

The European Security Strategy

An Evolutionary History

SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10

Alyson J. K. Bailes

sipri

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

February 2005

© SIPRI, 2005

Printed and bound in Sweden by
Ingeniörskopia, Solna

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>Abbreviations and acronyms</i>	<i>v</i>
1. Introduction: the prehistory of the strategy	1
Substantial antecedents: creating the demand, setting the scene	1
Procedural antecedents: why a strategy?	6
2. The genesis and contents of the 2003 European Security Strategy	9
The proximate procedural history of the European Security Strategy	9
Analysis of the European Security Strategy	12
3. Short-term follow-up, longer-term implications	19
Follow-up on the four designated topics	20
Larger and longer-term questions	23
Appendix. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy	29
About the author	36

Preface

On 20 June 2003, barely three months after one of the worst-ever crises of the European Union (EU) generated by the United States-led invasion of Iraq, Europe's leaders meeting in the Council of the European Union were able to unite in welcoming a first draft of a new Security Strategy for the EU. The document, finally adopted by the European Council of 12–13 December 2003 under the title 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', was (in symbolic terms as well as in substance) a bid to reassert the EU's common strategic vision and to strengthen its common will for action in the realm of security. Thanks, not least, to its brevity and clear language, the document attracted wide and largely favourable attention both within the EU's territory and abroad.

Many studies, including some book-length compilations, have been devoted to the European Security Strategy (ESS) since mid-2003. The majority of them have, however, focused either on the ESS as a kind of 'snapshot' of European politics in a troubled period—to be used, notably, in assessing the evolution of European–US relations—or on its adequacy as a basis for the EU's further growth in the field of security and defence. The present study takes a rather different, more historical and institutional approach. It asks questions about the antecedents of the ESS, both political and procedural; about the significance of the way in which it was produced, as well as of its contents; and about the comparison of intention and reality in the way in which the EU's organs and member states sought to follow it up. The December 2003 text of the ESS is reproduced as an appendix for ease of reference.

Clearly, an assessment written just one year after the ESS's adoption is no place to offer a final historical judgement on its 'success'. The provisional analysis in this Policy Paper highlights the fact that the European states focused their initial follow-up plan for the ESS on areas of policy where the EU consensus was already relatively solid and collective action already a habit. A better test of the ESS's effectiveness will be whether it helps EU nations and organs to avoid splits and to respond quickly (or even preventively) in the case of future challenges arising outside the sphere of pre-formulated common policies. At the time of writing, the EU's role in responding to the crisis over presidential elections in Ukraine has provided one such example, with not wholly unencouraging results.

As author of this Policy Paper I would like to thank especially Lise Tønnesland, for invaluable research assistance; Rory Keane, for initially inspiring and helping to define the task; Nenne Bodell, Head of the SIPRI Library and Documentation Department; and Jetta Gilligan Borg, SIPRI Editor, who edited the text for publication.

Alyson J. K. Bailes
Director, SIPRI

February 2005

Abbreviations and acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISS	(EU) Institute for Security Studies
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NSS	(US) National Security Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction: the prehistory of the strategy

The adoption by the European Union (EU) of its first official and comprehensive security strategy—‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’—in 2003¹ may be seen (aside from any practical results it leads to) as a conceptual and procedural turning point in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Set against its specific political background, it was also an important stage in the developing self-awareness and ambition of the EU as a player in the global arena.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) has already attracted perhaps more than its fair share of exegesis, comment and debate. Too often, however, it has been treated almost in the style of literary criticism, divorced from its historical, institutional and short-term political context. This Policy Paper illuminates the latter dimensions of the document’s significance and lays out a framework for considering and monitoring its future impact.

The first chapter of this Policy Paper sets out the longer-term background to the production of the ESS: first, in terms of the evolving demands of the security environment and their impact on the EU’s institutional development, and second, in more narrow procedural terms (why was the ESS called a ‘strategy’?). Chapter 2 takes up the story from the beginning of 2003 and explains the immediate background to the commissioning of the ESS, and then provides a step-by-step analysis of its contents. The final chapter looks at the short-term arrangements made and steps taken for follow-up of the ESS and raises some questions about how to read its significance and possible impact in the medium to longer term. The full text of the European Security Strategy in its final, December 2003 version is provided in the appendix.

Substantial antecedents: creating the demand, setting the scene

The very creation of the European Communities—the forerunner to the EU—was an eminently *strategic* undertaking in terms of its ambition, long-term goals and desired impact on the whole fabric of European power relationships. Since then, the member states have shown similar strategic vision and resolve in developing many areas of *internal* policy, most recently and notably in the building of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The European Union’s original and still pri-

¹ The first version of the ESS was presented by High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana in June and provisionally endorsed at the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June 2003. Solana, J., ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>. After a review process (described later in this chapter) the text was finally adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 Dec. 2003. Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf>.

2 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

mary instrument for external strategic relations, the CFSP,² was by comparison a late development and something of a problem child. In its first incarnation, the semi-detached ‘European Political Cooperation’ was much geared to producing joint positions in forums where the EU did not dictate the course of events (such as the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe or United Nations arms control committees), and it was—at least in practice—treated as ‘additional’ or complementary to nations’ existing policies, rather than functionally replacing them. Institutionally, the intergovernmental and non-legislative nature of proceedings in the second pillar³ excluded the European Commission’s normal ‘strategic’ functions—the exclusive right of initiative, the duty to make long-term proposals and the ability to apply resources in a sustained manner for change—and thus weakened the character of the associated *acquis*. For all these reasons, the CFSP was more or less condemned for many years to be essentially reactive, short-term, disaggregated and non-cumulative—the opposite of a strategy as normally understood.

When observers such as the United States accused European states during the cold war decades of lacking a ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic thinking’, however, other and broader factors were also involved. For example, there was the perception that the EU was hiding under the strategic cover of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), limiting itself to the more popular and productive tasks of European construction; that it was an ‘economic giant and political pygmy’ (the same thing, not by coincidence, was often said about Germany); and the obvious point was made that the EU had no military component at all up to 1999. There were, moreover, patent divisions between different European states in strategic position and outlook. Up to 1989 the most obvious of these was the East–West confrontation, but there were also basic—and more enduring—differences between powers with a continental or maritime, global or localist, federalist or statist vision; between big and small, north and south European nations, and so on *ad nauseam*.

All these weaknesses were far more evident and problematic in regard to European interests, visions, priorities and modes of operation *outside the European theatre* than inside it. They were mirrored in practical form in the paucity of collective EU *instruments* abroad, beginning with the small-scale and largely economic focus of the European Commission’s overseas representation network and including the handicap of the CFSP’s reliance on rapidly rotating (six-month) and highly variable national presidencies. In terms of substance, Europe either lacked, or was unready to use, powerful sticks and carrots to pursue its strategic aims. Its development and humanitarian aid were sizeable but not applied with any kind of

² Cameron, F., *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Contemporary European Studies 7 (Sheffield Academic: Sheffield, 1999); and Smith, M. E., *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004).

³ In terminology widely used in the 1990s, the ‘first pillar’ of the EU refers to Treaty of Rome-based activities (trade, the common market, etc.); the ‘second pillar’ to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and now, the European Security and Defence Policy); and the ‘third pillar’ to cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.

security conditionality;⁴ economic sanctions were used more often in demonstrative than in leverage mode, and so forth. EU states did, of course, own and often use substantial military resources abroad, but they did so in a purely national—often post-colonial—connection: as contributors to UN peacekeeping, or (as in the 1991 Gulf War) in ad hoc coalitions under non-European leadership. The theoretical option of mounting operations under an alternative ‘European flag’ in the Western European Union (WEU) framework was barely explored.⁵

The start of the new historical dynamics that would eventually open the way for the 2003 European Security Strategy may perhaps best be placed in the mid-1980s: a time of painful European–US tensions over the management both of East–West relations and of out-of-area threats (including, significantly, terrorism).⁶ This period, not by chance, also witnessed the first serious attempt to revive the WEU at least as a political talking shop, and the beginning of steps that would widen the WEU membership structure to a point where it embraced the whole EU policy-making circle (and in fact went a bit further).⁷

Forces that would prove much more decisive were set in motion by the end of the cold war in 1989–90. The rapid withdrawal of the Soviet strategic threat removed the previous foundation and ‘cement’ for European–US strategic unity; Europe’s overall security agenda was progressively ‘demilitarized’, as reflected *inter alia* in the rapid and large cuts made in both stationed and indigenous forces. NATO reoriented itself by stages towards a crisis management agenda, which started in the Balkans but was always potentially global (and was steadily driven to become more so by shifting US perceptions and demands). Preparations began for the institutional enlargement, first of the EU to former European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries⁸ and then of both NATO and the EU to Central Europe:⁹ a

⁴ ‘Good governance’ conditions had, however, been introduced by the 1990s.

⁵ The WEU was created separately from the European Communities, by the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, after the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954. It was based on mutual defence commitments among its full members but in the 1990s switched its focus to preparing for possible European-led crisis management operations (defined generically in the WEU Ministerial Declaration of 19 June 1992 at Petersberg, near Bonn, hence ‘the Petersberg tasks’—see also note 19 below). In reality, the WEU only ever managed to carry out some small-scale police and de-mining missions, although it also provided a coordination framework for European naval operations in the Persian Gulf in 1988–90 and in the Adriatic Sea in 1993. See the WEU Internet site at URL <<http://www.weu.int>>.

