces are unlikely to be coherent or effective.

A few words on doctrine are in order here, but the focus of the rest of this paper will be on structure. Strategic doctrine, like strategic forces, must flow from the grand political object. The doctrine, or principles, which govern at operational and tactical levels (which are not of concern here) tend to be more flexible and dependent on immediate circumstances such as weather, terrain and the local balance of forces. But strategic doctrine reflects strategic purpose. This leads to somewhat of a paradox: on the one hand, doctrine may appear to change relatively rapidly as the leadership's intentions (or the leadership itself) change. On the other hand, because the nature of a regime and the circumstances which form it tend to change slowly, then its perceptions and objectives will also evolve incrementally, and supporting doctrine will follow suit. This leads to the first important point about doctrine. Doctrine is not necessarily what officials formally say it is. Changing intentions, battles among the leadership or outright disinformation can lead to misperceptions of 'true' doctrine. Therefore, the second important point about evolving strategic doctrine is: look to fundamental political objectives. For example, a truly defensive power cannot support an offensive strategic doctrine. As we discuss later in terms of forces, it might operate offensively at the operational or tactical levels, but its fundamental purpose will be defensive. Such a purpose is easier to see over time, especially in open, pluralistic societies where basic objectives and policies are continuously debated and put to the vote. For example, the defensive strategic doctrine of NATO is clear and unchanged over nearly four decades in spite of many changes over the years in how it planned operationally to achieve its defensive objectives. The point is that the criteria for a defensive doctrine are not always clear. What is clear is that doctrine will be consistent with fundamental political purpose, offensive or defensive.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of discussing force proposals in the abstract, which it is hoped the earlier parts of this paper have illustrated, some general comments on the ESS 2020 force proposals can be made. The primary criteria that bound this discussion are the force structure's constrained size (100 000 soldiers per region for all ground, air and naval forces) and its defensive nature (i.e., not only must the mission and orientation be defensive, they must be per-

ceived as such by all involved). Before continuing, a general comment is in order. There is no such thing as an 'offensive' or 'defensive' force structure. Rather, there are forces which are used offensively or defensively, and there are stronger or weaker forces. But these labels reflect the intent and objectives of the leadership, and the comparable forces of the enemy, not the force structure *per se*. For example, currently the best attacking force is a combined armour and infantry team with the necessary fire and logistical support, because it provides the combination of mobility, fire-power and protection that gives the attacker his most prized capability, initiative. On the other hand, the best defensive structure to counter this attack is the mirror image, for that is the force that allows the defender to react to the attacker and to wrest the initiative from him. As another example, some propose the creation in Europe of a network of small, lightly armed 'non-provocative' territorially based infantry as a clearly defensive force. What this really means is a proposal for a *weaker* force (relative to normal conventional forces). If the forces of all nations were so configured, then it is easy to imagine scenarios where the light infantry of one region, if mobilized and concentrated, could become threats to neighbours quite rapidly, albeit not as rapidly as a mobilized armoured/mechanized force.

The size constraint of 100 000 soldiers has many significant implications. This is a small force which is responsible for a large area. The force would have to be widely dispersed to cover and prepare defended territory. Dispersal would also be necessitated by the need for security; concentration of forces into large operational units might become necessary, but doing it for extended periods would be risky (especially as there would be no manpower resources to constitute reserves). Some technical trends will support such dispersal. One of the most important is the evolution of modern weapons. The trends in accuracy, reduced size and increased destructiveness mean the devolving of true combined arms capability (including air defence) to smaller and smaller units. It is not inconceivable that units comparable to today's battalions will have the capability of today's brigades or divisions in terms of the type and number of targets they will be able to attack. Future communications means will provide secure, reliable and effective networks to support dispersed units over the geographical distances envisioned in ESS 2020. Such communications will be necessary to allow rapid mobilization and concentration of forces, and to keep up with what would be highly fluid battlefields.

Command and control will be extremely difficult, further complicated by the multinational character of each regional force. There will have to be a highly centralized command system so that smaller units could be rapidly brought together and employed on an operational scale if needed. Conversely, each level of unit, to include the lowest, will require capable, self-confident leadership to enable it to operate independently, which in most cases will be its natural role. One can imagine that the training challenge for basic level commanders will be immense, a challenge they will be pressed to meet with short-term conscripts.

The principal requirement will be mobility, which will be a function of both organization and equipment. Small numbers, large areas, concentration and dispersal, weapon lethality—these considerations and many more dictate all-terrain (including over water), all-weather, day and night mobility that far exceeds current standards. Achieving such mobility will not be simple. It would undoubtedly be based on a combination of vehicles and aircraft. Both will be increasingly vulnerable to the modern weapons of the next century. Both require extensive logistical support which will necessitate some difficult trade-offs, given the 100 000 man limit. Civilian contract assets can handle some of the burden, but dependence on such assets has obvious drawbacks.

From these general comments we can draw a few conclusions on some of the specific questions raised by the ESS 2020 model. Tremendous mobility and fire-power, based on very sophisticated but reliable technology, will be key to regional forces. Some sort of flying platform that incorporates the fire-power of the tank/tank-killer (but suitably advanced to the year 2020) and the troop-carrying capability of the infantry fighting vehicle would be ideal for the basic unit. Its 'armour' would come from speed, stealth and special defensive electronic and other devices. The constraint on force size, and the uncertain mission, will not allow specialized forces. Fast, flexible units with appropriate equipment which can perform a variety of missions will be essential. It might be worth a reminder here that those missions could be 'offensive' and 'defensive'.

This does not mean modernized versions of current units and equipment will be obsolete. Some number of smaller, faster, better-protected main battle tanks would have limited but reduced roles. They will clearly need mechanized infantry to provide them the same support they require today. Indeed, the continuing urbanization of Europe will increasingly restrict tanks and make them more dependent on accompanying infantry. But again, the severe constraint of overall force size will preclude the existence of many manpower intensive units. Lots of infantry brigades will just not be possible.

