1. Euro-Atlantic security and institutions

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I. Introduction

Factors of both continuity and change coexisted in Euro-Atlantic security in 2006. The United States and its coalition partners continued their operations in Iraq in spite of mounting domestic disillusion and protest, above all in the USA itself. At the same time, other areas of cooperation between the USA and European countries were pursued pragmatically, including the increasingly difficult North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Afghanistan. Such shared liabilities, combined with gradual US policy shifts in some areas, had a steadying effect on European–US relations overall.

The impasse over the 2003 Constitutional Treaty and enlargement issues dominated the agenda of the European Union (EU) but did not prevent further incremental developments in EU external security roles (including crisis-management missions) that point in the direction of growing global ambitions. NATO member states debated further reforms and increased their involvement in Afghanistan as part of efforts to bolster the organization’s own relevance. In the Western Balkans, the complexity of the Kosovo problem became more obvious the closer the international community came to addressing concrete proposals for the province’s separate future.

The interruptions of energy supplies from Russia to its western neighbours at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 made energy security a central topic. There were other signs, too, of Russia using its latest economic gains and growing confidence to assert its interests more forcefully in relation to both the West and its own near neighbours. Its disputes with Georgia were kept under control with some difficulty. Ukraine’s politics, including its engagement with Western institutions, showed signs of having reached a stalemate.

Section II of this chapter addresses developments in US policies on Euro-Atlantic issues. Sections III and IV review developments in the EU and NATO, respectively. Section V examines events in Kosovo and section VI in the former Soviet area. Section VII presents the conclusions.

II. The United States

The principles of US external policy, a matter of the highest importance for the world, were developed with the publication in 2006 of two major documents: the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense
At the same time, events abroad and in the USA called into question the longer-term continuance of the robust policies that these documents reflected. US strategy in Iraq was under particular fire by the end of the year—and new divisions were looming over the challenge of Iran—against a background of increasing interplay with US domestic politics, including the outcome of mid-term elections to the US Congress.

The US Administration of President George W. Bush issued its second National Security Strategy in March 2006. Unlike the previous version of 2002, the new NSS neither reflects any one clear shift in prevailing circumstances nor shows a convincing adaptation to existing and prospective changes. It starts from the same basic threat analysis and objectives as the 2002 NSS but claims that since then ‘the world has seen extraordinary progress in the expansion of freedom, democracy, and human dignity’. For example, it states that the ‘peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq have replaced tyrannies with democracies’, but there is no reference to external forces that contributed to the change. Since ‘tyranny’—apparently selected as a more flexible term than dictatorship—threatens ‘the world’s interest in freedom’s expansion’, the goal is to eliminate it. A list of examples of such dangerous regimes includes North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Myanmar (Burma) and Zimbabwe—countries that the NSS also claims ‘in their pursuit of [weapons of mass destruction] or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten our immediate security interests’. The report also identifies Iran as posing the single most urgent threat of this kind.

The world view of the document is explicitly dualistic, comparing the post-September 2001 battle of ideas between democracy and tyranny with the ideological contest of the cold war between democracy and communism. Perpetuating the pre-emption notion that was so controversial in the 2002 NSS, the 2006 NSS states that the USA does ‘not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’.

The 2006 NSS gives some evidence of changed thinking by the US Government, however. Emphasis is put on multilateral cooperation, particularly with the oldest and closest allies of the USA, but not excluding a role for the United Nations or formal regional structures. The section on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, not present in the previous NSS, shows a softening of the negative US attitude to activities such as state building and calls for cooperation with others working in the field. Space is given to global and


2 On Iran’s nuclear programme and related policy issues see chapter 12 in this volume.


transnational threats such as avian influenza, AIDS, environmental destruction and natural disasters.\(^6\)

The report of the Quadrennial Defense Review was also published in early 2006. It is a reflection of the lessons learned by the US Administration and US military leadership in the first four years of the ‘global war on terrorism’. As the war is expected to be of indefinite duration, the QDR makes clear that it is not designed as a ‘new beginning’. It defines two fundamental imperatives for the US Department of Defense (DOD): continuing to reorient its capabilities and forces to give more flexibility in response to asymmetric challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years; and making comprehensive changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction.\(^7\) The document shows that the USA intends to maintain its predominance in traditional warfare while improving its ability to address the non-traditional, asymmetric military challenges.

As noted by the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘The 2006 QDR was the first contemporary defence review to coincide with an ongoing major conflict.’\(^8\) It was published against the background of an increasing challenge to the ‘transformationalist’ policies associated with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld—which prescribe the use of smaller forces equipped with high technology\(^9\)—from ‘traditionalists’ both inside and outside the US armed forces, who argued that only the presence of a mass ground force can hope to hold territory in the face of low-intensity insurgency. Supporters of this view have called for the US Army to grow by several thousand troops per year in the near future and have drawn attention to evidence of the forces already in the field being overstretched and under-equipped.\(^10\)

The 2006 QDR calls for an increase in the USA’s deployable (i.e. fully equipped and fully manned) forces and a rebalancing between active and reserve forces. Specifically, it prescribes more special operations forces and special forces battalions.\(^11\) In a related development, in December 2006 the US military issued a new army and marine force manual on counter-insurgency operations (the first for 20 years), reflecting its concern about its limited ability to cope with insurgencies in the light of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^12\) The manual recognizes the complexity of the tasks facing troops who

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\(^6\) The White House (note 1), pp. 16, 38, 47.

\(^7\) US Department of Defense (note 1), pp. v, 1.


have also to assist in the rebuilding of infrastructure and facilitate the establishment of local governance and the rule of law.

In the US domestic context, the QDR stresses the inter-agency approach to providing security, and its reference to ‘better fusion of intelligence and operations’ may or may not be made in this context. Such references raise the question of there being a blurring of roles between the DOD and other government agencies, including those responsible for intelligence. It is known that the DOD has used the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as an opportunity to expand its autonomous intelligence activity. This has sometimes resulted in overlaps, duplication of effort and even major differences of assessment between various agencies. The 2006 QDR, while understandably stressing the intelligence needs of the armed forces, avoids commenting on the problem of reconciling the many institutions that are active in this area. Although the establishment of the post of Director of National Intelligence in 2004 has reduced the problem, it apparently has not resolved it.

The QDR aims to accelerate military transformation by focusing on the needs of combatant commanders (who head unified combatant commands) and on developing joint capabilities. Effective network-centric warfare continues to be an objective. If such qualitative improvements and tactical lessons learned from recent combat experience take effect, this may widen the problematic technology gap between US and other coalition armed forces, unless experience is shared with and digested by at least the main partner countries.