⁶ The reference is to West–West strains connected with the USA’s unilateral bombing of Tripoli, Libya, in Apr. 1986, in retaliation for terrorist attacks. See Bailes, A. J. K., ‘NATO’s European pillar: the European security and defense identity’, *Defense Analysis*, vol. 15, no. 3 (Dec. 1999).

⁷ The WEU’s full members were 10 of the 11 states belonging to both the EU and NATO (Denmark, a potential 11th member, opted out). In the early 1990s Denmark and the non-NATO EU states were allowed to become Observers; non-EU NATO states became Associate Members; and the Central European applicants to the EU became Associate Partners, making up a total of 28 states which all had access to significant parts of WEU activity such as field missions and relations with third countries.

⁸ The reference is to Austria, Finland and Sweden, which joined the EU in 1995. Of the remaining 4 members of EFTA, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein subsequently took part in the new European Economic Area (EEA) together with the EU nations.

⁹ Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU in 2004.

4 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

process in which the significance of EU entry was always inherently greater for purposes of internal ‘transformation’, including all the *non*-military dimensions of welfare and security. Enlargement also made the EU more ‘representative’ of all European states and of Europe’s various strategic sub-regions, while bringing in useful new strategic resources.

All these trends shifted the balance of threats to security, and of the methods needed to maintain security, in Europe towards the end of the spectrum where the EU was at home: while also calling for greater European self-awareness and self-reliance. They were coupled with internal EU dynamics that pushed in the direction of a steady increase in ambition and the enhanced institutionalization (or at least coordination) of different dimensions of governance, including some that the founding fathers had never dreamed of bringing into the Community process. In retrospect, innovations that helped to set the scene for the defence and strategic developments of 1999 onwards were: (a) the creation of a new, third pillar dealing with internal security, and its relatively rapid assimilation into the 1957 Treaty of Rome mainstream;¹⁰ (b) the design of the EMU, which lay outside the Treaty of Rome structure but was still highly institutionalized and with supranational elements; and (c) the formulae of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which for the first time envisaged the use of military resources for EU policy aims, albeit at this stage *via* the WEU.¹¹ Taken together, these showed that the EU not only had a growing appetite to act in traditional ‘power’ dimensions but also was capable of finding the institutional fixes required, case by case and beyond the confines of traditional ‘treaty method’.

At the end of the 1990s, the Balkan wars, which had in the early part of the decade done so much to underline the weaknesses of the CFSP, gave the decisive boost to the creation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP, later usually referred to as ESDP). The Kosovo crisis crystallized the frustration of the EU’s largest military spenders, France and the United Kingdom, with Europe’s poor capabilities performance overall: but it also created European–US tension over questions of *method* and *control* in Western crisis management, leading even the UK to express the view that Europe must have at least the option of operating under its own flag in the future. Some curious foreshadowing of the events surrounding the 2003 ESS may be seen: (a) in the fact that the crucial steps to launch the CESDP were taken while most EU members were still fighting side

¹⁰ The originally separate ‘Schengen’ network for common immigration controls was brought into the Community framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 Oct. 1997, URL <<http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>>. The text of the Treaty establishing the European Community (known as the Treaty of Rome) is available at URL <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm>>.

¹¹ Article J4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 Feb. 1992, and Article J7 of the Amsterdam Treaty provided for the WEU to be entrusted with implementing EU decisions that had ‘defence implications’. The Amsterdam formula enhanced the element of direct EU political control over the WEU. A number of minor, non-military WEU actions were actually carried out at the end of the 1990s under these formulae. The text of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) is available at URL <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>>.

by side with the USA in Kosovo,¹² and (b) in how quickly the institutional Gordian knots were cut through once the political will was there (*vide* the abrupt jettisoning of the WEU).¹³ There was also a new flavour—a certain ‘chutzpah’¹⁴ previously witnessed only in the external trade field—in the way that the EU members pushed through their new policy, shouldering aside, for instance, the non-EU European allies, which lost at a stroke the advantages they had enjoyed in the WEU framework.¹⁵

In more substantial ways, both positive and negative, the launch of the CESDP at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999¹⁶ may be seen as having helped to create the opening and the need for the eventual ESS. It allowed the EU’s first military institutions¹⁷ to be created, bringing some notions of ‘strategic culture’ into EU corridors for the first time—although the initial impact was limited by poor civil–military interaction. It instituted a full-time intergovernmental community of ambassadors in Brussels (the new Political and Security Committee, PSC, or, in French, Comité Politique et de Sécurité, COPS) who would devote themselves full-time to CFSP/ESDP and who for the first time offered a potential creative process, audience and implementing authority for ‘strategic’ concepts and programmes—all without reliance on the Commission. The creation of the new High Representative for the CFSP (a post first taken by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana), together with the strengthening of his staff and the introduction of a policy planning capacity,¹⁸ improved the central support available in terms of both quantity and quality and implied a large step away from the earlier primacy of presidencies in this field.

At the same time, the way in which the CESDP was first set up created a ‘conceptual gap’ calling for further work on strategy, because the initial emphasis was so much on capacities and on generic types of operation rather than on policy goals and rationales. Once a political fix had been found in 1999 for reconciling the interests of different members by focusing on the Petersberg tasks of crisis man-

¹² This occurred, notably, at the Cologne European Council of 3–4 June 1999.

¹³ The 15 EU states, which also encompassed all 10 full members of the WEU, decided in June 1999 that the WEU should cede all its operational functions to the EU and be preserved only as a skeleton organization for the unlikely event of activation of the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty.

¹⁴ The same phenomenon was alluded to by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten as ‘a moderate, but fair sense of pride’ in an issue of the *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* devoted to the ESS. Patten, C., ‘A security strategy for Europe’, *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 2004), URL <http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/journal/OJGG_Vol_1_no_1.pdf>.

¹⁵ The new CESDP structure provided for ‘15 + 6’ consultations and practical cooperation between the full EU members and those which had been Associate Members in the WEU, but the latter no longer had any rights of co-decision—which they had enjoyed, in practice, in the WEU’s operations and its relations both with the EU and NATO.

¹⁶ Council of the European Union, ‘Helsinki European Council, 10–11 Dec. 1999, Presidency Conclusions’, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm>.

¹⁷ These were the European Military Staff and the European Military Committee.

¹⁸ These 2 steps were decided in the Treaty of Amsterdam before the genesis of the CESDP, but the capacities involved were harnessed to the latter by decisions taken in 1999, notably by making Solana simultaneously Secretary-General of the WEU for its fold-down period.

agement inherited from the WEU,¹⁹ the ‘finalité’ of CESDP was either deemed to be obvious from the context—the lessons of the Balkans—or deliberately left vague in order to avoid confronting differences between those Europeans who did or did not contemplate moving one day to a ‘real’ European defence. (Similar ‘wriggle-room’ was left in the way the Helsinki documents referred to ESDP operations taking place in the ‘framework’ of the principles of the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rather than in direct obeisance to them.) In the atmosphere of the time, there was a strong and persuasive flow of opinion in favour of the EU’s ‘learning on the job’ without too much theorizing. Another factor holding up the doctrinal side of ESDP development, for a good two years after the Helsinki European Council, was the blockage throughout that period of the progress in EU–NATO planning and operational cooperation that both institutions’ leaders had decreed under the name of the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.²⁰

Procedural antecedents: why a strategy?

By the 1990s, the EU was increasingly preoccupied with the need for coherence and longer-term consistency in external policies, and—following the breakdown of former rigid boundaries between CFSP and first pillar-related proceedings at Council of Ministers level—it had created a procedural setting in which it was possible at least to attempt the multifunctional coordination of European instruments for the purpose. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht affirmed that the European Council (which had in practice the greatest freedom to work across ‘pillar’ boundaries) would ‘define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy’,²¹ a role to which the word ‘strategic’ could be and often was applied in contemporary debate. During the years that followed, the European Council adopted or endorsed a series of documents relevant to external relations where the word ‘strategy’ appeared in the title: on Central and East European countries’ accession (Essen European Council, 9–10 December 1994), EU–Russia relations (Madrid European Council, 15–16 December 1995), and the Baltic Sea (Florence

¹⁹ The Helsinki decisions limited the immediate field of action of the CESDP to the same generic missions defined in the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration (note 5), namely, humanitarian and rescue missions, traditional peacekeeping and ‘tasks of military forces in crisis management’—but *not* European self-defence, which remained the province of NATO. This formula not only reassured the more pro-NATO EU members, but also made it possible for the EU’s 4 non-allied states to participate fully without doing violence to their principles.

²⁰ NATO’s Washington Summit of Apr. 1999 had envisaged giving the EU somewhat more support—in terms of providing NATO planning and operational support for EU missions—than the WEU had enjoyed under an earlier arrangement approved at NATO’s Berlin Ministerial Meeting in 1996. Implementation of this ‘Berlin Plus’ deal was held up until the end of 2002 by essentially political difficulties involving Greece and Turkey, which did not stop the institutional development of the ESDP but delayed both its first major operations and the clarification of related doctrines and principles. The Berlin Plus arrangements are described briefly at NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ‘Berlin Plus agreement’, URL <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm>.

²¹ Article J8, Maastricht Treaty (note 11).

