CHINA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING
Prospects and Policy Implications
BATES GILL AND CHIN-HAO HUANG
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China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping
Prospects and Policy Implications

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BATES GILL AND CHIN-HAO HUANG

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Preface

China's growing global presence has meant a growing awareness and concern within the country about international economic and political developments. As China's national interests have become more global in their scope, China has shown an increased willingness to commit resources towards constructively engaging the international community and contributing responsibly to stability and security in a widening array of locations. China's expanding role in United Nations peacekeeping is one important manifestation of this trend, and is the focus of this Policy Paper.

Despite the importance of China's growing engagement in UN peacekeeping, that role deserves deeper analysis than it has so far received. This Policy Paper aims to help fill that gap. It draws on research carried out in Chinese and English; on field visits to UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Liberia; on earlier SIPRI work on Chinese peacekeeping; and on interviews conducted with a range of relevant officials and experts in Addis Ababa, Beijing, Brussels, London, New York, Stockholm and Washington, DC. It describes the developments in China's contributions to UN peacekeeping, the factors motivating these developments, and the prospects for Chinese peacekeeping and related activities. It also presents constructive recommendations aimed at policymakers in China and in Africa, Europe, the United Nations and the United States on deepening China's commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations and the multilateral peacekeeping regime.

This Policy Paper highlights SIPRI's longstanding expertise and interest in multilateral peacekeeping, alongside its newly established Programme on China and Global Security. That programme, formally launched in March 2009, is a rapidly growing component of SIPRI's overall research agenda. This paper is one of the first publications to come out of the programme, which is also carrying out studies in such areas as Sino-European relations, China's role as a security actor in Africa, and Chinese attitudes and policies towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

As SIPRI Director, I wish to extend enormous thanks to Chin-hao Huang, who has so ably carried out most of the work to complete this study, logging tens of thousands of air miles and untold hours in doing so. I am proud and privileged to be his colleague and co-author. The authors would also like to thank Ian Anthony, Bai Lin, Nick Birnback, Dennis Blasko, Sophie Boutaud-de-la-Combe, Jennifer Cooke, Richard Gowan, He Yin, Drew Holliday, Charles Hooper, Olewale Ismail, Rune Jensen, Mattias Lentz, Herbert Loret, Estalyn Marquis, Florence Mazzone, J. Stephen Morrison, Beatriz Munoz-Girardengo, Wuyi Omitoogun, Kirsten Soder, George Somerwill, Sun Baohong, Wang Yang, Pieter Wezeman, Siemon Wezeman, Sharon Wiharta, Xu Weidi, Zhang Jianxin, Zhou
Zhe and various interviewees in China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Liberia, as well as in the African Union and the UN, for their generosity with their time and expertise, which made such a positive contribution to this study. A special note of appreciation also goes to Caspar Trimmer for his excellent assistance, both analytical and editorial, in preparing the manuscript for publication.

Finally, SIPRI gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the United States Institute of Peace and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which helped to make this study possible.

Dr Bates Gill
Director, SIPRI
October 2009
Summary

China’s contributions of personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations have expanded dramatically in recent years. In August 2009 China was the 14th largest contributor to UN missions, providing more troops, police and military observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. By engaging more deeply in peacekeeping activities and providing engineers, transport battalions and field hospitals, China contributes critically needed capabilities—as well as a degree of added legitimacy—at a time when UN peacekeeping is severely overstretched.

A key factor behind China’s expanding engagement in peacekeeping is the country’s overall effort, especially since the late 1990s, to raise its international profile. As part of this, China is responding to international expectations that it should make more tangible contributions to global peace and security. In addition, Chinese security forces benefit from participation in multilateral peacekeeping in terms of practical experience of different types of operation, overseas training opportunities and close cooperation with other countries’ forces.

Based on the authors’ analysis and extensive field research, particularly in Africa—where three-quarters of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed—and on interviews with mission staff and with officials and policymakers in the African Union (AU), Europe, the UN and the United States, the following observations can be made regarding China’s engagement in peacekeeping and how this engagement could be made even more constructive in the future.

- Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined in UN peacekeeping operations.
- Chinese personnel are increasingly involved in mission leadership and decision making.
- China’s higher profile in peacekeeping reinforces both the perceived legitimacy and the effectiveness of UN peace missions.
- China’s expanding military, political and economic ties in Africa will need to be better managed to complement Chinese peacekeeping efforts in the region.
- China will increasingly be expected to broaden its peacekeeping contributions, especially with respect to combat troops and ‘force enablers’ such as land and air transport assets.
- There is potential for deeper cooperation between China and African bodies on peacebuilding in Africa.
- Chinese deliveries of military equipment have improved other countries’ capacity to take part in peacekeeping.
- Foreign language proficiency is generally a problem for Chinese peacekeepers.
As demand for, and appreciation of, Chinese contributions grow, China can be expected to focus on improving the quality of its peacekeeping troops and expanding its contributions to include much-needed combat troops and force enablers. China may be hoping to gradually counterbalance Western influence and more actively shape the norms guiding UN peacekeeping operations in ways that are consistent with Chinese foreign policy principles and national interests. However, to achieve this it will need not only to broaden the range of assets it contributes but also to further demonstrate its leadership capabilities at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and in missions themselves. It may also need to increase its contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget.

China’s expanding participation in peacekeeping offers new opportunities to strengthen the country’s commitment to building international stability and security and to improve multilateral peacekeeping capacity. It also opens up areas for closer military cooperation between China and other major security actors. However, the expansion of China’s role in multilateral peacekeeping is likely to face a number of domestic constraints, among them the dominance among Chinese policymakers of traditional views on state sovereignty and non-interference; shortfalls in political, military and bureaucratic will and capacity; a shortage of well-trained peacekeeping personnel with the necessary language and technical skills; and insufficient air- and sealift capacity, limiting the ability of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to rapidly deploy peacekeeping assets over long distances.

China and the international community can afford to be cautiously optimistic about the developments in China’s peacekeeping engagement. The following policy approaches should be considered by China and by the major players in the international community to try to reinforce some of the encouraging trends.

Policy recommendations for the United Nations

1. Identify and propose areas where China could play a more active part in policy planning, coordination and leadership roles at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
2. Encourage China to increase its financial contribution to the operating budget of the DPKO.
3. Step up consultation with the Chinese Mission to the UN on peacekeeping matters and encourage the mission to bring in more staff officers with peacekeeping expertise, especially in the area of civilian policing.
4. Encourage China to increase its financial and logistical support and contributions of military equipment, to help expand the peacekeeping capabilities of other UN member states.
5. Facilitate greater interaction, including exchanges and training activities, between the Chinese Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre and the
DPKO Police Division, and draw on greater Chinese civilian policing expertise to support the newly established UN Standing Police Capacity.

6. Encourage China to increase and diversify its contributions of assets to peacekeeping operations, especially with regard to combat troops and such force enablers as ground transport, light helicopters and other logistical support units.

**Policy recommendations for African partners**

1. Establish a more focused and regular dialogue on African security matters, including peacekeeping—involving the AU Secretariat, African subregional bodies and China—under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation FOCAC.

2. Solicit greater financial and logistical assistance and contributions from China to increase the peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities of the AU and individual African countries, with a particular focus on such areas as medical support, engineering and transport.

3. Encourage China to support AU peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council (currently the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM).

4. Engage in dialogue with China, based on peacekeeping cooperation, around matters of military transparency, confidence building and security sector reform.

5. Solicit increased Chinese support for the training of the African Standby Force.


**Policy recommendations for European partners and the USA**

1. Increase transatlantic consultations on how to improve engagement with China on peacekeeping.

2. Give cooperation on peacekeeping higher priority in military-to-military consultations with China and establish a formal, bilateral, interagency, working-level mechanism to plan and coordinate official exchanges on peacekeeping matters.

3. Increase and sustain close dialogue and coordination with China at the senior policymaking level regarding situations of mutual security concern (e.g. in Afghanistan, the DRC and Sudan).

4. Regularize and increase the frequency of bilateral exchanges, seminars, training courses and other capacity-building activities with China related to peacekeeping.

5. Invite China to participate in or observe more peacekeeping exercises and simulations, including those conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO partner countries, and those carried out in cooperation with other European and US allies.
6. Broaden discussions on security-related issues in Africa, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding, to include China and the AU and other African partners.

7. Use growing Chinese interest in peacekeeping to encourage openness and transparency in the PLA, emphasizing that a greater degree of openness is needed on all sides to sustain a collaborative relationship.

