2. Major armed conflicts

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I. Introduction

In 2006 Africa, Asia and the Middle East were the principal geographical locations of armed conflicts, with events in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan commanding much international attention. Elsewhere, long-standing, frozen and local conflicts continued to inflict a significant cost in terms of lives, suffering and economic damage. Section II examines three main features of the transnational aspects of collective armed violence, today considered vital for understanding the causes and progression of armed conflicts. Section III discusses three conflict areas that were active in 2006 and displayed striking transnational elements during the year: Afghanistan; Israel, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon; and Somalia. The conclusions are outlined in section IV.

Appendix 2A presents data on major armed conflicts in the 10-year period 1997–2006 based on the findings of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and appendix 2B provides the definitions, sources and methods for the UCDP’s data collection. Appendix 2C discusses forms of collective violence with elements beyond those of the standard definition of armed conflict and the availability of adequate conflict data.

II. Transnational dimensions of contemporary conflicts

Transnationalism has been identified as an important aspect of international relations for several decades.1 The concept emerged as a way of understanding developments in the international order during the 1970s, partly in response to trends in global business and economics (the rise of transnational companies), which it was felt were calling into doubt the leading role of the state in some areas of the international system. Subsequently, the concept was developed in response to further work that explored the significance of state-based military capacities in the context of new global processes, the role of networks of non-

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1 Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (eds), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1972). In this section, the term ‘transnationalism’ is used to denote a variety of cross-border interactions and connections between all types of actor, including both non-state and state actors, that go beyond interstate interactions, exchanges and links and which are facilitated by more open national borders. The term ‘internationalization of conflict’ is often used interchangeably with ideas about transnational aspects of conflict, although it generally implies the direct engagement of third-country state-based actors in conflicts rather than the diffuse groups of non-state and state actors that are understood to constitute transnational conflict networks.

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state actors, the significance of diplomacy, multilateral institutions and ideas for effecting and limiting the power of the state in international relations.

Currently, the concept of transnationalism covers a broad range of phenomena and is based on a recognition that a set of interrelated developments—modern telecommunications and travel, multinational companies, global financial and commodities markets, increased levels and changed forms of population movement, and a reduced utility of state-based military forces—have posed significant challenges both to the primacy of states as international actors and to the concept of sovereignty. Collectively, such changes suggest that the nation-state model, which has provided the foundation of the modern international system, is being superseded by other types of governance and loyalty, frequently based on transnational affiliations.

Transnationalism has recently become a more important factor in the analysis of conflict as researchers have sought to supplement or supplant state-centric understandings of armed violence and its causes. The move to identify transnational aspects of conflict has further been linked to globalization and the growing role of non-state actors in collective violence. In this way, transnationalism has provided explanations for and definitions of conflict that link local incidents of violence to broader social, political and economic developments in the world order.

The evolution of thinking on the nature of transnationalism has also been accompanied by shifts in understandings of the appropriate policy response to the threats associated with transnational forces. Thus, the focus that emerged during the 1970s on strengthening multilateral institutions to manage global economic actors has been supplanted by a concern with building strong states. ‘Failed’ or ‘failing’ states have come to be viewed as not only creating problems for the populations in those states but also potentially posing threats to the international community as havens for transnational terrorist and criminal groups and as transit points for human trafficking and illegal migration.

The view that states are an inadequate frame of reference for analysing conflict causes and dynamics has been supported by research that begins from the observation that states and societies in particular regions are often linked together by networks of external relationships that play an important role in determining the prospects for peace or conflict. This approach has been linked to notions of ‘conflict diffusion’ and ‘contagion’ and to research on the agents and relationships that foster the spread of intra-state conflict across state borders. Transnational ‘conflict networks’ consisting of a variety of social, economic and political connections, as well as state-based and non-

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4 See appendix 2C; and Gleditsch, K. S., All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, Mich., 2002).
state actors organized in relationships that reach far beyond the location of an intra-state conflict, have been identified as playing vital roles.\textsuperscript{5}

The growing transnational character of global developments not only challenges states to develop responses through their own (global, multilateral and regional) cooperative groupings\textsuperscript{6} but also opens up a way to address conflicts through transnational civil society organizations and movements.\textsuperscript{7} These organizations range from the more traditional humanitarian actors, such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières, to non-governmental organizations that are ready to take on new generic functions, such as conflict mediation and post-conflict election monitoring.

Agreement is lacking on the exact nature of transnationalism and its overall importance for conflict. At the heart of the current debate is the issue of how much significance should be attached to the state in the context of transnational forces. Despite the relative decline of the state and the rise of non-state actors, some authors have recognized that states can also play important roles in transnational networks that include non-state actors.\textsuperscript{8} The issue of the transnational challenge to state capacities and roles in conflict, notably the state monopoly on the use of violence, has been prominent in recent debates such as those on the shift in the character of armed conflicts from inter-to intra-state,\textsuperscript{9} the importance of violent non-state actors, and the political significance of the aspects and forms of the privatization of security.\textsuperscript{10}

An early effort by the US Department of Defense to identify transnational security threats noted as key factors terrorists, members of criminal groups, insurgents and opposing factions in civil wars that conduct operations outside their country of origin.\textsuperscript{11} More recently, refugees and diaspora groups, militant Islamist networks and terrorism, legal and illegal economic networks, and


\textsuperscript{7} Kaldor, M., Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Polity: Cambridge, 2003), especially chapters 1, 5 and 6; and Tarrow, S., The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005).