European Council, 21–22 June 1996). The Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe, adopted at Paris in May 1994, and the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’, adopted in 1995, did not have the word in the title but were clearly ‘strategic’ in motivation and expression.

The Amsterdam Treaty regularized this position by introducing explicitly the notion of ‘common strategies’ as CFSP products and instruments, in addition to the ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’ defined at Maastricht. Article J3.2 (later Article 13 of the consolidated treaty) made clear that the European Council would ‘decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States shall have important interests in common’. The strategies would define ‘objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States’. More specific Joint Actions and Common Positions would flow from them. Importantly, it was stated (Article J3.3) that ‘The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them’—that is, a purely intergovernmental cycle of initiative and follow-up, in which the Commission would presumably only have those general rights that pertained to it in the CFSP field. A separate declaration at Amsterdam on the creation of a policy planning and early-warning unit in the Council Secretariat added that the unit could produce ‘at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers . . . which may contain analyses, recommendations *and strategies* for the CFSP’²²—thus giving a pretty clear hint of where strategy documents should come from in future.

The main strategies adopted by the European Council in succeeding years were those on Russia (Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999), Ukraine (Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999) and the Mediterranean region (Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19–20 June 2000). The new Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, adopted in June 1999, did not term itself a strategy but called for one to be developed jointly by the EU and its partners ‘for stability and growth in the region’. Significantly, there were fewer cases of the word ‘strategy’ being used by the Commission in documents presented on its own authority and initiative²³—and when the Commission did describe its proposals of 12 May 2004 on European Neighbourhood Policy as a ‘strategy paper’, the Council pointedly did not use the word ‘strategy’ in its decision of 14 June on how to proceed.²⁴ In sum, by 2003 the EU member states were familiar with the idea of ‘strategies’, and they

²² Treaty of Amsterdam (note 10), p. 132, emphasis added.

²³ E.g., the word was not used for the Commission’s ‘wider Europe’ document, although in terms of substance it could have been. ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, wider Europe–neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours’, EU Commission document COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 Mar. 2003, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf>.

²⁴ ‘Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, EU Commission document COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/document_en.htm>; and Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions in the GAERC [General Affairs and External Relations Council] press release 10189/04 (provisional version)’, Luxembourg, 14 June 2004, available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/whats_new_en.htm>.

8 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

were looking (more and more exclusively) to Solana and his team to produce them. At the same time, there was a growing awareness of possible deficits in coherence and completeness among the strategies so far adopted on a piecemeal basis (and perhaps of a quality problem as well²⁵), and nothing had yet been provided or mooted that could serve as an ‘ESDP strategy’.²⁶

²⁵ As a result of pressure from some states, concerned that the 1999 Russia strategy had been both too loosely framed and too loosely interpreted by subsequent presidencies, the European Council in Dec. 2003 asked the Commission for an assessment report on the EU–Russian ‘strategic partnership’. For the resulting report see ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia’, EU Commission document COM(2004) 106, 9 Feb. 2004, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/com04_106_en.pdf>.

²⁶ Awareness of the ESDP conceptual gap did, however, lead the Laeken European Council on 15 Dec. 2001 to commission from the EU Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in Paris ‘a publication on European Defence in the framework of the Petersberg tasks’, for which modalities were agreed under the succeeding Spanish Presidency. ISS, ‘European defence: a proposal for a White Paper’, May 2004, available at URL <<http://www.iss-eu.org/public/content/bookse.html>>. This report focuses on operational and resource aspects of ESDP (which might be seen as elements of a *military strategy*), but it abstains from the larger political and institutional questions. See also note 54 below.

2. The genesis and contents of the 2003 European Security Strategy

The proximate procedural history of the European Security Strategy

The events that set the scene for the commissioning of a new ‘super strategy’ for the EU in the spring of 2003 can only be briefly summarized here.²⁷ The US decision to take military action in Iraq, in March, without a specific UN mandate and with only some members of the EU on its side had created open rifts and a more general crisis of confidence within both the EU and NATO. France and the UK, which had together driven the creation of the CESDP, found themselves now leading the opposing camps. In the EU normal CFSP processes had been sidelined or overtaken, and Solana’s position undermined, by decisions taken by pro- or anti-invasion groups of states even while notional EU ‘Common Positions’ were being drafted and executed. Many observers, not only in the USA, were claiming that Europe’s divisions reflected a more general inability by the continent to get to grips with the ‘new threats’ agenda—primarily involving terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and the ‘rogue’ and ‘weak’ state regimes associated with both—that had driven the US Administration’s policies ever since the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001. Some questioned whether a semi-supranational, legalistic and consent-based community like the EU could cope at all with the realities of power and responsibility in a world where ‘the bad guys’ were so remote from and contemptuous of anything like European norms.

These factors provided, as it were, the lash under which Europe had to try to rediscover its unity and better its performance, but there were also some more positive foundations and inducements for the task. All the then 15 members of the EU had adopted some important positions opposed to or critical of non-Iraq-related aspects of the Bush Administration’s policy—the International Criminal Court (ICC), various arms control treaties, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on limiting emissions relevant to climate change, and so on, in addition to a new rash of transatlantic trade disputes. There was talk in European policy, academic and media circles of an irreparable and increasing divergence in certain fundamental security tenets or ‘values’ across the Atlantic: a thesis borne out by opinion polls which showed in particular a greater European reluctance (even in the UK) to use force for a purely national interest without international legal sanction. European threat perceptions, although recognizing the ‘new threats’, remained equally or even more focused on the general undesirability of conflict and on ‘human’ challenges such as unemploy-

²⁷ For a somewhat fuller account see Bailes, A. J. K., ‘Introduction, Iraq: the legacy’, and Dunay, P. and Lachowski, Z., ‘Euro-Atlantic organizations and relationships’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 1–28, 31–66.

ment, poverty, crime and environmental change.²⁸ Moving to the more specifically institutional dynamics, the solution of the Berlin Plus problem at the end of 2002 and the rapid mounting of the first EU military as well as police operations²⁹ was leading attention back again to the need for a clearer ESDP policy framework. Last but not least, the massive undertaking of the European Convention in 2002–2003 and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which followed it, aiming to draw up a new (and more comprehensible) EU ‘constitution’, created a climate in which it could seem natural and even necessary to pluck up the CFSP and the ESDP by their conceptual roots and to give them a similarly fresh—and hopefully well-written—articulation.³⁰

The power of these combined motives can be seen from the fact that they inspired the drafting of the Basic Principles for an EU *Strategy* against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the associated Action Plan,³¹ in parallel with the main security strategy in mid-2003—although the former documents would more logically have been subordinated to and derived from the latter. Apart from the obvious overlap in subject matter, these WMD documents offer an interesting parallel to the main strategy in that they were the product essentially of non-Commission (member state³²) initiatives and drafts; that they nonetheless quite successfully integrated actions carried out or to be carried out by all the different EU organs and by states themselves; and that they were very specific about operational priorities, time-lines and monitoring for the future. (The WMD ‘strategy’ document proper was not adopted until December 2003³³ but contained little that went beyond the earlier documents.)

The story of the European Security Strategy itself began with the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers at Kastellorizo on the island of Rhodes, on 2–3 May

²⁸ For the detailed opinion poll evidence behind these two sentences see Bailes, A. J. K., ‘EU and US strategic concepts: a mirror for partnership and difference?’, *International Spectator*, vol. 39, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2004).

²⁹ See Anthony, I. *et al.*, ‘The Euro-Atlantic system and global security’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 47–78.

³⁰ The other great EU development under way in 2003, viz. the accession of 10 Central European and Mediterranean states planned for May 2004, may also have been a motive in some people’s minds given the concern that the ‘new Europeans’ might try to tilt the policy balance in a pro-US direction or make CFSP consensus building mechanically more difficult. Having all 25 states of the larger EU pre-committed to the ESS would offer at least one defence against this.

³¹ Council of the European Union, ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, document 10352/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003, URL <<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10352en03.pdf>>; and European Council, ‘Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, document 10354/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003, URL <<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10354en03.pdf>>.

³² The suggestion for the WMD Strategy was first made by Sweden, and the UK later took a significant part.

³³ Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/newsRoom/LoadDocument.asp?directory=en/misc/&filename=78340.pdf>.

2003, where Javier Solana was mandated³⁴ to produce a ‘European strategy concept’ and present it to the next European Council (which would ensure that it was also available in time for the next EU–US Summit). In the weeks that followed, although Solana’s team sought advice from certain experts in the EU and beyond (including the USA), the drafting was kept under close control by a few key individuals, offering the chance of maintaining a ‘personal’, non-bureaucratic and user-friendly style. Particular efforts were made to keep it short—the final draft comprised only 16 pages. This version, under the title ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, was unveiled by Solana at a Council meeting on 16 June 2003 and was well received. The Thessaloniki European Council agreed on 20 June (without substantial discussion) to welcome the recommendations in it and to commission Solana to present an ‘EU Security Strategy’ for adoption by the European Council itself in December. In the interim, Solana was to work with ‘Member States and the Commission’ to refine the text, which ‘should also encapsulate Member States’ interests and citizens’ priorities’. The resulting version would still not be strictly final but would be treated as ‘a living document subject to public debate and to review as necessary’.³⁵

The first follow-up step taken after the Thessaloniki European Council, in a novel departure for the EU, was to plan three research conferences in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October) under the overall coordination of the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS). These events, focusing respectively on threats, EU objectives, and capabilities and coherence, allowed academics and other independent experts from all parts of Europe—and outside powers like China, Russia and the USA—to join with officials in discussing the original document and making suggestions both for the redrafting and for future action.³⁶ The remaining time from October to December was used for internal discussion among member states and with the Commission, during which a number of amendments to the June text were agreed, including two significant changes of sequence and a number of more limited (but important) modifications of the wording (see details below). The general character and style of the document, however, and its brevity remained. The resulting final draft was duly ‘adopted’, without difficulty, on 12 December by the European Council at Brussels, which also tasked the next presidency and Solana (in coordination with the Commission) to ‘present, as appropriate, concrete proposals for the implementation of the . . . Strategy’.

