Appendix 2C. Collective violence beyond the standard definition of armed conflict

MICHAEL BRZOSKA

I. Introduction

The major collections of data on armed conflicts are in agreement that the number of armed conflicts today is significantly lower than in the early 1990s. However, there is a widespread reluctance to accept these numbers as evidence of an increase in global peace and security. An example of this was the sceptical reception in some quarters of the Human Security Report 2005, which had the decline in warfare as its main message. The data in that report are based on the same source—the database of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Studies—as the data reported in appendix 2A of this volume.

Are the quantitative data on armed conflicts that are reported in this Yearbook and elsewhere a good measure of the trends in war and peace, insecurity and security, or are they representative of a specific class of collective violence with a declining relevance for peace and security policies? Answers to this type of question have a high degree of policy relevance. For instance, if current quantitative data on armed conflicts are a good measure, the trend would signal a major success of the international community in reducing collective violence worldwide; if they measure only a certain class of collective violence, no such conclusion would be possible on the basis of these figures alone. Additional data would become vital.

Other figures, beyond data on the elements of the standard definition of armed conflict, are in fact available. The question is whether they are adequate to allow an extension of the findings based on the standard definition of armed conflict to broader concerns about collective violence. Section II of this appendix reviews the core features and limitations of the standard definition of armed conflict. There has been much controversy in the past over the relationship between violence, peace and security, but one view of what constitutes an armed conflict—with the elements of battle, political objectives and government participation at its core—has until recently dominated in both academic and policy circles.


2 UCDP data are available on the programme’s website at URL <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/>.

3 For the definition of collective violence see section II below.

4 In peace research the issue of the relevant fields of analysis of violence has been heatedly debated at various times. One such debate ensued over Johan Galtung’s distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace. See Galtung, J., ‘Violence, peace and peace research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 167–91. Interestingly, discussions among security experts in the 1990s on broadening the
that such a view is too narrow to facilitate an understanding of the trends in peace and security or to serve as a basis for formulating relevant policies.

Section III discusses recent responses to these challenges by those who have constructed additional data sets on aspects of collective violence, including the Human Security Centre. Section IV takes a more conceptual approach to the challenge of the declining relevance of the standard definition of armed conflict. Data requirements are sketched for two broad understandings of peace and security that are important in current policy debates—one on the victims of violence and the other on security risks to the fabric of societies.

The purpose of this appendix is to stimulate discussion on the correspondence between data requirements and alternative conceptions of peace and security—a traditional conception linked to armed conflict, and two linked to broader understandings of peace and security (see section IV). It does not attempt to provide workable definitions for the collection of additional data, still less the ready-to-use data themselves. For this to be done in a professional way, additional research and resources would be required. This appendix should therefore not be read as a criticism of the available data collections but rather as a contribution to the ongoing debates on what data should be collected for what purposes and how. As noted by Taylor Seybolt, data collectors have to seek a balance between the reliability and the validity of their data: ‘that is, between accuracy in recording information and appropriateness of the information for addressing theoretical concepts of interest’.

II. Limitations of the standard definition of armed conflict

The standard definition of armed conflict reflects a conception that was expressed perfectly in Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’. The conception of armed conflict as an extension of politics has shaped the efforts of data collectors, even though they may use slightly different definitions.

This conception of armed conflict has five constituent elements: (a) deliberate violence by collectives, (b) the use of arms, (c) the battle, (d) political objectives and (e) a government as an actor on at least one side of a conflict. Various definitions may have additional data requirements, but in standard definitions of armed conflict these five elements need to be in evidence. The types of collective violence without battles (including violence carried out by both non-state actors and governments), such as massacres or terrorist acts carried out against civilians, are outside the realm of this conception. This also applies to armed conflicts where the clash (or incompatibility) concept of security beyond military security to include e.g. environmental change to some extent mirrored that earlier debate.


6 The concepts ‘armed conflict’ and ‘war’ are not differentiated in this text: the usage corresponds to the praxis in various sources and strands of literature referred to in this appendix. Armed conflict is generally defined as the broader of the 2 categories when such a distinction is made in statistics.


