3. Peacekeeping: keeping pace with changes in conflict

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I. Introduction

As 2006 began, it promised a continuation of the heightened international political commitment to peacekeeping1 that had characterized the ‘banner year’ of 2005.2 In April 2006 the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to ‘a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’;3 and the newly established United Nations Peacebuilding Commission took on its first two country cases, Burundi and Sierra Leone.4 Illustrating the widespread recognition of the primary role of the United Nations in peacekeeping, some 70 per cent of Nepal’s population reportedly wanted the UN to become involved in the country’s peace process. In January 2007 both the Nepalese Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) formally requested that the UN support the implementation of the peace agreement reached between them by assisting in the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, among other tasks.5 The UN and a number of regional security organizations took several steps to enhance their operational effectiveness in carrying out peace missions. For example, the UN embarked on an ambitious reform agenda aimed at professionalizing the conduct of UN peacekeeping.

However, unforeseen political and strategic developments in mid-2006 created severe problems for a number of peace missions and served to dampen the earlier optimism. Among others, conflict in Lebanon and mounting violence in Afghanistan necessitated major expansions of the international missions in those countries. The need to replace the small UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) with a considerably larger integrated and multidimensional

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1 The term ‘peacekeeping’ is used in this chapter to cover all peace operations intended to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, to support a peace process, or to assist conflict prevention or peacebuilding efforts. On definitions see also appendix 3A.


mission, the UN Mission in Timor (UNMIT), sparked new debate about the shortcomings of past international peacebuilding efforts. This discussion focused in particular on the growing complexity and increasing number of functional tasks given to peace missions, and the multiplicity of actors involved in conducting them. The apparent failure in Timor-Leste also clearly demonstrated the crucial importance of the emerging principle of local ownership in peacebuilding.6

Some long-standing core principles of peacekeeping, such as consent, impartiality, neutrality and the use of force only in self-defence, also came to the fore in policy discussions and severely tested in their practical implementation. After the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) successfully oversaw a constitutional referendum and elections in that country, the new government accused the mission of favouring the opposition and requested that it be withdrawn ahead of schedule. Although sporadic violence continued in the country, the UN had little choice but to comply.7 Similar political resistance emerged in Côte d’Ivoire: in September the chief of the Ivorian Army accused the international community of ‘sickening partiality’ and President Laurent Gbagbo urged UN and French peacekeepers to leave the country, saying that the UN-facilitated peace process had failed and that he intended instead to approach the African Union (AU) for assistance.8 Following the decision by the European Union (EU) to include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in its list of international terrorist organizations,9 the LTTE demanded that EU monitors be expelled from the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), arguing that the mission was no longer either impartial or neutral.10

Thus in 2006 the UN and other multilateral security organizations were obliged to address recurring political and operational dilemmas in peace-

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6 ‘Local ownership’ here refers to full acceptance of the institutions and processes for upholding the rule of law by the people who will live under it and, in the long term, uphold it. This generally occurs only where the local stakeholders (government and population) have been centrally involved in defining those institutions and processes.

7 ONUB was succeeded by a smaller political mission in 2007. Gowan, R., ‘The UN and peacekeeping: taking the strain?’, Signal, autumn 2006, pp. 44–51.


9 The EU list of international terrorist organizations and persons linked to terrorist activities was established by Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, 2001/931/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, L344 (28 Dec. 2001), pp. 93–96, and has been updated several times since then. The LTTE was added to the list by Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Union, L144 (30 May 2006), pp. 25–29.

keeping and to re-evaluate the role of peacekeeping in the resolution of contemporary conflicts.

Section II of this chapter discusses recent efforts to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of peacekeeping. It also examines current paradigms of peacekeeping and questions whether they are still appropriate to address contemporary challenges. Section III illustrates some of the issues with developments during the year related to peacekeeping operations in four important theatres: Lebanon, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Darfur region of Sudan. Section IV offers conclusions. Appendix 3A presents extensive data on the multilateral peace missions that were active for all or part of 2006.

II. Rethinking peacekeeping

Both the number and the scale of international peace operations reached unprecedented levels in 2006: over 148 000 military personnel and approximately 19 000 civilian police and civilian staff from 114 countries were deployed in 60 multilateral peace operations.11 The continued surge in demand for deployable personnel and the difficulties experienced by states and by multilateral security organizations and alliances in meeting this demand warrant a close re-examination of the concept of peacekeeping—what it is, what it should aim to achieve and how it can best achieve those aims.

Peacekeeping has proved its effectiveness—and even necessity—in assisting conflict-ridden countries to establish lasting peace by creating an environment in which respect for human rights can be restored and democratization and sustainable development can take place. While there has been a dramatic rise in the number and intensity of intra-state conflicts since the early 1990s—these are now the dominant type of conflict and no interstate major armed conflict has been active in the past three years—the total number of conflicts around the world has declined dramatically in the same period. The Human Security Report 2005 showed a strong correlation between this decline and the increase in international engagement, especially in the deployment of peace operations.12

The shift from inter- to intra-state conflict has been reflected in peacekeeping efforts. Prior to 1989, only two large-scale UN peace missions were deployed in the wake of an intra-state armed conflicts—in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Cyprus.13 Since that time, only one major UN mission—the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)—has been established in response to an interstate armed conflict.

