3. Planning and deploying peace operations

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I. Introduction

Mission planning was a crucial issue for the peacekeeping community in 2007, a year in which eight new peace operations were launched and the United Nations and the European Union (EU) both prepared to deploy their largest new peace operations to date.¹ The continued surge in demand for new peace operations over the past decade and the complex multidimensional nature of many of the operations that have been deployed have underlined the need for a more nuanced approach to mission planning. While mission planning in organizations such as the African Union (AU), the EU and the UN has previously been carried out largely by one or two departments, the integration of political, humanitarian, development and military dimensions requires much more internal coordination. Similarly, there is a need for better cooperation between the numerous external actors with whom the operations must interact.

Planning for any peace operation is a complex process with several distinct phases, each of which has its own priorities and potential pitfalls. This chapter focuses on pre-mission planning, the earliest stage of planning that culminates in the operation’s deployment. Some of the most significant developments in—and criticisms of—peace operations in recent years have concerned this stage of planning. It is recognized that a coherent mission strategy, defined early in planning, is crucial not only to developing a peace operation with clear objectives and mandates but also to identifying and obtaining the necessary human, material and financial resources. Weaknesses in pre-mission planning have been identified as causing poor coordination and leading to the deployment of peace operations that do not meet the needs of the host country and the affected groups, thus compromising the sustainability of progress in several major peace operations, such as the UN operations in East Timor, Kosovo and Liberia.²

There have been two main criticisms of past UN pre-mission planning exercises. The first is that the process has been overly—even exclusively—based in UN Headquarters, far removed from the country and the communities

¹ The EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), launched on 28 Jan. 2008, has an authorized strength of 3500 troops. The EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR ALTHEA, which was launched in 2004, included over 6000 troops but was largely a ‘rehatting’ of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) and so required less planning than an entirely new mission. On multilateral peace operations ongoing in 2007 see appendix 3A.

² These are the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2002); the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999–present); and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003–present).
where the operation will be deployed. The second is that there has been too little consultation and coordination among UN departments and agencies, between UN Headquarters and the UN in-country presence, and between the UN and other relevant stakeholders, which range from other peacekeeping operations to the host government, civil society, rebels and affected communities.

In 2007 the UN began full implementation of its Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) as part of its wider ‘Peacekeeping 2010’ reform strategy.\(^3\) The IMPP, which attempts to create a sequential, coherent and unified framework for the planning of all UN multidimensional operations, includes substantial elements of in-country planning and consultation.\(^4\)

The planning processes for several operations in 2007 illustrated both attempts to address the problems of pre-mission planning—and the difficulties that can be encountered. Section II of this chapter examines in more detail some of the recent attempts that have been made to address problems in UN peace operation planning, particularly pre-mission planning, and thus create operations that better address the needs and realities of the host country. It summarizes the IMPP and, for comparison, gives a brief overview of the EU’s mission planning process. Section III examines the pre-mission planning in 2007 for three new peace operations: the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). Section IV offers conclusions. Appendix 3A gives details of all multilateral peace operations ongoing, launched or terminated in 2007.

II. Efforts to improve pre-mission planning

The imperative for needs-driven operations

There is a growing recognition that the needs of the affected country must be better reflected in the planning of UN peace operations.\(^5\) Academics and practitioners argue that, as the UN continues to move towards ambitious, multidimensional deployments, the ‘one size fits all’ approach that has often been taken in the past is less and less likely to result in operations that are genuinely ‘needs-driven’.


