

Sizing and Shaping European Armed Forces

Lessons and Considerations from the Nordic Countries

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Preface

The end of the cold war, the successive enlargements of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the growing demand for crisis management operations abroad and the emergence of ‘new threats’ have radically transformed the security environment of Europe’s northern region. Once pre-occupied with a delicate local security balance and the looming shadow of the Soviet Union, the four Nordic states that maintain defence forces—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—are now drawn into a wider process of maximizing Europe’s contribution to the ‘export of security’. There is nothing new for these countries—prominent contributors for decades to peacekeeping under United Nations auspices—in having to provide capabilities for multilateral action abroad. All of them have put their forces on the line for a succession of major crisis operations since 1990, and they have often ‘punched above their weight’ in terms of individual troop quality. All of them, however, diverge from the European mainstream inasmuch as they have held back from simultaneous membership in the EU and NATO and/or have, in significant ways, curtailed their membership obligations. For this and other reasons, their adjustment to the new security agenda facing Europe and their involvement in institutional responses to this agenda have been neither simple nor painless.

In this Policy Paper, written during an attachment to SIPRI as a guest researcher in autumn 2003, William Hopkinson—a British defence expert with both official and analytical background—approaches Nordic defence performance from the standpoint of general defence planning desiderata. Planning should start from an up-to-date assessment of the range of security threats, and the role of military assets as such, in meeting them. It should then consider how each country’s limited resources and particular skills can best be deployed to meet the challenges, acting together with partner countries when necessary (as it is, in fact, necessary for the majority of current needs). Applying this set of tests, Hopkinson concludes that the remotest contingency for any Nordic state today is that of an all-out territorial attack: yet that is what the lion’s share of national defence preparations in Finland, Norway and Sweden in particular is still directed towards. Maintaining so many armoured infantry brigades, for example, is hard to justify unless any of these nations intend to engage in large-scale war fighting abroad. Nor is it necessarily the right basis for reconstituting forces to meet a gradually reviving threat from the East, given the further transformations in warfare that might be expected over the long timescales involved. Hopkinson concludes that shifting more resources away from what are essentially cold-war defence configurations would allow the Nordic countries to contribute more in the dimensions of crisis management, where they excel, as well as fine-tuning the military input to their new ‘homeland security’ challenges. For all of them it would, of course, also imply entering more fully into a collective defence mentality.

Hopkinson's use of universal, 'ideal' defence planning principles bears dividends notably in illuminating the features common to all four countries addressed, regardless of their different alliance statuses. In reality, the way in which these issues are discussed within each state depends greatly on national circumstances, and on the particular institutional agendas for change in which each country is embroiled. Social, political, regional and industrial factors all complicate the path to reform. Nevertheless, it is perhaps this complexity that gives value to the attempt by an impartial but friendly outsider to illuminate the issues from a fresh angle. At the least, we hope that this Policy Paper will provide stimulus for further national and comparative debates, and I would like to thank both William Hopkinson for writing it and Angelina Sanderson for the editing.

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Acronyms

AIDS	Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BW	Biological weapon(s)
C ⁴ I	Computers, command, control, communications and intelligence
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CW	Chemical weapon(s)
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EEA	European Economic Area
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty)
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MBT	Main battle tank
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, biological and chemical (weapons)
NCM	Nordic Council of Ministers
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NORDAC	Nordic Armaments Co-operation
Nordcaps	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PSO	Peace support operation
R&D	Research and development
SARS	Severe acute respiratory syndrome
Shirbrig	Standby High Readiness Brigade
Swedint	Swedish International Command
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

‘Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power.’¹

There are many threats in the current security agenda that call for collaborative international action: they include environmental degradation, organized crime, disease, natural disaster, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sometimes collaboration is political or diplomatic, and sometimes it is economic. In other cases, security needs will require either the direct application of force or the use of organized, disciplined groups that may ultimately have to use force to protect themselves and others. Javier Solana, the European Union (EU) High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), pointed out: ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention. We should think particularly of operations involving both military and civilian capabilities’.²

Multinational cooperation in cases potentially involving the use of force is necessary in order to acquire legitimacy and sufficient resources and assets to enable participants to put personnel and equipment—whether for disaster relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement—on the ground in distant places; very few countries have sufficient resources of their own to do this. The focus of this policy paper is on how European countries might better prepare themselves to meet the requirements of the current security agenda, for cooperation in action either with the United States, or with other European countries; either in ad hoc coalitions, or under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the EU.

The present study, although intended to be of general application, focuses on the four Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden³—for three reasons. First, none of them is a full member of both the EU and NATO, and there should be some lessons to be drawn from that. Second, some of them have a laudable record of being serious about defence, from which there may be general security lessons for other European countries. The obverse is that, in any or all of these states, national institutions and assets which were of great relevance during the cold war may no longer be appropriate and may be consuming resources that could be better applied in other ways. Producing less of what is not required would enable each of the Nordic countries to produce more of what is needed. They might very usefully stimulate other European countries to follow their example.

¹ Blair, T. (British Prime Minister), ‘Prime Minister’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange’, Prime Minister’s Office, 6 Oct. 2000, URL <<http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3384.asp>>.

² Solana, J., ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, European Council, Council of Ministers, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003, URL <<http://ue.eu.int/solana/list.asp?BID=111>>.

³ Iceland is excluded from this study of the Nordic region because it does not possess military forces.

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Finally, the Nordic countries often have an outward vision that has led to their enthusiastic involvement in certain international organizations and activities. There is a paradox, however: each of the four countries supports the United Nations (UN), humanitarian action and the rule of international law, but each has shunned complete engagement in the EU and NATO. There is a sense of deep-seated nationalism in their various rejections of aspects of these organizations. Norway is a strongly Atlanticist member of NATO, but it does not station troops abroad and it does not participate in collective defence outside its area. Denmark also does not have troops stationed abroad and has EU opt-outs.⁴ Finland and Sweden are not NATO members and in 2003 Sweden voted against joining the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Providing capabilities

The USA has by far the greatest power-projection capabilities and the world's strongest military forces. It can deploy forces and equipment almost anywhere, and it can maintain and direct them while deployed. For the most part, the USA seeks to do this for hard, war-fighting purposes. Most European countries of comparable wealth per capita are unable to make appropriate contributions to large-scale and distant operations, even though they may have important skills and a great willingness to help with the problems of poorer or afflicted countries. The result is that in many cases the USA has to act, or the necessary steps will not be taken. However, the USA will understandably have its own priorities and concerns. It may be unwilling to act when and in the manner that some European countries would wish. (There are significant unilateralist tendencies in the Administration of President George W. Bush.) Even if the USA is willing to act, it may call upon others to join it. Unless other countries help, they cannot hope to have a significant voice in what is done or how.

European overseas engagements that involve either the use or the potential use of force, that call for sending personnel and equipment long distances, and require international collaboration (as they almost always will) will need to build on current planning arrangements and political coordination. Overseas operations may sometimes involve the USA, but they are increasingly likely not to involve the USA. In either case, they are likely to necessitate the use of machinery and institutions now found within NATO or the EU. Membership of either organization or of both may not be feasible for all countries; in those cases where it is not, an alternative route to effective cooperation must be found. Unless that is achieved, European countries will not be able to exercise appropriate influence in decisions that affect them or the rest of the world. Nor will they be able, as rich and successful nations, to aid the less fortunate countries of the world and give effect to their strongly felt commitment to international order. Institutional membership can be a

⁴ Holm, H.-H., 'Factsheet Denmark: foreign and defence policy', Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2003, URL <http://www.um.dk/english/faktaark/fa06/fa06_eng.asp>.

very significant political issue, as can the participation of non-members in an organization's activities. However, for the purposes of enabling countries to act, those are second-order matters. If capabilities and assets are developed, they can be used either in ad hoc cooperative action, or in EU- or NATO-coordinated action. If capabilities and assets are not developed, there cannot be satisfactory participation, regardless of whether or not a country is a member of the EU or NATO.

The task of determining the shape and size of national armed forces has become more difficult and complex since the end of the cold war owing to changes in the nature of security and the threats to it, changes in the roles of military forces and other organizations, and changes in international institutions and their functioning. These changes have affected no region more than that of northern and western Europe.

The factors that affect decisions on how much to spend on armed forces, how to organize them and how to equip them include considerations of resources—how much can be afforded, how many men are of military age and what other calls on manpower exist; political desires—what the government or the society wishes to do; and political constraints—existing beliefs, self-images or ways in which the society functions that are inconsistent with certain actions, however logical those actions may be. Linked to the last two considerations are national (and possibly regional) traditions of conducting certain activities in certain ways.

Tradition may affect a society generally, or a particular segment such as the armed forces. It may have good or bad effects, such as producing young men willing to do their duty, even at the risk of death, for the honour of the regiment or cavalymen who cling to the horse in the era of the tank. Tradition may also be an excuse for inertia: it may be easier to continue misallocating resources than to improve public welfare by redirecting them. Thus, bases with no military function may remain open in order to aid local economies, even though better assistance could be given by allocating resources to civilian projects. Such considerations raise important questions for general economic and defence industrial policy, which are relevant to improving the output of European force structures, yet go beyond the scope of the present paper.

In principle, the process of force planning (and this goes beyond the strictly military sphere) should begin by examining the threats. The next step would be to consider what measures, and thus what resources, are necessary to respond to identified threats, and then to provide for the necessary measures. In practice, this process is rarely possible. Not only do the factors stated above impede what can be done, but so also do legacies in the sense of established structures, trained personnel and existing equipment. These impose constraints on rational adaptation in the face of rapidly changing threats.

The need for defence

For the first time in history, there is very little threat of external state aggression against the countries of northern and western Europe, although the international

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territories owned by France and the United Kingdom may make them more vulnerable to threats. As regards the Nordic countries, none has overseas possessions that might be the subject of attack. Classic defence of territory can hardly, therefore, provide a justification for their allocation of scarce resources. Instead, there are five other areas in which military expenditure can be justified: (a) maintaining skills and capacities to reconstitute the ability to defend against attack if the international situation should change in the long term; (b) being prepared to support the partners, allies and other countries in which the Nordic countries have a particular interest; (c) responding to the new security agenda, including the current (and largely non-military) threats to the Nordic countries' direct well-being; (d) preparing to assist other countries that are experiencing security threats, even though the Nordic countries have no direct interest in the matter (this contingency may arise under the security agenda of the EU or NATO, to which member states have subscribed for wider reasons, and it could certainly include security activities such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement); and (e) defending the regional and global interests (including economic aspects such as energy, tourism, trade and investment markets) of the Nordic countries and their partners against adverse developments.

Obviously, these factors overlap, and action under one may contribute to avoiding the need for action under another at a later time. In particular, strengthening the application of international law may produce beneficial effects by deterring other would-be malefactors from undesirable behaviour.

The role of armed forces

It is commonplace to believe that armed forces are state-controlled and -funded bodies whose ultimate function is the application of force, lethal if necessary, for the protection of a state's security. Closer examination suggests that this is too simple an analysis. Today, many members of European armed forces are not engaged, nor are they expected to engage, in lethal action. Some gather intelligence; others are logistics experts, skilled mechanical and electronics engineers, or policy advisers; and some destroy arms. In fact, many of those who are trained for combat are engaged in addressing complex security situations where lethal force is avoided by all means possible. They may be working on behalf of their own governments or for international organizations. Other members of the armed services (and sometimes the same ones) are called upon to assist in natural disasters, refuse disposal and firefighting. In short, members of armed forces are subject to direct governmental authority and have skills and equipment that enable governments to respond to challenges, both in their own countries and elsewhere, that could not otherwise be addressed so promptly.

At the same time, functions that were previously undertaken by members of the armed forces are now being devolved to civilian contractors or civilian agencies. These include logistics, maintenance tasks and training, as well as some security duties (e.g., the guarding of installations and mine clearance). Thus, the defined

role of armed forces is changing, and in order to meet the new security agenda it needs to change further. The old divisions between the military and civilians are no longer appropriate, difficult as it may be to redraw them.

Regional interests in stability

All European states have a general interest in tranquillity at home and in a peaceful world in which trade and economic progress can take place. More specifically, they have an obvious interest in stability in neighbouring territories. There is a major European interest in establishing lasting peace and order in the Balkans, which will demand complex efforts for many years. To the east lie Russia and some other former Soviet republics. They pose no current military threat, but they are turbulent, crime-ridden and sometimes the source of trafficking in arms, drugs and people. Creating stability in the former Soviet Union will generally not involve military commitment, but it may require some peacekeeping and policing duties. There will certainly have to be close cooperation with the authorities of these states, both to help them stabilize their own countries and to deal with the overspill of problems from them. The latter will require cooperative efforts on border management, and helping Russia and other states to understand that visas and customs regulations—rather than classic geopolitical considerations—are security necessities for their western borders. It may also be desirable to cooperate with them in coping with disasters, man-made or natural, both on general humanitarian grounds and to prevent indirect effects.

Many of the same security considerations, but with important modifications, apply to the states in the Near and Middle East and North Africa. For a variety of reasons, they are likely to prove less stable and more difficult to help than the former republics of the Soviet Union. European countries may want to contribute non-military assistance in the classic sense; however, there will be harder security issues, particularly terrorism and violent crime, that will require the understanding and application of force. There may also be some difficult peacekeeping to do in the Near and Middle East and North Africa, as well as civilian evacuation. There will certainly be issues of maritime policing in order to keep shipping lanes open (and sometimes to blockade them).