\textsuperscript{9} See also appendices 2A and 2C.


crime have been highlighted as playing prominent roles in conflicts.\textsuperscript{12} Research has also drawn attention to the important role that transnational networks can play in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Population displacement and diasporas}

Previously, migration was predominantly a directed movement with specific points of departure and arrival. Today, however, more and more migrants have strong ties to more than one home country, blurring the coincidence of political, economic and geographic space.

Population movement as a result of conflict may be one of the key factors in conflict diffusion. Not only do refugees and displaced populations themselves suffer but they may also increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries. For example, refugees may extend rebel networks to neighbouring countries. Although the vast majority of refugees do not engage in violence directly, refugee flows may facilitate the transnational spread of conflict-oriented ideologies, combatants and weapons, alter the ethnic composition of states and exacerbate the competition over resources.\textsuperscript{14}

Diaspora and exile groups may play an important but sometimes also controversial role in conflicts and in political unrest in their countries of origin. This is by no means a new phenomenon, but the multiplication of diaspora communities playing such roles (especially since the end of the cold war), the prevalence of intra-state as opposed to interstate conflicts and the enhanced possibilities for transnational communication, mobilization and action have all led to a greater interest in examining this issue.\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, conflict-generated diasporas—populations scattered to multiple locations as a result of violence—can play key roles in conflicts. A variety of types of role have been identified, including economic (providing funds for militant organizations, notably in Somalia) and political (lobbying) support.\textsuperscript{16} Financial remittances from exile communities have been identified as of crucial importance for conflict economies—sometimes as the single most important source of income and means of survival for local populations. Other

\textsuperscript{13} A particular focus of work has been on the role of civil society—see e.g. Batliwala, S. and Brown, L. D. (eds), \textit{Transnational Civil Society: An Introduction} (Kumarian Press: Bloomfield, Conn. 2006), especially chapters 9, 10 and 11—and of diaspora communities—see e.g. Kent, G., ‘Organised diaspora networks and homeland peacebuilding: the Bosnian world diaspora network as a potential development actor’, \textit{Conflict, Development and Security}, vol. 6, no. 3 (Oct. 2006), pp. 449–69.
\textsuperscript{15} See e.g. Diaspora, Development and Conflict, a research project conducted by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), on the DIIS website at URL <http://www.diis.dk/sw8952.asp>.
recent examples include Sri Lanka and Kashmir, with populations scattered across the world but whose identity is tied to a symbolically important territory and who aspire to return to that territory. Diaspora communities often promote idealized visions of the homeland as part of their efforts to retain a distinctive cultural identity and may thereby foster radical nationalist sentiments or provide practical help to groups that are involved in conflict over territory. It has been suggested that diasporas can even prolong conflicts since they tend to be less willing to compromise\(^\text{17}\) the conflicts in the Balkans, for example, have been affected by the actions of diaspora communities that support radical nationalist forces by providing funds and often weapons and equipment.\(^\text{18}\)

On the other hand, research has shown that diasporas are less often a source of conflict than was previously thought, reflecting the relative weight of other factors—strategic calculations, economic interests and the difficulty of mobilizing ethnic identities for political aims.\(^\text{19}\) In fact, there have been efforts to use diasporas in conflict-resolution efforts, notably in the conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.\(^\text{20}\)

**Transnational conflict networks involving states**

During the cold war, countries in both the East and the West supported armed groups outside the Euro-Atlantic region through so-called proxy wars. With the end of the two-bloc system, the leading military powers intervened more directly in conflicts. In recent years, however, the high cost of military interventions—notably the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—coupled with the difficulty of resolving conflicts between weak states from outside and the political advantages of avoiding any close relations with armed groups have led renewed experimentation by large powers in what could be called proxy situations. In combination, notably with the rise of Islamist-inspired groups and networks, this has produced new conflict dynamics.

In 2006, the conflict in Lebanon contained strong elements of transnationalism. Hezbollah, in its confrontation with Israel, was in many respects arrogating the conventional sovereign state’s right to make war or peace. Although it was a partner in the Lebanese Government, Hezbollah acted independently from key parts of the Lebanese state. The fact that Hezbollah is


widely believed to have received significant financial assistance and armaments from Iran and Syria highlights the way in which transnational linkages are working in the Middle East conflict. Later in the year, in the conflict in Somalia, a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East aided armed Islamic militants who were trying to seize control of the country, while the United States and Ethiopia played key roles in supporting armed groups that challenged the Somali Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). This included the provision of support for the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which eventually defeated the UIC. Both these cases illustrate models of cooperation between violent non-state actors and states with some motive for supporting them, with the net effect of undermining the viability, or at least the independence, of state structures in the target area.

International terrorism and crime

The recent rise in international terrorist threats, especially those associated with violent Islamist groups, has been linked closely with the issue of transnationalism. The creation of Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, based on extended networks composed of cells of militants, has been seen as a potent challenge to a wide variety of states and societies. In particular, the ability of such groups to operate across great distances—using modern transportation and communications and often relying on dispersed networks based on family, clan or ethnicity—has challenged conventional security approaches and concepts of conflict.

Islamist groups are regarded as archetypal transnational organizations because their mode of operation often transcends state boundaries and their ideology challenges the notion of the state. Thus, despite the important differences between groups—ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan to the militant Hezbollah and Hamas—they all criticize the state as artificial, illegitimate and rejected by populations. The declining popular acceptance of governing elites and their failure to protect human rights and guarantee the minimum requirements of a decent life have aided the rise of populist non-state Islamist opposition movements.

