1. Euro-Atlantic security institutions and relationships

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I. Introduction

During 2007 the main Euro-Atlantic actors confronted renewed estrangements and overcame old ones. A number of sharpened differences between Russia and other states of the Euro-Atlantic community were among the outstanding features of this dynamic. Russia’s conduct has left the West divided, unable to form a united response. The European Union (EU), despite the adoption of a new treaty in December 2007, has not yet fully recovered from the Constitutional Treaty debacle of 2005; this has considerably hampered its programme for the wider European neighbourhood, external relations and common foreign and security policies. Greater pragmatism and realism characterized the United States’ security policy, resulting in a partial, yet real, readiness for engagement and dialogue.

This chapter analyses key security challenges and policies in the Euro-Atlantic region, with an emphasis on institutional developments. Section II presents an overview of the challenges of ‘managing estrangement’, with subsequent sections examining at these challenges in more detail. Section III looks at Russia’s new assertiveness, focusing on the key sticking points of the USA’s missile defence programme, energy security issues, the Kosovo crisis and important developments in the post-Soviet area. Section IV reviews the EU’s choices concerning enlargement and its ambition to wield more influence in foreign, security and defence policies. Section V addresses the Atlantic community’s problems with security cooperation including counterterrorism, collective defence and other security endeavours. Section VI presents conclusions.

II. Managing estrangement

Russia’s new assertiveness, based on a few, but crucial, instruments of power, has raised significant problems for other European countries, the USA and multilateral institutions on a spectrum of issues. Compared to the recent past, Russia has tended to be a less cooperative partner with the rest of Europe, opposing a wide range of Western preferences, from enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and missile defence to energy supplies. Analogies with the cold war period are, however, misplaced. So far, confron-
tions remain largely rhetorical, even if some moves and pronouncements by Russia give rise to major concerns. For the most part Russia’s alienation, in some measure provoked by US policies, has a regional rather than a global dimension.

National interests and specific security concerns have hampered a common EU approach to Russia. This was particularly so in the case of energy security, where embedded trade relations and different dependencies have made concerted action in this area difficult for the EU. The challenge of EU unity was even more acute over the issue of Kosovo. More broadly, the EU tends to be reactive and divided when dealing with Russia; instead it needs to engage it more effectively.

Beyond the Russian challenge, the EU had numerous problems of its own during 2007. Much attention was devoted to settling the constitutional dispute that has deeply divided Europeans in recent years. The Treaty of Lisbon was agreed, but the treaty negotiations were more about members managing differences, opt-outs and ‘red lines’ than unifying diverse interests. In this process, the central EU institutions seem to have lost momentum vis-à-vis the more sceptical member states. With such an inward-looking agenda, the EU’s foreign policy coherence could only suffer.

In the Western Balkans, where the EU has massively invested diplomatic and economic resources, the outcomes have been mixed. While the region’s future is said to ‘lie in the EU’, this aim is not easily achievable. There have been positive developments in progress towards membership by the interested countries, but the process is uneven, hampered by insufficient domestic reforms and unsatisfactory governance. The EU wavers between imposing strict conditions that may encourage nationalist reaction in these countries and offering them a clearer prospect of accession, which has so far been insufficient to overcome political inertia. In its wider neighbourhood, conflicting plans about a Mediterranean Union, divergent interests in Asia and fundamental disagreements about Turkey continue to weaken the EU’s clout.

A similar absence of cohesion affects its defence and security policies. The lack of deployable military capabilities constrains the scope and range of its humanitarian interventions. EU battle groups are now on standby, but there is no consensus on how and when to use them. National deployments in Lebanon under the United Nations and in Afghanistan under NATO take precedence over common EU missions, the majority of which are civilian operations, most importantly in Kosovo. To speak with a more influential voice and to act more decisively remains an unfulfilled ambition for the EU.

In this context of fragmentation, relationships with the United States remain critical. After years of estrangement between Europe and the USA following the split over the 2003 US–British-led invasion of Iraq, a genuine willingness to place the transatlantic relationship in a more constructive framework was apparent on both sides in 2007. While public perceptions in Europe of the

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USA have continued to deteriorate,\(^2\) there have been real improvements in transatlantic relationships at official levels. This was especially noticeable in the case of France: President Nicolas Sarkozy seems keen to restore a friendly relationship with the USA and a constructive approach towards NATO. Highly symbolic gestures, such as Sarkozy’s speech before the US Congress in November, were followed by convergence in the French and US positions on Iran, Kosovo and Syria.\(^3\) In contrast, the new British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, while reasserting the United Kingdom’s status as the USA’s best friend, in practice distanced himself from Tony Blair’s embrace of the US agenda, starting with the partial withdrawal of British troops from Al-Basra, Iraq. Between these two reversals in position, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far succeeded in sticking to the middle ground with considerable influence, especially on climate change issues.

In this landscape of Euro-Atlantic relationships, multilateral security institutions do not effectively reinforce cooperation and rapprochement or mitigate crises and conflicts. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the institution that is most suitably designed to deal with regional challenges, has thus far been helpless in the face of Russia’s new assertiveness, on the one hand, and the EU’s encroachment on the OSCE’s competence, on the other. Meanwhile, the EU itself lacks a coherent and proactive strategy towards Russia. NATO has yet to regain its central significance to Euro-Atlantic security, and its relationship with Russia remains uncertain. The second half of 2007 saw the USA more actively engaging in intra-NATO cooperation regarding conventional arms control in Europe and pushing for NATO enlargement. However, the main bone of contention between Russia and the West at present—the US missile defence plan—is for the most part being addressed bilaterally between the USA, the Czech Republic and Poland and with NATO following rather than shaping the process.

III. Russia’s policy

Russia’s changed approach to the West

During the last full year of his presidency, Vladimir Putin embarked on a forceful course in security and political relations with Russia’s Euro-Atlantic partners. This assertiveness in 2007 seems to have been motivated by a number of factors—a restored sense of international power based on Russia’s growing wealth and influence in energy markets; domestic political calcu-

\(^2\) A 2007 opinion survey in the 5 largest EU states—France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom—shows that a large portion of the public sees the USA as the greatest threat to world stability. According to the FT/Harris Poll, 32% of respondents labelled the USA ‘a bigger threat than any other state’. The view of younger generations is particularly negative: e.g. 57% of Germans aged 18–29 years consider the USA as more dangerous than the regime in Iran. Dombey, D. and Pignal, S., ‘Europeans see US as threat to peace’, Financial Times, 1 July 2007. See also Malzahn C. C., ‘Evil Americans, poor mullahs’, Der Spiegel, 29 Mar. 2007.

lations (including the search to secure the current leadership’s grip on the country); and Russia’s genuine disenchantment with the USA.