11 Figures are as of 31 Dec. 2006. As a statistical outlier, the 155 000 troops of the Multinational Force in Iraq are not included in the 2006 totals. The operation is, however, included in the total number of operations and listed in appendix 3A. On SIPRI’s sources and methods see appendix 3A.
13 These were the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–64) and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964–present).
A new phase in peacekeeping

The end of the cold war and the emergence of what have been called ‘new wars’—predominantly intra-state conflicts characterized by, among other things, asymmetry between combatants, the avoidance of conventional battle, the deliberate targeting of civilians, the crucial role of economic motives and a fluidity of actors (global and local, state and non-state)—ushered in a new phase in the evolution of peacekeeping. The frequency with which peacekeeping missions are now deployed in weak or failed states where the ‘lingering forces of war and violence’ are still present after years of protracted civil conflict has led to significant developments in the conceptualization of peacekeeping, the articulation of mission mandates and the way in which those mandates are carried out.

Peace operations were traditionally mandated simply to monitor ceasefires, interpose between conflict parties and maintain buffer zones, and were bound by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, intervention only with the consent of the conflict parties and use of force only in self-defence. While peacekeepers are still fulfilling such a traditional mandate in theatres such as Cyprus, the Golan Heights and Kashmir, the early 1990s saw the launch of a second generation of UN operations in Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador. The range of tasks given to these new, multidimensional operations included, among many others, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; justice and security sector reform; support for the extension of state authority and control; electoral assistance; and support to the protection of human rights. Many of these tasks are now common elements in the mandates of multidimensional peace operations.

While the established principles of peacekeeping have withstood the test of time, they have undergone considerable reinterpretation in the light of the new mandated tasks. For example, the recent trend towards more robust peacekeeping shows that positions on the use of force are evolving. At its meeting in February 2006, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations endorsed the use of force in ‘defence of the mandate’ as well as in self-defence, and identified a need for ‘an appropriately strong military and civilian police presence . . . in order to deter spoilers and establish the credibility of the United Nations’. Similarly, the 2005 World Summit outcome document states that peacekeeping operations should have ‘adequate capacity to counter

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hostilities and fulfil effectively their mandates’. The shift away from limiting the use of force to self-defence is more pronounced in current national peacekeeping doctrines, such as those of the United Kingdom and the United States, which acknowledge the existence of a grey area between traditional peacekeeping and war fighting, and refer instead to the ‘minimum necessary’ or ‘proportionate’ use of force.

More recent norms and concepts such as ‘the responsibility to protect’, human security and the rule of law are now ubiquitous in peace mission mandates. This demonstrates, on the one hand, a palpable shift in the conception of sovereignty and, on the other, changes in the nature of conflicts themselves and in how the international community understands and seeks to resolve them.

A debate of growing importance is whether the role of peacekeeping is merely to prevent the resumption of conflict by making it more difficult for spoilers to disrupt the peace or if it is also, and above all, to help rebuild states after conflict—what some observers have described as imposing a ‘liberal peace’. This entails a broader discussion of the political and moral implications of peace operations. It has also been argued that current peace operations often respond more to the concerns of the interveners to prevent insecurity and instability spilling over from failed states than to the needs of the country in conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq provide the most extreme examples of a new dilemma in peace operations: how to balance the original interveners’ counter-terrorist aims with that of rebuilding the host state, especially when elements of violence pitting local forces against the interveners continue. The initial post-invasion prioritization of counterterrorism by the US-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) has clearly undermined rebuilding efforts in the

19 E.g. the mandates of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). See appendix 3A.
country. The situation in Iraq also clearly attests to the fact that, while a military force may be necessary to stabilize a country, a political resolution is still essential for sustainable peacebuilding. Finally, the role and status of the Multinational Force—which is legally sanctioned by the UN—have increasingly been called into question, particularly the way in which they have arguably blurred the line between peacekeeping and war fighting.

In recent years there has also been recognition that international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts that neglect the principle of local ownership are neither viable nor sustainable. Meaningful consultation local stakeholders and their full participation in establishing objectives and priorities and assessing progress are needed if substantial political and popular support is to take root, as was clearly illustrated by the crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006 (see below).

Evolving attitudes and practices

The growth in the scale, scope and complexity of contemporary peacekeeping operations over the past decade suggests that the future of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist countries in the transition from conflict to peace is assured. However, there is a growing recognition that understanding the conditions under which peacekeeping works best and the types of situation in which peacekeepers should or should not be deployed is crucial in order to avoid a repetition of the failures that occurred in the mid-1990s and to increase the efficacy and efficiency of peacekeeping.

The establishment of ambitious mandates may be seen as evidence of growing international political commitment to peacekeeping, but this has created new operational dilemmas. These mandates often require technical and other capacity that is untested or not readily available. The landmark 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) proposed groundbreaking reform initiatives to improve the way in which peacekeeping operations are carried out. Since then, much of the discourse about peacekeeping, as well as practical efforts to improve it, have focused on addressing the operational challenges of peacekeeping operations. Both the UN and regional organizations and alliances such as the AU, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken steps to enhance their peacekeeping capacities. These steps have included undertaking substantial

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25 Such failures occurred in e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia. See Findlay (note 18); and Seybolt (note 20).


organizational reforms, developing rapidly deployable forces, and building up expertise in areas such as civilian policing and the rule of law.

