The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan

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Preface

Over and above the frightening levels of terrorist violence that persist in Iraq, a major terrorist incident in London and threats against other European countries have kept the terrorist menace high on the international agenda in 2005. Few nations have had a more intimate and troubled relationship with this scourge than Pakistan: a one-time supporter of the Taliban that has at the very least condoned terrorist infiltration in Kashmir, but that now aligns itself firmly with the international ‘war on terrorism’ and whose own president has been the target of extremist assassins. The suggestions that perpetrators of the July 2005 London bombings might have found succour in extremist circles in Pakistan, at the same time that Pakistani forces have been going to unprecedented lengths to hunt down al-Qaeda, provides just one hint of the complexity of the resultant problems.

Aarish Ullah Khan, a researcher from Pakistan, worked at SIPRI as a guest scholar for some months in early 2005. In this Policy Paper he sets out in concentrated and penetrating fashion the historical, political and strategic background to Pakistan’s experiences with religiously motivated terrorism as both a tool and a curse. He shows that, while Pakistan’s identity as a nation state is inseparable from Islam, no such easy equation can be made with religious extremism or with the related brands of terrorism. Rather, certain Pakistani leaderships (and power constituencies, like the army) have chosen to instrumentalize religious fervour and even terrorist violence for their political and strategic purposes at various times—not always against the wishes of Western powers. The consequences of such past choices have come home to roost for President Pervez Musharraf, who has set his face against all brands of terrorism but has, so far, found it much simpler to pursue al-Qaeda and to stamp down on purely domestic extremism than to extract the terrorist fuse from the powder keg of Kashmir. As Aarish Ullah Khan argues, only progress in peace with India in the short term, and attention to Pakistan’s weaknesses of society, economy and governance in the longer term, can separate Islam and terrorism as they must be separated for the future stability and dignity of the state.

Thanks are due to Aarish Ullah Khan for the dedication, openness and sense of responsibility with which he has addressed this sensitive and tangled subject; to Dr Pál Dunay and other colleagues inside and outside SIPRI who supported Aarish’s research assignment; and to the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department for the editing.

Alyson J. K. Bailes
Director, SIPRI
August 2005
### Abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FPCCI</td>
<td>Federation of the Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial year</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
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<td>ISPR</td>
<td>Inter-Services Public Relations</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e Amal</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime minister</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VVIP</td>
<td>Very very important person</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of mass destruction</td>
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1. Setting the scene: the historical, political and religious background

Introduction

Terrorists manipulate fear through the use of violence to achieve their objectives. An understanding of what motivates terrorists to employ mindless violence against civilian or non-combatant targets is essential for assessing the phenomenon. The current discussion of ‘root causes’ often focuses on finding the causes of antagonism towards civilization in the mind of a fanatic terrorist at the individual level. The debate about what motivates a terrorist, however, overlooks the factors that enable a terrorist to conduct terrorist activities. As argued by Walter Laqueur, even if better control can be achieved over the extremist motivation for terrorism, there will still be a few isolated individuals for whom the temptation to employ terrorism—if the opportunity remains—will be hard to resist.1

While the root causes must be tackled to decrease the number of terrorists, an understanding of the enabling factors for terrorists is also needed in order to reduce their capacity to act. It is all the more necessary because reducing the motivation behind terrorism is a task for a generation or more, and reducing their capacity will demand constant attention in the meantime. Without ignoring the root causes, this Policy Paper explores the role of the state in breaking the link (or other form of relationship) between the motivation for and actualization of a terrorist act.

In Pakistan, a state where religion provides the only collective identity of its people—over and above the very existence of the state—flirting with religion is an important political activity. In the earlier East–West context of the cold war, the religiosity of the nation’s people and the religious factor in its politics attracted international interest and support (paradoxically, it now seems) as a basis for securing the country’s liberal allegiance. ‘Islamism’ has subsequently become a source of concern and ultimate threat to the whole world: but Pakistan as a state has found and is still finding it hard to reconcile itself with this reality. This Policy Paper attempts to establish whether Pakistan now is, and considers itself (rightly or wrongly), a part of the world community that has come to dread religious extremist terrorism.

The remainder of this chapter explains the broader socio-economic and political background in Pakistan and offers a brief account of the political history of religious activism in the country, including the nature of the association between religious radicalism and terrorism. Chapter 2 addresses the current types of threat that terrorism presents for the internal and external security dynamics of the society and state of Pakistan. Chapter 3 provides a description of the accomplishments and limitations of the state in dealing with extremist terrorism and debates the reasons for the inadequacies. Chapter 4 presents the conclusions. In general, this text adopts a political-level, state-centred approach, emphasizing state responsibility for corrective measures. Accordingly, it concludes with some suggestions regarding short- and medium-term priorities for the concerned authorities.

Pakistan today

‘Pakistan is a paranoid state that has its enemies’.2

Pakistan is located at the junction of South, Central and West Asia and borders on Afghanistan, China, India and Iran, with an area of about 800 000 square kilometres and a population of about 160 million.3 With a gross per capita national income of $520, Pakistan ranks 161st in the world by this measure.4 For 50 years Pakistan’s population has grown by an average annual rate of almost 2.9 per cent, and this is unlikely to change in the near future because of strong socio-cultural factors, lack of education (especially female education) and low investment in health and family planning.5 Pakistan’s economy has grown by an impressive average annual rate of 6 per cent since 1950, but it remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, burdened by defence expenditure and excessively reliant on textiles.6 According to the official statistics, in financial year (FY) 2002/2003 the Government of Pakistan spent about 22 per cent of its total expenditure on defence and about 29 per cent on debt servicing, while its overall expenditure for internal development purposes was just 18 per cent of the total.7

6 Textiles provide 46% of manufacturing output in Pakistan and 68% of Pakistan’s exports. Cohen (note 5), p. 259.
Over the 58 years of its independence, Pakistan has had three full-scale wars and a limited one (all with India); three different constitutions; and four successful military coups, giving rise to intermittent military rule that has spanned more than half the life of Pakistan. No elected prime minister (PM) of Pakistan has completed his or her full term of office, nor is any elected PM who held office prior to November 2002 both alive and resident in Pakistan today. Pakistan’s first constitution was promulgated eight years after its independence, in 1956, only to be abrogated two years later. Pakistan’s first direct national elections took place more than 20 years after its independence, in 1970, and resulted in the secession in 1971 of one of its parts, East Pakistan, to form Bangladesh. According to the criteria used in Freedom House statistics, Pakistan has not been a totally free country since 1973. On an indicator relating to civil liberties, Pakistan has scored as low as 5 (with 1 as the highest ranking) almost throughout the period, with the exception of a few years following the death of President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in 1988.

The level of corruption in Pakistan is high. According to Transparency International’s *Global Corruption Report 2005*, Pakistan ranks at 129, scoring better than only 14 other countries on the list. When surveyed in 2002, 40.4 per cent of senior international business managers identified corruption as the major constraint on foreign investment in Pakistan, while 62.6 per cent lacked confidence in Pakistan’s courts to uphold their property rights. The primary law-enforcing institution, the police, is perceived to be the most corrupt institution by Pakistanis. This institutional incapacity is linked with the prevalent poverty in Pakistan: 65.6 per cent of the country’s population lives on less than $2 per day.

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8 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had called early elections in 1977 and thus did not complete his term as PM. All the other PMs were dismissed before the expiration of their terms.
9 Pakistan’s first elected PM, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was deposed in 1977 and hanged (accused of conspiring to murder) in 1979. The second PM, Mohammad Khan Jonejo, was deposed in 1988 and later died a natural death. The other 2 elected PMs, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were both deposed twice and are currently living in exile. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali resigned as PM in June 2004 and was replaced by interim PM Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and subsequently by Shaukat Aziz, the current PM.
10 The independent Freedom House ranking classifies countries as free, partially free or not free on the basis of how each country scores on various indicators of political rights and civil liberties, with 1 as the highest score and 7 as the lowest. For details see the Freedom House Internet site at URL <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>.
11 Freedom House index (note 10).
total consumption while the poorest 20 per cent accounts for just 8.8 per cent.\textsuperscript{16} Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 14 per cent of the workforce.\textsuperscript{17} The health and education sectors have long been ignored. The government spent 1.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on health and 1.8 per cent on education in FY 2002/2003,\textsuperscript{18} but 4.7 per cent was spent on defence in 2002.\textsuperscript{19} The institutional degeneration of the education sector is on such a scale that it has become irreparable in the short run and may, in the long term, be ‘one of the prime causes of economic stagnation and perhaps political turmoil’.\textsuperscript{20}

This chaotic and gloomy statistical picture of Pakistan has a history and logic behind it. Pakistan was created in 1947 out of the provinces of India with a Muslim majority when British colonial rule over India ended. Created in the name of a religious identity, Pakistan has inherited a diverse ethnic composition\textsuperscript{21} and an enduring enmity with India—a Hindu-majority and overtly secular state.\textsuperscript{22} The two factors have played a critical role in Pakistan’s security concerns and politics. Indeed, it was the Pakistani Government’s wrong choices with respect to these two factors in 1971 that combined to give rise to a secessionist movement in East Pakistan, resulting in the creation of Bangladesh. Both factors are still important and have prompted Pakistan to resort to such measures as a strong central government, strong defence and a constant search for powerful foreign allies. As to the results of such measures, the facts and figures tell their own tale.

\textsuperscript{16} World Bank (note 3), p. 73.
\textsuperscript{17} World Bank (note 3), p. 77.
\textsuperscript{18} World Bank (note 3), p. 81.
\textsuperscript{20} Cohen (note 5), pp. 236–48.
\textsuperscript{21} Since 1971, Pakistan’s 4 provinces—Punjab, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan—have respectively and in broad terms represented the 4 major ethnic groups of the country: Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis. All these provinces, however, have sizeable minority ethnic and linguistic groups. Another ethno-linguistic group in Pakistan is the Urdu-speaking Mohajir community that migrated to Pakistan from India in the wake of partition. The population of the province of Punjab—and the ethnic group of Punjabis—is larger than the population of all the other 3 provinces and of all the other ethnic groups put together. In the past, various forms of autonomist and secessionist movements have arisen, although they have not achieved their goals, among the minority ethnic groups. For details see Fair, C. C., ‘Islam and politics in Pakistan’, in A. M. Rabasa \textit{et al.}, The Muslim World after 9/11 (RAND: Santa Monica, Calif., 2004), pp. 251–53, full text available at URL <http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG246/>; and Cohen (note 5), pp. 201–29.
\textsuperscript{22} Pakistan and India became bitter rivals immediately after independence. Although various disputed issues (e.g., the partition of assets, rioting and migration, allocation of water resources, etc.) have affected relations between the 2 states, the most intractable dispute between them remains Kashmir. Before 1947 Kashmir was an autonomous princedom with a Muslim majority. Its Hindu ruler brought it into India at the time of partition despite the religion of the majority of its population and its geographical contiguity with Pakistan. Since then, Pakistan has fought 3 wars with India and 1 limited conflict with hostilities continuing as late as 1999. The first war, in 1948, left part of Kashmir within Pakistan and part attached to India, divided by a boundary called the Line of Control. The second war occurred in 1965. The third war, in 1971, was not directly linked with Kashmir.
The governing elite of Pakistan has sought the support of Islam as a rallying force to help cope with diverse and rebellious ethno-linguistic groups and with a hostile neighbourhood since the inception of the state. This has automatically drawn religious forces to the centre stage of politics and served to increase their influence. In brief, since independence Islam has become a cover for the institutional inefficiency of Pakistan and religious activism has been its by-product.

A political history of religious activism

The political struggle that started in 1940 under the banner of the All India Muslim League resulted in the creation of Pakistan in 1947. While created in the name of Islam, or more precisely as a state for the Muslims of India, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—the founding father of Pakistan—wanted it to be a modern secular state. In his speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the status of the national covenant on 11 August 1947, Jinnah said:

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State . . . We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State . . . I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in due course Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.23

In short, Jinnah did not want Pakistan to be an Islamic state. His vision can best be described as a state for Muslims that would free them from religious persecution by the majority Hindu community of India. It is no surprise, however, that the common people of Pakistan—far less well versed in modern statecraft or constitutionalism than Jinnah himself—should have conflated the creation of Pakistan to various degrees with their own perceptions and beliefs, as reflected in the campaign slogan ‘Pakistan ka matlab kya la Ilaha Illa Allah’ (Pakistan means there is no God but Allah). Moreover, during his passionate quest to create Pakistan out of a set of Muslim-majority provinces where the Muslim League as such had little base of support prior to the 1945–46 elections, Jinnah was obliged to seek the support of many political constituencies that did not necessarily share his vision of Pakistan.24 Jinnah succumbed to tuberculosis in 1948 before he could give a sense of direction to the newly founded state.