In light of Russia’s lack of an officially articulated defence and security policy, there were a number of noteworthy security developments in 2007.4 In February the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced a new armament programme for the years 2007–2015.5 The programme budgets nearly 5 trillion roubles ($189 billion) to replace 45 per cent of the Russian arsenal with modernized weapon systems, including intercontinental missiles, long-range strategic bombers, early-warning stations and possibly aircraft carriers.6 In August Russian strategic bombers began to fly long-range missions in the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Pacific. In December the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov set sail to patrol strategic lanes in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.7 The year also saw successful tests of new Russian intercontinental multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

Russia launched a political counteroffensive in the face of growing Western criticism about Russia’s perceived anti-democratic conduct domestically. Russia also reacted to what it saw as the USA’s dismissal of its desire to be treated as an equal partner and player in global politics. At the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in February, President Putin surprised the audience with a confrontational speech.8 He accused the USA of attempting to force its will on the world and provided a catalogue of complaints regarding the superpower and its allies, from NATO’s progressive enlargement via foreign interventions to a new arms race. During the year the rhetoric charging the USA with ‘imperialism’, ‘diktat’, ‘containment’ and the like was ratcheted up in successive pronouncements by Putin and other prominent Russian political and military leaders.9 All this led some observers to portend a ‘new cold war’.10

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4 In Jan. 2007 a special joint meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and the command of the Russian Armed Forces was held to discuss the shape of a new military doctrine. The discussion lacked any substantial result, while the unchanged role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security policy was confirmed. Korobyshin, V, ‘Al’ternativy poka net’ [No alternative for the time being], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreniye, 2 Feb. 2007.


6 For more on Russia’s military expenditure see chapter 5 in this volume.

7 Nevertheless, many analysts see a continuing decline in the Russian armed forces. See e.g. Rostopshin, M., ‘Strategicheskaya poterya tempa’ [The strategic loss of the tempo], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreniye, 9 Feb. 2007; and Associated Press, ‘Experts see decline in Russia’s military’, International Herald Tribune, 13 Nov. 2007.


10 For a Russian analysis of the strain in Russian–Western relations see Arbator, A, ‘Is a new cold war imminent?’, Russia in Global Affairs, vol. 5, no. 3 (July–Sep. 2007), pp. 84–97.
During the year the Russian–Western security disputes and clashes centred on four prominent issues: missile defence, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) regime, energy security and Kosovo.11

**Missile defence**12

From the Russian political perspective, the issue of missile defence constituted the yardstick of Western goodwill and credibility in 2007. Russia has concerns about the effectiveness of the US plans in their stated objective of intercepting missiles launched in the Middle East (specifically, by Iran). Apart from these concerns, other motives have been suspected behind the Russian campaign. Russia sees US military bases and presence close to Russia’s European borders as a breach of an understanding that Western military resources will not be deployed into the territories of new NATO members. The charge that Russia is trying to drive a wedge between NATO members has also been levied again.13

In early 2007 the Czech and Polish governments agreed to start formal talks with the USA on the deployment of a radar system and associated 10 missile interceptors on their respective territories. The future deployments are strongly contested in both Central European countries. Russia’s response was sharp: suspecting the USA of dubious intentions to counteract Russia’s nuclear deterrent rather than defend against a rogue actor, President Putin and his top military commanders warned of possible ‘asymmetrical responses’, including targeting future installations.14 In the Russian view, the USA’s missile dialogues with the Czech Republic and Poland notably coincided with the USA’s military basing plans in Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, despite US assurances, Russia believes that the modest facilities in Central Europe forewarn of an expanded system with a strategic purpose.

In June, President Putin offered the USA joint operation of the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan.15 While not rejecting the proposal, the US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, made clear that Gabala could be an ‘additional capability’ but not a replacement or alternative to other US plans in Central Europe.16 At the Bush–Putin meeting in early July, Putin offered more suggestions aimed at closer cooperation (e.g. another radar site in southern Russia), but the USA remained committed to developing its presence in Eastern Europe. Following the meeting, Russia hinted at the possibility of deploy-
On 12 October Gates and the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, while meeting their counterparts in Moscow, offered Russia a ‘joint regional missile defence architecture’ under which Russia would join the USA and NATO as a full partner in designing and operating a missile defence system guarding all of Europe. The US proposals would allow each country to retain exclusive command and control over its missiles and decide when they should be launched. Moreover, the US negotiators suggested that Russia could station monitors at the US bases if the Czech Republic and Poland agreed to house the US missiles. Gates further suggested that the USA could delay activating the missile sites until it had ‘definitive proof’ of a missile threat from Iran.

The change of government in Poland in the autumn resulted in its more persistent demands for stronger military cooperation with, and security protection from, the USA—primarily the USA’s bolstering of Polish air defences and coming to agreement on missile defence. In December Russia and Poland agreed to enter bilateral consultations on missile defence. Meanwhile, in November the US Government apparently backed down on most of its initial informal proposals from October, including those concerning constant Russian monitoring of planned US facilities in Central Europe and joint evaluations of threats. Instead the USA proposed a set of transparency measures.

Energy security

As one of the largest exporters of natural gas and oil, Russia has become a major player in world energy markets. Since 2000 the Putin Administration has consistently encouraged the renationalization of Russia’s energy industry. Consequently, the state has taken control of the country’s energy supplies and

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17 The Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stated: ‘If our proposals are accepted, Russia will find it unnecessary to deploy new missile armaments in the European part of the country, including the Kaliningrad region, aimed at fending off the threats that would emerge in case of the deployment of missile defence elements in the Czech [Republic] and Poland. . . . If our proposals are not accepted, we will adopt adequate measures. An asymmetric and effective response will be found.’ Cited in Sukhov, P., ‘Rossiya nashla “asimmetrichnyi” otvet stranam NATO’ [Russia found an ‘asymmetric’ response to the NATO countries], Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 July 2007.


production, pipelines and long-term contracts with European customers.\textsuperscript{23} Russia’s natural resources have become a tool with which to influence its allies and client states as well as to reassert itself vis-à-vis the West, especially the EU. Russia’s energy policy has evoked concerns, among them that supplies to the rest of Europe could become unreliable (some see Russia’s recent cut-offs to some of its neighbours as a precedent\textsuperscript{23}); that Russia’s aims are incongruous with the EU’s (i.e. state control versus privatization); and that EU–Russian energy relations are unbalanced (i.e. there is no ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and Russia). It is questionable whether energy serves Russia’s offensive or defensive purposes. Its commercial aims notwithstanding, Russia’s purported energy-related political aims can be summarized as follows: (a) bringing the ‘near abroad’ countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe under stricter control; (b) neutralizing the new EU members in Central Europe; and (c) constraining the other EU and Western partners.

Russia’s energy ambitions are not without complications. Russia has not invested enough in the development of its domestic gas reserves to meet future demands and apparently faces shortages in the coming years. The first signs of possibly adverse energy trends emerged in 2007 (including growing inflation and Gazprom’s declining profits) At the same time, Russia has invested heavily in pipelines and downstream assets in Europe.\textsuperscript{25} A strategic battle has started over the rich gas resources of Central Asia. Thus far Russia has trumped the EU’s belated attempts since 2006 to institute a policy of direct access to the Central Asian resources by ensuring that pipelines run through and to Russia. Such control would eliminate Western competition, bind the Central Asian governments to Russia and satisfy Russia’s internal demand for energy. Given the volatility of the situation in Central Asia, however, Russia’s future monopoly cannot be presumed.