Although the UN and other organizations have made remarkable progress in building their capacities to conduct peace missions, merely possessing these capacities does not automatically mean that operations will be established when they are needed or guarantee that countries will participate in such operations. The moral imperative of peacekeeping may be universally accepted at the conceptual level, but a country’s decision to participate is more likely to be based on self-interest. Ultimately, decisions about whether to set up or participate in a peace operation must take into account political dimensions and intra-regional divisions (if any) and are increasingly framed within the new ‘risk’ paradigm. In the past, countries have attempted to mitigate risk by only sending their forces to UN-led peace operations. However, as UN operations have taken on more responsibilities, states have started to seek more control over the operations to which they contribute, for example by imposing strict conditions on the deployment of their forces or deploying their forces to non-UN missions in which they have greater influence.

The risk paradigm also entails the possibility of flawed risk assessments, which can have serious repercussions—as illustrated by the case of Afghanistan. Common security concerns may have brought NATO members together for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but the prospect of possible failure has caused divisions in the alliance. Other factors influencing a country’s participation in peacekeeping operations include the pressure placed on it by other members of the international community to conform to an agreed set of norms. For example, Indonesia’s offer to deploy peacekeepers to Lebanon in 2006 (see below) was in large part motivated by the Indonesian Government’s desire to improve its image and standing in the international community. Conversely, domestic misgivings have greatly influenced countries’ willingness, and in some cases ability, to participate in peace missions—particularly missions that have robust rules of engagement or are perceived as risky, morally unjustified or illegal. As the situation has deteriorated in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, many countries, bowing to domestic public pressure, have pulled out of the MNF-I. Spain is perhaps the highest-profile example. The sitting Popular Party government suffered electoral defeat in 2004 in what was widely interpreted as a reaction against its decision to commit soldiers to the MNF-I in the face of popular opposition.

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32 Also thought to have contributed significantly to the government’s defeat in the 14 Mar. election were the bombings on trains in Madrid three days earlier and the government’s initial decision to blame Basque separatists for the attack, which was ostensibly claimed by al-Qaeda as retaliation for Spain’s involvement in Iraq. Ladnier (note 31).
countries have responded to domestic pressure by placing caveats on deployment of their forces in Afghanistan. These national caveats, even when they are imposed for legal and moral reasons, suggest the potential start of a worrying trend whereby the demands of participating countries may hinder the effective conduct of peace operations.

Recognizing that even the best set-up mission can be undermined by an unclear, inappropriate or unrealistic mandate, countries contributing to peace missions are increasingly calling for clear principles and guidelines, particularly when they are themselves subject to greater scrutiny and demands for accountability. In an effort to enhance both the efficacy and the efficiency of UN peacekeeping, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) embarked in 2006 on a major reform initiative, Peace Operations 2010. One of the key objectives of Peace Operations 2010 is the development of a high-level doctrine document that states clearly the fundamental principles that apply, the major lessons learned and the factors that enable success in modern peace missions, along with the core functions of UN peace operations.

The missions surveyed in the next section illustrate how the principles and current practice of peacekeeping were tested by the conflicts in 2006.

III. Peace missions in practice in 2006

Lebanon: new tasks for UNIFIL

The new outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia in July 2006 was largely unanticipated. The fighting was the most intense in the region in recent years: in the course of 34 days an estimated 1191 Lebanese and 162 Israelis were killed, 900 000 Lebanese civilians were displaced, and damage was inflicted on Lebanon’s infrastructure that has been valued at an estimated $7–10 billion.

In multiple and protracted negotiations on a resolution to the crisis, it was agreed that a sizeable multinational force would be needed to buttress a ceasefire. However, no agreement could be reached on what shape this force would take. On 26 July 2006 the Lebanese Government put forward a seven-point plan for resolving the conflict. Elements of this plan were subsequently incorporated into UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was adopted in

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Resolution 1701 called for an immediate end to hostilities and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. It authorized an increase in the mission strength of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, established in 1978) to 15,000 troops—nearly eight times its previous authorized mission strength. The reinforced UNIFIL was given a more proactive role, supporting the Lebanese Government’s assertion of state control in southern Lebanon by ensuring that a 20 kilometre-wide buffer zone between the Litani River and the Blue Line (the UN-demarcated border between Israel and Lebanon) remain free of foreign armed personnel, assets and arms; assisting the government in securing its borders; and assisting in the implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement, which calls for the disarmament of militias. While UNIFIL was given robust rules of engagement, Resolution 1701 did not grant it powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and limited its use of force to ‘areas of deployment of [UNIFIL] forces and as it deems within its capabilities’. Israel had demanded that UNIFIL peacekeepers be gradually deployed alongside Lebanese forces in the buffer zone, to ensure that Hezbollah forces would not reoccupy territory there, as a precondition for withdrawing its 30,000 troops. It was hoped that the enlargement of UNIFIL and the presence of the Lebanese Army in the south of the country for the first time in decades would serve as strong confidence-building measures for the conflict parties, create space for political talks on a permanent and lasting ceasefire and, most importantly, improve security in the settlements that were affected.