The Islamic idealism stirred up by Muslim League leaders during the campaign for Pakistan soon vanished after the state’s creation, and vested interests came to the fore. Faced with numerous political and economic problems and with dwindling support among the masses, Pakistan’s leadership pushed the country

into a political crisis that lasted until martial law was imposed by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 11 years later. During this first period, the leaders of Pakistan were wary of the excessive political activism of the religious parties and were sometimes led to confront them outright. In such tough times, however, the leadership had little option but to rely on Islam and thus, by default, on Islamic elements in society for purposes of political expediency ranging from the preservation of their governments or hiding their own incompetence to the task of integrating Pakistan as a multi-ethnic state.

During the rule of Ayub Khan—the general who came to power as a result of a coup in 1958 and ruled until 1969—the religious elements were relatively marginalized, and Ayub Khan did not hesitate to distance himself from them publicly. He actually sought to replace the influence of religious parties on Islam with an official brand of Islam that he tried to implement through presidential decrees with the assistance of his own coterie of religious scholars and the civil bureaucracy. Interestingly, however, during this era both the government and the religious parties were ready to compromise on their positions out of political expediency.

The Ayub Khan era was followed by the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971, which led to an all-out war between Pakistan and India at the end of that year and to the creation of Bangladesh. This was the first occasion on which the military made use of the student wing of Jamaat Islami (Islamic Party)—known as Islami Jamiat Tulaba (Islamic Gathering of Students)—in the civil war against the nationalist Awami League (People’s League) activists of East Pakistan: a showdown that

25 E.g., after the anti-Ahmedi riots of 1952–53, religious leaders like Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi and Amin Ahsan Islahi were put behind bars or sentenced to death by a court on 1 occasion, although the decision was later reversed. For details see Nasr, S. V. R., *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, Calif., 1994), pp. 131–41.

26 For a detailed account of how political problems were tackled by the political leadership of Pakistan in its initial years see Talbot (note 24), pp. 95–147. For an analysis of how religious parties played on contemporary problems in order to persuade the politicians to co-opt them even against their own will, see Nasr (note 25), pp. 116–46.

27 E.g., the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which gave extra rights to women in their marital relationships, was vehemently opposed by the religious groups, but Ayub Khan persisted in implementing it in defiance of such religious sentiments.

28 E.g., the Jamaat Islami (Islamic Party) moderated its anti-regime rhetoric during the period of martial law (1958–62), fearing an extreme response from the government. During the indirect elections held after the lifting of martial law in 1962, the Jamaat Islami sided with the former opposition camp under such leaders as Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi and went so far as to support the candidacy of Fatima Jinnah—the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah—for the presidency against Ayub Khan. The emphasis of the Jamaat Islami in that period was more on democracy as such than on the Islamic state. Ayub Khan remained hostile towards Jamaat Islami and its activities but invited the party’s founder, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, to speak on the radio in favour of jihad when faced with a war against India in 1965. For details see Nasr (note 25), pp. 147–65.

29 Jamaat Islami is one of the largest religious political parties in Pakistan and has the most elaborate political Islamist ideology, based on the writings of Mawdudi, who died in 1979. His writings have also provided a guide for various political Islamist movements in other countries.
left about 2000 Islami Jamiat Tulaba members and supporters dead.\textsuperscript{30} It should be noted that the Islami Jamiat Tulaba behaved independently from Jamaat Islami in this episode and showed considerable independence in the subsequent years as well: for instance, it bore prime responsibility for the 1974 anti-Ahmedi campaign that ended in the declaration of the Ahmedis as non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{31}

After the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became prime minister of the remaining Pakistani state on the basis of the results of the 1970 elections, in which his political party (the Pakistan People’s Party) had made a better showing in West Pakistan. He no longer sought to distance himself from religious organizations but in a sense tried to co-opt them, notably in the face of separatist tendencies in Balochistan while memories of the secession of East Pakistan remained fresh. Bhutto also invited help from radical elements from Afghanistan in 1974, hoping to use them against the incumbent regime of President Mohammad Daoud in Kabul, who was becoming assertive with regard to claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun territories.\textsuperscript{32} Bhutto’s oscillation between socialist rhetoric and Islamic symbolism gave rise to the new, more Islamic constitution of 1973—which is still in place, although with certain major modifications over the years—and to the declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims. All this was not enough, however, to win him the support of the religious parties and he was brought down in an army coup in 1977.

In the face of increasing political instability resulting from protests by an alliance of mainly religious parties, General Zia ul-Haq imposed martial law in 1977 and remained in power (later as president) until his death in 1988. The real shift towards state patronage and the instrumentalization of Islamism originated during his rule. The Zia era can be considered, as Nancy Hayden has put it, as the ‘epochal’ stage\textsuperscript{33} in the overall evolution of religious radicalism in Pakistan. All the militant religious organizations in Pakistan that are involved in terrorism today originated in the period after 1979. This epochal rise in religious radicalism was due not only to the personal inclinations of General Zia, but also to the international and domestic political situation that arose after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The vigorous implementation of a

\textsuperscript{30} Nasr (note 25), p. 169.

\textsuperscript{31} Nasr (note 25), p. 178, pp. 181–82. The Ahmedis originated in the late 19th century in Punjab under the leadership of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, who claimed to be a prophet, thus challenging Mohammed’s status as the final prophet of Allah.

\textsuperscript{32} Afghanistan’s reluctance to accept the Durand Line as the international boundary between the 2 countries has remained an issue of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same Islamist rebels—including, e.g., Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmed Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani—who were harboured by Bhutto in 1974 were instrumental in the Afghan resistance following the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Sunni Islamization programme initiated by Zia antagonized Pakistan’s Shias, and the consequent Sunni-Shia hostility provided the cornerstone for the violent sectarian conflict in Pakistan that followed, reinforced by the developing jihadi culture of the time and the (Shia) Islamic revolution in Iran. The 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1980–88 Iraq–Iran War resulted in a peak in Arab–Iranian rivalry that was reflected in the form of Sunni–Shia hostility in Pakistan, with consequences that both brought new support to and radicalized the opposing sects in Pakistan.

As a consequence of the 1979–88 Afghanistan War, the Zia Government gave free rein to the proponents of jihad and strengthened the hand of the Muslim clergy. Private and official funds of both local and foreign origin were increasingly channelled into the establishment of madrasas (religious seminaries), which began to be established in large numbers across the country. The madrasas have remained the essential source of manpower for jihadist activities since that time, and their numbers have increased considerably. Out of the 3906 registered madrasas in 1995, 2010 had been established after 1979. Current estimates of the number of madrasas in Pakistan put the figure at 10 000, with as many as 1.7 million students attending classes at least for short periods. During the Afghanistan War these madrasas produced jihadi activists who were trained and motivated to serve as foot soldiers for the war against communism that was being pursued in Afghanistan with the active involvement of several other states, including the United States.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pumped in about $3 billion to the armed Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. The Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the intermediary between the Afghan mujahedin and the CIA, and the ISI distributed the funds among the seven different mujahedin groups. While it was the ISI’s choice to favour the most radical elements among the mujahedin, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Group), the US Government remained tolerant on this point so long as the groups concerned were proving effective in the war against the Soviet Union. US policy makers completely overlooked the long-term implications of jihadi texts that, at the time, were being designed _inter alia_ at the University of Nebraska under a $51 million grant from the US Agency for International Development.

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38 The US Department of State’s Afghanistan specialist, Eliza Von Hollen, had expressed reservations about the trend, but the CIA brushed aside such criticism. See Kux (note 37).
Saudi Arabia also contributed some $3.5 billion to the Afghan jihad, most of which went to Sunni extremist groups. Saudi aid to the Afghan resistance was supposed to equal the amount disbursed by the CIA to the same cause, under a deal concluded between Saudi Arabia and the USA during the Administration of President Jimmy Carter and maintained by the Administration of President Ronald Reagan after 1981 for the duration of the Afghanistan War.

After the end of the Afghan jihad in the late 1980s the US Government withdrew financial support for the relevant jihadi organizations, but, more broadly, the USA and the rest of the world community were largely inattentive to what happened in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the succeeding years. Pakistan continued to support, recruit and train the religious radicals for another arena that was not only attractive to the minds of Pakistani strategists but also closer to their hearts: Kashmir. It was also important for Pakistan that Afghanistan should remain pliant and supportive of Pakistan’s strategic interests. Pakistan’s quest for so-called ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan—not only to facilitate the continuation of insurgency in Kashmir, but also for defence against aggression from India at a time when Pakistan’s military assistance from the USA was dwindling owing to the Pakistani nuclear programme—marginalized the more rebellious groups in the Afghan resistance in favour of more extremist but tractable ones. This policy eventually led to support for the Taliban after their emergence in 1994. The Taliban, who captured Kabul in 1996, was a force that was to serve as a lifeline both for Pakistani religious radicals—who became increasingly involved in terrorism inside Pakistan—and for the international terrorist network with al-Qaeda at its hub.

During this time Pakistan was growing increasingly isolated internationally, right up to the catalytic events of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA. Those events forced Pakistan to alter its Afghan policy, which was spreading religious radicalism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in order to join with the USA in the war against terrorism. Pakistan’s sudden policy shift was, naturally, not welcomed by the Taliban, their associates or their sympathizers in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Group loyalties became more uncertain and difficult to assess than ever before, and religious violence persisted in an atmosphere of growing confusion.

The next section analyses the nature of current extremist religious forces in Pakistan.

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41 Kux (note 37), p. 252.
Religious radicalism and terrorism

Islam in Pakistan

Ninety-seven per cent of Pakistan’s population is Muslim, but it is not a monolithic whole. The two major sects of Islam in Pakistan are Sunni and Shia. Sunnis can be considered as adherents of the conservative Muslim school of thought, who perceive themselves as following the Sunna or tradition of the Prophet Mohammed. The Shias have their origins in a political controversy regarding the succession to the Prophet among various caliphs, which later led to their development as a dis-
distinct religious sect. No reliable figures are available on the division of Muslim believers between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan: Christine Fair notes that estimates of the Shia population range from 15 to 25 per cent, but she regards the figure of 20 per cent as a fair estimate.  

Sunnis in Pakistan follow the Hanafi school of religious doctrine—the teachings of the eighth century religious scholar Abu Hanifa—and are divided further into two principal traditions: Deobandi and Barelvi. These traditions flow from two religious movements that arose in the towns of Deoband and Bareili during British rule in the late 19th century. Since the Afghanistan War, the Ahl-e-Hadith (People of the Prophet’s Tradition) movement has also gained strength in Pakistan but still forms a tiny minority of the total Sunni population. Shias are also divided into two main sub-sects in Pakistan: the predominant sub-sect is the Ithna Ashariyya, or the Twelvers, and the other major group is the Ismailis, who consider the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader. Figure 1.1 illustrates these divisions. There are many other Muslims who would not associate themselves with any particular school or tradition. On the whole, the divide between Sunnis and Shias remains the most profound one.

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**Figure 1.1. Major subdivisions of Islam in Pakistan**

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43 Fair (note 21), p. 256.

44 The Barelvi tradition believes in Sufism and in the veneration of saints as intermediaries to connect man and God, while the Deobandi tradition emphasizes the direct connection between man and God through individual actions that may take a personal, social or political form.

45 The Ahl-e-Hadith school is close to Saudi Wahabism, and in various ways opposes the Hanafi school of religious doctrine that is most common in Pakistan.

46 The followers of the 2 sects do not worship at each other’s mosques and perform the basic rites of Islam (e.g., prayers, fasting and the mandatory alms giving, called zakat) in different ways. The Sunnis have a particular dislike for the annual mourning days that are celebrated by the Shias in the Islamic lunar month of Moharram (commemorating the murder of Hussain bin Ali, the grandson of Mohammed, by the army of a Muslim provincial governor at the time of the Islamic caliphate). The differences between the Barelvis and Deobandis have also been a source of mutual controversy, but these groups do worship at each other’s mosques and interpret basic questions of doctrine in essentially the same manner. There are no profound differences in their prayers, fasting and alms-giving practices. The Twelvers and Ismailis also disagree on various issues: for Twelvers the title of
Certain segments of both the Sunni and Shia communities are more intolerant towards the other community. Not only have certain groups in the various subdivisions of Islam become more intolerant and radical in this regard, but many of them have also developed militant groups of their own, largely as a result of events since 1979. The Deobandi Sunnis—joined by Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamaat Islami (which has also acquired the status of a defacto Muslim sect following Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi’s teachings)—were the biggest beneficiaries of the Afghan jihad. Their madrasas received large amounts of funds during this period and are in the forefront of jihadi activism and terrorism in Pakistan today.47 Some militant groups are involved in sectarian terrorism against Shias, and others are targeting non-Muslims; some are targeting the state, while others were used until very recently by the state to promote its strategic objectives. The Shias also have militant terrorist organizations, but their influence has waned over time.

Religious militants and terrorism

When the term ‘terrorism’ is used to refer to certain groups or their actions, it risks straying into the realm of subjectivity. The attacks of September 2001 and the terrorism associated with al-Qaeda have added to the existing confusion regarding the definition of terrorism by popularizing new terms and phrases such as ‘international terrorism’, ‘global terrorism’, ‘catastrophic terrorism’ and the like. Not all the militant religious groups in Pakistan are involved in terrorism as such, but they are part and parcel of the militant Islamic framework that feeds and links up with terrorism.