Europe's major interests in the Middle East are threefold, starting with the dependence of Europe and the rest of the world on Middle Eastern energy. If substantial parts of that oil supply were cut off, the global economy would falter. Second, the area is a potential source of terrorism. Third, Europe has an interest in cultivating, to some degree, a common international agenda with the USA. Given US interest and involvement in the Middle East, European countries must at least examine the extent to which they can collaborate with the USA there. That could involve serious war fighting as well as other long-running engagements.

In addition to the above common interests, some European countries have specific individual interests arising from cultural or economic ties. This means that there will be a willingness in some countries to intervene, for example, in Central

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Africa, despite the lack of a general European interest there, because of their desire to relieve misery or prevent crimes against humanity.

Threats to security

Local threats can be very demanding, particularly for small or poor states, and there is often good reason for others to assist, whatever the category of threat. If a threat is regional or global it cannot be tackled by one country alone, even the richest or most powerful. Globalization is a phenomenon that has attracted more attention than understanding. It stands for the interconnectedness of life in the current age, with a variety of links—economic, political and social—across international borders. Globalization involves a decreasing ability of the state to conduct its own affairs in isolation. With globalization come problems of all sorts that cross borders, and tackling them will require coordinated effort.

Information, people and goods can move worldwide with a speed and in quantities that are unprecedented. This also applies to diseases. The result is a bundle of potential threats to well-being: some are consciously generated, such as terrorism and trafficking; some are the by-product of human action but not of deliberate decisions to pose a threat, as is the case with global warming; and other threats are the result of human behaviour and social constructs, such as the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). These various threats overlap: there are obvious links between some instances of crime and terrorism; poverty and misery can lead to a desperate desire to move from a country, and can also breed terrorism or gangsterism; and disease can lead to economic collapse, giving rise to some of the foregoing.

Deciding which threats a given country should address is difficult. It is even more difficult to decide on the appropriate policies and instruments to address the problem, especially if this involves international cooperation. However, it is essential for all governments to make these decisions, which impact directly on domestic and international affairs. If countries such as Norway or Sweden believe that genocide in Central Africa is unacceptable, they need to take steps to enable effective action. This belief must be considered when evaluating what sort of armed forces they require.

International structures

Taking into account threats to international security, it is clear that enhancing security will require collaboration between countries, both near and distant. Collaboration should address information or intelligence gathering, collective policing of international borders, and joint action on both the causes and the symptoms of security problems. It will have to address both imminent threats and the long-term conditions from which they may spring. Much, if not most, of the action will be complex and will not involve the use of force: it will include assistance and aid,

diplomacy, and education. Regrettably, however, dealing with terrorists and certain other criminal elements will demand the capacity to apply force at times. So, too, will preventing genocide and maintaining order in collapsed states.

Whether or not the action involves the use of force, a major consideration will be with what partners, and in what framework, European states should coordinate security activities. That has never been an easy question and is made more difficult by recent and ongoing changes in the international system and in the role and functions of the various structures that exist. The principal organizations relevant to this study are the EU, NATO and the UN; all have been damaged by the inept diplomacy that preceded the 2003 Iraq war. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have important functions, but they are not as relevant in this context. There are also regional groups in northern Europe that are important and need to be considered when matters of joint procurement, role specialization or sharing infrastructure enter into planning.

NATO is an important actor in setting military standards, providing or multiplying military capabilities, and potentially establishing a link to US forces and assets. New threats may need new instruments. The EU may become particularly relevant given the range of tools—economic, financial, diplomatic and others—at its disposal. The UN is irreplaceable as an authorizing and legitimating body; it may also have some important executive roles in state building and humanitarian relief. However, the UN is not likely to be the leading executor of hard security operations. When it comes to such operations, collaboration between the EU and NATO will raise important questions that vitally affect the size, shape and interoperability of European military forces.

2. International cooperation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO has proclaimed for itself, in both of the alliance's New Strategic Concept documents published since the end of the cold war, a variety of missions and functions.⁵ Those documents did not fully measure up to reality. However, recent events, for example its involvement in Afghanistan, have started to give NATO some real relevance, as have the more concrete aspects of its collaboration with Russia and its operations in the Balkans. There may be considerable doubts as to NATO's long-term future, but at least three substantial functions can be seen for it at present.

1. *The provision of military standards and procedures.* There are no other common standards as important as those developed in NATO, and de facto they are the nearest there is to a universal standard. Ironically, they are ceasing to be the standard for NATO's leading member, the USA, which is pulling far ahead of its allies and all other states in its technological developments.

2. *A political framework for the assimilation or at any rate introduction of European non-members to Western defence cooperation structures.* Paradoxically, at the same time, the alliance long ago ceased to be the principal forum for consultation among its long-standing members on security matters.

3. *An organization, with staffs and certain assets, for the conduct of military operations,* although not in the foreseeable future for war fighting. Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 was NATO's first and probably last war.

NATO has other functions that have been important in the past and to which some countries still attach great importance. Most significant among them is its role as a link between Europe and the USA. The USA has used NATO as a means of controlling and influencing European defence and foreign policies. That role seemed to slip from prominence after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, and under the Bush Administration some senior members have been reported to be openly scathing about the alliance. However, in the light of US reactions to European efforts in 2003 to pull together more effective defence capabilities in a non-NATO (EU) context, it would appear that the NATO link might once more be assuming importance in Washington.⁶ That said, there is every indication that the

⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'The alliance's New Strategic Concept', Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7–8 Nov. 1991, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>>; and 'The alliance's Strategic Concept', Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, 23–24 Apr. 1999, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

⁶ US spokesperson criticized the proposals of some EU members for separate multilateral headquarters staffs as threatening NATO's primacy. Spiegel, P. and Blitz, J., 'US dismay over Blair's stance on EU defence', *Financial Times*, 16 Oct. 2003, p. A1.

USA, after Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, is not interested in using NATO for serious war fighting.

European motives for maintaining the transatlantic link via NATO are varied. Some former Warsaw Pact member states fear that Russia may one day return as a threatening factor. Some of them—and some smaller western ones—have similar feelings about Germany, or at any rate about the undesirability of the larger European states managing European affairs too closely. Other European countries, such as the UK, believe strongly in the significance of a tight link with the USA, despite the absence of any perceived threat to European security in which such a link might help. A less extreme form of this position is the recognition that European states still lack many military capabilities, and, when there are security challenges that require those, US involvement is essential. The obverse of this position is that, since the mid-1990s, NATO has enabled European countries to participate in peace support operations (PSOs) *after* the USA has waged war, thus supporting the USA in tasks that would otherwise be beyond its capabilities and spreading the security burden.

Transatlantic relations have for some time been strained for a variety of reasons, including differences over the role of international law, the functioning of the international system and US unilateralism. NATO has also suffered for some of the same reasons and because, despite great efforts, since the cold war it has not been able to find a role as predominant as its former one. NATO cannot hope to regain its former importance in binding the USA and Europe together, politically or strategically. However, it plays an indispensable role by providing for military standardization, force planning, and command and control assets. Any European state that wishes to be a serious military player should try to conserve what can be saved from NATO's assets and capabilities, and to use any tools that can be made available.

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) has enabled non-NATO members, whether potential members of NATO or not, to engage effectively with its mechanisms and thus enhance their own capability, as well as overall European capability.⁷ The PFP is not meant to be the exact template for how EU states that are not members of NATO should coordinate with NATO members, but it is helpful in defining how the relationships and capabilities could be enhanced. The major future technical problem with such NATO-based cooperation is the extent to which the USA's capabilities will outstrip the ability of European armed forces to engage with them, whether by forming niche capabilities or operating as a major component of a US-led force.

⁷ *NATO Handbook*, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, chapter 3, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm>>.

The European Union

The EU has been very successful in the economic area and in enhancing stability and security in Europe. It is only on the threshold, however, of becoming a hard security or military actor. Since the bilateral UK–French St Malo initiative of 1998⁸ and the formal launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the Helsinki Summit of 1999,⁹ there have been many fine words, but relatively little concrete progress in enabling the rich states of western Europe to assume security responsibilities more commensurate with their needs and potential abilities. They still lack many necessary assets and capabilities. Resources will not be forthcoming to enable European states to duplicate the full range of assets that the USA can make available through NATO (and suggestions that there might be duplication, in any case, raise loud US objections). Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the EU, or coalitions of European states, will need to collaborate with the USA, either directly or via NATO, for its most serious military tasks.

There is much that the EU, its members or other European countries can do with comparatively modest expenditure to make themselves more effective partners of the USA—if the USA really wants partners. Improving efficiency will be vital to enhancing European capabilities. That means more rational procurement, division of support and infrastructure costs, role specialization and identification of Europe's security needs in the light of the current security agenda. Doing that involves ascertaining European interests, the threats to them and the means of countering those threats. Considering the nature of today's globalized society, such assessments can only be made on the basis of something wider than the individual country. As of yet neither the EU nor NATO provides a complete response to this need, although sensible use of both should eventually provide new mechanisms. Meanwhile, the current informal and formal Nordic defence cooperation may provide useful pointers for the rest of Europe.

There is, of course, the question of why the EU would want to become a hard security actor rather than its members relying on NATO. There are several answers to that question.

1. Despite considerable efforts at reform, NATO is not well geared to respond to current security concerns; something more is required. In principle, the EU offers a much wider range of tools, although it needs to evolve comprehensive security policies to draw all of the elements together.

2. As a member of NATO, the USA is a source of both strength and weakness for the organization. If the USA is not engaged, then the other members cannot readily make NATO function. The USA may also sometimes seek to block action.

⁸ 'UK–French Summit St Malo, 3–4 Dec. 1998', ed. M. Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents*, Chaillot Paper no. 47 (Imprimerie Alençonnaise: Paris, May 2001), URL <<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3>>.

⁹ 'EU security policy and the role of the European Commission', European Union, Dec. 2002, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/index.htm>.

3. Not all the EU members are members of NATO and not all NATO members are members of the EU.

4. As a global economic and political actor, the EU needs to be able to implement security policies that meet its regional needs, which may differ from the USA's policy.

Consideration of such things led European heads of state and governments to decide upon having a CFSP and to adopt the 1999 Helsinki decision on ESDP.¹⁰ What now remains is to consolidate those decisions and give appropriate effect to them.

A start on the task was made at the 1999 Helsinki Summit by defining the Headline Goal.¹¹ It called on European states to produce a force of up to 60 000 personnel, to be projected and maintained in the field for a year. The demand was relatively low, given the size of EU members' armed forces and the fact that the UK alone was able to commit some 40 000 personnel for the 2003 Iraq war. Nevertheless, the Headline Goal poses real difficulties for the EU, and without a disproportionate British contribution it can now be met only with great difficulty. Europe has too many troops of the wrong type, too much unsuitable equipment, and not nearly enough modern assets that would give deployability, flexibility and sustainability.

The Headline Goal was fixed before the most recent security demands became clear, when Europe did not have a strategy or a strategic concept. That has now been remedied in part by the decisions of the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003.¹² That meeting approved a statement on the means of dealing with WMD.¹³ It also approved the paper, 'A secure Europe in a better world', by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, which analysed certain threats facing Europe—terrorism, WMD, and failed states and the organized crime they foster. Solana's paper concluded that 'if we want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, we should be ready to act when the rules are broken'.¹⁴

¹⁰ From 1970 until 1993, EU members participated in the European Political Cooperation (EPC). In 1993, the 1997 Treaty of Maastricht replaced the EPC. Since 1999, the CFSP has been based on Articles 11–28 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 'Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy', Council of the European Union, URL <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/intro_pesc/pres.asp?lang=en#SCRL1>.

¹¹ 'EU security policy and the role of the European Commission' (note 9).

¹² 'Thessaloniki European Council, 19–20 June 2003: Presidency conclusions', Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek Presidency of the EU, URL <<http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/6/20/3121/>>.

¹³ 'Basic principles for an EU strategy against weapons of mass destruction', Council of Ministers 10353/03, Council of the European Union, URL <<http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf>>.

¹⁴ Solana (note 2).

Nordic arrangements

Close contacts between the countries of the Nordic region date back to the Middle Ages; there were cultural and linguistic affinities but also great tensions and sometimes violent struggles. Modern relationships date back to the years following World War II, when there was an abortive attempt to form a Nordic Defence Union. Although that did not come to fruition, certain institutional arrangements for cooperation were set in place in 1952 with the establishment of the framework for the Nordic Council. The Nordic Council framework is a joint forum for discussion and cooperation between parliaments and governments that does not, however, deal in hard security. The framework for the Nordic Council was extended in 1971 with the addition of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM).¹⁵

In the 1990s, cooperation between the Nordic countries was expanded to include issues arising in adjacent areas, such as the Baltic Sea, the Barents and Arctic regions, and in European cooperation, especially in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) frameworks. New sub-regional forums were created. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), founded in 1992, has 12 members and seeks to achieve democratic development in the Baltic Sea region, a greater unity between the member countries and favourable economic development.¹⁶ The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), with seven members, provides a forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues concerning the Barents region.¹⁷ Both these organizations touch upon items in the new security agenda, but they are not places where military cooperation normally takes place. However, cooperation between the Baltic Sea countries on border and coastal control is being developed within the framework of the Baltic Sea Regional Border Control Cooperation Conference and the operational committee for the Task Force on Combating Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region.¹⁸

In the military area, there is close collaboration within the Nordic defence ministers' Nordic Armaments Co-operation (NORDAC), which was launched in 1994 by the signing of a Framework Agreement by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.¹⁹ This provides a basis for cooperation on research and development (R&D), production, procurement and maintenance of defence materiel. After two years of pre-feasibility studies on a possible common submarine project, a permanent project group was established in 1997; Denmark and Sweden have decided to continue into a Project Definition Phase. A common Nordic Standard

¹⁵ On the Nordic Council and Council of Ministers see URL <<http://www.nordic.org>>.