The Iraq operation and the US domestic debate

The Iraq operation entered its fourth year in 2006 and increasingly affected US domestic politics. As so often with major military actions carried out far from home, support has declined for several reasons. There has been an erosion in the US public’s trust in the ability of the president to lead generally and, more specifically, in the winnability of the Iraq conflict as the situation there has become hard to characterize as anything other than a civil war. While it remains a delicate matter for the US Democratic Party to take any stand that could be criticized as failing to ‘support the troops’, partisan debate on the issue started to become more open and polarized even before the mid-term elections to the US Congress in November 2006, which gave the Democratic Party control of both houses. Overall, while US popular support for the

17 On network-centric warfare and related policies see chapter 9 in this volume.
war in Iraq was more than 70 per cent in the spring of 2003, by 2006 the majority had concluded that the war was a mistake.\textsuperscript{19}

Deaths of US military personnel reached 3000 by the end of 2006 and were particularly high in the last three months of the year.\textsuperscript{20} However, the overall fatality rate in 2006 was not significantly different from previous years.\textsuperscript{21} The casualty rate for Iraqi police and security forces is roughly twice the rate of that for all coalition forces, which is a serious problem not least in view of the plans to gradually hand over responsibility for the country’s security to Iraqi units.\textsuperscript{22} Perhaps even more significant as a motive for revision of the US strategy is the steadily increasing number of enemy-initiated attacks since May 2003, and the rise in the average number of attacks per day since the beginning of 2006.\textsuperscript{23} Both trends indicate that the coalition is not controlling the situation and have fuelled the widespread concern that it may deteriorate further.

The views of the US Administration itself evolved during 2006. At the start of the year, President Bush reiterated that ‘The road of victory is the road that will take our troops home.’\textsuperscript{24} By the autumn most members of the administration were finding it necessary to nuance this view, although Vice-President Dick Cheney still emphasized that ‘we are not looking for an exit strategy; we’re looking for victory’.\textsuperscript{25} The president in his turn said that the US goal in Iraq ‘is clear and unchanging’ and rightly pointed out the risks of a hasty withdrawal: ‘A failed Iraq in the heart of the Middle East will provide safe haven for terrorists and extremists.’\textsuperscript{26} By the end of the year, after much similar criticism at home as well as abroad and the elections to the Congress, the president was ready to recognize that ‘We’re not winning, we’re not losing’, a formula also employed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{20} The precise figure is 3003 deaths. Fatality figures are taken from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count website, URL <http://www.icasualties.org/>.
\textsuperscript{21} The total number of coalition fatalities was 897 in 2005 and fell to 871 in 2006. Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (note 20).
The question was, of course, what alternative strategy might produce better results for the interveners or, indeed, for Iraq. During 2006 various bodies started to work on ideas for withdrawal from Iraq, and the US Administration launched its own bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG) in March, led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former congressman Lee Hamilton. The ISG’s report, published in December 2006, starts from a grim picture of the situation in Iraq, which it argues could not improve without reconciliation among various population groups.\(^{28}\) The report sets aside the much-discussed option of decentralizing Iraq into three regions, concluding that the ethnic and religious groups are too mixed to be neatly separated. Its two most important recommendations are to change the role and reduce the number of coalition troops in Iraq and to launch a major diplomatic offensive that would reconnect the process of Iraqi reconciliation with the peace process in the Middle East, including by opening a dialogue with Iran and Syria.\(^{29}\) Within Iraq, the report calls for a revision of the current US approach, with more emphasis on the political process, including state building. Specifically, it recommends the withdrawal ‘of all combat brigades not necessary for force protection’ by the first quarter of 2008 on the condition that ‘additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed’.

The questioning of US strategy also extended in 2006 to the link between Iraq and anti-terrorism policy. According to the reported results of a national intelligence estimate that addressed this topic for the first time since March 2003, the ‘invasion and occupation of Iraq has helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism’ and ‘New jihadist networks and cells, sometimes united by little more than their anti-Western agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge’.\(^{30}\) This official US analysis, increasingly also supported by US and British public opinion, underlined that arresting the trend of violence in Iraq would be crucial for success in reducing terrorist activity globally.\(^{31}\)

Within the US establishment, the military has opposed reductions in coalition troop numbers, but the military also objected to another widely canvassed idea—sending additional troops to stabilize some of the hot spots in Iraq, including Baghdad, as a step towards making large-scale withdrawals possible


\(^{29}\) In this respect the ISG echoes the judgement of many observers that the Iraq invasion did not, as the US Administration hoped, bring closer a breakthrough in Israeli–Palestinian and Israeli–Arab relations. Instead, it complicated the prospects for such a breakthrough, while inadvertently giving greater leverage to radical Shia elements backed by Iran.


thereafter. According to one report, the ‘Pentagon has warned that any short-
term mission may only set up the United States for bigger problems when it 
ends’.33

President Bush announced his own new Iraq strategy in January 2007. Its 
most important element was the sending of more than 20 000 additional troops 
to Iraq in order to gain control over the insurgency, particularly in Baghdad 
and its vicinity, because ‘Eighty percent of Iraq’s sectarian violence occurs 
within 30 miles [50 kilometres] of the capital’.34 The troops thus committed to 
Iraq would work alongside Iraqi units (one US battalion to each Iraqi brigade) 
and have some elements embedded in the latter.35 The president made no men-
tion of subsequent troop withdrawals, except to remark that the USA’s 
commitment ‘is not open-ended’. He did not signal any diplomatic opening 
towards Iran and Syria, but stressed that the USA would ‘interrupt the flow of 
support from Iran and Syria’ and that the USA would do more to make its 
friends in the Middle East understand their own interest in the stability of Iraq.

In the new stage of debate the Iraq operation is being increasingly compared 
with events during the Viet Nam War in the 1950s–70s in terms of the escal-
ating demand for US forces, the failure of the latter to master the situation in 
spite of superior technology and the disappointment of hopes that local mili-
tary forces could be sufficiently prepared to take their place. In one respect, 
the Iraqi conundrum appears more difficult because, while the US retreat left 
Viet Nam on the road towards unification, Iraq seems more likely to end up 
dismembered.

Whatever military measures may be taken in the short term, the Iraq conflict 
seems to have demonstrated that the ‘Bush revolution’ in foreign affairs based 
on the combination of ‘hyper-realism and transformational zeal’36 has been at 
least partially exhausted. Domestic criticism is continuing to mount over the 
president’s use of his executive powers on matters concerning Iraq and secur-
ity generally, while the growing boldness of the Democratic Party has been 
matched by loss of cohesion in the Republican Party.37 If the documents pub-
lished by the US Administration in 2006 show a limited readiness to rethink, 
influential groups of experts are already elaborating alternative strategies to 
help the USA lead the international system in a more cooperative and liberal 
direction in the future.38 In the meantime the Iraq conflict has contributed to

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33 Wright, R. and Baker, P., ‘White House, Joint Chiefs at odds on adding troops’, Washington Post, 
34 The White House, ‘President’s address to the nation’, Press release, Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2007, 
35 Pace, P. (Gen.), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Testimony before the US House of 
36 These terms are used in Krepon, M., ‘Negating American power’, Henry L. Stimson Center, 
37 DeYoung, K., ‘Skepticism over Iraq haunts U.S. Iran policy’, Washington Post, 15 Feb. 2007, 
p. A01.
38 Ikenberry, G. J. and Slaughter, A.-M. (co-directors), Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. 
National Security in the 21st Century, Final report of the Princeton Project on National Security (Prince-
the growing prominence of security as an issue in US politics and has been a massive drain on US resources, making the country more vulnerable to reversals in foreign trade and in the monetary sphere. Judgement should perhaps still be suspended, however, on how far the outcome reflects the shortcomings of the ‘Bush doctrine’, as such, and how far the problems have flowed from selecting some of the toughest available targets for action and from specific mistakes committed there.