Academic and other experts have made numerous efforts to develop a generally acceptable definition of terrorism but have not reached consensus. If the issue is considered from the perspective of history and academic discourse since the time when the notion of terror was first popularized—the French Revolution, with its régime de la terreur—certain patterns can be observed. For most of the time, and contrary to its French origins, the notion of terrorism has been associated with revolutionary forces opposing governments. Only briefly in the years leading to World War II, and during that war, was the term widely used to describe mass repression by states of their peoples.48 While there was a time when revolutionary organizations using terror tactics would publicize and justify them as ‘propaganda by deed’, after World War II no revolutionary organization wanted to call itself

Imam cannot be given to anyone after the Twelfth Imam, while for Ismailis their own spiritual leader holds the title of Imam. These differences, however, are manageable.

47 Barelvis have not been involved in violence against Shias and share some common religious ground with them, such as veneration of and devotion to saints and shrines. See International Crisis Group (note 40), pp. 2–3. No reliable statistics are available, but Barelvis are considered to be the largest denomination of Sunnis in Pakistan, although they represent only a small part of Pakistan’s militant Islamic activity.

'terrorist', even if it targeted civilian populations and non-combatants in practice; hence the growing confusion and subjective connotations of the term.49

This subjectivity regarding the definition of terrorism has given rise to various new approaches to understanding the concept. Some terrorists have portrayed themselves as freedom fighters struggling for their rights, which—according to them—justifies their targeting of civilians. Some states have made use of the prevailing ambiguity to apply the term ‘terrorist organization’ to guerrillas and freedom fighters and have cited the threat of terrorism as a pretext to crush them with brute force. One approach that may avoid such sweeping uses of the term is to concentrate more on the nature of the act than on the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause, but this opens up the possibility of extending the definition to include acts of terror committed by states.50 Currently, a number of states and organizations and agencies within states have taken cover behind the dispute over definitions and have simply defined terrorism as they wish. The nature and the highly practical implications of the modern controversy have, for obvious reasons, made it even harder to secure a consensus on the definition at the international level.

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which delivered its report on global security in December 2004, made an attempt to circumvent these controversies. The report defines terrorism as: ‘any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.51 At the same time, and more importantly, it excludes the terrorization of people by states from the definition of terrorism with the argument that such violence is dealt with by


other instruments of international law relating *inter alia* to war crimes, crimes against humanity and violation of human rights.52 The utility of excluding so-called state terrorism from the definition of terrorism was also emphasized in March 2005 in the subsequent report by the Secretary-General.53

The definition offered by the High-level Panel clearly leans towards the ‘nature of the act’ approach, rather than the ‘identity of the actor’ or the ‘nature of the cause’ approach, while at the same time seeking to exclude the violence of states against their civilian populations from the purview of terrorism. The rationale is not to deny the challenge of political violence by states against civilians (whether in their own country or elsewhere) or the features it holds in common with terrorism, but rather to separate the two problems in the interest of clearer analysis and in order to facilitate the markedly different strategies needed to deal with each of them at the national and international levels.

If the High-level Panel’s definition is compared with the definition of terrorism in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the intention becomes even clearer. The convention defines terrorism as ‘any other act [in addition to those enumerated in the conventions mentioned above] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.54 Taking the two definitions together, it would appear that the threat or use of indiscriminate violence does not in itself count as terrorism but, conversely, violence must not necessarily be indiscriminate to count as ‘terrorist’—terrorism may include targeted violence against state authorities or functionaries to make them change their policies. Under the same approach, the use of violence against non-combatant military personnel ‘not taking active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict’ can also be considered as terrorism. Thus, if an organization in conflict does not use guerrilla activity to attack its armed opponents but relies solely on hide-and-seek ambush techniques or bomb attacks against civilian and non-combatant military personnel, the organization is involved in terrorist violence.55 In addition, terrorist violence can be exercised for

52 United Nations (note 51), para. 164(a).
the political purpose of influencing state policies or for the intimidation of a specific population.

There are 134 parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, including four of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{56} Its definition can be considered one of the most acceptable ones in the world today. On the basis of this convention, therefore, as supported by the High-level Panel report and the UN Secretary-General’s pronouncements that state terrorism should be excluded from the international legal discourse on terrorism, the following characteristics define a terrorist: (a) the actor is a non-state one; (b) the person is involved in violence that can cause serious bodily harm or death (indiscriminate or targeted); (c) the violence targets civilians or non-combatants (including military personnel if not in combat);\textsuperscript{57} and (d) the purpose of the violence is to intimidate a population or to change the policies of a government or an international organization.

All militant Islamic groups in Pakistan are armed non-state actors and are called jihadi or sectarian organizations in this paper. Chapter 2 explains how some of them are associated with terrorist violence inside Pakistan, while others are connected with political violence outside Pakistan—especially in India-administered Kashmir and India—that sometimes acquires the character of terrorism. Terrorist acts carried out inside Pakistan by groups not associated with radical Islam are outside the purview of this study.


\textsuperscript{57} The attacks of militant organizations, whether based in Pakistan-administered Kashmir or India-administered Kashmir, on the armed forces in India-administered Kashmir are not treated as terrorist acts in this Policy Paper because the armed forces are engaged in combat against insurgents. Attacks in these areas are considered terrorist acts only if directed against civilians, such as the attacks on Hindu Pundits or on the Sikh community in India-administered Kashmir.
2. The terrorist threat

There is great concern in Pakistan today about the threat posed by terrorist violence to the nation’s security. When a spectacular terrorist attack occurs it is followed by an uproar in the media. Commentators from various walks of life condemn the terrorist acts, pointing to the dangers of rising religious extremism and terrorism and the government’s inability or unwillingness to deal with them. Some analysts would go to the extent of describing terrorism as an existential threat for Pakistan; others would warn of its long-term implications for the state. The real nature and reach of the threat, nevertheless, remains in the realm of speculation. It is easy to claim that terrorism spells disaster for Pakistan but harder to explain how that disaster would come about and to predict the shape that it would take.

Two faces of terrorism in the name of religion

Religion is used for the instigation of terrorism by two sets of actors in Pakistan. The two sets are somewhat inter-related but show certain differences with respect to their objectives, areas of operation and targets of violence.

First, there are sectarian groups belonging to the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam that are active in terrorist activities which are mostly—but not exclusively—directed against the people from the opposite sect. The Sunni militant organizations call for Pakistan to be declared a Sunni state while Shias fight for specific political rights to safeguard their distinct status. This communal schism on sectarian lines was the direct outcome of the process of Islamization of laws in Pakistan that was introduced, as noted above, by President Zia ul-Haq in 1977–88; sectarian violence was very rare before that period.58 The Shias, feeling empowered after the 1979 Iranian revolution and embittered over Zia’s Islamization (in practice, Sunni-ization) programme, created an organization with the name Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Fiqah-e-Jaffria (Movement for the Imposition of Shia Law)59 and protested against the president’s policies. They were successful in securing escape clauses in the new Islamized laws for themselves and in having the Shias in general exempted from certain aspects of those laws.

Not only did President Zia grow apprehensive about Shia power in Pakistan, but the Sunnis were also agitated at the time. They feared that people might seek conversion from the Sunni faith to Shiism in order to seek exemption from zakat (the annual tax of 2.5 per cent on the savings of Muslims to be distributed among the poor) or from other, more rigid Sunni family laws. The vigilante Sunnis therefore created Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the Prophet,

59 The organization was later renamed Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (Shia Movement of Pakistan) because discussing the restoration of Shia law in a predominantly Sunni country implied a more militant tone.
Pakistan) in 1985 as a check on Shia power. With the abundant weapons, black money and external influence that were available thanks to the Afghan jihad, the sectarian conflict soon mutated into a gory blood feud between the two communities.\(^6\) The political objectives of the various groups seemed to get lost along the way, but the violence continued and still continues in the form of retaliatory killings.

The major sectarian organizations that have been involved in violence since the 1980s are Shia Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan and its breakaway faction Sipah-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad), on the one side, pitted against the Sunni—or more precisely Deobandi—Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi), on the other side. The sectarian violence has caused more than 2000 deaths since the 1980s. The Karachi-based journal *Newsline* reported in June 2004 that more than 300 people had been killed in sectarian violence in the first six months of that year.\(^6\) The violence has evolved through several different phases. Initially, the killings by the militant organizations of both sects were targeted, that is, directed against the leaders and activists of rival organizations. After 1995, targeted killings began of high-profile civilians, such as lawyers and doctors, in rival sects even if they did not belong to the militant factions; and since 1997 there has been indiscriminate mass killing of members of rival sects.\(^6\)

The second set of actors are jihadi groups that were considered by the Government of Pakistan up to 2001 as strategic tools to be used in Afghanistan and Kashmir, some of whom have now turned against the government and become involved in terrorist activities inside the country.\(^6\) By and large, the militant jihadi groups were not directly involved in terrorist activities against civilian targets inside Pakistan until October 2001. After September 2001, when the Pakistani Government’s support for the international reaction to terrorism led it to reverse many of its policies that had been amenable to the jihadis, some jihadis also resorted to terrorist violence inside Pakistan, initially directing their attacks against foreigners and the local Christian population. Their use of violence has had a more pronounced political overtone and targeted assassinations seem to be their preferred mode. Their objective is not to intimidate the population of Pakistan in general or a particular segment of it, but to coerce the nation’s rulers into accepting their demands. That is why they have focused their attacks either on foreigners or on high-level government officials; the deaths of ordinary Pakistanis have been the result of collateral damage.

\(^6\) For details see Nasr, S. V. R., ‘Islam, the state and the rise of sectarian militancy in Pakistan’, ed. Jaffrelot (note 58); Zahab (note 58); and International Crisis Group (note 40), pp. 10–12.

\(^6\) Hussain, Z., ‘No way out?’, *Newsline* (Karachi), June 2004.

\(^6\) Zahab (note 58), p. 118.

\(^6\) Not all jihadi groups have adopted the use of terrorist violence inside Pakistan, even after the government’s post-Sep. 2001 policy shift.
Table 2.1. Details of the important Deobandi militant religious groups in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Primary mode and area of operation</th>
<th>Leader before September 2001</th>
<th>Status of leader as of September 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi)</td>
<td>Sectarian terrorism in Pakistan</td>
<td>Riaz Basra</td>
<td>Killed by police in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the Prophet, Pakistan)</td>
<td>Sectarian terrorism in Pakistan</td>
<td>Azam Tariq</td>
<td>Assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkat-ul-Mujahedin al-Alami (Worldwide Movement of Mujahedin)</td>
<td>Jihadi terrorism in Pakistan</td>
<td>Asif Zaheer</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jundullah (Army of Allah)</td>
<td>Jihadi terrorism in Pakistan</td>
<td>Attaur Rehman</td>
<td>Arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (Movement for Islamic Jihad)</td>
<td>Jihadi terrorism in Pakistan</td>
<td>Qari Saifulullah Akhtar</td>
<td>In Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), associated with Jamaat-al-Dawa (Party for Preaching)</td>
<td>Kashmiri insurgency</td>
<td>Abdul Wahid Kashmiri and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, of Jamaat-al-Dawa</td>
<td>In Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad)</td>
<td>Kashmiri insurgency</td>
<td>Masood Azhar</td>
<td>In Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (Worldwide Movement of Mujahedin)</td>
<td>Kashmiri insurgency</td>
<td>Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil</td>
<td>In Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbul Mujahedin (Party of Mujahedin)</td>
<td>Kashmiri insurgency</td>
<td>Mohammad Salahuddin</td>
<td>In Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The names of the organizations have changed repeatedly, but the most widely known nomenclature is used here.*

The level of determination of the jihadi terrorists is evident from their targeting of Pakistan’s political structure right up to its top. The highest target of these terrorists was and remains the president of the country. There were two successive attacks on the life of President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003, which he narrowly escaped. Other targets later included the military Corps Commander at Karachi in June 2004 (who is currently the Vice Chief of the Army) and the current Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz (who was PM designate and Finance Minister at the time), in July 2004. Neither was hurt in the attacks, but the events demonstrated the reach of the terrorists and the potential perils of terrorism. The two main Pakistan-based militant religious organizations that have been blamed for most of these
attacks—besides al-Qaeda—are Harkat-ul-Mujahedin al-Alami (Worldwide Movement of Mujahedin) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (Movement for Islamic Jihad). A new terrorist organization called Jundullah (Army of Allah) was also implicated in the terrorist violence in Karachi, especially in connection with the assassination attempt on the Corps Commander in 2004. It is believed to be the front organization for al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

Many of the jihadi groups that were active in the Kashmiri insurgency after the Afghan jihad are trying to distance themselves from terrorism in Pakistan. Organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammed) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), which were banned by the government in 2002 in response to international pressure, have made serious efforts to distance themselves—at least in appearance—from domestic terrorist violence. Table 2.1 lists the Deobandi groups that have become the most important in connection with terrorism and that also have significant interconnections. It indicates the current status of the individuals who led the groups before September 2001.