**Policy recommendations for China**

1. Establish a formal interagency working group or similar mechanism to better promote and coordinate China’s approach to peacekeeping.

2. Devote additional financial and human resources to the Ministry of Defence Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, the PLA General Staff Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, peacekeeping training facilities and other relevant entities in order to expand and enhance China’s capacity to contribute to peacekeeping.

3. Increase financial and material contributions to the DPKO and to UN peace operations.

4. Increase the availability of military and diplomatic personnel to serve in administrative, advisory and decision-making roles in the UN in support of peacekeeping activities.

5. Expand engagement with and increase the provision of resources to regional partner organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the AU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to support their capacities for peacekeeping and related activities.

6. Involve the PLA, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant Chinese entities in more exchanges, dialogues, and joint exercises and simulations with other international, regional and national players aimed at strengthening Chinese peacekeeping capacities. As part of this, invite foreign military and diplomatic personnel to take more active part in peacekeeping-related work in Chinese defence academies and other facilities.

7. Increase funding to Chinese universities and defence academies to carry out policy research and recommendations concerning China’s future contributions to peacekeeping.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China–Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed police unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military operations other than war</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>UN Standby Arrangements System</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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</table>
Figure A.1. Type, number and location of Chinese personnel contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, August 2009

AU = African Union; UN = United Nations

Note: China does not presently provide combat troops. Personnel listed as troops are chiefly medical personnel and engineers.

1. Introduction

In the mid-1990s the foreign and security policy of the People’s Republic of China began a significant metamorphosis. Broadly speaking, China has since that time pursued a more engaged, pragmatic and constructive approach in its external relations that is increasingly convergent both with its own globalizing interests and with the interests of other major powers.⁸

Among the most interesting and important manifestations of this trend has been the dramatic expansion in deployments of Chinese peacekeepers—which have so far included civilian police and military observers, engineering battalions, medical units and transport companies—to United Nations peacekeeping operations.¹ China now deploys more than 20 times as many peacekeepers as it did in 2000.² As of August 2009 China was the 14th largest contributor of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, providing more troops, police and observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council (see table 1.1). Nearly three-quarters of China’s peacekeepers are deployed in Africa (see figure A.1), reflecting the current focus of UN peacekeeping deployments.³ Perhaps most significantly, by engaging more deeply in peacekeeping and by providing engineers, transport battalions and medical units, China contributes critically needed material assets—and perceived legitimacy—at a time when multilateral peacekeeping is severely overstretched.⁴ If China continues on its current course, peacekeeping could soon become, in the words of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘an area where China stands tall’.⁵

¹ SIPRI follows the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-afflicted countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping tasks may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; contributing to a more secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. Peacekeeping can also serve as confidence-building measure.
⁵ ‘UN’s Ban calls on China to be bigger peacemaker’, Reuters, 1 July 2008.

⁸ Parts of this study draw on previous work which appeared as Gill, B. and Huang, C., ‘China’s expanding presence in UN peacekeeping operations and implications for the United States’, eds R. Kamphausen, D. Lai and A. Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan (US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, 2008).
The evolution of China’s approach to peacekeeping is all the more interesting given the country’s traditional position on matters of national sovereignty and championing of non-interference in states’ internal affairs. Moreover, it is fascinating to see the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one of China’s most conservative and secretive institutions, taking an increasingly active part in UN peacekeeping and a widening array of other multilateral security arrangements. The PLA evidently sees practical advantages in this, not least possibilities to improve its own capacities for ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW), such as humanitarian relief operations, both in China and abroad.

More broadly, an understanding of China’s evolving approach to peacekeeping sheds light on a range of strategic issues, including China’s integration into the international community and its emergence as a more responsible power; the Chinese Government’s changing views on sovereignty and intervention; its commitment to international norms in the areas of global and regional security; and the future of peacekeeping operations worldwide.

Despite these important developments and their implications, China’s growing engagement in peacekeeping remains a relatively under-analysed aspect of the country’s re-emergence on the world stage.\(^6\) Policymakers and pundits remain

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largely unaware of the scale and scope of China’s participation in peacekeeping in recent years. The challenge for interested observers is to develop a better understanding of the dynamics behind China’s more constructive and proactive policies and then to identify responses that can be implemented by the international community to bolster China’s commitment to regional stability in Africa and elsewhere; to strengthen China’s appreciation of the norms of military transparency and multilateral security cooperation; and to further the development of more effective multilateral peacekeeping operations.

With that end in mind, this Policy Paper aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of China’s expanding peacekeeping role. It is based on analysis of a range of both Chinese and international sources; field research at peacekeeping training facilities in China and peace missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti and Liberia; and discussions with African Union (AU) and UN officials working in the area of regional security and peacekeeping affairs, along with diplomats, military officials and policy analysts in Addis Ababa, Beijing, Brussels, London, New York, Stockholm and Washington, DC.

Chapter 2 presents a broad overview of the landmarks and recent developments in China’s role in multilateral peacekeeping. Chapter 3 examines the current domestic debate behind China’s expanding peacekeeping engagement. It illuminates some of the motivations and decision-making processes that drive China’s evolving policy towards peacekeeping.

Chapter 4 examines some of the ways that deepened involvement in peacekeeping has positively affected China’s relations with the international community in military and security matters, and how it has increased contacts between the PLA and other national security forces. Chapter 5 offers some general observations on China’s current contributions to peacekeeping and how even more constructive engagement could be shaped in the future. The chapter draws heavily on the observations of officials and policymakers in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN peace operation headquarters, the AU, Europe and the USA.

Chapter 6 looks ahead at how China and the international community could build on the encouraging recent trends in China’s peacekeeping engagement in ways that are mutually beneficial. It offers policy-oriented recommendations aimed at policymakers in the UN, Africa, Europe and the USA and in China.
2. The expansion of China’s engagement in peacekeeping

In July 2008, during his first official visit to China as UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon welcomed China’s increasing support and engagement in peacekeeping. At the same time, he urged the Chinese leadership to provide more funding and troops for multilateral peace operations, to better reflect China’s growing economic and political power and to help the international community to respond to emerging international crises. More recently, Alain le Roy, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs, publicly commended Chinese peacekeeping contingents for their exemplary organization, skills, precision and professional standards. His predecessor, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, visited China twice during his tenure and offered similarly positive assessments.

These recognitions of China’s new role in multilateral peacekeeping demonstrate just how far Chinese policy in this regard has changed in a relatively short time. Following the 1950–53 Korean War, during which Chinese forces encountered and fought the US-led UN Command, China viewed UN operations with scepticism and often questioned their legitimacy. This cautious approach continued even after China’s admission to the UN in 1971: although a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China by and large refrained from playing a major role in Security Council debates on peacekeeping for many years. China cast its first Security Council vote on peacekeeping in 1981, supporting Security Council Resolution 495, which extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The following year China made its first official financial contribution for UN peacekeeping operations. In 1988, China was accepted as a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, marking the beginning of greater Chinese engagement in peacekeeping affairs. The call by Ambassador Yu Mengjia, then Chinese Representative to the UN, for the international community to give ‘powerful support’ to peacekeeping activities, set a new tone for Chinese pronouncements on peacekeeping matters.

Personnel deployments

China first deployed personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation in 1989, when 20 Chinese military observers took part in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) monitoring elections in Namibia. This was followed by the deployment

7 ‘UN’s Ban calls on China to be a bigger peacemaker’ (note 5).
of five Chinese military observers to support the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. China sent its first military units—two separate contingents of 400 engineering troops each, accompanied by 49 military observers—to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), over 18 months in 1992–93.

Since the mid-1990s China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping activities have steadily increased and diversified. According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defence Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, which was established in 2001 to oversee the strategic management and coordination of the PLA’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, China has contributed more than 12,000 peacekeepers since 1990. In August 2009, 2155 Chinese peacekeepers were serving in 11 of the 19 active UN peace missions, and China ranked as the largest contributor of personnel to UN missions among the permanent members of the Security Council (see table 1.1). Since 2000, as deployments of UN peacekeepers from Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have declined or remained static, China’s personnel deployments—including troops, police and military observers—have increased (see figure 2.1).