The USA and Europe: concord and discord

The discord that prevailed in European–US relations in 2002–2003 has gradually given way to pragmatism, as the great majority of European governments have accepted the need to return to cooperation with the USA across a broad front. The underlying disagreements, however, are based on different perceptions of security. Public opinion polls show that every threat experienced by both sides—with the exception of global warming—is graded as more acute by US citizens than by Europeans. In consequence, the USA sees its international environment as more hostile, and security as a higher priority overall, than Europe does. This gives the US leadership scope to spend more resources on security, and even to take steps in pursuit of it that may contradict the rule of law, with (at least) mainstream popular support.

Consistent with these findings, European public opinion has remained sceptical towards the USA even while official elites have become more accommodating. The proportion of favourable opinions on the USA have continued to fall practically everywhere in Europe and in many countries no longer represent the majority. A recent poll found that US leadership in world affairs was regarded as desirable by only 37 per cent of European respondents, and only three countries—the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom—viewed it more positively than negatively. Even Tony Blair, the strongly pro-US British Prime Minister, called in 2006 for a revision of strategy on Afghanistan, Iraq and extremism more broadly. In a speech in August 2006 he suggested that the banner should not be ‘regime change’ but ‘values change’ and that popular support could only be maintained if policy ‘is not just about interests but about values, not just about what is necessary but about what is right’. He stated that ‘the stronger and more appealing our world-view is, the more it is seen as based not just on power but on justice, the easier it

39 See chapter 8 in this volume.
42 Transatlantic Trends (note 40), p. 5.
will be for us to shape the future’ and that ‘whereas unilateral action can never be ruled out, it is not the preference’.43

A particularly acute difference between the current US and European leaderships concerns the relationship between the rule of law and security, particularly in the context of countering terrorism. It is also a divisive issue within the USA. There have been domestic as well as foreign protests over the US Administration’s detention of foreigners on its territory without being convicted and without access to due process of law, and the US Supreme Court has challenged some of those practices.44 During 2006, Republican and Democratic congressmen alike voiced their concerns over the torture of terrorism suspects and achieved a revision of a draft bill that sets clearer limits to interrogation techniques.45 It is fair to add that there were similar internal divides in European states over some governmental counterterrorism proposals liable to affect personal freedoms.

During 2006 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe carried out an investigation into the much-publicized reports of terrorist suspects being secretly detained and unlawfully transferred between countries (‘rendition’) by the USA with help or connivance from Council of Europe member states. The stories included alleged flights commanded by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through European bases, detention without rights at sites other than the Guantánamo Bay detention camp and rendition of some suspects to their home countries, where they were likely to be tortured. The Parliamentary Assembly condemned ‘the systematic exclusion of all forms of judicial protection’ and called on the USA ‘to dismantle its system of secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers’ and to ‘prohibit the “extra-legal” transfer of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist organisations and all forcible transfers of persons from any country to countries that practise torture or that fail to guarantee the right to a fair trial’.46 In a separate report, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, highlighted various weaknesses in the control mechanisms over intelligence services and the lack of adequate human rights safeguards for civil air traffic.47 These conclusions,

47 Council of Europe, ‘Supplementary report by the Secretary General on the use of his powers under Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the light of reports suggesting that individuals, notably persons suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, may have been arrested and
even if not binding on European governments, may be expected to discourage them from considering or condoning similar practices in future.

European–US differences also crystallized around the balance to be struck between, on the one hand, the security interests of airlines and flight destination and departure countries and, on the other, the right of passengers to privacy. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the USA passed legislation requiring airlines operating flights to, from or across US territory to give US authorities electronic access to the data contained in their reservation and departure control systems, called passenger name records (PNR). Implementation in Europe was a matter for the European Union to rule on, given its competence in the area of aviation. In 2004 the European Commission had assessed that the US Customs and Border Protection agency could provide enough protection of passenger data to meet European privacy standards. In the same year the EU Council of Ministers had approved the conclusion of an agreement with the USA on the processing and transfer of PNR. The European Parliament, however, applied to the European Court of Justice for the annulment of these decisions on the grounds that there was no basis for such action in EU law, and in May 2006 the court duly annulled both the Commission and Council measures, thereby forcing the reopening of EU–US negotiations. The EU now rejected the US demand for routine sharing of passenger data among US law enforcement agencies and barred the US Department of Homeland Security from extracting data automatically from European airlines’ computer systems, safeguards that were enshrined in the new agreement that was reached in October 2006.

With some delay on the European side, biometric passports were introduced at the end of August 2006 for visitors entitled to visa-free entry to the USA through a major airport or seaport. The US Department of Homeland Security is now considering the extension of the Visa Waiver Programme in response to ‘the increased interest among some international allies’ of the USA.


III. The European Union

In 2006 the European Union remained in a state of transition. In the wake of the negative referendum results on the 2003 Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, EU leaders had announced an indefinite period of ‘reflection’. It was clear by 2006 that the constitution’s failure had left Europe uncertain about fundamental questions regarding its future, purpose and course, including the best way to handle divisive debates both among governments and between governments and the people. The idea of European solidarity is being challenged by several different ‘patriotisms’ arising in the political, ethnic, economic and even linguistic spheres. The current mood of pessimism and confusion has spread beyond traditionally Euro-sceptical countries to affect even the EU’s new members, which have appeared increasingly inward-looking and hardly able to forge consensus regionally, let alone EU-wide. The constitutional stalemate has also increasingly affected plans for the further enlargement of the EU, thus reviving the old widening-versus-deepening dilemma (whether new members can be absorbed in the absence of deeper institutional and financial reforms). It remains to be seen whether the departures and arrivals of leading politicians in the governments of the large EU members in 2006–2007 can open the way to a deeper transformation of the European political landscape.

The Constitutional Treaty deadlock

The prospects for an EU relaunch were brightened somewhat by the agreement of the outline of the EU budget for 2007–13 at the December 2005 European Council. However, over the next year the member governments remained deeply divided over whether, how and when the constitution should be resurrected. It was evident that the issue would not be tackled until mid-2007 at the earliest, and attention became focused on the plans of Germany, the EU Presidency holder in the first half of 2007. Given the presidential election in France and the planned change of prime minister in the UK about that
time, however, the room for early progress by Germany looked narrow. In the meantime, the process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty continued: altogether 16 member states had ratified it by the end of 2006, showing their determination to keep the matter on the agenda symbolically in the absence of any more practical way forward.

Enlargement

Some effort was made in 2006 to confront the EU’s increasingly evident enlargement fatigue. The planned admission of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 became a test case: would it be seen as the completion of the May 2004 enlargement phase, followed by an indefinite pause, or as a prelude to further expansion? Should enlargement in general be considered a success story worth continuing, or had the EU’s capacity to absorb new members been exhausted politically even if not in objective economic terms?