¹⁶ The 12 members are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the EU. On the CBSS see URL <<http://www.cbss.st/>>.

¹⁷ The 7 members are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission. On the BEAC see URL <<http://www.beac.st/>>.

¹⁸ On the Task Force on Combating Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region see URL <<http://www.balticseataskforce.dk/>>.

¹⁹ 'Nordic defence materiel cooperation (NORDAC)', Ministry of Defence of Finland, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/page_id/128/topmenu_id/5/menu_id/128/this_topmenu/71/lang/3/fs/12>.

Helicopter has been procured under an agreement signed in November 2000, and is now being manufactured for Finland, Norway and Sweden.²⁰

Operational cooperation had meanwhile been strengthened in 1997 by the creation of the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (Nordcaps).²¹ The aim was to strengthen the existing military cooperation for UN matters. The founding members were Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; Iceland joined in 2003. Earlier that year, Nordcaps adopted a 'Level of Ambition' for a land force of brigade size, including some role specialization, but did not reach consensus on air and naval forces.

²⁰ Ministry of Defence of Finland (note 19).

²¹ On Nordcaps see URL <<http://www.nordcaps.org/>>.

3. European interests

Europe is an ill-defined concept. In purely geographical terms it extends from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean. Turkey, therefore, largely falls outside Europe, except for Turkish Thrace and Constantinople. Western Russia, on the other hand, is included in the definition of Europe. However, Turkey is a candidate for the EU; Russia is far from that, as are Belarus and Moldova. Some Central Asian states are members of the OSCE, but can in no logical sense be considered a part of Europe. An oversimplified, yet reasonable, working definition to identify common European interests (particularly bearing in mind the problems of the western Balkans and the aspirations of countries there) for the purposes of this paper is to consider the interests of countries on the eastern side of the Atlantic that are or will by 2004 be members of the EU or NATO. That still leaves a very diverse spread, especially between those that were incorporated into the former Soviet alliance system before 1989 and those incorporated into western Europe. Even the latter show considerable diversity between north and south, and between countries that have long been prosperous and functioning societies and countries that have only recently emerged from poverty and in some cases dictatorship. Nevertheless, at a general level, a number of common concerns can be established.

Peace in Europe

First, and obviously, the preservation of peace in Europe—and hence the absence of threats of aggression or overspilling turbulence from neighbours—is a prime interest. Countries in Europe have largely accomplished this. A second common concern is the removal of direct threats from states outside the area. Again, for the most part, almost all European nations are in a fortunate position; the most exposed is Turkey, with its Middle Eastern borders. Very few outside states wish to threaten individual European countries, and even fewer are in a position to do so.

Humanitarian engagement

There is a strong current of opinion in Europe that favours aid and humanitarian action. The EU and its members are by far the largest donors of foreign aid. There is a long tradition of European contributions to peacekeeping, even in areas where engagement can bring no direct benefit. Many European countries perhaps lack the vision of or inclination towards geopolitics, but there is widespread consciousness of at least some aspects of the outside world and of the burdens carried by the masses of disadvantaged. Meeting aspirations to be a good neighbour or a good world citizen legitimately describes, in part, European interests. Supporting a system of international relations in which the rule of law is upheld is conducive to

European interests in the long term. What may be lacking is a clear understanding of what is required to give effect to those aspirations.

Prosperity

All European countries have a major interest in a functioning and prosperous world economy. This applies in different ways to the economically developed states, which need stability and trade to maintain their standards of living, and to the relatively impoverished states, which need to develop their economies and societies. All countries need a stable supply of energy and raw materials. Thus, instability in areas such as the Middle East, which provides almost 30 per cent of the world's crude oil production,²² is an important problem for the global economy. The threats to the world economic system relate to protectionism and bad governance. However, major crime may also undermine it.

European countries cannot achieve stability in all regions on their own, even when acting collectively. The problems in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s demonstrated that the European countries were not able to manage even modest military and international security matters without assistance. Europe, with all its wealth and political development, is still very weak militarily.

The role of the USA in global security

Since the USA has a major interest in global stability, European nations could choose to leave all the necessary military work to the USA. That might be economically rational. The USA can be counted on to pursue (at least some) terrorists, it will safeguard Persian Gulf oil, and it will resist (in most cases) the further proliferation of WMD. However, if European countries choose to free ride, they will certainly not be in a position to press their views, and they might find that the issues that the USA is concerned with do not match their own interests. For example, long-term engagement by the United States in the Balkans region seems unlikely, as does significant involvement in Africa. Even if the priorities coincide, how the USA chooses to tackle the problems might not be agreeable to European states, which might then be faced with what they regard as less than optimal outcomes. Finally, the USA might tire of carrying the burden alone and demand compensation, to which the European countries might be reluctant to agree. An arrangement in which the USA did all the fighting and European states the peacekeeping, economic support and civilian work (including policing) would not be stable. It would breed resentment. Moreover, important elements of political power, necessary for diplomatic work and reconstruction, come only from military capability.

²² International Energy Association (IEA), *Key World Energy Statistics: 2003* (IEA: Paris, 2003), URL <<http://www.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/bookshop/add.aspx?id=144>>.

If European countries want to have their security needs addressed and influence the decisions taken in places such as the Balkans region and Africa, then they will have to engage and play their part. That part will probably include undertaking actions, both within and outside of Europe, that require the use of military forces in combat roles. However, many situations require much more than military effort to stabilize them (although force or the threat of force may be necessary) and demand concerted international effort. That will be true of situations in the Balkans, eastern Europe and, ultimately, North Africa and the Middle East—all areas in which European countries have a major concern about stability, not least if they become bases for crime or terrorist activity.

Engaging the USA in European security

During the cold war there was an imperative need to bind the USA directly to European security. There was also a major US interest in being so engaged: its own security was directly at stake. However, circumstances are now different, and the need to incorporate the USA, and how that might be done, have to be re-examined. There are three principal ways that circumstances have changed. First, there is an absence of external military threats that require the might of the USA to deter. Second, the need to constrain strong European states from dominating the smaller ones (at least by force) has dissipated, largely because of the EU. Third, the evolution of US interests and policies has moved the USA away from the (average) views of European states, and the terms on which it might be prepared to engage may no longer be acceptable. This is not to say that Europe should seek to rival or challenge the USA—only that careful consideration is necessary before accepting the premise that Europe still needs to engage the USA in its own military security affairs, which may come only at a high price.

In the past, the USA sometimes asserted that it would engage in military matters only if European countries made an effort. That pressure certainly bore some fruit. On the other hand, with the knowledge that the USA would defend Europe, if only in its own profound interest, European states did not strive as they could and should have done to develop their military capability. For the future, it is clear that the only chance, if any, of securing continued US engagement on anything other than purely US terms will depend on European states' willingness and ability to contribute their share to tackling security challenges together with the USA.

The implications for Europe of seeking to develop its military strategy are complex. Maintaining a degree of military interoperability, or at least a capacity for cooperability, with the USA is a European interest; whether it can be done remains to be seen. The advanced development of the US military will pose major problems—both technical and doctrinal—for any country operating alongside it.

The USA often had reservations about spreading integration into the security field. However, for a considerable period after World War II, US policy embraced European integration. That may no longer be the case: some members of the current US Administration appear to see attractions in 'divide and rule'. The USA

may seek to act through ad hoc coalitions as its preferred way of responding to crises, rather than working with the EU and NATO. Therefore, tackling security threats with the USA may become procedurally as well as substantively difficult.

Having a voice in the international arena

In addition to specific material interests, all countries have concerns of another sort: that their voice should be heard in the international arena. This sort of concern ranges from the psychological need to feel important, to the political need to be seen as a credible international actor. During the cold war, western Europe's most important interests were very clear and US engagement gave effect to them. Psychological and political interests were generally subsumed in the greater security concerns. There were undoubtedly many occasions of differences of opinion over the handling of the Soviet Union or the appropriate military technology, and sometimes over extra-European conflicts as well, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis or the 1965–1973 Viet Nam War, and over various issues involving China. However, the overriding need for solidarity against the USSR meant that these disagreements did not fundamentally divide Europe from the United States. It cannot be assumed that this will be the case in future disagreements.

There are strong currents of unilateralism in US policy, which are reinforced—however illogically, given the need for international cooperation to deal with terrorism—by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. As a result, the United States addresses its own interests and pursues them in a manner it determines to be best, with very little consideration for European concerns and interests. In addition, the military, economic and, thus, political pre-eminence of the USA and the increasing weight of other players, such as China, mean that other smaller countries acting alone have very little control over the global political and economic environment.

In an era of globalization with several other major players and external pressures of various sorts against open and liberal societies, European governments can only accomplish what their citizens expect by acting collectively. In this way countries can hope to make a significant impact on the operation of the international system and the transnational problems that they face. The great question is the choice of partners and institutional frameworks, such as the CFSP and the ESDP.

Not all European countries are members of the EU or are likely to become so in the near future. Some countries, such as Norway, have declined the option of joining; other countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro, are not ready to join. Nevertheless, the EU is the organization most likely to be the instrument that safeguards and maintains the interests of all European countries. That is true of the economic sphere, of much of the foreign policy sphere, and increasingly of the security sphere—although not with issues concerning territorial defence, which is either a national matter or a matter for NATO.

To demonstrate the general need for collective action, it is useful to use the example of Norway, a firm supporter of the transatlantic relationship. Within

global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the UN, Norway is too small to be able to exercise any leverage against decisions made by the United States. With the changed security environment, the USA, grateful as it is for Norwegian support in places such as Afghanistan, would not weigh its relations with Norway more heavily than its relations with Russia. For countries in the Nordic region, the integration of Russia into the European order is a major objective. The USA has played a major role in that, and will probably continue to do so, but the European countries are the ones which share the continent with Russia and will have a direct and probably increasingly important role to play. In dealing with Russia, Norway's weight would be small if taken alone. When acting with Nordic or other European partners, its voice would be greater, and Russia's main interlocutor on matters affecting Europe will be the EU. In any case, on almost all issues of international relations Norway's sense of what is appropriate would be closer to that of other European states than to that of the United States.

Winning the peace

As the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated, it is not sufficient to win a battle or even a war. One goes to war to achieve peace. That may be much more difficult and take a much longer time. Winning the war may be a necessary part, but it is unlikely to be sufficient for many of the security problems confronting the West in the coming decades. The types of effort and capabilities necessary to win the peace, although they may involve the application of significant force, are not the same as those required for war. There are complex operations involved in remaking civil societies, developing infrastructure and economies, and combating a wide range of concomitant threats. Paradoxically, non-war activities require more manpower than fighting a war. In the 2003 Iraq war, technology aided a swift US military victory. Mobility, flexibility and technical excellence enabled relatively small numbers of soldiers to defeat the enemy in battle. Having won the battle, there were many new manpower-intensive tasks for which the forces on the ground were insufficient. If the EU or European states are to engage in difficult security tasks, the latter types of operation will have to feature in their understanding and their planning. They will also need to consider how they will contribute to security tasks that will involve serious war fighting.

4. Threats

After the cold war a different hierarchy of threats became apparent. This was due, in part, to the emergence of genuinely new problems and, in part, to the reprioritization of previously existing problems that were overshadowed by the cold war. Contemporary threats require much more emphasis on non-military means to tackle them than did the cold war confrontation. Indeed, different structures are appropriate to deal with many of the complex transnational issues involved. In the current transatlantic dialogue, terrorism and WMD have a high profile. In the Nordic region, environmental-, ecological- and health-related issues often have a greater salience; crisis management and territorial defence are the only security matters that the Nordic countries readily support by employing military forces.

Environmental and ecological problems

Environmental and ecological problems are mainly the results of human activities: industrial production, over-exploitive agriculture or fishing, military processes such as nuclear weapon testing and worn-out nuclear-propulsion, and power-generation systems. These problems are of particular concern to the Nordic countries, partly because of their acute sense of the need to safeguard the environment, and partly because of the results of the activities of the former Soviet Union and now Russia in the Nordic region. Military skills and organization may sometimes be necessary to address the problems, as will be international cooperation.

Natural disasters

Natural disasters may be the result of natural phenomena or human activity, as with the effects of global warming. They may affect one country or a whole region, as with the August 2002 Central European floods. When they strike an impoverished or undeveloped region, the damage may far exceed the capacity of the state to respond effectively.²³ It makes sense to seek international collaboration in disaster relief. Sometimes it is ad hoc; sometimes UN agencies can undertake contingency planning; and at other times regional organizations, particularly the EU or NATO, can undertake contingency planning that draws on national assets. Those assets will include military formations, transport capabilities and equipment. Disaster relief cannot be the main driver for having military forces, but it may help a country to decide how to shape its military's size and capabilities, particularly since defence against major terrorist attacks requires similar preparations.

²³ Even the Soviet Union found itself unable to cope adequately with the Armenian earthquake of 1988.

Similar preparations are also needed when a country's domestic services collapse, whether from sabotage, accident or natural forces. Modern societies and economies are dependent to a very large degree on electricity, telephone and information technology systems. Even temporary loss of these systems can cause severe stress. When planning military strategies, countries must take these possible events into consideration and ensure that military functioning is sufficiently protected and prepared.

Disease

Leaving aside possible use of biological weapons (BW), major direct security threats from epidemic diseases are not a cause of concern to most European countries. That is not the case in Africa, where AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are causes of misery and potential economic and social collapse. If European states want to play a leading role in the world they must be prepared to help with such problems. They must also be capable of dealing with the risk of the spread of diseases to Europe, either as a consequence of normal travel or of tides of refugees. The 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was an example of what could be done, although its scale and virulence were nothing like the problems that could be caused by a major successful BW strike. European countries' planning must include preparations for responding to any BW attack. Such an attack in Europe would be most efficiently dealt with on an international basis.