The majority of the Chinese troops deployed with UN peacekeeping operations (1894 in August 2009) offer engineering, transport or medical support. Chinese peacekeepers claim to have built more than 7300 kilometres of paved roads and 200 bridges, treated more than 28,000 patients, and cleared more than 7500 explosive devices.11

In August 2009 China was the joint 13th largest contributor of civilian police to UN peacekeeping operations (see table 2.1). China first deployed civilian police to a peacekeeping operation—the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)—in 1999. In 2004, despite having no formal diplomatic relations with Haiti, China dispatched formed police units (FPUs, complete units that have trained and serve together) to support the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), helping to maintain law and order and train local police. Box 2.1 looks in more detail at Chinese FPUs.

**Peacekeeper training**

In 2007 Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, publicly acknowledged the continued challenges that China faces in its peacekeeping capabilities, saying that China ‘must vigorously strengthen building of the peacekeeping ranks and forge a high-calibre peacekeeping contingent.’12

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12 ‘Chinese deputy military chief on raising army’s peacekeeping role’, Zhongguo Xinwen She, Beijing, 22 June 2007, Translation from Chinese, BBC Monitoring International Reports.
an attempt to improve the quality of PLA peacekeepers, the Defence Ministry is seeking to benefit from the experiences of other countries and institutions by sending PLA officers abroad for exchanges and training on peacekeeping and by seeking assistance within China from the DPKO and others. China’s international contacts linked to peacekeeping training and related military and security cooperation are discussed in detail in chapter 4. Box 2.2 gives some details of the selection and training processes for military observers, peacekeeping troops and staff officers.

China is also improving and expanding its peacekeeping training facilities. In June 2009, Chinese officials announced the opening of a new peacekeeping training centre in Huairou in suburban Beijing. The facility is already being used in the training of Chinese military peacekeepers, particularly in pre-deployment training. It will also be the main venue for international exchanges on peacekeeping, including international conferences and training with foreign peacekeepers, according to Chinese defence officials. The new centre’s facilities include simulation rooms for shooting and driving and simulated UN peacekeeping camps and demining training grounds.

The Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre was established in Langfang, a city about 40 km south-east of Beijing, in 2000. It has the capacity to train more than 200 officers at a time. The training programmes at the Langfang facility are designed for Chinese police officers who will be deployed to UN missions and

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include map reading, handling of weapons, radio communication, conducting investigations and arrests, and other aspects of law enforcement. According to senior officials at the centre, it has received $13 million to finance further expansion and modernization. 15

Other Chinese personnel in the multilateral peacekeeping system

In recent years China has also contributed a larger number of administrative personnel and senior officers to UN peacekeeping operations. In August 2007 a highly experienced Chinese officer, Major General Zhao Jingmin, was appointed force commander of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the first time that a Chinese national has held such a senior position in a UN peacekeeping operation. Zhao had previously been Chief Liaison Officer in the United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and a military observer with MINURSO. He had also held senior posts in the Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, attended the University of Dakar in Senegal and served as China’s military attaché to Tunisia. 16 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, called the appointment


Table 2.1. The top 20 contributors of civilian police to United Nations peacekeeping operations, August 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Police contributed</th>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1 372</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>156</td>
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</table>

Box 2.1. A closer look at Chinese formed police units

The first Chinese formed police unit (FPU) deployed to a peace operation, consisting of riot police under the Ministry of Public Security, joined the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. Subsequently, China has typically contributed FPUs comprised of personnel drawn from provincial-level border police forces (gong an bian fang, 公安边防). Border police are considered part of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary force in charge of domestic security and external defence and under the command of the Central Military Commission and the State Council. However, they do not have paramilitary domestic security responsibilities and are, for practical purposes, under the command of the Ministry of Public Security, not the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the PAP. They are mainly responsible for areas such as immigration and narcotics control. Chinese border police can also conduct criminal investigations and riot control operations, like ordinary civilian police officers.

The Office of Peacekeeping Affairs at the Ministry of Public Security coordinates the selection, training and deployment of border police officers for FPUs for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

\(^{a}\) Foreign media mistakenly reported that this contingent consisted of People’s Armed Police. See e.g. Cody, E., ‘China readies riot force for peacekeeping in Haiti’, Washington Post, 30 Sep. 2004.

an important recognition by the UN of China’s positive role and growing importance in peacekeeping.\(^{17}\)

A number of mid- to senior-level posts concerned with peacekeeping affairs at UN Headquarters are held by Chinese diplomats and military officials. Several Chinese senior colonels and colonels are serving as staff officers at the headquarters of UN peacekeeping missions, for example with the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Nevertheless, according to Zhao, ‘though there are more Chinese officers in middle- and high-ranking posts for UN missions, the ratio is still lower than those from other major world powers. This is incompatible with China’s active participation in UN affairs and contributions to peacekeeping operations.’\(^{18}\)


**Box 2.2. Training of People’s Liberation Army peacekeepers**

There are two separate tracks for the selection and training of Chinese military personnel and staff officers for peacekeeping operations.

The first track is for military observers and United Nations staff officers. The basic selection requirements include a high level of competence and professional responsibility, proficiency in English, and at least five years of active service in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Candidates with a minimum of one year’s experience of peacekeeping in the field may be recommended for posting as staff officers at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Prospective military observers and staff officers undergo a three-month training course organized by the PLA. The course covers the following areas: (a) general knowledge, literature and background on UN peacekeeping; (b) English language proficiency; (c) driving in difficult terrains; and (d) diplomatic and negotiation skills.

The second track is for peacekeeping troops. The PLA creates a formed unit for each UN mission. The formed unit is selected on a rotating basis from one of the seven military regions of the armed forces. Each unit is deployed overseas for eight months. Units are complemented by a handful of specialist personnel (e.g. translators). Each unit is trained in its region for up to three months, with a focus on (a) the UN Charter and DPKO protocols and disciplinary regulations; (b) the laws of the intended host country; (c) international humanitarian law; (d) physical training; (e) English language proficiency; and (f) simulation exercises.

Before being deployed the unit undergoes a week-long final preparation course in Beijing, organized by the Office of Peacekeeping Affairs. During this training, the unit is briefed on the current security situation in the host country, cultural sensitivities, the logistical support system in place and the rules of engagement.
3. Key factors shaping China’s evolving approach to peacekeeping

The internal debate on peacekeeping in China

China’s role in peacekeeping is a topic of increasingly active debate that is unfolding among the country’s policy elites. In June 2009, senior officials from the Central Military Commission, the PLA and five of the seven military area commands gathered for a two-day meeting in Beijing to review and assess China’s participation in peacekeeping and to propose new measures to strengthen and improve the PLA’s peacekeeping role globally. This appears to have been a follow-on discussion to an internal ministerial meeting that the PLA convened in June 2007 on peacekeeping, where senior representatives of the PLA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Security gathered to discuss ways to further streamline and improve the selection, organization, training and rotation of Chinese peacekeepers.

Following that meeting, Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng asserted that new insights gained at the meeting would help ‘to raise the peacekeeping capabilities of China’s armed forces . . . and [to] gradually expand peacekeeping exchanges and cooperation with the outside world in a planned and focused manner’. Acknowledging the continued challenges China faces in its peacekeeping capabilities, Zhang also said that China ‘must vigorously strengthen building of the peacekeeping ranks and forge a high-calibre peacekeeping contingent.’

At a separate seminar on international security organized by the PLA National Defence University in 2007, senior officers also called for greater Chinese participation in peacekeeping operations, rescue-and-relief operations, counterterrorism exercises and post-conflict reconstruction. This reflects President Hu Jintao’s 2004 call for the PLA to perform ‘new historic missions’—meaning various types of MOOTW—in the 21st century, which is discussed below.

The PLA’s growing presence abroad has in turn prompted some Chinese academics to call for a clarification of the legislative framework governing overseas

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19 For examples of those in Chinese policy circles calling for a more cautious approach see Xu, W., ‘摇摆与犹豫中的探索：联合国维和行动面临的困难与挑战’ [Exploration in vacillation and hesitation: difficulties and challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations], World Economics and Politics, no. 5 (2005), pp. 8–13; and Zhang, L., ‘论当代联合国维和行动的易化：对第二代联合国维和行动面临问题的思考’ [On the differentiation of contemporary UN peace operations: assessment of the challenges of the second generation of UN peacekeeping operations], Pacific Journal, no. 2 (2004), p. 75.

20 ‘PLA peacekeeping work conference held in Beijing’, Jiefangjun Bao Online, Beijing, 26 June 2009, Translation from Chinese, World News Connection.

21 ‘Chinese deputy military chief on raising army’s peacekeeping role’ (note 12).

