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Preface

Arms procured from abroad play an important yet ambiguous role in the peace and security of sub-Saharan African. In some cases they fuel the many conflicts that afflict the region; in others they are used for legitimate defence or by multilateral peace operations. The widespread concerns about the risks of arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere has resulted in regional and global discussions about the need for regulation; of these, the efforts to agree an international arms trade treaty (ATT) are the most prominent. At the national level, civil society groups—in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere—try to engage in debates about the economic and security wisdom of arms procurement and export decisions.

To promote and inform these discussions between governments and within civil society in both sub-Saharan Africa and supplier countries, this Policy Paper provides an overview of arms procurement, arms supplies and the use of arms in the region. It is an element of SIPRI’s long-standing efforts to monitor international arms transfers—efforts which remain essential, given the continuing secrecy surrounding arms procurement and transfers. A single report like this cannot completely cover the issue. However, it is rich in detail and will support future debate by pointing the reader at key open sources of relevant information and by underlining the need for greater transparency. Monitoring and analysing arms transfers will continue to be of importance for both sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world and SIPRI will maintain its efforts to support relevant debate, policymaking and policy implementation with objective and verifiable data.

Thanks are due to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for its generous financial support for the research that led to this publication and for the maintenance of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. The authors are grateful for the comments received from Guy Lamb of the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, and from SIPRI colleagues Mark Bromley, Hugh Griffiths, Dr Paul Holtom and Sharon Wiharta. Special mention should also be given for the invaluable advice and support provided by Dr David Cruickshank of the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department. Finally, thanks are due to Noel Kelly, who has played an important role by maintaining the archives of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.

Dr Bates Gill
Director, SIPRI
December 2011
Summary

Concerns regarding arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa are widespread and have motivated worldwide efforts to control arms flows. Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) accounted for 1.5 per cent of the volume of world imports of major arms in 2006–10. Although this is low by global standards, with little indigenous arms-production capacity in the region, most countries are fully dependent on arms imports.

States in sub-Saharan Africa have received major arms from a wide variety of countries all over the world. China, Russia and Ukraine are consistently among the largest suppliers. Other countries that play a relatively modest role as arms exporters globally are significant arms suppliers to individual countries in sub-Saharan Africa or provide a significant proportion of the major arms supplied to the region as a whole. Due to a lack of accurate information, no comprehensive picture of transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and other military equipment to the region can be given, but available open source information shows that transfers of such equipment to the region in 2006–10 was common.

The motives for arms transfers to sub-Saharan African destinations are diverse, including direct financial revenues—even if they are small compared to revenues from sales to other regions—and strengthening political influence in sub-Saharan Africa in order to gain access to natural resources and to further the security interest of the supplier.

Intergovernmental transparency is necessary for an informed debate about how the military needs of sub-Saharan Africa states should be taken into account in discussions on arms control in the region. While countries in the region regularly express support for conventional arms control initiatives, their low level of participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)—the key intergovernmental reporting instrument on conventional arms—casts doubts on their willingness to actively control arms. Public debate about arms procurement is often based on incomplete and confusing information which emerges only after key decisions have been made. Even those governments that have been more forthcoming with public information about their arms procurements tend to remain reluctant to discuss the rationale and underlying threat assessments in public or in the parliament.

Case studies show that supplies of SALW and major arms play a role in armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa; even supplies of relatively small quantities of older weapons can have a notable impact on conflicts. The uncertainty about the impact of arms transfers to conflict areas in sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in the experience of 2006–10. In several cases it could be argued that arms supplies have contributed to a government’s ability to legitimately maintain or restore stability in its country, including with the use of force against rebel groups. In a number of cases, exporting countries have supplied arms to governments in the region which supported efforts to achieve these objectives and in line with UN statements or actions. The least controversial arms supplies are those aimed at
improving African states’ capabilities to participate in peace operations, even though these supplies remain insufficient to fulfil the needs of regional peace-keepers.

However, in many cases arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa have had clearly undesirable effects.

1. The supply of arms can be argued to have been an incentive for the recipients to try to achieve their goals via violence instead of dialogue.
2. Arms have been used in human rights violations.
3. Arms recipients often do not have the capability to secure their stockpiles and weapons have been lost or stolen, including by rebel groups.
4. Arms recipients have deliberately diverted weapons to targets of UN arms embargoes or rebel groups in neighbouring countries.
5. Arms supplied to governments have been turned against those governments in military coups d’état.

As a result of ambiguity about the impact and desirability of arms transfers, arms export policies by individual supplier countries vary widely. Some suppliers appear reluctant to supply arms to most countries in the region; others seem to consider only UN arms embargoes as a reason not to supply arms. The ambiguity is also reflected in the inconsistent approach of the international community to conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa: whereas arms embargoes have been agreed in relation to some conflicts, in other cases no embargo has been imposed.

Weapons used in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by government forces have in general been delivered with the consent of the governments both in the supplier and recipient countries. Nonetheless, it appears that the illegal arms trade continues to play a role in the procurement of arms by both government and rebel groups in the region even though there is no hard evidence of widespread large illegal supplies from outside the region into sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10. However, there have been regular instances of weapons flows within the region to, in particular, rebel groups in violation of UN embargoes. To better understand the nature of the illegal arms trade in sub-Saharan Africa, information about interceptions by government authorities of illegal arms transfers and related legal activity should be centrally collected, for example in the annual national reports on the UN Programme of Action on SALW.

The lack of transparency in arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa obstructs an informed debate on the proposed arms trade treaty (ATT) and would be a serious obstacle to its verification. A starting point for improving transparency would be to support initiatives on corruption in the arms trade. Interest in the corruption issue and increasing willingness by governments to discuss it could be a stepping stone towards more transparency in arms procurement. If sub-Saharan African states want to persuade arms suppliers—which regularly hinder arms exports by refusing export licences—that they have legitimate reasons to procure arms, they should be more forthcoming about their motives.
Abbreviations

AAD2010 Africa Aerospace and Defence 2010
AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia
APC Armoured personnel carrier
ATT Arms trade treaty
AU African Union
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DICON Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FMS Foreign Military Sales
GOSS Government of Southern Sudan
MIC Military Industry Corporation
SALW Small arms and light weapons
SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UN United Nations
UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNROCA UN Register of Conventional Arms

Background papers

A series of background papers accompanies this Policy Paper:

‘Arms flows and the conflict in Somalia’, Pieter D. Wezeman, October 2010;
‘South African arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa’, Pieter D. Wezeman, January 2011;
‘Ukrainian arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa’, Paul Holtom, February 2011;
‘Arms transfers to Zimbabwe: implications for an arms trade treaty’, Lukas Jeuck, March 2011;

All are available at <http://www.sipri.org/publications/>.
1. Introduction

Armed conflict and military regimes are perceived to be prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. A consequence of this perception is that any transfer of arms to the region tends to raise questions about whether they will help to provoke or prolong armed conflicts, aggravate inter- and intrastate tensions, or weaken civilian-led governments. These questions are fuelled by the failure of many governments in the region—regardless of whether the state is in armed conflict or has poor relations with its neighbours—to share information on their arms acquisition plans and motives.

Answering these questions requires a broad overview of recent developments in arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa, including objective and verifiable information and analysis. To date, no such overview has been published. Relevant research has consisted of ad hoc studies on specific countries or regions conducted by, for example, United Nations panels monitoring arms embargoes, research institutes and advocacy groups. This lack is not surprising because collecting information about arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa, as for other regions of the world, poses a series of challenges and is a time-consuming process. The most serious challenge is the habit of secrecy that surrounds arms acquisitions in most states in the region.

Many of the concerns regarding arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa are reflected at the global level, where they have fuelled a worldwide debate and policymaking efforts aimed at controlling arms flows. In efforts to prevent and end conflicts, the control of arms flows has often been used as a tool in the form of national export and import regulations, multilateral arms export and import regimes, UN arms embargoes, and initiatives to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The widely recognized need to control international arms flows has also led to the worldwide intergovernmental debate about the feasibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT), which would establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.

This Policy Paper helps to fill the gap in reporting on and analysis of the supply of conventional arms to sub-Saharan Africa by providing a tour d’horizon of recent developments in arms transfers to both governments and rebel groups in the region. To provide general context, chapter 2 gives an overview of transfers of major arms, SALW, and other arms and military equipment to states in the region in 2006–10.


Sub-Saharan Africa is defined here as including the 48 African countries other than Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In chapter 2 below, South Africa is treated separately from the rest of the region.

Chapter 3 examines the steps that governments in sub-Saharan Africa have taken to publicly discuss arms acquisition in advance of delivery and to declare details of acquired arms. It highlights the lack of both intergovernmental and public transparency, which hinders assessments of whether arms that are procured actually do contribute to peace and security.

The impact of arms transfers on conflict has long been the topic of debate. While this Policy Paper does not attempt to provide a definitive answer as to whether and which arms transfers support peace and stability, it illustrates the dilemmas related to arms transfers and conflict with a series of cases. Chapter 4 presents cases in which arms have been transferred to government and rebel forces in countries in conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, and where possible assesses their impact on the conflict. It also discusses the role of illegal arms flows in conflicts in the region and the conundrum of how to supply arms to multilateral peace operations.

Chapter 5 presents conclusions, policy recommendations and suggestions for further research.

Much of the evidence presented in this Policy Paper is from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, which is a cornerstone of SIPRI’s continuous monitoring of international arms transfers aimed at promoting transparency in arms transfers and arms procurement. Because the database is freely accessible online, many details are not included in this report. Instead, the reader is encouraged to consult the database, which is updated annually, for information on individual importing or exporting countries.

Although SALW are widely used in crime and other non-political violence in the region, this problem is not addressed here.


At the time of writing, the most recent year for which details of arms transfers were available in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database was 2010.
2. Arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–10

To provide a general context for discussions on the causes and impact of arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter gives an overview of international transfers—including sales, loans and gifts—of arms and other military equipment to the region. It shows that arms transfers by a wide variety of suppliers worldwide are crucial to arms procurement in sub-Saharan Africa and gives an insight into how government policies have resulted in actual arms procurement and arms transfers. For the reasons given in box 2.1, South Africa is excluded from the general discussion here.

The statistics on volumes, trends, recipients and suppliers of major conventional weapons are based on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Because of a lack of information from open source on transfers of small arms and light weapons, other military equipment, and technology for local production of arms, no useful statistics can be compiled for these categories of transfer. Instead, they are discussed here in general terms using illustrative examples. Similarly, although there were several reports during 2006–10 of rebels acquiring substantial volumes of SALW from abroad, no accurate assessment of the total volumes involved can be made. Examples of where and how rebels groups obtain arms appear in chapter 4.

The recipient states

The lack of indigenous arms-production capacities means that most African countries are fully dependent on arms imports. Thus, an overview of arms acquisitions by governments in the region can be based on information on international transfers of major conventional arms, small arms and light weapons, and other military equipment, and on official data on arms export licences.

Imports of major conventional arms

Imports of major arms by states in sub-Saharan Africa decreased rapidly after the end of the cold war (see figure 2.1). Although imports have increased somewhat from their low point in the mid-1990s, they remain far below the level of the 1980s.

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6 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4).