In addition to terrorism, transnational criminal networks have also emerged as a key element in conflict analysis and international security, notably in studies of the conflicts in the Balkans. Analysis of the political economy of conflict has highlighted the importance of transnational, often illegal, eco-


nomic networks that connect non-state actors, ranging from organized crime groups to multinational companies. The struggle over natural resources in Africa, perhaps most notably ‘conflict diamonds’, has been widely viewed as a key element in the durability and complexity of conflicts such as those in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.\footnote{Collier, P., ‘Natural resources and conflict in Africa’, Crimes of War Project, War in Africa, Oct. 2004, URL <http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_04_collier.html>.
} Over the past decade, transnational criminal networks have also received growing attention as a result of their importance within the political economy of conflicts and especially since September 2001 due to connections with terrorist groups.\footnote{Woodward, S. L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 1995); United Nations, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA: The ‘Fowler Report’, in Letter dated 10 March from the chairman of the Security Council committee established pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN document S/2000/203, 10 Mar. 2000, URL <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm>, annex I; and Sanderson, T. M., ‘Transnational terror and organized crime: blurring the lines’, SAIS Review of International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (winter/spring 2004), pp. 49–61.} At the same time, the strong current focus of the international community on the transnational, even global, character of crime and terrorism may lead to undue attention being paid to the asymmetrical threats they pose to Western societies, when in fact crime and terrorism may have an even greater impact on conflicts in the developing world.

III. Transnationalism in armed conflicts in 2006

Three geographical locations of conflict that claimed international attention in 2006 most starkly demonstrate some of the transnational dimensions of modern conflict. The Afghanistan and Somalia conflicts and Israel’s two-front war in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon were each derived from unique circumstances, yet they all serve to illustrate the limits of a state-centric understanding of the nature and origin of violence as a basis for conflict resolution. In each case, increasingly prominent non-state actors, underpinned by cross-border associations and networks, have filled a void owing to either the weakness or the perceived illegitimacy of the state.

Afghanistan

In 2006 Afghanistan suffered the highest levels of violence since the US-led invasion to oust the Taliban regime in 2001. The Taliban re-emerged from their defeat with an unexpected capacity to mount insurgency operations against the government and foreign security forces, especially in the south of the country. The main transnational element of the conflict was the Taliban’s ability to operate from bases in neighbouring Pakistan—an allegation that has been contested by the Pakistani Government but is otherwise generally
accepted as fact—putting them beyond the reach of the coalition security forces.  

Violent acts in Afghanistan reached an unprecedented level in 2006, with the death of nearly 4000 people, a quarter of them civilians. The escalation of violence was particularly sharp in the middle of the year as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US military commanders initiated operations to dislodge the Taliban from their strongholds in eastern and southern Afghanistan, mainly in Helmand, Kandahar and Oruzgan provinces. In several areas security problems brought reconstruction and development work to a halt. Concern that a still weak Afghan state would be incapable of containing other transnational militant terrorists remained a powerful motivator for continued international involvement in the country.

At the beginning of 2006, the international London Conference on Afghanistan—an initiative of the Afghan Government, the United Nations and international donors—resulted in the Afghanistan Compact, which built on full implementation of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. The Afghan Government presented a five-year development plan to consolidate the state-building process under Afghan ownership, and international donors pledged $10 billion in reconstruction aid for the coming five years. However, the government’s inability to extend its control and enforce order in large parts of the country obstructed efforts to develop democratic institutions. In the areas that it did control, inexperience, nepotism, corruption and lack of resources continued to hamper good governance.

A surge in Taliban operations in the spring of 2006 led to a further deterioration of the security situation and testified to the Taliban’s expanded capacity, confidence and resolve. The number of military confrontations and the increased levels of violence were also a manifestation of a strategic shift by the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition forces, which were expanding their operations in the south of the country in preparation for handing over operational responsibility to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The perceived lack of improvement in the lives of many Afghans, especially those caught in the fighting, and the mounting civilian casualties, particularly from NATO air strikes, eroded popular support for the Afghan Government.

30 In 2004–2005 the Taliban extended their influence to large parts of southern Afghanistan, owing to the limited presence of international or Afghan security forces. Walsh, D., ‘US troops to lead major attack on Taliban’, The Guardian, 14 June 2006, URL <http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1797387,00.html>. For more on ISAF see chapter 3 in this volume.
and the international military forces. A shift in Taliban tactics could be discerned from the latter half of 2005, when they began to carry out suicide bombings—previously a rare occurrence in Afghanistan—on a regular basis. According to a US military intelligence officer, a total of 139 suicide attacks were carried out in 2006—a substantial increase from the 27 attacks in 2005. There was also a sharp increase in the number of roadside bombings. Both types of assault showed that Afghan insurgents had access to more sophisticated technology and better training. This tactical shift led some observers to note the similarity between the insurgency in Afghanistan and that in Iraq, which may reflect the transnational spread of conflict patterns. While the Taliban have claimed to have had ‘contacts with the mujahideen in Iraq’ and some analysts claim that the insurgents’ use of tactics and technology is an indication that Iraqi militants participated in training or command, others suggest that tactics have migrated from Iraq either through human contacts or simply by the spread of information through the media.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan would increase by about 59 per cent in 2006, with the $2.7 billion drug trade amounting to one-third of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. Despite a costly, two-year government eradication and crop-substitution programme, efforts to destroy poppy fields often exacerbated an already difficult economic situation for poor farmers and fuelled both general discontent and support for the insurgency. Increasingly, links

38 The UNODC claimed that the increased cultivation in the south could be explained in part by the local strength of the insurgency, leaving considerable areas outside government control. Buddenberg and
between transnational organized crime and the drug trade in Afghanistan have come to be regarded as a major security concern. Some US officials have claimed that criminal elements and illegally armed groups with links to the narcotics industry pose a greater threat than the Taliban to the future development of Afghanistan.