Refugees and asylum seekers

Refugees and asylum seekers for the most part are not a security threat, but they can add to pressures in the host country, and some may be involved in criminal activities or terrorism. Immigration problems, especially the underlying problems that lead to such population movements, need to be considered when developing European security policy. That will require state-building activities and sometimes military intervention, as in the western Balkans in the 1990s. In the case of major population flows, armed forces might also have to be used for border reinforcement, blockades or deportation.

Crime

Crime, which has increased with globalization, is now very big business. South American drug cartels command firepower once associated only with state forces. Tackling them can require major military resources. The USA has engaged in combating organized crime, and some European countries have provided military assistance to affected countries.

Most states in western and northern Europe are too solid to be shaken badly by crime, but in weaker and poorer countries it can threaten basic institutions. Even

prosperous European states suffer great losses from crime, which can generate real feelings of insecurity in urban areas. As criminals acquire access to the latest technology, the effort and resources required to maintain order within states increase substantially. Coordination of intelligence within and between countries is necessary if law is to prevail. The effective policing of borders, sea and airspace requires military- or paramilitary-type effort and close cooperation with neighbours.

Fighting crime and advising others on fighting crime will be a major activity for European states that are engaged in state building with others, whether in the former republics of the Soviet Union, the Balkans, the Middle East or Africa. Honest and effective police forces that are able to operate in severely adverse conditions will be required during complex emergencies and their aftermaths. They will often have to operate as paramilitary forces. Given the duration of such operations, there will be a long-term need for a substantial number of personnel, able to operate together and to rotate, relieving those committed earlier.

Terrorism

There is no generally accepted useful definition of terrorism,²⁴ although the term covers a wide spectrum of groups and activities. It ranges from the lone and possibly deranged individual, to the organized group with defined and attainable objectives, to the group with millennial or totally unrealizable aims. In some cases a negotiated political settlement is possible; sometimes terrorism can only be treated as a form of crime; and at other times it is possible to address the underlying causes with economic or social development.

A range of tools is required to deal with this phenomenon. Gathering intelligence and information is a primary need. Judicial cooperation may play a role and sometimes it is necessary to apply lethal force. Some types of terrorism are now in retreat,²⁵ but the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, with their demonstration of potentially catastrophic effect, have given terrorism a renewed salience in security concerns. Many European countries have been directly afflicted in the past 30 years. In addition to threats from national or regional groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, or Basque Fatherland and Liberty) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Europe is threatened by the effect that terrorist groups may have on discontented members of immigrant groups (e.g., from the Indian subcontinent); by terrorist groups attacking non-European targets located in Europe (e.g., Israel and Turkey); and by groups such as al-Qaeda, seeking to attack the West in general.

Terrorism is the prism through which the USA currently views almost all security concerns. In 2003 it launched a major war on Iraq on the basis *inter alia* of

²⁴ Simpson, G., 'Terrorism and the law: past and present international approaches', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 23–31.

²⁵ US Department of State, 'Patterns of global terrorism 2002', Appendix H (Office of the Secretary of State: Washington, DC, Apr. 2003), URL <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20125.pdf>>.

assumed links with terrorists and it has declared that those that are not with it in its war against terrorism will be treated as enemies. Moreover, the US Administration has concluded that intense military operations are a major, if not the main, tool in countering terrorism. There is much in the analysis that is dubious, but, given the role and weight of the USA in the international system and the fact that some aspects of terrorism can be dealt with only by force, there is very little that can stop the USA. Inevitably, its beliefs and actions will have an impact on European policies.

Weapons of mass destruction

Traditionally WMD has referred to nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. In recent years the term has been extended to include (at least on occasion) radiological weapons and ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering non-conventional payloads. Leaving aside the delivery vehicles, this kind of bundling together mixes the militarily useful with the unknown and possibly useless. Radiological weapons are essentially radioactive substances scattered by a conventional explosive. They have extremely limited uses for war fighting. They might induce panic or major disruption if used on an unprotected population, but the direct casualties would scarcely be larger than those caused by their explosive content. Their radiological effect might manifest itself as a small increase in cancer cases decades later.

Chemical weapons (CW) can be tactically useful in warfare, but large quantities are required—up to hundreds and possibly thousands of tons. They can cause significant casualties if used against unprotected civilian populations, but even the most sophisticated modern kinds would have to be delivered in large quantity and dispersed effectively to cause great harm. Neither the lone terrorist nor the odd ballistic missile would easily achieve this. A more lethal effect could probably be achieved by using the same weight of conventional explosive.

Biological weapons, in theory, make a much better terrorist tool. Grams, instead of tonnes, are required to produce thousands of lethal doses and it may be possible to start an infection that is transmitted through a population. The necessary skills to make BW are becoming more widespread. However, a biological weapon is not a war-winning weapon: it takes time to have effect, it is difficult to use with precision and it is difficult to deliver lethal doses efficiently. In short, BW could be WMD and could appeal to terrorists, although so far they have been used very little.

Nuclear weapons are also WMD; they have been used in war with very high casualties. They could be used on the battlefield or in attacks on cities. Protection against their effects is very difficult, except for small numbers of people sheltered in fixed strong points. Nuclear weapons could certainly complicate the engagement of European forces in certain theatres of operations, notably the Middle East. A number of countries have made strenuous efforts to acquire them and some have

succeeded.²⁶ By 1990, Iraq was very close to success; North Korea may have WMD or at least be close to acquiring them; and Iran may also be close. Pakistan has engaged in both confrontation and a nuclear arms race with India and is a weak if not failing state.²⁷ Thus, there is legitimate concern about which states or groups might gain access to such weapons. Once a state possesses nuclear weapons it is much more difficult to coerce it or threaten it. Therefore, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major concern for Western security authorities and efforts to limit proliferation will continue, with general support from all the members of the UN Security Council and many other states as well.

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) limits very closely the legitimate possessors of nuclear weapons and has near universal membership, even if not all members abide by it.²⁸ The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) seek to prohibit the possession of CW and BW.²⁹ There are also supplier regimes that provide restrictions on the supply of materials, technology or knowledge necessary to make WMD.³⁰ Overall, the treaties and the regimes have been successful; the vast majority of states do not possess and are not pursuing such weapons and they are not readily or easily available to non-state actors. Nevertheless, the pressures from the few aspiring possessors, and the concerns over what the effects would be if they were successful—hence making them more available to terrorists—serve to keep up incentives to improve and extend the non-proliferation effort.

²⁶ Kile, S. N., 'Nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and ballistic missile defence', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), pp. 577–609.

²⁷ Ramana, M. V. and Mian, Z., 'The nuclear confrontation in South Asia', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), pp. 193–212.

²⁸ The 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 Mar. 1970; it was extended indefinitely at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. See also Bodell, N. and Wall, C., 'Annex A: Arms control and disarmament agreements', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), p. 772.

²⁹ The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (corrected version) is reproduced at URL <<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-texts.html>>. The 31 Oct. 1999 amendment to Part VI of the Verification Annex of the CWC is reproduced at URL <<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-verannex5bis.html>>. Complete lists of parties, signatory and non-signatory states are available on the SIPRI CBW Project Internet site at URL <<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-mainpage.html>>. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction is reproduced at URL <<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-text.html>>. Complete lists of parties, signatory and non-signatory states are available on the SIPRI CBW Project Internet site at URL <<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-mainpage.html>>.

³⁰ Anthony, I., 'Supply-side measures', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), pp. 727–48.

Terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction

Certain terrorist groups undoubtedly wish to gain access to WMD, although that poses very considerable difficulty for them. As regards nuclear weapons, obtaining fissile material is not easy unless it can be acquired from a state supplier. Many regimes would be reluctant to put such instruments in the hands of those whom they do not control and who might even turn against them. The alleged link between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda appeared dubious even before the 2003 intervention and few other examples have been put forward. Even with fissile material of the right sort, a terrorist group would not find it easy to make a viable weapon.³¹ Enriching uranium or producing plutonium requires significant infrastructure that cannot be easily concealed. Moreover, while the principles of nuclear weapons are well known, the applied technology is much less widely disseminated.

In fact, most terrorist groups have no interest in such weapons, if only because of the loss of sympathy for their cause that might ensue, as well as the technical difficulties. To date, there have been no mass-casualty terrorist attacks using WMD. As noted above, CW is generally unsuited for such attacks. Some attacks have been carried out with chemical or biological agents, for example, that by Aum Shinri Kyo on the Tokyo underground in 1995, which led to 12 deaths, and the anthrax letters that followed the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA.³² The latter caused five deaths and a good deal of disruption. A successful biological mass attack or a nuclear strike by a terrorist group would indeed be very serious, but there is little evidence that such an attack would be more likely in the immediate future than attacks using conventional explosives or weapons, or indeed ships or aircraft.

As well as guarding against terrorist use of WMD in the strict sense, security authorities also need to consider the threat of mass disruption and devastation caused by other means. These threats may be easier for terrorists to manipulate and may have more appeal to some groups as being a more acceptable way of attacking a state. Threats of the use of WMD, cyber attacks or disruption of transport or electricity services could cause almost as much damage (inculcating panic) as an actual CW attack. Some of the newer members of the EU and NATO, not least in the Baltic area, may be particularly fragile in the face of attacks aiming to cause disruption and devastation.

³¹ The fear that it might have succeeded would, of course, have a major inhibiting effect on Western publics, politicians and military planners.

³² Zanders, J. P., Hart, J. and Kuhlau, F., 'Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control', *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 696–704.

Counter-proliferation

To deal with both the problem of rogue states and the possible acquisition of WMD by terrorists, the USA has sought to develop counter-proliferation policies: in other words, policies designed to deal with proliferation if it should take place. This links with its pre-emptive and preventative doctrines and policies as set out in the National Security Strategy of September 2002.³³ The United States is prepared, when WMD may be involved, to move first without waiting for an imminent attack to develop.

European force planners are therefore under a twofold obligation as regards the concerns over proliferation. First, they must take into account in their work the possibility that their forces, military and others—and including those engaged in Homeland Defence—may have to cope with incidents involving the use or threatened use of WMD.³⁴ They must also, subject to national policies and strategies, consider whether counter-proliferation should be among the tasks for which their forces are designed, equipped and trained. To keep the matter in perspective, it is worth noting that European states are now threatened by far fewer NBC weapons than in the days of the former Soviet Union. At that time, WMD were deployed in great quantities far forward in Europe, backed by a trained military with doctrine and delivery vehicles. The difference, of course, is that deterrence worked vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but is much less likely to be effective against a terrorist group or some collapsing regime.

³³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Washington, DC, Sep. 2002), URL <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

³⁴ Bailes, A. J. K., 'Introduction: trends and challenges in international security', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), pp. 6–22; and Zanders, J. P., 'Weapons of mass disruption?', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (note 24), pp. 683–90.

5. Force planning

The concept of force planning is relatively simple: after defining its objectives, a country calculates what type of forces it needs to achieve them, focusing on outputs rather than inputs. However, the complications are legion. First, defining national objectives may be very difficult, and some of them may be incompatible. Second, deciding how to achieve the objectives when there is more than one possible way can be very complex, especially when there are multiple objectives and some means may serve more than one of these objectives, albeit imperfectly. Third, resources are unlikely to permit all that is desired. Fourth, there is seldom a tabula rasa: the heritage of the past, material or psychological, may present formidable obstacles. Fifth, while there is often opportunity to collaborate with other states that will individually face the same problems, there is the difficult issue of deciding who should do what, as well as the concern that the others may fail to meet their side of the bargain.

Over the years, NATO has developed a defence planning process to address these issues (except for the problems of national resources). The process has been tedious and bureaucratic and has certainly not produced ideal results, particularly since the end of the cold war.³⁵ The arrangements badly need reform. Nevertheless, the system exists and there is nothing better available on an international basis, although there are signs that some change is under way. For lack of a better structure, the NATO system will have to provide the basis for force planning for European countries that seek to act militarily with others, regardless of whether or not they are full members of NATO. NATO will provide the foundation for EU activities in the military sphere, even if particular aspects have to be modified to take into account specific EU members' and non-members' requirements.

The crucial role of the USA in global military matters

By size, military capability, expenditure, public expectation, doctrine and national strategy, the United States is the prime global actor in military security matters. It sees itself as having worldwide responsibilities that it is prepared to discharge, alone if necessary, and it is equipped to do that. However, the USA cannot deploy sufficient numbers of forces to deal with all security situations and it requires sup-

³⁵ The biennial process recommends national levels of effort and produces specific goals to promote modernization etc. but cannot compel members to comply. By 1999, EU members were obviously lacking in capabilities, hence the Defence Capabilities Initiative of the 1999 Washington Summit. 'NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative', Apr. 2000, URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>>. Since that did not lead to the desired improvements, the matter was revisited at the Prague Summit of 21 Nov. 2002, which approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment. 'Prague Summit Declaration', NATO press release (2002)127 (21 Nov. 2002), URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>.

port in both military and non-military roles.³⁶ The USA also usually perceives the political utility of acting multilaterally and for both political and military reasons may seek allies or coalition partners to engage in particular operations. In addition, by training foreign forces and supplying them with equipment, the USA garners more political influence for itself. Given other countries' lack of capabilities, these countries' force planning must consider the extent to which they are willing and able to integrate with US operations, technology and doctrine. To the extent that they are not willing to integrate with the USA, European states' force planning must also consider how and with which other states they will seek to protect their interests.