In May and December 2007 Russia signed agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build a natural gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea coast. This frustrated Western hopes of diversifying its supplies from Central Asia and apparently foiled the EU plan for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Compounding this frustration, the EU-backed Nabucco gas pipeline project, intended as the EU’s main alternative to Russian supplies, remained in limbo during the year.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, Western Europe failed to make progress in persuading

\textsuperscript{23} E.g. in 2000 only 15% of Russian domestic oil production was national; in 2007, 50% was under state control, mainly through the renationalization of Yukos in 2003. The Russian Parliament voted to give Gazprom, the state-controlled natural gas monopoly, an exclusive right to export natural gas. On European energy security see e.g. ‘A bear at the throat’, \textit{The Economist}, 12 Apr. 2007.

\textsuperscript{24} In Eastern Europe oil and gas serve as tools for curbing the real and potential political leanings of the countries in the region towards the West. Following energy shut-offs in Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine, Belarus and Latvia were similarly ‘punished’ for their respective behaviours during 2007.


\textsuperscript{26} This concerned Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and other countries. During 2007 Hungary switched sides from the EU’s Nabucco gas pipeline project (a southern corridor from the Caspian Sea to Turkey to
Russia to ratify the 1991 Energy Charter Treaty, which would require Russia to allow foreign access to its energy resources. Meanwhile, European and US companies (e.g. BP and Shell) had problems with their stakes in Russia’s infrastructure.\(^{27}\)

**Kosovo**

Administered by the UN and protected by a NATO peace operation (KFOR) since 1999, Kosovo has become a proving ground for post-conflict peace-building and conflict prevention for the EU, Russia, the USA and the broader international community. In January 2007 the UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, unveiled his proposals on the province’s future. The proposals sought to overcome the apparently irreconcilable differences between the Serbian and Kosovar positions.\(^{28}\) His plan offered all the main elements of sovereignty to Kosovo without naming it a sovereign state.\(^{29}\) This wide autonomy would involve EU supervision for at least two years. Overwhelmingly accepted by Kosovo’s Albanians, the Ahtisaari plan was rejected almost immediately by Russia and Serbia. Russia claimed that diplomacy needed more time; moreover, it warned against possible repercussions elsewhere—in such ‘frozen conflict’ areas as the South Caucasus and Trans-Dniester. The situation became a double impasse at the international and Serbia–Kosovo levels.

The following months witnessed a tug-of-war between the Western powers, which circulated several Kosovo-related draft UN Security Council resolutions, and Russia, which rejected each draft, standing firmly by Serbia. Consequently the frustrated US Government unilaterally declared uncompromising support of Kosovo’s independence.\(^{30}\) The EU had a tough choice: either recognize Kosovo’s independence without a UN mandate or hold back, thus allowing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to be taken hostage by Russia. Both options ran the risk of fomenting further unrest in the
Balkans. Facing Russia’s indirect threat of vetoing a UN Security Council resolution, several major EU countries considered recognizing Kosovo without a resolution. This, however, would have jeopardized EU cohesion, as members with real or potential secessionist problems or national minority protection concerns—Cyprus, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Spain—would have been reluctant to go along without a UN directive.

With the decision delayed and UN authority being worn down, the EU brought more pressure to bear on Kosovo and Serbia to reach a solution.\(^{31}\) The EU threatened to withdraw the possibility of early EU membership for both actors and suggested, for the first time, partitioning Kosovo along ethnic lines if both sides agreed.\(^{32}\) In August, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, ordered a new round of Kosovar–Serbian talks with a troika of high-ranking mediators from the EU, Russia and the USA. The talks were due to end on 10 December, the date on which Kosovo vowed to declare independence. Meanwhile, the USA reiterated its readiness to unilaterally recognize Kosovo by the end of the year, thus potentially aggravating its relations with the EU, which again was enticing Serbia with a fast track to membership. In response, a top Serbian official threatened to use force in the event of Kosovo’s independence, but he was soon disavowed by Serbian President Boris Tadić and the foreign and defence ministers.\(^{33}\) In the autumn the USA renewed diplomatic efforts with Russia to find an amenable Kosovo solution in a ‘package deal’ that also addressed the CFE regime and missile defence problems—once again, to no avail. On 8 December, the troika informed the UN Secretary-General that they had failed to broker an agreement on Kosovo’s status.\(^{34}\) The end of the year saw no denouement; the UN signalled that it was unable to resolve the status of Kosovo and the EU prioritized unity and delayed its decision until after the presidential election in Serbia in early 2008. On 17 February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence followed by a controversy among the states concerned.

**The post-Soviet area**

In 2007 the former Soviet states continued to cope with a variety of problems and challenges related to the democratization process. For all its troubles with illiberal democracy, multi-year efforts by Kazakhstan to be granted the OSCE’s chairmanship bore fruit at the end of 2007. The OSCE participating

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\(^{32}\) This suggestion was soon dropped as both Kosovo and Serbia firmly rejected it. See e.g. ‘EU puts pressure on Kosovo rivals to reach deal’, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 Aug. 2007; and Bilefsky, D., ‘Top EU mediator warns against partition of Kosovo’, *International Herald Tribune*, 6 Sep. 2007.


\(^{34}\) In parallel, NATO foreign ministers decided to keep KFOR troops in the region at least at the current level of 17 000. ‘NATO/Ministerial: in Kosovo, NATO hopes for best but prepares for worst’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 8 Dec. 2007, p. 3.
states conditionally agreed to Kazakhstan’s candidacy for the year 2010.\textsuperscript{35} Given its poor record on human rights and political freedoms, Kazakhstan’s appointment as the first post-Soviet state to chair the OSCE was based less on merit than other relevant considerations, such as the insistence of Russia and its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) partners, Western geopolitical calculations regarding Russia, the OSCE’s viability and other political contexts as well as Kazakhstan’s role as a major political player and oil-rich country in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{36}

Parliamentary or presidential elections were scheduled in a number of countries in the post-Soviet area in 2007. The record was mixed, with the ruling governments, except for one (in Ukraine), retaining power. In May in Armenia the parliamentary elections improved from previous ones and were held largely in accordance with international commitments.\textsuperscript{37} The local elections in Moldova in June showed that key problems persisted, particularly media bias and the intimidation of candidates.\textsuperscript{38} The August parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan reflected progress but a number of international standards were not met, specifically regarding the new legal framework and the vote count.\textsuperscript{39} In contrast, the September parliamentary elections in Ukraine were conducted mostly in line with international commitments and standards for democratic elections;\textsuperscript{40} the election led to a narrow victory of pro-Western parties that formed a government under Yuliya Tymoshenko at the year’s end. In November, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) announced that it would not be able to observe the December elections to the Russian State Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament).\textsuperscript{41} The December parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments, including those relating to transparency and accountability.\textsuperscript{42} Also in December, the presidential election in Uzbekistan was held in

\textsuperscript{35} To meet certain conditions in the run-up to the 2010 chairmanship, Kazakhstan amended its laws on the media and elections and promised to create a better model of public dialogue. It also vowed not to seek to weaken the ODIHR mandate. Originally the Kazakh Government aimed at gaining OSCE chairmanship for 2009. See Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Address of H. E. Dr. Marat Tazhin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting, Madrid, 29 Nov. 2007, <http://en.government.kz/documents/publications/page09>.