The link between drug trafficking and the Taliban insurgency is complex, involving criminal networks of informants and various smuggling routes and systems of protection. The Taliban have reportedly charged transit fees for the safe passage of drug convoys through the border areas under their control, a sharp contrast to their position at the end of their rule, when they sought to ban poppy cultivation altogether.

In 2006 concern also grew over the alleged support underpinning the Afghan insurgency from militant elements in Pakistan, with which Afghanistan shares a long, porous border and a complicated history. Diplomatic relations between the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, became tense, with each leader blaming the other for failing to act against Taliban militants. Musharraf was accused of failing to destroy training bases and sanctuaries for Taliban insurgents and al-Qaeda allies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. In early 2007 the US Director of National Intelligence claimed that al-Qaeda and the Taliban maintain ‘critical sanctuaries’ in Pakistan, from where they can rebuild their strength. Ethnic affinities among the Pashtun along the Afghan–Pakistani border, growing support for the Taliban insurgency and a growth of religious extremism have led to a reported ‘Talibanization’ of the

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39 In general, the links between weak states and the rise of transnational organized crime began to emerge as a problem in the mid-1990s but this was not sufficiently recognized as a security problem, despite the apparent internal and cross-border security implications. Cornell, S., ‘Narcotics, radicalism, and armed conflict in central Asia: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’, Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 17 (2005), pp. 577–97.


44 The FATA are also thought to be bases for other types of crime, such as drug trafficking. On Afghanistan’s cross-border relations see ‘Afghanistan’s regional diplomacy: starting from scratch’, Strategic Comments, vol. 12, no. 5 (15 June 2006); and Saikal, A., ‘Securing Afghanistan’s border’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 1 (spring 2006), pp. 129–42.

Pakistani FATA, areas over which government control has traditionally been very weak.\textsuperscript{46}

Reports in 2006 suggested the possibility of more direct Pakistani assistance, implicating the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in facilitating the Taliban cause by ‘turning a blind eye’, but also through monetary support and assistance in coordinating cross-border activities.\textsuperscript{47} Senior Afghan and NATO officials insist that Taliban fighters continue to be assisted by Pakistan, an allegation that has been vehemently refuted by Pakistani authorities.\textsuperscript{48}

On 5 September 2006 Musharraf signalled a halt to his costly military campaign against extremists in the FATA by signing a controversial peace agreement with tribal elders in North Waziristan, which called for the cessation of fighting, the dismantling of border checkpoints that had been set up to find members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the release of 132 Taliban fighters in Pakistani custody.\textsuperscript{49} Sources soon reported a rise in cross-border infiltrations from these areas, with the Taliban and their supporters able to operate more freely and cross into Afghanistan: US and NATO sources claimed that there was a threefold increase in attacks in eastern Afghan provinces in the autumn.\textsuperscript{50} Afghanistan’s broader transformation appeared to hinge on its problematic relationship with Pakistan.

In early 2006, several people were killed by Afghan police during protests against the publication in September 2005 of a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper.\textsuperscript{51} The failure to subdue the protesters further testified to the significant weaknesses still extant within the Afghan regime. The inability to recruit, train and equip a capable police force in Afghanistan continued to exacerbate security problems during the year, particularly in the south of the country. In Kabul, violence occurred on a significant scale in May, when the fledgling police force could not contain demonstrations and looting incidents in which 12 people were killed.\textsuperscript{52} A European Union police training mission was proposed for deployment in 2007 in order


\textsuperscript{47} Rubin (note 26); and ‘Afghanistan’s regional diplomacy: starting from scratch’ (note 44).


\textsuperscript{52} The violence was triggered by a traffic incident in Kabul that, according to a US colonel, killed 1 person, caused by a US military convoy suffering technical problems. ‘NATO/Afghanistan: great wave of violence in Afghanistan: ISAF extracts EU delegation staff from Kabul’, Atlantic News, no. 3781 (1 June 2006), pp. 1–2.
to strengthen the Afghan police force. The many challenges facing international state-building efforts in Afghanistan continue to raise questions about the effectiveness of applying the Western state model to a country with little historical experience of a central state system.

Israel, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon

Israel was involved in two concurrent conflicts in 2006: with Hamas in the Palestinian territories and with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The former constituted an escalation of the long-running and seemingly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Both conflicts exhibited the greater role of regional and transnational conflict networks and the link between state and non-state actors, as both Hamas and Hezbollah were strengthened by political, ideological and practical support from states such as Iran and Syria. With such broad involvement, any escalation like the Israeli military operation in Lebanon risked causing a significant geographical expansion of the conflict. In the broader regional context, Iran’s support for Hezbollah, coupled with Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East and the rise to power of the Shia community in Iraq, highlighted the potential transnational role that the Shia factor can play in regional politics.

In January 2006 Ehud Olmert replaced Ariel Sharon as Israeli Prime Minister, when Sharon was incapacitated by illness. In the same month Hamas won a landslide victory in the second election to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the parliamentary branch of the Palestinian Authority (PA), thus bringing to an end Fatah’s long-standing political domination of the PA. The democratic election of Hamas brought to power a government that rejected negotiations on a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel, all but destroying any prospect for cooperation between the PA and Israel or other international actors.