The fact that this debate is taking place suggests that there is greater appreciation of the PLA’s increasing participation in MOOTW, including peacekeeping. It also indicates a growing recognition of the need for clearer legislation on practical issues such as the administration of the exit and entry of military personnel and their weaponry, signing procedures for related agreements, the legal responsibilities and jurisdiction of military personnel involved in non-military actions abroad, the rescue and treatment of casualties, and responsibility for compensation.

Nevertheless, traditional ideas about state sovereignty and the international community’s right to intervene are still dominant in Chinese policy thinking, as is clearly visible in some recent positions China has taken in the UN Security Council. China continues to regard calls for international intervention on a case-by-case basis—particularly when it perceives that the situation does not threaten international security. Twice in 2008 China blocked in the Security Council interventions with a humanitarian justification that went against the will of the host country government—ignoring calls from human rights groups and some Western governments. First, China opposed any move by the Security Council to pressure the Burmese Government to accept emergency assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Later in the year it vetoed a resolution to impose sanctions on the Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, and his associates over the use of violence and intimidation during presidential elections.

However, China has previously supported international intervention on humanitarian grounds: in 1999 China voted for a Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of an international force in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) after violence broke out in the wake of a vote on independence from Indonesia. In this case, the intervention was to be carried out by a non-UN force. China even contributed a civilian police contingent to the subsequent UNTAET mission. In 2001 China also voted in favour of the UN Security Council resolution that sanctioned the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA. In 2003, in response to growing instability in the DRC and Liberia, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang

24 ‘Speeding up legislation on PLA’s non-war military actions’ (note 23).
27 The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was mandated, by UN Security Council Resolution 1264, to protect the local population and facilitate humanitarian assistance, among other tasks. UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 Sep. 1999.
Yishan, argued that the UN should intervene in conflict areas ‘earlier, faster and more forcefully’.²⁹

**Peacekeeping and China’s rising international profile**

The expansion in Chinese peacekeeping contributions reflects the country’s overall efforts, especially since the late 1990s, to raise its profile in the international community as a constructive and responsible power. As part of this, it is seeking to become more responsive to international expectations by making positive and tangible contributions to international peace and security. Beijing policymakers see engagement in peacekeeping, and in conflict resolution, as a way for China to project a more benign and ‘harmonious’ image beyond its borders, to reassure neighbours about its peaceful intentions, and to softly balance US and other Western influence while gradually but more firmly establishing China’s status as a great power.³⁰ At the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy a senior Chinese official observed that China’s increasing involvement in UN peacekeeping missions ‘reflected China’s commitment to contribute to global security given the country’s important role within the international system and the fact that its security and development are closely linked to that of the rest of the world’.³¹

According to Pang Zhongying, an academic who has commented widely on China’s peacekeeping activities, the Chinese leadership has gradually come to realize that participation in peacekeeping operations can help to reduce tensions and conflicts in global hotspots, ‘which works in China’s national interest as the country begins to build a sound external environment for its long-term economic growth and social development’.³² Thus there seems to be recognition in China that, as its interests become more global, its national security is increasingly linked to international peace and development. This, in turn, is a key factor in the adoption of a more constructive role in multilateral peacekeeping.

China also sees participation in peacekeeping operations as a way to assuage the concerns of its neighbours about the growing military capabilities of the PLA. The Chinese leadership is increasingly aware of worries in the region that a rising China could pursue a more aggressive and destabilizing foreign and security policy in the years ahead. Hence, Chinese strategists argue that one of the most

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²⁹ ‘China takes on major peacekeeping role’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 1 Nov. 2003.
³² Pang, Z., ‘China’s changing attitude to UN peacekeeping’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 12, no. 1 (spring 2005), pp. 87–104.
urgent diplomatic tasks for China is to assure the world of its good intentions. By participating in UN peacekeeping operations, China is seeking to show the PLA and China's increasing military capabilities in a positive light and to send the message that China is further integrating into the international community and acting as a more responsible, and responsive, major power.\(^{33}\)

An interesting aspect of this is China's greater flexibility on peacekeeping matters where Taiwan is concerned. In the past, in UN Security Council votes relating to peacekeeping missions in countries that diplomatically recognized Taiwan, China would typically take obstructionist positions. For example, in 1996 China's threat to veto the extension of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was widely seen as being linked to Haiti's diplomatic relations with Taiwan.\(^{34}\) In January 1997 China vetoed a proposed peacekeeping mission to Guatemala. Upon receiving assurances from Guatemala that it would no longer support a General Assembly vote on readmitting Taiwan to the UN, China withdrew its veto after 10 days, allowing the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to proceed.\(^{35}\) In 1999 China vetoed the continuation of the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) two weeks after suspending diplomatic ties with the country over its recognition of Taiwan.\(^{36}\) In this case, China's actions hampered UN peacekeeping efforts. Some Chinese peacekeeping specialists later acknowledged that this was a 'difficult lesson for China' and that the government should have 'considered Macedonia's interests more than its own national interests'.\(^{37}\)

China has moderated its approach in recent years as it has sought to burnish its credentials as a more responsible power (and taken a more nuanced approach in its relations with Taiwan). China supports the current UN operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH, and since 2004 has been providing FPUs to the mission, even


\(^{37}\) Pang (note 32).
though Haiti still formally recognizes Taiwan. A senior minister in the Ministry of Public Security commented in 2004 that ‘China’s active involvement in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, especially in Haiti, which has not set up diplomatic relationship with China, fully exhibits a peace-loving and responsible image of the country.’ Another Chinese official involved in the country’s peacekeeping activities noted that China’s less heavy-handed approach in its dealings with Haiti were ‘a reflection of China’s growing diplomatic sophistication compared to a few years ago’. Indeed, China’s support for MINUSTAH might be intended to bring Haiti into China’s diplomatic camp over time. However, China apparently continues to use the threat of curtailing MINUSTAH’s mandate to warn Haiti off any high-profile diplomatic activity in support of Taiwan.

The Darfur region of Sudan provides another prominent example of China’s increasing responsiveness to international expectations. China in the past supported a UN peacekeeping role in Sudan. Beginning in 2006, responding in part to mounting international criticism of its relations with the Sudanese Government, China began to put greater pressure on Sudan to follow through with its international commitments and allow UN peacekeepers into the troubled Darfur region. China’s shuttle diplomacy between Sudan, the AU and the UN, as well as its role behind the scenes in negotiating with the Sudanese regime, were instrumental in securing the eventual deployment of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and widely appreciated by AU officials. On top of this, China was among the first countries to deploy troops to UNAMID in December 2007, sending engineering battalions to help prepare for the arrival of the larger hybrid force. In August 2009, China deployed 324 engineering troops and 1 police officer to UNAMID. The fact that China has shown itself increasingly willing to contribute to highly sensitive and potentially dangerous missions, both in Sudan and elsewhere, seems to be partly aimed at deflecting international criticism as well as at building its international profile.

China has also stepped up its levels of engagement in helpful and significant ways at critical moments in other parts of Africa. When the security situation in Somalia was unravelling in 2006, China reportedly played an important and con-

39 He (note 6), p. 44. He Yin is an associate professor at the Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre in Langfang and served as a civilian police officer with UNTAET in 2001 and 2002.
43 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (note 2). UNAMID deploys nearly 17 000 troops and police from 54 countries. On China’s approach to the Darfur crisis see Huang (note 42).
The factors shaping China’s approach to peacekeeping have been significant in recent years. China’s increased peacekeeping activity helps to put into action the 2004 call by President Hu Jintao for the PLA to perform ‘new historic missions’. It thus parallels the PLA’s growing interest in expanding its MOOTW—such as counter-piracy, disaster response and humanitarian relief—both in China and abroad. While the aims of this initiative are related at least in part to China’s internal politics, there is undoubtedly an interest in external profile building. Among the ‘new historic missions’ are ‘providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and . . . playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development’.

In May 2009 the PLA General Staff Department announced that it had established an ‘arms force system’ for MOOTW. The aim is to strengthen the PLA’s emergency response system and enhance its capacity for rapid deployment both inside and outside China. Five specialized forces were created under this system: a flood and disaster relief force; a post-earthquake emergency rescue force; an emergency rescue force for nuclear, chemical and biological disasters; an emergency relief force for transport facilities; and an international peacekeeping force. It is unclear whether the international peacekeeping force is to be a dedicated standby unit, but according to the Chinese Ministry of Defence, it will comprise engineering, transport and medical personnel and will contribute to UN peacekeeping operations.