The force planning process

Force planning is an iterative process; given its complexity, it makes sense to start from processes that already exist and to build on policies that are already established. As stated above, collective European force planning would fundamentally depend on the NATO process, amplified and modified by what is necessary to give effect to the EU's CFSP and ESDP.

In order to guide national thinking about what sort of forces a nation needs and how many, planners need to consider likely scenarios of security threats, and then compile lists of tasks that should be undertaken to address them.³⁷ Having formulated potential scenarios, it is possible to derive a set of tasks necessary to support the civil authorities in dealing with such matters. Force planners then need to identify tasks that the given state absolutely must undertake on its own; a list of security requirements must be defined, quantified and prioritized so far as possible; and appropriate force structures must be organized to give the best coverage for the tasks listed. Forces that are structured for only one use are less desirable than others that are less effective at any one function but can discharge several tasks reasonably well. Decisions on organizing force structures must also be made on the basis of considerations of concurrency, likely levels of assistance and flexibility for deployment for other tasks, and existing structures and resources. The tasks that a state must undertake on its own may turn out to be substantially fewer than in the recent past.

Next come the tasks that must be undertaken but can perhaps be done best with other countries. This requires the same process as that described above, with the

³⁶ Brun-Rovet, M., 'Call to extend US Army tour of duty in Iraq', *Financial Times*, 6 Nov. 2003.

³⁷ There are arguments for doing force planning on a capability basis—i.e., to provide a range of capabilities not tied to particular scenarios. However, without scenarios as a reality check, it is difficult to know which capabilities, and how much, to provide. Useful studies were carried out in 2002–2003 by the US Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology (US-CREST) and The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on possible scenarios for EU intervention and are presented in 'Future military coalitions: the transatlantic challenge', (US-CREST: Arlington, Va., 2002). Further work is currently in hand by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), Paris, due to be published in early 2004.

added complication of several nations facing different patterns and probabilities of occurrence and concurrency. Moreover, in matters of internal security that have to be covered but are done so jointly, states may see the need to duplicate activities in order to ensure that national security is not dependent solely on other states. However, collaboration is now politically possible, and even absolutely necessary when it comes to safeguarding territorial waters or airspace or combating terrorism on home soil.

The third set of tasks is that which is desirable but not essential: in other words, where there is discretion on whether or not to act. This category includes peacekeeping and state building in the Balkans, humanitarian relief in Africa and, most difficult of all, engagement in expeditionary warfare. All of these will involve collaboration. Assumptions must be made about the duration and scale of engagement and possible partners. Assets and resources required to conduct essential tasks may also be enough to address non-essential tasks. However, this may not be the case. A predetermined framework is necessary in order to determine systematically what action to take in different circumstances and with which other country or countries to collaborate.

Uncertainties about security threat scenarios are made somewhat easier by the fact that many of the military requirements for most if not all of the scenarios set outside of states in western and northern Europe are the same, and many of the military requirements are also necessary for domestic security. Engagement relies on having flexible and deployable assets, with highly trained personnel, good communications and good intelligence. All deployments will depend on logistics and the ability to move, supply, sustain and retrieve forces sent. In short, choices are narrowed by the sort of capability that can be provided, given national interests, traditions, political climate and, inevitably, limited resources.

Current military requirements

Old-fashioned distinctions between what was required for territorial defence—under Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty)—as opposed to expeditionary warfare, have diminished.³⁸ Even if there were a need for territorial defence in Europe, it would have to be undertaken by extra-national reinforcements against a mobile and flexible enemy. There are no large forces waiting to cross the Elbe River or burst into the Finnmark (the north-

³⁸ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic’. Planning against such attacks was the core of NATO’s work during the cold war and there is general agreement that this task, to the extent that it is necessary, should remain one for NATO (or for individual countries who are not members) and not for the EU. For the North Atlantic Treaty see URL <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>>.

ernmost region of Norway). Any such forces would very rapidly overrun a local force of non-mobile, ill-trained conscripts or reservists attempting a linear defence. Under current security concerns and conditions, a mobile, flexible and deployable force would provide a better basis than a traditional national defence force would, for the regeneration or reconstitution of forces for the defence of national territory.

A crude rule of thumb is that a modern state with a west European-style economy should be able to field one properly equipped, effective and mobile army division for every 25 million inhabitants. (It should also be able to deploy one aircraft carrier for the same number of inhabitants.) The USA has a population of approximately 281 million and fields 10 army divisions and 3 marine divisions: thus, it nearly fits the formula. It also has 12 aircraft carriers, which is proportionate to its population size. The EU currently has a population of 379 million, but it can field only two fully modernized divisions—the British ones—with a number of other formations about to come into full deployability.³⁹ In addition to the lack of aircraft carriers and other deployable air assets, European countries are in no state to defend their interests worldwide, nor even in the near abroad, as was learned from the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia⁴⁰ (Kosovo) in 1991. If there are security breaches that they wish to challenge in the world, they need now to put effort and resources into making it possible. That means moving away from current patterns of expenditure, force structures, and military and security practices, and spending money much more effectively.

Europe's problem is not a shortage of soldiers, or even a lack of expenditure; it is lack of *effective* expenditure leading to inadequate equipment and personnel. EU nations had 1.6 million men under arms in 2002, NATO nations had 1.77 million, and the USA had 1.41 million.⁴¹ However, the military effectiveness of each entity is belied by its numbers. The Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson, pointed out that European countries spent 60 per cent of what the USA did and got 10 per cent of the deployable force.⁴² Recent increases in US spending mean that European nations now spend only about 40 per cent of what the USA does, and their deployable forces are even smaller. Efforts have been made in both the EU and NATO to improve European capabilities.⁴³ While there has been some progress, there is still a very long way to go. The 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands showed that by the early 1980s, the UK was capable of projecting a div-

³⁹ The UK would find it very difficult to deploy both together, at a great distance, quickly and for an extended period.

⁴⁰ Serbia and Montenegro as of Feb. 2003.

⁴¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2003/2004* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), URL <http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/hdb/Volume_103/Issue_01/>.

⁴² Vlachos-Dengler, K., *From National Champions to European Heavyweights: The Development of European Defense Industrial Capabilities Across Market Segments* (RAND: Santa Monica, 2002), URL <<http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB358>>.

⁴³ DCI and Prague on NATO (note 37); on EU, 'European Council, Helsinki, 10–11 Dec. 1999', ed. Rutten (note 8); and 'Franco-British Summit Declaration on strengthening European cooperation in security and defence', *Le Touquet*, 4 Feb. 2003, URL <<http://www.elysee.fr/actus/dep/2003/province/02-frgb-touquet/angdefsecu.htm>>.

ision size force outside Europe with some logistics and other help. Despite the efforts since then to improve European defence, that sort of operation remains the limit for any European country and beyond the capabilities of most.

Cooperation, role sharing and common support

Peacekeeping arrangements can perhaps be successfully put together ad hoc, but more difficult tasks, including peace enforcement and nation building, will almost certainly require the prior creation of multilateral arrangements and training. European states need to think creatively about international cooperation when preparing an effective response to crises that might occur. Discussions with allies and partners must cover the question of which partners will undertake which tasks in different scenarios, with the implication of at least a degree of role specialization. Role specialization has its problems, not only because it depends on all partners engaged in planning being ready to actually play their role on the day, but also because if some nations undertake all the fighting while others have only support roles there are liable to be political difficulties (about overburdening or over-exposure, respectively) on both sides. Nevertheless, some degree of specialization must be pursued, as must the sharing of infrastructure and of the various overheads involved in protecting forces.

Ideally, cooperation would range from common procurement decisions, with reductions in unit costs and logistics requirements to common training and common maintenance and supply pool. Consider the simplification if there were only one set of truck spares to be held, distributed and used between countries. It would be prudent to avoid having only one supply or maintenance depot for a particular function lest it become unavailable in a crisis, but there is great scope to improve on current, often almost entirely national, arrangements.

Such standing arrangements (whether or not they are made in the form of a military alliance as previous ones have been) and cooperative military operations would raise political problems both for countries that have concerns about non-members of NATO having a role in European military security and for countries that have had a policy of non-membership of alliances. However, confronting and resolving such problems is essential if European states are to develop effective military capacity that addresses current needs. It will also be essential if they are to play their roles as allies or partners and be able to defend their global interests. Few European countries will be able to undertake even the simplest tasks and only one or two will be able to engage in serious war fighting on their own.

The appropriate partners for operational cooperation may not, of course, be the same countries with which industrial or procurement collaboration seems most attractive. Existing holdings of equipment and different security needs may make full rationalization in the choice of partners impossible. It will be important, however, to achieve the greatest degree possible of interoperability between potential partners, which should be reflected in the specifications and choices for equipment.

In principle, NATO could provide everything that is necessary for a framework for cooperation. Indeed, NATO standards and procedures will be a necessary part of coalition operations for European forces, but they will not be sufficient. It seems that the Berlin Plus agreement would allow automatic access for European (or rather EU) operations to NATO staffs for planning, but there is no such automaticity for command and control arrangements or communications and logistics.⁴⁴ Moreover, NATO does not address the sharing of defence roles, cost or infrastructure in ways that would be helpful for current European security needs, nor does it provide for the integration of the full range of non-military tools available to the EU. Although the European objective must be to work with NATO and take advantage of what it can offer, European nations must also be prepared to operate without NATO's support. There must, therefore, be an available framework for ad hoc European coalitions and EU operations to use in a European context.

Doctrine

Finally, in deciding how to carry out military operations and with which partner, European countries will have to consider doctrine. Close cooperation with partners ideally requires common doctrine. At the very least, it requires an understanding of the partners' doctrine, rules of engagement and legal framework. This is an area that NATO does not address. These questions are not confined to war fighting, but are also very relevant to PSOs. Technological change could exacerbate the problems. For example, network-centric warfare will raise problems not only of connectivity but also of principles of command and how a battle is fought. However, if there is to be specialization in operations, common understanding and rules between the different elements will be vital.

⁴⁴ The Berlin Plus agreement is foreseen in the NATO Summit Declaration of 12 Apr. 1999, but it was not implemented until 2003 as a result of political difficulties. Its effect is to give the EU assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations and to allow NATO assets and capabilities to be made available for such operations. It includes agreements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements. NATO, 'Berlin Plus agreement', Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 22 Aug. 2003, URL <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm>.

6. Nordic case studies⁴⁵

The strategic background

The Baltic Sea has long been a Russian window on the world, and in the cold war it was a major focus of Soviet power. Now it is, for all intents and purposes, a 'NATO and EU lake'. With the exception of St Petersburg and the Kaliningrad exclave, all the littoral states are members of the EU, NATO or both organizations. Russia's best interest now lies in integration with the West; even if it were to turn against that policy, Russia would be in no position to deploy major military forces against neighbouring countries or to make the Baltic region a base for aggression. Russian forces could be bottled up in St Petersburg or Kaliningrad, and the Danish Straits could easily be sealed, closing off the whole sea.

There will, however, be security problems coming from Russia in the Baltic region during the next decade. Most of them will require cooperative action with Russia. Many of the security problems will need competent border guard and coastguard activity. In addition, the Baltic Sea states will need competent ground forces to assist the civil authorities with disaster relief, special forces to deal with major crime or terrorist incidents and deployable forces to undertake any overseas commitments. Small vessels and even some submarines will be needed for protection of territorial waters and fisheries, surveillance, and intelligence gathering. Larger units will not generally be required in Baltic waters. Air reconnaissance assets will be needed, as will means of dealing with illegal, non-state penetration of airspace. However, fighter and bombing missions will not be required in this area.

Larger maritime units; attack, strike or supersonic interceptor aircraft; and heavy ground equipment (tanks and artillery) owned by the littoral states must be regarded as assets either for use outside the Baltic area or as a basis on which to rebuild armed forces at some future date, 10 years or more in the future, if regional security prospects have deteriorated. In reality, the security focus of all the Nordic and Baltic states, particularly at a popular level, still remains on Russia. In Finland that is almost totally the case. The other Nordic countries have in principle turned their focus away from Russia, but their force structures still reflect a continuing concern with territorial defence, which only the proximity of Russia can explain.

Sweden

Sweden has a history of taking defence seriously. Part of this seriousness was linked with the political and moral importance of conscription and a strong focus on territorial defence. Sweden's long-standing policy of neutrality was coupled

⁴⁵ Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise stated, data on personnel and equipment numbers are from International Institute for Strategic Studies (note 41); and on expenditure from the SIPRI military expenditure database.

with significant effort and expenditure during the cold war years. Neutrality did not prevent tacit collaboration with Norway—a NATO member—or close cooperation, not made public at the time, with the UK on intelligence and even on issues such as landing rights for nuclear bombers.

Sweden has, in principle, a Total Defence system, in which the military and civil sectors collaborate, although civil–military cooperation is a very sensitive matter and the Swedish armed forces are prohibited from using their combat capability in the service of peacetime civil society. The tasks of the Total Defence system are to guard against armed attacks and to lend support to society in peacetime emergencies. According to Swedish policy, other potential threats include terrorist actions and large-scale violence that could lead to war or destruction, and refugee problems. Another important objective is to promote détente, disarmament, cooperation and democratic development by participating in international organizations and cooperating with other states.⁴⁶ The armed forces cooperate with outside powers, although not in formal alliances. This includes participation in ESDP; membership of the PFP and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC); a commitment to extensive international efforts such as peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN and, more recently, the EU and NATO; and cooperation in Nordcaps. Swedish policy also includes a continuing, if diminishing, focus on conscription. Another significant factor in Sweden’s policy is its well-developed defence industry:⁴⁷ the jobs and technology that the defence industry provides can weigh more heavily than operational output when making procurement decisions.