Key international stakeholders such as the EU and the USA were sceptical about whether Hamas, which they classified as a terrorist organization, would be a dependable political partner. The elections left the PA increasingly isolated, with the main international donor countries (led by the USA) refusing to support Hamas in its new capacity. Israel immediately stopped the transfer of tax revenues collected on behalf of the PA, an income that in 2005 represented around 35 per cent of the PA’s budget. In March 2006 the EU and the USA

53 The EU approved the training mission on 13 Feb. 2007.
56 ‘A dilemma over Hamas and its cash?’, The Economist, 18 Feb. 2006, p. 35; and Brown, N. J., Living with Palestinian Democracy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief no. 46 (Car-
suspended their financial assistance to the new PA administration and its agencies.\textsuperscript{57} A US-imposed business ban restricted financial support from other donors by limiting bank transfers.\textsuperscript{58} The PA was unable to pay its employees’ salaries, which support about 30 per cent of the Palestinian population.\textsuperscript{59} In spite of the fact that some aid was provided—a result of the diplomatic efforts of the Middle East Quartet (the EU, the UN, Russia and the USA) to find a mechanism to funnel aid directly to the Palestinian population—conditions in the Palestinian territories remained dire, with only limited provision of social services.\textsuperscript{60}

Political fragmentation, coupled with severe financial challenges, led to a further deterioration of the security situation.\textsuperscript{61} The armed forces and police split into Fatah and Hamas factions, and gunfights and kidnappings by both parties ensued in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.\textsuperscript{62} In May Hamas formed a shadow security force comprising 3000 members of aligned militant groups to complement the largely Fatah-loyal security forces, sparking another political crisis.\textsuperscript{63} A general increase in violence could be discerned as poverty, in combination with an abundance of weapons, drove up crime rates.\textsuperscript{64}

While Palestinian rivalries led to domestic instability, the search for peaceful resolution of the enduring conflict between Israel and the Palestinians remained at a standstill. Israel’s parliamentary elections in March showed that the electorate favoured more unilateral Israeli action and, together with the election of Hamas, signaled a clear shift away from negotiations.\textsuperscript{65} As Hamas
did not recognize Israel and refused to call for an end to violence as a means of resistance, the two elections effectively brought the peace process to a halt.\textsuperscript{66}

Violent skirmishes between Israel and Palestinians continued, with intermittent peaks in raids against suspected militants in the Palestinian territories. Attacks with Qassam rockets launched from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and suicide attacks perpetrated by the Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Brigades and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) led to a continuation of Israeli air strikes in April and May, claiming Palestinian civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{67} An alleged Israeli attack in which eight Palestinian civilians were killed in the Gaza Strip and a rocket attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, effectively ended the informal truce that had been agreed in February 2005.\textsuperscript{68}

The violence escalated on 25 June, when the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) and a previously unknown group called the Army of Islam attacked an Israeli Army post near the Gaza Strip border: two Israeli soldiers were killed and one was abducted.\textsuperscript{69} Israel responded by conducting a major military operation, moving into the Gaza Strip only hours after the ambush—the first major Israeli military incursion since the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza.\textsuperscript{70} Around 60 Hamas officials, including several ministers, were taken into custody in an Israeli operation in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{71} Rocket attacks and air strikes followed, and by mid-July about 65 Palestinians and 1 Israeli had been killed.\textsuperscript{72}

On 12 July the Hezbollah Shiite group and its militant Islamic Resistance wing, based in Lebanon, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid near an Israeli Army base and killed several others.\textsuperscript{73} Israel declared that Hezbollah’s role as a political actor with representation in the Lebanese Gov-
ernment made the attack not an act of terrorism but an attack by the state of Lebanon. Israel refused to negotiate any offers of a prisoner exchange and responded to the perceived provocation by carrying out a military offensive against the Hezbollah stronghold in the south.\textsuperscript{74}

Israeli forces launched heavy air strikes and moved 30 000 troops into Lebanon, the first time Israel had sent troops to the country since their withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah responded by launching rockets against Israeli troops and towns in northern Israel. Both sides extended their military operations to include civilian targets. In an attempt to prevent the kidnapped Israeli soldiers from being relocated, and to interrupt weapon deliveries from abroad to Hezbollah, Israel attacked infrastructure across Lebanon, including the civilian airport and the single road connection to Syria, and announced an air and sea blockade against the country.\textsuperscript{75}

The 34-day conflict ended in August, when Israel, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government agreed to the ceasefire set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and Israel began a gradual withdrawal from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{76} By then the fighting had cost the lives of an estimated 1191 Lebanese and 162 Israelis, displaced scores of people from both countries, demolished thousands of homes (the vast majority Lebanese) and countless buildings and vital infrastructure, and caused billions of dollars worth of damage in both countries.\textsuperscript{77}

The conflict ended inconclusively for both Israel and Hezbollah. Israel had neither recovered the kidnapped soldiers nor succeeded in its broader aim of subduing the threat that it perceived Hezbollah posed to its borders. The fighting revealed the military shortcomings of Israel, and its operation was criticized domestically for being poorly coordinated and weak, which strained Olmert’s Government.\textsuperscript{78} Hezbollah’s capacity, with elaborate bunker systems and a level of arms build-up that Israeli intelligence had failed to recognize, surprised some observers.\textsuperscript{79} Although Hezbollah suffered heavy casualties and a severely depleted weapon arsenal, the war boosted its support in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East and made it a symbol of opposition to

\textsuperscript{74} Myre, G. and Erlanger, S., ‘Clashes spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah raids Israel’, \textit{New York Times}, 13 July 2006. The fierce Israeli retaliation is thought to have surprised the Hezbollah leadership, which had had previous successes in exchanging abducted Israelis for imprisoned members and allies. Susser, A., ‘The war in Lebanon and the new Middle East’, \textit{RUSI Journal}, vol. 15, no. 4 (Aug. 2006), p. 36.