\textsuperscript{36} The CSTO is a collective security arrangement founded in 2002 by the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006.


\textsuperscript{40} OSCE, ‘Ukraine’s elections open and competitive but amendments to law of some concern, international observers say’, Press release, 1 Oct. 2007, <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_26824.html>.

\textsuperscript{41} ODIHR experts and observers have been denied entry visas for a long time into the Russian Federation. OSCE, ‘ODIHR unable to observe Russian Duma elections’, Press release, 16 Nov. 2007, <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_27967.html>.

\textsuperscript{42} OSCE, ‘Kyrgyz elections fail to meet a number of OSCE commitments in missed opportunity’, Press release, 17 Dec. 2007, <http://www.osce.org/item/28914.html>. The US State Department released a statement on 20 Dec. 2007 criticizing some aspects of the elections, including ‘uncertainty over elec-
a clearly dictatorial environment which left no room for real opposition and ‘generally failed to meet many OSCE commitments for democratic elections’. The international outrage following the 2005 Andijon massacre, however, did not prevent the EU from taking steps towards easing the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan in October 2007. Turkmenistan, which did not hold elections in 2007, has slowly been overcoming the legacy of late President Saparmurat Niyazov’s reclusive regime.

Progress in frozen conflict areas remained stalled. Despite hopes for a breakthrough, no headway was made in the Armenian–Azerbaijan conflict in 2007. In fact both countries accelerated their military build-ups, reinforcing the growing instability in the region. Nevertheless both sides declared their will to continue the ongoing negotiations on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moldova seeks to balance its policy between the Eastern and Western orientations, streamline relations with Russia and other neighbours, get closer to the EU and, above all, solve the frozen conflict in Trans-Dniester.

Georgia and Russia continued to face a wide spectrum of issues, such as Russia’s support of secessionists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s energy-related punitive sanctions and Georgia’s desire to join NATO. The most publicized incident of 2007 took place in August when a Russian military aircraft allegedly dropped a missile on Georgian territory, near South Ossetia. Russia denied the incident and the OSCE chose not to act further. These issues notwithstanding, the pullout of Russian armaments and troops from Georgia continued uninterrupted in 2007, with the one exception of the Russian presence at the base in Gudauta in Abkhazia. Acclaimed by Western countries as a model democracy-building state, Georgia faced a domestic crisis and international concern in November when President Mikheil Saakashvili briefly imposed a state of emergency in response to anti-government protests. In an early presidential election held in January 2008, Saakashvili won against a divided opposition.

In August 2007 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—which brings together China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and


47 On the conflict in Trans-Dniester see chapter 10 in this volume.
Uzbekistan—held a counterterrorism ‘Peace Mission 2007’ exercise in China and Russia, officially aimed at cooperation in combating ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’. The exercise fuelled speculation that the SCO was laying the groundwork for a military bloc to rival NATO and minimize Western influence in Central Asia. While the predictions turned out to be unfounded, it cannot be ruled out that future SCO operations may be used for quelling rebellion or managing political instability. Also, the agreement signed on 6 October between the SCO and the CSTO was not intended to confront NATO. The agreement was interpreted as a sign of Chinese and Russian determination to strengthen security links with each other and energy-rich Central Asia.

IV. The European Union

For the EU, 2007 was not a year of much celebration. The Lisbon Treaty, when finally agreed to and signed, was accompanied by sighs of relief rather than fanfare. Enlargement fatigue dominated. Efficiency versus cohesion was the theme for many deliberations on the working of the enlarged Union. At the same time it was obvious that cooperation in the EU was primarily led by states rather than EU institutions and was centred on protecting national interests rather than those of Europe as a whole. Still, the foreign, security and defence policies showed both activity by the European institutions and determination among the member states to continue to play a role in the stabilization of the EU’s neighbourhood and on a global level.

The Treaty of Lisbon

During 2007, after two years of stalemate with the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, a solution was finally achieved. In June, after overcoming many hurdles from various quarters (with Poland and the UK among the staunchest sceptics) a draft reform treaty text was agreed. EU heads of state and government signed the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December.

If ratified, the treaty will be implemented starting in 2009. It contains several reforms related to institutions, leadership and decision making, aiming at

51 On the structure and membership of the EU see annex B in this volume.
52 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 29 Oct. 2004 but has not been fully ratified. Its text is published in Official Journal of the European Union, C310 (16 Dec. 2004).
53 For analysis of individual states’ positions before the June summit see e.g. Peel, Q., ‘Why a Europe of opposites needs to break its constitutional deadlock?’, Financial Times, 10 June 2007.
increased efficiency. The European Council will have a full-time president, elected for a two-and-a-half year term, renewable once. From 2014 qualified majority voting will be extended into new areas and the European Commission will no longer include members from all countries.

In foreign and security matters the posts of High Representative for the CFSP and the European Commissioner for External Relations are to be merged under the title High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, assuming a position of Vice-President of the Commission. This merged post will be supported by another innovation, the External Action Service.\textsuperscript{54} A mutual defence clause (from which non-aligned states are excluded) and a solidarity clause, which is similar in kind but concerns assistance in case of a natural catastrophe or terrorist attack, were among the steps taken to strengthen the EU defence policy. Furthermore, permanent structured defence cooperation was included, allowing states that are willing and able to cooperate on the development of military capabilities. How relations will develop between the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remains to be seen. However, for all the progress achieved, the treaty has not fully succeeded in its stated ambition to give European citizens a more effective, more accountable and more comprehensible EU.

**Enlargement and neighbourhood policies**

With the recent accessions creating a Union of 27 members, enlargement fatigue is prevalent especially among older EU states. The poor performance of Bulgaria and Romania—which joined the EU on 1 January 2007—in fulfilling the promised post-accession reforms is a case in point.\textsuperscript{55} In 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a committee of experts—dubbed the ‘wise men group’—to focus on defining the EU’s final borders. However, the idea met with opposition from enlargement-friendly states, such as the UK. Instead the group, later renamed the ‘reflection group’, is to help the EU anticipate and meet challenges more effectively for the period 2020–2030.\textsuperscript{56}

The countries of the Western Balkans are seen by the EU as future members. First in line for membership is the candidate state Croatia, whose accession negotiations are advancing well. A number of deficiencies in the

\textsuperscript{54} Treaty of Lisbon (note 1), Article 30. The service will comprise members from the EU Council, the Commission and the national diplomatic services of the member states.


reform processes for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (a candidate country) and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (potential candidate states) will delay their memberships.\textsuperscript{57}

The acrimonious controversy over the accession to the EU of Turkey, the third candidate state, continued. Concerns included freedom of expression, rights of non-Muslim religious communities and the Kurdish population, corruption, judicial reform, trade union and human rights, and the normalization of relations with Cyprus.\textsuperscript{58} Despite French attempts to block Turkish accession and tensions between EU members on this issue, two new chapters were opened for negotiation in December 2007. However, a consequence of this was that Turkish enthusiasm for the EU dampened.\textsuperscript{59}

The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)—established to foster positive relationships with EU neighbours—continues to be a set of disparate endeavours. Without offering the hope of membership, the goal of coming to terms with security and societal problems in partner states remains elusive. There is, furthermore, an ambivalence among EU states’ attitudes to the EU neighbours. This has been demonstrated by the EU members’ timid market openings and their reluctance to take full advantage of some of the provisions of the agreements, such as those regarding mobility.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{The Common Foreign and Security Policy}

French President Sarkozy has proposed that the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) be revised with a common vision on the threats facing Europe and the means of response. Following this the European Council of 14 December 2007 invited the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, ‘in full association with the Commission and in close cooperation with the Member States’, to propose ways in which the ESS could be improved as well as complemented with the aim of adoption by the European Council in December 2008.\textsuperscript{61} Further development of the ESS will, however, not be unproblematic


\textsuperscript{58} European Commission, (note 57), pp. 8–9; and Council of the European Union, 2839th Council meeting, Press release, 16326/07, 10 Dec. 2007, p. 9–10.