Pre-mission planning has traditionally been done at the headquarters level—and crucial decisions have been made after only minimal attempts to find out the realities of the affected country. It has thus been suggested that field-based fact-finding and needs-assessment exercises should become integral elements of the planning process for any peace operation—whether conducted by the UN or by a regional security organization. In response, the UN increasingly carries out fact-finding and needs-assessment exercises prior to mission deployment—such as the one that prepared a detailed plan for the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan⁶—although they are often criticized for being too short. In 2006 the EU went as far as to establish a large in-country planning mission, the EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo). During the whole of 2007 EUPT Kosovo planned and prepared for the possible handover of certain responsibilities of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to an EU crisis-management mission as well as drawing up detailed plans for the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), which started deployment in February 2008.⁷

Fact-finding and needs-assessment teams in the past have often comprised mainly military planners but are gradually expanding to comprise multidisciplinary expertise, including existing in-country development and humanitarian staff, anthropologists, members of expatriate and diaspora communities, and other local experts. Nevertheless, these teams—and peace operation planning processes in general—are frequently accused of not adequately consulting and involving local stakeholders. However, as the experiences in Chad and Sudan in 2007 discussed below illustrate, there are inherent difficulties in and limitations to increasing local involvement. The status quo at the outset of pre-mission planning, the conflict situation, the local political context and international political will all affect the practicalities of local involvement.

In addition, any attempt to move towards more needs-driven peace operations must eventually confront the fundamental question of whose needs to prioritize. Different stakeholders—local and external—will have different priorities. For instance, in its initial decision to deploy a robust multidimensional operation in Chad, the UN was responding to the needs of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the eastern part of the country. However these needs directly conflicted with those of the rebel groups there.

It has been observed that consultations undertaken under pressure, for example during rapid needs assessments, may serve to reinforce the planners’ preconceptions rather than generate independent and objective analysis. They thus fail in their stated goal of identifying the true needs and priorities of the affected populations. Also, local non-government stakeholders may feel pres-

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sured to say what they believe the international community wants to hear, rather than expressing their real priorities. In contrast, powerful local stakeholders can manipulate consultation processes to their own advantage, as the Government of Sudan clearly did in 2007.

Reforming UN mission planning

Integrated mission task forces

Until the turn of the 21st century, it was normal for the planning of UN peace operations to begin in earnest only after the UN Security Council had passed a resolution authorizing the mission. Important decisions had thus already been made and planning consisted mainly of operationalizing the resolution. Mission planning was done only by the UN’s departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Political Affairs (DPA). Poor planning capabilities led to a lack of detailed pre-mission planning for complex operations such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993), the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II, 1992–1995), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2002) and UNMIK (1999–present). A seminal 2000 report by the independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations—known as the Brahimi Report—articulated the need for coordination between the development and peace and security elements of the UN system to allow the emergence of an integrated approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It called for all pre-mission planning to take place through mission-specific integrated task forces, with the active participation of the UN Secretariat (DPKO and DPA) and UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

The integrated mission task force (IMTF) concept was first put into practice during planning for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). A prototype IMTF was established to plan the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET, 2002–2005), the successor to UNTAET. Caplan, R., International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford University Press: New York, 2005), p. 235.
found that the IMTF was successful in ensuring that all relevant UN agencies and departments were centrally involved in pre-mission planning. However, an external report noted that the IMTF for UNAMA played a largely advisory, rather than decision-making, role and had little direct contact with the pre-existing country team based in Islamabad, Pakistan. A UN assessment in 2007 found that: ‘the IMTF functions well only as an information exchange and has been less successful as a strategic planning and management mechanism’.

The 2006 IMPP guidelines (see below) expanded the composition of IMTFs to include at a minimum representatives from the political, military, police, security, logistics, humanitarian, development and human rights sections of the UN Secretariat along with representatives of the UN country team, if there is one.

In April 2007 UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, proposed the establishment of seven integrated operational teams (IOTs), which would support UN peace operations, including forming the core of future IMTFs. The IOTs will consist of military, police, support and political experts and are to be situated in the regional divisions of the DPKO’s Office of Operations. The IOTs are designed to make integrated mission planning, management and support more effective by serving as information and liaison hubs. They should ensure a much higher level of continuity during planning and implementation. The first IOT was formed to help in the planning of UNAMID. The others were expected to be operational in January 2008.