Effects of terrorism

The rising level of violence has proved a difficult challenge for Pakistan’s ill-equipped and ill-trained police force, which is better known in the country for its corruption than for its professional competence. Ironically, far from being able to secure civilians against terrorist attacks, the police force itself is particularly vulnerable to attacks by well-trained and highly motivated terrorists. Social disorder and instability have been the result, adversely affecting the economy of the country. The unfortunate fact that the economically most productive part of Pakistan—the city of Karachi—is also the most violent is a cause of concern. While a local businessman found it easy to shrug this off by saying that ‘Karachi is a big city and a violent incident in a certain part of the city gets lost in the crowd’, it has not been equally easy for foreign investors and local big businesses to ignore the risks, as is evident from the declining interest of foreign investors in Pakistan from FY 1994/95 to FY 2001/2002 (see figure 2.1).

A major factor contributing to this declining interest by foreign investors was (and still is) the level of violence in the country and the resultant sense of insecurity. Foreign investors’ sense of insecurity is exacerbated when they are specifically targeted by radical elements. The response of domestic investors to violence has

64 Harkat-ul-Mujahedin al-Alami is a breakaway faction of the Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami has long been associated with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
65 Personal interview by the author with a transport executive from the North West Frontier Province operating in Karachi, Jan. 2005.
66 E.g., a number of petrol stations of the multinational oil company Shell were blown up in Karachi in May 2003. In Jan. 2003 there was an assassination attempt by terrorists on the president and chief executive officer of the largest cell phone company in Pakistan, A. L. F. Barry, who is an Egyptian-born US citizen. In May 2004 when angry Deobandi protesters—mainly students of madrasas—protested against the murder of renowned Sunni cleric Mufti Shamzai chanting the slogan
also not been particularly positive. The Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index fell by 3.3 per cent in May 2004 as a result of the rise in religious and terrorist violence in Karachi.⁶⁷ According to the former President of the Federation of the Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), Riaz Ahmed Tata, every strike results in losses of 7–8 billion rupees (c. $12–13 million) to industry.⁶⁸ In Tata’s words, ‘If Karachi is not peaceful then Islamabad’s business-friendly policies will suffer’.⁶⁹ Some industrialists and professionals, including well-known doctors, have left the country after receiving threats from terrorist sectarian organizations.⁷⁰

Business people and professionals are not the only ones worried about the rising level of terrorist violence. The relative ease with which the terrorists penetrated the highest levels of security in Pakistan to attack its supreme institutions has increased the level of disquiet about Pakistan’s security and the integrity of its security institutions, such as the military and the police. Questions that are attracting serious attention include: how could the terrorists have real-time intelligence information about the movements of VVIPs (very very important persons, as the high-level government officials are called in the official jargon in Pakistan), and what made the attacks so well coordinated?


⁶⁷ Hussain (note 61).
⁶⁸ Tohid (note 66).
⁶⁹ Quoted in Tohid (note 66).
Investigations into the assassination attempts on President Musharraf revealed that junior-level security officials from the army and air force were involved—a fact admitted by the president himself in an interview.\textsuperscript{71} Security agencies have also found evidence of the collusion of certain low-ranking police staff in the sectarian violence.\textsuperscript{72} In 2003 a few army officers below the rank of colonel as well as a few junior members of the military were found to have links with terrorists and were court-martialed by the army.\textsuperscript{73} Although the threat obviously becomes more serious if the security apparatus is sympathetic to the cause of terrorists, the number of personnel involved in such activities is small and the level of their involvement obscure. While there was an attempted coup by some Islamist military officers in September 1995, the military as a whole can be considered an organization with strong institutional structures and liberal religious views, and it is unlikely that it will be influenced by radical religious ideologies to any great extent.\textsuperscript{74} The possibility of military personnel conniving with terrorists to bring about political change through assassinations remains, nevertheless, an issue of major concern.

Differentiation not exclusivity

Another cause for alarm is the fact that the various types of radical Islamic militias in Pakistan are not operating in isolation from each other. The distinction between a sectarian and a jihadi organization notwithstanding, all of them share a variety of common features and, above all, a similar world view. All of them see Islam as a magic pill to cure the ills of society, are against the concept of the nation state and are only interested in using the structure of the state to transform society according to their brand of Islam before proceeding even further.\textsuperscript{75} Different groups have at times also acted in ways that complement each other’s cause. It can be argued that the predominantly Sunni jihadi organizations have not been directly involved in the killing of Shias in Pakistan and have been more concerned about jihad abroad. Conversely, for the sectarian groups ‘the internal enemy [members of the opposite sect] still takes priority over the enemy without’.\textsuperscript{76} In other words, here are two

\textsuperscript{72} Ansari (note 71).
\textsuperscript{73} Much controversy surrounds the number and identification of these officers. The numbers cited range from 3 or 4 to 20, depending on whether official or non-official sources are used. For details see ‘ISPR clarifies detention report’, \textit{Daily Times} (Lahore), 31 Aug. 2003; and ‘Army officers being probed for extremist links: ISPR’, \textit{The Dawn} (Karachi), 1 Sep. 2003. Regarding their identification, official sources say that these officers were captured in Kohat in the North West Frontier Province, but other sources claim that they were captured in the Afghan province of Zabul by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and handed over to Pakistan—a charge that was vehemently denied by the Pakistani Government but supported by the Afghan Government. See ‘Dangerous signals’, \textit{The Nation} (Karachi), 2 Sep. 2003; and Shinwari, E., ‘Arrest of Pak army men in Zabul denied’, \textit{The News} (Karachi), 2 Sep. 2003.
\textsuperscript{74} Cohen (note 2), pp. 16–17.
\textsuperscript{76} International Crisis Group (note 40), p. 5.
faces of the same coin of religious extremism. Such differentiation as exists, however, may facilitate the analysis of these groups, the government’s responses and the underlying problems.

Differentiation is also significant inasmuch as the government itself usually avoids grouping all the religious groups together when responding to the threat posed by religious radicalism. The extremely violent sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad have faced the special wrath of the government, as have the jihadi groups that turned their jihad against Pakistan after September 2001 (a few of which are listed in table 2.1). There is still a strand of thinking in Pakistan, however, which seems relatively unconcerned about the activities of the jihadi groups operating in Kashmir and does not consider them to be involved in any anti-state activity inside Pakistan. Leaving aside the question of whether their activities outside Pakistan are in the best interest of Pakistan (see below), these groups cannot be absolved from involvement in the internal predicament of the country. In fact, the relationship between all Sunni groups, from the political parties through to jihadi groups and from sectarian groups through to foreign terrorists, gets murkier the deeper one digs into the details.

Almost all of the militant groups have had connections with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and most of them obtained their training there. Some have also been associated with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (Movement of Mujahedeen), co-signed the 1999 edict by Osama bin Laden which called it a duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and Jews. Jamaat-al-Dawa acquired its 77-hectare Muridke estate with the help of a donation from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, who was arrested because of connections with al-Qaeda. Many Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi recruits received their training in the jihadi camps of Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Companions, later renamed Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Jamiat-ul-Ansar) in Afghanistan during the years of Taliban rule. Much-sought Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists like Riaz Basra were given refuge by Harkat-ul-Ansar at the same time. In the other camp, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have been vocal in their support for the Taliban and jihad and were involved in fighting on the side of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance forces. All these groups might be given the benefit of the doubt with respect to their association with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the period before September 2001 on the argument that they did not know, or at least did not share, the more general world view of al-Qaeda and were only in an alliance of convenience sometimes involving al-Qaeda as well as the Taliban. After September 2001, however, all concerned had a clear choice of

The land for building the complex was given by the government of President Zia ul-Haq, with a huge investment from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, as a gift to Markaz al Dawa wal Irshad during the jihad years. The reason for Sharahi’s generosity was the close association between him and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the leader of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba. See Zahab, M. A. and Roy, O., *Islamist Networks: The Afghan–Pakistan Connection* (Hurst: London, 2004), p. 32; and Rana, A., ‘Jamaatud Dawa splits’, *Daily Times* (Lahore), 18 July 2004.

Zahab (note 58), pp. 120–23. See also Zahab and Roy (note 77), pp. 48–49
whether to stand on the side of civilization or its adversaries. Since then, any connection between al-Qaeda and any other organization has been rightly suspect.

Some observers believe that in addition to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, such jihadi groups in Pakistan as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin maintain links with al-Qaeda. Reports suggest that there is some basis for these suspicions. Some of the ‘prized catches’ of al-Qaeda personnel have been made in houses belonging to members of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat Islami; Abu Zubaida was captured from a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in Faisalaba;79 And Abu Omer and Abu Hamza were captured in January 2003 from the house in Karachi of the former national field hockey player Shahid Ali Khan, whose wife Sabiha Shahid is a member of the Jamaat Islami women’s wing.80 The number three in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—along with Mustafa Hawsawi—was arrested at the home of Abdul Qudoos, a Jamaat Islami supporter, in March 2003.81 Waleed Muhammad bin Attash, a suspect in the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, is reported to have claimed the recruitment of a dozen Lashkar-e-Taiba workers for suicide missions against US targets.82

The jihadi groups operating in Kashmir have also been linked to terrorist incidents inside Pakistan. Many Jaish-e-Mohammad members were directly involved in terrorism in Pakistan and were arrested by the police in connection with such violence.83 According to reports, Jaish-e-Mohammad was involved in an attack on President Musharraf as well.84 One report claims, in fact, that Muhammad Jamil, one of the suicide bombers who blew himself up in an attempt to assassinate President Musharraf, was a member of Jaish-e-Mohammad, but that the investigators hushed up the issue.85 Noor Ahmed, one of the attackers involved in the grim July 2003 terrorist attack on a Shia mosque that killed 50 and injured another 60 people, belonged to Al-Badar, a group fighting in Kashmir.86

The involvement of jihadi groups in criminal activity is also a matter of concern for the government. The record of criminal activities, such as robberies and extortions, by terrorist organizations inside Pakistan is relatively little known. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that members of the terrorist organizations have also been involved in other forms of criminal activity for moneymaking. Some high-ranking members of militant groups have been arrested on charges of drug trafficking in the past;87 and some militants have also been involved in robberies of various kinds, especially after September 2001 when their funds

82 Zahab and Roy (note 77), p. 66.
started to be squeezed. One of the top members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Akbar Khan, was shot dead in a police encounter after a bank robbery in which the police had no idea that they were fighting a sectarian terrorist rather than a bank robber. The most remarkable incident of involvement in robbery by a jihadi group was the theft of 2.2 million rupees (c. $37,000) from a branch of the National Bank of Pakistan in the Swat district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) by Jaish-e-Mohammad activists. Some of the religious militants have reportedly turned to kidnapping for ransom after their finances dwindled in the wake of the war on terrorism. Another interesting angle on the relationship between crime and jihad is provided on the Internet site of the US Department of the Treasury, which claims that al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been receiving funds for terrorist attacks from the billionaire and alleged international criminal Dawood Ibrahim.

The external angle

While some activists in organizations involved with the insurgency in Kashmir have been directly involved in terrorism inside Pakistan, most of the leaderships of such jihadi groups have managed to stay clear of accusations of involvement in such attacks. Although such jihadi leaders may not have been implicated in terrorism inside Pakistan, their role in the Kashmiri jihad and as part of the broader militant Islamic discourse is also open to question. In the past, it was difficult to deny that these groups served the vital interests of Pakistan—or, to be more precise, the Pakistani military’s interests—by depleting India’s resources in Kashmir for more than 10 years and inflicting heavy casualties on Indian forces while keeping Pakistan’s image clean at the international level behind the cover of plausible deniability. The question that may be asked in the light of current circumstances is whether such forces are still a strategic asset or have become a political liability. For the Pakistani strategists who started diverting the battle-hardened jihadis of the Afghanistan War into Kashmir to support the insurgency at the end of the Afghan jihad, the escalation of the indigenous insurgency in Kashmir looked like a golden opportunity. Over the years, however, the effect was to change the whole context of the insurgency from freedom struggle to jihad, and the pro-freedom indigenous movement became marginalized in comparison with the jihadi groups that supported Kashmir’s annexation to Pakistan.

Among the groups that are active in the Kashmiri insurgency, the most important are Hizbul Mujahedin (Party of Mujahedins), Harkat-ul-Mujahedins, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. While Pakistan claims that most of the jihadis who are active in Kashmir are Kashmiris, India alleges that many of them are foreigners. In 2001, according to Indian estimates, out of the 2400 militans active in

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the Kashmir Valley alone, 1400 were Pakistanis or Afghans. The involvement of Pakistanis with the Kashmiri insurgency is also evident from the leaderships and cadres of the various jihadi organizations, which are heavily manned by Pakistanis. The leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad, Maulana Masood Azhar, is from the Punjab province of Pakistan, while the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil, is a Pashtun from the NWFP. According to some observers, as much as 80 per cent of the membership of Lashkar-e-Taiba comes from Pakistan.