\textsuperscript{75} Jones (note 54); and Salhani and Saoud (note 54). See also chapter 10 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{76} UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 11 Aug. 2006. For this and other UN Security Council resolutions see URL <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>. On the reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon, tasked with monitoring the ceasefire, see chapter 3 in this volume.


Strengthened by its self-proclaimed military prowess and ‘divine victory’, Hezbollah publicly offered Hamas much-needed financial support. After the ceasefire Hezbollah quickly took the lead in the reconstruction work. With monetary support from the wealthy Lebanese diaspora as well as external states (including Iran), Hezbollah promised to rebuild within a year the 15,000 homes that were destroyed and offered $12,000 to each family in need of replacement housing.

Domestic politics in Lebanon were tainted by the polarizing effects of Hezbollah’s unilateral decision to launch an attack on Israel. Despite the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, Hezbollah refused to be disarmed, and the government expressed its reluctance to forcibly disarm the group. In the second half of the year, Hezbollah called for a new government of unity because it was dissatisfied with the parties’ political representation in the Western-backed coalition government led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Hezbollah also aimed to obtain a veto position in the government, according to some observers in order to obstruct the impending trials of Syrian officials who were implicated in the assassinations of several leading Lebanese political figures, including former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In this and other ways Syria was seen as continuing to influence developments in Lebanon for its own ends, notwithstanding its military withdrawal following the non-violent Cedar Revolution of 2005. With its demands for greater power in the cabinet unmet, Hezbollah and its allies pulled their ministers out of the government in November 2006. Each side in the government called on its supporters to take part in demonstrations to show their support.

In the Palestinian territories, sustained Israeli attacks and intermittent factional clashes continued during the latter half of the year. Particularly severe clashes took place in the Gaza Strip between Hamas’s auxiliary forces, then formally part of the police force, and members of the Fatah-dominated security forces demonstrating over unpaid wages. This raised fears of the outbreak
of civil war.\textsuperscript{87} Israeli raids in the Gaza Strip included a one-week operation in Beit Hanun, which killed more than 50 Palestinians, and massive shelling, which killed 18 civilians, purportedly by mistake.\textsuperscript{88} In response, Hamas threatened to resume its suicide attacks in Israel, which could mark a reversal of its transformation from a militant group to a political party.\textsuperscript{89}

The attempts by Hamas to overcome the political stalemate and end the international financial boycott of the group by creating a national unity government foundered as it affirmed that it would never recognize Israel.\textsuperscript{90} Diplomatic efforts were further complicated by different lines taken by the Hamas leadership in the Palestinian Authority and the more hard-line exiled faction in Syria. Broader efforts to open a dialogue were obstructed by the reluctance of the USA and other states to give legitimacy to non-state actors that they consider to be involved in terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{91}

In early 2007 prospects for prompt resolution of the separate but interlinked crises in the Middle East looked dim. In Lebanon, Hezbollah called for strikes, which turned violent and further strained the elected government.\textsuperscript{92} Meanwhile, international donors gathered at a conference in Paris, where they confirmed their support for the Siniora Government with pledges of monetary assistance. In turn, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, called for a Lebanese state free from foreign influences, promoting the belief that Israel acted in the war as a proxy of the USA to further the latter’s interests in the region.\textsuperscript{93}

It appears unlikely that progress can be achieved in the conflict in Lebanon unless the destabilizing influences of regional actors are replaced by impartial and constructive international involvement.\textsuperscript{94} Although the ceasefire set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 remains largely intact, the underlying tensions in Lebanon have still not been addressed.\textsuperscript{95} Israel’s inability to prevent the kidnapping of its soldiers, defeat Hezbollah through force and stop rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip appeared to have eroded its power

\textsuperscript{91} Neumann, P. R., ‘Negotiating with terrorists’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 86, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2007), pp. 128–38.
\textsuperscript{95} International Crisis Group, ‘Israel/Hizbollah/Lebanon: avoiding renewed conflict’, Middle East Report no. 59 (1 Nov. 2006).
of deterrence\textsuperscript{96} and raised questions about its longer-term strategy to ensure national security in the region. In 2006 the negative transnational influences appear to have greatly outweighed any positive impacts. Hamas and Hezbollah both benefited, at the very least, from political and material support from Iran and Syria. Recognition was given to the interlinked nature of the conflicts in the Middle East by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his call for a ‘Whole Middle East Strategy’ to resolve the problems of the region.\textsuperscript{97} Such a strategy, however, requires an exploration of new ways to engage with armed non-state actors with broad-based popular support that have assumed state functions.

**Somalia**

In 2006 violent battles and humanitarian crises in Somalia claimed scores of civilian casualties and led to widespread population displacement. The inability of the Transitional Federal Government to extend its control throughout the country enabled the Union of Islamic Courts to broaden its influence, at first challenged only by a US-supported constellation of Mogadishu warlords. As inter-communal strife had brought about further societal disintegration, there was greater transnational involvement in Somalia, which served as a proxy battleground for regional interests and as a focal point in the USA’s ‘global war on terrorism’.\textsuperscript{98}

Since the fall of Muhammad Siyad Barre’s dictatorial regime in 1991, Somalia has experienced 16 years of warlordism and internal violence. Devoid of any state authority to impose internal order and to counter destructive external influences, Somalia provided a base where transnational criminal and terrorist interests could intersect. Crime is rife in Somalia: fighting has commonly been clan-based and motivated more by opportunities for economic exploitation, including systems of ‘taxation’ at roadside checkpoints and through rampant weapons trading, than by political goals.\textsuperscript{99} Somali ports and waters have been used for smuggling, illegal fishing and waste disposal, and by notorious pirate networks.\textsuperscript{100} The Somali diaspora around the world con-


continues to affect the conflict in various ways, and large Somali refugee populations outside the country may also be a destabilizing factor.