**Practical benefits**

Finally, participation in UN peacekeeping carries important tactical and strategic benefits for China’s security forces. China’s peacekeeping deployments, and the associated opportunities to train and operate alongside other countries’ forces, have provided practical experience for Chinese security forces. Each returning
peacekeeping contingent can share valuable experiences and insights that may benefit and help in the modernization of the force and its military region.  

Among other things, peacekeeping deployments have helped China’s security forces to improve their responsiveness and riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergency command systems, and ability to conduct MOOTW.

In addition, most of today’s PLA forces have no combat experience. While peacekeeping is not combat, and Chinese personnel have so far only fulfilled support roles away from the front line, it does provide personnel with field experience. All of these benefits will be reinforced if, as expected, Chinese forces increasingly participate in peacekeeping missions with more robust mandates and in which Chinese troops take on force protection and possibly combat roles.

It has been observed that China’s numerous deployments in Africa also allow PLA personnel to amass strong operational knowledge of different local operating environments, an advantage that few counterparts have. According to one observer familiar with Chinese peacekeepers, ‘This advantage comprises invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communication, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local “atmospherics” and modus operandi and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged periods.’  

Chinese military literature also suggests that the PLA increasingly sees taking part in military operations in cooperation with foreign military forces as a useful means to demonstrate its growing professionalism and operational competence—and, thus, its deterrent capability.

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4. Peacekeeping, military confidence building and military-to-military cooperation

As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the advantages of China’s expanding engagement in peacekeeping is the wealth of learning opportunities it provides for Chinese security forces. At the same time, other troop-contributing countries have learned from the work done by, for example, the Chinese medical unit in MONUC. Alongside the immediate advantages of capacity building, this has allowed other countries’ security forces to observe and even interact with the PLA at close quarters.

Chinese personnel have in recent years increasingly participated in joint peacekeeping training and exchanges and in related military activities with other countries. Peacekeeping has even opened the door to other bilateral and regional security-related dialogues. This can only assuage the concerns among China’s neighbours and further afield about China’s strategic intentions and help China to be accepted as a positive force in the international community.

**Peacekeeping training and exchanges**

As part of an overall effort to ‘go out to learn’, PLA officers have been sent to take part in professional training and exchanges on peacekeeping operations in countries including Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand. Chinese officers have also participated, either as observers or as active participants, in peacekeeping training exercises organized under the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP) initiative as well as those sponsored by the British defence and security establishments.\(^{53}\)

The PLA has requested some foreign military counterparts to provide additional help and more rigorous peacekeeping training programmes. According to the Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, the PLA has recently invited peacekeeping specialists from the DPKO and military officers from the UK and other countries, to assist and inspect China’s contingents prior to their deployment.\(^{54}\)


\(^{54}\) Xinhua (note 14).
China has hosted and organized a growing number of international seminars on peacekeeping affairs. For example, since 2004 it has hosted the annual UK–China Seminar on Peacekeeping Operations. These meetings are intended to encourage joint operations in peacekeeping and to exchange views on how it can be done.\(^{55}\) China has also arranged similar seminars with Norway and Sweden. These seminars have given the PLA a chance to learn more about the standard training manuals and courses commonly used by other countries’ peacekeeping training programmes. The International Committee of the Red Cross has provided seminars and pre-deployment briefings for Chinese peacekeepers on international humanitarian law.\(^{56}\)

China is also stepping up coordination on peacekeeping at the regional level. In 2007 the Office of Peacekeeping Affairs sponsored the first China–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) peacekeeping seminar in Beijing. At this event, representatives of the ASEAN member states and China exchanged ideas and experiences on UN peacekeeping and explored ways to strengthen cooperation.\(^{57}\) More recently, at the 2009 China–ASEAN High Level Defence Dialogue, senior PLA officials reiterated the country’s commitment to cooperation on peacekeeping, including training.\(^{58}\)

**Joint military exercises and other military-to-military cooperation**

China has also significantly increased its engagement in joint military exercises with foreign militaries in recent years. While not directly related to UN peacekeeping per se, Chinese authorities have sometimes referred to these exercises as ‘peace missions’ and linked them to the goals of combating the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism; improving regional security and stability; and building mutual trust between the PLA and other militaries.

The first such exercises, referred to as joint counterterrorism exercises, saw the participation of China and its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in October 2002 and 2003.\(^{59}\) These were followed by similar counterterrorism exercises held with Pakistan and, shortly afterwards, with India in August 2004. In September 2006, Chinese and Tajik troops carried out a joint military exercise, named Co-ordination 2006, in which they simulated a hostage-taking

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\(^{55}\) Zhang (note 53).


scenario. Strike 2007, a two-week joint counterterrorism training exercise involving 60 specialized Chinese and Thai troops, was held in July 2007 in China’s Guangzhou province. China and Mongolia held their first joint military training exercise, Peacekeeping Mission 2009, in June and July 2009. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defence, this nine-day exercise included academic lectures, joint training and simulation drills on peacekeeping, with 90 military officers from both countries taking part.

China has also increased its participation in joint naval activities since the early 2000s. In recent years it has held bilateral exercises with the navies of Australia, Canada, France, India, Pakistan, Thailand, the UK and the USA. Furthermore, in December 2008 China announced that it would cooperate with the multinational anti-piracy force in the Gulf of Aden and deployed its first ships to the region. In September 2009, military officials from Australia and the USA announced that they would invite China to take part in trilateral military exercises initially focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

China carried out its largest joint military exercise to date in August 2005. Peace Mission 2005 involved some 10,000 army, air force and naval personnel from China and Russia. It included headquarters and command-post exercises in Vladivostok, movement of ships from Vladivostok to the Shandong Peninsula, amphibious landings and over-water air force exercises. It was believed by observers to simulate intervention in a country facing political turmoil. Two years later a smaller counterterrorism exercise, Peace Mission 2007, was carried out in Urumqi, China, and in Chelyabinsk, Russia, involving approximately 4000 troops and 80 aircraft from the six members of the SCO. Peace Mission 2009 was another joint Sino-Russian exercise, involving 1300 troops and air force personnel from each country. Held in August 2009, it involved exercises in China’s Jilin province and in Khabarovsk, Russia.

China is likely to continue with and expand joint exercises and training in the years ahead. These activities will affect China’s approach to peacekeeping in

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various ways. For example, they will help the PLA to improve its ability to mobilize and conduct a range of operation types that could be applied in formal multilateral peace missions, including both combat and non-combat missions. In addition, some observers have argued that the Chinese–Russian military exercises are contingency plans for dealing with a possible humanitarian or political crisis in North Korea. More broadly, these joint exercises and training activities will build the confidence of Chinese leaders and of PLA commanders and troops in the PLA’s ability to interact and cooperate with foreign militaries in the field. The decision to deploy Chinese naval ships in the Gulf of Aden to carry out anti-piracy missions was no doubt helped along by confidence built up during joint naval exercises. Similarly, it is possible that the joint exercises and training activities will encourage China to increase its participation in UN and other multilateral peacekeeping operations in the future.

**Other bilateral and multilateral developments**

Several developments have already taken place in China’s relations with segments of the international community that should help to deepen and broaden the recent trends in China’s peacekeeping engagement.