The fact that all these groups are based in Pakistan or in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, LOC) is also patent. Before the 2002 ban on Lashkar-e-Taiba, it had its headquarters in the town of Muridke near Lahore, and this facility was transferred to Jamaat-al-Dawa following the ban. Both Hizbul Mujahedin and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin have headquarters in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. While all these jihadi groups would be only too proud to admit their involvement in the Kashmiri insurgency, they would deny their involvement in terrorist activities against civilians in India-administered Kashmir or in India. Lashkar-e-Taiba has claimed to have killed 14,369 Indian soldiers in 1989–2000. Hizbul Mujahedin has claimed to have killed 770 Indian soldiers in 2003 alone. The jihadi publications of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin—Jaish-e-Mohammad and Al Hilal, respectively—have also been vocal about the jihadi operations of these two groups against India. In an interview, the current head of Jamaat-al-Dawa, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, said that jihad was the only option to liberate Kashmir from India. He stated at a gathering in the Punjab in late 2003: ‘This cannot be called infiltration because Kashmir is the jugular vein of Pakistan and fighting for freedom is not a sin. . . . We deduce our military and jihad planning from the Holy Quran and one day the Almighty will give us Khilafah and the government’. In other words, these groups consider their struggle in India-administered Kashmir legitimate because they regard it as a disputed territory and not a part of India, so they have the right to help the local population of Kashmir to gain freedom from Indian occupation.

Besides their involvement in the Kashmiri insurgency, the Indian Government has blamed these jihadi groups for many of the terrorist attacks against civilians in India-administered Kashmir and India. There were some gruesome attacks against civilians after September 2001 and the Indian Government has blamed most of them on Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. On 13 December 2001,

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93 Zahab and Roy (note 77), p. 36.
94 Zahab and Roy (note 77), p. 40.
98 The South Asia Terrorism Portal, an Internet site developed by the New Delhi-based think tank
the Institute for Conflict Management, lists the various terrorist activities allegedly conducted by
these jihadi groups. See URL <http://www.satp.org>.
when the Indian Parliament in New Delhi was attacked, India blamed it on Jaish-e-Mohammad and massed its troops along the boundary with Pakistan in response. A military stand-off ensued for 10 months, with tensions getting very high at certain points: some observers have even suggested that India was seriously contemplating a limited war to flush out the so-called terrorist training camps from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. President Musharraf, when banning Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in January 2002, used a rationale that might be considered a tacit admission of those organizations’ role in the parliament attack and other attacks in India. In his televised address to the nation, the president said, ‘Those involved in terrorist attacks in India are also trying to destabilise Pakistan’.99

Despite the ban on these particular groups in January 2002, the issue was not resolved easily or quickly: the forces of both Pakistan and India remained on high alert for eight more months, and it took a great deal of serious diplomacy on the part of the USA to defuse the situation. If India had decided to launch what it defines as a surgical operation against the training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it would not have been surprising if the situation had escalated into an all-out war. Bearing in mind Pakistan’s lower capability to sustain a long-term conflict with India by conventional means, the stakes could have been high indeed. US President Bill Clinton, during his trip in 2000 to South Asia, called it ‘the most dangerous place on earth’.100 Some two years later the most dangerous place on earth found itself once more on the verge of a nuclear holocaust as a result of one terrorist attack by overzealous extremists.

Thanks to immense diplomatic efforts, both Pakistan and India have not only redeployed their troops back to their peacetime positions since late 2002, but also resumed what is known as the Composite Dialogue in early 2004. This dialogue was initiated in 1999, but could not be sustained for long at the time. It encompasses eight issues, five of which—including Kashmir—can be considered security issues. Even though progress on the dialogue is slow, it is considered in both Pakistan and India as a great breakthrough in the relationship between the two countries.

The jihadi groups do not seem, however, to share other Pakistanis’ optimism about the dialogue and have directly threatened to disrupt it at times. On 29 April 2004 Hafiz Mohammad Saeed stated at a public meeting organized by Jamaat-al-Dawa that ‘Jihad will never be stopped in the [Indian] held [Kashmiri] territory. On this issue, there is complete unity and solidarity in the ranks of the mujahideen’.101 Jaish-e-Mohammad activists threatened to attack the bus service that was initiated in April 2005 between the two parts of Kashmir as a confidence-building measure,102 and an attack occurred on the bus service on its first day of operation,

although responsibility was not claimed by any major jihadi group. Most of the jihadis, apart from the relatively moderate Hizbul Mujahedin, remain sceptical about the peace process between Pakistan and India. If an attempt should be made by these groups (or by renegade factions within them, for that matter) to halt progress on the peace process, for example by attacking the bus service at some future point, they would be running counter not only to what they stand for—the liberation of Kashmir—but also to Pakistan’s national interests and the hopes of peace in the region.

Whether progress in the Composite Dialogue is halted because of a terrorist attack (most likely on the bus service by jihadi groups), or is stopped as a result of frustrations on either Pakistan’s side (regarding progress on Kashmir) or India’s side (regarding progress on the other seven issues on the agenda), the militants in such a situation would find an excuse to restart the infiltration of jihadis across the LOC. Pressure would also increase on the government to loosen its grip again on movements along this line. Such a development would place Pakistan in a precarious position internationally. Moreover, if jihadi insurgents found it hard to resist the temptation to commit further terrorist acts, an aggressive retaliatory response from India would be more likely than ever—and would certainly be impossible to avoid if the terrorists used any kind of weapon of mass destruction or ‘disruption’ (WMD).

It might be argued that the likelihood of a WMD attack by terrorists is remote. A terrorist would require not only the expertise, but also a large amount of radioactive material to detonate a nuclear device, which is no easy task. However, in order to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’—a so-called weapon of mass disruption—a terrorist would require only minor amounts of fissile material, which can be obtained even from a hospital laboratory. If a dirty bomb was detonated, casualties would be low, but the high psychological impact could trigger retaliation. The lethality of a chemical weapon might be much higher than that of a dirty bomb, but it would be very hard for terrorists to acquire such a weapon.

It may be assumed that the most likely tactic of terrorists in such a scenario would remain a conventional or suicide bombing, but even conventional attacks on key targets have the potential to escalate into greater hostilities. Such a scenario is quite likely in view of the ideological tenacity of the terrorists and past Indian and Pakistani experience with the fallout of such an attack. Moreover, the ideology of organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba is pan-jihadist and they do not intend to stop at the liberation of Kashmir, even if that is obtained. Such groups would have to turn their energies elsewhere, perhaps towards India or Pakistan with the aim of establishing the Khilafa (a nostalgic notion of restoring the 1300-year-old Muslim

103 Such an action could be accompanied by a dubious excuse like that offered by Jaish-e-Mohammad: that India was sending agents from the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s intelligence agency, to Pakistan-administered Kashmir on the bus.


105 Zahab and Roy (note 77), pp. 35–36.
form of government at the time of pious caliphs succeeding the Prophet Mohammad) there.

In brief, the activities of radical religious militants both within and outside Pakistan are proving to run counter to the national interest of the country. The militant groups are threatening the internal security of the country by instigating and perpetrating violence and are placing Pakistan in an increasingly insecure international and regional environment, in addition to creating armed parallel power structures within the state. While it is unlikely that the religious militants would gain access to the corridors of power in the near future, their capacity to destabilize the internal socio-political environment in the country needs to be taken seriously.

Pakistan is one of the poorest states of the world with some of the most deplorable human resource development statistics and a decaying institutional performance. It can hardly afford any longer to sustain the presence of highly trained and armed men for whom killing in the name of an ideology is their mission. South Asia as a whole is a very poor region of the world, and its poverty can partly be attributed to the environment of hostility that has prevailed there for more than half a century. Peace and order is the call of the day for South Asians seeking to better their lives. Religious radicals, with their potential for mindless terrorism, are by contrast an anathema for peace, for order and, ultimately, for prosperity in the region.

The realization that this threat exists seems slowly to be taking root in the policy circles of Pakistan. The September 2001 attacks have given the Pakistani Government an opportunity to deal with the threat of increasing religious radicalism and militancy. Since then the government has put in place various measures to control the activities of the jihadis. It has apprehended hundreds of terrorists, banned various groups, choked off their finances and put curbs on their activities. Chapter 3 analyses these policy responses by Pakistan to the problem.
No matter how deeply analysts dig into the root causes of religious radicalism and terrorism and try to explore the psychological and social phenomena motivating terrorism, it can hardly be denied that the factor contributing most to the promotion of jihadi culture—which ultimately mutated into dreadful kinds of terrorism—in Pakistan has been the state itself. In the 1980s state support to radical religious movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan was an international phenomenon, with the United States, Saudi Arabia and some other Persian Gulf countries and their citizens pouring money into the jihad. While the USA extracted itself from the exercise rather easily at the end of the Afghanistan War, other countries, most importantly Pakistan, found it hard to change course so quickly. It took another 12 years and the horrific attacks on the USA to make Pakistan realize that it was on the wrong track.

Over the years, state support—even if in the form of toleration of their activities rather than outright sponsorship—has helped terrorists in a variety of ways. They have been able to operate freely, acquire funds from states and non-state actors, access arms and munitions, acquire combat skills, move freely around the world and recruit openly for jihad. This situation has been transformed since September 2001: religious extremists are finding it much harder to wage a brutal campaign against civilians in the name of jihad. Not only have many nations the world over turned against these terrorists—after perhaps, at best, ignoring them before—but states have also combined and coordinated their efforts internationally. Pakistan today occupies a central position in this internationally coordinated effort.

Pakistan versus al-Qaeda

It was not long ago that the Government of Pakistan expressed its approval of the Taliban government of Afghanistan at international forums; but it took President Musharraf and his team of Corps Commanders only a few days to reach the decision to support the USA against the Taliban and to start viewing the latter as a source of threat to national security rather than a source of strategic depth against Indian aggression. In reality, Pakistan was not given much choice by the USA: it could opt to be either with the USA or against it—with no grey areas of neutrality. Pakistan would also have faced a threat from India in the event that Pakistan declined to cooperate with the USA and India did otherwise. In the event, after agreeing to support the USA, Pakistan gave unprecedented support to US forces:

first during the war to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and then in the long
drawn-out war against the remnants of al-Qaeda. The effectiveness of the measures
undertaken by the Pakistani Government is, however, still a matter of great debate.
This chapter analyses the pros and cons of that question.

The efforts made by the Pakistani Government to control al-Qaeda’s terrorist
threat have produced some concrete results. Since September 2001 the
Government of Pakistan has apprehended about 600 al-Qaeda operatives and
foreign militants.\textsuperscript{108} The terrorists captured by Pakistani authorities have included
significant arrests, such as that of Abu Zubayda (March 2002 in Faisalabad),
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003 in Rawalpindi) and Abu Faraj al-Libbi
(May 2005 in Mardan).\textsuperscript{109} Pakistan has also helped to freeze bank accounts of al-
Qaeda and its affiliated welfare organizations, such as the Al-Rasheed Trust and
the Rabeta Trust.

The government has also launched an operation against al-Qaeda in Pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This represents the first time in the
history of the country that Pakistan’s military has been deployed in the region. By
February 2005 the Pakistani military had conducted 44 operations in the FATA in
which 223 military personnel lost their lives and 503 were injured. The operations
resulted in the killing of 302 terrorists and the capture of 663 (44 of whom were
wounded during combat).\textsuperscript{110} While the Pakistani forces have been successful in
catching some foreign terrorists of Chechen and Uzbek origin and have killed a
few others during the operations in the FATA, Osama bin Laden and Ayman
al-Zawahiri are still at large. Tahir Yuldashev, the leader of the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, was injured in one of the operations but managed to escape.\textsuperscript{111} At
the time of writing, the Pakistani military are still stationed in the FATA and have
access to all the former ‘no-go areas’—approximately 8250 square kilometres—
for the purpose of checking terrorist activity: an unprecedented state of affairs.\textsuperscript{112}
On any given day some 10 000–12 000 military personnel are deployed in the
region.\textsuperscript{113}

The USA has acknowledged on a variety of occasions the role played by
Pakistan in the war against terrorism or more specifically the war against al-Qaeda
and its terrorist network. Some of the reasons for the USA to commend Pakistan’s
role in dealing with al-Qaeda are obvious. The capture of al-Qaeda operative
Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan, which subsequently led to the arrest of Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani, revealed horrific facts about the kinds of attacks that al-Qaeda

\textsuperscript{108} International Crisis Group (note 40).
\textsuperscript{109} Others include Abu Omar (arrested in Jan. 2003 in Karachi), Abu Hamza (arrested in Jan. 2003
in Karachi), Ramzi bin Alshibh (arrested in Sep. 2002), Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi (arrested in
Mar. 2003 in Rawalpindi), Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman (arrested in Mar. 2003), and Khalfan
Ghailani (arrested in July 2004 in Gujarat in India).
\textsuperscript{110} Briefing at the 11 Corps Headquarters of the Pakistan Military (the main army corps involved
in the operation against foreign terrorists in the FATA) at Peshawar, 8 Feb. 2005.
\textsuperscript{112} Briefing at the 11 Corps Headquarters of the Pakistan Military (note 110).
\textsuperscript{113} Briefing at the 11 Corps Headquarters of the Pakistan Military (note 110).
was planning. Some extremely accurate information about targets in the United Kingdom and the United States was recovered from these individuals, and it is quite likely that an attack on the targets would have been carried out, had they not been arrested.\textsuperscript{114} A Pakistani military official called the al-Qaeda plan to attack Heathrow Airport a ‘flawless’ one.\textsuperscript{115}

The role that the Government of Pakistan can play in controlling international terrorism came to light once again when three of the four bombers of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, which killed 56 people and wounded more than 700, turned out to be ethnic Pakistanis of British origin who had travelled to Pakistan and visited radical religious seminaries.\textsuperscript{116} On the basis of interrogations of Abu Faraj al-Libbi and the data on Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan’s computer, the Pakistani authorities claim to have warned the UK of the impending attacks in May 2005, but they could not provide the UK with specific information about the timing or targets of the attacks.\textsuperscript{117}

In short, the Pakistani Government has tried to do its part to control the religious radicalism originating from Pakistan and to prevent it from endangering the world, but the international network has proved resilient. This demonstrates not only the importance of a coordinated international effort to control extremist terrorism but also the role that Pakistan ought to be assigned in it. Strengthening the capability of Pakistan’s security apparatus has become increasingly relevant.