Two specific types of units would appear to have no role in ESS 2020: they are airborne and amphibious forces. Airborne forces, once on the ground, will be too immobile and weak to compete with the type of forces envisioned above. Moreover, deep 'strategic' drops would seem to be incompatible with the defensive nature desired of regional forces, and tactical/operational envelopments would be more appropriately performed by air assault or armoured/mechanized forces. Amphibious forces would be eliminated for many of the same reasons: the limited force size could not accommodate such specialized units, their capabilities seem to contradict the defensive nature that is desired and limited over-shore operations could be done by airlifted units. It is not clear if any of the regions would need amphibious forces for out-of-area operations, but it is unlikely.

Thus, it would appear that there would not be revolutionary changes in current organizations and equipment, but there would be significant evolutions. Therefore, would such a force structure meet the other main criterion, which is

that its nature be defensive and perceived as such? The answer is probably yes. However, that result flows more from *a priori* constraints, such as the small overall force size and the political prohibition on the use of force, than it does from the structure *per se*. The dispersal of the force under routine circumstances, or the lack of large, operational manoeuvre units would no doubt contribute to the pacific perception, but the structure itself would not be the source of that perception. That is not a surprising result, however, because it reflects the fact that when seeking to determine the offensive or defensive nature of a military force, the source is the objectives of the political leadership.

Notes and references

* The views expressed in this paper are solely the personal views of the author. They do not necessarily reflect any policies or opinions of the United States Government or any of its Agencies or Departments.

¹ von Clausewitz, C., *On War*, eds and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N. J., 1976), p. 87.

On political and military aspects of a European security system

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I. ESS 2020: prospects and considerations

The objective pursued by the hypothetical model of a European security system for the year 2020 (ESS 2020) is to be welcomed. As the vital interests of the peoples of Europe are involved, the necessity of a co-operative security structure is quite obvious. Since the foundation of the socialist defence alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) member states have striven for the creation of a system of common security in Europe which would enable all European states to combine their efforts for the safeguarding of peace.¹ They plead for the simultaneous disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the WTO and, as a first step, for the elimination of their military organizations, as well as the final establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.² In view of the military confrontation in Europe and the existence of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems—the use of which could result in the annihilation of civilization on the continent—it is legitimate to think about a future common European house in which threat, deterrence and confrontation will no longer exist, and in which the two military alliances will no longer be necessary.

Visions of a world without weapons and force are not new. As a long-term final goal the socialist countries wish to achieve general and complete disarmament.³ The United Nations, the Palme Commission and, indirectly, even NATO have stated their support for that.⁴

In our time of upheavals the GDR and the other socialist countries plead for improvement of the world and for comprehensive security. In his address to the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly Mikhail Gorbachev, the highest representative of the USSR, presented convincing prospects of an era of peace and international co-operation. The hypothetical and long-term forecasts for the development of Europe, though they may vary, are in line with this global framework. The project leaders have submitted a possible scenario for a future European security system which contains a number of interesting ideas and suggestions.

We whole-heartedly support the primary premise that all states consider military conflict as an unacceptable method of settling controversies and that they draw the necessary conclusions for their foreign and military policies. Owing to its basic political attitude, its historical experience and its geographic and strategic position, the GDR has always been interested in preventing any military conflict in central Europe, in which its territory would be a major theatre of operations with unimaginable consequences. Together with all of the member states of the WTO it pleads actively, according to its capabilities, for the resolution of all disputed international issues exclusively in a peaceful fashion, by political means.

The demands of the scenario for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and the scrapping of all stockpiles must be supported. This is in keeping with numerous proposals from both socialist and capitalist countries, such as the 5 April 1988 Joint Declaration of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of the Federal Republic of Germany for a prohibition of chemical weapons. As far as renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is concerned, the Soviet Union took this step unilaterally in 1982, and the WTO member states laid down this principle in their May 1987 Declaration on Military Doctrine.

The socialist countries in Europe and influential circles in Western Europe consider zonal solutions such as nuclear- and chemical weapon-free zones and zones of confidence and security as steps towards the reduction of military confrontation.⁵ Chairman Honecker of the GDR Council of State stressed at the Berlin meeting on nuclear-weapon-free zones that: 'We regard nuclear-weapon-free and peace zones as an important stage on the way towards strengthening of peace and security. They can directly lead to the reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.'⁶

A fundamental condition for a future European security system is that all countries recognize the political and geographic status quo and that no individual nation attempts to jeopardize, or even to change, the frontiers or the political system of other participating nations. This problem area also touches upon the specific security interests of the GDR, which are still threatened by efforts hidden behind the slogan of 'keeping the German question open'. Such demands to change the status quo undoubtedly undermine the prospects for an ESS 2020. A European security system is only conceivable if the existence of the two social systems is accepted and if the states of both social systems learn to get along with each other peacefully and in a neighbourly way.

It is not unequivocally clear in the scenario what is meant by Europe and who will belong to the ESS 2020. On the one hand, in accordance with the Document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, Europe is seen as a whole from the Atlantic to the Urals. On the other hand the Soviet Union is to be excluded from the European security system and to act as a guarantor power, as is the USA. This would create a Europe from Portugal to Poland. Some people mean only Western Europe when they refer to

Europe, but such attempts to scale down the European house are not realistic. According to geography and history as well as the perception of its citizens, the major part of the USSR to the west of the Urals belongs clearly to Europe. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the highest representative of the Soviet Union, has already given an answer to the attempts at 'excluding' the USSR.⁷ He emphasized that Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, Karelians and other peoples of the USSR have contributed considerably to the development of European civilization. They rightly regard themselves as Europeans. The GDR has close alliance relationships with the USSR, which have developed over decades and which are vital especially to its security. The GDR would attach great importance to the fact that the Soviet Union, as a CSCE participant, should also be included in the ESS 2020.

Similarly the US and Canadian ties and alliance relationships with the West European states, which have developed since World War II, are a reality that has to be taken into account in the concept of a common European home. However, the USA must be precluded from acting contrary to the interests of the European peoples by misusing the territory of the continent to threaten countries outside Europe with military force or to attack them, as has already been the case. Ultimately the ideas of creating a future European security system will only have a real chance within the CSCE process if the Soviet Union, the USA and Canada take part.