8 The data on battle-related deaths presented in appendix 2A only partly take into account cases of violence against civilians. Bombings, sniper attacks and urban warfare (bombs, explosions and assassinations) are recorded as acts of war if the targets of the attacks are military forces or recognized rep-
security and conflicts, 2006

Reliability is not about ruling a country or parts of its territory but, for instance, personal economic gain. The requirement that at least one of the parties to the conflict is a government reinforces the political dimension of armed conflicts.

Two of the five elements of the definition have gone unchallenged in recent debates about what constitutes an armed conflict: collective violence and the use of arms. The term collective violence means that the infliction of violence must be deliberately carried out by actors who are, or perceive themselves to be, part of a group with a common purpose beyond the immediate act of violence. Individual acts of violence, violent crime and general disorder are thus not included. Collective violence results from clashes that cause significant levels of destruction and death, for which various data sets have different thresholds. The second element, the use of arms, is generally defined rather widely to include the active use of any instrument or material to inflict violence but not, for instance, killing people by failing to cure illness.

The other three elements of the definition, however, have been heatedly debated for a number of years and are discussed below. Authors have claimed that since the end of the cold war there have been fundamental changes in how collective violence is used. Some argue that ‘new wars’ have become the dominant type of armed conflict, a claim that others refute. New wars are said to be marked by characteristics that call into question the validity of the standard political definition of a war, such as the avoidance of battle, the deliberate killing of civilians, the crucial role of economic motives in warfare and a fluidity of actors.

The battle. One of the hypotheses of the new-wars literature is that the battle is not as central to warfare as it was both before and during the cold war, while a specific type of asymmetric warfare—marked by the strategic use of the deliberate killing of civilians—has become more frequent in recent armed conflicts. Deliberate killing of civilians in massacres and terrorist acts has been a tactic in many armed conflicts, including those carried out during the cold war, but the new-war thesis argues that it has attained strategic importance for inferior fighting parties and can even be their representatives of the groups in conflict. In such cases, deaths of civilians ‘caught in the crossfire’ are also considered as battle-related deaths. The data exclude, however, death and devastation resulting from the targeting of civilians, even if such killing is deliberate. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Definitions, sources and methods for Uppsala Conflict Data Program battle-death estimates’, URL <http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP Battle-deaths – definitions sources methods.pdf>. An example is helpful to illustrate the difference between civilian deaths that are recorded as battle-related violence by the UCDP and those that are not: for 1994, the UCDP reports fewer than 1000 battle victims for Rwanda, whereas the number of all victims of violence, mostly carried out by militia groups against civilians, is generally estimated at 800,000. See Human Security Centre (note 1), p. 41. For further comparisons of estimates of battle-related and total deaths in select wars see e.g. Leitenberg (note 1); and Gleditsch, N. P. and Lacina, B., ‘Monitoring trends in global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths’, European Journal of Population, vol. 21, nos 2–3 (2005), pp. 145–65.

9 See appendix 2B in this volume for the UCDP’s definition and use of this term.

10 The concept was first introduced in Kaldor, M. and Vashee, B. (eds), Restructuring the Global Military Sector, vol. 1, New Wars (Pinter: London, 1997).


13 This hypothesis is disputed, however, and does not have strong empirical support because the data on civilian victims of war are so thin. See e.g. Kalyvas (note 11); and Human Security Centre (note 1), pp. 70–76.
dominant method of warfare, as in the current conflict in Iraq. The purported recent change in the scale and significance of the deliberate killing of civilians in warfare challenges the reliability of the standard definition of armed conflict as a measure of collective violence. The deliberate killing of civilians who are not involved in battles, for instance those killed in massacres or terrorist acts, is not covered by this definition. This omission may make a crucial difference to whether a conflict is classified as ‘major’ in quantitative approaches. Such problems are well illustrated by the conflict in southern Lebanon and the north of Israel in the summer of 2006. This was widely perceived as an armed conflict of major consequence. According to the Lebanese and Israeli governments, over 2000 people were killed. Many of them were civilians, although it is difficult to distinguish specifically civilian casualties in cases where a guerrilla force such as Hezbollah is fighting. It is even more difficult to judge whether death was directly related to combat, as required by the standard definition of ‘battle death’, or occurred outside of combat situations.