The Integrated Mission Planning Process

Following the Brahimi Report, and building on lessons learned in UNAMA, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and others, the DPKO made further efforts to improve and develop its operational planning capacity by creating new structures, plans and standard procedures. The IMPP was developed to ensure a transparent and inclusive approach in the planning of multidimensional operations. The IMPP includes consultations with key external partners and stakeholders, including national actors when appropriate.

In June 2006 guidelines setting out the IMPP, which had been in development for several years, were endorsed by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi


17 United Nations, ‘Momentous year for United Nations peacekeeping as it mounts two unique operations in Africa, sustains 18 more, restructures department, Fourth Committee told’, GA/SPD/382, 31 Oct. 2007. In the same announcement, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, said that the number of IOTs would be cut to 6.
Annan. This policy document details the steps involved in establishing, maintaining and terminating a UN integrated peace operation. It sets out priorities and establishes a clear delineation of responsibilities within the UN system.

The guidelines divide planning for an integrated mission into three stages. Stage one, advance planning, consists of pre-mission planning, including developing strategic options for an enhanced UN engagement. It is the basis for developing a concept of operations. Stage two consists of operational planning and occurs when the mission has been authorized by the UN Security Council. The final stage is review and transition planning, which includes continual assessment and updating of the mission plan and planning for the closure of the mission. The rest of this section looks at the planning processes in the IMPP leading up to deployment.

In the advance planning stage, the IMTF gathers information from a wide variety of sources, including the national and regional stakeholders. It draws up a range of strategies, options and scenarios for the scope of the operation and identifies factors and risks that could affect the operation’s deployment or functioning. For example, it assesses the security situation in the country to prevent the operation being deployed in an inhospitable environment. The guidelines recommend a time frame of six weeks for this initial assessment.

The assessment is followed by the drafting of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping’s planning directive, which outlines the strategic objectives for UN engagement, the priorities of the mission, and the timing and sequencing of further planning activities. This directive is then translated into a draft concept of operations. At this stage, a technical review or assessment team is sent to the affected country to see what adjustments are needed to the concept of operations, based on the local situation. The IMPP guidelines stress the importance in this process of properly consulting local stakeholders and other external actors who would be engaged in the region. The team also makes a preliminary assessment of resource requirements and prepares an initial estimate of the funding required to carry out the concept of operations. In the cases reviewed in this chapter, it is evident that the time frame of two weeks for the technical review was barely sufficient, not least because of geographical constraints, which added to the travel time.

If the proposed operation receives authorization from the UN Security Council, detailed operational planning then takes place. This involves refinement of the concept of operations into a mission plan. The core elements of the mission plan include a comprehensive results framework, which indicates the objectives of the operation, the desired outputs and activities, and the key benchmarks of the operation. The plan also outlines the operation’s structure, including a detailed elaboration of its thematic and functional components. According to the IMPP guidelines, this process should take six weeks. How-

19 United Nations (note 18).
ever, owing to the operation’s complexity and the political difficulties it encountered, operational planning for UNAMID took several months. Human and material resources needed for the operation are also gathered at this stage.

The final stage of pre-deployment planning—referred to as implementation planning—concerns the handover of planning responsibilities from the IMTF to the operation’s leadership. A 2006 study commissioned by the DPKO’s Best Practices Section, which looked at management issues during the start-up phase of a peace operation, found that this handover is often problematic.\textsuperscript{20} Because the planning team and the operation leadership are almost never the same people, there is a danger of losing continuity and valuable insight gained during the earlier planning processes. The study recommends that more time be devoted to pre-deployment briefing and there should be greater focus on substantive and planning issues. Most notably, it recommended that the briefings be centred on meetings with the various substantive and support units involved in the advance planning process. This would allow the incoming head of mission—a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG)—and the senior leadership of the operation to obtain an overview of the mission planning processes. More importantly, it would give them the opportunity to discuss the plan in depth with the people who drafted it, including their assumptions and the challenges they anticipate. This would supplement the SRSG’s normal bilateral meetings with senior UN Secretariat officials and key member states. The establishment of the IOTs should also improve continuity.