Provided that a European security system exists, the deployment of US and Canadian forces in Europe and the presence of Soviet forces to the west of the border of the USSR will no longer be necessary. As is generally known, the Soviet Union also included in its far-reaching disarmament concept the redeployment to their home countries of all troops deployed in foreign countries. The WTO member states in their Declaration on Military Doctrine emphasized the aim to remove military bases on the territory of other states and to repatriate the troops to their national territories. It is obvious that steps in this direction must rest on mutual agreements.

It is a matter of fact that the USSR and the USA have world-wide interests. Europe can neither be detached from its ties with these two leading powers nor from its correlation with the security of the world. In their own interests the European nations are forced to consider the security problems which could arise from possible military conflicts or other political, economic and military developments outside the continent. For the projected period of the ESS 2020 scenario, reliable forecasts can hardly be made that a political safeguard of peace throughout the world will have been reached, and that no threat of any kind from outside Europe will exist. If absolutely no threat existed, armed forces would be superfluous.

The proposal to establish an all-European confederation with central institutions and certain regional organizations needs further consideration. The existence of sovereign states belonging to different political and social systems has to be taken as the basis of such consideration. As the scenario rightly states, a qualitative development of the European communities will take shape in the

near future. The socialist countries of Europe will continue to deepen their co-operation as well. These developments need not stand in the way of improved East–West relations, as has been proved by the entering into official relations of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid and the European Community.

An ESS 2020 confederation could, as it were, be a system of sovereign states which would co-ordinate their policies and their international relations as closely as possible, and which would co-operate in all possible fields. In a common European house, institutions and organizations which cover the entire continent would certainly be required. To specify this in detail already today seems premature.⁸ Steps in that direction could be taken within the CSCE process in order to achieve an ever closer and more comprehensive co-operation and co-operative security structures. It is difficult to predict whether it will be possible to achieve a confederation in the above-mentioned sense by 2020. In any case this should not be made an absolutely necessary prerequisite for a European security system. In view of the totally different status of Berlin (capital of the GDR) and Berlin (West) under international law, the idea that the seat of the central all-European institutions should be just there is a doubtful one. The choice could more likely fall on cities such as Vienna, Stockholm or Geneva.

In part the proposed regional structure with its four centres does not correspond to historical realities. As regards the absence of an East European Region, in the form of the European part of the USSR, we have already stated our opinion. The Northern and the South-Western Regions would consist only of capitalist states, whereas the Central and South-Eastern Regions would comprise both capitalist and socialist states. Furthermore, it seems doubtful whether Czechoslovakia, given its close ties with Central Europe and especially with the GDR, should be placed in the South-Eastern Region. As is generally known, the geographical centre of Europe lies in Czechoslovakia.

Fundamental objections have to be made against the proposal to establish a European Nuclear Force (ENF) and to the proposal that the nuclear capability be controlled by two West European states. This would result in unequal relations between the European countries and in the danger of misuse for a policy of pressure and blackmail; confidence- and security-building measures would be made more difficult. The socialist countries and wider and wider circles of public opinion consider the employment of nuclear weapons a threat to the existence of mankind, and especially to the peoples of Europe. For the GDR even the effects of tactical nuclear weapons would result in irreparable damage. The WTO member states unswervingly stand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They resolutely object to nuclear weapons remaining in the structure of armed forces and armaments. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, Supreme Commander of the Combined Forces, emphasized, ‘They are prepared to organize their defence without nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and to practically implement the principles of denuclearization concerning the structure and training of

the armed forces without delay, provided, of course, that the other nuclear powers pursue the same course.’⁹

The socialist countries are well aware both of the close correlation between the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and the problems associated with these aims. The Chairman of the GDR Council of State declared: ‘A world free from nuclear weapons is, no doubt, a bold idea. But it is not an illusionary vision, no matter how arduous the road to its realization. To go it to the end needs goodwill, courage and patience from all sides. It demands determination and confidence in the strength and common sense of the peoples, whose primary human right is peace.’¹⁰

In summary, the considerations on the feasibility and conditions of a European security system show that there are close correlations between the political, economic and military problems and that armed forces and armaments do not exist for their own sake but constitute a part of the ‘total strategy’ of a state or an alliance. In other words: A common European house is inconceivable without the renunciation of political aims which impair the existence and sovereignty of other states.

The military aspects of a European security system are also very complex and manifold. They encompass the content and main criteria of military doctrine, balance of power and force structure as well as the development of the arms industry.

II. Criteria for a defensive military doctrine

In their Declaration on Military Doctrine, which was adopted in May 1987, the WTO member states subordinated their military doctrine to the task of preventing any war, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. This is the most important aspect of a defensive military doctrine that results from the conditions of the nuclear space age (i.e., the increasing interdependence of states and peoples) from scientific–technological developments, and the existence of weapon systems with the implicit capability for global destruction. The scenario, too, emphasizes the prevention of war as the basic objective of a future European security system.

Under these conditions, military means and the continuing perfection of weapon systems are decreasingly viable measures to guarantee security. Real security can only be achieved by political instruments, by peaceful co-operation. The present situation in which security is primarily maintained by military means, by nuclear deterrence and the capability of mutual destruction must be gradually overcome and replaced by a collective security based upon political guarantees. Referring to this question the Minister of National Defence of the GDR, Army General H. Kessler, wrote the following: ‘This security system should be built upon agreed political rules and methods geared to the accommodation of interests, to the management and avoidance of conflicts by peace-

ful means, something which is dictated by common sense today and which has proved possible and effective.’¹¹

A new approach to all issues of the military doctrine of states and alliances is necessary. Military–strategic concepts that aim at nuclear deterrence, at the feasibility of conducting and winning wars, at surprise, preventive or pre-emptive operations, at offensive capability and deep strikes must be overcome. The principles of military doctrine of the states and alliances are the result of the development of many decades and are partially based on century-long security perceptions; take, for example, the maxim: ‘He who wants peace prepares for war’. In recent years essential changes have taken place in the military–political and military–strategic thinking of the Soviet Union and the entire WTO, which found their expression in the Declaration on Military Doctrine of 29 May 1987. Minister of National Defence of the GDR, Army General H. Kessler, stated that ‘much progress has been achieved in the process of elaboration and implementation of the new military doctrine and that this strictly defensive doctrine is prevailing throughout the field practice’.¹²

Reshaping towards a defensive military doctrine is no easy task to be accomplished on short order. Military doctrine is not merely a general theoretical view but constitutes the official and binding principles of the state or alliance concerning military tasks and the ways in which the state or alliance and the armed forces fulfil them. Even with an ESS 2020 approach there will still be military doctrines of individual states corresponding to the social conditions and the missions to be completed. States with different social systems will continue to exist in Europe, but their mutual relations will be characterized by a comprehensive co-operation. Mutual fears of threat will be reduced; the military doctrines of all states will have a defensive posture and correspond to the concept of common security.