**China and Europe**

The European Union (EU) and individual EU member states have intensified cooperation with China in a number of security-related fields. This cooperation has emphasized such ‘soft security’ activities as strategic dialogues, military-to-military diplomacy and educational exchanges, port visits, peacekeeping training, and some joint military exercises. For example, China has established formal defence-related consultative dialogues with France, Germany and the UK. China has also exchanged military officers with these three countries for training at their respective military colleges, and lower-level Chinese and European military officers and enlisted men have also increasingly interacted through port visits and other military activities such as peacekeeping and military exercises (see above). In 2005 China and the EU agreed to launch a regular vice-ministerial strategic dialogue to discuss international and regional issues. This mechanism has ‘proven to be a valuable tool in the frank and in-depth discussions of

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important international and regional issues and the exchanges of views on bilateral issues of common concern’.68

In a policy directive issued by the European Commission in October 2008, the EU outlined an initiative for AU–EU–Chinese trilateral dialogue and cooperation. The directive recognized the three partners’ common interest in African peace and security as prerequisites for the region’s development. It proposed that the EU and individual EU member states should work directly with the AU and with China in the UN to strengthen the development of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture—which will include a new peace-support force, the African Standby Force (ASF)—and assist with AU peacekeeping operations, capacity building and training.69

**China and the United States**

Peacekeeping is an important issue area for cooperation between China and the United States, arguably one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world today. The idea of deepening peacekeeping cooperation with China has gained greater traction in the USA. The then US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, stated in a speech in Beijing in 2000 that ‘US and Chinese service members may one day find themselves working side by side in peacekeeping missions’.70 More recently, at an unofficial but senior-level dialogue on Sino-US security issues, another US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, proposed that the two countries’ armed forces should cooperate more closely on humanitarian operations and peacekeeping missions.71

However, taking such cooperation forward will require navigating carefully around some significant obstacles in both China and the USA. The 2006 US Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) expresses concern about the pace, scope and future direction of China’s military modernization effort.72 This reflects deeper concerns about the opacity of China’s longer-term military intentions and how they might conflict with US regional and global security interests. Nevertheless, the QDR is far from dismissive of the potential for Sino-US cooperation. It asserts that US policy ‘remains focused on


encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as a partner in addressing common security challenges’ and that the USA’s goal is ‘for China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world’. It also recommends military-to-military exchanges and similar forms of engagement with major partners, including China, as ways of promoting transparency. Regular military contacts between the USA and China can build confidence, reduce the possibility of accidental confrontations and provide lines of communication that are essential for the two militaries. Sino-US cooperation on peacekeeping training and capacity building could thus provide a useful platform to build mutual trust and understanding between the two militaries.

A more serious obstacle lies in US legislation. The 2000 Defense Authorization Act for financial year 2000 prohibits the Pentagon from engaging in military-to-military exchanges or contacts with the PLA if they would create a risk to US national security. The act does not explicitly restrict official exchanges on peacekeeping training and coordination, but it will require strong political will at the senior policymaking level to make the case that such exchanges do not pose the kind of security risk referred to in the act. In the absence of such political will, and as long as the limitations have legal force, there will be continued caution in the level of interaction between the two countries’ militaries.

The USA’s current intensive campaign to enhance peacekeeper training and build the peacekeeping capacity of foreign militaries has provided a framework for some contact between the Chinese and US militaries, even if it falls short of direct military-to-military cooperation. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the flagship of this campaign, was established in 2004 in response to a Group of Eight (G8) agreement to address the shortage of available peacekeepers. The GPOI’s goal is to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010, mostly in Africa.

China is not among the GPOI partner countries. However, China has sent observers to two sets of GPOI exercises: Cobra Gold in Thailand and Khaan Quest in Mongolia. These exercises simulate the kind of multinational cooperation necessary in UN peacekeeping missions and follow most of the UN’s standard peace-support operation training, techniques and procedures. Activities

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include command-post exercises for officers, field training and live-fire exercises, and humanitarian assistance projects. In addition, as in the case of Mongolia, China conducts extensive bilateral peacekeeping capacity-building exercises with countries that conduct similar peacekeeping training operations with the USA.

Additionally, there is emerging interest within the US State Department in exploring the prospects for working with China to help build Africa’s peacekeeping capacity. This would include, for example, working with Chinese contractors and drawing on Chinese assistance in infrastructure support in the initial build-up stage of peace operations.77

China and Africa

As the EU and US initiatives described above indicate, there is clear international recognition that China has the potential to become a key partner for Africa in conflict management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In March 2009 the UN Security Council met to explore ways to strengthen AU–UN cooperation on matters of peace and security. Among the topics discussed was the possibility of increasing the financial and logistical support and the contributions of personnel and other assets offered to the AU by both African countries and UN member states. The aim was to develop the AU’s capacity in such areas as intelligence, early warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. During the deliberations, Chinese UN Ambassador Zhang stated that China ‘supported more reliable means and funding for African Union peacekeeping operations . . . [and] enhancing the regional body by scaling up personnel, institutional training and logistical support in order to implement the UN 10-year capacity-building programme for the AU. [China] encouraged donors to make a similar commitment since United Nations peacekeeping was grappling with overexpansion, low efficiency and inadequate resources.’ 78

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) action plan for 2007–2009, drawn up in 2006, opens the door for greater dialogue and exchanges on peace and security issues in Africa. According to the plan, China has pledged to provide assistance and to enhance cooperation with the AU and with other regional


organizations in the prevention, management and resolution of regional conflicts in Africa.\textsuperscript{79}

Chinese cooperation with African counterparts on peacekeeping matters will certainly proceed in the coming years, although slowly and cautiously. The FOCAC conference in Egypt in November 2009 is likely to provide some strategic guidance for security cooperation between Africa and China, including on peacekeeping. It is also possible that China will make a more concrete contribution to the AU’s capacity to address security challenges—such as through funding of the ASF—and through some bilateral military-to-military exchanges with African countries on peacekeeping-related matters on a case-by-case basis. However, China’s most substantial contribution to African security in the near term will be through peacekeeping contributions under the auspices of the UN.

5. Observations on China’s peacekeeping contributions

This chapter presents some assessments of the strengths and limitations of China’s peacekeeping contributions to date and suggestions for how more constructive Chinese engagement in future peacekeeping operations could be shaped. It is informed by substantial field research and interviews carried out by the authors, particularly in Africa, with officials and policymakers in the AU, Europe, the UN and the United States.

1. Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operations. Assessments of Chinese peacekeepers’ performance are generally positive. UN officials working within missions have reported that Chinese peacekeeping contingents are among the best prepared, most professional and well disciplined.

For example, MINUSTAH officials commend the Chinese FPU’s rapid deployment, flexibility and effective implementation. The Chinese FPU has frequently been called in to quell riots and assist in crowd control during large street demonstrations in central Port-au-Prince and in the notoriously dangerous Cité Soleil district. In 2008–2009, the seventh Chinese FPU deployment in Haiti conducted more than two dozen major operations, arresting gang members involved in money laundering, drug and arms trafficking, and tracking down kidnapping rings. The FPU is also reported to have integrated itself well into the larger mission. Its commander maintains frequent contact with his counterparts in other national contingents and with the MINUSTAH Police Commissioner to coordinate policing activities and conduct joint planning and training exercises. Finally, the FPU is noted for carefully documenting traffic accidents, mass protests, murders and kidnapping incidents in its patrol zone in Port-au-Prince and readily sharing the information with other MINUSTAH contingents, which helps in monitoring and predicting the security situation and in responding more effectively to prevent unrest in the city.

In the DRC, MONUC headquarters recently arranged for a party of officials from the Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani contingents to visit the hospital operated and maintained by the Chinese medical unit at Kindu, which provides medical assistance not just to MONUC personnel but also to the local community. According to UN officials, this was the first time that MONUC had organized such a study visit to a national contingent.

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Chinese peacekeeping contingents provide critical logistical, transportation and engineering support. For example, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) currently depends entirely on the Chinese transport company to transport personnel, fuel, water and other essential goods around Liberia. The unit has proved reliable, even though it frequently has to travel through dangerous areas and is only lightly armed and despite the country having only 1000 km of paved roads. Chinese peacekeeping contingents also respond to requests from local and national governments to help in infrastructure development projects such as building hospitals and roads, thus helping to improve local perceptions of the mission. In the DRC, Chinese engineering units have been asked by MONUC to take on projects such as repairing vital roads to Kavumu Airport and the Ruzizi power plant in the volatile South Kivu province, and constructing helipads, container grounds at Kavumu, and training sites and facilities for the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) at Luberizi, also in South Kivu. In Liberia, following the drawdown of UNMIL, Chinese engineers have been working with the Liberian Ministry of Public Works and engineers from the Armed Forces of Liberia to build and rehabilitate infrastructure, especially in the south-east of the country.