The treaties of accession with Bulgaria and Romania had been signed on 25 April 2005, with the aim of full entry in January 2007. A monitoring report by the European Commission in May 2006 gave qualified approval for the accession of both states but deferred a final decision until early October 2006. The report called on both countries to address a number of outstanding issues, including greater efforts to fight corruption and crime, and judicial reforms for greater transparency, efficiency and impartiality. Bulgaria was indirectly warned that, failing such improvements, the Commission could recommend deferring its accession. On 26 September a new monitoring report stated that the two countries were ‘sufficiently prepared’ to meet the political, economic and acquis criteria by 1 January 2007 but proposed the unprecedented step of creating a mechanism to promote and verify both states’ progress after accession in certain areas.

In the light of the experience with these two states and the talks with other current and potential candidates, the December 2006 European Council set a number of new criteria for future admissions. First, it was agreed that the enlargement strategy would henceforth be based on ‘consolidation, conditionality and communication’, combined with the EU’s capacity to integrate new

56 See note 52.
57 In this context, The Economist rightly noted that the EU ‘is not a club with a fixed lump of benefits that get used up when it adds new members. It is more like a network in which the benefits of membership increase as more members join.’ ‘The absorption puzzle’, The Economist, 29 June 2006. For arguments on absorption capacity see also Bildt, C., ‘Open wide Europe’s door’, International Herald Tribune, 7 Nov. 2006.
members. Second, ‘difficult issues’, such as judicial reforms and fighting corruption, would be addressed early in accession talks. Finally, ‘the pace of the accession process depends on the results of the reforms’ in the applicant country and the EU would no longer set target dates for accession until and unless negotiations were close to completion.\(^{60}\) These new criteria will apply first and foremost to Turkey and the Western Balkan applicants—the candidate countries Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. Meanwhile, Croatia was commended for the progress it had made in the past year.

On the Western Balkans, generally, the December 2006 European Council reaffirmed that the future of the region ‘lies in the European Union’, but this did not stop local states worrying that the EU’s new mood and new admission criteria might leave them outside the EU for the indefinite future.\(^{61}\) No new commitments or hints of membership were offered to other interested countries, such as Georgia or Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro were called off on 3 May 2006 because its government failed to meet its commitments on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to catch General Ratko Mladić, charged with war crimes.\(^{62}\)

Turkey’s EU membership negotiations ran into increasing difficulties in 2006. Formally, Turkey has to negotiate and conclude 35 ‘chapters’ on issues including trade, economy, information, foreign, security and defence policy, the legal and judiciary system, religious and democratic freedoms, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities.\(^{63}\) Enthusiasm for the process declined during 2006 on both sides. Militant Islamic radicalism and the war in Iraq confirmed the scepticism of some in the EU and strengthened concerns about letting a large Muslim country into the Union.\(^{64}\) In turn, Turkey slowed its political reforms and continued to refuse to recognize the Republic of Cyprus (now an EU member) without a comprehensive deal to end the long-standing division of the island.\(^{65}\) Popular support for EU membership in

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\(^{61}\) Council of the European Union (note 60), p. 3.


\(^{64}\) Islam was not the only issue for the anti-Turkish lobby: in Nov. 2006 the lower house of the French Parliament approved a law making it an offence to deny that there was a genocide of Armenians in Turkey in 1915–17. In response, Turkey suspended its military relations with France. Shihab, S., ‘Génocide arménien : le Parlement turc dénonce l'attitude de la France’ [Armenian genocide: the Turkish Parliament denounces the French standpoint], Le Monde, 19 Oct. 2006.

\(^{65}\) Turkey has not fully implemented the additional protocol extending its customs union to the 10 new EU members admitted in 2004 and has denied access to its ports to vessels flying the Republic of Cyprus flag or whose last port of call was Cyprus.
Turkey has fallen to 35 per cent from almost 80 per cent in 2003. This was mirrored by a similar average level of support (39%) from EU citizens for Turkish membership of the Union. A November 2006 European Commission report bluntly warned Turkey over the Cyprus issue and criticized other shortcomings ranging from minority rights to freedom of expression. In the autumn, EU member states remained divided over the importance as well as the possibility of avoiding an impending collapse in the negotiations over Turkish membership. In face of continued Turkish intransigence regarding the Cyprus deadlock, in December the EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend negotiations on eight chapters that were directly relevant to Turkey’s behaviour in this context but, in a compromise, did not set a deadline for compliance.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

As the enlargement of the EU is increasingly showing signs of exhaustion, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)—which at present covers only non-candidate countries—is attracting new attention as a possible long-term alternative. Even if some thinkers still maintain that enlargement is ‘not just the EU’s best foreign policy; it’s their only foreign policy’, neighbourhood policy is moving to the centre of debate. The present ENP proceeds by means of negotiations between the EU and individual ‘neighbours’, giving flexibility to adjust the rate of ‘Europeanization’ to the ambitions of the two sides. However, some eastern neighbours—such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—would clearly like to move on to become candidates for accession. Ukraine has made some progress towards European standards, despite difficulties stemming from internal divisions in its political institutions, and Moldova is closely watching and trying to copy its example. The ENP has different dynamics with neighbours to the east and those to the south of the EU, and some EU members have suggested that it be divided accordingly, although the individualized nature of the present policy gives no logical reason for such

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68 European Commission (note 63).


72 E.g. the preliminary EU–Ukraine agreements in Oct. 2006 on visa facilitation and readmission is intended to be followed by the same arrangement with Moldova. Ukraine closely monitors developments in the EU–Russian relationship for the same reason.
differentiation. One author has argued (in the context of rethinking enlargement) that an ‘enhanced neighbourhood policy should be tried out first in the east and later applied in the south’.73

By the end of 2006 the EU had agreed ENP action plans with 11 neighbours and the geographical framework (the ‘list of neighbours’) had been consolidated.74 In December 2006 the European Commission put forward proposals for strengthening the ENP by seeking the conclusion of ‘deep and comprehensive’ free trade agreements (first with Ukraine), the facilitation of mobility and managed migration, and financial cooperation.75 Financial assistance will be channelled under the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) starting in 2007.76 The joint management of programmes under the instrument may provide the EU with more transparency and help the EU transfer its know-how to partners.

European security and defence

The failure to create a single staff and budget for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—one consequence of the non-ratification of the 2003 Constitutional Treaty—has exacerbated the long-standing problems of institutional demarcation, bureaucracy and states’ reluctance to cede powers or resources to the EU. The 2003 European Security Strategy has thus far worked poorly in generating coherent responses to specific crises and challenges around the world.77 Lacking progress in its plans to create a 60 000-strong rapid reaction force, the EU continues to rely for the most part on its ‘soft’ policies and diplomacy. The Lebanon crisis in summer 2006, where EU countries made their troop contributions in a UN framework rather than to an EU operation, demonstrated the limits that the EU still faces in the ‘hard’ power context.78 Unsurprisingly, initiatives by German and Polish politicians to revive the idea of a ‘European army’—a German Social Democrat proposal concerning an EU army and Poland’s incoherent suggestions on a 100 000-
strong EU–NATO force—proved to be non-starters.\textsuperscript{79} In contrast, the cases of Iran and North Korea show that the EU states are able to adopt and pursue a concerted stance using their non-military instruments.\textsuperscript{80}