The UN and the Lebanese and Israeli governments agreed that the Israeli withdrawal should be completed by 1 October, and the corresponding staggered deployment of UN and Lebanese forces should be completed by 4 November. However, when the ceasefire came into effect on 14 August, it was still not clear when the expanded UNIFIL force would be ready for deployment nor was there agreement about which countries would contribute to the mission. Countries that were approached to contribute forces hesitated to make firm commitments until the mandate and the rules of engagement had been clarified. Also, something of a competition developed between different

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37 The Taif Agreement, signed by the Lebanese Parliament on 22 Oct. 1989 at Taif, Saudi Arabia, was designed to end the civil war in Lebanon. For the full text of the agreement see URL http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/CAHIERS/PROCHE-ORIENT/REGION-LIBAN-TAEF-EN/.
41 No formal ceasefire agreement was signed between the conflict parties, but the Lebanese Government and Hezbollah signalled their acceptance of Resolution 1701 on 12 Aug. 2006, and the Israeli Government followed suit on 13 Aug.
UN missions and between the UN and NATO in seeking contributions of personnel. Some troops and police originally earmarked for Afghanistan and Darfur were now diverted to UNIFIL. The short timeline meant that the UN had to use a rolling deployment, including a vanguard of 3500 troops in mechanized battalions. Few countries have the capability to deploy mechanized battalions rapidly, and thus it fell on European countries to assume responsibility for this advance deployment. Given UNIFIL’s mandate and France’s prominent role in securing Resolution 1701, France and other European countries were also expected to contribute significantly beyond the advance deployment. European countries now account for about half of UNIFIL’s troop strength, making it the most sizeable European deployment under UN command since the early 1990s, but the commitments were only given after protracted negotiations. France, the lead nation for UNIFIL before the renewed hostilities, was initially slow to commit a large additional troop contingent to UNIFIL and to confirm that it would continue to lead the mission. Finally, Italy committed 2500–3000 troops and France another 2000. China became the third largest contributor, with 1000 troops.

The need for rapid deployment also obliged the UN Secretariat to innovate with regard to pre-mission planning—for example, making administrative processes more flexible by waiving the requirement for pre-inspection of troop contingents, and seconding a limited number of personnel without the usual two-month notification of member states. In spite of all of these efforts on the part of the UN, UNIFIL remained below its mandated strength at the end of 2006, with only 11 500 troops.

Another important innovation related to the expansion of UNIFIL was the creation of a Strategic Military Cell at the UN specifically for strategic military command of the mission, which liaises directly with the UNIFIL Force Commander and reports directly to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Strategic command of UN peace missions has previously been given to the DPKO. The new cell is comprised military officers from the troop-contributing countries and one officer from each of the permanent members of the Security Council. The creation of the cell was one of the key conditions for European participation in the expanded UNIFIL.

The experience of UNIFIL in 2006 also underscored the fact that the principle of impartiality remains crucial in peacekeeping. Even though other Middle Eastern countries possessed armed forces that met the UN’s requirements for participation in the expanded UNIFIL, they were considered to be too closely linked to the conflict to be viable contributors. Similarly, Israel blocked early offers of troops from three Muslim countries, Bangladesh,

45 Center on International Cooperation (note 26).
Indonesia and Malaysia, none of whose governments formally recognizes Israel. While UNIFIL now comprises troops from highly developed armed forces and has its own military command centre, it is vulnerable because of a lack of clarity over how to respond to breaches of Resolution 1701. In its earlier incarnation, UNIFIL had failed to deter Israeli occupation and the actions of Palestinian guerrillas and Hezbollah, and Resolution 1701 is strikingly similar to the Security Council resolutions that established UNIFIL’s original mandate: resolutions 425 and 426. Some observers have expressed doubts about the conflict parties’ commitment to abiding by Resolution 1701, even after UNIFIL reaches its full complement of 15,000 soldiers.

**Afghanistan: extending the boundaries of peacekeeping?**

The outlook for Afghanistan was bleak at the end of 2006. Early optimism that the Afghanistan Compact would help the country to consolidate the gains made through the 2001 Bonn Agreement was quickly dissipated by a new wave of attacks by Taliban and other insurgent forces in the south of the country. In 2006 the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force completed the phased expansion of its remit to all regions of Afghanistan by setting up regional commands—and taking over some of the role of the US-led counterterrorist Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—in the southern and eastern regions of the country, where resistance to coalition forces has been strongest. The first two stages of ISAF’s expansion, in 2004 and 2005, had taken it into the north and west of the country, respectively, from its original base of operations in the Afghan capital, Kabul.

The core of the ISAF expansion strategy is establishing civil–military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) or taking over command of existing nationally led PRTs. It was hoped that consolidating the different elements of ISAF under a single chain of command would reduce some of the confusion and

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incoherence that had resulted when different regions were operating under separate national commands. In stage 3 of the expansion, which ended in July 2006, ISAF took over command of the four PRTs—led by Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA—in the south of the country. In stage 4, completed in October 2006, the mission took over command of the eastern region, where US forces were concentrated. Discussions about ISAF’s expansion had previously been driven in part by the US Government’s desire to reduce the number of US troops participating in OEF. However, the increasing violence did not permit a US drawdown in 2006. Instead, the expansion into the eastern region largely involved ‘re-hatting’ (redesignating as NATO forces) 12,000 US troops who were already in place. By the end of the year, ISAF comprised 32,000 troops and was present in 19 provinces through 25 PRTs, making it the largest ground operation ever mounted by NATO.