³⁴ The idea of the mandate was pushed by France, Germany and the UK as part of their general attempt to regroup after the Iraq-related split—a political dynamic that would lead also to their joint initiative to try to avert a similar crisis with Iran (through tripartite approaches seeking a peaceful solution to concerns about Iranian nuclear policy).

³⁵ Council of the European Union, ‘Draft EU Paper for submission to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, document 9165/04, Brussels, 11 May 2004, URL <<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st09/st09165.en04.pdf>>; and Council of the European Union, ‘Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003’, document 11638/03, Brussels 1 Oct. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf>.

³⁶ Summaries of the findings of these seminars and some papers prepared for them are available at the ISS Internet site at URL <<http://www.iss.eu.org>>.

(Further points agreed regarding follow-up to the ESS are discussed in the first part of chapter 3.)

What stands out immediately from these events in a *procedural* sense are the confidence placed by EU members in Solana and his team; the self-restraint shown by states when they refrained from quibbling before the June ‘welcome’ and publication of his text, or from prolonging and over-complicating the phase of inter-governmental redrafting; and the novel and rather successful use made of intellectual resources in the European (and partner countries’) security research community. Taken together, these features point to a more *operational* and *cohesive* approach by national policy actors, but also to a new (and more collective) *presentational awareness*—in Brussels and the relevant capitals. Rather as NATO had learned to its cost in the Kosovo campaign, the EU community was starting to realize how important it could be (for European credibility and impact) not just to produce the right message but to be able to get it across, in the right words and at the right time, with the right intellectual allies. The balance of public and political reactions to the ESS, both in Europe and abroad,³⁷ gives reason to believe that this behaviour was rewarded—and should logically be reinforced.

Analysis of the European Security Strategy

As noted above, there is no shortage of textual exegeses of the European Security Strategy—in both its versions. In particular, it became a popular academic pursuit after June 2003 to compare the text (often in tabular form) with that of the USA’s National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002,³⁸ and sometimes with the NATO Strategic Concept document of 1999³⁹ as well. In context, the former comparison was an interesting and valid one because the NSS had been the first fully conceptualized presentation of the strategic approach adopted by the Administration of George W. Bush after 11 September 2001. It had—most famously or infamously—spelled out the USA’s new doctrine of ‘pre-emptive’ military intervention, which might be triggered by perceived terrorism-related or WMD-related threats to the USA itself, as well as by more familiar challenges to world order such as genocide. The doctrine was both a *post facto* justification of the US-led action by then already well under way against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in

³⁷ The Solana text received favourable commentary in *The International Herald Tribune* at the time of its publication, and immediate European reporting conveyed no reservations. *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June 2003, pp. 1, 6. *The Financial Times* published a whole-page analysis of the significance of the ESS in the light of the changes made during redrafting. Dempsey, J., ‘Words of war: Europe’s first security doctrine backs away from a commitment to US-style pre-emption’, *Financial Times*, 5 Dec. 2003. For some more considered US reactions see the contributions by Bereuter, D., ‘NATO and the EU Security Strategy’, Posen, B., ‘The European Security Strategy: practical implications’ and others in an issue of the *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* (note 14).

³⁸ The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, foreword by President Bush, Washington, DC, 17 Sep. 2002, URL <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

³⁹ The Strategic Concept was published during the Washington Summit. NATO, ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 Apr. 1999, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

Afghanistan, and a foreshadowing of the arguments that the Bush Administration would in due course use for justifying the onslaught on Iraq.

Insofar as the political dictate of the day in the spring of 2003 was for the EU to orient itself vis-à-vis this US vision, and to achieve a united statement on points of agreement or difference with the USA, the NSS could certainly be seen as a major ‘source’ document for the ESS—and it was clearly uppermost in the minds of the original drafters. However, some of the meaning of the ESS may be lost if it is not also analysed as an outgrowth of the EU’s own doctrinal development and experience, and as a commentary on purely intra-European debates over priorities and governance. Part of the effect of changes introduced in the December version can be seen as to strengthen the latter connection and to make the document look less like a toned-down précis of the NSS. The analytical approach taken here uses the NSS–ESS comparison as a point of departure, but it aims to do justice also to points of intra-European significance. It considers first the structure and general purpose of the ESS and then its substantial contents.

Nature and structure

Both the June and December versions of the ESS have a three-part structure (after a one-page introduction): threats, strategic objectives and policy implications for Europe. In both versions, the evolution of threats is first described in global terms with emphasis on the shift away from the ‘Westphalian’ interstate order, the demise of direct military challenges to Europe’s mainland, the prevalence of conflict in the world generally and its linkage with poverty and bad governance, and the increasing tightness of supply of energy and other natural resources. Then a number of ‘key threats’ are addressed in more detail—in Solana’s June draft limited to terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states and crime, and in the December version broken down further into terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.⁴⁰ The ‘strategic objectives’ section of the Solana draft has three subsections on ‘extending the zone of security around Europe’, ‘strengthening the international order’ and ‘countering the threats’. The December version puts the section on ‘addressing the threats’ first—perhaps logically, since it explains what the EU has already done—and slightly alters the other section headings *inter alia* to strengthen the focus on ‘effective multilateralism’ in the context of world order. The third part of the ESS, on ‘Policy implications for Europe’, was drafted by Solana with four subsections devoted to making the EU ‘more active’, ‘more coherent’ and ‘more capable’ and to ‘working with partners’, plus a short conclusion. The December version reverses the order of the ‘more capable’ and ‘more coherent’ subsections, the logic being that it makes sense to discuss first what different instruments the EU should have and then address their coordination.

⁴⁰ For comparison, the NSS’s sequence of challenges is ‘human dignity’ (i.e., more on democracy up front), terrorism, regional conflicts, WMD, free trade and democratic development.

Three points stand out when the ESS is compared at this structural level with the USA's 2002 NSS and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept: the ESS is shorter,⁴¹ more analytical and far more general. If the Introduction is counted, the ESS devotes one-third of its whole length to analysing the many threatening (and some positive) features of the contemporary world environment. One of the main shifts of emphasis from the June to the December version was in fact to make the lead-in analysis more balanced and comprehensive, with much attention to the interplay of causal factors (and some de-singularizing of the terrorism threat as a result). The NATO document by contrast has just six paragraphs on threat factors scattered through it, and the NSS has no specific section set apart for analysis⁴² but rather leaps straight into detailing the *action* to be taken with further specification of *targets* as necessary. This difference could be explained by Europe's greater concern to justify its actions by reference to outside compulsions and provocations: or, more likely, by the fact that a shared threat assessment was one of Europe's greatest objective wants before the ESS was drafted.

The third contrast is that the policy prescriptions in the ESS are of a purely *generic* nature, sometimes illustrated by examples, rather than providing specific mandates and instructions for the use and development of the EU's instruments (or for specific overseas operations). The NSS is at the opposite extreme, with a full catalogue of changes to be made, actions to be taken and guidelines extending well down into the tactical (as against the strategic) level. The NATO Strategic Concept contains detailed guidelines, at least as specific as those that would normally appear in a ministerial communiqué, for the various segments of the alliance's future activities. These differences are much easier to understand in the light of the particular genesis of the ESS and the unique polity of the EU. As a (largely, even in December) *non-negotiated* document produced within a highly legalistic institution, the ESS would have been a quite inappropriate vehicle for laying down binding decisions for the EU. It had no legal *vires* to commission or to allocate financial resources.⁴³ In political terms, it could only achieve its unity-building aim by staying broad-brush enough for all the EU members to read their favourite agendas into it, leaving them room to assert their special interests during the follow-up. It had (as noted above) a confidence-building function⁴⁴ and also in some sense an *inspirational* one, designed not so much to embody good policy decisions as to create the environment and mood for taking them. The instrumentality of the NSS was quite different, as a statement of interest by a unitary government that controlled all the means to do what it promised and that was concerned simultaneously to reassure its

⁴¹ It is half the length of the NSS and 2–3 pages shorter than the NATO document.

⁴² The threat analysis of the NSS comes mainly in the president's foreword, with such striking but abstract phrases as 'The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology'.

⁴³ These features are also typical of EU 'strategies' in general, as distinct from (notably) CFSP Joint Actions.

⁴⁴ 'Its laundry-list format and politically correct tone clearly were not designed to strike fear into the hearts of potential adversaries.' Schmidt, P. and Geipel, G., 'Forward again in US–European relations', *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* (note 14), pp. 29–32.

public and to warn its foes. The NATO Strategic Concept was negotiated specifically—and at painful length—as the alliance’s collective action programme for the 21st century.