The loss of the Constitutional Treaty also made it hard to focus instruments from different parts of the EU bureaucracy on members’ shared internal security challenges of terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration. The foiled terrorist plot of August 2006 in the UK to blow up civilian airliners, the unprecedented influx of illegal immigrants during the year and flourishing organized crime activities all underlined the need for decisive EU-wide measures—yet many justice and home affairs (JHA) decisions still have to be taken unanimously.\textsuperscript{81} Attempts to allow more policy decisions to be agreed on a majority vote broke down at the informal meeting of JHA ministers at Tampere, Finland, in September. Nevertheless, plans are continuing for the adoption in 2007 of a broad programme leading to the creation of a joint coastal patrol network for the EU countries with coasts and other measures to fight illegal migration and human trafficking.\textsuperscript{82}

As to external operations, crisis management remains the steadily evolving focus of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP’s operative missions remain typically small but are broadening both in functional range and geographical terms (now in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa and Asia). Seven of the eight EU crisis-management operations continuing at the end of 2006 were civilian.\textsuperscript{83}

The Civil–Military Cell in the EU Military Staff officially reached full strength in 2006, although the need was recognized to do more for civil–military coordination.\textsuperscript{84} Progress was made also in the ‘systemic approach’ to capability planning called for by the Headline Goal 2010, adopted in 2004.\textsuperscript{85} Results included the preparation of the Force Catalogue 2006, which assessed EU states’ pledges of forces and capabilities against required capabilities. The


\textsuperscript{80} On both these nuclear-related problems see chapter 12 in this volume.


\textsuperscript{83} The European Council also set up in Apr. 2006 the EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) in preparation for a possible new EU mission in 2007. For full details of EU crisis-management operations in 2006 see appendix 3A in this volume.

\textsuperscript{84} Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy, 2761st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 13–14 Nov. 2006.

catalogue will allow remaining EU shortfalls to be set out in a ‘progress catalogue’, due by the end of 2007.86

The continued migration of project groups of the former European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to more integrated structures associated with the European Defence Agency (EDA) was noteworthy.87 Further steps were taken towards creating a more competitive market for defence commodities in the EU.88 With regard to capabilities, the EDA noted progress in the fields of command and control, strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling.89 In October the EDA presented a document called ‘An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs’ (LTV) to EU defence ministers.90 The aim of the LTV is to help EU defence planners identify and analyse the key trends shaping the future (for up to 20 years ahead) in the light of changes in military technology, the changing roles of armed forces and various other factors (financial, demographic, economic, legal etc.). The key desiderata for EU capabilities are defined as synergy, agility, selectivity and sustainability.91 The EDA’s work programme for 2007 builds in part on the LTV report. Major initiatives include establishing an ESDP capability development programme; developing a defence research and technology strategy to identify key defence technologies and find ways to ‘spend more, spend better and spend more together’; elaborating the characteristics of the European defence technological and industrial base with the aim of increasing interdependence and specialization; and developing a ‘cooperative armaments process’, with initial focus on armoured fighting vehicles and the ‘21st century soldier’ programme.92

Financial constraints limit the EDA’s ambitions. Once again, EU ministers failed in November to agree on the EDA’s three-year financial framework, although they adopted its budget for 2007.93

Battle groups are part of the EU’s rapid response capacity.94 From January 2007 the EU will have the capacity to undertake two ‘nearly simultaneous’

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87 The EDA became operational at the start of Jan. 2005, with the objectives of improving European defence capabilities, bringing about more efficient management of multinational arms cooperation, developing and integrating Europe’s defence markets, and coordinating research and development.
88 For more details see chapter 9 in this volume.
89 The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) consortium was launched on 20 Oct. 2005. It includes 13 EU member states, Canada, Norway and Turkey and remains open to participation by other EU and NATO member states. SALIS is intended to serve as an example of solutions to overlapping capability shortfalls of the EU and NATO. Progress in air-to-air refuelling and strategic airlift was, however, assessed as insufficient owing to the inability of member states to significantly invest in these capabilities. European Defence Agency, ‘Annual report by the Head of the European Defence Agency to the Council’, Brussels, Nov. 2006, URL <http://www.eda.europa.eu/reference/reference.htm>.
battle group-sized operations. The required number of battle group packages for 2007–2009 has been decided, and the EU member states agreed to provide naval ‘enablers’ for the battle groups in the first half of 2007.  

IV. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Since the turn of the century NATO has continued moving away from the territorial defence of Europe towards out-of-area expeditionary tasks, plus limited non-military missions. However, this shift is not equally endorsed by all members, and NATO is still searching for a strategy that would fend off charges of redundancy and consolidate its pertinence in the new, complex security environment. Its members, including the USA, are meanwhile tending to tackle their latest major security challenges outside, not through, the alliance framework. In this light, in order for NATO to preserve its relevance and find a new purpose, transformation has become an imperative. In 2006 Afghanistan, enlargement and transformation were the themes of NATO’s effort to persuade publics and governments on both sides of the Atlantic of its continued pertinence to their security needs.

Out of area: focus on Afghanistan

In 2006 NATO members provided more than 50 000 troops for a range of NATO-led actions that included missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina; training and helping to develop the officer corps in Iraq; supporting the African Union in the Darfur region of Sudan; and conducting counter-terrorism naval patrols in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains NATO’s single largest external engagement and in 2006 became even more of a test case of its credibility and cohesion.

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has operated as a stabilizing presence in Kabul and in the north (the 2004 stage-1 deployment) and west (2005 stage-2 deployment) of the country. As NATO has moved into tougher areas of operation—stage 3 in southern Afghanistan from July 2006 and stage 4 in the east from October—and has taken over some roles from the separate US-led Operation Enduring Freedom counter-insurgency operation, more allies have become reluctant to provide troops at all or to let them move beyond certain areas and duties defined in national...
caveats. The year 2006 began with a difficult debate in the Netherlands over sending 1200 more troops, although the UK committed 4000 at the same time (and more later).99 By September, the Supreme Allied Commander responsible for the operation, General James Jones, assessed that NATO forces were manned at only about 85 per cent of planned levels. During stage 4 some 12,000 US troops were reassigned from Operation Enduring Freedom to NATO command, bringing total allied forces to some 32,000 from 37 countries.100

At the NATO summit meeting at Riga in November 2006 the national caveats were the dominant issue, and significant progress was reported on eliminating or reducing them (especially for emergency situations).101 NATO also announced its intention to start a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan and to transfer responsibility for the country to Afghan security forces by 2008. The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, called for a broader and radical overhaul of military, civilian and development operations in Afghanistan, with the EU playing an expanding and vital role.102 However, as Polish President Lech Kaczyński noted, ‘The summit did not have the character of a major breakthrough’ and the accompanying optimistic declarations about the mission in Afghanistan sounded less than fully convincing.103