7 Details of the numbers and types of major arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa can be found in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4). SIPRI data on arms transfers refers to actual deliveries of major conventional arms. SIPRI uses a trend-indicator value (TIV) to compare the data on deliveries of different weapons and to identify general trends. TIVs give an indication only of the volume of international arms transfers and not of their financial values. For a description of the TIV and its calculation see ‘Background information and explanations’, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background>.
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) accounted for 1.5 per cent of the volume of world imports of major arms in 2006–10. Not only did states in the region procure few major arms (see table 2.1), many of those acquired were generally less capable and less advanced than those acquired in other regions and many were second hand. For example, 27 of the 91 combat aircraft imported by sub-Saharan African states during 2006–10 were new F-7MG aircraft from China, one of the least advanced new combat aircraft available on the market. A further 18 were K-8 trainer/light combat aircraft from China and the other 46 were second-hand and relatively basic. All 8 ships delivered to the region were small and simple vessels. The 160 imported tanks were all second-hand T-55 and T-72 tanks and were at least 20 years old.

The relative importance of recipient states changes significantly, even over short periods (see table 2.2). For example, Angola was by far the largest importer in 1996–2000, was still a significant recipient in 2001–2005 but was only a minor importer in 2006–10. Similarly, Ethiopia and Eritrea were large importers in 1996–2000 and 2001–2005, but were not significant importers in 2006–10. In contrast, Nigeria jumped from being a minor importer to become the largest importer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10. Because the volume of transfers of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa is very low, a single transfer that in other regions would be insignificant may change the position of a sub-Saharan state
dramatically. For example, Namibia’s sudden rise to become the fourth largest importer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10 is almost entirely due to the delivery of 12 F-7 combat aircraft in 2006 and 2008.

**Imports of small arms and light weapons**

Because there are generally only small numbers of functioning major arms in service in sub-Saharan Africa, SALW play an important role in the arsenals of governments and in the violent conflicts in the region. A lack of accurate information means that no comprehensive picture of transfers of SALW to the region can be given. Instead, an overview of the available open source information on such transfers in 2006–10 is presented in appendix A.

Transfers of SALW to sub-Saharan Africa were common, with at least 34 of the 48 countries in the region importing SALW for their armed forces (see table A.1). These included transfers of at least an estimated 220 000 assault rifles and sub-machine guns, with Nigeria procuring 72 000 rifles, Kenya 51 500, Uganda 38 000 and Chad 31 000. Many of the rifles transferred to Kenya were probably redirected by Kenya to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).

Most of the available detailed information on SALW transfers comes from suppliers that have chosen to report publicly on their exports. It is likely that more
ARMS FLOWS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Table 2.1. Imports of selected major arms by states in sub-Saharan Africa as a share of global imports, 2006–10
Figures are numbers of units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Combat Heli-</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Transport aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>units</td>
<td>copters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,817</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,390</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,559</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,535</strong></td>
<td><strong>245</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,221</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) as a share of total (%)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Weapons and ammunition have been imported into the region from countries that do not report on their arms exports in sufficient detail or at all. For example, there are strong indications that during 2006–10 Sudan received substantial numbers of SALW from China, which does not report on its exports of SALW.¹⁰

**Imports of other military equipment**

Monitoring transfers of major arms and SALW provides only a partial picture of the supply of arms and military equipment to Africa. There are other transfers of military equipment—such as communications and intelligence-gathering equipment and transport vehicles—that are more difficult to obtain detailed information about than is the case for major weapons.¹¹ However, the import of such equipment can have a significant impact in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in what may have been Nigeria’s largest military procurement in 2006–10, in 2006 it reportedly ordered from Israel an integrated coastal surveillance system including command-and-control centres and a communications network worth $260 million.¹² The surveillance system may have been used in the Nigerian armed forces’ successful operations against the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) during 2007–10.

In addition to transfers of military equipment other than major arms and SALW, modernization of existing weapons in African inventories can be just as important as the procurement of complete new weapons. For example, during 2006–10 the modernization by Nigeria of 5 G-222 transport aircraft and 12 MB-339 and 21 L-39 trainer/combat aircraft by foreign companies was arguably as important in military capability terms as the country’s import of new

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¹¹ For these reasons, such equipment is not covered by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4).

In another example, Kenya’s main naval procurement in 1996–2010 was a contract signed in 2008 to modernize its two Nyayo fast-attack craft.

Available national reports on arms exports can be used to complement assessments of arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa, even though there remain problems with the validity and reliability of the reporting. The most useful are the annual reports published by the European Union (EU) on exports of major arms, SALW and other military equipment by EU member states. Information extracted from these reports on exports to sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009 are summarized in appendix B. Many of the supplier recipient relationships that are documented in these reports on the broad category of arms and military equipment would be unlikely to have been publicly known otherwise. For example, the EU report is the only public source that indicates that Ethiopia imported or sought to import arms or military equipment from nine EU member states during 2005–2009.

Table 2.2. The top 10 importers of major arms in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), 1996–2000, 2001–2005 and 2006–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Importer</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Importer</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Importer</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sudan*a</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sudan*a</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sudan*a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Sudan*a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

*a Although South Sudan did not become independent until July 2011, Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan are treated as separate importers from the establishment of the latter in July 2005.

The relation between arms production and arms import

Over the past 60 years several sub-Saharan African countries have tried to establish indigenous military production capabilities in order to reduce their dependence on arms imports. However, the region’s arms industry does not provide a substitute for arms imports. Not only is it limited in scale and on a low level of technology, it also remains heavily dependent on foreign supply of designs, production equipment and components. Furthermore, its development has been almost stagnant over the years and it remains focused on weapon maintenance and the licensed production of small arms and related ammunition. The Sudanese arms industry is probably the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by those of Ethiopia and Nigeria.

Arms production in Sudan started in 1959 in a rifle ammunition plant supplied by British and West German companies. The current Sudanese arms industry is concentrated in the Military Industry Corporation (MIC), which was established in the early 1990s. Several reports suggest that MIC rebuilt or refurbished its ammunition-production facility in 1996–97, possibly with the involvement of Bulgarian, Pakistani and Ukrainian firms. Currently, the small arms that MIC claims to produce are copies of the Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault rifle, the US-designed M-16 assault rifle, and the German-designed MG-3 machine gun, G-3 assault rifle and MP-5 sub-machine gun. The technology or components for these weapons are likely to come from China, Iran or Pakistan, which produce these weapons themselves and have had arms supply relations with Sudan in recent years. On its website, MIC advertises that it is involved in the upgrading of T-55 tanks and in the production of Chinese-designed WZ-501 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and Type-85-2 tanks and several Soviet-designed artillery pieces. The T-55 upgrade package was imported from Iran around 2006 and the artillery production is probably related to an import of materials and production equipment from Bulgaria in 1995–2002. MIC advertises that it assembles a light aircraft with Russian and Chinese assistance, AK1-3 light...
helicopters from Ukraine and UTVA-75 light aircraft from Serbia.\textsuperscript{24} MIC also has a maintenance centre for combat and transport aircraft and helicopters.\textsuperscript{25}

In Ethiopia, several companies under the Ministry of National Defence produce 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, small arms ammunition, a version of the Kalashnikov rifle (called the ET-97/1), and grenade launchers and overhaul armoured vehicles and military aircraft.\textsuperscript{26} Production of the ET-97/1 rifle started in the late 1990s with help from North Korea, which in 2006 delivered further spare parts for machinery and engineering equipment and raw material for making ammunition for small arms.\textsuperscript{27}

The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) was established in 1964, when Nigeria obtained production equipment for Italian-designed rifles and small arms ammunition from West Germany. In 1983 DICON started production of rifles, pistols and machine guns with technology imported from Belgium.\textsuperscript{28} After a period of decline, in 2007 the Nigerian Government financed a project to revive DICON, which reportedly managed to restore a substantial part of its production capability.\textsuperscript{29} The project included the procurement from China of a production line for 7.62-mm ammunition.\textsuperscript{30} DICON also claims to have designed its own version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle (called the OBJ-006) and to have procured machinery from China to produce it.\textsuperscript{31} On several occasions in 2006–2009 DICON announced the start of production of the OBJ-006 rifle.\textsuperscript{32} It currently claims it can produce or assemble 81-mm mortars, Belgian-designed FAL and Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault rifles, Soviet-designed RPG-7 grenade launchers, Belgian-designed MAG light machine guns, Italian-designed M-12 sub-machine guns as well as hand grenades and small arms ammunition.\textsuperscript{33} During the 1990s, 60 Air Beetle basic trainer aircraft from the USA were assembled in Nigeria, but an attempt around 1990 to set up an assembly plant for 4K7FA APCs from Austria failed.\textsuperscript{34}

Several other countries in sub-Saharan Africa have small military production capabilities. The Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation started production in

\textsuperscript{24} Jackson, P., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2010–2011 (Jane's Information Group: Coulsdon, 2010), p. 581.
\textsuperscript{30} Mamah, E., ‘TRADOC, DICON to produce armoured personnel carrier’, \textit{Vanguard} (Lagos), 15 Jan. 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} ‘Nigeria to mass-produce Nigerian version of AK-47 rifles’, Xinhua, 2 Oct. 2006.
\textsuperscript{32} Mamah (note 30); and ‘Nigeria to mass-produce Nigerian version of AK-47 rifles’ (note 31).
\textsuperscript{34} Adewoye (note 28).
ARMS FLOWS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Table 2.3. The top 10 suppliers of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), 1996–2000, 2001–2005 and 2006–10

Figures are the percentage shares of the total volume of exports of major conventional arms to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1997 of small arms ammunition on a Belgian-supplied production line with an annual capacity of 20 million rounds ordered in 1988. In Tanzania, Mzinga Corporation reportedly had an annual production capacity of 7 million rounds in 2005, using Chinese production equipment supplied in 1972. A 2005 effort to increase production capacity with Belgian equipment failed because the Belgian authorities did not authorize the deal. In Uganda, Luwero Industries refurbishes Kalashnikov-type rifles and uses South African equipment and cartridge cases, propellant, primer caps and bullets imported from China to produce ammunition. Zimbabwe Defence Industry (ZDI) started to produce ammunition for small arms, mortars and artillery in the early 1990s using equipment imported from France and China. Some key components for the ammunition had to be imported, including casings from Bulgaria and fuses from Israel. ZDI is reported to have gone bankrupt and closed down in late 2009. In Namibia,

Windhoeker MaschinenFabrik (WMF) has manufactured small numbers of wheeled light-armoured vehicles since 1977, including some for export.\textsuperscript{41}

The supplier states

Supplies of major conventional arms

States in sub-Saharan Africa have received major arms from a wide variety of countries. China, Russia and Ukraine are consistently among the largest suppliers, although their shares of total imports vary widely (see table 2.3). In 2006–10 many of the world’s leading arms exporters were among the main suppliers to sub-Saharan African states—including China, Italy, Russia, Ukraine and the United States. However, other leading arms exporters—such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom—transferred only small volumes of major arms to the region.\textsuperscript{42} Conversely, countries that play a relatively modest role as arms exporters globally—such as Belarus, Jordan and Moldova—are significant arms suppliers to individual countries in sub-Saharan Africa or provide a significant proportion of the major arms supplied to the region as a whole. For most suppliers, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only a very small share of their arms exports. However, in 2006–10 it accounted for 11 per cent of Chinese exports of major arms and for 17 per cent of Ukrainian exports. While some suppliers—such as China, South Africa and Ukraine—have exported arms to many countries in the region, others have supplied to few or only one (see table 2.4).