The *political aspect* of a defensive military doctrine is determined, first of all, by the previously mentioned main criterion (i.e., the prevention of war) and, furthermore, by the defensive character of the doctrine, its orientation to no use of military force, to disarmament and confidence building.

The participating states of a European security system would respect and promote the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act that relate to: having no territorial claims against a state inside or outside Europe; regarding no state and no people as an enemy; not threatening militarily; not conducting provocative military activities, and never and under no circumstances, conducting armed attacks against a state or alliance of states; co-ordinating military activities such as exercises, troop deployments and the like in order to have a share in the building and maintaining of confidence; and providing mutual support in case of military threat.

The declarations and actions in favour of disarmament and the reduction of forces and armaments in conformity with the idea of ‘creating peace with fewer and fewer weapons’ are decisive criteria for a defensive military doctrine.

The continuation of the arms build-up that has lasted up to the present time runs counter to the establishment of co-operative security structures and thus to

a European security system. Beyond this the GDR has a burning interest in stopping the arms race, also because of its ambitious policy of economic and social aims in solving environmental problems and the like. GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer, expressed the conviction that: 'Immediate and effective disarmament is necessary for mankind to survive. Economically, too, both in the East and the West, the arms race encounters the bounds of the bearable. The arms race and the settlement of global problems exceed the economic capabilities of all states. The only feasible alternative is: disarmament, the settlement of global problems instead of the arms race.'¹³

It is in this context that one must see the scenario's question of how, on the long road towards an ESS 2020, a 'wrong' military organization can be avoided. This depends on a realistic assessment of the potential military threat (which will be discussed later on) and the orientation towards disarmament. It will be necessary to count back from the year 2020 and to discuss the military measures that must be initiated as well as those that must urgently be avoided. As is known, arms policy in particular is pre-planned over a long period. This means that right from the beginning long-term objectives would be jeopardized if long-term arms programmes cannot be stopped. Within the framework of an ESS 2020, and on the road to such a system, binding agreements on investigation, development and production in the military field ought to be made in order to exclude any effort to achieve superiority by means of new weapon systems. This approaches the very important field of arms conversion for which it is indispensable to conduct separate investigations. No limitations must be imposed on the verification of agreements. Without such provisions an effective European security system seems inconceivable.

A defensive military doctrine should be characterized by transparency, openness and predictability to create an atmosphere of confidence inside and outside the European security system. The setting up of an ESS 2020 without confidence among the participating states is impossible. On the road to this objective confidence- and security-building measures may contribute to the removal of 'enemy images' dating from the cold war period and having a long-term effect.

Despite the inevitable coexistence of and confrontation between opposed social systems and ideologies, it is necessary to regard the other side as a partner in a policy of common security and co-operation. This requires a constant exchange of knowledge and ideas concerning military policy, military doctrine, military theory and the training of armed forces.

The *military-technological aspect* of a defensive military doctrine is determined primarily by analysis of threat and the military missions resulting from it that are in keeping with the principles of reasonable sufficiency and response.

The ESS 2020 scenario proceeds from the assumption that in Europe there will be neither threat nor confrontation. This is conceivable provided that the CSCE process is steadfastly carried out in correspondence with the Helsinki Final Act and that comprehensive results have been achieved primarily in disarmament and reductions of armed forces. The security of the participants must not be guaranteed and organized by means of confrontation with each other but

rather by unity and co-operative action. The experience of both the past and the present shows that what is needed is a realistic approach without any illusions, which also takes into consideration the major difficulties and the resistance from certain influential circles. At the same time the first successful steps towards arms limitation, disarmament and confidence building justify a certain optimism, in particular because a broad movement has emerged that stands for a world free of nuclear weapons and violence. Nevertheless it is important not to underestimate the risk of new threats and crisis situations caused by set-backs or sudden changes in the domestic developments of a European state, which would favour reactionary forces hostile to peace.

The attempt to define a potential threat to a European security system that might emerge in the year 2020 from the outside does not seem to lead to useful results. As long as there is no world-wide political system for safeguarding peace, the European states will have to consider such a threat and take appropriate measures. This extra-European aspect will, in particular, affect the military–doctrinal views of the USA and the USSR. On the other hand the ESS 2020 must establish guarantees against being dragged into conflicts by the ‘extra-European interests’ of participating states. Peace-keeping missions for ESS 2020 armed forces contingents outside Europe would be acceptable only within a framework similar to that currently governing the use of UN troops. These troops play an increasingly important role now and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This should be seen in the context of the current trend to settle conflicts not by military but by political means.

The mission of the armed forces within a ESS 2020 would therefore be limited, in the first place, to the protection of European states, borders, coasts and lines of communication at sea as well as the air space of the continent.

The principle of reasonable sufficiency, or sufficient defence capability, as a decisive criterion for a defensive military doctrine is closely connected with the previously mentioned threat analysis. The ESS 2020 requires the maintenance of only a minimum of armed forces and weapon systems necessary for the safeguarding of security and the defence of the states of the continent against a potential external threat. This military potential must not pose any real or potential threat to the nations outside Europe.

Sufficiency is not a static, but rather a dynamic quantity, which depends upon the degree of threat and which can be achieved, above all, by essential reductions of armed forces and armaments. However, principles can be established already today. Sufficiency means that: the strength of armed forces, their armament and equipment will not be based on what is possible or feasible but on the necessary minimum for defence; the disposition and deployment of forces will be strictly in keeping with defensive missions; and the strategic and operational levels of the armed forces will no longer possess attack capabilities, or the ability to conduct surprise attacks or deep offensive operations.