Swedish forces are involved in numerous international engagements; participation in PSOs has provided an impetus for change in force structure and doctrine. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency carries out international rescue and disaster operations and contributes to reconstruction. It has undertaken international relief actions in Africa, Asia, Central America and Europe; it has for many years taken part in environmental cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki Convention; and it is responsible for humanitarian action on landmines. The Swedish Coast Guard is engaged in extensive international activities including, for example, crime prevention around the Baltic Sea and environmental protection within the framework of a number of partnerships.

⁴⁶ Swedish Ministry of Defence, ‘A changing world—a reformed defence’, The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report, Jan. 1999, URL <http://forsvar.regeringen.se/propositionermm/ds/pdf/ds99_2eng.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Sweden is the only non-NATO country to have joined the Letter of Intent (LOI) group of European countries, signing the LOI on 6 July 1998. The LOI seeks ‘to establish a co-operative framework to facilitate the restructuring of European defence industry’ with the end result of increasing efficiency in defence research without increasing the defence research budget. The 6 countries party to the LOI are: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. ‘Letter of Intent between 6 Defence Ministers on measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European defence industry’, London, 6 July 1998, URL <<http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1015.html>>.

Table 1. Nordic data

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
NATO member	Yes	No	Yes	No
EU member	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
ESDP member	No	Yes	No	Yes
Population	5.31 m.	5.22 m.	4.52 m.	8.80 m.
GDP ^a	172 b.	148 b.	192 b.	240 b.
Defence expenditure ^a	2.53 b.	1.47 b.	3.16 b.	4.58 b.
Main battle tanks	238	235	170	280
Major artillery	405	1125	184	181
Active forces	22 880	27 000	22 600	27 600
Conscripts	5700	18 500	15 200	12 300
Reserves	64 900	435 000	219 000	262 000
Serving abroad	1650	910	1300	780

m. = million

b. = billion

^a Expenditure in US\$ at 2000 prices and exchange rates.

Sources: **Population, GDP, personnel and equipment numbers:** International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2003/2004* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), URL <http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/hdb/Volume_103/Issue_01/>; **Defence expenditure:** Stålenheim, P. *et al.*, 'Tables of military expenditures', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), Table 10A.4, pp. 351–359.

Sweden has also contributed to both regional and global security via political engagement in the cause of peace (e.g., Prime Minister Olof Palme's mediating role in the 1980–88 Iraq–Iran War). This niche in peace support activities suits Sweden since it did not have great power-type involvement in 20th century disputes, nor does it have a recent colonial history. This has given Sweden a wider perspective than some countries in central and eastern Europe, as well as a rather moralistic view on engagement.

Defence forces

The 1996 Defence Resolution provided for the enhancement of Sweden's capacity for participation in PSOs.⁴⁸ The Swedish International Command (Swedint), established in 1997, organizes, trains and supports forces for PSO activities.⁴⁹ Swedint includes a battalion able to act as an independent unit in a larger international force, and can organize special units for command and control, field (e.g., demining, transport and medical services) and civilian humanitarian operations. Sweden also participates in the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (Shirbrig)

⁴⁸ Swedish Ministry of Defence, 'International cooperation', Area of responsibility (28 July 2003), URL <<http://forsvar.regeringen.se/inenglish/issues/internationalt.htm>>.

⁴⁹ On Swedint see URL <<http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/exmaps2.html>>.

for UN operations, an arrangement to boost the UN's rapid intervention capacity for peacekeeping—not peace enforcement—operations.⁵⁰

The *Military Balance 2001/2002* of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) stated that Sweden's armed forces were undergoing rapid reorganization so that they could react rapidly and flexibly to a range of threats.⁵¹ Key aspects were new command and control systems (using commercial technology as far as possible), expansion of R&D, and reduction of manpower and platforms. Further reductions of some 50 per cent were planned for manpower, surface vessels and submarines, and to a less extent, fighter squadrons. Sweden has also restructured its coastal defences to produce a mobile deployable force better suited to current needs at home and abroad. Further announcements are expected in 2004 regarding reforms that will make the Swedish armed forces better fit for overseas service and able to undertake the full range of tasks envisaged for the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).⁵²

These changes are good for the future of Swedish security and defence. *Prima facie*, Sweden would appear to be well attuned to current security challenges and to have moved a considerable way in the right direction with its force planning. However, there is considerable doubt about whether or not the changes will be enough without further impetus. For example, Sweden places a great emphasis on network-centric warfare (or networks-based defence in its terminology), but the new system will not be implemented until after 2010. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, there is some lack of clarity as to how these reforms will affect hardware and doctrine, and how Swedish developments may be integrated with other nations' systems for international operations. Also, there has not been any provision for the acquisition of long-range precision-guided munitions, which are generally thought to be a component of this approach.⁵³

A major difficulty is money. Sweden's military expenditure in 2001 and 2002 was 1.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). In comparison, Swedish military expenditure in 1985, during the cold war, was 2.5 per cent. The 2002 defence budget is probably not enough to provide fully effective armed forces; a minimum of 2 per cent of GDP is generally more appropriate for a modern Western state. (US military expenditure in 2002 was 3.4 per cent of GDP and was projected to increase substantially.) In the longer term, Sweden will not be able to keep a balanced mix of forces or to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities without additional resources. The current government, under Prime Minister Göran Persson, believes that it has an interval during which it may reduce old capabilities

⁵⁰ On Shirbrig see URL <<http://www.shirbrig.dk/>>.

⁵¹ IISS, *Military Balance 2001/2002* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002); table 1.

⁵² At Helsinki in 1999 the range of military tasks that could have been undertaken by the EU was defined with the same 'Petersberg' formula used earlier by the Western European Union (WEU), i.e., evacuation operations, peacekeeping and other tasks of military forces in crisis management.

⁵³ I am indebted to a preview of an article by Captain Lars Wedin for a clearer understanding of a number of points in this section. Wedin, L., 'Sweden in European security', eds B. Hultdt *et al.*, *Strategic Yearbook 2004: The New Northern Security Agenda, Perspectives from Finland and Sweden* (Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm, 2003), pp. 319–35.

before new ones become available.⁵⁴ This may be true in terms of not facing a territorial threat, but there will be other difficult security challenges over the next 10 years.

In order to support mobilization, which produces six mechanized brigades, there are 262 000 reserves (the Army has 225 000 reserves) and conscript service lasting 7–15 months. Army equipment includes 282 main battle tanks (MBTs) and 155 towed and 26 self-propelled 155-mm artillery pieces. The Air Force is making a major acquisition of fast jet fighters (Gripen) and air-to-air missiles. Some of the aircraft will have an electronic fit enabling them to operate with NATO aircraft.

The mobilization plans and the quantities of tanks and artillery are symptomatic of a deep problem for Swedish politicians. Since a conventional war will not be fought on Swedish soil, it is necessary to ask where Sweden could envisage employing these heavy land forces; how it would get them there; and in what manner and for what purposes they would be used. Sweden could neither move, sustain, command nor relieve such numbers of forces away from home territory. The aircraft will provide excellent air defence of Sweden, but, for the most part, they are not deployable elsewhere, nor are they useful for supporting other nations' ground forces.

The events in the Balkans during the 1990s and in post-conflict Iraq in 2003 offered an opportunity for European countries to contribute modest amounts of heavy armour and artillery to PSOs and similar operations. For a country of Sweden's size, deployment of one squadron (company) of MBTs and one battery of artillery would probably suffice; at most, a regiment of each would be required. However, it is more practical to deploy one Nordic regiment of 60 tanks and one of artillery, which would provide sufficient redundancy for rotation and a variety of training. Currently, Sweden can deploy fewer than two battalions abroad. In no conceivable circumstances would Sweden need to mobilize six mechanized brigades.

There seem to be no circumstances in the foreseeable future in which the ground force structures and equipment now available would match Sweden's needs, even if the country took a very proactive view of its international obligations. Reservists trained long ago would be of little use for expeditionary warfare, but those who received training in civilian skills such as transport or logistics, and especially communications or intelligence, could play an important role. The same is true of the conscription system: some conscripts may volunteer for active duty in international operations, but they are not suitable for any exacting duties after only seven months of training.⁵⁵ For those who do not volunteer, the effort on basic training is wasted, with regards to military output.⁵⁶ Maintaining the infrastructure and equipment to mobilize such forces consumes resources that could be better spent preparing Sweden to meet its ambitions for active international engagement,

⁵⁴ Wedin (note 53).

⁵⁵ Some 7% of conscripts are reported to volunteer.

⁵⁶ The officer corps is c. 10 000; the annual intake of conscripts is c. 15 000 (of 45 000 eligible men). There is a substantial burden on the officer corps from training these conscripts.

as either specialist support or major front-line participants. One effective and useable brigade would be far more valuable than six non-deployable ones.

Given historic, economic and social factors, there would be obvious problems for Sweden if it ended conscription. Military depots and bases provide employment in areas where there are few other opportunities. Whatever the logic of force planning, Sweden feels that participation of a significant proportion of the male population in the armed forces has a role in shaping its society. Such matters cannot simply be ignored, but an attachment to current practices or transitional difficulties should not prevent necessary developments from occurring. Maintaining the wrong military structure in order to meet social desiderata costs Sweden a diminution in its ability to participate in activities necessary for its own and for European security.

In short, Sweden has set out on the correct path in its determination to engage on the international stage; it has taken essential steps in collaboration and reorganization. Sweden has a solid core of skills relevant to the new security agenda in its Navy, Coast Guard,⁵⁷ reshaped coastal defence forces and Rescue Services Agency. It has addressed the need for greater connectivity by focusing on network-centric warfare, for example. However, it is still using resources inefficiently. The Army has too much unsuitable equipment and too many unusable and insufficiently trained men. Moreover, Sweden lacks a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, which limits officer specialization and puts a greater demand on conscripts who are used as sergeants and second lieutenants in both mobilization and international deployments. There are similar resource problems with the proposed Air Force acquisitions. Revisiting its force planning, disposing of assets no longer required, and concentrating on flexible, deployable and well-trained manpower able to help in responding to current security requirements would increase Sweden's impact and performance internationally without adding to the overall costs of defence. It would also add significantly to the ability of European countries and the EU to be serious about security.

Finland

Finland, like Sweden, has a record of neutrality, brought about by the circumstances of its relationship with Russia. As a result of this relationship, Finland had less contact with Western powers than Sweden did during the cold war. Finland also took defence very seriously, but it did less than Sweden in developing an indigenous arms industry. Since the 1990s, Finland has revised its formal status to 'militarily non-aligned' and has a permanent, if thus far inconclusive, political debate about NATO membership. Although Finnish–Swedish defence relations remain close, they are changing, not least because of Finland's greater continuing concern about Russia. Formally, Finnish policy maintains that there is no threat.

⁵⁷ The Coast Guard has no legal mandate to act outside the Swedish economic zone. There is also an unfortunate lack of cooperation with the Navy.

However, Finland's defence planning remains firmly focused on its eastern neighbour and on keeping up—or even enhancing—its ability to defend national territory, rather than on the ability to reconstitute defence forces if necessary.

Finland's defence expenditure for 2002 was 1.2 per cent of GDP, the same as the previous year; materiel procurement accounts for just over a quarter of the 2003 allocated military budget.⁵⁸ Active armed forces number 27 000, of which 18 500 are conscripts serving for 6–12 months. There are 435 000 reserves, to be reduced, however, to 340 000; reservists do 40 refresher training days spread over approximately 30 years (100 days over some 40 years for officers). Leaving aside training formations, the structures include two armoured brigades and 11 infantry brigades, as well as engineering and air defence units. That is the equivalent of four divisions. The Army's inventory of equipment shows some of the same characteristics as Sweden's. It has 235 MBTs, of which 74 are very old T-55s and 161 are T-72s.⁵⁹ Finland's artillery holdings are also large: they have over 1000 towed pieces and 90 self-propelled, as well as many mortars and 60 multiple rocket launchers.

The Finnish, and typically Nordic, national defence policy includes military defence, economic defence, civil defence, social welfare and health care, the functioning of society's technical systems, public order and security, and defence information activity. The armed forces, which enjoy high public esteem, have an important role in assisting the authorities with non-military problems, for example violent terrorist groups and environmental threats.

Finland reviewed its defence requirements in the late 1990s.⁶⁰ Its thinking now embraces more distant regional crises affecting the security of Europe and foresees participation in international security cooperation and multinational crisis management operations. National defence is to be developed so that it allows Finland to act flexibly in changing threat situations and to participate in international cooperation to manage the threats. Preventing and repelling a strategic attack has replaced the national defence goal of dealing with a large-scale invasion.

In line with changes in defence goals, Finland will invest in new technologies. Improvements in equipment will be focused on command and control, surveillance capacity, electronic warfare, mobility, and the capacity to deliver and protect against long-range fire. The planning, command and control, and intelligence systems of all the services will be integrated into one secure joint system. Troop numbers will be reduced, bases closed, facilities given up and interoperability enhanced, taking into account national and international requirements for cooperation. Wartime forces, especially those with equipment that will not be replaced as

⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence of Finland, 'The Finnish defence budget 2003', 27 Oct. 2003, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/chapter_id/1161/lang/3#1161>.