There are indications that in the coming years there might again be significant shifts in the ranking of the suppliers. For example, deliveries of 6 new Su-30MK2 combat aircraft to Uganda (ordered in 2010) and of 32 Mi-24 combat helicopters to Sudan (ordered in 2009) are likely to increase Russia’s share of arms supplies to the region substantially.\textsuperscript{43} Ukraine may also account for a larger share in the future because it is to deliver 10 modernized S-125-2D surface-to-air missile systems to two as-yet-unidentified recipients in Africa and 200 T-72 tanks to Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{44} China is also trying to increase its arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa. It was the largest exhibitor at the Africa Aerospace and Defence 2010 (AAD2010) arms fair held in Cape Town, South Africa, but the secrecy that surrounds contracts for Chinese arms export means that it is hard to predict future Chinese deliveries.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{42} The top 10 exporters in 1996–2010 were the USA, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, China, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Italy and Sweden. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4).


\textsuperscript{44} [Ukraine to deliver 10 missile systems to Africa by end of 2011], Interfax-Ukraine, 24 Nov. 2010 (in Ukrainian); and ‘Ethiopia to acquire Ukrainian MBTs’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 June 2011, p. 20.

Table 2.4. The suppliers of major conventional arms to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) and their recipients, 2006–10

The share of exports of the largest recipient is that recipient’s share of the total volume of the supplier’s exports of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Largest recipient (share of exports)</th>
<th>Other recipients</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Nigeria (35%)</td>
<td>Benin, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Chad (28%)</td>
<td>Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Sudan (77%)</td>
<td>Chad, Niger, Senegal, Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Nigeria (77%)</td>
<td>Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Gabon (58%)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Sudan (94%)</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Angola (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Kenya (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep. (56%)</td>
<td>Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Nigeria (96%)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Botswana (44%)</td>
<td>Cape Verde, Mauretania, Rwanda, Senegal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Nigeria (46%)</td>
<td>Cameroon, Chad, Lesotho, Rwanda, Uganda</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Sudan (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Chad (86%)</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Mali (86%)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea (58%)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Namibia (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Senegal (50%)</td>
<td>Chad, Mauretania, Togo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Sudan (60%)</td>
<td>Angola, Central African Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Nigeria (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Zambia (80%)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Burkina Faso (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Chad (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Uganda (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Burkina Faso (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Sudan (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Chad (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Tanzania (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One or more unidentified suppliers (possibly including suppliers listed above) delivered major arms to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea.

a Although South Sudan did not become independent until July 2011, Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan are treated as separate recipients from the establishment of the latter in July 2005.

b South Africa also delivered major arms to the African Union.

Supplies of small arms and light weapons and other military equipment

At least 22 countries supplied SALW to sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10 (see appendix A). Several countries are known to be significant suppliers of SALW to the region. For example, in 2006–10 China exported SALW to at least six countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including over 40 000 assault rifles, and Ukraine is known to have exported SALW to five countries, including at least 126 000 assault rifles. Ukraine still has large numbers of surplus major arms and SALW for sale, and many of those may reach sub-Saharan Africa in coming years. Some minor suppliers of major arms are also significant suppliers of SALW. In 2006–10 Serbia supplied SALW to at least nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Bulgaria to at least eight and Romania to at least five, including over 6000 rifles. Although they are not prominent in appendix A, it is probable that countries such as Belgium, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Russia that have an SALW industry or stocks but do not publish detailed information on their exports of SALW and related ammunition play a significantly bigger role than suggested.

Some countries that supply other military equipment may play a more important role in the region than the data on transfers of major arms or SALW suggest. The EU, which publishes extensive information on arms exports, can be used to illustrate this: whereas 15 EU members exported major arms to sub-Saharan Africa, 7 more exported or licensed the export of the broader category of arms and military equipment, including major arms and SALW (see table B.1). Some of these exporters which supply major arms to only a few countries in the region have many more clients for other military equipment. For example, during 2005–2009 the Czech Republic supplied major arms to three countries in the region but exported other military equipment to an additional five countries. Such exports might involve significant volumes by regional standards. For example, France did not supply major arms to Angola during 2005–2009, but in 2008 a French company won a contract for the supply of a combined military–civilian telecommunications network to the Angolan Government, worth $221 million. Other sources indicate that countries which do not report on their arms export in detail are also significant suppliers of military equipment other than major arms. For example, Israel is known to have supplied military command, control and intelligence equipment to a number of countries in the region.

Governments reports about the financial value of arms exports, including major arms, SALW and other equipment, reinforce the conclusion that total arms exports to states in sub-Saharan Africa account for a small share of world arms transfers. According to official reports, arms exports by EU member states to the region were worth $381 million in 2005–2009, accounting for 0.8 per cent of

47 See e.g. eds Jones and Ness (note 21).
49 Wezeman (note 12).
arms exports by EU member states. The USA reported that in 2005–2009 military equipment worth $95 million was delivered to sub-Saharan Africa (including $6.8 million for South Africa) under its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, one of the two main administrative channels through which the USA exports arms. This accounted for 0.2 per cent of worldwide FMS deliveries.

**Motives**

Suppliers’ motives for supplying arms to sub-Saharan Africa are diverse, including short- and long-term economic aims, political influence and security aims. The relative importance of each of these considerations is difficult to assess.

During the cold war China, France, the Soviet Union, the UK and the USA supported various states in the region with the supply of arms as part of their efforts to gain or maintain political influence. In more recent years it has been argued that, because the prospects for sizeable revenues from arms sales to most African countries are low, arms transfers to Africa are likely to be part of broader policies for gaining access to natural resources in the recipient countries. This is particular true for China, the largest arms supplier to the region. For example, some observers have argued that Chinese arms transfers to Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia have been an instrument to improve relations in order to ensure China’s access to oil, tin and tantalum in these countries. One of China’s leading arms-exporting companies, NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation), has cited the ‘spillover effect’ of military trade in its efforts to get contracts for its subsidiary Zhenhua Oil Co. in several countries worldwide including Angola. However, it is hard to gauge the importance of access to natural resources as a motive for any of the suppliers. For example, China’s arms transfers to Sudan and Zimbabwe may be better explained by a desire to strengthen or maintain long-standing military ties than by access to resources. Moreover, China’s delivery of

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arms and military assistance to Tanzania, from which it imports few natural resources, shows that access to resources cannot be China’s only motive for supplying arms to Africa.\(^57\)

Even if revenues from arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa are low in absolute terms, the arms industry’s straightforward desire for profits can still drive arms exports. Statements by politicians and officials in Ukraine indicate that its arms supplies to Africa are primarily seen as a source of direct revenue for the Ukrainian arms industry, which depends on exports for its survival.\(^58\) According to Ukrainian Government data, in 2010 Ukrainian arms exports to Africa amounted to 18 per cent of total arms exports worth $956.7 million.\(^59\) In the case of China, since sub-Saharan Africa accounts for an estimated 11 per cent of Chinese exports of major arms, profit is likely to be a motive; this is backed up by the fact that at the AAD2010 arms fair several Chinese arms companies were competing to sell similar products.\(^60\) Russian officials have stated that low military budgets in Africa are an obstacle to arms exports to the region.\(^61\) To overcome this problem and earn income from arms exports, Russia has offered African countries flexible terms for paying for military equipment, including the possibility to barter arms for raw commodities or Russian involvement in the exploitation of natural resources.\(^62\)

The desire for political and military influence as a motive for supplying arms—which was common during the cold war—appears to have been of limited importance in transfers in 2006–10. The supply of arms does not appear to have played a prominent role for France, the UK and the USA in their security-related policies on sub-Saharan Africa, even though they are important external actors in security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. British military aid to the region in 2006–10 included only one delivery of arms: 450 assault rifles for Somaliland in 2010.\(^63\) While the USA provides military aid to states in the region as part of a variety of programmes to strengthen counterterrorism, peacekeeping and border security capabilities, in financial year 2010 the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme—the main US aid programme related to military equipment—provided only $18 million in aid to sub-Saharan Africa compared to $5 billion world-

\(^{57}\) Shinn (note 56), p. 161.

\(^{58}\) Holtom (note 46), p. 3.

\(^{59}\) ‘Arms exports generate nearly $1 billion for state’, Kyiv Post, 20 Jan. 2011. See also Holtom (note 46), p. 3.


\(^{62}\) These options have been promoted by officials of Rosoboronexport—the Russian state arms export agency—in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Rosoboronexport (note 61); Rosoboronexport, ‘Rosoboronexport State Corporation at Africa Aerospace and Defence 2006’, Press release, 19 Sep. 2006; and ‘Russian arms trade official upbeat on prospects for cooperation with SAfrica’, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep. 2010, Translation from Russian, World News Connection.

wide.\textsuperscript{64} Whereas in the 1990s, it was suggested that South Africa should position itself as a key supplier of arms to African countries in order to gain influence and strengthen its African identity, economic reasons have now clearly become the prime motive.\textsuperscript{65} In contrast, some of Israel’s arms exports to the region are probably related to its efforts to develop military ties, particularly with states strategically located to counter what Israel perceives as Iran-supported anti-Israel policies.\textsuperscript{66} 


\textsuperscript{65} Wezeman (note 16).

3. Recipient states’ transparency in arms procurement

To understand the potential impact of arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa on peace and security and to argue for and contribute to the better control of arms flows to Africa, it is necessary to know what arms states in the region procure and why. Arms should be acquired for genuine security purposes, such as self-defence, to maintain internal security or to be able to participate in international peace operations. The decision to buy arms should be based on an adequate threat assessment; they should not contribute to destabilizing build-ups of arms; they must be suited for the envisaged tasks; and they must represent value for money. A key challenge to understanding the motives for and impact of arms procurement in sub-Saharan Africa is the recipient states’ lack of transparency, which presents an obstacle to meaningful debate about how the states’ military needs should be taken into account in discussions about arms control in the region.

The following sections study transparency at the national and international levels. At the international level, transparency is the exchange of information by states as a means of building mutual confidence; the key global instrument in this area is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA); a sub-regional example is provided by the ECOWAS Convention on SALW (see box 3.1). At the national level, transparency refers to a government informing its citizens or their representatives (e.g. parliament) of its defence policy, including its procurement of arms and the underlying motives. National transparency improves accountability and can help ensure that resources are actually used to accomplish policy objectives. As the following sections show, levels of participation in UNROCA by sub-Saharan African countries (including South Africa) are low, while examples of arms procurement by sub-Saharan African countries show that levels of domestic transparency are also low but highlight attempts to place arms procurement on the parliamentary or public agenda in the region.

International transparency: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

Each year the UN requests all member states to report information on imports and exports of seven categories of major conventional arms to UNROCA in the preceding year. States are also invited to submit information on their holdings and procurement from domestic production of major conventional arms and, beginning in 2003, on their imports and exports of small arms and light weapons. The information provided by states to UNROCA can be used in analyses of states’

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military intentions and capabilities and in bilateral or regional consultations to help avoid misinterpretations, miscalculations and the exaggeration of threats that can influence arms races and armed conflicts. Since it was established in 1991, UNROCA has played a crucial role in promoting the norm of transparency in arms transfers and a state’s participation in it can be seen as a measure of its transparency in arms exports and imports.68

Sub-Saharan Africa has a poor record in reporting to UNROCA (see figure 3.1). While all UN member states in the region voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution establishing the register in 1991, 11 did not report for any of the 18 years between 1992 and 2009. Most of those that have reported did so only for a few years. On average only 9 states—just under one-fifth of all sub-Saharan African states—responded each year to the request for data.69

While it is certainly true that most African states probably have fewer imports to report than many countries in other regions, the reports of exporting countries show that most transfers to sub-Saharan African recipients are not being reported by the importers: the importing state either submits incomplete or inaccurate information or does not report at all. For 2005–2009 most deliveries to sub-Saharan African states reported by exporters went to states that did not

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69 UNROCA database, <http://www.un-register.org>. These figures are based on reporting for the years 1992–2009. By early Nov. 2011 the 78 states that had reported to UNROCA on arms imports and exports in 2010 included none from sub-Saharan Africa, but additional reports are likely to be submitted.