Substance

The contents of the ESS may conveniently be addressed under its three main sections, even though the structural differences explained above make some of the comparisons with the NSS and the NATO Strategic Concept a little artificial. Further mention is made below of the principal changes introduced between the June and the December versions.

The first line of the ESS is optimistic: ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’. This acknowledgement of the fundamentally changed situation for Western democracies after the cold war is one of the themes it shares most closely with the NSS. Other common features at the stage of general analysis are: (a) a distinctly ‘post-modern’ approach combining observations from the political, social and economic as well as traditional strategic dimensions, and attention to sub-state and trans-state as well as interstate processes; and (b) a truly *global* approach to threat, interdependence and responsibility, which for the EU was one of the ESS’s most novel features (a least when stated with this degree of clarity). Only slightly watered down from Solana’s draft, the last line of the Introduction in the December version states: ‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.

Important differences of both content and emphasis are, however, clear even in the respective opening pages of the ESS and the NSS. The US NSS document paints the threat to national interests in sharp and personalized terms with much talk of ‘enemies’, while the ESS never uses this word (or even the word ‘rogue’). The ESS nails its colours to the multilateral mast already in its third paragraph with the statement that: ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’. The tenth paragraph of President Bush’s introduction to the NSS does say that ‘No nation can build a safer, better world alone’, but before this point he draws a picture of US exceptionalism and voluntarism with statements like ‘We seek . . . to create a balance of power’, ‘We will extend the peace’, other nations ‘must’ do this or that, and so forth. The ESS hails NATO’s security contribution in its third paragraph, while Bush’s introduction mentions it only in its last paragraph and does not mention any separate role for Europe at all. When it comes to the detailed threat analysis, the ESS devotes much more attention than the NSS to the economic and social sources of insecurity and conflict (the NATO Strategic Concept document has one sentence on these). The ESS has a striking paragraph on motivations for terrorism—retained from Solana’s draft but moved further up in the December version—which concludes that ‘This phenomenon is also a part of our own society’; the NSS document, on the other hand, lacks any such acknowledgement of an ‘enemy within’. Moving to the WMD challenge, the December version of the ESS tones down Solana’s language by making this ‘potentially the

greatest threat to our security’ rather than ‘the single most important threat’. It somewhat de-emphasizes, while retaining, Solana’s warning of the ‘most frightening scenario’ in which terrorists might acquire WMD. The December version also does greater justice to the evils caused by conflicts, failed states, bad governance and organized crime in their own right—while recognizing that they can also be sources of, and aggravated by, terrorism. This is one of the respects in which the phase of intergovernmental discussion most clearly and deliberately moved the message of the ESS away from that of the NSS, with its ‘new threats’-dominated analysis and its relativization of the risks of conflict (after all, the USA *started* armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq).

The ESS section on ‘Strategic objectives’ picks up some important themes of the NSS, in that it stresses Europe’s need to ‘promote its values’ (including economic development and free trade in addition to democracy), as well as to defend its interests, and again underlines the universality of the challenge: ‘We need both to think globally and to act locally . . . distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand . . . With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’. It devotes several paragraphs to Europe’s need and duty to spread security through direct involvement in its neighbouring regions ranging from the Balkans and along the EU’s eastern and south-eastern borders to the coasts of the Mediterranean—an element which can be seen as reflecting Europe’s different geo-strategic position rather than disagreement with anything in the US strategy.⁴⁵ Points of difference do, however, emerge.

1. The value of military strength and the use of military means is played up by the NSS but this part of the EU document plays it down, discussing it only in the context of crisis management and here stressing the importance of civilian inputs and ‘nation building’ as well.

2. The manner in which ‘dynamic’ threats should be tackled differs. The ESS accepts that ‘we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs’, but it links this statement to the relatively familiar concepts of ‘conflict prevention and threat prevention’—whereas the NSS, notoriously, had defined a right of ‘pre-emptive’ (military) action when necessary against emergent new as well as old threats. More carefully examined, the ESS does not at any point explicitly say what conditions or restraints should apply to threat-based military interventions, but it creates the overwhelming *impression* that these should be undertaken in a multilateral context and with a proper legal base⁴⁶ (see the next point and the next paragraph).

⁴⁵ There are, however, some interesting nuances in the treatment of the Middle East, where the Dec. version of the ESS explicitly calls for a ‘two-state solution’. In internal EU terms, the ESS is also noteworthy for demanding for the first time that EU neighbourhood policies should pay special attention to the South Caucasus.

⁴⁶ The impression is given *inter alia* by the attribution of an active role to the international institutions themselves: Europe must help equip the UN ‘to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively’, and ‘international organizations . . . must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’. On the same subject, a great deal of fuss has been made over the fact that the word ‘pre-emptive’ was used in the Solana draft and watered down to ‘preventive’ in the Dec. version. In actuality, the former version referred to ‘pre-emptive *engagement*’ (emphasis added) in a paragraph (p. 10) dealing with

3. The ESS (December version) contains a full two pages about promoting ‘a rule-based international order’, including specifically international law, international treaties (which are also mentioned with approval in the specific context of WMD), the United Nations, regional cooperation groupings, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court. The NSS, by contrast, treats institutions at best instrumentally, is more concerned to stress that US actions in the national interest should not be hampered by legal and institutional ties, and calls for US personnel to be protected against the ICC.

4. As the obverse of its refusal to name enemies, when referring to countries ‘outside the bounds of international society’ the ESS document advocates a transformational and inclusive solution: ‘It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance’.

The final section of the ESS, ‘Policy implications for Europe’, calls for the development of an EU ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’. Points that it shares with the NSS are the recognition that defence capabilities must be strengthened and burden sharing improved; that military forces can be applied to a variety of tasks; that the ‘soft’ skills of diplomacy and intelligence remain vital; and that apart from the traditional Atlantic relationship (where the ESS calls for an ‘effective and balanced partnership with the USA’), the interests of Western democracies can be served by judicious cooperation with other powers such as China, India, Japan and Russia (to which the ESS politely adds Canada). Divergent emphases (many of them strengthened by the drafting changes in the December version) relate to: (a) military strength again: the NSS states that ‘It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength’ while the ESS stresses that military means alone solve nothing; (b) the UN, for which the EU explicitly pledges operational support in crisis and post-conflict situations; (c) other institutions—the December version adds a paragraph on EU–NATO cooperation; (d) the difference between ‘pre-emptive’ (US) and ‘preventive’ (EU) action;⁴⁷ (e) a further EU emphasis on *multilateral* regional solutions and partnerships; and (f) the EU’s direct rejection of unilateralism: ‘There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own . . . we should look to develop strategic partnerships . . . with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support’. The NSS urges ‘an appreciation of others’ interests’, but it makes clear that ‘we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require’.

This final section of the ESS also contains several points of mainly intra-EU interest, designed both to reflect current progress and to encourage further breakthroughs in building the EU’s strategic identity. These include a reference to the

trade, development and justice for all citizens (i.e., a context far removed from the US version of the pre-emptive doctrine). In the Dec. version, the sentence in question was dropped and the idea of ‘preventive engagement’ was added in the document’s final section when discussing failing states, proliferation and humanitarian emergencies. The countries which called for this change cited *inter alia* translation problems.

⁴⁷ See note 46.

new ‘defence agency’ (see chapter 3); a call (although softened from Solana’s draft) for more pooling and sharing of military assets; stress on the need for intelligence sharing and common threat assessments; and a suggestion that ESDP military missions might in future include disarmament-related tasks, ‘support for third countries in combating terrorism’ and ‘security sector reform’.⁴⁸ The subsection on coherence ventures into constitutionally delicate territory in stressing the need for coordination between second pillar and third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs, JHA) actions, and for the security significance of first pillar instruments such as the European Development Fund to be recognized. It stresses that ‘Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states’.

In summary, it could be said that the European Security Strategy of 2003 (in both versions) conveys significant acceptance of the ‘new threats’ agenda as defined by the USA—but with important shadings regarding its character, proportional importance and relation to more familiar challenges. It affirms shared *goals* with the USA at the broadest level (i.e., defending and actively promoting democracy and free market values). It partially accepts the new US security *discourse* regarding the inadequacies of traditional state-based security policies and institutions—but comes out clearly in favour of improving rather than jettisoning or bypassing the latter. It also clearly rejects (by the indirect means of stating the contrary) a number of US *methods* and *rationales*, especially for coercive and unilateral actions. It aims to salvage all that can be salvaged of the framework for *joint EU–US* security-directed action, both through NATO and through a direct EU–US relationship: but matches this goal with (and some might say, subordinates it to) the clearest ever proclamation of the EU’s right and duty to pursue its *own global security policies* and of the need to build up the necessary minimum of independent capacities to do so.

⁴⁸ These last ideas had found broad support during the drafting of the Constitution for Europe; putting them in the ESS was perhaps seen by some as preserving the option of pursuing them before the Constitution could come into force.