\textsuperscript{59} In the spring of 2007 62% of the Turkish population endorsed EU membership. This figure had gone down to 53% at the end of the year. European Commission, Eurobarometer 68: Public Opinion in the European Union (First Results), Dec. 2007, p. 27; ‘Turkey’s EU membership talks move forward’, EurActiv.com, 20 Dec. 2007, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-eu-membership-talks-move-forward/article-169296>; and ‘EU to open new chapters with Turkey’, \textit{European Voice}, 6–12 Dec. 2007, p. 2. The chapters concern trans-European networks and consumer and health protection. According to French statements, Turkey can participate in these EU policies whether it is a member state or not. Each chapter corresponds to an area of the \textit{acquis communautaire} (EU common rights and obligations).


considering the divergence of views among EU countries, as evidenced in the Lisbon Treaty provisions to the effect that the ESDP shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.62

Some EU countries’ dependence on Russian energy supplies has been a major impediment in forming a united policy towards Russia. In September 2007 the European Commission, striving for an integrated EU-wide market for gas and electricity, unveiled a radical liberalization package that would break up Europe’s national energy companies to open the markets to greater competition and to promote diversification.63 The Commission also proposed limitations on foreign ownership of European power assets, aimed at Russian energy giants such as Gazprom and Rosneft. Due to strong French and German opposition, the Commission’s energy liberalization plan will face a long legislative battle in the years to come.

Immigration, climate change and counterterrorism were among a host of pressing issues involving the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament in 2007.

The need for a common European immigration and asylum system became even more urgent as illegal immigration led to great difficulties for some EU states, especially in southern Europe.64 The EU’s ‘Global Approach to Migration’ of December 2005 and 2006, which focused on Africa and the Mediterranean region, was extended during the year to include the regions to the east and south-east of the EU.65 A joint EU–Africa strategy and action plan that contained a number of concrete measures related to migration was endorsed in December.66 However, border control remains difficult and there is still no implementation of the agreed external border controls for the Schengen area, which was extended to include nine more states in December 2007.67

62 Treaty of Lisbon (note 1), Article 28A.
67 The Schengen area was extended to cover the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. European Council (note 56). Schengen is a body of Euro-
The need for an integrated climate and energy policy was another important issue during 2007. This issue took a step forward with the March 2007 agreement to achieve at least a 20 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 as compared to 1990 levels.68

A crucial area for both the EU and its citizens is the fight against terrorism.69 Its saliency has increased owing to several foiled attacks during the year.70 The November 2007 biennial review of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 described existing problems among states in coordinating activities in terms of insufficient capabilities.71 Corrective action taken in 2007 included the EU Council agreement of June 2007 on the Visa Information System (VIS) aimed at preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offences. The VIS will be used by designated authorities and Europol (the European Police Office). Another is an agreement with the USA on processing of passenger name record (PNR) data.72 After the six-month vacancy following the stepping-down of Gijs de Vries, Gilles de Kerchove was appointed the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator in September. The vacancy has been interpreted as a sign of disagreement over the mandate and capabilities of this position, with some countries resisting a strengthening of them.73 The European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, has put forward a number of proposals, the reactions to some of them demonstrating the sensitive nature of measures dealing with personal privacy.74

As security threats cross borders easily, solutions often require a variety of means and cooperation among several countries and organizations. Efforts under the CFSP and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillars address both internal and external dimensions of security. The JHA pillar is complemented by the 2005 Prüm Convention on a number of security objectives such as the exchange of DNA information.75 A number of EU countries are in the process of implementing the Schengen acquis which enables greater freedom of movement for persons, while at the same time introducing compensatory measures to maintain and reinforce the level of security.

69 According to Eurobarometer of Dec. 2007, 81% of the EU population see the fight against terrorism as the most important task for the Union. European Commission (note 59), p. 28.
71 Council of the European Union, ‘Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’, Brussels, 28 Nov. 2007. In the document (pp. 1–3) the problems are described as relying on lack of platforms bringing together the different agencies, such as police, customs and financial intelligence units (FIU) and on insufficient links between the agencies’ databases.
72 Council of the European Union (note 71), pp. 5–6.
75 The Prüm Convention (Schengen III Agreement) was signed on 27 May 2005. Its text is available at <http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/rtf/Prum_Convention.rtf>. Originally only 7 countries were
of ratifying the Prüm Convention, which was included in EU law in 2007. Furthermore, JHA issues are dealt with in the ‘EU G6’—the unofficial grouping of the interior ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK. While this signifies the great importance given to the particular area, unavoidably there are overlaps and complications.

Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East are all areas of vital importance for CFSP policies. In Africa, the EU is concerned by the lack of cooperation from the Sudanese Government in deploying the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Nevertheless, there is some hope in the political talks about Darfur that started in Sirte, Libya, in October. Central Asia is of crucial importance to the EU because of its strategic location and energy resources. However, the EU strategy for future collaboration in Central Asia as officially adopted by the European Council has been hampered by human rights concerns in the region. The Middle East peace process—in which EU participation is pursued along with the UN, the USA and Russia in the Quartet—is seen more positively than before in light of the Annapolis Conference and the understanding between the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas.

The variable geometry of EU cooperation acknowledges that not every country needs to be part of every policy and some countries can cooperate together more closely than others. The cooperation initiated by France, Germany and the UK (the E3), on behalf of the EU and including Javier Solana, to address the issue of the Iranian uranium programme offers one example of variable geometry. Another example of this approach relates to the role of the Contact Group—which brings together France, Germany, Italy and the UK with Russia and the USA—in the search for a solution to the Kosovo issue.

party to the Prüm Convention: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourgh, the Netherlands and Spain.