**Political objectives.** Debates on recent cases of collective violence have highlighted the difficulty of disentangling political, economic and ideological objectives. Warring parties will not necessarily reveal their intentions, and what look like economic motives to one observer may seem political to another. Armed groups generally stress political objectives in their public pronouncements, but they may in fact be primarily and ultimately interested in private economic gain. Armed groups that have economic or ideological objectives may not seek control of government or territory but may instead want to influence the way in which societies operate or may simply be interested in private gain. This presents major empirical problems for use of the standard definition of armed conflict, which requires the data compiler to decide whether the conflict is about political issues or not. Furthermore, why privilege objectives that relate to government and territory as definers of armed conflict and exclude all others? To return to the example of the armed conflict that took place in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, there were objectives, such as the release of hostages, the intimidation of populations and the weakening of Hezbollah. While these could be regarded as political objectives, neither side aimed at taking over a government or gaining control over a territory.

**A government as an actor.** The discussions about the changing nature of conflict are embedded in broader debates about the effects of globalization and the changing post-cold war international order on the power of governments, or rather their lack of such power, to control violence in their territories. Fighting without government involvement has become frequent. In a number of recent cases of violent conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it has even become difficult to determine who is the government.

What the challenges to all five criteria have in common is that they question the boundaries of the standard definition of armed conflict and aim to extend them to include other forms of collective violence. While this presents problems for data collectors, it reflects a more general broadening of concerns regarding peace and

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security. Additional issues related to collective violence have become important subjects of peace and security politics.

III. Data beyond elements of the standard definition of armed conflict

Collectors of data on armed conflicts have responded to these challenges in different ways. For example, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegursachenforschung (AKUF), in Hamburg, Germany, has dropped from its definition of armed conflict the requirement that one of the parties must be a government.\(^{15}\) Data on mass killings of people of different political persuasion, ethnic background or societal position have received renewed attention. The updated data collection of Milton Leitenberg, of the University of Maryland, for instance, includes any available estimates of the total number of victims and, in a separate list, victims of massacres and other forms of one-sided violence.\(^{16}\)

The best-organized effort to address broader concerns about collective violence is that of the UCDP. With support from the Human Security Centre, the UCDP has begun to compile two additional data sets on collective violence—one on non-state conflicts and one on one-sided violence—that are not restricted by the standard definition of armed conflict.

A non-state conflict is defined by the UCDP as the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per warring dyad.\(^{17}\) One-sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year.\(^{18}\) Both of these new data sets establish minimum thresholds for the number of victims, but each relaxes major elements of the standard definition of armed conflict. On the one hand, for the data on non-state conflicts the battle remains a requirement while the criteria of participation of a government and a political objective are dropped. One-sided violence, on the other hand, is included with no restrictions on the objectives of the use of such violence nor the collective actor, and no requirement for a battle. One-sided violence is thus close in conception to other data sets on genocides and massacres.\(^{19}\)

These UCDP data sets have been developed to achieve ‘a better understanding of the full range of threats to human security posed by collective violence’.\(^{20}\) They have been used extensively in the publications of the Human Security Centre. Its first

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15 On AKUF data see URL <http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/lpw/Akuf/> (in German).
16 Leitenberg (note 1).
19 References to and discussions of such data sets can be found in Leitenberg (note 1); and Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, Human Security Brief 2006, URL <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/>, chapter 2. The latter updates the core trend data on political violence that were published in the Human Security Report 2005 and analyses key findings of data sets that track these changes.
20 See the UCDP project description at URL <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/HumSec_index.htm>.
major publication, the *Human Security Report 2005*, presented data on ‘violent threats to individuals’, described as the focus of a preferred narrow definition of human security.21 The report’s team of authors, led by Andrew Mack, make a distinction between ‘political violence’ and ‘criminal violence’. For them, in addition to the armed conflicts listed by the UCDP, political violence includes one-sided violence and non-state conflict as well as genocide and ‘politicide’. The report includes data from a collection developed in the 1990s and maintained by Barbara Harff;22 data on international terrorist incidents recorded since the early 1990s from the US Department of State;23 and data on political repression from the Political Terror Scale (PTS), originally developed more than 20 years ago at the University of Purdue and now maintained by the University of North Carolina at Asheville.24 The report also uses data from the Political Stability and Absence of Violence index of the World Bank, which measures the likelihood of destabilization of a government *inter alia* by domestic violence and terrorism and is one of the six dimensions of its Worldwide Indicators of Governance.25