**Enlargement**

Given its general political malaise and the burdens of Afghanistan, NATO continued to be unenthusiastic about expansion of the alliance following the latest ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. Albania, Croatia, the FYROM and Georgia met in mid-2006 in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in order to promote their membership aspirations and made clear that they hoped NATO would invite them to negotiate entry at the Riga summit meeting. The USA publicly supported the three Balkan countries, as expected, but went further by advocating the admission of Georgia and Ukraine as well.104 While the Balkan candidates are now participants in NATO’s Membership Action Plan and are formally well on the way to membership, Ukraine was evidently unprepared in political and practical terms for the USA’s proposal, and Georgia remains handicapped by breakaway internal territories and unsettled border disputes. In September

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100 8000 US troops remain active in Operation Enduring Freedom. On ISAF troop numbers and troop-contributing countries in 2006 see appendix 3A in this volume.
the NATO foreign ministers offered Georgia closer relations in the form of ‘intensified dialogue’.\textsuperscript{105}

Despite US support for Ukraine’s participation in the Membership Action Plan and the qualified satisfaction expressed in June by NATO foreign ministers over the NATO–Ukraine intensified dialogue, the latter half of the year saw dwindling hopes for progress in the wake of Ukrainian domestic developments. The final blow came in September when the newly appointed Ukrainian Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, declared that his country was not prepared for the Membership Action Plan and requested a pause in discussions on possible membership.\textsuperscript{106}

In the run-up to the Riga summit meeting, NATO remained reluctant to offer membership of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), including the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, mainly because of the lack of satisfactory collaboration with the ICTY in The Hague. However, at US insistence, NATO reversed its position at the eleventh hour and agreed to invite all the three states to join the EAPC. The decision was officially justified by the desire not to isolate Serbia and its President Boris Tadić before the Serbian parliamentary elections in January 2007. In effect, the USA hoped that the NATO gesture would smooth the way for a compromise on Kosovo.\textsuperscript{107}

At the Riga summit meeting, the NATO member states generally reaffirmed the organization’s ‘open door’ policy for countries that meet NATO standards and indicated that they would extend further invitations at the next meeting in 2008.\textsuperscript{108}

Transformation

Transformation is intended to be the engine for NATO’s change and consolidation. It was planned that the November 2006 Riga summit meeting would provide new guidelines for it, thereby determining what NATO will do, with whom, where and how in the 21st century. However, during the year expectations were toned down and the Riga summit meeting was seen rather as a ‘stepping stone’ to future breakthroughs, probably at NATO’s 60th anniversary meeting in 2009. This slow pace of progress carries some risk that the notion of transformation will be diluted to cover all types of ongoing change. One symptom is provided by the struggle of the Allied Command Transformation network—established after the 2002 Prague summit meeting to lead the

\textsuperscript{105} North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘NATO offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia’, NATO Update, 21 Sep. 2006. URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/>. Russia’ reaction to this was sharp. It denounced NATO’s decision and in the following weeks became embroiled in angry exchanges with Georgia—see section VI below.

\textsuperscript{106} Socor, V., ‘Yanukovych’s nyet to NATO membership; painful, but not the final word’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 Sep. 2006.

\textsuperscript{107} Dempsey, J., ‘NATO to offer Serbia partnership’, International Herald Tribune, 29 Nov. 2006. See also section V below.

\textsuperscript{108} North Atlantic Council (note 101), para. 29.
military transformation of NATO forces and capabilities—to propagate its own vision in NATO.

In mid-2006, De Hoop Scheffer anticipated three ‘baskets’ of results from the Riga summit meeting. The first was to cover operations such as Afghanistan and Kosovo and the second capabilities issues such as the NATO Response Force (NRF), strategic air lift and military spending. The third area for progress was political, including the question of NATO’s partnership frameworks. In addition to strengthening existing links with the EU, the UN and countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Gulf (under the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) and the Mediterranean (under the Mediterranean Dialogue), the USA led the way in proposing that NATO should set up a ‘global partnership’ with interested countries such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan, some of which were already operating with NATO in Afghanistan. The idea was that a new global partnership forum should include like-minded countries with a Western orientation, able to contribute to NATO’s military missions around the world. As noted by an observer, the new forum would differ from the other partnership concepts in that its primary goal would not necessarily be to export democracy to the partnership regions but instead to import new security contributions to NATO. The emphasis on joint responses to new threats might lead to NATO admitting countries with dubious democratic credentials, such as Pakistan. The proposal was viewed by some European countries, particularly Belgium, France and Greece, with suspicion as another variant of the USA’s ‘coalitions of the willing’ concept, potentially weakening NATO as a collective defence organization. It was consequently deferred at the Riga summit meeting, although NATO did agree on practical improvements in consultations with non-NATO troop contributing countries and on a training cooperation initiative to share NATO training expertise with partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The largest policy achievement of the summit meeting was the endorsement at the highest political level of the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) agreed in December 2005 by member states and endorsed by NATO defence ministers in June 2006. The CPG sets out the framework and priorities for all of NATO’s capability goals, planning disciplines and intelligence cooperation for the next 10–15 years. It analyses the range of threats in the probable future security environment and stresses that priority needs to be given to expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them. Generally

111 North Atlantic Council (note 101), para. 17.
Speaking, the CPG supports NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept but does not replace it.\textsuperscript{113} In the area of military transformation, on 29 November the NATO Response Force was declared fully operational. The member states also announced agreement to share the costs of airlift for short-notice deployments of the NRF. The Riga summit meeting endorsed a set of initiatives designed to increase NATO force capacities, covering multinational joint expeditionary operations, strategic airlift, special operations forces, military support to stabilization operations and reconstruction endeavours, sharing information, data and intelligence in allied operations, further progress in the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme, and more.\textsuperscript{114} The first major contract for a NATO ballistic missile defence system was signed during the summit meeting. This followed successful completion of a missile defence feasibility study, which confirmed that territorial missile defence of NATO population centres, forces and territory from the entire range of ballistic missile threats is technically feasible.\textsuperscript{115}

At Riga, US Senator Richard Lugar called for NATO’s role to be extended to the protection of energy security for member states.\textsuperscript{116} This idea was warmly received by the Central and East European members, who feel most vulnerable to disruptions of the flow of oil and gas because of their heavy dependence on Russia. Ultimately, an anodyne statement calling for further study on energy security was placed in one of the last paragraphs of the Riga summit declaration.\textsuperscript{117}

V. The Kosovo issue

The year 2006 was widely expected to be decisive for three key issues in the Western Balkans: the status of Kosovo, the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia, and the relationship between the entities and ethnic communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{118} By the year’s end only the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro has been clarified. On 21 May 2006 Montenegro held a referendum on its independence. The EU had set a 55 per cent threshold for approval of the proposition: in the event a majority of 55.5 per cent voted in favour of independence, and 44.5 per cent against. With 86.5 per cent of the registered electorate voting, the result had substantial legitimacy.\textsuperscript{119} The legal


\textsuperscript{114} North Atlantic Council (note 101), para. 24.


\textsuperscript{117} North Atlantic Council (note 101), para. 45. On energy and security see chapter 6 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{118} This third issue is not discussed in this chapter since there was no significant development in 2006.