The study also stresses the importance of the mission’s senior leadership—in particular the SRSG, the deputy SRSG, the force commander and the police commissioner—establishing contacts with key local people, including opposition leaders and civil society figures, as quickly as possible. A number of this study’s recommendations were taken up in planning for UNAMID.

The IMPP entered its first year of full implementation in 2007. The planning processes for MINURCAT and UNAMID, which are discussed in section III, were the first in which the IMPP was tested.

**Launching an EU peace operation**

Compared to the UN, the EU has little experience of planning and conducting peace operations, having deployed its first missions only in 2003.\textsuperscript{21} The EU typically deploys smaller missions in support of the UN. It does not deploy multidimensional operations. While the main aspects of the EU and UN planning processes are similar, the biggest difference is that the EU process is led

\textsuperscript{20} Gilmore, S., Wilcock, G. and MacKinnon, M., ‘Mission management/start up scoping project: final report’, Final report, Peace Dividend Trust, 24 Apr. 2006. The study was based on 200 interviews with current and past senior peace operation leaders.

\textsuperscript{21} The EU deployed its first civilian mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), in Jan. 2003 and its first military mission, the EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia), in Mar. 2003.
by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which comprises national diplomats. This can unduly politicize mission planning.

The decision to launch an EU peace operation, under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy—whether military or civilian—lies with the Council of the European Union and therefore requires consensus. There are four phases in the decision-making process: development of the draft ‘crisis-management concept’ (CMC); approval of the CMC and development of strategic options; adoption of a Council joint action (CJA) and development of planning documents; and implementation.

In the first phase, a crisis-response coordinating team comprising representatives of the ‘key entities’—the EU Military Staff, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Police Unit, the Policy Unit and the European Commission—is set up to draft the CMC. The team carries out a field-based assessment of the situation in the affected country and identifies the options for an EU operation. The PSC may also choose to appoint an EU special representative to the affected country to heighten diplomatic engagement. The draft CMC is presented to the PSC, which then submits it to the Council for approval.

Upon approval of the CMC, the mission’s senior leadership is identified and strategic options—military, police or civilian—are elaborated. The CJA—the legal basis for the operation—is drafted based on these options and goes through several bodies within the Council Secretariat for review before submission to the Council for approval. Like a UN Security Council resolution, the CJA is a document that specifies the mission’s mandate, objective, duration, structure, including the chain of command, and financial costs. The CJA also specifies the start date of the mission. However, in the case of a military mission, a separate Council decision is necessary.

The time frame for the adoption of the CJA varies according to the urgency of the deployment and how long it takes to reach political consensus among the member states. Adoption has previously taken between 4 and 19 weeks. Once the CJA is adopted, the concept of operation (CONOPS) and the plan of operation (OPLAN) are drafted. During this stage, necessary personnel and equipment and the countries that will provide them are identified. In recent experience, this stage has been prone to the greatest delays, hindering rapid deployment of the mission. When the OPLAN and the CONOPS documents have been adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council the mission is formally launched.

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22 The European Commission is more actively involved in civilian peace operations than those with a military component.

III. Mission planning in practice

UNAMID

Efforts to revitalize the Darfur peace process and to deploy the AU/UN hybrid operation UNAMID attracted international attention throughout 2007. UNAMID’s planning and deployment illustrate strikingly the disconnect between policy and practice as well as the fact that even a well-planned operation may suffer from implementation challenges. Several features distinguish UNAMID. It was the first hybrid peace operation—an operation jointly conducted by two or more security organizations but under a single chain of command—ever deployed. While the operation’s planners attempted to follow the IMPP guidelines, this unique aspect of the operation tested the IMPP’s flexibility. In few past peace operations has there been such a long gap between the initial discussions and deployment. The planning process was also unusually intensive. Among other things, there was a high level of consultation with local stakeholders, in line with the IMPP guidelines. Besides complicating the planning process, this also allowed it to be held hostage to political developments. The fact that planning was taking place simultaneously at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa and the UN Headquarters in New York also created difficulties.