3. Short-term follow-up, longer-term implications

In 2003 the conditions which led to the creation of the European Security Strategy, and witnessed its further development, also produced a number of other important steps—some qualifying as ‘breakthroughs’—in the building of the EU’s policy corpus, governance structures, and experience in the defence and security field. Apart from the WMD policy documents mentioned in chapter 2, these included: (a) the first-ever ESDP military operation outside Europe, carried out during May–June 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC);⁴⁹ (b) the firming up of proposals for the EU to take over NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a transfer eventually completed in November 2004; (c) the decision to set up an EU agency in the field of armaments and defence capabilities (an idea ‘plucked out’ of the draft Constitution for Europe for early implementation);⁵⁰ (d) the reaching of agreement (after considerable Franco-British negotiation) on the establishment of a small EU military planning cell⁵¹ (in parallel with an EU planning implant in the NATO structure); and (e) provisional agreement among member states on measures to be included in the draft Constitution with a view to strengthening leadership as regards EU external policies. These constitutional innovations included: a longer-term presidency of the European Council; a single ‘foreign minister’ in Brussels under whom the external services of the Commission and the Council would be merged; a new ‘solidarity’ commitment under which EU members would aid each other against terrorist attack; and a European ‘collective defence clause’—albeit subject to caveats called for by the non-allied states to safeguard their position. Although the adoption of the Constitution as a whole proved impossible at the December European Council, these features were retained when final agreement was reached on the text under the Irish Presidency in June 2004.⁵²

⁴⁹ It was known as ‘Operation Artemis’. See Mace, R., ‘Operation Artemis: mission impossible?’, *European Security Review*, no. 18 (July 2003), pp. 5–6.

⁵⁰ ‘Council Decision of 17 November 2003 creating a team to prepare for the establishment of the agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments’, 3 Dec. 2003, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 318/19 (3 Dec. 2003), URL <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2003/l_31820031203en.html>. The European Defence Agency (the new simplified title) began work in 2004 under its first director, Nick Whitney.

⁵¹ It is now known as the civil–military planning cell and is linked with a (non-standing) EU ‘operations centre’.

⁵² Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, ‘2003/2004 IGC—Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’, document CIG 86/04, Brussels, 25 June 2004, URL <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/press_data/en/misc/81243.pdf>. For a summary see Centre for European Reform (CER), *CER Policy Brief: The CER’s Guide to the EU’s Constitutional Treaty* (CER: London, July 2004), URL <http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_constitution_july04.pdf>. Formal signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe took place in Rome on 29 Oct. 2004. The full text of the draft Constitution is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm>.

No direct cause-and-effect link can be claimed from the adoption of the ESS to any of these other moves. They are perhaps best seen as *parallel* reflections of the determination of the then 15 EU members to build doctrinal common ground and to demonstrate their capacity for action after the setbacks of early 2003. The experience of drafting the ESS may, however, be credited with a certain *confidence-building* value, constituting as it did a kind of technical exercise in the reconciliation of British and French, old and new, militarist and idealist positions within the EU community before the member states went out together to test their unity in face of new responsibilities and new risks. (The way in which the exercise helped rebuild Solana's personal prestige is also relevant in this context and made a minor contribution to setting the scene for his selection in June 2004 to serve in due course as the first EU 'foreign minister' after ratification of the Constitution for Europe.)

This broader background is also important for understanding the choices made by European leaders regarding primary areas of follow-up for the ESS itself. The European Council at its December 2003 meeting, when endorsing the ESS text, asked that follow-up should focus initially on just four topics: 'effective multi-lateralism with the UN at its core', terrorism, the Middle East and BiH. No more specific deadlines or procedural instructions were laid down (at that time).⁵³ The first and most obvious explanation of why other 'hot topics' of the day were not included in this list is that some of them—notably the ESDP-related ones⁵⁴—were already being driven forward in the various other contexts indicated above; and that others had to be treated as *sub judice* in the Constitution context.⁵⁵ Even in the light of these factors, however, at least three of the chosen four topics—the UN, the Middle East and the Balkans—have a distinctly old-fashioned, 'CFSP *acquis*' flavour, and the omission of any direct reference to Iraq is remarkable (these points are taken up again below).

Follow-up on the four designated topics

In the second follow-up area—a strategy on terrorism—events were soon to overtake planning in a way typical of the EU's whole development. The terrorist bombings, subsequently linked to al-Qaeda, at Madrid on 11 March 2004 kick-started the adoption of the EU's new anti-terrorist programme. This programme consisted of a

⁵³ Council of the European Union, 'Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003, Presidency Conclusions', document 5381/04, Brussels, 5 Feb. 2004, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ue_docs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/78364.pdf>.

⁵⁴ An important, and correct, observation on the ESS made by many European commentators has been that it does not provide a 'strategy' in the sense of a military 'doctrine' or operational 'concept' and that the ESDP still lacks one. For the ESS to have tried to fulfil this function would not have fit with its conscious relativization and minimizing of military approaches in general. See particularly Heisbourg, F., 'The European Security Strategy is not a strategy', Freedman, L., 'Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine?', Centre for European Reform (CER), *A European Way of War*, CER Pamphlet (CER: London, May 2004); and the ISS 'White Paper' project and publication (note 26).

⁵⁵ Similarly, the ESS did not need to focus much on WMD because of the separate strategy on this.

mixture of performance review and ‘must do better’ on existing commitments⁵⁶ with new elements such as the creation of a senior anti-terrorism coordinator post under Solana at Brussels (filled by Gijs de Vries) and the bringing forward of a further element in the draft Constitution—the ‘solidarity’ commitment in the event of terrorist attacks—for immediate adoption by all EU members. In the same declaration that announced all these steps, the European Council of 25 March 2004 called for a ‘long-term strategy’ document on terrorism to be produced⁵⁷—implying that the present crop of measures might equate to a short-term strategy.

Interestingly, however, there was no sign of foot dragging on the remaining three items, where the pressure came more from internal deadlines than any external shock. Already in September 2003 the EU had adopted a Communication from the Commission on EU–UN relations with special reference to cooperation in crisis management, and a joint EU–UN Declaration had been issued.⁵⁸ On 17–18 June 2004 the European Council further approved an EU contribution to be submitted to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the UN Secretary-General,⁵⁹ noted progress on the clarification of modalities for EU military contributions to UN crisis management and the need for further work on civilian capabilities; and welcomed ‘joint commitments on support for effective multilateralism made with key regional partners’. It looked forward to receiving further proposals from Solana and the Commission on ‘concrete steps designed to promote the development of a rules-based international order’. It noted, finally, that the Council had adopted basic principles on the use of sanctions in the same context.⁶⁰

The June 2004 European Council also endorsed a text forwarded from the Council on 14 June⁶¹ concerning a ‘comprehensive policy’ for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was explicitly identified as the response to the ESS-related mandate of

⁵⁶ In particular, a large number of member states were found not to have taken domestic action to implement EU decisions dating from early 2002 on the definition and handling of terrorist offences.

⁵⁷ European Council, ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’, Brussels, 25 Mar. 2004, URL <<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsUpload/79635.pdf>>. See also Council of the European Union, ‘Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004, Presidency Conclusions’, document 10679/04, Brussels, 18 June 2004, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf>.

⁵⁸ ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism’, EU Commission document COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 Sep. 2003, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/un/docs/com03_526en.pdf>; and Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration on UN–EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, document 12730/03, Brussels, 19 Sep. 2003, URL <<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st12/st12730en03.pdf>>.

⁵⁹ Council of the European Union, ‘Draft EU Paper for submission to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (note 35).

⁶⁰ See notes 54 and 55. Council of the European Union (note 57). For further reflections on the ‘effective multilateralism’ dimension of follow-up see Biscop, S., ‘Effective multilateralism—bringing the European Way into practice’, ed. S. Biscop, *Audit of European Strategy* (Royal Institute of International Relations: Brussels, Dec. 2004), URL <<http://www.irri-kiib.be>>. Biscop rightly argues that finding an EU common line on the recommendations in the report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will be the next real test in this policy area, especially given the divisive overtones for EU members of the report’s proposals on UN Security Council reform. UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (United Nations: New York, Dec. 2004), available at URL <<http://www.un.org/secureworld>>.

⁶¹ Council of the European Union, ‘European Council, 17–18 June 2004, European Security Strategy: Bosnia and Herzegovina/comprehensive policy’, document 10099/04, Brussels, 15 June 2004.

December 2003. This rather short text underlined the political aim of putting BiH ‘irreversibly on track towards EU membership’ and otherwise consisted of a set of general and specific measures to improve the coherence of the EU’s various activities and instruments in BiH with special reference to the impending EU takeover of SFOR. It acknowledged inputs made by Solana’s team, the Commission and member states. As for the Middle East, the development of EU policy continued essentially within the framework of the ‘Quartet’ (with Russia, the UN and the USA) and did not take on—at least outwardly—any qualitatively new ‘autonomous’ features up to mid-2004.⁶²

On this initial evidence, the most pessimistic alternative view of the ESS as a mere ‘piece of paper’ can already be set aside. A suitable political and procedural transmission belt appears to have been found to translate specific desiderata from the ESS into more immediate operational requirements, and to make sure that the latter are followed up and reported on in good time. To the extent that a non-insider can judge, the various follow-up documents and actions adopted also seem to be compatible in principle and content with the philosophy of the ESS itself and with each other.