\textbf{Pakistan versus domestic terrorists}

The Government of Pakistan has not only been instrumental in hunting down al-Qaeda operatives and their foreign supporters, but also dealt harshly with the sectarian terrorist groups and the few jihadi groups that have been involved in terrorism inside Pakistan. The two leaders of the notorious Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Riaz Basra and Asif Ramzi, were killed in 2002, and many other operatives of this organization have either been killed in police encounters or are behind bars. The threat that such groups have posed to the internal security and stability of Pakistan has clearly led the government to take strong measures against them. Currently, every new terrorist attack inside Pakistan by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi merely escalates the government’s operations against it.

Asif Zaheer, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin al-Alami, has been arrested and sentenced to death. The leadership and cadres of the recently established organization known as Jundullah, which was implicated in the 2004 attack on the

\textsuperscript{114} See Burke, J., Harris, P. and Bright, M., ‘Suspect arrested in Pakistan may hold al-Qaeda’s secrets’, \textit{The Observer}, 8 Aug. 2004, URL <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,1373,1278649,00.html>.

\textsuperscript{115} Briefing at the 11 Corps Headquarters of the Pakistan Military (note 110).

Table 3.1. Averted terrorist attacks in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2002</td>
<td>President of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2002</td>
<td>President of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2002</td>
<td>Unknown targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2002</td>
<td>US diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Awam express train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2004</td>
<td>US Consulate, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Military General Headquarters and Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2004</td>
<td>Shah Faisal Mosque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from news reports about the thwarted terrorist attempts. The list may not be exhaustive but is illustrative of the government’s few successes. It indicates only pre-empted attacks, not attacks that took place but were unsuccessful.

Karachi Corps Commander, have also been arrested, including its top leader, Attaur Rehman—a renegade from the Islami Jamiat Tulaba—who was arrested in June 2004. A few members of the suicide squad of Jaish-e-Mohammad, a militant organization involved basically with Kashmir, have also been arrested in large numbers after their involvement in local terrorism was disclosed. Thus, even if terrorism has continued inside Pakistan, the performance of the government has not been completely hopeless. The sometimes ruthless pursuit of terrorists by the authorities has yielded tangible results and, on some occasions, by extracting information from the captured terror suspects, the authorities have been able to pre-empt terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Table 3.1 lists some of the terrorist attempts that were pre-empted by the government authorities.

Pakistan versus the Kashmiri jihadis

Pakistan’s efforts to control the activities of jihadi groups active in the Kashmiri insurgency have come under scrutiny at both the national and the international level. On a few occasions the government has banned particular jihadi groups, but they have usually reappeared with new names. Although the groups’ offices have been raided and the members arrested at the time of the ban, they have been released quickly: most of the 3300 members of such groups who were arrested in 2002 were later freed. The leaders of these organizations have not only been released but are still preaching jihad.

One of the foremost jihadi leaders, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, was released in November 2002 on the order of the Lahore High Court, which declared his

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117 Pepper and Hosenball (note 116).
120 Kronstadt (note 79), p. 4.
detention unlawful. He quickly assumed the leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s parent organization—the former Markaz al Dawa wa Irshad, now renamed Jamaat-ul-Dawa—and embarked on a countrywide tour to motivate people for jihad in various cities of Pakistan. On one occasion he claimed to have recruited 7000 boys for jihad during a six-month period in 2003. In December 2002 the Lahore High Court ordered the release from house arrest of Masood Azhar, the leader of the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad, because of the lack of sufficient evidence presented by the government in support of his detention. Like Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Masood Azhar soon restarted his jihad campaign under the banner of Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam—a new name for Jaish-e-Mohammad. Fazlur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, was freed after being held in custody for a few months in 2004 on charges of sending militants to Afghanistan. More intriguingly, the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, was released discreetly by the authorities despite the fact that his organization’s operatives were involved in terrorism inside Pakistan. It has also been alleged that the authorities provided monthly stipends of 10 000 rupees (c. $170) to both Azam Tariq and Masood Azhar while they were in custody.

At the same time, terrorist incidents have continued to occur in India-administered Kashmir and India proper, and India has persisted in blaming them on Pakistan-based militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. In March 2003 Indian officials reported that they had provided the USA with proof that there were 70 jihadi training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In May 2003 the Indian Defence Minister claimed that about 3000 militants were being trained in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In October 2003 an Indian military spokesman alleged that Pakistan was still running 85 training camps and was pushing militants to infiltrate India-administered Kashmir. He cited 86 separate attempts at infiltration since January of that year.

In response to renewed international pressure, the Government of Pakistan banned six militant organizations in November 2003, sealed their offices and froze

123 Masood Azhar was detained by the Indian Government when he crossed the LOC to enter Indian-administered Kashmir. He was later released in exchange for the release of the passengers of a hijacked Indian airliner in 1999. After returning to Pakistan he organized his own militant organization, Jaish-e-Mohammad, which was banned in 2002.
125 Qari Saifullah Akhtar was allegedly linked with the attempted coup by some Islamist officers in 1995 against the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. While the army officers involved in the coup attempt were court-marshalled, Akhtar was freed. He was arrested in a Gulf state after the government began pursuing Islamist militants after Sep. 2001. On his recent release see Hassan, S. S., ‘Under wraps’, Herald (Karachi), July 2005.
126 Zahab and Roy (note 77), p. 25, p. 31.
their accounts. These groups included Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Islamic Movement of Pakistan, formerly known as Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan); Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Islamic Union of Pakistan, formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan); Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam (Movement of the Servants of Islam, formerly known as Jaish-e-Mohammad); Jamiat-ul-Ansar (Gathering of the Companions, formerly known as Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Harkat-ul-Ansar); Hizb-ul-Tahrer; and Jamaat-ul-Furqa (Group of the Distinctive People, the breakaway faction of the Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam, which is discussed below). In addition, Jamaat-al-Dawa was put on the watch list.\textsuperscript{129} Five of these organizations (including Jamaat-ul-Furqa) had previously been banned by the government, only to re-emerge under new names. Two of the organizations banned in November 2003 were sectarian and were outlawed following sectarian attacks in Quetta (the capital of Balochistan province) and other parts of the country. Jaish-e-Mohammad (now called Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam) and Jamiat-ul-Ansar (the new name of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin) were the two main groups associated with Kashmir that were banned under the 2003 decision. However, the authorities have found it difficult to stop Masood Azhar from issuing press statements and holding rallies to motivate people for jihad or to stop Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil from inciting violence in the name of religion.

\textsuperscript{129} ‘Three religio-political outfits banned’, \textit{The News} (Karachi), 16 Nov. 2003; and ‘Three more extremist groups banned’, \textit{The Nation} (Karachi), 21 Nov 2003.
Although the Indian Government has repeatedly accused Pakistan of insincerity in its war on terrorism, Pakistan’s efforts to control militant infiltrations across the Line of Control must be judged as quite successful—even if the government’s decision was not initially popular in military circles. While the issue of insurgent training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the number of infiltrations across the LOC in a given year can be considered controversial, depending on the point of view, the decrease in the level of violence in India-administered Kashmir since 2001 is indicative of decreased Pakistani support for militant infiltration. The number of fatalities resulting from violence in Kashmir, as shown in figure 3.1, illustrates a considerable decline. In 2004 the total fatalities from violence in Kashmir (military, civilian and militant) were the lowest since 1992, and civilian deaths were at their lowest since 1990. These figures clearly indicate the reduction or withdrawal of support for infiltration. While a cynic might argue that they also tend to prove Pakistan’s official involvement with the insurgency, the positive message is that Pakistan seems to have changed its policy and that it has made a difference.

The effects

The real question, now that the Pakistani Government has reduced extremist activity by stopping infiltration across the LOC, is whether it can control the forces that contribute to it by reducing extremism as such. It can be argued that, by using a tough policy against some extremists while ignoring others altogether, the government is making both aspects of the problem more unmanageable. The targeted factions are breaking up into small, flexible splinter groups under pressure from the government, while the non-targeted elements are multiplying in hope of gaining advantages.

Since the beginning of the crackdown on organizations such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, these groups have become increasingly elusive. Al-Qaeda operates through various front organizations such as Jundullah. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, on the other hand, has split into small cells centred around previously little-known figures in its hierarchy following the killing of its top leaders, including Riaz Basra and Asif Ramzi, and the capture of Akram Lahori. This has made the organization more unpredictable and dangerous. Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin al-Alami have also split and merged in secretive ways to create groups with new names such as the World United Army.

Jihadi organizations are also splitting but for totally different reasons. The Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam (previously Jaish-e-Mohammad), led by Masood Azhar, split along personality lines, giving rise to Jamaat-ul-Furqa under the leadership of Masood Azhar’s former lieutenant Abdul Jabbar. Jamaat-al-Dawa, led

by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, also split in a similar fashion, with Maulana Zafar Iqbal forming his own breakaway faction called Khairun Naas (Welfare of the People) and attracting various Jamaat-al-Dawa operatives, including the former leader of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. These events indicate that the jihad ‘franchise’ is still worth fighting for among the jihadi groups; far from disbanding, they continue to squabble over control of finances, mosques and madrasas.

Lashkar-e-Taiba—the jihadi group associated with Markaz al Dawa wal Irshad, now called Jamaat-al-Dawa—has received most of its funds from sources in Saudi Arabia. At the time of the Jamaat-al-Dawa split, Zafar Iqbal was in Saudi Arabia to solicit finances for his organization. At the same time, his lieutenants—including Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the former chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba—severed ties with Hafiz Mohammad Saeed. This may indicate that Iqbal’s policy of seeking more funds from the Arab countries was one of the stimuli for the split. The Pakistani Government’s efforts to control jihadist fund-raising from Pakistani citizens—on occasions such as the Eid ul-Adha, the Muslim festival during which animals are sacrificed in remembrance of the sacrifice given by Abraham—may be judged successful. However, international travel and networking by the groups is proving more profitable for them.

Most of the jihadi organizations in question either have a close association with certain madrasas or actually control large seminaries. Thus, even if the organizations and their leaders now keep a somewhat lower profile, the breeding grounds of militant ideology are still very much alive and connected to them. President Musharraf has pledged to implement reforms in the madrasas to modernize their system of education, but his promise has not yet borne much fruit. Not only have the reforms been made conditional on the consent of the clergy in the madrasas concerned, but these madrasas have also been given unconditional benefits in the form of a government grant of 14 billion rupees ($233 million) for their modernization. An official paper on the Pakistani Government Internet site devoted to the successes of the Musharraf regime in its initial three years refers only to the creation of model madrasas as a goal of madrasa reform, and the fact sheet explaining the record of democratic government in 2002–2003 completely ignores the issue.

After it was discovered that Pakistani madrasas were associated with the 7 July 2005 London bombings, President Musharraf re-emphasized the need for registration of madrasas, and a deadline of December 2005 was set for them to register with the government. The plan also includes the registration of foreign students.
and their subsequent deportation. There is confusion in official circles over whether such students will be deported immediately or after the completion of their study tenures in the madrasas. The results of this recent activity on the madrasa registration process remain to be seen.139

The role played by the Islamist political parties in the context of religious violence must also be emphasized. The process of Islamization that has directly fuelled sectarian militancy in the past has ceased at the national level, but it continues at the level of the provincial government of the NWFP in the form of the Hasba (accountability) bill that was passed on 14 July 2005 in the NWFP’s provincial assembly.140 The government’s lack of success in controlling the Islamist political parties has allowed them to manipulate the religious sentiments of Pakistanis and to exacerbate religious radicalism and militancy. Not only is Islamization creating rifts in society, but the continuous manipulation of foreign policy issues to incite hatred also fuels religious militancy and violence.