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**Box 3.1. Transparency in small arms and light weapons in West Africa**

Transparency in transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a key element in the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.6a The convention requires the parties to provide detailed information to the ECOWAS Commission on any import or production of SALW, including an annual report detailing orders and purchases.

By the end of 2010, 11 of the 15 ECOWAS member states had ratified the convention: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.6b There is no public information on the reporting under the convention. At least 6 ECOWAS member states—Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal—imported SALW in 2006–10 (see appendix A). It is not known if these imports have been reported to the ECOWAS Commission. For the period 2006–2009, of the imports of SALW identified in appendix A, only Senegal reported the import of 150 machine guns in 2006 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).


RECIPIENT STATES’ TRANSPARENCY IN ARMS ACQUISITIONS

For example, none of the 296 tanks reported by exporters as delivered to the region in 2005–2009 was reported by a recipient. In 16 of the 30 cases where both exporters and importers submitted a report, the importer reported nil imports while the exporter reported deliveries. In another 7 of the cases the data provided by the importer did not match the data provided by the exporter. For 2009 alone, exporters reported deliveries of 330 weapons to 18 states in sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa). However, South Africa was the only one of the cited recipients that reported. Even in this relatively positive case, South Africa only reported on imports from one of three suppliers and in that case the number of deliveries reported did not match the number given by the exporter.\(^70\)

SALW are considered to have a significant role in destabilization and conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Before the UN request for information for UNROCA was extended to include SALW in 2003, several states maintained that the lack of coverage of SALW meant that UNROCA was not a useful mechanism for the region. This perception was cited as one of the factors behind the low level of

\(^70\) UNROCA database (note 69). Reported exports or imports of weapons clearly not covered by UNROCA or delivered to non-military users are excluded.
UNROCA reporting in the region.\textsuperscript{71} However, even prior to 2003 reporting on SALW was possible: states have always been invited to submit unformatted background information on their arms transfers beyond the seven main categories; and since 2003 few states have responded to the request to report on SALW, even after the introduction of a specific format for SALW reporting in 2006. Indeed, UNROCA reporting from sub-Saharan Africa continued to decrease (see figure 3.1).

Furthermore, the claim that major weapons do not play an important role in security thinking in sub-Saharan Africa is contradicted by the known imports of major arms, with exporters continuously reporting major arms transfers to UNROCA. For example, of all the weapons reported to UNROCA by exporters as delivered in 2009, 15 per cent of all of tanks, other armoured vehicles and attack helicopters and 20 per cent of all combat aircraft went to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa).

**National transparency**

Previous research suggests that in many cases arms procurement decisions in sub-Saharan Africa are not based on well-established procurement processes.\textsuperscript{72} Efforts to assess arms procurement policies are hindered by the fact that the governments of almost all sub-Saharan African countries show little or no public transparency about military matters and arms procurement decision making. This is true even for those few countries in the region which have formal structures and institutions that should provide some form of government accountability. In the period 2006–10 it seems that South Africa was the only country in the region to regularly publish documents describing in detail its defence policy.\textsuperscript{73}

Such secretiveness undermines claims by governments that weapons are procured for legitimate reasons. In 2006–10 many of the arms procurement projects that were large in the regional context were not subject to public scrutiny regarding their purpose and utility. For example, the purchases of 15 F-7M combat aircraft by Nigeria, 12 F-7Ms by Namibia, 6 Mirage F-1A combat aircraft by Gabon, 14 Su-25 combat aircraft by Sudan, 6 Su-25s by Chad and 4 Su-25s by Equatorial Guinea were not discussed publicly in any detail by the respective governments.

To illustrate the contrast between high public interest in arms procurement and low government transparency in the region, three countries are discussed

\textsuperscript{71} Holtom, Béraud-Sudreau and Weber (note 68), p. 6.


below: Ghana, Uganda and Kenya. The Ghanaian experience provides an example of one of the more transparent discussions in the region. The example of Uganda shows how a once relatively transparent government has fallen back to habits of secrecy at a time when its arms procurement has drastically increased. Kenya is a case of a country where parliamentary pressure has led to promising signs that transparency in arms procurement is developing.

Ghana

The Ghanaian Government is, by regional standards, relatively open about the official motives for its arms procurements, even though it has reported to UNROCA only for 2002 and 2007. Ghana’s annual budget statements include reasoning for its procurement decisions. For example, the budget statement for 2010 stressed the need for a credible deterrent to defend Ghana’s national interests, including new oil finds in its coastal waters. The 2009 statement reported that the government had obtained a $60 million loan facility in order to procure unidentified equipment to enhance the operational effectiveness of Ghanaian troops on UN peacekeeping operations.

Arms procurement also appears on the agenda of the Ghanaian Parliament. In 2008 a parliamentary committee prepared several reports about the planned procurement of arms, transport aircraft, patrol boats and a range of other support equipment for the Ghanaian armed forces. It concluded that the procurements were made necessary by a deterioration of the armed forces combined with the ‘security implications’ of the discovery of oil off the coast of Ghana. Subsequently, in a closed-doors session in July 2010, the parliament approved the procurement of two patrol craft from Germany for $38 million and equipment for the army and air force worth $100 million from China.

Despite this degree of transparency, Ghanaian arms procurement can still be opaque and marred by confusion. This was shown in September 2009 when the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reported that Ghana was interested in buying four C-27J transport aircraft for an estimated $680 million. The high cost estimate gave rise to criticism in the Ghanaian press, followed by contradictory reactions from government sources. Whereas a spokesperson for President John Atta Mills and a deputy information minister, Samuel Okudzeto, both denied that Ghana was negotiating the procurement of the aircraft, the defence minister, Joseph Henry Smith, confirmed that the purchase was under

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76 Hanson, E., ‘Parliament leads the quest to re-equip the military before oil exploitation’, *Public Agenda* (Accra), 17 Mar. 2008.
negotiation but said that the cost would be nowhere near the reported estimate.\textsuperscript{79} The minister for information, Zita Okaikoi, added that a final proposal for the procurement would be sent to the parliament for assessment.\textsuperscript{80} In 2011, instead of four C-27Js, the Ghanaian Parliament approved the procurement from Spain of two C-295 transport aircraft for the air force.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{Uganda}

In general, the Ugandan Government has been secretive about its arms procurement, both regarding the arms procured and its motives for the procurement. For example, it has never reported to UNROCA. However, the Ugandan Parliament has actively scrutinized several dubious arms procurement cases in the past 15 years. In 2000 a parliamentary select committee probed allegations of corrupt practices in the late 1990s in the Ugandan Ministry of Defence that resulted in the import of faulty and overpriced weapons.\textsuperscript{82} In 2004 the Ugandan Government published its first and only white paper on its overall military policies, which listed the perceived security threats to Uganda in general and abstract terms and provided some details of the costs and types of equipment that were to be acquired in 2004–2007.\textsuperscript{83}

Developments in 2010–11 showed that the gains made in transparency in the early 2000s had been reversed. In April 2010 Russian newspapers claimed that Uganda had signed a contract for six Su-30MK2 combat aircraft in a deal estimated to be worth $200 million.\textsuperscript{84} The claims were remarkable because, even with this small number of aircraft, Uganda would leap from having an outdated air force to having the most advanced combat aircraft in Central and East Africa. A Ugandan Army spokesperson admitted that negotiations had taken place but said that no contract had been signed.\textsuperscript{85} The defence minister, Crispus Kiyonga, only stated that Ugandan arms procurement was classified, and that classified purchases were regularly audited by the auditor general to ensure appropriate accountability.\textsuperscript{86} Even though it remained unclear to what extent the government had actually been negotiating the procurement of the aircraft and if it still planned the procurement, Ugandan parliamentarians questioned the need for


\textsuperscript{83} Uganda Ministry of Defence (MOD), \textit{White Paper on Defence Transformation} (MOD: Kampala, June 2004).


such advanced and expensive aircraft and raised concerns that they could fuel a regional arms race.\footnote{Olupot, M. and Bekunda, C., ‘Parliament queries Russian jet deal’, \textit{New Vision} (Kampala), 7 Apr. 2010.}

Despite the clear interest from the parliament in the issue, no further information was published until March 2011, when leaked information indicated that the Ugandan Government had secretly ordered combat aircraft and other military equipment worth $740 million from an unidentified supplier and first payments worth $400 million had been made. Officials from the Ministry of Defence responded to parliamentary questions by indicating that details of the deal were secret. An army spokesman provided a vague justification for the project, stating that the equipment was needed for ‘strategic management of Uganda’s security’.\footnote{Barigaba, J., ‘$740m fighter jets scam sneaks under the radar’, \textit{East African}, 4 Apr. 2011.} Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had earlier announced the deal at a closed meeting of members of his party, but withheld information about numbers and the delivery schedule. Museveni argued that the procurement of combat aircraft and tanks was necessary for use in the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group and in anticipation of future conflict with Egypt over claims to the water of the White Nile.\footnote{Byarabaha, B. and Mulindwa, H., ‘M7’s Shs1.7tnr fighter jets: the inside story’, \textit{Red Pepper} (Kampala), 1 Apr. 2011.} Parliamentarians from all parties questioned the acquisitions mainly on costs grounds and the deal contributed to anti-government protests related to high food and fuel prices.\footnote{Mugerwa, Y., ‘Uganda government takes Shs1.7 trillion for jet fighters’, \textit{Daily Monitor} (Kampala), 27 Mar. 2011; and Doornebal, A., ‘Fighter jet deal contributes to Ugandan anger’, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 20 Apr. 2011, \url{http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/fighter-jet-deal-contributes-ugandan-anger}.} Finally, the deal was confirmed in the summer of 2011, when the first two of six Su-30MK2 were shown publicly shortly after delivery.\footnote{Ssebuyira, M., ‘You don’t wait for war to buy fighter jets, says Gen. Museveni’, \textit{Daily Monitor} (Kampala), 26 July 2011.}

**Kenya**

On the international stage, Kenya has been a prominent supporter of the proposed arms trade treaty. It was among the seven co-authors of the original UN General Assembly resolution proposing an ATT and was represented in the group of governmental experts on its scope, draft parameters and feasibility.\footnote{UN General Assembly Resolution 61/89, 6 Dec. 2006; and United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’, Note by the Secretary-General, A/63/334, 26 Aug. 2008.} Domestically, arms procurement received little attention from the parliament and the general public until September 2008, when Somali pirates hijacked the MV \textit{Faina}, which was transporting 33 T-72 tanks from Ukraine. Shipping documents gave rise to speculation that the tanks were to be supplied to the armed forces of the Government of Southern Sudan via Kenya.\footnote{‘Hijacked tanks “for South Sudan”’, BBC News, 7 Oct. 2008, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7656662.stm}} In reaction, the Kenyan Government stated that the weapons were for the Kenyan Army but refused to discuss arms procurement any further.\footnote{Shiundu, A., ‘No more discussion on arms destination’, \textit{Daily Nation} (Nairobi), 9 Oct. 2008.} In June 2008 Ukraine had already reported to UNROCA the export of 77 T-72 tanks to Kenya in 2007, whereas
Kenya submitted a nil report for 2007. A Kenyan Government spokesman, replying to the question of why Kenya had not reported the tanks to UNROCA, said that ‘The government is not going to discuss its defence strategy, weapons acquisitions and deployment and its military plans with the media or anybody else for that matter’, but that ‘Any purchases will be reflected in the government’s report to the UN next year’. However, Kenya did not report to UNROCA for 2008 or 2009.