The WTO not only declares its principle of reasonable sufficiency, but by its deeds shows that it has already started the implementation of this principle. This is primarily testified to by the important decision taken by the USSR to

unilaterally cut troops and armaments, as was announced in Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the 43rd UN General Assembly. The Minister of National Defence of the GDR pointed out that the socialist defensive alliance does 'by no means insist on maintaining the present potential but is striving unrelentingly for the fastest possible reduction of the level of military confrontation until obtaining the attack incapability on both sides'.¹⁴

The demand for 'attack incapability' requires a more precise and concerted definition. This can only be achieved by complex mutual measures which will take place over an extended period of time. In the process, essential changes should focus on the following:

On the basis of defensive military doctrines the operational concepts and combat manuals, as well as the education and training of troops, must be oriented exclusively to defence.

The structure of the armed forces, their weapons and equipment, and especially their mobility and fire-power, may permit defensive operations but must not be sufficient for surprise attacks and offensive operations.

The rear support (logistics) and the infrastructure must also be limited to defensive missions.

The preparations for mobilization must be limited to the principle of defence sufficiency.

The principle of response is another essential criterion for a defensive military doctrine. It implies the commencement of military actions only in the event of attack against one or several ESS 2020 states. Thus any kind of preventive strikes or pre-emptive actions, as well as any first use of weapon systems, are excluded. This approach is unequivocally geared to preventing war by political means up to the last possible moment. If an act of aggression is unleashed, the armed forces must be prepared for defensive operations. The principle of response affects the entire military policy and strategy (i.e., the allocation of financial, material and personnel assets, the development and production of combat equipment, the training and deployment of troops and headquarters) as well as the potential employment of armed forces.

The WTO member states have already initiated important steps in order to relate their military doctrine to the principle of response. They have unilaterally renounced the first use of nuclear weapons to conduct any preventive or escalating actions in the event of an imminent threat of war. These advances constitute a considerable risk to them because they have deprived themselves of the possibility of militarily opposing an aggressor at an early stage. They have broken with the old maxim 'attack is the best defence'. The developments in military science, the planning at headquarters and the training of the troops concentrate upon the preparation and conduct of defensive engagements and operations. In summary, the military efforts of the WTO member states are oriented exclusively towards defence, and are undertaken in order to ensure that any attack against the alliance or one of its members would have a poor chance of success

and be a crushing defeat for the aggressor. They do not strive for victory in war, but for its prevention.

III. Features of defensive armed forces

Starting from the above-mentioned main criteria of a defensive military doctrine, it would be necessary to initiate and realize the reshaping of the armed forces into a posture of incapability of attack. Here, it has surely to be taken into account that the process of reorganization of the armed forces, their structure, organization, equipment and training will be complex and protracted. A whole series of considerations such as social, historical, economic, scientific and geographical factors as well as the position of a country within an alliance and other concerns have influenced, and are still influencing, the development of national armed forces. The process of reorganization would be realized step by step over a long period of time.

It is necessary, first of all, to clarify the purpose and tasks of the armed forces in a European security system. As already mentioned their task would be above all to protect the European states, their borders, shores and naval lines of communication and the air space of the continent from all possible threats from outside. However, in ESS 2020 the armed forces would, to a certain extent, be in a transitional stage; they would guarantee the prevention of a 'security vacuum' until non-military security guarantees could be created once and for all on a world-wide scale. The key problem for the reshaping of the armed forces into a purely defensive posture for incapability of attack is disarmament, that is, the quantitative and qualitative reduction of troops and armament. Here one has to consider that this is a rather complex problem in which interrelations between services, arms and weapon systems have to be taken into consideration.

Possible principles for reorganization of the armed forces could include the following essentials:

First, there must be substantial reductions of troops and military equipment to agreed ceilings. The question concerning the lowest possible level of efficient armed forces for the defined defensive mission can only be answered in terms of possible threat, and taking into account the relation between weapon systems and personnel. One can assume that this level will be a fraction of the size of the armed forces of today. To provide detailed specifications of a decrease to the level of 100 000 men by the year 2020 seems to be premature since that will depend on the progress reached in disarmament, the reduction of armed forces all over the world and the extent of peace-keeping accomplished by political means.

Second, there must be a limitation and elimination of those arms and weapon systems which are regarded as especially offensive and destabilizing. Leading representatives of the WTO consider these to include, among others, tactical

attack aircraft, tactical missiles, long-range and highly mobile artillery and the operational armour component of them.¹⁵

Third, attention must be paid to the dangers of technically new systems being substituted for reduced or eliminated weapon systems and of a so-called defence superiority being reached by expansive rearmaments. This would result in further rounds of the arms race with the additional economic burdens which would arise. (Reduction of the armed forces is closely connected with the problems of the arms/defence industry which will not be dealt with here.) The questions concerning structure, organization, equipment, command and control of armed forces in ESS 2020 can only be answered in principle without going into detail. First, one should consider that even after 30 years two different social systems as well as national states with sovereign rights, including the right of adequate defence, will continue to exist. That is why the change towards multi-lateral armed forces with one central headquarters and several regional headquarters is, as a general solution, rather unlikely. However, co-operation to solve common problems would be conceivable.

There are several forms of manning armed forces: compulsory military service, voluntary military service, militia or mixed forms. The decision on this issue has to be taken in accordance with the requirements and abilities of the respective states and will always be a sovereign right of every state.

After the liberation of the world from all weapons of mass destruction, the armed forces in the ESS 2020 framework could consist of three parts: ground forces, air defence forces and naval forces.

The *ground forces* would have the task of defending land and naval borders against possible invasion by the troops of an aggressor. In this they would have to co-operate with the air defence forces and the naval forces. The ground forces would consist of mobile units and formations having at their disposal the defensive means, especially against tanks, aircraft and amphibious forces. The weapons and equipment of these forces would mainly consist of small arms, artillery pieces (mortars, guns, anti-tank guided missiles), anti-aircraft missile systems, radar stations, communication systems, engineering equipment and means of transport (armoured and non-armoured vehicles, helicopters and transport aircraft).

The *air defence forces* would have to guarantee air sovereignty and protection from enemy air attack. Their weapons and equipment would consist of anti-aircraft missile systems, interceptors, radar stations, communication equipment and the like.