In addition to political violence, the *Human Security Report 2005* covers criminal violence as a major concern for its human security audit. The report argues that this is necessary because ‘In most states, most of the time, far more people are killed or injured by criminal violence than by warfare’.26 Its authors warn, however, that only a few countries produce timely and comprehensive data on crime. Quantifying criminal violence thus runs into major data problems, particularly in those countries where human security is poor. There is also a major overlap with the data on genocides: the 1994 Rwanda genocide produces a spike in the global homicide statistics. The report contains global data on homicides and rape from Interpol, based on estimates for many regions.27 However, the authors are sceptical about both the possibility and usefulness of combining such data in a single data set or even a single grading for each country in a ‘human security index’. They argue that the available data, particularly on criminal violence—which in their view must be included in any composite index on human security—are not sufficiently comprehensive. Moreover,

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21 Human Security Centre (note 1), p. VIII.
22 See Harff, B., ‘Genocide’, Background paper for the *Human Security Report 2005*, 17 July 2003, URL <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/background/Harff_Genocide.pdf>; and Harff, B., ‘Genocide, politicide’, University of Maryland, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, 18 May 2004, URL <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/genocide/>. In the latter publication Harff defines the difference between genocide and ‘politicide’: ‘In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. In [both types of violence] killings are never accidental, nor are they acts of individuals . . . [but] are carried out at the explicit or tacit direction of state authorities, or those who claim state authority.’
26 Human Security Centre (note 1), p. 64.  
combining the data in an over-simplified, single indicator might conceal more information than it would convey.\(^{28}\)

The *Human Security Brief 2006* takes a somewhat different approach to human security: its core message is that human security ‘is about protecting individuals and communities from *any* form of political violence’.\(^{29}\) While it also states that human security is about ‘violent threats to individuals’, no data on criminal violence or forms of violence other than political violence are presented or discussed. Political violence covers largely the same phenomena that were the subject of the 2005 report: UCDP-listed armed conflicts, one-sided violence and non-state conflict, with additional data on genocides and ‘politicides’ as well as on international terrorism.\(^{30}\) In addition, data are included on terrorism incidents, presented by national location. These data are taken from the Terrorism Knowledge Base of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT),\(^{31}\) which integrates a number of major data sets on terrorism, most importantly that of the RAND Corporation.\(^{32}\) The effort is funded by the US Department of Homeland Security.

The *Human Security Brief 2006* presents a narrower concept of human security than that of the *Human Security Report 2005*. The latter’s broader concept encompasses all types of violent threat to individuals while the former focuses on a smaller set of forms of collective violence, for which the Human Security Centre uses the term political violence. While not explicitly defined other than through the data sets that are included, this concept neatly fits the centre’s major policy message: that the incidences of most forms of political violence are declining and that ‘many of these changes could be attributed to an explosion of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, that sought to stop ongoing wars, help negotiate peace settlements, support post-conflict reconstruction, and prevent old wars from starting again’.\(^{33}\) The data-driven approach to support this message has added to the scepticism in many quarters, mentioned above, about the centre’s findings.

Both the report and the brief contain discussion of concepts—for instance, the importance of data on the total number of victims, direct and indirect, of political violence—but they lack a comprehensive discussion of what data should be available for the preferred definition of human security.\(^{34}\) Combined with the opaqueness of the definition of human security, this nourishes suspicion that the major findings of the Human Security Centre may reflect a bias in the selection of data towards proving the success of international activism. The centre could easily counter any such suspicion by taking a more conceptual, less data-driven approach.

### IV. Data for broader concerns of peace and security policy

The standard definition of armed conflict corresponds to a specific view of the objective of peace and security policy: to prevent or to contain and end armed conflicts between states as well as those between states and rebel groups. While this

\(^{28}\) Human Security Centre (note 1), pp. 90–91.