If there is room for a more cynical assessment, it might be focused rather on *why* these particular follow-up actions were taken and on the reasons for the exclusion of what was *not* selected. It could be argued that the first four selected topics related to things that the EU policy community wanted to do or was forced to do anyway—the Italian Presidency of July–December 2003 was very keen on EU–UN relations, and terrorism and the Balkans had their own unstoppable dynamics—rather than on genuine new departures and extensions to the *acquis*. The substance of the new work done on them was, moreover, evolutionary rather than revolutionary in terms of the dossiers’ history and stopped short of tackling such political hot potatoes as UN Security Council reform or the rationale for continued European loyalty to the Quartet for the Middle East. All four topics, moreover, were either completely or to a significant extent grounded within the traditional second pillar of CFSP, and hence offered natural areas for the Council’s own policy-making community to take the lead. They ducked the challenge of trying to apply the principles of the ESS to an essentially first pillar domain like the handling of the EU’s external trade (or even aid) relationships. Only the terrorism dossier—aided by the force of events—called for serious progress in breaking down inter-pillar demarcation lines, in this case between CFSP and JHA work in the third pillar.

Another apparent no-go area for the selection of follow-up themes in December 2003 was anything directly touching on the Iraq controversy itself—although by June 2004 the European Council was able and ready to produce a joint EU approach to the challenges of Iraqi reconstruction.⁶³ This latter point offers a strong hint about the essentially *instrumental* role of the ESS. It was made to serve, not to direct and not even fully to reflect, the dynamics of ‘real politics’ in Europe. It might have enough conceptual and procedural force to improve the quality, time-

⁶² Council of the European Union (note 57), pp. 23–24.

⁶³ Council of the European Union (note 57), pp. 22–23.

liness and coherence of EU policy in areas of de facto convergence: but it was never expected, and could not be expected, to have an effect of ‘banging heads together’ and bringing states within the disciplines of a common policy before they are ready for it.

To express it another way, the ESS exists to proclaim and promote greater unity in facing still-emerging challenges, rather than directly to close the gaps or heal the wounds of past disunity. European nations can, of course, do the latter for themselves in other ways. The still open question is whether, when faced with the next set of seriously divisive issues, they will tackle them within the framework of the ESS—or be helped by it, or even think of it at all. If the answer is Yes, it will probably not be for the sake of the ESS’s own virtues but primarily as the result of other dynamics arising from inside the EU (the working through of enlargement, what happens on the Constitution, etc.) and in the world outside (notably, future US policies and the fate of other institutions). These interactions will ultimately be more important for history’s view of the ESS than the purely procedural developments of the next year or so—interesting and useful although it may be to watch the follow-up of existing follow-up dossiers, any selection of a new batch of follow-up themes, the way in which the next presidencies use or fail to make use of the ESS, and so on. The closing section of this chapter, therefore, looks in more speculative mode at some larger questions of extra- and intra-European relations that are raised by the ESS and that seem bound to influence its historical fate. It deals, in turn, with issues relating to the EU’s external relations; to its internal politics; and to its values and style of governance, in security affairs and more generally.

Larger and longer-term questions

The ESS was born at a time when leading EU states were seeking reconciliation both with each other and across the Atlantic, but it was tailored much more for the former than the latter aim. Its divergences from US language and doctrine were conscious and explicit; were willed by all of the then 15 member states; and were intended to bind the EU’s full future membership of 25. Its drafters sought to impress the USA with the very fact that Europe now had a ‘strategy’ based on hard-headed threat assessment, but they made little effort—especially in the December version—to placate the US Administration over the details. Should the ESS be seen, then, as an anti-US manifesto for an increasingly anti-US (or, at least, un-US) future direction of march by the EU? Several reasons suggest that this would be an oversimplistic or premature reading. For a start, the US policies of 2001–2003 and the NSS which embodied them represented a particular phase in the evolution of one particular US Administration, and no one can say how much of them will be retained in the light of bitter experience, even after the re-election of President Bush. Already by mid-2004 the USA had ‘walked back’ into cooperation with the UN, NATO and the European states—including those which had offended it worst in early 2003—on a range of international dossiers, by no means limited to the need for wider assistance in Iraq. Indeed, in the light of these and

other variations and modifications in US policy, it would not be unfair to claim that (to date) the NSS has had a less convincing record of implementation than the ESS itself.

From Europe's viewpoint, the closing of ranks of the EU members around the draft ESS reflected a belated realization that Europe could not be united either on an automatically pro-US, or on a crudely anti-US, platform. It was an attempt to work out first what Europe itself wanted and needed: after which—it might be hoped—it should be possible to take more rational, sober and consistent decisions on when to work with the USA, in parallel with the USA, or alone. As the ESS itself pointed out, a Europe that believed in multilateralism and partnership would be perverse not to work with its closest institutional partners across the Atlantic. The very fact of starting to think in 'strategic' language—implying *inter alia* greater realism about power politics, including the currently overwhelming power of the USA—should logically bring Europe's policy makers closer to a world view that the USA could recognize and should make them see the unwisdom of needlessly provoking their overmighty friend. All this said, however, it is hard to dismiss the thought that the ESS represents the EU's acquisition of the self-awareness and chutzpah needed to stand up for itself, even in face of its oldest friends when necessary. By bringing more 'strategy' into EU-US relations as part of a new global outlook, the ESS has also to some degree de-singularized them and taken out some of the family sentiment.

By the same token, it will be interesting to see what if any impact the ESS has on the relations of the EU with other poles of power in the world, including especially the multinational groupings in regions like Africa, South-East and East Asia, and Latin America.⁶⁴ Its signal to them was one of an increasingly distinctive European voice, with more than a hint of willingness to make strategic common cause over and above more familiar (commercial, development, conflict limitation, etc.) shared interests. Many of these groupings went through a set of reactions to the Bush Administration's policies rather similar to that of the EU itself in 2002–2004, culminating in their adoption of new common policy documents that often included new strategies of their own against local conflict escalation or transnational threats. Far more questions hang over the future effectiveness of these programmes than over the ESS, but they do imply a shared concern by local powers to resist possible US 'divide and rule' policies in the political sphere and to avoid offering incitement for US intervention in the military sphere. It remains to be seen whether the EU can put enough effort into its dialogues with such groupings—traditionally something of a Cinderella in the priorities of Brussels and successive presidencies—to explore these new synergies and their implications for the future world order. An even bigger question is whether the EU's methods and values, as reflected in the ESS, can offer anything at all useful (and whether Europe has the will and skill to apply them) for kick-starting integrative regional security solutions

⁶⁴ On this issue see also Gowan, R., 'The EU, regional organisations and security: strategic partners or convenient alibis?', ed. Biscop (note 60). Gowan focuses particularly on the EU–African Union relationship and makes suggestions for enhancing it.

in the few regions—the greater Middle East and South Asia, for instance—that still lack them today. If not, will the EU ever find something decisive that it *can* do about those regions?

Questions about the ultimate impact of the ESS *within* the EU quickly become entangled with assumptions about the course of other and greater vectors of change, notably the new Constitution and enlargement. For example, it seems clear that the aspirations of the ESS for greater (especially inter-pillar and Brussels–member state) coherence will never be realized fully until and unless such provisions of the Constitution as the fusion of EU external services and the new-style European Council president and ‘foreign minister’ come into force. Similarly, if the dynamics of enlargement should lead to the fragmentation of the EU polity into inner and outer tiers or into several regional constituencies—as some observers have feared—it is hard to see how the unity and solidarity required to realize the stated goals of the ESS could be maintained. At best, a subgroup of European states might continue to march down its path with more limited resources and (in most people’s eyes) weakened credibility.⁶⁵ On the other hand, it could be argued that the immediate post-enlargement period—coinciding with the limbo pending ratification of the Constitution—will create conditions in which it is easier (politically and mechanically) for the 25 members to demonstrate unity and resolve on the foreign front than it is on the EU internal front. If so, the implementation of the ESS might come to serve as a rallying ground for ‘old’ and ‘new’ European states and as an arena for the latter to show off their best behaviour. Further external security-related measures (not needing basic institutional change) might be ‘plucked out’ from the Constitution for advance implementation, as has already happened with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the ‘solidarity’ commitment on terrorism.

An interesting question, however, is whether any such further surge of ambition at the level of EU governments will risk outstripping—or perhaps has already outstripped?—the basic level of popular tolerance and support for a strengthened EU security identity. At first glance there is not too much to worry about on this score, since opinion polls in all parts of the EU show high rates of support for the ESDP as such and for the broader notion of common action to tackle shared contemporary threats.⁶⁶ A comparison with the particular issues and values highlighted by EU public responses in opinion polls around mid-2003, when the ESS was being refined, shows, moreover, that the ESS document itself was remarkably well in line with the average European respondent’s thinking.⁶⁷ The Council took unusual care

⁶⁵ In such a scenario it would, e.g., be much harder for the EU to make progress in inter-institutional relationships (NATO and the UN) where it has to act as a collectivity.

⁶⁶ Indeed, in some countries this approval rating is higher than the level of acceptance for EU policies in general. The poll survey *Transatlantic Trends 2004*, URL <<http://www.transatlantictrends.org>>, found that in EU countries as a whole 71% of all respondents agreed that the EU should ‘become a superpower’ (compared with 65% in 2002), and German support for this thesis had risen by 25 percentage points in 2 years.

⁶⁷ The polls and the language of the ESS show resemblances both in the threats identified as being of concern and in the desire for a European response that avoids the un-mandated use of force whenever possible. See Bailes (note 28), pp. 19–33.

to open up the process of production of the ESS to intellectual debate throughout the European Union (see 'The proximate procedural history of the ESS' in chapter 2) and, after the adoption of the final text in December 2003, had copies translated and printed for public distribution in all of the Community languages.