A Kenyan parliamentary committee started an investigation in October 2008 to establish if the weapons were intended for Kenya or South Sudan. In its final report in November 2009, the committee concluded that the status and ownership of the 33 T-72 tanks could not be established with certainty and that the investigation had been hindered by government secrecy. The committee recommended that the law be changed to allow public officers to disclose information to parliamentary committees in order to introduce accountability and checks and balances in the armed forces.

In late 2010 strong evidence surfaced that most or all of the T-72s had been delivered to the armed forces of the GOSS with the full knowledge of the highest levels in the Kenyan Government. However, the revelations did not lead to any significant renewed debate about the Kenyan Government’s secretive support of the GOSS.

In August 2010 a new Kenyan constitution was adopted which increased the government’s accountability to the parliament. As a result, in mid-November 2010 a parliamentary committee was able to question high-level military officers and the defence minister about reports that 15 second-hand F-5 combat aircraft bought from Jordan were delivered in unserviceable condition in 2010. In the same month questions were raised in the Kenyan press about possible corruption in the procurement of upgrade packages for armoured vehicles from Israel and a contract for the purchase of armoured vehicles from South Africa.

As in the debate about the T-72 tanks in 2008–2009, in the 2010 debates the parliamentary and public interest did not appear to be driven by questions about the purpose of the weapons acquired and their relation to actual security threats and the regional military balance. The issues of concern were claims that the equipment in question was overpriced or not functioning properly and suspicions of corruption in the procurement process.

95 UNROCA database (note 69).
4. Arms transfers and conflict

In 2006–10, 22 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced armed conflict of some type.\(^\text{102}\) If providing an accurate overview of arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa is a difficult task, understanding the impact of those transfers on armed conflicts in the region is even harder.\(^\text{103}\) On the one hand, there is limited empirical evidence to suggest a direct causal link between arms supplies and the outbreak or increase in intensity of a conflict. On the other hand, arms are widely believed to help states maintain or restore order and to be needed for legitimate defence purposes. Nonetheless, it is widely assumed that under certain circumstances there is a risk that arms supplies may provoke, prolong or exacerbate violent conflict. This assumption is reflected in the use of arms embargoes and other restrictions on arms exports as a conflict management tool by the United Nations, other multilateral organizations and individual countries (see box 4.1 and table 4.1).

To illustrate the complexities of assessing the impact of arms supplies on violent conflict, this chapter provides examples of how arms transfers played an actual or perceived role in violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10. Focusing on intrastate armed conflict, the predominant form of conflict in the region in this period, the first section discusses the role of arms exports to governments and rebels groups in a selection of countries involved in armed conflicts or where militaries have been involved in the overthrowing of governments. The following section assesses the occurrence of illegal arms transfers to both governments and rebel groups. Such illegal transfers are widely considered as playing a prominent role in fuelling armed conflicts. The chapter ends with a discussion of the contrast between the widely accepted need for well-equipped peacekeepers and the restrictions on arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa.

Arms supplies to countries in conflict

Governments involved in armed conflict, unless subject to an embargo, can legally import arms. Rebel groups have two main sources of arms: capture (usually of small arms and light weapons) from government arsenals or on the

\(^{102}\) This includes inter- or intrastate armed conflict, one-sided armed violence involving government forces, or non-state armed conflict. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/>.

battlefield and international arms transfers. Rebel groups may acquire weapons from foreign dealers, acting without state authorization, or from foreign governments supportive of the rebel’s cause. In particular, several states in sub-Saharan Africa are suspected of supplying arms to rebel groups in the region in 2006–10.

Rebels in one conflict area may also obtain weapons from other conflict areas. During the Libyan conflict in 2011, the country’s well-stocked arsenals were plundered and the whereabouts of many weapons is now unknown. Large numbers of these weapons may have been stolen and supplied to rebel groups in neighbouring countries and beyond. Weapons known to have been taken from Libyan arsenals include large numbers of basic arms, such as rifles, and smaller numbers of more advanced light weapons, such as portable or light truck-mounted anti-aircraft missiles and portable guided anti-tank missiles, which could significantly boost rebel forces’ capability to fight aircraft and armour deployed by governments. The concerns raised by these developments led the
Sudan

The Sudanese Government, along with the government-aligned Janjaweed militias, fought a conflict with rebels in the Darfur region of Sudan, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), throughout the period 2006–10. The UN Security Council, stressing that there could not be a military solution to the conflict, prohibited any movement of military equipment into Darfur by all of the belligerents, including Sudanese government forces, in March 2005.\textsuperscript{108}

The Sudanese Government, ignoring the UN sanctions, continuously moved military equipment into Darfur in 2006–10.\textsuperscript{109} During the same period Sudan imported arms from several countries, in particular Belarus, China, Russia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{110} While there is no evidence that these arms were supplied directly to Sudanese Government forces in Darfur in violation of the UN embargo, there was good reason to believe that, soon after delivery, they were moved to and used in Darfur in violation of the UN sanctions. For example, in 2010 several Su-25 combat aircraft were observed in Darfur. The Sudanese Government had acquired these aircraft, part of a batch of about 15, from Belarus since 2008 under a letter of guarantee that they would not be used in violation of the UN e...

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{United Nations arms embargoes on targets in sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–10}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
Target & Entry into force & Lifted \\
\hline
Côte d’Ivoire & 15 Nov. 2004 & – \\
Congo, Democratic Republic of (NGF) & 28 July 2003 & – \\
Eritrea & 23 Dec. 2009 & – \\
Liberia (NGF) & 19 Nov. 1992 & – \\
Rwanda (NGF) & 16 Aug. 1995 & 10 July 2008 \\
Sierra Leone (NGF) & 5 June 1998 & 29 Sep. 2010 \\
Somalia (NGF) & 23 Jan. 1992 & – \\
Sudan (Darfur region) & 30 July 2004 & – \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

NGF = non-governmental forces; in all other cases the target of the sanctions is the entire country or region.


In response to these findings, in October 2010 the UN Security Council decided that states must ensure that any sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Sudan is conditional on end-user documentation stating that the arms will not be used in Darfur.

Until about 2009, when relations between Chad and Sudan improved, weapons from Chadian Government stocks ended up in the hands of rebels in Darfur. Elements in the Chadian Government had been involved in arms supplies to Sudanese rebels, possibly with support from actors in Eritrea. The UN panel of experts on Darfur also found SALW in the hands of rebels in Darfur that could be traced back to Libya. Although it could not be established when and how these arms had arrived in Darfur, the panel suspected that the weapons had been supplied directly by the Libyan Government of Mu'ammar Gaddafi.

Arms acquisitions by the Sudanese Government in 2006–10 should also be assessed in connection to its hostile relations with the Government of Southern Sudan. Both the Sudanese Government and the GOSS upgraded their armed forces during that period. Until its independence in July 2011, South Sudan was part of Sudan but was governed by the GOSS following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese Government. Despite the fact that the CPA did not allow arms procurement by the GOSS without the consent of the Sudanese Government, the GOSS did so without consent, including an estimated 110 T-72 tanks from Ukraine (via Kenya) and 9 Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia. As a result, Russia and Ukraine have become suppliers to both sides. At the same time, the EU and the USA maintained arms embargoes on the whole of Sudan, although the UK and the USA have been heavily involved in the transformation of the SPLA into a national army. The USA actively tried to convince both Kenya and Ukraine to stop the transfer of the T-72 tanks to South Sudan.

**Chad**

During 2006–10 the Chadian Government fought various rebel factions, some of which were supported by Sudan. In the same period, increased oil revenues pro-
vided the means to sharply increase arms imports. Some suppliers provided Chad with arms in order to bring the conflict to an end more quickly.

In February 2008 the UN Security Council called on member states to support the Chadian Government in its fight against the rebels, which was interpreted by some as legitimizing arms supplies to Chad. By far the largest supplier of arms was Ukraine, followed by a variety of other suppliers of major arms and other weapons including Belgium, Bulgaria, China, France, Israel, Libya, Russia and Singapore. The supplied arms were a major boost to Chad's military strength and were quickly deployed in the fight against the rebel forces. For example, six Ukrainian-supplied Su-25 combat aircraft were Chad's first jet combat aircraft; they played a significant role in offensives against the rebels and provided Chad with the means to attack rebel camps in Sudan. As in Somalia (see below), arms supplies were not universally seen as part of a solution to the conflict. This division of views was reflected in the widely differing policies of EU member states—which apply the same criteria for their arms export licensing decisions—regarding Chad. Whereas France actively supported Chad with arms, Romania and Germany refused licences for the export of military or combat equipment to the Chadian Government, referring to the conflict and human rights violations in the country.

Different rebel forces in Chad sustained their military activities with weapons received from the Sudanese Government. Despite denials from Sudan, the available evidence indicates that the Sudanese authorities hosted Chadian rebel groups and supplied them with SALW and multiple rocket launchers.

Whereas in February 2008 rebel forces managed to push unhindered through Chad and attack the capital, N'Djamena, by 2010 the Chadian Government had once more gained control over most of the country. It is unclear whether this change in fortunes was due to the government forces’ major increases in firepower or to Sudan normalizing its relations with Chad and ending its support for Chadian rebel groups. However, access to many arms suppliers may have been a significant incentive for the Chadian Government to pursue a military solution to its dispute with the various rebel groups.

*Côte d’Ivoire*

In 2002 a rebellion broke out in Côte d’Ivoire that divided the country into a northern zone controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) and a southern zone controlled by the Ivorian Government, led by President Laurent Gbagbo. The two sides were kept apart by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), supported by French troops. After nine French soldiers were killed in a government air attack on rebels in November 2004, French forces destroyed the

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122 Wezeman (note 113), p. 3. Germany has reported supplies of arms to UN peacekeepers in Chad as exports of arms to Chad.

In the same month the UN imposed an arms embargo. The presence of UNOCI and the generally successful implementation of the arms embargo prevented the Ivorian Government from rebuilding its air force, stopped it from resorting to force to regain control of the whole country, and finally hindered it from fighting off an opposition offensive in early 2011.

From the outbreak of conflict, Burkina Faso was accused of backing the Forces Nouvelles with training, funding and arms supplies, in contravention of the UN arms embargo. Evidence for the accusations of arms supplies from Burkina Faso increased in 2010, when small arms formerly belonging to the Burkinan armed forces were seen in the possession of the Forces Nouvelles. Burkina Faso denied the allegations and claimed that Burkinan Army and Police ammunition found in Côte d'Ivoire came from stocks looted during unrest in Burkina Faso in 2006, illustrating the difficulty of proving allegations of government support to rebel forces. There were also indications that the Forces Nouvelles bought weapons from sources in neighbouring countries.