The *naval forces* would defend the European shores, the air space above these shores and the sea routes of the merchant fleets. Their armament and equipment would consist of frigates and escort vessels, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, anti-submarine vessels, naval aircraft for naval reconnaissance and submarine defence purposes, coastal artillery, radar stations and communication equipment.

In connection with the tasks of the naval forces, agreements by all ESS 2020 states would have to be reached regarding the use of the European adjacent

waters, their straits and sea routes, including a limitation of the activities of the naval forces. The regional deployment of the armed forces in a European security system should be laid down in agreements covering the different missions, structures and strength of the national armies in the various regions. The naval forces, for example, could consist exclusively of forces of the states bordering the European adjacent waters. Other states would instead contribute larger shares of the ground forces or air defence forces.

The C³I systems would have great importance for the role of the defensive armed forces. In order to provide timely detection of the possible military activities of an attacker, modern means of reconnaissance, including common satellite surveillance, would be used. The information gained would be transmitted to the respective centres. The most modern electronic equipment would be required for data transmission and comprehensive and fast data evaluation. High-tech command and communication equipment would also have to be available. The influence of possible weapon system developments during the next 30 years on the equipment and weapons of the ESS 2020 armed forces needs further investigation. Basically one should start from the above-mentioned principle of reasonable sufficiency, that is, not introducing everything into the armed forces that is technically feasible but only that which is necessary for defence. Accordingly, research and development in the field of military technology would have to be taken into account. In order to avoid the destabilizing and unpredictable changes in military and technological development, we must end the arms race and bring about disarmament and conversion of the arms industry. An appropriate current example is the struggle of different forces, among them especially those of the WTO member states, to prevent the militarization of outer space (i.e., the development of weapon systems as planned, for instance, in the 'Strategic Defence Initiative').

In summary, many questions related to the military doctrines and the armed forces in an ESS 2020 remain open. Further detailed investigations would be required which should be carried out together by scientists and military experts from the participating states of the CSCE. The merit of the ESS 2020 scenario is that a series of ideas and suggestions have been offered for research in this field.

Notes and references

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² 'Über die Militärdoktrin der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages', *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, 30–31 May 1987.

³ Already at the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty on 14 May, the signatory states accepted (in article 2) the general disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

⁴ Schlusssdokument der 1. Sondertagung der UN Vollversammlung über Abrüstung, *Dokumente zur Abrüstung 1977–1982* (Berlin, 1984), p. 107 ff; Der Palme Bericht, *Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission für Abrüstung und Sicherheit* ([West] Berlin, 1982), p. 156;

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⁸ See Schmidt, M. and Schwarz, W., 'Das gemeinsame Haus Europa: Realitäten, Herausforderungen, Perspektiven (II)', *IPW-Berichte*, Berlin, vol. 10 (1988), p. 4.

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The role of military forces in a European security system

Commandant Daniel Bosserelle

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I. Personal comments

As regards the ESS 2020 scenario, let me make some preliminary remarks about the effectiveness of the next arms control talks, the appraisal of the threat and about the strategic approach of our defence.

The ESS 2020 scenario is, indeed, in opposition to that which General-Secretary Gorbachev proposes in his book *Perestroika*. Such a scenario does not take into account the European part of the USSR, putting aside the Gorbachev idea of a 'common European house'. However, by giving nuclear power to the new European bloc, the scenario is in opposition to the Soviets, who are trying to denuclearize Europe. So, how could the USSR agree to a scheme that ignores it and which contradicts Soviet proposals?

I will not dwell upon the costs and the difficulties of a marriage of Western ideology and the Marxist system. But, let me nevertheless note that I cannot imagine such a union without an intricately arranged wedding.

From a military point of view, the appraisal of threat is obvious. Indeed, the project allows both superpowers enough latitude to dispose military forces which would be stronger in quality and quantity than the European ones. Moreover, the Soviet forces would have the opportunity of being stationed beyond the Ural Mountains. If military power is similar on both sides, the basis of peace will be either fear (i.e., a negative peace or non-war) or trust (a co-operative peace). But on the other hand, if it is not similar we cannot rely on a real guarantee. It is sufficient to remember history!

In fact in such a new scheme Europe would be regarded as a Third World nation because it would have few means to implement its own policy. Considering its demographic, economic, intellectual and cultural potentials, this is, of course, irrelevant. Moreover the high cost of research and development (R & D) in the weapon industry is generally reduced by foreign market opportunities. But if Europe could no longer sell abroad, it would also no longer be able to modernize its military forces through technological advances. This would also

amount to limiting its capacity for innovation in civil fields, atrophy of its economy and in the long run, the maintenance of Europe in an underdeveloped status. Last but not least the non-European interests of the new bloc would lead it to a necessary opposition of one of the superpowers protecting it.

In addition to a military threat, Europe would face an economic one coming from the two superpowers, which would still be able to implement their policies. That paradox and what I have mentioned above strengthen the importance of the US and Soviet guarantee of the existence of ESS 2020. Indeed problems encountered outside Europe could turn into a threat to Europe. The superpowers, with their military potentials, would not limit themselves to applying political pressure.

All in all considering the hypothesis of the ESS 2020 scenario, the new bloc would not be an international power but rather an international 'non-power'. For instance the setting up of a military doctrine and special military structures are actually nonsense. That kind of intellectual exercise is, however, of military interest because, even if it is far from reality, it enables us to define what a non-provocative defence could be in practice. From a military point of view the very few troops granted for the defence of ESS 2020 (400 000 soldiers)—in relation to its strategic expanse and its four different military areas—raise the problem of the effectiveness of the defence of Europe.

If we consider that the ESS 2020 scenario would be implemented in 30 years we can assert that, in the meantime, no revolutionary new arms will emerge. There is a necessary 10 to 15 year period of R & D from the time when a new arms programme is planned, and the operating life is about 20 years for any kind of weapon. Thus we can assert that no really brand-new arms will be on the market.

II. Criteria for a defensive military doctrine

Military doctrine expresses the political ambition of a country in relation to the international balance of power. As the international strategic balances continues to alter the doctrine is obliged to change as well. Doctrine is not an end in itself but a way to guarantee political and strategic stability. This means, of course, that a doctrine is in no way 'holy'. As far as I am concerned, I think that three main data must be taken into account: the strength balance, the present state of the technology and evolution of the weapon system, and the doctrine of the opponent.