Some would argue, however, that such passive or coincident popular 'support' for the ESS is no substitute for tangible measures of democratic control and for a more genuinely participatory approach, both to framing the security policies of the EU in general and to deciding on specific operations.⁶⁸ The conundrum of democratic control is a well-worn issue in the whole field of CFSP, where the European Parliament has no real powers of co-decision and little opportunity to use the power of the purse to influence or control individual operations.⁶⁹ Under the constitutions of most EU nations, the control that can be exercised by national parliaments over specific operational decisions is also distinctly limited.⁷⁰ The lack of explicit, prior approval from representative institutions for key strategic actions by the EU might not seem to matter much so long as all goes smoothly, but it creates a risk of unpredictable backlash in the event of, for example, an ESDP operation going sour—with large casualties either suffered by or caused by the European troops. Domestic reactions might complicate the execution of European policy even outside the operational context, for example, if a government feels compelled by the pressure of EU norms and capability demands to carry out national defence reforms and restructuring of a kind that the public is not prepared for, and the logic of which the ordinary citizen is ill-equipped to understand. Problems for the coherence and credibility of EU policies would be compounded in the event of *differential* reactions by publics in different EU states or sub-regions, and the opinion poll evidence (again) suggests that this is more than an imaginary risk.⁷¹

What can be done to alleviate this set of difficulties is not so easy to say. It is a natural corollary of joint security policies executed in 'peacetime' (and, moreover, with a shrinking number of EU countries making use of universal conscription) that the shared security experiences of European politicians, diplomats and military professionals will diverge from the more locally grounded perceptions of ordinary people. Deliberate efforts for popular education and debate, within countries and

⁶⁸ See, e.g., Grevi, G., *European Security: No Strategy Without Politics*, Ideas Factory Europe paper IDEA4 (European Policy Centre: Brussels, Nov. 2004), available at URL <<http://www.theepc.be>>.

⁶⁹ Under a decision of 2002 only certain categories of the 'common costs' (pre-defined or added case by case) of ESDP operations are met from central EU funds, and the main costs (e.g., of personnel and equipment) 'lie where they fall' with the contributing nations.

⁷⁰ See Born, H. and Hänggi, H. (eds), *Double Democratic Deficit: Parliamentary Accountability of the Use of Force Under International Auspices* (Ashgate: London, 2004). This issue is further analysed in Born, H. and Hänggi, H., 'Governing the use of force under international auspices: deficits in parliamentary accountability', *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, forthcoming 2005).

⁷¹ Public attitudes in different EU states diverge, e.g., regarding the geographical areas in which, the grounds on which and the force with which it would be proper for the EU to intervene. For a fuller discussion based on opinion poll findings see Bailes, A. J. K., 'Differentiated risk and threat perceptions of EU members and their impact on European security cooperation', *Dis Politika—Foreign Policy* (forthcoming 2005), URL <<http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr>>.

also making use of the Brussels ‘family’ of institutions, think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, would certainly be worth attempting—if national politicians were not all too easily tempted to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. Possibly, it is only through new approaches to the *internal* dimensions of EU security policy—where all citizens would have to be aware and involved, for example, in preparations for civil emergency management—that anything like a large-scale ‘buy-in’ to the practice as well as the theory of a single European strategic community could be achieved.

Against the background of these conditioning factors and uncertainties, a final set of questions may be defined that are worth pondering and watching in regard to the larger meaning of the ESS initiative, and of the specific contents of the ESS, for future EU *governance*. First, in the institutional sphere: does the ESS tip the balance towards a centrally defined concept of EU strategic interests and growing central control of the resources⁷² needed to pursue them—meaning that states will increasingly have to ‘opt out’ of joint strategic actions rather than deigning to ‘opt in’? Alternatively or at the same time, could the ESS define a space for ‘subsidiarity’ and for the differential use of the strategic advantages of states and sub-regions in pursuit of a larger goal? In any event, where exactly in the EU’s complex and hybrid polity would the ‘ownership’ of a more centralized and collectivized EU strategic policy lie? Has the Council apparatus won this contest for good over the Commission, at the possible price of subjecting itself and its states to more quasi-supranational disciplines (à la EMU)? Or is the real battle still to come, as and when a serious attempt is made to harness first pillar assets (under full Commission control), as well as third pillar ones, to the service of CFSP/ESDP objectives?⁷³

At the political level, will the ESS enhance and to some extent legitimize the prospect of the largest states (and military contributors) pulling the strings of external policy? If so, must it be assumed that they will do so in older-fashioned *realpolitik* style (in the light of their own national interests and visions or of ad hoc deals among themselves), or could the ESS itself help them to converge and to discipline themselves in the service of more genuinely common European interests? What role will the medium and small states seek, and what new methods (e.g., ganging up) could they use to promote their interests?

As regards the nature and style of subsequent action, will the ESS ultimately do more to license forceful interventions (perhaps amounting to ‘double standards’) in the EU’s name, or to ensure that European actions (at least, when carrying the official EU brand) stay permanently within a legalist, multilateralist, normative framework? To put the same point another way, where will the EU draw the line in future if obliged to choose between effectiveness and legitimacy?

⁷² There has been much comment on how the ESS could be vitiated if European states are not prepared to spend more on defence and spend it more wisely, but equally important in the longer term is where the control of the spending and the resulting assets will lie. The dream (or nightmare) of a ‘European army’ has not gone any further away with the ESS.

⁷³ A provision included in the draft Constitution which may go some way towards anticipating and helping to manage this emergent dialectic is that the new EU ‘foreign minister’ (i.e., initially, Solana) will simultaneously be a vice-president of the European Commission.

In one intriguing passage, the ESS contrasts the ‘traditional concept of self-defence’ with Europe’s current needs for ‘threat prevention’ and for a ‘first line of defence . . . abroad’: strongly implying that it is or at least soon may be the business of the EU (not NATO) to meet these latter needs. Will this prove a self-fulfilling prediction, in that NATO (the classic instrument of collective self-defence) will continue to draw back from direct engagement in European security, leaving the European states and their fledgling security community in the EU to take care of their own (steadily expanding) backyard *faute de mieux*? If so, might Europe before too long experience a further ‘revenge of history’ in which the shift of the ESS towards a non-traditional, non-territorial threat spectrum is exposed as premature, and Europe has to use its new-found strategic sense to cope with much more basic security challenges on its eastern and southern borders?

There is one last broad issue which some US analysts have raised by arguing that the ESS of 2003 names not too few but too many strategic objectives for the EU, without any apparent attempt to prioritize. They are tempted to see this as evidence of lack of seriousness or, at best, of an incurably *reactive* European habit. There is some justice in the latter point, which indeed is neatly proved by the ‘reactive’ and ‘corrective’ nature of the motives for the creation of the ESS itself as discussed above. What does not make sense is the often associated US criticism that European caution and defensiveness spring from fixation with the *status quo*. Nothing could look less like a stable status quo than a Western Europe that has just opened itself up in the most intimate fashion to 10 new members, adopted a new Constitution and is now agonizing over how soon it should expand to the borders of Syria, Iraq and Iran.⁷⁴ The integrated Europe’s strategic emergence over the decades has been reactive, not in the sense of defending a fixed perimeter and birthright, but of swimming with organic and often subterranean tides of demand, response to demand, diffusion and transformation. An ESS designed for so strange and unpredictable an organism as this could hardly be expected to set clear priorities, targets and standards: or clear boundaries, for that matter. Whether to interpret the functional and geographical ‘*tous azimuths*’ approach that it did adopt as weak-mindedness, as mere ‘political correctness’, or as a daringly boundless ambition is ultimately a matter of taste—and of belief.

⁷⁴ This expansion would occur with the accession of Turkey.

Appendix. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy

Adopted in Brussels on 12 December 2003

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places

as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

I. The security environment: global challenges and key threats

Global challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence—and so vulnerability—on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now

than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources—notably water—which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain

and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

Regional conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State failure: Bad governance—corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability—and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is

an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan—where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200 000 of the 700 000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together—terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force—we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

II. Strategic objectives

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence—up to and including the Cold War—was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected—as we have seen in West Africa.

This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building security in our neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The Euro-

pean perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution—which Europe has long supported—is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

An international order based on effective multilateralism

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United

Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed

democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

III. Policy implications for Europe

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new

dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

More capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway—notably the establishment of a defence agency—take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU–NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

More coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in

different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners. There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Source: Council of the European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf>.

About the author

Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom) has been Director of SIPRI since July 2002. She was previously a member of the British Diplomatic Service for 33 years, ending as British Ambassador to Finland in 2000–2002. Her other diplomatic postings include Budapest, the British Delegation to NATO, Bonn, Beijing and Oslo, and she spent several periods on detachment outside the Service, including two academic sabbaticals, a two-year period with the British Ministry of Defence, and assignments to the European Union and Western European Union. Her main analytical interests are politico-military affairs, European integration and Central European affairs. She has published a large number of articles in international journals on these subjects as well as on Chinese foreign policy. She is co-editor of *Business and Security: Public–Private Sector Relationships in a New Security Environment* (2004), and is currently editing a volume on the Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy (forthcoming 2005). She also contributed to the SIPRI Yearbook in 2003 and 2004.