Gbagbo was removed from power in April 2011 having been denounced by the international community for refusing to step down after losing presidential elections in November 2010. UN forces destroyed heavy arms and arms stockpiles of the Gbagbo forces, but the illegitimate supplies of arms to the Force Nouvelles in 2010 in combination with the successful arms embargo on the Ivorian Government are likely to have contributed significantly to the victory of the Forces Nouvelles and the instalment of the internationally recognized president, Alassane Ouattara.

Somalia

Somalia is a clear case in which the assumption that arms supplies can contribute to stability has played an important role in international efforts to address a violent conflict. During 2006–10 Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) depended for survival mainly on an Ethiopian intervention force (in 2006–2009) and protection from the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Ethiopia and Yemen supplied arms to the TFG in 2005 and 2006. Once the UN arms embargo on Somalia was amended in 2007 to exclude the TFG, the UN urged the international community to supply arms to the TFG. From 2009 the TFG received SALW from or via Uganda, for which the USA reimbursed

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127 United Nations (note 126), pp. 28, 32.
Uganda. Although the military aid may have helped to prevent the demise of the TFG, there have also been several negative consequences of the supply of arms. First, the TFG forces have been involved in disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian casualties. Second, the TFG forces have lost many weapons through theft and desertion, representing a significant source of arms for the armed groups they are fighting against. These risks of supplying arms to the TFG may be the reason for the apparent reluctance of EU member states to arm the TFG, despite providing military training to approximately 2000 members of the TFG forces. However, elsewhere in Somalia, the UK supplied 450 AK-47 assault rifles in 2010 to the Ministry of Interior of the nominally independent Somaliland.

The UN monitoring group on Somalia has assessed that commercial supplies from or via Yemen are the most consistent source of arms for non-governmental armed groups in Somalia. Since June 2008 curbs on domestic arms sales in Yemen have apparently reduced the volume of exports to Somalia and driven up prices in Somali markets. In addition, there is substantial evidence that armed groups fighting the TFG received arms from Eritrea in 2006–10. In general, these acquisitions involved small volumes of ammunition and SALW. Despite denials, this was one of the key reasons for the UN Security Council’s decision to impose sanctions, including an arms embargo, on Eritrea in December 2009.

The importance of arms imports for facilitating military responses to threats to security was clearly illustrated when in October 2011 Kenya launched an offensive against armed Somali groups inside Somalia, deploying arms such as armoured vehicles, Z-9 helicopters and F-5E combat aircraft that had been acquired in 2006–10.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

There has been continuous war and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1996. During 2006–10 violence between government forces and several rebel groups was concentrated in the east of the country. In response to the violence, in 2003 the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on rebel groups in eastern DRC, but allowed exemptions for arms supplies to the Congolese Government.

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131 Wezeman (note 130), pp. 5–6
132 Wezeman (note 130), pp. 6–7.
133 Wezeman (note 130), p. 7.
135 Wezeman (note 130), pp. 2–3.
136 Wezeman (note 130), p. 3.
137 Wezeman (note 130), p. 4.
During this phase of the conflict, Ukraine became an important supplier of arms to the Congolese Government, for example delivering 20 T-55 tanks and 20 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles in 2006 and 100 T-72 tanks, 30 T-55 tanks, 4 Mi-24 combat helicopters and 13,000 rifles in 2010.\textsuperscript{140} In 2010 the UK and the USA funded the supply of British military radios for a Congolese armed forces ‘rapid reaction force’ of up to 12 battalions for ‘stabilization projects’ in northern and eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{141} The newly acquired weapons were soon used in military operations. For example, the T-55 tanks and BMP-1 vehicles were used against rebel groups in eastern DRC in 2008, in a government offensive supported by UN combat helicopters, and in 2009.\textsuperscript{142}

Elements within the Congolese armed forces have been identified as one of the main sources of arms and military equipment for the rebel groups, which are a main cause of instability in the DRC.\textsuperscript{143} The rebels are also suspected of having bought SALW in contravention of the UN arms embargo from or via Tanzania through networks linked to high-level government officials in Tanzania and Burundi.\textsuperscript{144}

The arms supplies to the Congolese Government may have contributed to the government’s efforts to consolidate its authority in the country during 2006–10. However, the government forces have been involved in human rights abuses and the supply of weapons to a government that has shown signs of authoritarian behaviour can be questioned.\textsuperscript{145} Furthermore, due to a lack of stockpile management, arms supplied to the Congolese Government may have fuelled the conflict by arming both sides.

\textit{Mali and Niger}

Both Mali and Niger have experienced recurrent insurgencies by Tuareg rebels since the 1990s. The supply of combat helicopters to the governments of both countries provides an interesting example of how transfers of small volumes of major arms can play a key role in violent conflict.

In late 2007 Mali imported two second-hand Mi-24 combat helicopters from Bulgaria, the first combat helicopters in Malian service. Shortly after delivery, in April 2008 these helicopters played a major role in a government offensive against the rebels that reportedly killed dozens of rebels.\textsuperscript{146} Whereas the attack can be described as an escalation in the conflict, with increased use of firepower...

\textsuperscript{140} Ukrainian State Export Control Service (note 110).
\textsuperscript{143} Bromley and Holtom (note 139), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{145} Bromley and Holtom (note 139), p. 5; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘We Will Crush You’: The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of Congo (HRW: New York, 2008).
\textsuperscript{146} Sarrar, S., ‘Mali, rebels agree truce after bloody air strike’, Reuters, 3 Apr. 2008.
creating increased numbers of casualties, it could also be argued that the two helicopters were ‘game changers’ which ensured the success of the government’s military campaign and, in turn, forced the rebels to accept a ceasefire.

Niger acquired two Mi-24 combat helicopters from Russia in 2007 that were also used soon after delivery, in 2008, against the rebels. However, the rebels claimed to have shot down one of the helicopters and, unlike in Mali, there is no indication that their use had an immediate effect on the willingness of the rebels to continue fighting.

Arms supplies and military coups d’état

Arms supplies to government forces in Africa risk being used in the overthrow of African governments. In sub-Saharan Africa during 2006–10 armed forces in Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Mauritania (2008) and Niger (2010) were directly involved in overthrowing their governments. Little is known about the arms imports of these countries and the relations between arms supplies and coups d’état is therefore hard to assess. However certain arms supplies to Mauritania and Guinea illustrate how arms exports have been directly linked to putschists.

In 2006, a year after an earlier military coup in Mauritania, the Belgian authorities licensed the export of arms worth €5.9 million ($7.8 million) to Mauritania in support of the modernization of the Mauritanian military after the establishment of a democratic process with international support. There are strong indications that these arms were modern P-90 and F-2000 rifles for the Presidential Guard. In 2008, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, commander of the Presidential Guard, overthrew the government of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi.

In Guinea the military junta used recently delivered weapons in the violent suppression of demonstrations against the regime in September 2009, in which over 150 people were killed. Mamba armoured vehicles supplied by South Africa in 2003 and French tear gas grenade launchers delivered between 2002 and 2008

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149 For more on how arms supplies may lead to or be used to prevent military coups see Wang (note 103).
Illegal arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa

United Nations, multilateral and national arms embargoes and export regulations intended to prevent arms supplies from fuelling conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are regularly breached. During the 1990s in particular, several cases were uncovered of large-scale arms smuggling to sub-Saharan Africa in violation of international or national laws. As a result, illegal arms flows—defined as international transfers of arms contrary to the laws of one or more of the states involved—are widely thought to be a significant source of arms fuelling conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

By their very nature, it is extremely difficult to assess the occurrence, volume of, trends in and effects of illegal arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa. There is no region-wide assessment of illegal cross-border arms flows to or within the region, based on, for example, government reports on arms seized from smugglers. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that illegal arms supplies occurred regularly in 2006–10.

As described above, UN panels have concluded that several serious violations of UN arms embargoes took place in 2006–10, involving arms being supplied to embargo targets in sub-Saharan African, in particular rebel groups, from within the region. Considering that the panels have in general limited resources and investigative powers, it is likely that other violations have gone undetected. Several detailed case studies also provide evidence that small arms and light weapons are regularly smuggled in small batches between sub-Saharan African states or from elsewhere for supply to both organized rebel groups and individuals. It has been argued that together such small cases of arms smuggling,

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157 See e.g. eds Florquin and Berman (note 104); Mthembu-Salter, G., Trading Life, Trading Death: The Flow of Small Arms from Mozambique to Malawi, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 6 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Jan. 2009); Hazen, J. M. with Horner, J., Small Arms, Armed Violence and Insecurity in
sometimes referred to as ‘the ant trade’, are of much greater importance than the bulk transfers of arms from outside the region, which have received widespread attention.\textsuperscript{158}

Evidence from judicial investigations and prosecutions during 2006–10 into illegal international arms supplies to governments and rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa provides a starting point for assessing illegal arms flows from outside the region, albeit with limitations. Fourteen cases have been identified based on a survey of reporting by governments and press on the Internet (see table 4.2). In three of the cases (cases 1, 5 and 8), investigations were dropped when allegations were proven false or could not be proved. Four of the remaining 10 cases (cases 10, 11, 12 and 14) involved substantial numbers of arms. In one of these cases, weapons reached the client; in one case, weapons were intercepted in the region before delivery to the client; and in two cases, the weapons were stopped before they could be shipped to the region.

The comprehensiveness of the list is difficult to assess due to the difficulty of obtaining information, in particular in cases involving small batches of arms. In addition, accusations of illegal international arms transfers may only lead to legal action years later or may never be the subject of public judicial investigation. For example, a trial in France related to illegal activities surrounding arms sales to Angola in 1993–98 only led to convictions in 2010.\textsuperscript{159} Another case concerns the immediate re-export to South Sudan of 77 T-72 tanks supplied by Ukraine to Kenya in 2007–2008. Although Ukrainian officials are reported to have stated that the re-export was not authorized by Ukraine and that Kenya had signed an end-user certificate prohibiting re-export, there does not appear to have been a legal investigation into the case in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{160}

The cases underline that there is no international agreement on the circumstances under which arms transfers should be prohibited—other than in violation of a UN arms embargo. Transactions similar to those in table 4.2 can take place without being considered illegal. For example, in the case involving the largest volume of weapons (case 14), the illegal activity was a British dealer brokering a deal without permission from the British authorities; there is no indication that the deal was illegal in the recipient country, Nigeria, or in the countries from which the weapons originated. Indeed, according to the Nigerian Police, the thousands of rifles and pistols were acquired because the Nigerian Government decided that the police needed adequate equipment ‘to face the challenges of electioneering—before, during and after the [2007] election.’\textsuperscript{161} In the next largest


\textsuperscript{158} Bevan J., ‘Where have all the Antonovs gone?’, \textit{Public Interest Report}, vol. 60, no. 1 (winter 2007).

\textsuperscript{159} Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 11ème chamber, 3ème section, Jugement 27 Oct. 2009.

\textsuperscript{160} Holtom (note 46), pp. 10–12; and US Department of State, ‘Kenya’s conventional arms end-user certificate violation’, Cable to US Embassy in Nairobi, no. 27 Nov. 2009, 09STATE122115, \texttt{<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09STATE122115.html>}. See also chapter 3 above.