Finally, UN officials report that Chinese troops are well disciplined. To date, no allegation of misconduct has been lodged against a Chinese peacekeeper. This is important for the DPKO, as reports of misconduct by peacekeepers, including sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and corruption, have tainted and even put in jeopardy several UN missions in recent years, not least MONUC.81

2. Chinese personnel are increasingly involved in mission leadership and decision making. Chinese civilian and military officials are starting to play higher-profile roles at the headquarters level in numerous UN peacekeeping missions. For example, for the last three years the senior officer in charge of MONUC’s military observers has been a Chinese national. Additionally, in MONUC and UNMIL mid-to senior level Chinese personnel are regularly involved at the strategic planning level in the Military Observer and Force Commander’s offices. Selection for these positions is often a political process among troop-contributing countries and within the mission headquarters, but Chinese officials assuming these posts appear to have strong field experience in peacekeeping and to have been selected based on their competence and expertise. As mentioned in chapter 2, Major General Zhao Jingmin was appointed in 2007 as Force Commander of MINURSO—the first time that a Chinese national has held such a position. Although MINURSO is a relatively low-intensity operation, the appointment

3. China’s higher profile in peacekeeping reinforces both the perceived legitimacy and the effectiveness of UN peace missions. As both a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a developing country, China’s growing participation in UN peacekeeping lends credibility to UN missions, many of which have robust mandates allowing them to use force. Senior AU and UN officials believe that China’s participation in peace operations in sensitive areas such as Darfur, southern Sudan and the DRC helps to temper the host governments’ suspicions that the missions are really Western-led military interventions. Indeed, China has a strong record of political solidarity and partnership with developing countries, particularly in Africa. This dates back to the Bandung Conference in 1955, where China was a staunch supporter of the inviolability of African sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. As a result, AU and UN officials believe, the presence of Chinese peacekeepers sends a reassuring message and helps the mission to project an image of being inclusive, impartial and genuinely multilateral.

According to senior UN officials operating in the DRC, Haiti and Liberia, China has tended to vote in favour of extending mission mandates and supported increases in authorized troop strengths in these countries partly because its peacekeepers are active there and are directly aware of the needs of the mission.

Also important, with most major Western states making only limited troop contributions to UN missions, the UN hopes that the recent surge in Chinese peacekeeping contributions will motivate other countries to follow suit. According to former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehénno, ‘When it comes to the political credibility of the UN, the non-participation of the most powerful countries is a mortal danger.’

It is also worth noting that China appears to be increasingly willing to have its peacekeepers undertake more dangerous assignments. The Chinese engineering battalion deployed in Darfur as part of UNAMID in advance of the main force is one example. As noted above, the Chinese police in Haiti undertake potentially dangerous missions dealing with civil disturbances and rioting, and the engineering unit in MONUC frequently operates around Bukavu in South Kivu, an area of high tension. UN officials in New York and in Africa confirm that China has indicated that it could deploy combat troops to UN missions, for example in the DRC and Lebanon, and is likely to do so in the future if asked by the DPKO.

4. China’s expanding military, political and economic ties in Africa will need to be better managed to complement Chinese peacekeeping efforts in the region. MONUC
officials report some frustration at their lack of access to the details of the extensive bilateral military-to-military ties between China and the DRC. To them it is unclear whether the bilateral military engagement complements China’s peacekeeping activities in the DRC and MONUC’s mandate to support security-sector reform. However, UN officials are exploring with the Chinese Mission to the UN ways of supporting security-sector reform and issues related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the DRC. The Chinese delegation has reportedly not been obstructive; at the same time, it has not taken any major initiatives in this area.

As China’s diplomatic and business interests deepen in Africa, crafting appropriate policies to balance them is likely to become even more complicated. The goodwill earned by Chinese peacekeeping contingents repairing roads, improving other infrastructure and offering medical assistance, along with China’s broader policy in Africa, may be undermined by other activities of the Chinese Government or those of the increasing number of Chinese state-owned companies, entrepreneurs and émigrés in the region. As with most major governments operating abroad, there are many challenges inherent in sharing information or coordinating policies across various governmental agencies and with the Chinese private sector with regards to Africa.

As African trouble spots such as the DRC, Liberia and Sudan stabilize and emerge from protracted internal conflicts, China wants to be recognized as a critical partner in Africa’s development. The challenge for China will be to improve oversight and coordination to ensure that its bilateral military engagements and widening array of commercial links in the continent not only complement the Chinese peacekeeping presence and its objectives but also contribute to peace, development and stability to Africa.

5. China will increasingly be expected to broaden its peacekeeping contributions, especially with respect to combat troops and force enablers. In 2002 China agreed to join Level 1 of the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). Under this arrangement, the Ministry of National Defence has a 525-strong engineering battalion, a 25-strong medical unit and two 160-strong transport companies on standby and ready for deployment with other UN forces within 90 days.83

A critical next step is for China to fill perennial gaps in the supplies of certain other capabilities. The DPKO is short of both infantry troops and many categories of so-called force enablers or force multipliers—equipment or specialized units that support the main military force—including light tactical and transport helicopters and ground transport units. As noted above, China has previously offered to deploy combat troops to UNIFIL in Lebanon and has indicated that it could deploy combat troops in the DRC if requested.

6. **There is potential for deeper cooperation between China and African bodies on peacebuilding in Africa.** The AU Secretariat acknowledges that its interactions with non-African peacekeeping forces and contributors have been limited. In January 2009 China donated $300,000 to the AU in support of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). AU officials indicate that while this is not a significant sum, it represents a gesture of goodwill from the Chinese Government (to put this into context, the operation’s running costs are $2 million per day, $800 million per annum). China has not offered troops to AMISOM, but AU officials believe that the China would be willing to consider extending greater logistical and financial assistance to help support AU peace operations if requested.

The AU has yet to systematically enlist greater Chinese support (either with financial, equipment and logistical contributions, personnel training, or capacity building) towards the ASF. The AU still relies largely on its traditional donors and partners (European countries and the USA) for support. AU officials acknowledge, however, that as Africa gradually expands its interactions with other regional partners in Asia and the Middle East, China will become an important actor. The potential role of China in Africa’s security and peacebuilding activities could be a point of departure for future China–AU discussions.

7. **Chinese deliveries of military equipment have improved other countries’ capacity to take part in peacekeeping.** While most of the weapons exported by China in the past decade have been for military purposes other than peacekeeping, there have been cases where Chinese equipment has been sold specifically for peacekeeping. For example, in September 2008 the Ghanaian President, John Agyekum Kufour, signed a $160 million agreement with the Chinese Government that included help with re-equipping the Ghana Armed Forces and enhancing Ghanaian preparations for multilateral peacekeeping operations.84

Zambian troops have been using Chinese-manufactured WZ-551 armoured personnel carriers in their peace support operations in Sudan.85 In 2008 Argentina ordered WZ-551s from China for its troops in MINUSTAH.86

More recently, China has provided landmine detection equipment to Egypt and mine-clearance training courses for engineers from Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Peru and Thailand. Mine detectors manufactured in China have been used extensively by UNIFIL along the southern border of Lebanon.87

DPKO officials identified these transfers from China as important contributions to peacekeeping. The DPKO has encouraged the Chinese Government to continue to help enhance other troop contributing countries’ peacekeeping capacities with such materiel and similar contributions.

8. Foreign language proficiency is generally a problem for Chinese peacekeepers. Chinese troops’ English language skills are generally weak, according to officials who have worked with them in peacekeeping operations. Each contingent includes at least one or two interpreters. Although UN officials contend that language constraints have not affected the Chinese troops’ performance or their ability to carry out specific assignments, they also report that lower-ranking Chinese peacekeepers tend to keep to themselves and refrain from extensive interaction with other peacekeeping contingents or with local populations, due in part to language barriers.

China appears to have recognized the problem and is reportedly putting special emphasis on language training. However, given the limited amount of time available for pre-deployment training, Chinese troops’ English language ability is likely to remain a persistent challenge for the PLA.

88 Senior official, Chinese Ministry of National Defence, Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, Interview with the authors, Beijing, 15 Dec. 2008.
6. Looking ahead: conclusions and recommendations

China’s expanding engagement in UN peacekeeping provides an important and widening window of opportunity for the international community to engage with China more closely on global security issues; to help enlarge China’s commitment to regional stability, military transparency and confidence building; and to mount more effective multilateral peacekeeping operations. For China, it offers several strategic benefits, not least as a way to reshape China’s international profile and increase its influence in the UN. It also offers Chinese security forces a range of learning opportunities and valuable field experience, often in areas of strategic importance.

A number of uncertainties will constrain China and potential partners from deeper engagement in the area of peacekeeping. Nevertheless, both China and key member of the international community—the United Nations, the African Union and individual African countries, and Western partners such as the United States and European countries—should implement policies aimed at reinforcing some of the encouraging recent trends related to China’s involvement in multilateral peacekeeping.

The United Nations

For the UN, China’s growing role has a number of important policy implications. Perhaps most importantly, China can bring considerable political, human and material resources in support of a UN peacekeeping regime that is overstretched and having difficulty bringing missions to their full mandated strengths. China has a strong interest in strengthening the overall role and legitimacy of the UN as an international actor and will continue to see Chinese contributions to UN peacekeeping as an important means to that end. UN officials should continue to work closely with Chinese counterparts to see that China’s interest in increasing its contributions can be responded to in an effective and sustainable manner.