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76 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11177/1/07 REV 1, 20 July 2007, p. 6.
81 This delegation has been accepted by all EU members. When the 3 largest powers—France, Germany and the UK—took the initiative in 2003 and spoke in the name of the EU without involving it, there was strong criticism by others, leading to the involvement of the organization and Solana personally. See Crowe, B., Foreign Minister of Europe (Foreign Policy Centre: London, Feb. 2005), p. 15.
More problematic is when countries cooperate without connection to and in competition with the EU. Sarkozy’s plan for a Mediterranean Union, which would exclude countries without a Mediterranean coast, has been criticized by many EU countries for serving French interests and, if implemented, potentially weakening the EU.83

The European Security and Defence Policy

As in previous years, the ESDP managed a variety of issues in 2007, including conflict prevention and crisis management, training, military and civilian capabilities, adequate financing, European Defence Agency (EDA) progress, civil–military coordination and cooperation with other international organizations and states.84 The 1992 Petersberg Tasks, whose scope and range were extended by the June 2004 European Council, have been given an anti-terrorism emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty.85 By the end of 2007 the EU was carrying out 10 peace operations, most of them outside Europe.86

The large number and variety of missions reflects the EU’s interest in stabilizing both its neighbourhood and conflict zones around the globe. In 2007 and early 2008 the EU initiated a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and was preparing a military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and a police mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo).87 In January 2007 the first two battle groups became operational, to be replaced by two others on 1 July, but as yet none has been used in an operation.88 In October the European Gendarmerie Force became operational and sent a contingent of 140 gendarmes to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.89 As a result of the improved situation in that country, forces supporting the largest EU mission, EUFOR ALTHEA, were cut down to 2500.90

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84 On EDA activities see chapter 6 in this volume; and European Council, Presidency report on ESDP, 16426/07, 11 Dec. 2007.

85 According to Article 28b of the Lisbon Treaty (note 1), the Petersberg Tasks include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization’. The Petersberg Tasks were introduced in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.

86 See appendix 3A in this volume.

87 On the preparations for EUFOR Tchad/RCA see chapter 3 in this volume.

88 For a general description of the battle groups see Lindström, G., Enter the EU Battle Groups, Chaillot Papers no. 97 (European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, Feb. 2007).

89 The force is composed of Dutch, French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish gendarmes and is based in Vicenza, Italy. It could have up to 2300 men, with an 800-strong rapid reaction force. In addition to the missions sent out for specific and sometimes urgent tasks, the EU has special representatives in key areas of the world promoting EU policies and seeking to maintain peace and stability in the area. ‘EU/ Gendarmerie: gendarmerie unit in Sarajevo shortly’, Europe Diplomacy & Defence, 23 Oct. 2007, p. 3.

However, the events in Kosovo were a reminder that all is not going well in the Western Balkans.

Both Middle East missions have encountered obstacles related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Aimed at contributing to sustainable and effective policing under Palestinian ownership, the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories had a long wait for Israeli accreditation.\(^91\) The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) suspended operations after the closure of the Rafah crossing point in June 2007.\(^92\)

Africa is a region of special interest and a constant source of concern for the EU. For example, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, anticipated to start in January 2008 and to be operational in April, suffered from slow force generation and insufficient capabilities (e.g. helicopters).\(^93\) EUSEC DRC, which assists in security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is at an impasse, chiefly over the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme and the creation of a secure payment procedure.\(^94\) Missions are often small and short-term and are therefore inadequate to secure long-term progress. For example, the area of eastern Congo where Operation ARTEMIS was launched in 2003 is troubled again.\(^95\)

The EU grapples with other challenges as well. First, on a more general level, it faces overstretch. In this context, US demands for increased forces in Afghanistan have created problems for European countries related to the competing prioritization of EU and NATO missions.\(^96\) Second, the battle group concept proved to be an imperfect solution. Although the battle groups were formed in order to give the EU access to standby troops, none of the ongoing conflicts fit all the criteria put on battle group missions during their first year. Third, there is the issue of operation headquarters. While some would prefer that EU operations rely on NATO (under the 2003 Berlin Plus Agreement),

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\(^{92}\) The suspension is seen as temporary and formally EUBAM is therefore still operational. EUBAM Rafah, ‘EUBAM still operational’, Fact sheet, Dec. 2007.

\(^{93}\) Taylor, S., ‘Chad mission to test Union’s will and power’, *European Voice*, 2–29 Aug. 2007, p. 7; ‘EU/Chad: timid progress on way to forming European force for deployment in Sudan/Darfur border regions’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 27 Sep. 2007, p. 2; ‘EU/AFRICA: General Nash describes for ambassadors difficult conditions in which EUFOR Chad-DRC will be deployed’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 1 Nov. 2007, p. 1; and ‘EU/AFRICA: CONOPS for EUFOR Chad-DRC to be finalised soon’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 6 Nov. 2007, p. 2.

\(^{94}\) EUSEC DRC is the EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. DDR of former combatants plays a critical role in order to make the transition from war to peace. See ‘EU/DRC: EUSEC is in impasse’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 20 Dec. 2007, p. 2.


\(^{96}\) The US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, has called for ‘a greater role for the UN and the European Union in economic development and the training of the Afghan police’. See ‘NATO/Defence: first day of informal meeting in Noordwijk dominated by Afghanistan’, *Europe Diplomacy & Defence*, 26 Oct. 2007, p. 3.


others strive towards an autonomous EU military headquarters. The ESDP is now dependent on a number of national headquarters for many of its missions.98 If the EU is to assume a major role in the area of defence policy, it needs to deal with the lack of consensus on this vital issue.

V. Atlantic community security cooperation

At the heart of NATO’s difficulties is its relative marginalization in the transatlantic dialogue. For the USA, the greater Middle East theatre and combating terrorism remain the most important security challenges, and in this regard NATO does not necessarily offer an obvious added value. NATO urgently needs a new Strategic Concept to give it a clear sense of purpose, whether alliance-related or global. France’s possible full return to NATO, much publicized in 2007, looks hopeful, but much will depend on whether the USA and other Atlanticist governments (the UK in particular) are prepared to adopt a more favourable view of the ESDP. At the end of 2007 and in the run-up to the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the prospects for NATO enlargement with the entry of Balkan states seemed to be brighter, with Croatia in the lead.

The European–US rapprochement

The overall rapprochement between the USA and its European allies and partners has limitations. The USA is now less a ‘European’ power than it used to be.99 The USA considers the greater Middle East its main strategic theatre, and it remains heavily engaged there, both diplomatically and militarily, with its ongoing conflict in Iraq as the highest priority.100 Despite the hope that US troop numbers in Iraq could be reduced after the ‘surge’ of 2007, the Iraqi Government appears to require a continuing US presence.101 In December 2007 the legal basis for the US presence in Iraq was renewed until 31 December 2008 by UN Security Council Resolution 1790, but this is to be the last such renewal.102 After that date, a bilateral agreement will have to be negotiated between the two countries, one of the first tasks awaiting the new US Administration in 2009.

The US Administration of President George W. Bush took a more pragmatic approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, allowing for more constructive

99 As the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, succinctly put it, ‘The United States’ policy towards Europe is no longer about Europe. It’s about the rest of the world.’ Beatty, A., ‘America and Europe go their separate ways’, European Voice, 7 Apr. 2007.
101 For a detailed account of the conflict in Iraq see chapter 2 in this volume, section III.
cooperation with the EU, which has long regarded the peace process as a key prerequisite for a stable Middle East. The revival of the ‘road map’ for peace and the negotiations launched at the November 2007 Annapolis Conference marked a clear departure from President Bush’s past choices. Transatlantic rapprochement was also noticeable regarding the other crucial issue in the Middle East: the Iranian proliferation problem. However, Western cohesion in Afghanistan suffered from strategic divergences, national constraints and the resurgence of the Taliban.