\(^{29}\) Human Security Centre (note 19), p. 31.

\(^{30}\) On the term ‘politicide’ see note 22.

\(^{31}\) On the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base see URL <http://www.tkb.org/>.

\(^{32}\) See the RAND–MIPT Terrorism Incident Database Project website at URL <http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismsdatabase/>.


\(^{34}\) Human Security Centre (note 1), p. 91 and (note 19), p. 17.
view is important, it does not cover the full gamut of policy-relevant peace and security issues—in the perspective not just of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and experts, but also of many governments and international organizations.

Two examples of broader concerns regarding peace and security are highlighted in this section. One is a variant of the concept of human security, discussed above. The other is related to the objective of preventing new types of threat to peace and security. There are other possible objectives of peace and security policy, such as one based on an understanding of human security that includes all serious threats to the life, health and livelihood of individuals and communities. The discussion here does not aim to establish whether data requirements for such objectives can be met.

Concerns related to human security, particularly in the extreme cases of humanitarian emergencies, have received increasing attention in international politics. International attention to victims of collective violence has grown, through media coverage and the activities of international NGOs. This has put pressure on governments, particularly in the industrialized world, to do more to prevent or curtail collective violence. An important political expression of the growing attention to victims is the adoption of resolutions by the United Nations Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The most recent one endorses the ultimate humanitarian principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ with special reference to victims of war.

There are several ways to define human security even within a relatively narrow focus (leaving, for instance, ‘economic security’ aside), but what they have in common is a focus on the victims of physical violence, regardless of the cause of their plight. From the perspective of humanitarian emergencies, an appropriate definition of human security would include all types of collective violence that threaten the life, health and livelihood of individuals and communities. It is intellectually defensible to also include individual violence without political objectives, such as murder and gang killings, or to limit the definition to the victims of political violence, as is done in the Human Security Brief 2006. A middle position is adopted here. Human security is thus defined as covering all types of collective violence, as itemized in table 2C.1.

The humanitarian turn in international politics has been mirrored by a broadening of national security concerns, particularly in the industrialized countries. This appendix argues that all types of collective violence can become a security concern if they are of sufficient magnitude to threaten the fabric of societies. Documents such as the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 and the European Security Strategy of 2003 emphasize the current range of transnational threats to societies, such as international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors and transnational crime networks. The actors involved seek to use violence to shape, or exercise control over, the will and behaviour of people in a particular society. Very low levels of violence can have such effects, as has been shown by recent terrorist attacks. With the exception of the attack on the New York World Trade Center...

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35 See chapter 7 in this volume.
37 See also the Introduction and chapter 7 in this volume.
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*These are victims of the follow-on effects of the application of violence, e.g. lack of food, epidemics or the degradation of the local health system.*
Trade Center in 2001, terrorist attacks typically cause far fewer casualties than armed conflicts, as traditionally defined. However, terrorist attacks are now commonly seen by people and governments alike as first-order threats and have the power to bring about major changes in behaviour or damage to the social fabric—on a scale almost comparable to major international wars of the past. An example of this (explicit or implicit) equation with war is the counterterrorist ‘mobilization’ in many countries after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA.

One reason for the shift in interest away from armed conflicts and towards humanitarian emergencies and threats to the fabric of societies is the relative incidence of various types of collective violence. While war between states with political objectives is not obsolete, it has become a rare phenomenon of only intermittent international importance, such as the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The number of internal armed conflicts recorded in appendix 2A and in other statistical sources is also declining. At the same time, transnational threats to societies seem to be on the rise, judging by the (albeit scant) data available to substantiate such impressions. The MIPT database, for instance, records an increase in the incidence of terrorism over the past decade. Data for the main indicator of a humanitarian conception of peace and security—the total number of victims—are currently not available. Thus, while the data that are available clearly point in this direction, it is still not possible to say with certainty whether the overall number of people dying from collective violence has or has not decreased over the past few years.