The relevant UN agencies and officials could consider the following measures.

1. Identify and propose areas where China could play a more active part in policy planning, coordination and leadership roles at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
2. Encourage China to increase its financial contribution to the operating budget of the DPKO.
3. Step up consultation with the Chinese Mission to the UN on peacekeeping matters and encourage the mission to bring in more staff officers with peacekeeping expertise, especially in the area of civilian policing.
4. Encourage China to increase its financial and logistical support and contributions of military equipment, to help expand the peacekeeping capabilities of other UN member states.

5. Facilitate greater interaction, including exchanges and training activities, between the Chinese Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Centre and the DPKO Police Division, and draw on greater Chinese civilian policing expertise to support the newly established UN Standing Police Capacity.

6. Encourage China to increase and diversify its contributions of assets to peace operations, especially with regard to combat troops and such force enablers as ground transport, light helicopters and other logistical support units.

The African Union and African countries

The expansion of China’s engagement in peacekeeping also has important implications for African partners. As noted above, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation action plan for 2007–2009 opens the door for enhanced dialogue and exchanges on peace and security issues in Africa. According to the plan, China has pledged to provide assistance and to enhance cooperation with the AU and with other regional organizations in the prevention, management and resolution of regional conflicts in Africa. The fourth ministerial meeting of FOCAC will convene in late 2009, offering additional potential to increase Sino-African cooperation on peacekeeping affairs. There is also potential to strengthen African peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities by means of greater bilateral cooperation between China and the AU member states.

For the AU and individual African countries, some future steps could include the following.

1. Establish a more focused and regular dialogue on African security matters, including peacekeeping—involving the AU Secretariat, African subregional bodies and China—under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation FOCAC.

2. Solicit greater financial and logistical assistance and contributions from China to increase the peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities of the AU and individual African countries, with a particular focus on such areas as medical support, engineering and transport.

3. Encourage China to support AU peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council (currently the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM).

4. Engage in dialogue with China, based on peacekeeping cooperation, around matters of military transparency, confidence building and security sector reform.

5. Solicit increased Chinese support for the training of the African Standby Force.

Europe and the United States

There is a considerable overlap of interests between China and Western countries in closer engagement in support of the multilateral peacekeeping regime and to bolster constructive bilateral relations in the military sphere. China, Europe and the USA have a common interest in the development of a more effective and better-resourced UN peacekeeping system, one that is capable of meeting growing demands. They also share an interest in seeing the Chinese military more constructively engaged with its foreign counterparts as a means to reduce uncertainties and improve mutual confidence. Cooperation around peacekeeping provides a critically important means to achieve this. Both the Chinese and several Western governments have shown themselves increasingly open to exploring further what action they can take together in the field of peacekeeping.

However, there will be limits to this cooperation, particularly regarding Sino-US ties. There is mutual strategic mistrust between China and the USA, especially in the military and security spheres, even as the overall bilateral relationship becomes more interdependent. As noted in chapter 4, US legislation limits certain forms of military-to-military engagement with China, although peacekeeping cooperation is not expressly prohibited. At the same time, the Chinese military remains wary of opening up too much to the USA. It may be that certain European countries will be in a position to move further and faster in building military-to-military exchanges and cooperation related to peacekeeping with their Chinese counterparts.

European countries and the USA could explore the following policy options.

1. Increase transatlantic consultations on how to improve engagement with China on peacekeeping.
2. Give cooperation on peacekeeping higher priority in military-to-military consultations with China and establish a formal, bilateral, interagency, working-level mechanism to plan and coordinate official exchanges on peacekeeping matters.
3. Increase and sustain close dialogue and coordination with China at the senior policymaking level regarding situations of mutual security concern (e.g. in Afghanistan, the DRC and Sudan).
4. Regularize and increase the frequency of bilateral exchanges, seminars, training courses and other capacity-building activities with China related to peacekeeping.
5. Invite China to participate in or observe more peacekeeping exercises and simulations, including those conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
6. Broaden discussions on security-related issues in Africa, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding, to include China and the AU and other African partners.

7. Use growing Chinese interest in peacekeeping to encourage openness and transparency in the PLA, emphasizing that a greater degree of openness is needed on all sides to sustain a collaborative relationship.

China

While the issue remains somewhat contentious in Chinese policy circles, China appears to be ready to play an even more significant role in the UN peacekeeping system. The challenges facing UN peacekeeping are only likely to increase as demands on it grow. As a result, greater demands may in turn be placed on China to increase its personnel and other contributions to UN peacekeeping.

China’s growing engagement in peacekeeping is evidently linked to a desire for more positive influence in UN peacekeeping affairs—beyond the threat of its Security Council veto. Furthermore, China may seek over time to counterbalance Western influence and more actively shape—in ways consistent with Chinese

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89 NATO consists of 28 member states in the Euro-Atlantic region. On NATO training exercises and other military-to-military cooperation see the NATO website, <http://www.nato.int/>.

foreign policy principles and national interests—the norms guiding UN peacekeeping.

In addition, greater Chinese engagement in peacekeeping offers an opportunity to expand China’s commitment to global norms of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. It also opens up a new avenue for Chinese engagement with the international community, including closer military cooperation with China’s major security partners.

However, China’s willingness to engage further in UN peacekeeping operations will face a number of constraints. Traditional views on state sovereignty and non-interference will continue to guide Chinese policymakers. China remains generally cautious towards the use of peacekeepers and the broader issue of intervention by the international community—especially in cases where it does not perceive a threat to international security. It is unlikely that China will offer active support to international intervention when the international community is divided and the government of the country in question is opposed. As it has in the past, China will continue to review calls for international intervention on a case-by-case basis.

Practical matters of political, military and bureaucratic will and capacity are also sure to slow China’s responsiveness in peacekeeping affairs. There is a shortage of well-trained peacekeeping officers with the necessary language and technical skills in the PLA. China’s ability to commit to the rapid deployment of significant troop contingents and materiel over long distances remains constrained by insufficient air- and sealift capacity.

China needs to develop several key areas related to its personnel contributions. As demand and appreciation for Chinese contributions grow, China should focus on improving the quality of its peacekeepers and expanding its contributions beyond maintenance, engineering and medical units to include combat troops and much needed force enablers and force multipliers. It also needs to demonstrate leadership capabilities at the DPKO and in peacekeeping operations around the world, a process that has started and is likely to continue. China’s financial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations currently hovers at around 3 per cent of the overall DPKO budget (see figure 6.1), significantly less than that of most other Security Council members. China will probably need to increase this if it wishes to play a larger role commensurate with its status as a permanent member of the Security Council and a rising global power.

As a result of these constraints, observers in China and in the international community should be cautiously optimistic but keep their expectations modest about China’s role in peacekeeping in the years ahead. China could consider the following measures.

1. Establish a formal interagency working group or similar mechanism to better promote and coordinate China’s approach to peacekeeping.
2. Devote additional financial and human resources to the Ministry of Defence Office of Peacekeeping Affairs, the PLA General Staff Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, peacekeeping training facilities and other relevant entities in order to expand and enhance China’s capacity to contribute to peacekeeping.

3. Increase financial and material contributions to the DPKO and to UN peace operations.

4. Increase the availability of military and diplomatic personnel to serve in administrative, advisory and decision-making roles in the UN in support of peacekeeping activities.

5. Expand engagement with, and increase the provision of resources to, regional partner organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the AU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to support their capacities for peacekeeping and related activities.

6. Involve the PLA, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant Chinese entities in more exchanges, dialogues, and joint exercises and simulations with other international, regional and national players aimed at strengthening Chinese peacekeeping capacities. As part of this, invite foreign military and diplomatic personnel to take more active part in peacekeeping-related work in Chinese defence academies and other facilities.

7. Increase funding to Chinese universities and defence academies to carry out policy research and recommendations concerning China’s future contributions to peacekeeping.
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China has dramatically increased its participation in United Nations peace operations in recent years. China now provides more uniformed personnel than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. This Policy Paper offers new insights into the development of China’s engagement in multilateral peacekeeping and the factors and debates that underlie it. It examines what these new trends mean for multilateral peacekeeping and for China’s major security partners. Finally, it makes recommendations for how policymakers in China and the international community can build on the unique opportunities to strengthen multilateral peacekeeping and to firmly establish a new, more positive international role for China.

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