EU–NATO cooperation

In recent years, despite their declared commitment to closer collaboration and consultation in security matters, the EU and NATO—the two main Euro-Atlantic institutions—have remained entangled in rivalry. In January 2007 the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, called for ‘strategic partnership’ between the two organizations, with a special emphasis on Kosovo’s final status, Afghanistan, military capabilities and political dialogue. Along with Darfur, these shared challenges should result in more effective collaboration and 2007 saw promising progress in these areas. For example, France’s overtures to NATO during the year and its engagement in the Afghanistan mission raised modest hopes for agreement on a more effective division of labour. In practical terms, however, high-level EU–NATO cooperation continues to be uneven. For instance, in Afghanistan—where there appears to be solid cooperation on the ground—the dispute between the EU and Turkey (a NATO member) over EU access to NATO intelligence and logistics hampered their joint Afghan police training plans. A number of possibly formidable issues could block the EU–NATO collaboration deal, among them forthcoming reviews of the European Security Strategy and NATO’s Strategic Concept, avoiding the competition between the EU battle groups and the NATO Response Force (NRF), and resolving the Cyprus–Turkey stalemate.

Combating terrorism

Differences between US and European approaches to international terrorism have continued to rise difficulties for the transatlantic community, despite a change in tone and tactics in the USA. The USA’s ‘global war on terrorism’ has proven far more complex and expensive than anticipated. Constantly reinventing itself, al-Qaeda has changed its leadership, diversified its bases and recruitment tactics, and expanded its Internet activities. According to a

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103 White House (note 80).
104 See chapter 8 in this volume, section II.
107 B. Riedel, a former senior CIA counterterrorism official, stated ‘what we are seeing is the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda’s capabilities to strike targets in Western Europe and ultimately North America on
US Government report, al-Qaeda ‘is driven by an undiminished strategic intent to attack the [US] homeland’ and is expected to ‘enhance’ its capability to attack the USA through cooperation with US-based terrorist groups. The report also underlines al-Qaeda’s ‘persistent desire for weapons of mass destruction, as the group continues to try to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material’. Six years after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the USA remained vulnerable. A unclassified summary of the July 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism threats concludes that the USA found itself in a ‘heightened threat environment’, underlining the ‘rejuvenating effect’ the conflict in Iraq has had on al-Qaeda and pointing to the failure to counter extremism in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Even if al-Qaeda perceives the USA as a more difficult target to strike, and despite several US successes against its leaders, al-Qaeda has been able ‘to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for [US] Homeland attacks’. The USA is increasingly concerned about Europe being used as a base for attacks against the USA; this led to reinforced measures to better control the flow of passenger airline traffic crossing the Atlantic. Since the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, European intelligence services have focused on domestic radicalization.

The USA’s reputation across Europe and beyond continues to suffer. Even if the USA’s sole superpower status fuels resentment and suspicion, US foreign policy choices have contributed to its isolation. In this context, the ‘jihadist’ movement seems to have gained ground in Pakistan, the Maghreb is increasingly embattled, Sunni extremism is on the rise in Lebanon and Hamas has maintained its power in the Gaza Strip. The deteriorating strategic environment affects Europe too. Not only have the risks of attacks in the UK as well as against US assets in Europe increased (e.g. in Germany), but the further radicalization of Muslim extremists against an undifferentiated West threatens Europe as a whole. In a move favoured by Europe, in 2007 the Bush Administration aimed to regain its strategic initiative by adopting a more comprehensive approach in the ‘global war on terrorism’, advocating engagement and negotiation in addition to coercion and containment. This was evidenced by the emergence of a more congruent framework of internal and external measures, and of hard and soft policies.


111 Dempsey and Bennhold (note 70); and MSNBC and NBC News (note 70).
Collective defence and rapid response issues

The novelty of 2007 was the reopening of ‘cold war’-style issues with Russia (see section III). The Russian–US brinkmanship over the CFE Treaty and missile defence reflected the wide spectrum of strategic, political, military issues that divide the Euro-Atlantic community. There has long been an unease among the members of NATO over the right approach to relations with Russia. For the sake of NATO cohesion as well as the viability of the CFE regime, NATO states—including the USA—have belatedly acknowledged the need to pay more serious attention to Russia’s CFE-related concerns. Given the growing tension and Russian demands, the autumn of 2007 saw the USA shift towards enhanced diplomatic efforts with Russia, undertaken in consultation with NATO allies. A challenge for the USA was to find creative ways to persuade Russia to not react adversely to the new developments in the European security environment and also maintain NATO unity.112

NATO suffers from a lack of consensus about its threat assessment and the scope of cooperation over the related US plan for missile defence in Central Europe. Pending the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the North Atlantic Council has so far ‘taken note’ of progress in its ‘ongoing work’ on the political and military implications of missile defence for NATO and has offered Russia consultations in the NATO–Russia Council as a cooperative transparency measure.113

Meanwhile NATO, as part of its 1999 Strategic Concept, has elaborated a plan for a theatre missile defence system, the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme. This ‘system of systems’ will be integrated into a single NATO command and control network.114 ALTBMD is scheduled to achieve an initial operational capability by 2010 and to be fully operational by 2016. Its goal is to protect NATO-deployed forces inside or outside NATO territory against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. However, there have been discussions at NATO Headquarters about making ALTBMD complementary with the USA’s missile defence plan for long-range missiles.

Little headway has been made on missile defence cooperation since the 2006 Riga Summit’s confirmation that the defence of NATO forces and territory from the entire range of ballistic missile threats was feasible. The USA’s missile defence plan, bilaterally negotiated with the Czech Republic and Poland, does not cover the whole of NATO’s European territory, leaving the south east exposed. On 14 June 2007 NATO defence ministers agreed to assess the possibility of ‘bolting’ the ALTBMD system on to the US system to ensure that all of NATO territory would be protected from missile threats and that the two systems would be interoperable.115 US officials have apparently

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112 See chapter 10 in this volume, section II.
114 For more detail see appendix 8C in this volume, section III.
interpreted this decision as NATO’s implied endorsement of the US missile
defence plan, although this is debatable.

The NATO Response Force is capable of performing missions worldwide
across a spectrum of operations, including evacuations, disaster management,
counterterrorism, and acting as ‘an initial entry force’ for larger, follow-on
forces.\(^{116}\) The NRF, which so far has been deployed twice—in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina and after the Pakistani earthquake, both in 2005—is to have
about 25 000 troops on standby. While the NRF remains an important tool for
the transformation, improvement and interoperability of NATO forces, the
perennial problem of members’ asymmetrical sharing of the costs and military
burden has effectively stymied its operability. As NATO’s engagement in
various theatres around the world has strained NATO members’ capabilities,
NATO defence ministers meeting in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in October
decided, as an interim measure, to reduce the core number of troops in a state
of readiness while retaining the ability to rapidly reinforce the NRF to its full
complement of 25 000.\(^{117}\)

**Afghanistan**

Although the much-feared Taliban spring offensive did not materialize and the
Taliban leadership appeared to be divided and unable to control their pro-
nvincial factions, the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated throughout
2007. After six years, progress in stabilization and reconstruction remains
limited.\(^{118}\) Almost half of Afghanistan, primarily in the south, is too dangerous
for aid workers to operate due to Taliban presence.\(^{119}\) This deteriorating situ-
ation exacerbated the pre-existing tensions among NATO allies and raised ser-
ious questions about the sustainability of the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF).