It will now be necessary for our opponent to include the ESS 2020 European bloc in its doctrine. The USSR would, of course, have to set up new defensive structures in the western part of its territory (i.e., from the ES 2020 bloc to the Urals). Beyond that limit the Soviets would choose the best structures in terms of their interests as an international power (probably in agreement with the USA). These interests might relate to either Europe or the Third World.

In terms of strategy Soviet military doctrine has not altered since Lenin as regards notions of peace and war. It is focused on a Marxist-Leninist approach to international relations, which postulates that: peace is not the status quo but the result of the total victory of socialism,¹ and that war is inevitable between the two systems. As the ESS 2020 scenario perceives Europe as non-Marxist, we would still be an opponent for the Soviets. We must take this into account in the establishment of our doctrine.

As far as the USA is concerned, the obvious diminishing of NATO's effectiveness would lead to a recognition that the doctrine of 'flexible response' had become irrelevant. It would be obliged to return to a policy of classical deterrence against the USSR and ESS 2020, because the weapons of the three blocs would be similar.

A balance has been reached for strategic nuclear forces, but this is not the case for conventional forces. The two superpowers keep on modernizing conventional weapons, increasing an imbalance that could backfire on Europe.

Last but not least we must also take into account the threat which could come from the rest of the world. That threat could be demographic, political, conventional or terrorist in nature and must be appraised in terms of risks (e.g., terrorism, hostage-taking). Europeans should be able to respond to such actions. The military doctrine described in the ESS 2020 scenario must not ignore those facts.

On the other hand, the nuclear power of ESS 2020 would be necessarily focused on given geographic areas. I mean, of course, the areas that have the same nuclear capacities. The two superpowers that are to guarantee the existence of ESS 2020 would be direct targets, which is paradoxical indeed. China would also be concerned although a direct military attack in Europe would seem to be total nonsense.

One of the main notions of 'non-provocative defence' is not to name the opponent, and indeed we feel a threat only if we are aware that military forces are directed against us. Thus Europe must have a military structure that does not frighten its neighbours. We must set up a military doctrine that is applicable to every likely opponent in order to prevent a country from focusing its military forces on Europe.

The new nuclear deterrent power concept would have to be a 'strong to strong' or a 'strong to weak' one because the nations involved would have the same nuclear capacity. The 'strong to strong' concept is defined in relation to the political and military strength balance. As Europe would be equal to the other blocs in the nuclear field, it would have to abide by that rule. But in terms of conventional forces Europe would not be as powerful. To offset such a situation it will be necessary to define a deterrent concept that would take into account the French views. We will therefore have to clarify the idea of an ultimate warning to stop military conflict that only can be implemented with pre-strategic nuclear weapons.

On the other hand if one of the superpowers disclaims its duty Europe would face a complete conventional handicap. Then we would have to convince our

opponents that we are determined to defend ourselves with our own means and at whatever cost. We could face such a conventional attack if one of the super-powers, which is to guarantee the existence of ESS 2020, were to deny its duty and instead try to subjugate Europe. Europe could not stop an attack with conventional means, and in such a case, should be able to threaten an invader with nuclear force. How then could ESS 2020 warn an enemy? It could use diplomatic means or employ the ultimate warning by firing strategic nuclear missiles at targets of high psychological value.

If we believe that the effectiveness of a doctrine of deterrence rests on political willingness to actually use force, oral warnings would only make an opponent doubt our determination. All in all, use of weapons against previously chosen targets strengthens the ultimate warning concept to the same extent that mere oral warnings weaken it. Thus it is essential to equip ESS 2020 with a decision-making structure for the use of deterrent power.

A deterrent system is all the more believable if there are several decision-makers. Indeed the decision is not bound to the desire of a single man. In that case Great Britain and France would be in charge of the deterrent potential.

Indeed, the armies and air forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact initially had such short-range nuclear weapons. Those weapons were only tactical. They were capable of strengthening conventional forces in the event of a clash with a stronger conventional opponent.

The dissolution of the alliances and the Non-Proliferation Treaty would lead to the removal of pre-strategic or tactical weapons. The idea of 'a warning shot across the bows' or 'the ultimate warning' rests mainly on the political meaning of nuclear force and has nothing to do with their effectiveness.

In conclusion I would dare to suggest that, in the ESS 2020 scenario, the worst eventuality for Europe would be the moment when one of the two super-powers refused to guarantee the existence of ESS 2020. Europe would not then be able to face an attack owing to its weaker conventional force. To remain free Europe will have to appear determined to use its strategic nuclear weapons. A warning shot would then have a very profound meaning.

III. Criteria for a defensive military force posture

First of all I would like to make some preliminary remarks about the manner of implementing a non-provocative military doctrine. I will not here consider the economic effects of the settlement of troops in a particular area. It would, of course, be most equitable if the largest investors in the defence of the region received a local return on their investment, but that kind of concern is beside the point for this discussion. I will also not take into account the problem of the geographic origins of the troops. However, by the time ESS 2020 is implemented, the European countries will need to have reached a consensus about the nationalities of the soldiers.

The navy

Submarines with nuclear weapons—a part of the European nuclear deterrent force—will obviously be the most important component of the Navy, if not of the entire armed forces. The European Navy will, however, have other targets owing to economic reasons.

The future of Europe rests on its nuclear freedom. Throughout the world many nations (the hundred or so which have become free since 1945, for instance) trust our continent.

In the economic sector Europe faces a double dependency: a dependence on raw materials, which mainly come from abroad; and a dependence on the sea, since 60 per cent of the European trade flow involves shipping (import and export). Additionally European interests in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Mediterranean are essential because of colonial history and its economic influence. Last but not least the Kourou launching base is vital for the independence of the European space programme. All in all the oceans are of the utmost importance for European interests, independence and political influence.

The Navy should therefore be able to implement and protect the European nuclear forces, defend our coasts, protect the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, protect European economic interest throughout the world and, if necessary, assist in civil missions.

The European nuclear force

Twenty submarines equipped with nuclear missiles could be given responsibility for nuclear deterrence and the 'ultimate warning' (see section II on defensive doctrine). The navy should patrol continuously in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans and in the Mediterranean.