In 2006 NATO introduced a new strategy of establishing and maintaining secure zones, so-called ink spots, allowing development initiatives to take root in areas that had been relatively untouched by reconstruction efforts since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. However, ISAF’s ability to implement such measures in the south and east of Afghanistan was significantly hampered during the summer by fierce resistance from the Taliban insurgents and their supporters. The expansion into these areas necessitated a change in ISAF’s role and its rules of engagement. NATO had announced new, more robust rules of engagement in 2005, reportedly permitting pre-emptive military strikes against perceived security threats. In addition, in 2003 ISAF had outlined clear arrangements to enhance coordination and reduce conflict between its stabilization mission and OEF’s counterterrorism mission.

In response to an upsurge of Taliban resistance in the southern provinces, ISAF launched Operation Medusa, a massive counter-insurgency offensive, in September 2006. The two-week operation reportedly claimed the lives of hundreds of Taliban insurgents and five NATO soldiers. ISAF personnel subsequently became the targets of insurgent attacks and between September and December the mission suffered the highest number of fatalities in any four-month period in its five-year history.

ISAF’s leadership has repeatedly emphasized that ISAF is distinct from OEF, but the growing number of direct military confrontations between ISAF and Taliban forces has reduced this distinction in the eyes of the local popula-

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52 Another 8000 US soldiers are deployed under OEF.
53 NATO/Afghanistan: since expanding southward, ISAF has entered into direct confrontation with Taliban—results of one month of fighting’, Atlantic News, 31 Aug. 2006.
58 ISAF suffered 30 deaths between Sep. and Dec. 2006, and a total of 60 fatalities in 2006.
tion and even in ISAF’s internal structure. Also, ISAF will in 2007 be, for the first time, under the command of a US four-star general, which may raise further concerns about the relationship between ISAF and OEF. British troops who had been stationed in the southern province of Helmand in early 2006 as part of OEF were re-hatted on 31 July as ISAF forces but continued to conduct counterterrorist operations.\(^59\) Often such changes are not adequately communicated to the local population. The blurring of the line between a peace operation and a counterterrorist operation has concrete implications on the ground. The local population may not appreciate this nuanced technical difference and may perceive ISAF now to be only a combat operation. This could mean ultimately that ISAF forces in other parts of the country face more resistance.

In 2006 NATO, like the EU and the UN, had to overcome both logistical problems and difficulties in force generation. In September 2006 NATO intensified its efforts to obtain an extra 2500 troops for ISAF, including a ‘hard-hitting’ reserve battalion of 1000 soldiers that could be rapidly deployed wherever needed—first requested in early 2005—and another 1500 air support staff.\(^60\) After nearly a month of negotiations, Poland announced that it would contribute 900 soldiers, who would arrive in early 2007; Romania pledged another 200 soldiers, to arrive at the end of 2006; and Canada and the UK together pledged another 900. These contributions came with conditions—for example, Poland preferred that most of its troops go to eastern Afghanistan, not to the south where they are most needed.\(^61\)

Only a handful of NATO members are prepared to send their troops to southern and eastern Afghanistan. The most significant contingents have come from Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK along with NATO partner Australia. Other NATO members, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Turkey, have opted to send their personnel to calmer duty stations in the north and west. Even there, stringent national caveats on force protection—operating procedures that ensure maximum safety for personnel—have hampered the troops’ ability to carry out their mandates. NATO’s Riga summit of 28–29 November 2006 sought to address the issue of caveats and their impact on cohesion and interoperability of forces in Afghanistan. It yielded at least partial gains in lifting the national caveats, with several countries agreeing (in principle) to allow their troops to be deployed anywhere in the country as required.\(^62\)

Questions were raised in 2006 about the relationship between the Afghan police and the ISAF mission. A report by the US departments of State and Defense criticized US efforts to train the Afghan police forces and the Afghan

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The report concluded that the USA had made some of the same mistakes in training police forces in Afghanistan that it made in Iraq, such as providing insufficient field training, tracking equipment poorly and relying on private contractors to conduct the training. The failure to create viable police forces to maintain law and order, the report alleged, had been pivotal in undermining international efforts to stabilize both countries. Efforts to respond to some of the problems that the report identified are already under way. A programme that aims to hire 11 200 auxiliary police officers, primarily in the southern and eastern regions, has been established. The need for such a programme was highlighted by the fact that several local governors in these regions began hiring their own close protection personnel after being exposed to frequent attacks by the Taliban. Observers have argued that the hastily created programme—which provides only two weeks’ training, while regular police officers are trained for eight weeks—could exacerbate the security situation by placing poorly trained officers in the field and potentially allowing insurgents and criminals to infiltrate the force.