The side effects

In response to the terrorist violence in Pakistan and to the fact that many foreign terrorists took refuge in Pakistan after September 2001, the Government of Pakistan has increasingly intruded into the lives of its citizens in a variety of ways. The Anti-Terrorism Act enacted by the government of Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in 1997 in response to the increasing sectarian violence in Pakistan was widely condemned at the time as violating constitutional provisions and international humanitarian law because of the disproportionate power it gave the authorities.141 The wave of terrorist violence after September 2001 has allowed the government to further strengthen the Anti-Terrorism Act. A 2002 amendment to the act extended the length of time a person may be held by the authorities without

139 Scepticism about the recent campaign against religious extremist madrasas has already begun to be expressed. See Abbas, Z., ‘Operation eyewash’, Herald (Karachi), Aug. 2005. One report claims that the police were specifically instructed by the authorities in the Interior Ministry to target sectarian groups only in the July 2005 crackdown on madrasas and militant groups. Hasan, S. S., ‘The untouchables’, Herald (Karachi), Aug. 2005.

140 The Hasba bill calls for the observance of Islamic principles—to be defined by a provincial Mohtasib (ombudsman), who would be a mullah with almost dictatorial powers on Islamic issues under his jurisdiction—in public places and the creation of a police force like the Taliban’s ‘vice and virtue promotion police’ to enforce it. In Pakistan the central government can override a provincial law or the provincial governor can dismiss the provincial assembly at the behest of the central government, but sensitivities are high in the case of religious issues. Moreover, this can also lead to centre–province disharmony and exacerbate the problems faced by Pakistan as a federation. As an alternative course, the central government took the case to the Supreme Court of Pakistan to check the constitutionality of the Hasba bill. The Supreme Court has declared that some of its important clauses pertaining to Islamization are unconstitutional.

charges on the suspicion of terrorism from three months to one year.142 This action by the government was widely condemned in the press as being open to abuse.143 In 2004 the ordinance and a number of additional provisions became parliamentary statutes through two amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law.

Similarly, there have been abuses in operations in the FATA in the form of human rights violations by the armed forces. A three-member enquiry commissioned by the Peshawar High Court Bar Association reported collateral damage resulting in the loss of civilian lives and property and the migration of thousands of civilians from the affected FATA regions.144 While the secretary for the FATA, the government’s representative for FATA affairs, was correct in pointing out that the commission did not have access to the tribal areas because the government had itself denied it to them, he did not deny the loss of civilian life—claiming rather that the commission’s estimates on this point were exaggerated.145 Amnesty International has also given an account of the targeting of civilians by armed forces in the FATA.146

Protection for high-level state functionaries was significantly increased after the upsurge in terrorist violence in Pakistan. Few VVIPs now appear in public and when they do the security demands can inconvenience ordinary citizens. The terrorists have thus been able to widen the gulf between the rulers and the ruled in Pakistan. Pakistani society can ill afford the separation of the ruling class from the rest of the population behind walls of security. Indeed, creating resentment among the population towards the government and alienating the two from each other is one important objective of the terrorists.147 By distancing the government from the people behind security barriers on the one hand and causing them to risk becoming demonized as a result of harsh actions against civil society on the other, the terrorists in Pakistan are succeeding at least in part, if not entirely.

In general, Pakistan is cracking down on al-Qaeda and on domestic terrorism with full vigour. When it comes to the jihadis involved in Kashmir, however, the policy level approach seems, at best, divided and, at worst, hesitant. It is true that the groups concerned have not been involved directly in terrorism inside Pakistan and that this has made it difficult for the courts to implicate their leaders. Never-

144 Khan, A. M., ‘Collateral fratricide’, Newsline (Karachi), Oct. 2004. Migration of the local population from the affected areas was also reported by a resident of the Waziristan Agency to the author in an interview. See also Amir, I., ‘Tribal turmoil’, Herald (Karachi), Dec. 2004.
145 Khan (note 144).
theless, stopping the spread of religiously motivated extremism requires an all-encompassing effort to deal with all the militant extremist elements, and in this respect official efforts are falling short. In practical politics, moreover, if the USA were to make fresh demands on Pakistan to crack down on Islamic militants, such as Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil and his cohorts, the government would again have little choice but to comply and thus to change its policy abruptly towards the Kashmiri insurgents. This would increase yet again Pakistan’s vulnerability to internal security challenges.

Why the inadequacies?

As argued in chapter 1, the root causes of terrorism play an important role in inciting violence in the minds of individuals. Economic deprivation and poverty give a sense of victimization to a particular community and when this is joined by lack of education it can lead to extreme responses from individuals. Lack of political openness removes people’s right to disagree with their political leaders and creates frustration with leaders which might lead people to attempt to take matters into their own hands in violation of laws and social conventions. The Muslim sense of community and the perception of injustice against this community also play an important role. As noted above, however, no attempt is made in this Policy Paper to explore the reasons that motivate individuals to become terrorists or religious radicals. Rather, the focus is on the factors that affect the gap between the motivation to commit a violent act and the actual commission of such an act. In this context, the reasons for the failure to block terrorism are also explained with a particular emphasis on the role of the state.

Even though the government has taken strong measures against Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the few other jihadi organizations involved in terrorism in Pakistan, there has not been a marked decline in such activity. Part of the problem lies in the approach of the government to the challenge. The government has so far acted in a piecemeal fashion of post-crisis overreaction induced by external stimuli, rather than adopting a concerted strategy to avert a dangerous threat to national security. For instance, as was the case with previous crisis situations, the July 2005 London bombings prompted the Pakistani Government to crack down on select religious seminaries again. Instead of solving the problem, this increased animosity among Pakistanis.

Improved investigative techniques and international cooperation have, without doubt, increased the capability of the country’s law enforcement institutions, but much remains to be done in this regard, especially in the police force. Apart from

\[148\] Every time the government responds to an international catastrophic event the resentment among the local population towards the actions of the government is high. Moreover, there are also lapses in the way in which the government responds to such situations. In the recent crackdown on madrasas following the London bombings, the police in Islamabad raided a seminary of girls, which created a public outcry in the traditional Pakistani society and resulted in the removal of 3 high-ranking police officers from their posts and their reassignment. ‘Crackdown on seminaries leads to shake-up in police: 15 booked under 3 MPO’, *The Dawn* (Karachi), 21 July 2005.
being regarded as corrupt, the police in Pakistan are ill-equipped and lack the resources to deal with the problem of terrorism. In-service training, especially for the lower ranks, is non-existent; the ratio of police personnel to the population that they serve is ill-adjusted to the task; and most police staff are kept busy with the task of providing security for VVIPs. The Immigration Department, which reports to the Interior Ministry, is reported to be in such a deplorable state of affairs that it mistakenly had the name of its own minister, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, on the Exit Control List of people who may not travel outside Pakistan.

Pakistan’s institutional weaknesses have also resulted in the slow implementation at the grass roots level of government decisions. A few ‘spoilers’ in key posts can gravely damage the state because of the government’s inability to control them, even when it wants to do so. At times, however, institutional inadequacy has been paralleled by reluctance in certain quarters at higher levels. This is especially true with respect to Kashmir and the militant organizations associated with it.

It is difficult for jihadis to change their views on the issue of Kashmir and equally difficult for the military establishment to do so. Both groups have an affinity with jihad in Kashmir but for different reasons. Jihadi groups are ideologically indoctrinated and motivated to think that fighting against India in Kashmir would benefit Islam and win them a place in heaven. The military, for its part, remains sceptical about dialogue with India—recalling 50 years of animosity and the slow progress made on Kashmir in the Composite Dialogue—and holds the view that eliminating support for jihad in Kashmir amounts to throwing a key card away needlessly and too soon.

The jihadis and certain elements in the military have already begun to show signs of frustration with the Composite Dialogue. With the unremitting obduracy (viewed from the Pakistani perspective) of the Indian Government on the Kashmir issue in the Composite Dialogue, those who hold the jihadi view are tempted to revert to the previous tactics of insurgency. It is reported that closed training camps in certain parts of Pakistan have reopened recently, not only taking in new recruits but also giving refresher courses to the old ones. President Musharraf has come far in committing his support to the peace process. His military colleagues would like him to show concrete results from the dialogue on Kashmir with India in order to assure them of India’s sincerity about the eventual resolution of the dispute. Failing that, they will persist in viewing efforts to confront or even to control the jihadi groups associated with Kashmir as tantamount to playing into India’s hands.

President Musharraf’s actions since 2001 have made many Pakistanis uneasy, especially those in the military. Before 2001 certain assumptions seemed evident: the USA was an untrustworthy friend; the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan would...
be antithetical to Pakistan’s interests if they ever assumed power there; India was eager to cheat Pakistan at any opportunity; support for the Kashmiri insurgency was the only feasible way to put pressure on India over Kashmir; any option less than self-determination for Kashmiris was a non-starter; and any reversal of or halt to Islamization was equivalent to threatening national integrity. Now President Musharraf preaches and practices something new and different, and it is taking time for this message to be accepted by most Pakistanis—many of whom consider Pakistan to be living in a Hobbesian environment where only zero-sum security makes sense.

Speaking to the media on 20 April 2005, President Musharraf said: ‘We need to resolve this issue once and for all in a flexible manner. The time of conflict management is over. It has to be conflict resolution. We must resolve this now or never’. Judging by his discussion of Kashmir in recent years, it seems clear that President Musharraf is powerfully motivated to seek progress on the issue during his tenure—hence the words ‘now or never’. According to the pro-jihad viewpoint of the army, if the issue is to be resolved now, the jihadi forces—dormant but alive—can act as a lever to obtain the necessary flexibility from India. If the issue is not resolved now, according to Musharraf, it will never be resolved.

There are reasons to believe that he is right: he is undoubtedly the most progressive leader of Pakistan ever as regards Kashmir and peace with India in general. Should peace ultimately fail to be achieved, however, pro-jihad thinking views the jihadis as a potential fallback option and a deterrent for India in the event of renewed hostility. The case made in chapter 2 regarding the questionable utility of the jihadis as an instrument for addressing the issue of Kashmir—at least in current circumstances—does not mean that influential people at the security-policy level view strategic issues in the same terms. There will always be caution on the part of the Pakistani Army with respect to complete eradication of religious militancy as long as the Kashmir dispute continues. India, on the other hand, can cite the same caution exhibited by Pakistan as a pretext to go slow on resolution of the issue.

Scepticism with regard to the USA is also taking time to fade. Nonetheless, Pakistan is desperate for any kind of foreign support in the resolution of the dispute over Kashmir, especially from the USA, and at times it considers the issue as a barometer of trust between the two countries. Many in Pakistan hold the view that the present is a ‘payback time’ when the USA should help undo the menace that it ignored or contributed to during the cold war and subsequently. The rise of religious extremism in Pakistan and Afghanistan was not, however, the only issue ignored by the USA during the Afghanistan War. Other issues, such as Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, were also ignored, to the gratification of the Pakistani

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153 Pakistan’s cautious approach with respect to Islamic militancy has reportedly prompted the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to decide to shelve the recently initiated redeployment from the LOC. See Gilani, I., ‘India to reinforce LoC deployment’, *Daily Times* (Lahore), 2 Aug. 2005.
authorities. Nor was the period of the Afghanistan War the first time that religious extremism in Pakistan was overlooked as a challenge by the US authorities. The US Department of State identified religious radicalism—as well as communism—in Pakistan as a prime threat to US interests as far back as 1951.\textsuperscript{154} Then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, was thrilled by the martial and religious potential of Pakistanis and in 1953 declared them to be capable of fighting against any communist invasion with their bare fists\textsuperscript{155}—a perception which led to the first alliance between Pakistan and the USA through Pakistan’s membership of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954–55. The contrast between these two expressions of policy not long after the initiation of relations between Pakistan and the USA exemplifies the USA’s tendency to tolerate religious extremism so long as it served, or did not run counter to, US strategic purposes.

In Pakistani policy circles, however, criticism of the USA is related not so much to what the USA did during the Afghanistan War as to what it did not do in the 1990s after the end of the war—that is, the absence of continued US financial and military support for Pakistan, which would have allowed Pakistan to cope with the threat from India and could have kept it from becoming radicalized. Censured for its nuclear weapon programme, Pakistan was starved of military aid and economic assistance from the USA in a way that heightened its perceptions of threat from India. This fostered Pakistan’s obsession with gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan and its interest in seizing the opportunity to add fuel to the locally launched insurgency in Kashmir.

Since 2001 the USA has pledged $3 billion in aid for Pakistan—about the same amount that Pakistan received in the 1980s during the Afghanistan War. As if to compensate for its support of covert operations and the rise of religious radicalism and to redress Pakistan’s past grievances, the USA is also now funding programmes to eradicate the root causes of religious radicalism and terrorism by supporting education, health, governance and economic development in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{156} The Pakistani definition of the causes of terrorism is, however, somewhat different from the US one. Pakistan includes political disputes such as Kashmir and the Palestinian question among the origins of religious radicalism and terrorism and wants the USA to play an active part in redressing them. There is, in fact, some logic behind Pakistan’s description of Kashmir as the root cause of radicalism also in social terms. Since terrorists play to an audience composed not only of the targets of violence and the bystanders but also of potential recruits, it is important for them to appear to be fighting for a cause.\textsuperscript{157} Many insurgents have joined the jihad in Kashmir from Pakistan after being convinced by the fiery
speeches of jihadi leaders, who successfully portray Kashmir as a place where the
rape, torture and victimization of innocent Muslim civilians occurs on a daily
basis. For the USA, on the other hand, Kashmir is an issue that concerns India as
well as Pakistan, and India is too large a country to be dictated to or ignored by the
USA.