\textsuperscript{119} Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Republic of Montenegro referendum on state-status, 21 May 2006’,
break-up of the former Yugoslavia of Josip Tito’s times was thereby completed. Although a part of the Serbian establishment had expected a different outcome, rapid reconciliation between the two newly independent states followed. Tension recurred only when the Prime Minister of Kosovo visited his Montenegrin counterpart.\footnote{Kostunica: Montenegro require to respect Serbia’s sovereignty and integrity—Tadic: unacceptable move by Podgorica, V.I.P. Daily News Report, 6 Nov. 2006, p. 1.} As Montenegro and Serbia had made a mutual commitment to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Serbia’s hostile reaction to Montenegro’s offering such indirect recognition to Kosovo was understandable.

Otherwise, the main developments in 2006 in the Western Balkans were in the negotiations over Kosovo. The position of all parties on the province’s future status became clearer, but there was no international agreement by the end of 2006, partly because the UN’s special envoy for Kosovo—former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari—deferred making his recommendations until 2007 in order not to interfere with the parliamentary elections in Serbia held on 21 January.

The starting positions of the two parties, Serbia and Kosovo, have been clear for a while: Serbia would consider solutions short of independence for Kosovo, whereas the Albanian Kosovars have excluded everything short of independence and sovereignty. Those who uphold Serbia’s territorial integrity and believe that Kosovo should remain a province of Serbia refer to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 passed at the end of hostilities in 1999, which reaffirmed ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.\footnote{UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999, URL <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>. This position is officially reaffirmed in the 2006 Serbian constitution, which makes it an obligation for ‘all state bodies to uphold and protect’ Kosovo’s existing provincial status. An English translation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which was adopted after a referendum on 28–29 Oct. 2006, is available at URL <http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php>.} Those contesting it refer to the right to self-determination of peoples as well as other normative and practical considerations.\footnote{For developments until the end of 2005 see Dunay, P., ‘Status and statehood in the Western Balkans’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (note 14), pp. 63–76.}

The Serbian Government has sought to defer resolving Kosovo’s status for as long as possible, in the hope that the conditions will change in Serbia’s favour (e.g. as a result of violence by the Albanian community). Internally, the status of Kosovo is the only major issue on which the Serbian political class maintains some consensus, although there are differences in the stands of various political actors. The nationalist Serbian Radical Party has vehemently rejected the independence of Kosovo.\footnote{‘If radicals come to power’, V.I.P. Daily News Report, 11 July 2006, p. 4.} The Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, reiterated many times during 2006 that ‘Kosovo always was and always will be part of Serbia’.\footnote{E.g. ‘Serbia’s PM vows to keep Kosovo’, BBC News, 28 June 2006, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/5127464.stm>.} However, Serbian President Tadić has
admitted that Kosovo is already ‘closer to independence than to substantial autonomy’, and after meeting members of the US leadership in September he said he had ‘the impression that the US Administration supports some kind of independence for Kosovo’.

Kosovo for its part continued to give signs that, in spite of all doubts, it could act responsibly as an independent state. This was important given the earlier difficulties encountered by international bodies in seeking improvement in standards of Kosovar behaviour before Kosovo’s status was settled (‘standards before status’). After the eruption of violence in March 2004 it was deemed unwise to defer the discussion on status any longer, and it has been assessed that ‘Kosovo Albanians have been under strict instructions from their political leadership to stay calm. It is argued that this will help ensure early independence.’ Although there have been some violent acts since then, they remained sporadic and limited.

An unresolved concern over potential Kosovo independence is how to provide for the rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo, in the hope that mass exodus from or secession by the Serb-inhabited area can be avoided. Current proposed solutions focus on decentralizing state power and establishing self-governing entities. According to the Serbian foreign minister, Vuk Drašković, adequate decentralization could guarantee that 95 percent of the Kosovo Serbs would live in municipalities with a Serb majority. However, the Serbs in Kosovo remain mistrustful and under heavy international protection, while the Serbian Government claims that two-thirds of Kosovo’s Serbs have been displaced to central Serbia. Talks between the parties in Kosovo on minority protection ended in failure during the summer of 2006, and it remains likely that Kosovan independence would prompt further migration.

The key external actors in deciding Kosovo’s future—the EU, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the Contact Group—look at the issue both against the broader background of stability and prosperity in the Western Balkans and in the light of their positions on other cases involving territorial integrity and the treatment of national minorities. The USA has clearly advocated an early decision on Kosovo’s independence, followed by a much reduced US role in the Western Balkans. Nicholas Burns, US Deputy Secretary of State, declared in December that ‘the Security Council will be requested to adopt a resolution on the status and we wish to see it happen very

128 ‘Draskovic: power to Albanians, integrity to Serbs’, Kosovo Perspectives, no. 32 (15 Dec. 2006), p. 3.
130 The Contact Group consists of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the USA. Representatives of the EU and NATO also attend Contact Group meeting.
soon, let’s say within a month after the [January 2007] vote in Serbia’. One month previously, a US envoy indicated that the decision would be ‘in keeping with the expectations of the majority in Kosovo, because these were the “legitimate aspirations” supported by the U.S.A.’.

While the USA has long held these views, Russia’s stance has evolved dramatically. It was long expected that Russia would be ready to strike a deal with the USA and others over Kosovo in the hope that the West would then accept the secession of the (Russian-backed) provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and Trans-Dniester from Moldova. During 2006, however, it became clear that Western powers were not ready to accept this implied trade-off and would continue to support the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova. This drove Russia back towards its more traditional policy of sympathy and cooperation with Serbia. Russia’s representatives stated on a number of occasions that it might veto a decision in the Security Council ‘if it should estimate that the resolution . . . was not in accordance with international law and Russian interests’, and echoed Serbian arguments by calling for strict adherence (among other things) to UN Security Council Resolution 1244. However, when Ahtisaari put forward his proposal in January 2007, Russia started to change its tone and no longer mentioned an eventual veto on the independence of Kosovo—a hint perhaps of renewed consideration being given to a quid pro quo.

Some EU member states have also taken a broader view: German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that ‘It is important that, on one side, the wish of the Kosovars for more independence be satisfied—but not at the price that we then have troubled situations in Serbia and democracy there is weakened’. While the pro-independence majority in the EU might be able to handle Serbia’s response, the question of precedent is ultimately trickier for other European states that face their own separatist challenges. For example, Spain—which faces such challenges in the Basque Country and Catalonia—is believed to have warned that Kosovo’s independence could encourage other separatist movements in Western Europe and the Balkans. The Spanish minister for the EU also claimed that an independent Kosovo ‘would be con-

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132 ‘Wisner: There will be no more postponements’, Kosovo Perspectives, no. 29 (17 Nov. 2006), p. 3.


trary to what EU aspires to, i.e. creation of multiethnic states’. Romanian President Traian Basescu has said that ‘solutions which grant collective rights to a national minority living on the territory of a sovereign and independent country should not be adopted’.

In the event, Ahtisaari put forward his proposals on Kosovo to the Contact Group in late January 2007 and then presented them to the parties directly involved in Belgrade and Priština in early February. His plan is much closer to the aspirations of Kosovo than those of Serbia. It offers all the main elements of sovereignty to Kosovo without naming it as a sovereign state. Internally, Kosovo is to adopt a constitution, have its own national symbols, and exercise authority with some exceptions over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control. In its external relations Kosovo will have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, and to seek membership of international organizations. Refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo will have the right to return and reclaim their property. This de facto sovereignty will, at least temporarily, be limited by international civilian and military presences, while the EU will establish a rule-of-law mission in Kosovo. Further subtleties of the scenario include the possibility that Kosovo will declare complete independence without, however, rejecting the foreseen international presence and controls.