As a result of NATO members’ continuing to frame the mission in different
and exclusive terms and limiting their involvement to specific and restricted
tasks (e.g. only a limited number of countries have accepted combat missions),
the flexibility and efficiency of NATO’s efforts have been reduced. For
example, the different approaches have led to different strategies, and not all
units under NATO command are using the same tactics: the Dutch forces in
Uruzgan province have opted for developing relationships with tribal leaders


\(^{117}\) ‘NATO/Defence: Changes planned to make NATO better able to respond to new challenges’,

\(^{118}\) The UN noted that ‘the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006 . . . The
nature of the incidents has however changed considerably, with high numbers of armed clashes in the
field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide’. Harrison,
C. S., ‘Half-year review of the security situation in Afghanistan’, UN Department of Safety and Security,
13 Aug. 2007. Terrorist attacks targeting visible and symbolic assets increased significantly in 2007.

\(^{119}\) A Senlis Report added that ‘The insurgency exercises a significant amount of psychological con-
trol, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long
history of shifting alliances and regime change’. Senlis Afghanistan, _Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan
on the Brink_ (Senlis Council: London, Nov. 2007).
while other forces have chosen to actively confront the leaders. The UK and Denmark are pushing for greater use of tribal militias to strengthen efforts against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, while General Dan McNeill, the commander of ISAF, and the USA more generally question this approach.

Despite the urgent need for a common, comprehensive strategic vision that involves both military and civilian aspects of the mission, ‘the coalition does not have a coherent strategy’ and the consensus-based nature of NATO is increasingly at risk.\textsuperscript{120} The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the reconstruction efforts experienced incoherence similar to that of ISAF. Since ISAF’s chain of command only covers the military components of PRTs, civilians working in PRTs only reported to their national governments, each with different frameworks and objectives. With limited budgets, frequent rotations, increased insecurity and without a specific mandate, the PRTs’ activities continued to amount to short-term crisis management.

Force generation problems have also plagued the mission. NATO members’ varying security concerns have strained NATO solidarity and fuelled disgruntlement about the mission among NATO member governments—Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and others—which had serious difficulties convincing their public to continue their deployments.\textsuperscript{121} According to NATO experts, ISAF needs at least four more battalions, including one to patrol Afghanistan’s Pakistani border, and suffers persistent shortages of helicopters and other heavy equipment.\textsuperscript{122} As a result, ISAF can clear territory but is


unable to hold it. The USA, after repeated but largely fruitless appeals to other NATO members to expand their commitments, has decided to send an additional 3200 marines by the spring of 2008.123

In addition to NATO’s efforts, the wider international community’s attempts to build internal security capacity have also been fraught. Although the Afghan National Army (ANA) plays an increasingly active role alongside ISAF, the ANA comprises fewer than 35 000 men, well below the goal of 70 000 by 2010. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which oversees the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, set a goal of recruiting 82 000 policemen, including 18 500 border police.124 The new EU and US effort to provide nearly 2500 personnel to train and equip the police force has not so far achieved significant results.125 Corruption is rife in the police force, especially regarding the booming opium trade, and the local population sees the police force as part of the problem rather than the solution. Moreover, repeatedly targeted by the Taliban, it remains weak and dysfunctional.126

Towards a new transatlantic bargain

The troubles in Afghanistan underscore the profound challenge that NATO faces in transforming from a regional collective defence organization to a global collective security alliance. It is possible that intrinsically multifaceted and long-lasting operations like Afghanistan, which demand a high level of unity and harmony in commitments, capabilities and strategic choices, are beyond the consensus-based culture of NATO—particularly because these types of security operations are a matter of national choice, not collective necessity. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts must be given a real chance to succeed. If state building is a responsibility that the USA is ‘utterly unable, for material, political and cultural reasons, to shoulder alone’,127 and if humanitarian operations remain the cornerstone of the EU’s ambitions in defence and security, then such tasks are an inescapable subject for transatlantic cooperation and the collective responsibility of NATO. To carry them out, fundamental institutional, strategic and operational changes must be add-

125 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report no. 138 (ICG: Brussels, 30 Aug. 2007). See also section IV this chapter and appendix 3A in this volume.
ressed—chief among them are the poor cooperation between the EU and NATO, the persistent failures to meet European capabilities targets, the opportunities for common funding and an updated Strategic Concept. The 2007 rapprochement between France and NATO was a potentially significant step toward achieving these reforms. At the same time, Turkey’s further alienation may render the effort ineffective. The NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008 has a broad agenda with many outstanding issues. Given NATO’s apparent lack of consensus about its future relevance, a significant breakthrough is unlikely.

VI. Conclusions

The most significant development in Euro-Atlantic relations in 2007 was Russia’s restored self-confidence and aspirations to equal status in security matters with its Western partners. Russia in the coming years will remain under the influence of the Putin-era leadership. Increasingly self-assured by the lucrative exploitation of its natural resources and emboldened by their use as a successful political weapon, Russia has returned to its traditional policy of playing its European partners against each other, seeking to weaken the transatlantic ties and to reassert influence over the former Soviet states. At the same time, Russia appears eager to maintain cooperative relations with the West and it is unlikely to risk challenging it too forcefully. In particular, the question of Kosovo, if not managed, is likely to be the source of increasing security tensions in South Eastern Europe and among the EU, Russia and the USA.

The challenges of the transatlantic partnership are increasingly global. Consensus and commitment are difficult to achieve and sustain. When acting together—for example, in the Middle East peace process or over Iran, Kosovo or Afghanistan—the partnership still suffers from self-imposed constraints, divergent approaches or insufficient leverage. The European–US rapprochement that emerged in 2007 was based more on acknowledged weaknesses than projected strengths. For both Europe and the USA, 2007 has been a year of reckoning. The EU has taken an important step by adopting the Lisbon Treaty, which broadly maintains the main elements of the rejected Constitutional Treaty, especially in foreign and security policy areas. The EU can now harness its considerable potential by translating this legal framework into political action. However, the treaty ratification processes may absorb the EU’s energies by emphasizing once again national preferences and opt-outs rather than genuine foreign agendas. In the USA, the policies that had diminished the country’s influence and prestige at home and abroad have largely been abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic approach to world affairs. Yet the USA remains heavily involved in Iraq and its diplomatic impact has shrunk globally. With a pending election, no foreseeable exit from Iraq and a worsening economy, the USA may become more inward-looking. Thus, transition will be the Euro-Atlantic community’s theme in 2008 and 2009.