UNAMID assumed full authority from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 31 December 2007, after a protracted planning process that began in 2006 and went through numerous amendments. The operation was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1769, adopted on 31 July 2007. This resolution was unique in that it set out a deployment schedule for the operation. UNAMID’s headquarters was to reach initial operating capability, including command-and-control structures, by October 2007. In the same month it was to complete preparations to assume operational command over the ‘light support package’, all AMIS personnel, and any ‘heavy support package’ and newly deployed UNAMID personnel.

Resolution 1769 was welcomed as a major step towards stability in the region. Following the IMPP guidelines, the advance planning stage had included substantial consultations with the Government of Sudan and others. In June 2007 the AU and the UN held high-level technical talks with the government, leading to the latter’s acceptance of UNAMID and the key ele-

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24 On the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, see chapter 2 in this volume, section IV.
26 The light support package consisted of human and material resources from the UN to help AMIS to fulfil its expanded mandate. The heavy support package included more personnel and substantial air and other military assets. It was agreed to by the Sudanese Government in Nov. 2006 but was still only partially deployed in Dec. 2007. United Nations, Letter dated 28 Sep. 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN document S/2006/779, 29 Sep. 2006; and United Nations, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, S/2006/1041, 28 Dec. 2006.
ments of Resolution 1769. This high-level meeting was the culmination of several rounds of negotiations. The resolution thus represented a firm commitment from the Sudanese Government that it would cooperate with the UN in the three-phased peacekeeping plan leading to the deployment of UNAMID. In marked contrast, the government had strongly opposed UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted on 31 August 2006, evidently because it had had little input. Resolution 1706 authorized the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to deploy in Darfur, which the Sudanese Government had never agreed to.

The idea for a hybrid operation had initially been developed and agreed to in principle by all three parties at the November 2006 meeting of the AU’s Peace and Security Council. A tripartite mechanism consisting of the AU, the UN and the Sudanese Government was established to ensure transparency and facilitate the deployment of the light and heavy support packages and the establishment of the hybrid operation. In February 2007 the AU and UN sent in a review team to undertake a quick assessment of whether an evaluation carried out by a UN technical team in June 2006 was still relevant and, more critically, whether the conditions in Darfur were still appropriate for deployment of the new operation. An AU–UN multidisciplinary planning team—composed of experts in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, refugee return and reintegration, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, military and police planning and mission support—was subsequently formed to elaborate on the findings of the review and technical assessment missions. The fact that the team was split between Addis Ababa and New York created coordination challenges. More substantial issues included balancing the respective organizations’ standards and interests.

The first of several joint AU–UN planning exercises took place in March 2007 in Addis Ababa to decide the broad tasks for the various mission components and identify personnel requirements. At a subsequent joint planning session it was determined that it would be necessary to deploy an advance police and military contingent—an ‘early-effect capability’—which would already be operational on the day of the transfer of authority. The credibility of UNAMID hinged on gaining the confidence of the local population in Darfur through an early and visible improvement in the security situation.

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29 Heller Chu, M., Darfur Integrated Operational Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Interview with the author, 30 Nov. 2007.
Following Resolution 1769, the planning team entered the operational planning stage and focused on force generation. Normally an arduous process in itself, force generation became even more complicated because of the multiple criteria that had been imposed. For example, the Sudanese Government had insisted that the force had to be predominantly African. However, from the UN’s perspective the force also had to be able to implement UNAMID’s robust mandate effectively. On 2 and 3 August 2007 the AU and the UN held meetings with potential contributors of troops and police in Addis Ababa and New York, respectively. Five countries agreed to make up the early-effect deployment. Offers for regular troops for UNAMID exceeded the requested numbers. However, some of the countries that pledged the troops indicated that they lacked the equipment necessary to implement the required tasks. More critical military capabilities, such as aviation, and transport and multi-role logistical units were not pledged. \(^{32}\) With respect to the police component, although the overall requested numbers were met, these came from a small number of countries and did not satisfy a broad enough geographic representation. \(^{33}\)