The reluctance of NATO member states to contribute their forces to ISAF and internal and public debates over such issues as command structures, policy harmonization, national caveats and the appropriateness of including counter-insurgency in ISAF’s mandate in 2006 put NATO’s solidarity and international image as an effective military alliance to the severest test. The outcome of ISAF, NATO’s first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic zone, is perceived as vital not just to Afghanistan but also to the alliance itself. In the words of one Western diplomat, ‘if NATO fails in Afghanistan, NATO fails’.64

**Timor-Leste: back to the drawing board**

Events in Timor-Leste in 2006, which led to the return of a relatively substantial international engagement in the country and the deployment of an Australian-led military force, were perhaps the international community’s biggest surprise—and a bitter pill to swallow. Just a year earlier, Timor-Leste was being heralded as one of the UN’s biggest successes in peace and state building.

The UN presence in Timor-Leste dates back to 1999, when the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to provide security and assist the transition to independence after a referendum in favour of East Timor’s secession from Indonesia.65 UNTAET assumed executive functions

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until the country’s formal independence in May 2002. It was succeeded by two smaller peacebuilding missions that supported the country’s efforts to build new state institutions.66

The UN was scheduled to withdraw from Timor-Leste entirely in May 2006, but its mandate was extended after a new outbreak of violence in the capital, Dili. In February around 400 members of the East Timorese armed forces (Falintil–Forças Armadas de Defesa de Timor-Leste, F-FDTL) demonstrated publicly to demand action from President Xanana Gusmão regarding alleged discrimination within the military against soldiers from the west of the country.67 A government offer to set up a commission of inquiry was met with scepticism and about 200 more soldiers subsequently joined the strike. In March the commander of the F-FDTL, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, dismissed all 594 striking soldiers, who constituted almost 40 per cent of the F-FDTL force.68 The dismissed soldiers and their supporters continued to hold demonstrations in Dili and on 28 April the situation escalated into a breakdown of law and order, with widespread looting and arson attacks carried out by and between gangs of people from the eastern and western regions of Timor-Leste.69 The national police force, the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), was unable to bring the situation under control. Prime Minister Mari Bim Amude Alkatiri, without consulting Gusmão, mobilized the army to restore order. The decision to use F-FDTL troops, who had no experience in riot control, to contain a volatile situation at the centre of which was a large group of former soldiers and their supporters, was widely criticized and its legality challenged.70

The violence stirred up latent social divisions. Although it claimed only 15 lives, it displaced 50 000 people and caused considerable damage to property.71 It also led to conflict between various factions of the police and military services. As the situation threatened to escalate into civil war, the government declared a state of emergency on 24 May and requested international assistance in stabilizing the security situation.72 The unrest also exacerbated tensions between Gusmão and Alkatiri. Gusmão subsequently requested Alkatiri’s resignation, citing his mishandling of the security crisis as well as alleg-

66 These were the UN Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (May 2002–May 2005) and the UN Office in Timor-Leste (May 2005–Aug. 2006).
70 At this point, a state of emergency had not yet been declared and the prime minister has no constitutional authority to mobilize the army. International Crisis Group (note 68).
72 ‘Emergency rule for E Timor leader’ (note 69).
gations that he had authorized the distribution of arms to fuel the violence. On 26 May, on the basis of a bilateral agreement, Australia deployed the 1300-strong International Security Forces (also known as Operation Astute and Joint Task Force) to disarm the armed groups and restore order in Timor-Leste. The Timorese Government also asked the UN to remain in the country with a strengthened follow-on mission. Based on the recommendations of a multidisciplinary team dispatched by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in June to assess the situation, the UN Security Council determined that an integrated multidimensional mission with a strong civilian policing component was needed. A controversial proposal by Timor-Leste that the International Security Forces should come under the command of the UN mission was eventually abandoned after vigorous opposition from Australia, the UK and the USA.

UN Security Council Resolution 1704, adopted in August, authorized the establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), mandated to support the Timorese Government in ‘consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion’. The mission is to consist of ‘an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1608 police personnel, and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff’. Notably, it was decided in December 2006 that the police component of the mission would become the interim law enforcement agency. This will be the first time that the UN has assumed executive policing functions in a sovereign state.

The events in Timor-Leste in 2006 demand a rigorous reassessment of the UN’s earlier engagement there. Both the origin of the crisis and its escalation have been attributed to the international community’s lack of sustained political and financial commitment to peacebuilding in the country and its desire for early withdrawal. Rushed UN-led processes to establish the F-FDTL and the PNTL security forces created a defence force consisting of poorly integrated former resistance fighters, operating under a questionably delineated
mandate, and a factious police force—many of whose officers had served in
the Indonesian National Police before independence—which lacked the
human and institutional capacity to control the unrest effectively.80

Although real progress was made in the operational aspects of East Timor-
esian policing capacity after 2002, the institutional framework of the PNTL
remains weak. At the heart of the problem is the failure to establish respect for
the rule of law firmly within the PNTL’s organizational culture. As this case
illustrates, such normative change requires sustained and constant reinforce-
ment and cannot easily be achieved through technical instruction. The report
of the UN assessment mission also made clear that, because the UN had failed
to find an inclusive approach and foster local ownership when building the
rule of law, the relative stability and order that prevailed until April 2006 was
inevitably fragile.