\textsuperscript{161} ‘Nigeria police to get arms boost’, BBC News, 1 Sep. 2006, \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5304896.stm>}. 
### Table 4.2. Judicial investigations and prosecutions related to arms exports to sub-Saharan African destinations, 2006–10

Start refers to the start of the prosecution or investigation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigating country</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The arrangement by a French company of the supply of a small number of armed light aircraft and helicopters to Chad without a French export licence. Investigation appears to have ended without prosecution in 2008.(^ {a} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The attempted export of 5 military vehicles from the UK to Sierra Leone in 2008 without export permit. Company fined in 2009.(^ {b} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The attempted export of components for assault rifles to Sudan in violation of US export laws. One person sentenced to prison in 2008.(^ {c} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The training of Guinean special forces and supplying them with weapons by an Israeli company without prior approval of the Israeli authorities. Company fined in 2010.(^ {d} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The suspected supply to Nigerian rebel forces of a small batch of mortars and machine guns on board a Ukrainian aircraft that had landed at Kano airport, northern Nigeria. Confirmed as a legal supply to Equatorial Guinea in 2009.(^ {e} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The supply to Sudan by a British company in 2005–2006 of 30 BV-206 military vehicles from the UK via Norway in violation of British export laws. Two people sentenced to prison in 2009.(^ {f} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The arrangement of the supply without licence of arms from the UK to countries worldwide including small quantities of sub-machine guns and ammunition to Nigeria and other arms to Burkina Faso, Gabon and Senegal in 2005–2007. Two people sentenced to prison in 2010.(^ {g} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The supply of part of 1884 tonnes of ammunition intended for destruction to rebels in the Angolan region of Cabinda via Bulgaria and Romania. Investigation ended in 2010 due to lack of evidence.(^ {h} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The suspected illegal supply of small arms ammunition to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by a South African company. Investigation appears to have been dropped in 2010 after the UN confirmed the ammunition was for UN security personnel in West Africa.(^ {i} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The attempted supply of 4000 handguns, 200 000 rounds of ammunition and 50 000 tear gas grenades from the USA to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in violation of the UN arms embargo. Prosecution ongoing as of 2011.(^ {j} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The shipment of 13 containers with ammunition for mortars and light guns and artillery rockets to Gambia through port of Lagos in violation of Nigerian import laws. Also reported to UN sanction committee as violation of UN arms embargo on arms exports from Iran. Prosecution ongoing as of 2011.(^ {k} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The planned delivery from the USA of 700 Kalashnikov rifles and arrangement of the transport of 6000 Kalashnikov rifles from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Somalia in violation of US laws. Two people sentenced to prison in 2010–11.(^ {l} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
investigating country | start | case
--- | --- | ---
13 | Somalia (Somaliland) | 2010 | The attempted supply to the authorities in Puntland of a planeload of weapons and military uniforms in violation of the UN arms embargo on Somalia. Goods seized by Somaliland authorities and six people sentenced to prison in 2010.\(^m\)
14 | United Kingdom | 2011 | The arrangement of the supply from the UK of 70,000 rifles, 10,000 pistols and 32 million rounds of ammunition from China and other countries to the Nigerian Police in 2006-2007 in contravention of British law. Trial ongoing as of 2011.\(^n\)


This case involved a violation of a UN arms embargo prohibiting the export of arms from Iran; however, this embargo is not aimed at a target in sub-Saharan Africa.

\(^{162}\) This case involved a violation of a UN arms embargo prohibiting the export of arms from Iran; however, this embargo is not aimed at a target in sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 4.3. European Union member states’ denials of arms export licences to the largest sub-Saharan African contributors to peace operations in Africa, 2005–2009

Countries are those sub-Saharan African countries that deployed more than 1000 personnel on AU and UN peace operations in Africa as of 31 Dec. 2010.

| Country    | Personnel contributed to peace operations in Africa, Dec. 2010 | No. of denials of arms exports licences by EU member states, 2005–2009 | Criteria on which the denials were based
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3 575</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2 304</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2 105</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5 663</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3 771</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2 181</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2 187</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4 584</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1 073</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AU = African Union; EU = European Union; UN = United Nations.

*a* The 8 EU criteria governing control of exports of military equipment and technology relate to (1) the recipient’s respect for the international obligations and commitments of member states, including UN arms embargoes; (2) the recipient’s respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; (3) the existence of tensions or armed conflicts in the recipient country; (4) preservation of regional peace, security and stability; (5) the national security of the member states and friendly and allied countries; (6) the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law; (7) the risk of diversion; and (8) the compatibility of the export with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.


Arms supplies to African peacekeepers

The clearest cases in which arms exported to sub-Saharan African destinations have been used in what is widely considered legitimate military action have been in the AU and UN peace operations mandated to manage and resolve conflicts in the region. African countries play an essential role in these operations and their peacekeepers are regularly involved in combat, for example in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur and Somalia.\(^{163}\)

In general, multilateral peace operations in Africa tend to suffer from a shortage of equipment, including weapons, to defend against or engage armed opponents. For example, in March 2009 Burundi appealed for armoured personnel carriers for its AMISOM troops in Somalia and in July 2010 AMISOM was in

\(^{163}\) For details of these operations and sub-Saharan African participation see the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>.
From at least late 2007, the commander of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) had requested 12 combat helicopters and 18 military transport helicopters. At the request of the Sudanese Government, UNAMID consists mainly of African personnel, and so these helicopters had to be sourced from African countries. It took until February 2010 before Ethiopia filled part of the equipment gap by contributing 5 combat helicopters to UNAMID.

Recognizing the need for improvement of African peacekeeping capabilities, multilateral organizations and individual countries have established several aid programmes. Despite this, the intention to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities can collide with concerns about the risk of undesired end-uses or end-users, which have been grounds for countries to deny licences for the export of arms to sub-Saharan African countries involved in peace operations.

In late 2009 the Malaysian Government denied permission for the export of 40,000 second-hand assault rifles to the Burundian Government, a major troop contributor to AMISOM, because of fears that they were intended for rebel groups in the DRC. In 2008 Swaziland reportedly wanted to procure from a British company 3 military helicopters, an unidentified number of armoured vehicles and 925 rifles, all officially intended for use by Swazi forces in multilateral peace operations. However, the British Government halted the export, because of concerns that the weapons were intended for use quelling internal unrest or for diversion to Zimbabwe or a Middle Eastern country. In 2010 Guinea planned to contribute troops to AMISOM while at the same time it was subject to an EU arms embargo related to political violence in Guinea. In addition, there are many other cases in which EU member states have refused licences for exports of arms to major participants in African peace operations.

One possible approach to overcome reluctance to supply arms to certain states is to supply the arms directly to the multilateral organizations involved or to supply arms to individual countries that are specifically to be used for peace operations. In 2006–2007 Belgium loaned 15 Pandur armoured vehicles to the
armed forces of Benin for use in the UN peace operation in the DRC.\textsuperscript{173} Units from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Senegal and Uganda participating in UNAMID in Darfur received up to 138 armoured vehicles supplied by South African companies in 2005–2009 funded by Canada and the USA.\textsuperscript{174} Between 2005 and 2009 Canada also lent 105 wheeled armoured vehicles to a pool of African countries consisting of Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal specifically for use by the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UNAMID in the Darfur region.\textsuperscript{175} In the framework of its Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix, RECAMP) programme, France bases VAB armoured vehicles in Senegal.\textsuperscript{176}


\textsuperscript{174} SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4).


5. Conclusions

Armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are fought with relatively small volumes of arms. With little indigenous arms-production capacity in the region, most countries are fully dependent on foreign suppliers for arms, yet sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) accounted for only 1.5 per cent of the total volume of major arms imports in 2006–10. Restraints on the exports of arms and military technology to countries in conflict in sub-Saharan African can therefore have a significant impact on the military capabilities of the parties to conflicts.

In the past 15 years, Belarus, China, Russia and Ukraine accounted for the bulk of deliveries of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa. However, many more countries from all parts of the world have supplied major arms, small arms and light weapons, and other military equipment to governments in the region.

The motives for arms transfers to sub-Saharan African destinations are diverse, including direct financial revenues—even if they are small compared to revenues from sales to other regions—and strengthening political influence in sub-Saharan Africa to gain access to natural resources and to further the security interest of the supplier.

While rebel groups acquire a substantial part of their arms inventory by capture from the government forces they fight, a significant number are imported. There is evidence that during 2006–10 rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa acquired arms from abroad, in particular from nearby countries, in some cases with the involvement of the countries’ governments. Thus, even though arms production in the region is minimal, there is a need for states in the region to recognize their responsibilities not only as arms importers, but also as potential exporters of or conduits for arms to rebel groups.

Arms transfers and conflict

A key challenge for adequate arms control in sub-Saharan Africa is to understand which arms supplies provoke, prolong or aggravate violent conflicts and which supplies contribute to security and stability. The uncertainty about the impact of arms transfers to conflict areas in sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in the experience of 2006–10. In several cases it could be argued that arms supplies have contributed to governments’ capabilities to legitimately maintain or restore stability in their country, including with the use of force against rebel groups. In a number of cases, exporting countries have supplied arms to governments in the region with the explicit intention to achieve these objectives and in line with United Nations statements or actions. The least controversial arms supplies are those aimed at improving African states’ capabilities to participate in peace operations.

However, in many cases arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa have had clearly undesirable effects.
1. The supply of arms can be argued to have been an incentive for the recipients to try to achieve their goals via violence instead of dialogue.
2. Arms have been used in human rights violations.
3. Arms recipients often do not have the capability to secure their stockpiles and weapons have been lost or stolen, including by rebel groups.
4. Arms recipients have deliberately diverted weapons to targets of UN arms embargoes or rebel groups in neighbouring countries.
5. Arms supplied to governments have been turned against those governments in military coups d'état.

Both SALW and major arms play a role in armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Even supplies of relatively small quantities of older weapons can have a notable impact on conflicts.

As a result of ambiguity about the impact and desirability of arms transfers, arms export policies by individual supplier countries vary widely. Some suppliers appear reluctant to supply arms to most countries in the region; others seem to consider only UN arms embargoes as a reason not to supply arms. The ambiguity is also reflected in the inconsistent approach of the international community to conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa: whereas arms embargoes have been agreed in relation to some conflicts, in other cases no embargo has been imposed. There are many cases in which it remains unclear whether and how governments in supplier states have assessed the effect the arms they have licensed for export to sub-Saharan Africa could have on prolonging or aggravating violent conflict. Even within the European Union—whose member states apply a shared set of criteria guiding their arms export licencing decisions—arms export policies on sub-Saharan African destinations remain far from harmonized.

Weapons used in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by government forces have in general been delivered with the consent of the governments of both the supplier and recipient countries. However, based on the limited information available, it appears that the illegal arms trade continued to play a role in the procurement of arms by both governments and rebel groups in the region. Although there is no hard evidence of widespread large illegal supplies from outside the region in 2006–10, there have been regular instances of weapons flowing from within the region to, in particular, rebel groups in violation of UN embargoes. It is worrying that the international community has either been unable to help stop such violations of arms embargoes or has taken too long to sanction violators.

Better insight into the role of illegal arms supplies could be achieved if more information about interceptions by government authorities of illegal arms transfers and related legal activity were made publicly available and centrally collected, for example in the annual national reports on the UN Programme of Action on SALW. This information, combined with the findings of UN panels

177 On the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects see <http://www.poa-iss.org/>.
monitoring arms embargoes, could form the basis for a more in-depth study of illegal arms transfers in the region.