Some observers also claim that the military-led government of Pakistan, the
military itself and especially the ISI have other reasons for allowing the religious
radicals to continue their activities. These observers argue that, by courting
the religious militants and their patrons in the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA), the
military government is sidelining the mainstream political parties that hold liberal
views and might threaten the military’s dominance of Pakistani politics. The
MMA, also known as the United Action Council, is a coalition of six major
religious political parties in Pakistan and, according to the same observers, a
construct of the ISI. It is also alleged that the military uses the sectarian violence in
Pakistan to pressure democratically elected governments. An additional argu-
ment is sometimes made that, by interposing itself between the extremist religious
forces and the West, the military can present itself to the West as the saviour of
civilization and thus both justify and perpetuate its special role in the state.

It must be acknowledged that, as in many other developing countries, the demo-
cratic institutions in Pakistan have not developed fully. The military continues to
play an important political role. However, the above arguments have limitations.
First, even if the armed forces have used religious radicals to promote their object-
ives, the military has also provided the strongest safeguard against radicalism. As a
modern institution with the strongest institutional structure in Pakistan, the army’s
function in the marginalization of the religious right cannot be overlooked. The
two periods in which the state has openly sought to distance itself from the
religious extremists through legal measures have coincided with periods of military
rule in Pakistan. The first was the Ayub Khan era, and the second is the current
regime of President Musharraf, who ‘has most explicitly and forcefully reiterated
Jinnah’s vision for a liberal, secular, and democratic Pakistan’. Second, any
relationship that the military currently maintains with the religious right for the
purpose of manipulating domestic politics does not appear to extend beyond the
authorized religious political parties. This argument is inadequate to explain the

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158 When there is a reference to the atrocities committed against Kashmiris by Indian forces, the
jihadi leaders also refer to other trouble spots involving Muslim communities, such as Palestine and
Iraq, and allege the involvement of Western governments in a conspiracy against the Muslim world.

159 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Pakistan: the mullahs and the military’, ICG Asia Report,
no. 49 (20 Mar. 2003). See also International Crisis Group, ‘Unfulfilled promises: Pakistan’s failure

159 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Pakistan: the mullahs and the military’, ICG Asia Report,
no. 49 (20 Mar. 2003). See also International Crisis Group, ‘Unfulfilled promises: Pakistan’s failure

160 Nasr (note 58), p. 91.

161 International Crisis Group (note 159).


164 An exception was the military support for Azam Tariq, the leader of the sectarian organization
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, who was allowed to contest an election from jail and sat on the government
benches after being elected a member of the National Assembly until his assassination in Oct. 2003.
nature of the military’s relationship with the jihadi groups, which bears an unmistakable strategic imprint. Third, just as sharia (religious law) cannot magically eradicate all the socio-economic problems of Pakistan—as the religious radicals would suggest—the advent of democracy cannot eradicate religious extremism. Fourth, past non-military democratic governments in Pakistan have not only made common cause with religious extremists but also actively promoted radical religious views.165

This Policy Paper does not address the long-standing debate on the Pakistani military’s lack of legitimacy as a political force or the potential damage that may result. The point made here is, rather, that the country’s civilian governments also have not managed to control religious extremism.166 It is usually argued that the civilian governments could not get to grips with the issue of religious extremism because the army would not allow them to do so, and it was the army that controlled policy on Afghanistan and Kashmir and the related questions. If true, this argument merely confirms that democracy is not a panacea for dealing with religious extremism. Even a future democratic government that was determined to eradicate the problem could not succeed unless it had support from the military. In a country whose military determines policy most of the time, change will not occur with the appointment of new leaders but rather with a new outlook on the part of those who bring the leaders to power. Such a shift would occur when the military as a whole realizes that the old ways of doing things no longer work in the changed strategic context. The resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which can form the basis of long-term peace with India, may prove effective in bringing about that change of attitude.

165 The government of Nawaz Sharif tried to make sharia part of the constitution through the passage of an amendment bill in the National Assembly, and Nawaz Sharif was canvassing support for this move in the Senate when he was deposed by Musharraf.

166 The author’s intent is not to deny the worth of democracy or its desirability for Pakistan but to argue that democracy alone is not the solution to the terrorist problem. Rather, it must be stressed that although democratic values in the long run can address some of the root causes of terrorism the groundwork for that stage must be accomplished by other means—most importantly by severing the links between Islamists and entrenched interests.
4. Conclusions

Pakistan is a poor and insecure state that has sustained itself with external support against the perceived existential threats in its immediate neighbourhood. Ever since Pakistan was created in the name of religion, generations of its leaders have tried to use Islamic ideology to persuade its diverse population to favour national unity and to counter external threats. In the process an uneducated Muslim population has persistently been duped and robbed of its rights in the name of a religious utopia. Flirtations by Pakistan’s leaders with Islam, especially the Islamization programme of Zia ul-Haq, eventually resulted in the religious radicalism which is at the core of Pakistani terrorism today and which, in various ways, threatens the stability of the country. Religious militancy and the terrorism associated with it have not only destabilized Pakistan internally but also placed it in an adverse position at the regional and international level. At times, the Pakistani Government has appeared unable to manage the militant Islamist forces even when these forces have been promoting certain of the government’s strategic objectives.

Under the leadership of President Musharraf an attempt has been made to reverse this policy. The process of Islamization has ceased at the level of the central government, and there have been attempts by the government to base laws on secular principles, although so far these attempts have been unsuccessful because religion remains a strong force. The current leadership of Pakistan, while trying to eradicate religious radicalism, is finding it difficult to cope with the confusion that it has created in the minds of many Pakistanis by simultaneously supporting the US action against Afghanistan, controlling infiltration into India-administered Kashmir, negotiating peace with India, cracking down on some extremist groups and striving to inculcate a modern outlook in its people. Overcoming this problem is crucially important as regard Pakistan’s armed forces, but progress on this matter has been slow. The inertia of outdated assumptions also helps to explain the mixed approach that the government itself has taken to the problem of religious radicalism and militancy. Not only is the government finding it difficult to pursue an all-embracing approach in order to deal with the radical Islamic superstructure, but its extremely diverse treatment of various components of this structure has led to contradictions that affect Pakistan’s security. Rather than securing the vital security interests and internal harmony of the country, religious fervour has fuelled militancy and terrorism, creating external hostility and internal instability. Pakistan is not fighting someone else’s battle on its territory; the problems which exist are the country’s own.

Progress on and, ultimately, resolution of the dispute with India over Kashmir would contribute to changing the way of thinking in the country. The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan, which resumed in January 2004, addresses the Kashmir dispute as well as other disputed issues, and there is hope among Pakistanis that its outcome will be successful. Solving this dispute is essential but far from easy. The eventual solution may not completely satisfy India, Pakistan or
even the Kashmiris; a solution will have to be based on compromise by all three parties. Achieving a settlement will take time, and meanwhile it is essential that the Composite Dialogue continues. Although not democratically elected, President Musharraf remains the Pakistani leader who is best suited to sustain this dialogue with a flexible perspective and a new vision. It will take him time, however, to sell his new vision to the military hardliners who have viewed India in zero-sum terms for their entire careers. The longer the dialogue can be sustained, and the more the people of Pakistan perceive dividends from the peace process, the less will be the support for Kashmiri insurgents among the military and the greater the support for peace, prosperity and tranquillity in the region.

The unresponsiveness of the political leadership to popular needs and institutional stagnation, or perhaps degeneration, also requires continuous monitoring. The two trends have led Pakistanis to fend for themselves rather than rely on the government. Non-governmental actors of all sorts—including religious extremists—have filled the vacuum between the state and the individual in such critical social sectors as education and justice. This situation has created parallel allegiances along with those to the state, which at times work at cross purposes to state goals. This makes the government increasingly powerless to control the ‘hearts and minds’ as well as the actions of its people. Instead of attempting to regiment their lives, the Pakistani Government ought to demonstrate its utility to its people. In this context, Pakistan is in need of external support not only for its external security, but also for its internal institutional development in order to regain the confidence of its people.

In the past, Pakistan has aligned itself with external powers to acquire internal harmony and external security, although with incongruent expectations. It remains an ally of the USA in the war against terrorism, but again the alliance seems based on dissimilar expectations. While Pakistan considers itself indisputably part of the campaign against al-Qaeda, the USA views it as part of the problem as much as of the solution. Nevertheless, for both its internal and external security, Pakistan needs the support of external powers to put its house in order.

At the operational level, the main law enforcement agencies in Pakistan lack the professionalism required to deal with the enormity of the challenges they face. Only a professional, modernized police force can ensure Pakistan’s internal security and deal with the spillover effects of its problems. At the social level, Pakistan is in need of institutional development to build people’s confidence in the utility of

However, one may be sceptical of the sincerity of a military ruler or of the military itself in seeking peace because of their institutional interests. It is possible that, even if there is peace with India, the military will find other ways to keep its presence felt. The military may not be completely dependent on the Indian confrontation. However, if it were, the irony is that even then there would be a need to work to alter this military mindset rather than to try to sideline the military forces—which is hardly possible in a country with a history like that of Pakistan.

Madrasas and jirgas (village councils of elders who deal with local issues and resolve disputes, thus providing a crude form of justice as an alternative to the protracted and expensive judicial system of the government) provide education and justice, respectively, almost completely independent of government control in many parts of the country.
the nation state and to prevent them from being lured by extremist ideologies. At the political level, the leadership needs to be convinced about the suitability of a regional development paradigm based on complementarity rather than competition, and about the need for responsiveness to public needs. At the strategic level, Pakistan’s military needs to be convinced of the futility rather than the undesirability of the jihadi forces. Development programmes based on institutional capacity building and support to sustain the Composite Dialogue with India are helping Pakistan significantly. An extended period of stable relations with India and internal economic and institutional development will help Pakistan develop a new understanding of the phenomena that are threatening not only the rest of the world but also Pakistan.

Pakistan is a developing country in which the institutions of political representation have not developed substantially and the army remains a powerful political force. Without exploring the causes for the involvement of the military in politics, it is sufficient to note that the army will continue to court the religious right for political purposes, as indeed do all other political actors in Pakistan. Dealing with the challenge of the military’s political role is neither possible in the short term nor helpful for eradicating religious extremism. However, it is desirable in the short term that Pakistan’s military sever its ties completely with the militant jihadi organizations that take part in the Kashmiri insurgency: this can only happen if there is progress in relations with India on the issue. Only after militancy is addressed can the problem of militarism in the politics of Pakistan be tackled. Attempting to deal with both together, without assurance of the durability and efficiency of the alternative political approach, would not only risk bringing the militants and the military closer but also create political instability that would be welcomed more by the terrorists than by anyone else.

Poverty, illiteracy, lack of democracy, the political problems of the Muslim communities around the world and the increasing sense of deprivation are important problems and should be dealt with as such, even if terrorism was not a factor. Only when Pakistan as a state is able to meet essential needs such as security, health, education and economic opportunity will it be able to stop hiding behind the ‘shield’ of Islam. Only then will the national political discourse shift from an ideological base to the utilitarian value of Pakistan. In a state where corruption is rampant, where people have no faith in their own police force, investors do not trust the courts to protect their property rights and two-thirds of the population live on less than $2 per day, there is every reason for the leadership as well as terrorists to attempt to use Islam as an instrument to rally the people.

As desirable as meeting these needs is, they rank second to the need for the change of the military outlook that would probably follow an extended period of peace with India. It is not that such basic issues are less important, but the impact of improvements can be felt only in the longer term. In the short term, it is important that the religious militias are neutralized and reintegrated into society. As soon as the military leadership is reasonably convinced of the prospects of long-term peace with India, the energy that is currently devoted to militancy by
extremist organizations can be diverted into social work in the name of Islam rather than of jihad. Here, too, the military may be instrumental in bringing about this change by rewarding organizations that choose social work over armed struggle.
About the author

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The IRS is a think tank that was set up in 1982 as a non-profit research centre to study the region in which Pakistan is located. The primary focus of the Institute is on politics, political economy, international relations, and socio-cultural and security issues.

During his association with the Institute of Regional Studies, Aarish Ullah Khan has published a research paper entitled ‘A decade of Indian economic reforms and the inflow of foreign investment’ in *Regional Studies* (vol. 21, no. 2, spring 2003) and conducted a variety of other studies. He has also written a number of articles for Pakistani newspapers. The primary focus of his current work is on Afghanistan, but he retains his keen interest in the politics of Pakistan and the issues of religious radicalism and militancy.

Previously, he worked for a short period in 2002 with the Repatriation Project of Afghan refugees from Pakistan under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in 2004 with the NWFP Essential Institutional Reforms Operationalisation Program under the United Nations Development Fund.