Of further concern to countries outside the region—not least the USA—were reports that terrorist training camps and members of al-Qaeda cells were in Somalia, described by al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri as ‘the southern garrison of Islam’.\(^{101}\) Concern grew in 2006 that conditions were optimal in the failed state of Somalia for international terrorists to use it as a safe haven and breeding ground for the spread of radical Islam in Africa.\(^{102}\)

In 2006 Somalia descended into further turmoil as three internally fragmented and externally sponsored armed groups vied for power. In addition, the country suffered the worst drought it had had for 10 years, compounding a dire humanitarian situation and aggravating clan fighting over grazing land.\(^{103}\) In the early part of the year there was a rise in the influence and popularity of the UIC, which at first operated mainly in Mogadishu,\(^{104}\) largely because of their efforts to re-establish law and order after years of anarchy.\(^{105}\) As the armed wing of the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSIC), the UIC is an umbrella organization for 11 aligned but autonomous Sharia courts, formed in 1996 with the support of local businessmen who opposed the mismanagement of past regimes. CSIC Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is listed by the USA as a terrorist suspect because of his previous affiliation with the al-Ittihad al-Islami, believed to have assisted al-Qaeda in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{104}\) The UIC is also referred to as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). On 24 June 2006 the UIC changed its name to the Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Council, but in the remainder of this chapter the group is referred to as the UIC.


In February 2006 Mogadishu’s main warlords formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) to counteract the rise of the UIC, with the stated intention of capturing alleged foreign al-Qaeda operatives operating under the protection of the UIC. The US State Department declared its support for the objectives of the ARPCT, while denying reports that it was breaking the UN arms embargo against Somalia.

Scattered clashes between the UIC and the ARPCT over control of Mogadishu peaked in the late spring of 2006, claiming some 330 lives before the Islamists gained control of the city on 5 June. The ARPTC then virtually disintegrated, with some of its members opting to join the UIC, revealing the mutability of Somalia’s conflict allegiances. With minimal force the UIC extended its authority throughout much of southern and central Somalia and seized the strategic port of Kismayo in September, which the UIC considered to be a potential base from which foreign troops crossing the border from Kenya could be repulsed.

Meanwhile, the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government, led by interim president and former warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, remained dysfunctional, domestically unpopular and unable to extend its influence beyond its temporary seat in Baydhabo, in western Somalia. A controversy over whether to engage in peace talks with the UIC sparked mass
resignations by government ministers in July and the dissolution of the cabinet, dealing an additional blow to the already weakened TFG.113

In mid-2006 there were reports of Ethiopian troops crossing clandestinely into Somalia, threatening to defeat the Islamists if the latter approached Baydhabo, but Ethiopia admitted only to sending military advisers in support of the TFG.114 As the UIC was not deterred from extending its de facto control over much of the country, the prospect of a military confrontation between the Islamists and the marginalized government loomed large, risking drawing in neighbouring states and the otherwise peaceful, semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the north of Somalia. A September suicide attack on the Somali president’s car convoy in Baydhabo, for which the UIC was blamed, sparked new violent tactics in Somalia’s conflict; this was attributed by some—including the president himself—to al-Qaeda involvement.115

The support that the UIC gained for restoring order and ousting the warlords appeared to be gradually weakened by its strict enforcement of sharia law.116 An attempt by the UIC to outlaw the widely used stimulant khat on the basis that it encouraged immorality prompted protests, leading to a violent response by Islamist fighters.117

Multiple rounds of talks in Khartoum, sponsored by the Arab League,118 were held between the UIC and the TFG in the second half of 2006, but they failed to make any substantial progress. The UIC’s refusal to negotiate while Ethiopian troops remained on Somali soil was countered by the TFG’s rejection of what it deemed illegitimate territorial expansionism by the UIC.119 Instead, both parties sought to strengthen their positions and build up military capacity with a strong influx of arms, in contravention of the 1992 UN arms embargo.120 Reflecting the growing involvement of external actors, the United Nations Monitoring Group’s November 2006 report implicated Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen in violations of the arms embargo in support of the TFG, while the UIC reportedly received arms and training from Djibouti, Eritrea,

118 On the Arab League and for a list of its members see the glossary in this volume.
119 Integrated Regional Information Network, ‘Hardline positions delay talks between rival groups’, 1 Nov. 2006; and United Nations (note 100).
120 See chapter 10 in this volume.
Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Gulf states. Thousands of Eritrean and Ethiopian troops were reported to be in Somalia, ready to back the TFG and the UIC, respectively, creating the risk of regional war. Ethiopia’s involvement was seen as motivated partly by the possibility of a spillover of Islamist activity and attacks from Somalia, threatening to radicalize its 40 per cent Muslim population, and partly by the need to contain irredentist groups of Somali descent among the population of Ethiopia’s south-eastern Ogaden region, advocating a ‘Greater Somalia’. The UIC publicly announced its pan-Somali aspirations and underlined them by carrying out cross-border military cooperation with rebel groups. Meanwhile, Eritrea, caught in a stand-off with Ethiopia since their 1998–2000 border war, allegedly supplied the UIC with materials and troops, triggering concerns that the Eritreo–Ethiopian conflict might restart with Somalia as a proxy stage.