The discussion of the data required for broad conceptions of peace and security comes back to much the same issues as those raised in the discussion in section II on the definition of armed conflict. The use of arms and deliberate violence by collective actors remain constitutive elements of all conceptions, but the other three traditional criteria of conflict—a political purpose, a battle and a government as an actor—apply only to certain forms of collective violence. Table 2C.1 sets out 10 different forms of such violence, which vary both as regards the relevance of the five classic criteria and in terms of the interaction among actors—that is, who is using violence against whom. The 10 forms are not exclusive; in fact they partially overlap and there will often be overlapping forms of collective violence. The main purpose of the table is to illustrate the breadth of data needed for different conceptions of peace and security.

The standard, narrow definition of armed conflict is reflected in the types A–D in table 2C.1. Good data are available on the incidence of such events, such as the UCDP data on armed conflicts, which cover the full range of types—from interstate war to riots—as long as thresholds for the number of victims in ‘battle’ are crossed. The UCDP and other sources also provide data on battle-related deaths for these types of collective violence. However, there are no consistent, complete data on victims who are not on a battlefield, whether deliberately targeted or indirect victims.

For a broader understanding of peace and security, all types of collective violence may be relevant. The issue is not whether one or all of the criteria of the standard definition of armed conflict are met, but whether there is a threat to human security that is sufficient to produce a humanitarian emergency or a threat to the fabric of a society.

39 See e.g. Human Security Centre (note 19).
40 On collective violence as an indirect cause of death see also chapter 7 in this volume.
New data sets, such as those of the UCDP and the Human Security Centre, cover additional forms of violence that go well beyond the traditional definition of armed conflict. Fairly good data are now available on both the incidence and the number of direct victims of all types of collective violence where the objectives are clearly political—including the elimination of ethnic, cultural or social groups (types E–I in table 2C.1, in addition to types A–D).\textsuperscript{41} There is a lack of comprehensive data on collective violence driven by other, particularly economic, objectives. Data on crime are weak for many countries, and the UCDP non-state conflict data set, which in theory should also include fighting among gangs, in practice seems to pick up few such cases, partly because of a lack of information and partly because of the threshold requirement of 25 battle-related deaths per year.\textsuperscript{42}

Most problematic is the lack of comprehensive data on all victims, including indirect victims of violence. The first challenge that needs to be tackled before such data can be collected is to define categories of indirect victims; the next task is to collect data corresponding to such definitions. Case studies have revealed the potential of various methods as well as the costs in time and resources of collecting such data.\textsuperscript{43}

V. Conclusions: broad perceptions, narrow data

The data on major armed conflicts presented in the SIPRI Yearbook represent important, but not all, aspects of collective violence. Statements about the broader trends in peace and security that are made on the basis of data on armed conflicts alone are therefore hazardous. International peace and security policy has moved on to broader conceptions of what is important, as reflected in an approach that focuses on human security and humanitarian catastrophe and another that stresses threats to the fabric of society.

The limitations of the standard definition of armed conflict combined with broader conceptions of peace and security have stimulated some changes in definitions and new efforts to collect data. While the latter have produced important new data on aspects of collective violence, more needs to be done before either of the two broader conceptions of peace and security can be comprehensively discussed in quantitative terms. The most important gap is data on all types of victim of collective violence, although efforts are under way to improve such data. The Human Security Centre has announced that its Human Security Report 2007 will focus on two major themes—‘The Hidden Costs of War’ and ‘The Causes of Peace’.\textsuperscript{44} Another important gap is data on crime.


\textsuperscript{42} Uppsala Conflict Data Program (note 41).


\textsuperscript{44} Human Security Centre (note 19), p. 1.
Any analysis of trends can only be exact for those empirical phenomena that are covered in the definitions. Currently, definitions and data exist for only some types of collective violence. Until such time as additional data, with adequate definitions, are available, analysis of the broader trends in collective violence has to rely mainly on inferences made from data collected for a particular conflict or on partial observations that are not based on comprehensive data. Much, but not all, of the data that have become available on additional types of collective violence—the only exception being data beyond armed conflicts—support the contention of a downward trend in collective violence: but more comprehensive sets of statistics, including those on the total number of victims of collective violence and of crime, are needed in order to convince the sceptics.