Force generation problems continued throughout the rest of the year and into 2008, greatly exacerbated by the attitude of the Sudanese Government (see below). By the end of August 2007 the AU and the UN had not been able to finalize an agreement on troop generation and the configuration of the UNAMID military and police components. There was concern that UNAMID would not be ready to take over full authority from AMIS by the 31 December deadline. \(^{34}\) A third meeting with potential contributing countries on 19 September did not obtain any more pledges. \(^{35}\) When UNAMID assumed full authority at the end of the year, the final force composition had still not been agreed and several force-enabling assets, including ground transport units, transport helicopters and attack helicopters, had still not been pledged. \(^{36}\)

In September 2007, in keeping with the IMPP guidelines, a joint AU–UN multidisciplinary transition team had been established in El Fasher, Darfur. The team, headed by the UNAMID deputy joint special representative, was responsible for implementing the deployment plans on the ground.

The Sudanese Government insisted on being centrally involved in all major decisions relating to UNAMID. In no other peace operation in recent history was the host government given so much influence. However, while the UN has embraced the principle of inclusiveness as a way of making peace operations more needs-driven, the Sudanese Government’s main aim was apparently to weaken UNAMID. For instance, the government ruled out UNAMID

\(^{32}\) On the supply of military equipment to UNAMID see chapter 7 in this volume, section V.

\(^{33}\) United Nations (note 31), p. 3.

\(^{34}\) ‘Darfur deadlines’, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 48, no. 18 (7 Sep. 2007), p. 9.


using force to disarm the militias, making it much harder for the peacekeepers to carry out one of their key mandated tasks.\textsuperscript{37} The government also demanded veto rights on the composition of the mission, to which the AU and UN reluctantly consented. An initial list of pledged troop and police contributions was given to the government on 18 September and a final list submitted on 2 October. The government did not respond for several weeks, preventing the AU and UN from carrying out predeployment assessments of each pledged unit to establish whether it met the required standards. The government finally responded in November with objections to the inclusion of Nepalese, Thai and joint Norwegian–Swedish units, despite the fact that the list of troop contributing countries was 80 per cent African.\textsuperscript{38} The exclusion of these units would significantly weaken UNAMID. At the same time, the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the main rebel groups, had earlier objected to the possible participation of Chinese engineering units—China is widely seen as partisan in the Darfur conflict.\textsuperscript{39}

Besides manipulating the principles of host country consent and inclusiveness to its advantage, the Sudanese Government took other measures that openly obstructed the deployment and functioning of UNAMID. These include refusing to provide suitable land for the operation’s secondary bases, proposing that the government be allowed to disable the operation’s communications network when necessary for security reasons, requiring UNAMID to notify the government in advance of any troop movements, denying night-time flying rights and, in the final moments before the transfer of authority, objecting to the ‘re-hatting’ ceremony.\textsuperscript{40}

Some other external factors influenced UNAMID’s fraught planning process. In April and May 2007 the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for two men—Ahmed Mohamed Harun, the Sudanese State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Mohamed Ali Abdel Rahman, a commander of the government-aligned Janjaweed militia—for crimes against humanity and war crimes. This created tension in Khartoum and raised fears that UNAMID would be given the authority to carry out the arrests.\textsuperscript{41}

Two months after adopting Resolution 1769, the UN Security Council authorized a multidimensional peace operation in the neighbouring Central African Republic and Chad—MINURCAT—aimed at containing the violence spilling over from Darfur and protecting civilians. It also requested the EU to deploy a military operation in support of MINURCAT.\textsuperscript{42} The simultaneous


\textsuperscript{42} UN Security Council Resolution 1778, 25 Sep. 2007.
deployment of these operations and the involvement of another regional security organization had a significant impact on the planning of all three operations.

MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA

Responding to concerns that the conflict in Darfur had extended into eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR), at the request of the African Union and as called for in the IMPP guidelines, the UN dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment team to Chad and the CAR at the end of 2006 to explore the feasibility of a UN peace operation.43

Hostilities in the affected areas limited the team’s ability to conduct its assessment, and the concept of operations the team proposed for a UN deployment was consequently set out in broad terms. The assessment team proposed that the UN could deploy either a monitoring mission or a monitoring and protection mission. Although both options would include political and civil affairs, police, human rights and humanitarian components, the second would entail a significantly larger, robust military component able to deter potential attacks on civilians and stabilize the border area. The assessment team also noted that support for the proposed UN peace operation was uneven—the Government of the CAR was considerably more positive about the idea than the Government of Chad. Based on the team’s findings, Ban Ki-moon recommended that the Security Council authorize a monitoring and protection operation.44

A second technical assessment team was deployed in January 2007. The mission took two and a half weeks to produce detailed recommendations for the Security Council. Unlike the earlier assessment team, the technical assessment team was able to visit areas outside Bangui and N’Djamena, the capitals of the CAR and Chad, including the Wadi Fira and Ouaddai departments of eastern Chad and Vakaga prefecture in north-eastern CAR, where many Sudanese had taken refuge. More importantly, the team was able to hold consultations with a wider group of stakeholders. These included refugees and IDPs, representatives of rebel groups and local authorities in eastern Chad; security actors in the CAR; and international diplomats and humanitarian organizations in both Bangui and N’Djamena. During the discussions rebel groups in Chad warned that a UN operation could—depending on its structure and mandate—be seen as supporting the Chadian Government and hence as partisan.45 To promote greater transparency in the planning process and ensure that any resulting UN operation should have legitimacy, the technical assessment team shared its findings and its recommendations for the make-up of the

43 On the subregional dimensions of the conflict in Darfur see chapter 2 in this volume, section IV.
operation with the CAR and Chadian governments and other stakeholders. Interestingly, the Security Council requested the deployment of a sizeable advance mission that could prepare the ground for an eventual multidimensional UN operation.46

During the ensuing discussions, the Chadian Government indicated that it would agree to the deployment of a civilian police operation but not to a UN operation with a military component.47 Negotiations with the Chadian Government regarding the operation’s structure continued into mid-2007, where with the intervention of newly appointed French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, the government softened its position and agreed in principle to an EU military force in support of the UN multidimensional operation.48 A revised proposal for the UN multidimensional operation was drawn up, with three significant changes to reflect the demands of the host countries. First, the tasks and functions of the military component would be carried out by an EU force for the first year. Second, the UN operation would not be directly involved in the border area between the CAR, Chad and Sudan. Third, Chadian police and gendarmes maintaining law and order in refugee and IDP camps inside Chad would remain under national authority and not be placed under UN command, as had been suggested in the earlier concept. However, they would be vetted, selected, trained, monitored and mentored by the UN police component and would be paid by the UN.49

The revised plan raised many concerns among the international humanitarian community. For example, UN humanitarian officials said that the mandate would have to be carefully drafted in order to prevent rebels being suspicious of the EU force. The EU force was associated with France, the former colonial power and perceived by some Chadian rebels as a government ally. If the rebels decided to attack the EU force, humanitarian workers in the area could be at risk. They also argued that the lack of direct involvement in the border area diminished MINURCAT’s ability to provide security for people living there, including refugees and IDPs. The displaced people may even move again en masse when they realized that they were not in an internationally protected area. Finally, the decision to allow Chadian police and gendarmes to maintain law and order in the refugee and IDP camps was seen to be flawed because the population in eastern Chad had lost trust in the Chadian security forces.50