⁵⁹ The Ministry of Defence states that the T-55s, although not the T-72s, are now retired. Both will be replaced by a substantial purchase of Leopard 2s. Personal communication with the author.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Defence of Finland, 'Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001', VNS 2/2001 vp, 13 June 2001, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/page_id/13/topmenu_id/7/menu_id/13/this_topmenu/7/lang/3/fs/12>.

it becomes obsolete, will be reduced. The Army is upgrading three Jaeger brigades to readiness brigades with improved firepower and mobility. The Defence Force will improve its capability to operate in urban areas. The Navy's mobile coastal artillery will be abandoned as the equipment becomes obsolete, and new equipment and weapon systems will be procured for the mobile coastal troops to replace fixed coastal defences.

All these changes are in the right direction and highly desirable as far as they go, and much of the formal policy is in line with current security requirements. However, within network-centric warfare, Finland has not embraced joint operations by air or ground forces, or close air support of the latter. Indeed, joint activities do not extend below the highest level of command. Great emphasis is still placed on conscription, and, despite national policy goals, the main focus is still the defence of Finnish territory. A further review that will be conducted in 2004 will exempt those two principles: in other words, it is not expected to recommend more radical options for change. Finland may, therefore, continue to tie up resources on outdated requirements at the cost of not being able to meet other pressing demands.

There are several ways to explain Finland's decisions not to replace conscription or change the focus on territorial defence. First, there is the understandable emphasis on being able to defend the national territory if matters in Russia should become unstable. Second, there is a very strong belief in the capabilities of the Finnish soldier when fighting for the homeland and a corresponding scepticism about other countries' readiness to help. Third, there is a general sense that, although Finland will undertake hazardous PSOs, war fighting is reserved for directly defending Finnish soil.⁶¹ Although Finland has participated in UN peacekeeping since 1956 and has extensive trade contacts with China and several of the world's largest 'globalized' companies, its strategic thinking remains focused on its eastern border. Finland lacks an understanding of southern Europe and fails to look beyond Europe (or even to the non-European parts of Russia).

NATO membership is a contentious issue in Finland, with debate in elite circles about the appropriateness of a Finnish application to join the alliance. However, widespread public misunderstanding of what membership would require and a lack of willingness to participate fully in the collective defence of other countries cloud the debate. The result is that Finland is restructuring its armed forces to better defend the homeland, which enjoys strong national support, and has little willingness to consider wider engagement beyond sending approximately 1000 peacekeepers abroad. It is also investing in equipment and doctrine suitable to fight an outdated type of war against an invader, rather than preparing itself for a flexible and joint war of manoeuvre that would be more likely in the future.

⁶¹ 'A characteristic of Finland ever since she gained independence has been a determination to remain uninvolved in international disputes, and especially armed conflicts.' Guest lecture by President Tarja Halonen at the University of Stockholm, 2 May 2000 cited in Archer, T., 'Keeping out of it: the hangover of Finnish neutralism and the limits of normative commitments', ed. T. Vaahtoranta, *The Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2003* (Forssan kirjapaino: Forssa, 2003), p. 58.

In the 2003 defence budget, Defence Minister Jan-Erik Enestam observed that the defence budget as a proportion of GDP was low in comparison with other EU and NATO members' defence budget allocations.⁶² However, he did not address the implications of current policies. For example, the capability and efficiency of Finland's defence are said to be primarily based on *inter alia*: (a) the high level of training of personnel and troops; and (b) the availability of sufficient and up-to-date military equipment in the country. Given the limited time for training recruits and retraining reservists, and the presence of T-55 (or even T-72) MBTs in the inventory, these statements do not quite ring true. The 8700 reservists trained in 1999 were less than 25 per cent of the target (35 000); the number of reservists trained in 2000 was 28 400.⁶³ Even if Finland reaches the target, there must be grave doubts for any outsider about the utility of the system. However, there is no doubt about the strong national support for the current way of doing things and the reluctance to engage in expeditionary war fighting.

Questions very similar to those asked of Sweden's armed forces arise from the numbers of armed formations that Finland has, either active or in reserve. There seem to be no circumstances in which Finland could ever deploy such numbers or would need to do so in the foreseeable future, even allowing for all the uncertainty and turbulence in Russia. While Finland makes welcomed contributions to UN and other PSOs, there is little capacity to move troops or equipment outside the European theatre and a lack of attention on integrating with foreign forces for the most demanding operations. Given Finland's seriousness in addressing defence issues, a revised basis of force planning with consequent major reductions in unusable equipment and formations would enable it to make a more significant contribution to the current security agenda. Finland's contribution to PSOs is helpful, but there is an unwillingness to go further, which may stem from a desire to avoid exposing weaknesses. If the EU becomes a more active security player, Finland will experience more pressure on this point.

Norway

Norway is a founding member of NATO, it is strongly Atlanticist in its orientation, and it takes defence seriously. Since World War II, Norway has grasped the need to 'multilateralize' its security force and has focused intensely on the need to defend itself with allies, although it does this without fully integrating into NATO's risk-sharing policies. It is not a member of the EU, having twice rejected accession by referendum. Norway makes significant contributions to PSOs, with almost 1200 personnel overseas, and its Special Forces served in Afghanistan during the US-led intervention in late 2001. Norwegian ministers have been politically

⁶² Ministry of Defence of Finland, 'The Finnish defence budget 2003' (note 58).

⁶³ Ministry of Defence of Finland, 'Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001' (note 60), section 2, 'Developing Finland's defence', part 2.2.

active in international security concerns including the Middle East peace process, and the current conciliation efforts in Sri Lanka.

Norwegian defence expenditure in 2002 was 1.9 per cent of GDP, up from 1.7 per cent the previous year, but down from 3.1 per cent in 1985. There are 26 600 active armed forces, of which 15 200 are conscripts. Conscripted is for 12 months, with refresher training periods. There are 219 000 reserves, including 83 000 Home Guards. In 2003, the Army consisted of one division plus two mechanized infantry brigades and one armoured brigade. Heavy equipment consisted of 170 MBTs and 184 artillery pieces, including 126 self-propelled 155-mm guns.

In its plans for restructuring the armed forces over the period 2002–2005, Norway acknowledged the need to make them leaner and more efficient.⁶⁴ The government accurately identified important needs that the new security agenda should address, emphasizing regional threats such as the ongoing turmoil in the Balkans. Without the threat of a military attack from Russia in the coming decade, the need is for flexibility, mobility, rapid reaction and the ability to operate with allies, thus enabling the services to handle their range of tasks and to adapt to new ones. The Norwegian Government also recognized the need to modernize its Total Defence concept to take account of changes in civil society and to establish civil–military cooperation in a broader perspective.

The Special Forces will be further developed and the great majority of service units will be at a higher state of operational readiness as the result of more resources for training, conducting exercises and improving general preparedness. They will also have improved access to strategic transport by sea and by air. The Army will consist of two brigades and a mobile divisional command. The Home Guard will have a force of 60 000 personnel and be adapted to take on new tasks. Its countrywide presence is seen as one of its strengths. The Navy will consist of five modern frigates carrying helicopters, six submarines, eight mine clearance vessels, one minelayer that will serve as a logistics vessel, sea mines, a Coastal Ranger Command and a Clearance Diver Command with various support units. In addition, the Coast Guard will receive new helicopters and a new patrol vessel specially reinforced for operations on ice. The Air Force will consist of 48 combat aircraft organized in three squadrons. It will also have a number of other aircraft, including three equipped for calibration and electronic warfare support, six maritime patrol aircraft, six transport aircraft, 18 transport helicopters, and a search-and-rescue service.

The Norwegian Government admits that the recommended force structure will have limitations, especially with regard to endurance in major conflicts and the capability of handling more than one crisis at a time, but it maintains that the changes will improve matters significantly. That is true, but, as in the cases of Sweden and Finland, the question arises as to whether or not Norway could have gone significantly further in its restructuring by applying resources more effect-

⁶⁴ Godal, B. T., 'The long term defence plan for 2002–2005', Norwegian Ministry of Defence, URL <<http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120018/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>>.

ively. The changes made are not as radical as their wording suggests: national defence policy will retain conscription (military service is seen as an invaluable channel of contact between the armed services and the public at large and as a means of ensuring access to suitable personnel for the armed forces) and continue minimizing expenditure.

NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative has established key requirements, and Norway will seek more multinational collaboration in the procurement and operation of military capabilities and support functions. When announcing that its 2004 defence budget would remain at the same level as in 2003, the Norwegian Government emphasized its commitment to its previously announced restructuring plans.⁶⁵ It also sounded warning notes, however, on the need to reassess certain planned investments and cut spending—materiel procurement amounted to about 25 per cent of the defence budget.

With no risk of a land attack, Norway must be asked (as must Sweden and Finland) to what use its heavy ground equipment could be put, in conjunction with which allies, and how the heavy ground equipment would be transported to the theatre of operations. Even the current goal of two brigades, if those are to be active units, would be a large force that would require significant support to be properly mobile and flexible. If they will not be active units, their utility seems very doubtful. It is not clear how continued conscription will fit into the new arrangements, nor the extent to which conscripts will be flexible and deployable.

As regards the proposed naval procurement, the assets involved are by nature flexible. Five modern frigates would certainly be the most useful assets although, as noted above, there would be little employment for them in the Baltic and little need for their combat capabilities in the North Atlantic. Norway has important economic and political interests in northern waters and needs to assert its presence there. The frigates would be able to do that, but, for full value to be obtained from this investment, Norway will need to deploy them in the service of a wider security agenda, which in its current political posture will probably imply use in a NATO operation or a US-led coalition.

Denmark

Denmark is a member of the EU and NATO, but it does not participate in ESDP, having secured an opt-out.⁶⁶ Even in the cold war, the country was not as fully committed to NATO as some other members were. In part, that reflected a division between elite and popular opinion. Paradoxically, a similar but opposite division has followed the ending of the cold war: NATO is now popularly favoured over engagement in the EU, except on strictly economic matters (and not even on all of those, since Denmark has stayed out of the EMU). Public opinion generally sup-

⁶⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 'The Norwegian defence budget 2004', press release no. 34/2003 (8 Oct. 2003), URL <<http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/aktuelt/pressem/01000-1070028/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>>.

⁶⁶ Holm (note 4).

ports a strong US link, bilateral as well as through NATO, in part because of awareness of Denmark's (and Europe's) military weakness, and in part (unspoken) because of a continuing fear of the weight and preponderance of Germany.

Denmark has an outward-looking vision: it is a major contributor to international aid and has participated effectively in PSOs, having about 1500 troops currently stationed abroad. It was the only Nordic state to participate militarily in the 2003 US-led coalition in Iraq. Nevertheless, Denmark tends to regard defence as primarily defence of home territory and it retains conscription. Despite a large (voluntary) Home Guard, it does not share the Total Defence concept of its fellow Nordic countries, nor does Denmark have the paramilitary and emergency forces that other Nordic countries have.

In 2001 and 2002, Danish defence expenditure was 1.6 per cent of GDP. There are 22 880 armed forces, of which some 5700 are conscripts whose service is generally 4–12 months. There are 64 900 reserves and about 59 300 Home Guards. The Army has 14 700 forces (including 5000 conscripts), 238 MBTs,⁶⁷ and a total of 405 artillery.

The 1997 Defence Commission examined the appropriate policy and structure for Danish defence.⁶⁸ Its findings, with the political agreement of the armed forces, provided the base for 'Vision 2010', which sets out objectives for the development of the Danish armed forces between 2000 and 2004.⁶⁹ The objectives include preparing the armed forces for effective participation in international, multinational and joint operations by improving logistics and acquiring robust command and control systems.

The Defence Commission's report acknowledged the positive developments in the general security situation around Denmark but placed great emphasis on the Army's collaboration with NATO, especially with NATO's main defence forces (i.e., forces for territorial defence of the NATO area).⁷⁰ There was more emphasis on the Danish Navy's international tasks, with a call for larger and more flexible platforms, albeit combined with a continuing NATO orientation. For the Air Force, too, the Defence Commission emphasized collaboration with NATO and increased participation in reaction forces.

Legislation in 2001 defined six main tasks for the Danish armed forces: (a) crisis management and cooperation; (b) the exercise of sovereignty and authority; (c) confidence building and promotion of stability, with the emphasis on states in central and eastern Europe; (d) peace support; (e) other tasks, primarily assistance to the civilian part of society; and (f) employment capability.⁷¹ None of these

⁶⁷ According to Defence Command Denmark, the Danish Army has 281 MBTs. Defence Command Denmark, 'Danish Defence', June 2003, URL <<http://www.forsvaret.dk>>.

⁶⁸ Danish Defence Commission of 1997, 'Defence for the future', Danish Ministry of Defence, URL <http://www.fmn.dk/english/index.asp?cat_id=306>.

⁶⁹ Defence Command Denmark, *Vision 2010* (Defence Command Denmark: Vedbaek, June 2000).

⁷⁰ Denmark's strategic situation differs from that of the other Nordic countries because of its border with Germany: territorial defence therefore implies collective defence, and Germany remains much inclined to territorial defence.

⁷¹ Defence Command Denmark (note 69).

strongly implies major war-fighting commitments in the immediate area. The only heading under which such a commitment might arise is crisis management.

Despite Denmark's highly desirable emphasis on modernizing forces and their equipment, its focus on territorial defence and the retention of conscription leads to the allocation of resources (as in the other Nordic countries) to structures and equipment that are unlikely to be useful in the current security context. Denmark's military expenditure is low as a proportion of GDP. For Denmark, as for the other Nordic countries, the question arises as to the purposes that are served by the heavy equipment and major ground force units. Put bluntly, if they are used at all in today's circumstances they will have to be used in a multilateral context and away from the region. However, Denmark cannot deploy and sustain its current Army at a distance and it has not sufficiently addressed the question of the circumstances in which and how its defence resources might be used for such a purpose.