In the past, those conducting international operations have generally proved
unwilling to engage in serious self-examination, and even incapable of doing
so, owing both to time pressure in the mission and to political pressure from
donors. In the case of rule of law missions, when self-assessments are made
they often focus on quantitative factors, such as the numbers of officers
trained and deployed or of command positions and police stations transferred
into local hands. Both premature and overdue handovers can undermine long-
term local ownership.81 It is clear from the problems in Timor-Leste that the
mission’s progress and the local authorities’ ability to uphold the rule of law
unaided were misjudged. Developing a system for setting objectives and
benchmarks and for measuring progress is complex and time consuming, but it
could yield significant benefits in areas such as the timing of handovers of
responsibility and ensuring that in future, lessons are learned and applied.

The United Nations–African Union hybrid mission in Darfur

At the end of 2005 discussions between the UN and the AU were under way
about the possibility and viability of the UN taking over peacekeeping
responsibilities in Darfur from the AU. The AU had been struggling to keep
the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) operational with only half of the logistical
capacity and funds necessary. The proposed handover would have involved
subsuming AMIS into the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which
was at that time tasked with assisting in the implementation of the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and Sudan’s
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

It was generally hoped that enlargement of UNMIS—with reliable funding
and a robust renewed mandate backed up by well-trained and well-equipped
forces and by civilian personnel from UN agencies—would improve the
chances of tackling the complex challenges in Darfur. For several months the

81 Hansen, A. S. and Wiharta, S., The Transition to a Just Order: Establishing Local Ownership after
Conflict, Policy report (Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications: Stockholm, Apr. 2007).
UN sought, on an informal basis, to obtain the agreement of troop-contributing countries to provide military personnel for a new mission. However, the countries approached expressed deep concern that not even a robust UN operation would fare any better than AMIS, given the lack of a strong commitment from the conflict parties to a peace process. To complicate matters, Sudan was not in favour of the UN taking over responsibilities in Darfur and instead softened its earlier hostile stance towards AMIS.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was reached in May 2006 between the Sudanese Government and the main opposition group in Darfur, the faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) led by Minni Minawi, following two years of intense and difficult negotiations brokered by the AU. The DPA was intended to end a conflict that had claimed 200,000 lives or more and displaced 2 million people since 2003. However, two parties to the negotiations—the SLM/A faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—refused to subscribe to the accord.

The DPA sets out principles for sharing power and wealth in the region along with ceasefire and security arrangements. It also provides the framework for ‘Darfur–Darfur Dialogue and Consultation’: ‘a conference in which representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders can meet to discuss the challenges of restoring peace to their land, overcoming the divisions between communities, and resolving the existing problems to build a common future’. The DPA calls for the disarmament and demobilization of the pro-government Janjaweed militia by mid-October 2006 and the scaling down of the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces. The AU is charged with verifying the disarmament process. The DPA also calls for the reintegration of approximately 5000 former combatants into the Sudanese Armed Forces and the police forces, while another 3000 are to be supported through education and training programmes. Critically, the DPA details measures to increase security for internally displaced persons and humanitarian supply routes, specifically the establishment of buffer zones around the camps and the humanitarian assistance corridor. The parties also agreed to create a commission to work with the UN to help refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. However, the DPA conspicuously lacks any reference to the UN taking over peacekeeping responsibilities.

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86 Darfur Peace Agreement (note 84), article 31.
The political provisions of the DPA include the establishment of a new body, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), to administer the three states of the Darfur region. The TDRA is given responsibility for implementation of the DPA. The rebel factions are guaranteed a majority position in the TDRA but are not granted the national vice-presidency they had sought. Under the terms of the DPA, a popular referendum will be held in 2010 to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government.

In the face of persistent, profound objections from the Sudanese Government to a UN-commanded operation in Darfur, in August 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, which expanded the operational and geographical mandate of UNMIS to include Darfur. Implementation of Resolution 1706 would have brought the total strength of UNMIS to 30,000 military and civilian personnel—in part because AMIS would be subsumed into the UN mission—making it the largest operation conducted in the UN’s history. The adoption of the resolution was welcomed by many as a significant step that moved the fragile peace process forward and finally paved the way for putting in place a UN operation and effectively addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the region.

However, the Government of Sudan strongly opposed Resolution 1706, threatening to expel AU personnel from its territory upon the expiration of AMIS’s mandate on 30 September 2006 if the UN were to take over the mission. The AU was forced to extend the mandate of AMIS for a further three months, while negotiations about the UN takeover continued. The AU and the UN proposed an emergency $21 million ‘light support’ package of resources to enable AMIS to fulfil its expanded mandate. This included the provision of 105 UN military staff, 33 police advisers and 25 civilian staff, along with logistical and material support. Although the Sudanese Government agreed in principle to the support package, it granted access to only nine military staff and nine police advisers.