It was hoped that the EU planning process would be fast-tracked, with the CMC and CJA approved simultaneously in mid-September 2007, thus allow-

48 Miarom, B., ‘Chad opens door to possible foreign military force’, Reuters, 10 June 2007.
49 United Nations (note 47).
50 Integrated Regional Information Networks (note 47).
ing for possible deployment of the force by the end of October.\textsuperscript{51} However, no agreement on the CMC or force composition had been reached by early September. The EU was struggling to obtain the necessary troop commitments from member states. One suggestion was that the bulk of the force could come from the 2400-strong Nordic Battlegroup, even though it was not due to start operational duties for the EU until January 2008. EU member states wanted guarantees that the EU force would be replaced after a year, as originally planned.\textsuperscript{52}

When both MINURCAT and the EU force, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, received UN Security Council authorization on 25 September 2007, MINURCAT was able to deploy almost immediately. However, planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA was still not finalized and there had been no CJA. One of the obstacles to approval of the CJA related to cost: there was disagreement as to whether the costs of airlift and the use of satellite images—which had not been used before in an EU mission—should be common costs, and thus be shared by all member states, regardless of their participation.\textsuperscript{53} Disagreement on the concept of operations and the plan of operations also delayed deployment, as did continuing problems with force generation. By mid-December, four force-generation meetings had been held, but with little success.\textsuperscript{54} The plans and concept were finally completed in January 2008 and deployment scheduled for mid-February.

MINURCAT’s final authorized strength of 300 civilian police, 50 military liaison officers and 135 civilian staff, and the 3500 troops envisaged for EUFOR Tchad/RCA, are a far cry from the UN’s initial plan to deploy up to 10 900 military and civilian personnel in the CAR and Chad.\textsuperscript{55} The revisions to MINURCAT were made in order to obtain consent from the host governments, a necessary precondition for deployment. However, the revised plans arguably do not meet the needs on the ground, nor do they take into account the demands of the civilian population for a robust force that could offer them genuine protection.

IV. Conclusions

The case of UNAMID clearly illustrates some of the inherent difficulties in trying to make the planning and design of peace operations more needs-driven. An inclusive and transparent planning process may succeed in fostering a sense of local ownership and in satisfying some local stakeholders. How-

\textsuperscript{52} Taylor, S., ‘Political dissent could delay EU military mission to Chad’, \textit{European Voice}, 6–12 Sep. 2007, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{54} ‘EU/Chad: Member States still show little interest for fate of refugees in Eastern Chad’, \textit{Europe Diplomacy & Defence}, 20 Dec. 2007.
ever, UNAMID demonstrates that such an approach can dangerously delay deployment and result in an operation that is barely capable of meeting the needs of the affected population. Inclusiveness involves listening to several stakeholders, each with their own agendas, and some—particularly governments and armed groups—able to exert greater leverage than others. Trade-offs and compromises are inevitable. The challenge is to negotiate for an operation that can fulfil its core purpose of supporting sustainable peace. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, accurately captured the difficult question facing the UN in Darfur: ‘Do we move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a difference, that will not have the capability to defend itself, and that carries the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the United Nations, and tragic failure for the people of Darfur?’

Similarly, the UN assessment team that visited the CAR and Chad early in the planning process, after consulting with a range of local stakeholders, found that IDPs and refugees in the border areas wanted protection by an international force, leading to Ban Ki-moon’s recommendation that a robust military mission be deployed for the purpose. However, after accommodating the Chadian Government’s objections, the final deployment—MINURCAT and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, unable to operate in the border area of Chad—is arguably too weak to be effective, while security for IDPs and refugees in Chad is supposed to be provided by the Chadian police and gendarmes, whose commitment to the task is questionable.

Another factor common to all three missions is the struggle to find the necessary equipment and skilled personnel. Shortfalls in expertise, tools, man-power and resources are likely to increase as the demand for peace operations grows. This raises the question of whether further adjustments are needed to planning processes, so that supply factors are also taken into account.

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