In December 2006 the UN, in Security Council Resolution 1725, partially lifted its arms embargo to authorize the deployment of an 8000-strong peacekeeping mission led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)—and to enable the strengthening of TFG security forces. The UIC opposed the prospect of a military intervention and announced a jihad against all foreign ‘infidels’. However, the rapidly deteriorating security situation and IGAD’s inability to mount the mission postponed the deployment of IGASOM. The talks collapsed and, following clashes between the UIC and the TFG, backed by Ethiopian forces near Baydhabo, the Islamist fighters were forced to retreat, with Sheikh Aweys calling on Muslims worldwide to join the UIC’s jihad against Ethiopia. Mogadishu fell without violent confrontation.

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125 UN Security Council Resolution 1725, 6 Dec. 2006. The International Crisis Group criticized the move, inter alia, as more likely to provoke a full-on military confrontation. Bryden, M., ‘Storm clouds over Somalia as rivals prepare for battle’, The Nation, 8 Dec. 2006, URL <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4569>. For the members of IGAD see the glossary in this volume.


127 Estimates of the number of foreign Islamist fighters in Somalia ranged from several hundred to thousands, including young radicals of the Somali diaspora. International Crisis Group (note 123), p. 4;
at the end of the year, followed by the fall of Kismayo. The remaining Islamists were driven to seek refuge in the dense forests along Somalia’s porous border with Kenya. There they mixed with the tens of thousands of Somali refugees who had fled from the violent effects of the year’s Islamist advance.\(^{129}\)

The fighting in December 2006 caused a fresh influx of refugees to Kenya, adding pressure on camps that already housed 130 000 Somali refugees from the 1991 crisis. Massive flooding in Kenya’s Dadaab region further compounded the crisis. To curb infiltrations by combatants, the border was closed and the US Navy began to patrol the adjacent waters.\(^{130}\) By the end of 2006 the TFG, buttressed by Ethiopian troops, had established formal control of all of Somalia. The shattered Islamists came under additional pressure when the US Special Forces Command launched air strikes in the southern border regions, acting on ‘credible intelligence’ that foreign al-Qaeda operatives were hiding in the area.\(^{131}\) Retreating Islamist fighters vowed to launch guerrilla-style attacks, mirroring the violent protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^{132}\) Somali officials estimated that 3500 Islamists remained in the area of Mogadishu and were likely to seek to destabilize the city.\(^{133}\) However, with its main leadership having fled to Kenya and Yemen, and its remaining troops in Somalia forced underground, it is uncertain how serious a threat the UIC presents from either within or outside Somali territory.

By early 2007 instability had returned to Mogadishu despite the stabilizing presence of Ethiopian and TFG troops, who were targeted by insurgents in recurrent hit-and-run attacks. The TFG’s continuing intrinsic weaknesses have led to concern that there may be a re-emergence of the same violent clan-based warlordism and criminality that the UIC managed to suppress.\(^{134}\) The long-standing lack of an effective central government in Somalia is likely to pose considerable challenges to state building. A political process that excludes powerful actors in the country, such as remaining Islamist elements,


\(^{131}\) Garamone, J., ‘Aircraft attack al Qaeda haven, Ike moves off Somalia’, American Forces Press Service, 9 Jan. 2007; and ‘US ‘targets al-Qaeda’ in Somalia’, BBC News, 9 Jan. 2007, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/6245943.stm>. The strikes appear to have missed their main targets (the 3 foreign al-Qaeda operatives thought to have been involved in terrorist attacks against US interests) but were reported to have killed others with close ties to the terrorist group. The reports on civilian casualties are highly contradictory but commonly estimate that about 20 were killed. Associated Press, ‘Raid killed Somali allies of al-Qaeda, US says’, New York Times, 12 Jan. 2007.


signals the prospect of further political fragmentation.\textsuperscript{135} A protracted Ethiopian presence in Somalia is likely to add to the tensions but, with a peace mission not yet deployed and given the difficulties involved in reaching agreement on troops and funding, the TFG is likely to remain reliant on Ethiopian forces for a considerable time.

IV. Conclusions

Developments in armed conflicts in 2006 continued to reflect the broad trends that have emerged in recent years, one of the most important of which is the fact that conflicts are no longer fought directly between states. Rather, there has been a rise in the number of conflicts involving a mix of state-based and non-state actors, usually operating in extensive transnational conflict networks. Notable in this respect were the conflicts between state-based political and military groups, principally the US-led coalition of forces, and violent non-state actors claiming to be motivated by militant Islamist ideas. An intensification of violence in Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa pointed to the surge of militant Islamist groups following the launch of the ‘global war on terrorism’ after the September 2001 attacks on the USA. However, the complex nature of these conflicts suggests that caution should be exercised in ascribing narrow causes—for example international terrorism, transnationalist threats or geopolitical challenges—to many of the contemporary conflicts. As noted in appendix 2C, with a lack of consensus about the nature of collective violence in the world today, one set of perceptions of insecurity, formed by a set of strong states and their populations in response to a ‘new’ transnational vision of threats such as terrorism, is in many cases playing a disproportionate role in shaping security policy.

While many of the conflicts in 2006 involved transnational elements, with impacts and connections far beyond the principal sites of conflict, local populations in the developing world continued to suffer disproportionately as a result of conflict in comparison to people in the developed world. This, together with recognition of the complexity of contemporary conflicts and the key role of both states and non-state actors in transnational conflict networks, suggests that further research is required to clarify the character, impact and significance of transnationalism and conflict. A growing awareness of the transnational character of security issues in 2006, the urgent need to counter the negative aspects of this phenomenon, and the potential for making positive use of transnational actors and influences to promote conflict resolution and peace-building all suggest that, in the future, finding ways to address transnational aspects of conflict effectively will be high on the international policy agenda.