**Transparency**

While sub-Saharan African governments may have legitimate reasons for importing arms, they continue to be highly secretive about their arms procurement. In general, they remained unwilling to discuss details of their arms acquisition publicly and to share information with other states in the region.

Intergovernmental transparency is necessary for an informed debate about how the military needs of sub-Saharan Africa states should be taken into account in discussions about arms control in the region. Countries in the region regularly voice their support for regional and global conventional arms control initiatives. But their low level of participation in UNROCA, the key intergovernmental reporting instrument on conventional arms, casts doubts on their willingness to actively control arms. To demonstrate serious support for better arms controls, sub-Saharan African countries must increase current levels of transparency in arms procurement. Countries that take the lead on these issues should carefully consider their own policies. For example, the secrecy surrounding Kenya’s arms procurement and its involvement in South Sudan’s secret arms acquisition is in clear contradiction to its formal support of improved controls on international arms transfers, in particular its prominent backing of the proposed arms trade treaty.\(^\text{178}\)

The lack of transparency in arms transfers to and arms procurement in sub-Saharan Africa obstructs an informed debate on an ATT and would be a serious obstacle to verifying and measuring the effectiveness of an eventual treaty. A central element of the negotiating process on an ATT is how and to what extent states parties should be legally obliged to provide information demonstrating their implementation of the operative provisions of an ATT for consideration by peers and the public.\(^\text{179}\)

The cases presented here show that domestic debate is often based on incomplete and confusing information which emerges only after key procurement decisions have been made. Even those governments that have been more forthcoming with public information about their arms procurements tend to remain reluctant to discuss the rationale and underlying threat assessments in public or in the parliament. In these and many other countries there is a keen and demonstrable interest in the parliament and among the public to discuss arms procurement, in particular in relation to the quality of the weapons procured and suspicions about the risk of corruption. The lack of public transparency is also an obstacle to constructive discussions on national defence.

A starting point for improving public transparency would be to support initiatives on corruption in the arms trade. Whereas in many sub-Saharan


\(^{179}\) Holtom and Bromley (note 2).
African countries arms procurement is not widely discussed from the perspective of its impact on peace and security, corruption in arms procurement has received public attention in a number of cases. Interest in the corruption issue and increasing willingness by governments to discuss it could be a stepping stone towards more discussion of and transparency in arms procurement in the region.

Even the strongest habits of secrecy among states in sub-Saharan Africa are often confounded by a combination of reporting by arms suppliers to UNROCA and information from open sources. Instead of letting rumours guide discussions and policymaking at home or in neighbouring countries, a more open approach would contribute to confidence building and preventing the misinterpretations and miscalculations of state intentions that can lead to a waste of resources and even interstate conflict. Moreover, if sub-Saharan African states want to persuade arms suppliers—which regularly hinder arms exports by refusing export licences—that they have legitimate reasons to procure arms, they should be more forthcoming about their motives.

Continuous and improved collection and dissemination of information from open sources about arms transfers, such as provided by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, and analysis provided by a range of research institutes and non-governmental organizations is important to help governments and civil society engage in informed decision making about arms procurement and arms exports.
Appendix A. Transfers of small arms and light weapons to sub-Saharan Africa

Table A.1 provides an indication of the occurrence of SALW transfers to sub-Saharan Africa. It includes cases of transfers during 2006–10 of those SALW and their ammunition that are most relevant for armed conflict: military-style rifles and sub-machine guns, machine guns, and portable grenade and rocket launchers.

The information has been collected from a wide variety of open sources. Cases are only included where there is credible information that the weapons were delivered to sub-Saharan Africa based on an assessment of the reliability of the sources and the level of detail of the report. Public information on SALW transfers is far from complete and the comprehensiveness of the list is unknown.

Table A.1. Examples of transfers of small arms and light weapons and related ammunition and technology to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), 2006–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Year of delivery</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1000 7.62-mm assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>40 grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2006–2008</td>
<td>219 grenade launchers, c. 1200 sub-machine guns, 347 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>115 510 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition delivered via Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12.7-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>c. 400 000 7.65-mm ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>400 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>c. 2006</td>
<td>Unknown number of Tavor and Galil assault rifles delivered to presidential guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>45 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4 million 5.56-mm ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50 000 VOG-17 30-mm grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2006–2009</td>
<td>31 000 assault rifles, 1500 RPG-7 grenade launchers, 551 machine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10 000 magazines for assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5000 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 M-84 machine guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9 million rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 54 mm), 1000 OG15V 73-mm shells, 2000 VO-1 82-mm shells, 2000 RPG-7 grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3000 rifles, 10 000 sub-machine guns, 600 machine guns, 1780 grenade launchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic of</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12 SPG-9 73-mm recoilless gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>100 assault rifle; recipient uncertain, possibly for the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Year of delivery</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (Forces Nouvelles)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>c. 2010</td>
<td>Unknown numbers of AKMS assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>141 assault rifles, 6 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>Estimated 4800 40-mm grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3 RBG-6 grenade launcher, including 1000 40-mm grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.05 million 9-mm, 30 000 7.62-mm, 1 million 5.56-mm, 30 000 7.62-mm ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1 machine gun, 2 grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>2 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50 82-mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>41 40-mm grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Machinery and raw materials for production of small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>€137 499 worth of small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>60-mm and 81-mm mortar shells and small arms ammunition; delivery halted in 2010 in Nigeria; Gambian Government denies involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>737 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td>655 grenade launchers, 44 500 assault rifles, 550 machine guns; possibly diverted by Kenya to South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>c. 6964 M4A1 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2008–2010</td>
<td>21 machine guns, 401 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50 assault rifles, 200 000 7.62-mm, 100 000 9-mm ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2006–2009</td>
<td>1607 assault rifles, 100 sub-machine guns, 150 RPG-7 grenade launchers, 2121 RPG-7 grenades, 1 702 968 7.62-mm ammunition; partly funded by USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>Unknown numbers of light machine guns, 82-mm mortars, grenade launchers, hand grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>133 assault rifles, 58 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>c. 340 M4 assault rifles, 335 000 9-mm, 244 000 5.56-mm ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>20 assault rifles, 4 light machine guns, 1 heavy machine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>c. 2006</td>
<td>Unknown numbers of F-2000 assault rifles and P-90 sub-machine guns delivered to army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>18 light machine guns, 10 heavy machine guns, 215 assault rifles, 36 sub-machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>150 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>1200 assault rifles, 192 machine guns, 75 grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2007–2009</td>
<td>Machinery for production of AK-47 assault rifles and small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40 000 AK-47 assault rifles for police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30 000 K-2 assault rifles for police; probably from South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Year of delivery</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2010 assault rifles, 50 semi-automatic rifles, €237,432 worth of small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>200 rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>40 sub-machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>45 assault rifles, 15 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>150 M-60 machine guns to army; aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5 sniper rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Assault rifles; grenade launchers; aid; agreed 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>c. 40 tonnes small arms and ammunition worth over $10 million delivered to Transitional Federal Government; financed by USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>c. 2009</td>
<td>Unknown quantity of 40-mm type-69 rockets; from undisclosed East African country; used by Somali pirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>450 Kalashnikov rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2005–2007</td>
<td>9 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Justice and Equality Movement)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>c. 2007</td>
<td>Galil and Tavor rifles; identified as delivered to Chad in 2006; unknown how they ended up in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3 82-mm mortars, 20 machine guns, 10 grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>60 machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1000 assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36,798 assault rifles, 25 machine guns, 50 grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3 million small arms ammunition, 1500 rocket-propelled grenades, 3224 mortar shells; shipped in 2008 to South Africa but further transport halted; possibly delivered to Zimbabwean Government via another route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown recipient</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Type-69 grenade launchers delivered to undisclosed government in East Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix B. Arms exports from the European Union to sub-Saharan Africa

Table B.1. Official reports of European Union member states’ arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) in 2005–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>EU member states that licensed exports( ^a ) or delivered arms worth over $100 000 to the recipient in 2005–2009</th>
<th>No. of licence denials</th>
<th>Criteria cited in licence denials( ^b )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany( ^d ), Poland( ^d ), Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, UK( ^a )</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Austria( ^a ), Belgium( ^d ), Bulgaria, France, Germany( ^d ), Spain, UK( ^a )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium( ^d ), France, Romania</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France( ^d ), Romania, Slovakia( ^a ), UK( ^d )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), France( ^d ), UK( ^d )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany( ^d ), Netherlands( ^d ), Romania, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2, 3, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Germany( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Bulgaria, France, Germany( ^d ), Portugal, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo,</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), France( ^d ), Germany( ^d ), UK( ^d )</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Bulgaria, France, Lithuania, UK( ^a )</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2, 3, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France( ^d ), Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 3, 5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Bulgaria, France, Italy( ^d ), Slovakia( ^d )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany( ^d ), Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Austria( ^d ), France, Germany( ^d ), Portugal, Romania, Spain( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), Germany( ^d ), Italy( ^d ), Slovakia, Spain, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>France( ^d ), Romania, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Czech Republic( ^d ), France, Germany( ^d ), Greece, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2, 3, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Spain( ^d ), UK( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Germany( ^d ), Malta, Romania, UK( ^a )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>France( ^d ), Germany( ^d )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>France, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Belgium, France, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Austria, France, Germany( ^d ), Romania, Sweden( ^d ), UK( ^a )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>UK( ^d )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Austria, Germany( ^a ), Sweden, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Bulgaria, France, Slovakia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Belgium( ^d ), Bulgaria, France, Germany( ^d ), Italy, Netherlands, Poland( ^a ), Portugal, UK( ^d )</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Belgium( ^d ), Bulgaria, France, UK( ^a )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>UK( ^a )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Arms Exports from the EU to Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>EU member states that licensed exports(^a) or delivered arms worth over $100,000 to the recipient in 2005–2009</th>
<th>No. of licence denials</th>
<th>Criteria cited in licence denials(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Germany(^a), UK(^a)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Austria, France(^a), Sweden, UK(^a)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 4, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>France(^a), UK(^a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Bulgaria(^a), Finland, Germany(^a), Netherlands(^a), Slovakia, UK(^a)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>France, Germany(^a), UK(^a)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** In some cases data on dual-use items delivered to civilian end-users or data on items exported to foreign actors operating in the recipient country, such as UN peacekeepers, are included.

\(^a\) These supplier countries licensed arms exports but it is not known if actual deliveries took place.

\(^b\) The 8 EU criteria governing control of exports of military equipment and technology relate to (1) the recipient’s respect for the international obligations and commitments of member states, including UN arms embargoes; (2) the recipient’s respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; (3) the existence of tensions or armed conflicts in the recipient country; (4) preservation of regional peace, security and stability; (5) the national security of the member states and friendly and allied countries; (6) the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law; (7) the risk of diversion; and (8) the compatibility of the export with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.

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Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa

Concerns regarding arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa are widespread and have motivated worldwide efforts to control arms flows. Although volumes of arms transferred to the region are low by global standards, even supplies of relatively small quantities of older weapons can have a notable impact on conflicts.

This detailed report provides a tour d’horizon of recent developments in arms transfers to both governments and rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa. It highlights the secrecy that surrounds arms procurement decisions, which hinders assessments of whether arms are being acquired for legitimate reasons and will contribute to the peace and security of sub-Saharan Africa.

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