The European naval air force

The European naval air force would be one of the main components of the ESS 2020 forces, and could be used at any stage of a crisis. Its advantages would consist of the absence of the need for diplomatic authorization in case of deployment, mobility, longevity and strength.

The maritime flying patrols

The aircraft of the maritime flying patrols, based on land, would watch over our coasts and could also fight submarines. They would be a precious component of protection against ships and submarines, and would also be very useful for civil rescue.

The open sea forces

The open sea forces are the main component of the conventional navy and would be in charge of actions which took place in the oceans. In addition to supporting the European nuclear submarine force (SNLE) and the maritime flying patrols, the navy would secure European influence throughout the world.

The sovereignty forces

The sovereignty forces would be responsible for the sovereignty of Europe in the economic sector and for the patrol of our coast line.

The support forces

The support forces cannot be separated from the other forces and would provide for fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts and the like.

Summary

These are my own personal ideas about the necessary requirements of a European navy. Considering the ships, the sailors and the missions of the different European navies which exist today, 100 000 men should be enough to set up a common navy. Figures 3 and 4 present possible organizational charts for the headquarters of the forces. Note that it would be necessary to find suitable locations for the Mediterranean Force headquarters, the Atlantic Force headquarters, the European Nuclear Force headquarters, and the Overseas Force headquarters.

The air force

Independence and solidarity are the best words to characterize the non-provocative European defence. This would also obviously be true for the air force, whose objectives would be: to guard Europe against any kind of attack, to protect the freedom of Europe, to protect European interests abroad and to take part in other missions to uphold 'peace' as well as in civil missions.

Considering the limited number of soldiers in the proposed European defence entity and the priority which would be given to the navy because of its deterrent mission, it would be impossible to attain air superiority. Thus we must find the best means/mission ratio to determine the numbers of air force and army troops. A middle-of-the-road decision would assign two-thirds to the army and one-third to the air force. Given this strength the missions of the air force should include: continuous patrol of the air, detection and assessment of the air threat, gathering of secret information, attacking of opponents in the event of a clash and organization of the air component of the 'Rapid Deployment Force'.

The air force must be organized according to the previous principles and with extensive scattering of equipment on the ground to decrease vulnerability, concentration of flight-time and training and the ability to perform rapid air raids. The ESS 2020 air force could maintain 600 aircraft, but considering the potentials of the two superpowers and of the rest of the world, this would seem to be a very weak force. We cannot afford to waste our forces, and therefore the air force would need to be maintained at its current levels.

Air defence

To defend Europe in the air it would be necessary to detect and identify all flights, to assess threat and pass on alerts and to recognize invaders as such. The air patrol and, not least, the 'preventive distance watch' for reconnaissance and surveillance are of the greatest importance.

To be able to assess threat from the very beginning we should have sophisticated means of detection, patrol and alert. In the short run considering the present level of technology, we should be able to accomplish this by using ground-based radar, electronic and satellite surveillance.

From my point of view a 'non-provocative defence doctrine' should also lead to transparency. The two superpowers, which guarantee the existence of the bloc described in the ESS 2020 scenario, should have total access to all of the data collected. The Soviet Union, Europe and the USA would then attain a balance. Any change would be detected immediately and one of the other powers would react.

Moreover the European Air Force should be equipped with many more surface-to-air missiles, as these would provide maximum fire-power with the limited number of soldiers available under ESS 2020.

The offensive air force

In the event of a sudden conventional attack, Europe should be able to respond quickly and on a massive scale to slow down opponents. The other superpowers would then have enough time to re-establish the balance.

The troop air transport

Rapidity and mobility would be essential to our forces because the ESS 2020 territory covers a very large area. Here again Europe must be able to transport troops very quickly. Special task force headquarters must be set up which correspond to the different kinds of missions, equipment and area to be covered.

We must also build a horizontal structure for the deployment of forces, support and protection corps. The solution could be some military areas, such as those proposed in the ESS 2020 scenario.

IV. How to manage the ESS 2020 defence

The navy, air force and army must obviously be co-ordinated. This would be the mission of the Staff Marshal and of the Central Headquarters which would be located in Berlin.

It is very important to keep in mind what I described above in the section dealing with the air force concerning communication, alert and patrol activities. As far as I am concerned, that part of a 'non-provocative defence' is essential for the maintenance of trust between the two superpowers and Europe. Europe is also the main link in that 'chain of solidarity'. For this reason that part of the defence structure must be clearly separated, under the command of the Staff Marshal and in close contact with the US and Soviet staffs.

It should be subsidized by the three blocs. It should also have access to advanced technology and to the very latest equipment that can disrupt the opponent's or protect one's own communication systems, and all information which is collected should be transmitted to the three blocs. The soldiers involved in such a system should be European and should be members of the three army corps. Of course, the data transmitted concerning the use of the European troops would remain secret.

The army

The army should follow the development of equipment and conflicts. Moreover, because of the small number of soldiers involved (200 000), the army should be able to respond quickly and should possess a high degree of mobility and massive fire-power.

The army should also be permitted to use the transport aircraft of the air force, (Rapid Deployment Force) and maintain helicopters (primarily against tanks).

The technology which the army would possess must be at the 'state of the art' in order to best employ the limited human resources. The troops should be dispersed to avoid massive losses in the event of an attack.

Under a non-provocative doctrine the weaponry of a European Army should emphasize tanks and aircraft. The basic question here is whether or not we would need tanks, as such equipment requires many specialized soldiers.

As with the air force, the army should have a horizontal organizational chart for the staff and a vertical one for the troops. Here again, the military areas of ESS 2020 are of basic importance.


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
Air forces	25 000
Ground forces	45 000
Naval forces	30 000



Air forces	25 000
Ground forces	60 000
Naval forces	15 000



Air forces	30 000
Ground forces	35 000
Naval forces	35 000



U.R.S.S	
Air forces	20 000
Ground forces	60 000
Naval forces	20 000



Figure 1. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE TROOPS




Figure 2. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE STAFF




Figure 3. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE TROOPS




Figure 4. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE STAFF




Figure 5. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE TROOPS




Figure 6. ORGANIZING CHART OF THE STAFF