In November, the AU and the UN intensified their negotiations with the Sudanese Government, pushing for full implementation of the light support package and for a longer-term ‘heavy support’ package that would include substantial air assets and significant military capacity, police advisers and other civilian staff. More importantly, a proposed alternative to a fully fledged UN mission—a UN–AU ‘hybrid mission’—was agreed to in principle by the Sudanese Government. The hybrid mission will retain a predominantly

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89 The resolution authorized increasing the size of the mission by 17,000 military personnel, 3300 civilian police (including 16 formed police units) and an appropriate civilian component in order to support implementation of the DPA. For further details about the elements of the proposed expansion of UNMIS see United Nations (note 87); and UN Security Council Resolution 1706.
African character but will benefit from UN command-and-control structures and could be funded from the UN’s peacekeeping assessment budget. It will be the first mission in which two organizations have joint command over a single operation. The Special Representative, the head of the mission, will be jointly appointed by the AU and the UN, while the Force Commander and the Deputy Force Commander will be appointed by the AU in consultation with the UN Secretary-General. The structure and mandated tasks of the hybrid mission will resemble those of the proposed UN mission. A joint technical assessment team and a further 25 police officers were sent to Darfur at the end of December 2006, but little further headway has been made to operationalize the new mission.

Although it was born out of political compromise, from an operational perspective the UN–AU hybrid mission is an important development in peacekeeping. The interaction between UN peace missions and those conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions has developed significantly in recent years. First, the previous norm of successive missions (either non-UN followed by UN or vice versa) is being replaced by a trend for simultaneous implementation of two or more missions in a given country. Although they may be co-located and cooperate closely, the simultaneous missions are deployed and commanded separately and perform different functions according to the comparative advantages of the respective organizations conducting them. For example, the Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is supported by the French military deployment Operation Licorne; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the EU’s policing and civilian security sector reform missions (EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo, respectively) supplement the extensive mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The EU’s military operation (EUFOR RD Congo) supported MONUC to enhance security during the election period. In Darfur, the EU, NATO and the UN collaborated to provide substantial support to the AU mission. The EU contributed military advisers who assisted the AU in establishing the command-and-control structure of AMIS and, more importantly, has provided most of the mission’s budget. NATO provided crucial strategic airlift resources, and the UN has provided assistance with mission planning since AMIS’s inception.

The difficulties that the international community has experienced in establishing an effective peacekeeping mission in Darfur are a vivid reminder that the consent of the host government is crucial for the success of peace operations carried out by the UN or by other organizations or even coalitions of the willing (something the US-led Multinational Force in Iraq also felt keenly in

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93 E.g. the AU’s African Mission in Burundi was succeeded by the much larger UN Operation in Burundi, which also had more responsibilities.

Whether the hybrid mission will be fully deployed in 2007 in the shape in which it was originally conceived remains to be seen.

IV. Conclusions

Europe’s difficulties in raising sufficient troops for both ISAF and UNIFIL raise serious questions about the EU’s ability and commitment to serve as a global security actor. They also underline the fact that issues of force generation are not merely technical but deeply political. Domestic concerns in the European capitals about putting troops in harm’s way certainly accounted in large part for the reluctance to commit substantial troops to either operation, not least because ISAF was already becoming in part a combat operation and UNIFIL seemed likely to develop along the same lines. Aside from that, both operations suffered from continuing political tensions between Washington and Brussels over the USA’s policy on its ‘global war on terrorism’ and associated policies towards the Middle East.

Even so, as the missions reviewed in this chapter illustrate, peacekeeping overall has managed to adapt operationally to changes in the nature of conflict. There is a broad spectrum of operations deployed, ranging from small training missions to large-scale multidimensional operations. The UN was able to deploy quickly the crucial first wave of reinforcement for UNIFIL; NATO was ultimately able to reach its desired mission strength in ISAF; and Australia also rapidly responded to the unrest in Timor-Leste. At the same time, the crises that provided the contexts for these efforts underscored the fact that, while the international security environment is rapidly changing and peacekeeping needs to adapt in new ways, respecting established principles—such as consent from the host government and the local population, impartiality, and political will from the conflict parties and the wider community—remains essential. Concomitantly, the peacebuilding efforts in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan highlight the difficulties of coordinating interrelated complex functions which are often assumed by a multitude of actors on the ground. Further, failures in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan attest to the fact that there is no alternative to implementing the principle of local ownership.

However, any discussion about the prospects for peacekeeping must ultimately examine the fundamental question of what peacekeeping should be trying to achieve and for whom. The international community has proved capable of ensuring that the ‘hardware’ of peace operations is put in place, and of establishing missions that effectively carry out the main elements of their mandates. However, developments such as Timor-Leste’s relapse into violence and Israel’s military incursion into Lebanon in 2006 cast doubt on whether this is enough to justify calling the missions effective or successful: both crises occurred in places where an existing mission was deployed.

suggests that evaluation of peace operations must take into account, and even focus on, the impact they have on the host countries.

In its attempts to keep pace with the changes in conflict, the international community has, over the past 16 years, placed strong emphasis on the efficiency of peace operations—sometimes at the expense of their efficacy. A more refined conceptualization of peacekeeping is now needed. One step forward could be the introduction of a ‘demand-driven’ approach, in which peace operations are conceived, planned and evaluated based on critical analysis of the underlying obstacles to peace and the broader human security needs of the host country—offering the possibility of more lasting change.

As the primary actor in maintaining international peace and security, it is the UN that will have the greatest influence on the future of peacekeeping. It is to be hoped that through Peace Operations 2010, the UN will set a new agenda that meets the many conceptual and practical challenges of peacekeeping today.