Moreover, Denmark has ruled out, at least for the present, participation in ESDP. In principle, it remains willing to join NATO or ad hoc crisis management missions: but neither its force structure nor its political orientation will add significantly to European crisis management capabilities.

The Nordic countries taken together

During the cold war, specific Nordic arrangements existed to maximize security through the actions (or self-restraint) of particular countries, and they had a decisive regional impact.⁷² That is no longer the case. There are important similarities among the four Nordic countries as well as important differences.

Each of the Nordic countries engages in international PSOs, but none has a history (in recent times at any rate) of expeditionary warfare. All say that they are undertaking fairly radical reform of forces and structures. However, territorial defence and conscription are still important in national defence policy in all four countries. Even after completing the reforms and restructuring, each country will still be influenced by legacy structures, equipment and policies. These relic features affect the scale of air defence assets and lead to a preponderance of heavy ground equipment that cannot be moved to or supported in any place where it could be used (at least in the quantities available)—even if the countries concerned were politically ready to engage in the serious war fighting that would necessitate it.

As regards parallels and differences, the three northernmost countries have elements of Total Defence linked with paramilitary and non-military structures that can be of particular assistance in the current security agenda, both at home and abroad. Denmark and Norway participate in the NATO force planning process; Finland and Sweden do their planning on a national basis but receive technical

⁷² The so-called 'Nordic balance' system maintained strategic calm in the area by 2 means: the US/NATO commitment to the security of Norway, Denmark and Iceland; and Finland's and Sweden's policies of neutrality.

advice from NATO in the PFP framework. Finland and Sweden are participants in ESDP, while Denmark and Norway are not.

If the Nordic countries continue to maintain major formations and large quantities of heavy equipment, this might be justified by their envisaged use in operations with others in serious war fighting, or as a nucleus from which forces could be regenerated or reconstituted in future. (Doubts about whether forces of this kind are actually the right nucleus from which to reconstitute for the changed technical demands of a territorial war in future have been stated above.) However, if these countries are or to engage in war fighting, they should consider whether such contributions are the most cost-effective use of resources and reflect a true Nordic 'comparative advantage', given the technical requirements of modern war fighting and the other tasks that these countries almost certainly wish to undertake.

There are encouraging signs of international cooperation on procurement in the Nordic area. However, more progress can be made in sharing infrastructure and logistics costs. The Nordic nations also need to address the major matter of role specialization, which is difficult for allies in NATO and even more difficult for neutral or formerly neutral states, whether in the EU or otherwise. Nevertheless, the issue should not be ducked and there is a degree of open-mindedness on role specialization in the Nordic region.

Conscription is gradually becoming a less central feature in the Nordic area, with the exception of Finland. The social utility, as well as the military effectiveness, of conscription should be questioned since only a proportion of the eligible groups now serve. Nevertheless, social, political and legal constraints mean that a move towards all-professional armed forces that can be sent and kept abroad at short notice would be very difficult not just for Finland, but for all of the other Nordic countries as well. These constraints, and national beliefs about appropriate contributions to international security, point to a degree of role specialization for the countries of this region away from heavy war fighting and towards support of classical peacekeeping, monitoring and other post-conflict roles.

Possible general outcomes of Nordic force planning

Without carrying out detailed work, it is impossible to state what the precise force structure for any country should be, nor is it possible to give definitive answers on the sorts of assets and units required, before the possibilities of infrastructure sharing, role specialization, and so on have been examined. However, it is reasonable, on the basis of general considerations that include the strategic situation in the Baltic region during the 1990s, to say that some assets and skills will definitely be required and that others will be needed only in very modest numbers. The following observations are arrived at by applying the sequence of questions set out for force planning in chapter 5 to the specific conditions faced by Nordic countries.

Ground forces

When applying a stricter assessment of current security needs, it can clearly be seen that the Nordic countries will in any case need the following in their ground forces: well-trained infantry, special forces, and engineers that are useful for a wide range of operations abroad and able to help ensure civil order. Nordic countries will need logistics units that can move men and equipment and keep them supplied in the field, or help with disaster relief. They will also need command and control machinery and assets appropriate for the tasks to be undertaken. To help in PSOs, Nordic countries should have access to a small amount of heavy armour and artillery.

All the above would fulfil the minimum requirements for a European country opting to engage in serious war fighting abroad. Additional components that could come in good use are more heavy armour (MBTs), armoured infantry, ground reconnaissance, substantial artillery and attack helicopters.

The question then is whether Nordic assets of this sort (with all that is necessary to deploy, support and use them) can be provided in sufficient numbers to make it worthwhile for the country or organization that is coordinating force deployment to receive and integrate the contribution. For example, sending an armoured brigade would be a worthwhile contribution to war fighting. Sending an independent troop (platoon) of tanks to join an armoured division provided by another country would probably not be helpful. The efforts involved in integration, whether of doctrine or logistics, and the likely problems of interoperability would make the addition a burden rather than a benefit. The equipment and training necessary to provide a deployable armoured brigade capable of integrating with US or British units would consume a large part of any Nordic country's resources, while the armoured brigade would be of limited use, particularly because of its heavy equipment, for many items on the current security agenda. Therefore, unless a country (or possibly, in the Nordic context, a consortium of countries) could make major formations of all arms available, it would probably do better to provide formations of the sort that it would already have and that are likely to be in short supply in any circumstance. Logistics, engineering and general-purpose infantry fit these parameters and, if provided in sufficiently large numbers, can be integrated into a multinational force relatively easily. Relieving the demands on the resources of other partners or allies by providing these elements might be a better investment because it is better directed to current security needs. Such a change would also harmonize more closely with financial realities than attempts to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities, attractive as that might be for national security. Less expenditure by all four Nordic countries can result in more useful and useable force structures.

Maritime forces

Some of the same arguments apply to maritime forces. Ships can often be integrated into international forces more easily than ground units, but whether they are useful rather than a burden is dependent on command and control linkages. For their own territorial security, the Nordic countries will need fast patrol craft that are able to pursue criminals and terrorists as well as take part in littoral warfare; a small number of submarines for intelligence gathering and blockading or closing straits; mine clearance assets; and maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

Beyond that, with the exception of showing presence in northern waters, a Nordic country will need larger warships only if it is prepared to engage in serious war fighting, which in the current nature of things would mean fighting with allies or partners far from home waters. If a country is prepared politically and psychologically for that and is prepared to provide ships with good computers, command, control, communications and intelligence (C⁴I) fit, then it will increase Europe's ability to be a serious security actor. If not, the resources would be better used on more of the preceding items or on transport capability.

Air assets

Apart from reconnaissance, intelligence gathering assets and transport (lift), air assets are more geared to war fighting than are the assets of the other components of military power. Nevertheless, peace enforcement missions may require ground attack to give support to ground troops. In any degree of war fighting, air defence is vital. However, air defence requires deep integration with ground radars, missiles and other air assets. Only if aircraft and pilots are capable of such integration, and if there is appropriate logistics support, will it make sense to send them away on multinational operations. Free-standing small units of fixed-wing aircraft are of little use. Doctrine, training and C⁴I fit all have to be appropriate.

Nordic force planning for air assets should, therefore, be for intelligence gathering and similar functions. There is also a need for appropriate air assets to defend domestic airspace against crime and terrorism, rather than against a hostile country's strike. The planning may then proceed to include ground-attack capabilities and sophisticated air defence, if the willingness to integrate, support and deploy is there.

Paramilitary and other forces

Many situations of crisis management, from the events in the Balkans during the 1990s to the US-led intervention in late 2001 in Afghanistan to the 2003 Iraq war, have shown the crucial need for efficient bodies of troops able to use force to protect themselves and others but not to engage in war fighting. Building functional societies in conditions of civil upheaval is a challenging task that in some ways is more demanding than combat. There are also many needs for practical construction

and basic engineering skills in both peace support and humanitarian relief operations. Because of their Total Defence concepts and existing specialized paramilitary and other forces, at least three of the Nordic countries are well placed to contribute in these areas and to help train newly emerging states in police and border guarding skills. Both the EU and NATO need to think more carefully about planning for the provision and deployment of such skills. This will require money, but, given the amount currently tied up in force structures and equipment that are no longer required, there is scope at least for considerable rationalization in the Nordic area, which would release resources for something that these countries do well and which could make a real contribution to security. Gendarmerie and police work is a vital need, and it is cheaper than heavy armour.

Armed police are not a Nordic tradition. However, Nordic countries can provide effective and honest civil police to PSOs. Many PSOs also require a paramilitary force, better armed than civil police and able, as formed bodies, to confront heavily armed lawbreakers and destructive elements. It is for consideration whether or not retraining substantial numbers of Nordic infantry so that they could perform the duties of paramilitaries while abroad on PSOs would be a better investment than so much armour and heavy artillery.

7. Conclusions

The following conclusions are a mixture of general lessons and judgements relevant to defence force planning in all European states and specific recommendations offered for consideration in the case of the four Nordic countries under discussion.

1. Safe and wealthy European states need the ability to apply force, both to protect themselves and their neighbours from threats to their interests and well-being and to undertake their share of responsibility for peace and order in the world. However, only seldom will military force alone be an effective tool.

2. Most threats facing developed European countries are transnational, with complex causes and complicated origins. No single country can tackle them alone. Most military engagements will be part of composite operations, involving non-military actors and often non-governmental ones.

3. European publics and governments must decide what their current security needs are and what they are prepared to contribute towards meeting them, including whether or not they are prepared to plan and conduct war-fighting operations abroad. For the latter they have the option of free riding on the USA, but the price will be a lack of influence.

4. European national force planning can only sensibly take place against the background of wider planning, internally covering the whole spectrum of the state's responses to the various challenges facing it, and externally working with collaborators on their response to common problems, the development of effective policies addressing common interests and institutional strategies to pursue them.

5. European countries have to be prepared to deal with terrorist attacks and other breaches of sea- and airspace. They must collaborate with allies on security actions abroad, including taking and holding ground, gendarmerie, nation building, traditional peacekeeping activities and the use of special forces for counter-terrorism actions. However, the likely applications of force will not in the foreseeable future involve the ground defence of north or west European territory from a classic invasion, although it may be prudent to maintain a capacity to reconstitute the necessary skills and forces for territorial defence.

6. The forces that European nations have must be mobile, flexible, well trained and equipped for a wide range of security activities.

7. European armed forces already have much equipment and many skills that enable them to assist civilian authorities in natural and man-made crises, at home and abroad.

8. The boundary between police and armed forces, particularly regarding activities such as intelligence gathering, will need to be reviewed to better deal with terrorist attacks, violent crime and other security threats, at home and abroad. Future European armed forces need not conform to established categories of military services: there are good arguments for many European countries to create forces

with combined police, civil defence and other civilian-type skills rather than investing in the full spectrum of artillery, armour and so forth.

9. There are important questions to be addressed about the role of European countries' reserves, especially of individuals or units with civilian skills. There is no current military need for conscription; other than supporting the civil authorities in natural or man-made disasters, conscripts and recalled generalist reservists are unlikely to be used on a large scale in tackling current security problems.

10. Given current economic restraints, role specialization and collaboration on infrastructure are essential for all European armed forces, especially the Nordic countries. Collaboration requires prior international agreement, although not necessarily a formal alliance. The options for collaboration are: (a) via NATO, regardless of whether or not all the countries concerned are full members; (b) via the EU or its ESDP; or (c) through ad hoc groupings of states that wish to collaborate. Additionally, the Nordic countries may decide to build upon current regional structures by creating additional integrated and interoperable forces that are appropriate for the current security agenda.

11. Already, partly because of enlargement, but also because of the adoption of more sensible views, the institutional boundaries of the EU and NATO as security groupings are more permeable than they were before the two enlargement processes. The PFP and the association of non-members with the EU's Schengen policy for immigration control are examples. There is increasing necessity for cooperation among European states because this will be the ultimate basis for European and wider military collaboration.

12. There are political problems ahead in the evolution of European security and defence policies, both for countries that have had policies of neutrality and for those with Atlanticist inclinations. These will arise in at least four areas: (a) resistance by some to what may be seen as a departure from the policy of neutrality or military non-alignment; (b) a fear of damaging cooperation with the USA if there is greater European autonomy in operational planning and action, or defence industrial collaboration; (c) an unwillingness on social and political grounds to abandon conscription and the capacity to defend national territory, even though no such defence is required in the current circumstances; and (d) a general resistance from both society and armed forces to military restructuring that departs from the current organization and structures.

13. The Nordic countries and other European states could release many resources for effective military output if they would stop focusing so strongly on territorial defence and the heavy equipment it requires and if they would move away from conscription. Although the final result will be enhanced efficiency and effectiveness, there will be transitional costs. The necessary funds to cover these costs will not be easy to find.

14. There is a pressing need for competent European armed forces to perform security roles in PSOs that are less demanding than front-line high-intensity combat but much more demanding than traditional peacekeeping. The Nordic countries' tradition, national attitudes and resource considerations make them ideal can-

didates for specialization in the provision of these services and in a range of post-conflict roles (including non-military and paramilitary ones), which would allow them to reallocate resources from heavier national forces.

About the author

William Hopkinson (United Kingdom) was Deputy Director and Director of Studies of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) from 1997 until 2000, when he retired to read and write. Before that, he served in the Home Civil Service for 32 years, serving 11 years in the Ministry of Defence as the Head of the Defence Arms Control Unit in 1988–1993 and as Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy) in 1993–1997. As such, he was particularly concerned with bilateral relationships with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. He was also responsible for matters concerning British relationships with European security institutions, including NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union, and for oversight of negotiations on arms control treaties. His particular concerns are transatlantic relations and European security. He has been an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute and Chatham House and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University. In 2001 he was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the WEU Institute in Paris.