VI. The former Soviet area: security relations re-energized?

The year 2006 started and ended on the same note for the area of the former Soviet Union: energy issues are assuming a central position, both for the region’s internal dynamics and its relations with the rest of Europe. Aside from this change, other security developments in the region showed a certain continuity.

Russia

In late 2006 a Russian politician offered a story of growing success and self-confidence in Russia’s policy: ‘[Russia] has restored its sovereignty in the Chechen Republic and stopped separatist actions in other regions . . . the country has paid off much of its foreign debt . . . it has diversified its foreign policy and established mutually advantageous cooperation with the leading states of the world, including China and India [and] important measures have

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137 ‘Romania for Kosovo within Serbia’, Kosovo Perspectives, no. 33 (22 Dec. 2006), p. 3.
been taken to strengthen the country’s defense capability’. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, concluded that ‘the role of the Russian factor in international affairs has considerably grown’.

There is also another story to tell. Russia’s recent economic upsurge has been based almost entirely on high oil and gas prices, rather than any general breakthrough in technology and competitiveness, and its (non-nuclear) armed forces continue to struggle with problems of quality and morale. Internationally, the events in Iran, Iraq and Kosovo have shown how hard it is for Russia to achieve more than a moderating or delaying influence over Western initiatives at the UN and elsewhere. Perhaps most decisive for the tone of its external relations, the Russian leadership was increasingly castigated in 2006 for—as US Vice-President Cheney put it—‘seeking to reverse the gains of the last decade’ in democracy building and domestic reform, and for interfering with democratic movements in its neighbourhood. Russian President Vladimir Putin has denied official responsibility for the most glaring occurrences such as the assassination of journalist Anna Politkovskaya in October 2006 and the poisoning of a former Russian agent, Alexander Litvinenko, in November 2006: but Russia’s own investigations of these cases have produced no alternative explanation.

On all such points, President Putin shrugged off criticism and continued to play his cards—strong or weak—with characteristic vigour in 2006. In particular, his government developed the use of energy supply as an explicit weapon of Russian self-interest. The shock of the temporary shut-off of Russian gas supplies to and through Ukraine in January 2006, which caused severe difficulties in Germany and elsewhere, was followed by a similar action against Belarus—hitherto Russia’s closest ally—in January 2007. While the ostensible agenda in each case was to bring neighbouring countries’ payments closer to world prices for oil and gas, there was an undoubted subtext about Russia’s wish to counter Ukraine’s improving relationship with the West, as well as playing on vulnerabilities and divisions in the EU. Even if the EU made a slow and unconvincing start on developing an energy policy—and was open to some criticism on market freedoms—Russia could not expect to emerge from such episodes without its intent and reliability as an energy supplier being questioned. The 2006 summit meeting of the Group of Eight

143 Some countries, notably in Central and Northern Europe, are already highly dependent on Russian oil and gas, and this is only part of the overall problem that within 20 years Europe will be drawing 90% of its energy imports from non-democratic regimes. Rahr, A., ‘Konfuren einer neuen Ostpolitik’ [Contours of a new Ostpolitik], *GUSbarometer*, vol. 12, no. 41 (May 2006), p. 4. See also chapter 6 in this volume.
(G8) industrialized nations, which Russia hosted at St Petersburg, adopted fine-sounding principles on the mutual responsibility of energy producers, consumers and transit countries, and the importance of reliability and security in both demand and supply, but Russia itself evaded any specific new commitments and, notably, refused to ratify the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty. A Russian analyst concluded in December 2006 that ‘Moscow has managed to position itself as part of the energy security problem rather than part of the solution’.

Meanwhile, President Putin intends to use part of Russia’s financial windfall to step up the modernization of its armed forces—which has often been attempted since 1990, but never with such an economic foundation. Government pledges include putting more technologically advanced missiles, long-range aircraft and submarines into service, using fewer conscripts and raising wages, and increasing the number of units that are permanently combat ready. In terms of defence doctrine, Russia is preparing to ‘fight in global, regional and—if necessary—also in several local conflicts’.

Russia’s actions presented a broad set of challenges for Europe in 2006. In reaction to the interruptions to gas supplies to Belarus and Ukraine, and hence to Western Europe through shared pipelines, the EU started its most serious discussions yet on a common energy policy while exposing major divisions between member countries. Russia pressed ahead with the construction of a gas pipeline that would bypass Poland and thus allow Poland’s supplies of Russian gas to be cut off without affecting Germany.

Not surprisingly, political relations between Russia and EU members became chillier in 2006. German Chancellor Merkel proved a tougher counterpart for Russia than her predecessor, and relations with the UK were overshadowed by the Litvinenko affair. In November 2005 Russia banned the import of Polish meat, but this move eventually misfired by provoking Poland to block a new EU–Russia partnership agreement and by making the EU reflect on the need for a tougher stance. Formal EU–Russian accords in


149 It caused some difficulty for Russia to get out of the stalemate. In Jan. 2007 the Russian ambassador to the EU indicated that his country would resume meat import from Poland if experts were satis-
From Belarus to Kyrgyzstan

In the Belarusian presidential election of March 2006, the incumbent, Alexander Lukashenko, won with 83 per cent of the votes and a turnout of 92.9 per cent. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) the conduct of the election ‘failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections’. According to Russia there were ‘all the grounds to believe that the election was held in conformity with generally recognized standards, and the legitimacy of their results evokes no doubt’. In late 2006, however, Russia emerged as a threat to Lukashenko by unilaterally imposing a large increase in prices for oil and gas deliveries to Belarus from January 2007. Belarus retaliated by introducing an oil transit tax, and after a few days—on 10 January—the dispute ended in a compromise. According to one estimate, the new prices could lead to the collapse of one-quarter of all Belarusian companies, and Lukashenko has certainly been given grounds to think twice about his policy of isolation from Europe with strategic cover from Russia alone.

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, also in March 2006, ‘were conducted largely in line with OSCE commitments, Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic elections’. The Party of Regions
gained most votes, further weakening the already embattled pro-reform leadership of President Viktor Yushchenko, and several months were spent on coalition talks that were more about personal status than policy differences.\textsuperscript{156} Another complication was created by constitutional changes that attempted to remove some powers from the president while leaving him in command of the defence and foreign ministries—a system that has already been found ineffective and has reignited constitutional debate.\textsuperscript{157}

Since taking over as Prime Minister, Yushchenko’s more conservative rival Viktor Yanukovich has stated that when foreign policy decisions are made ‘we have to think about preserving the country’s unity’.\textsuperscript{158} He was referring in particular to the issue of NATO accession, which he claims is supported by only one in five Ukrainians. The reduction in Ukraine’s formal relations with NATO is noted above, while EU accession, although far less controversial in Ukraine, would mean surmounting currently impassable practical obstacles.

No other post-Soviet relationship caused so much anxiety in 2006 as that between Georgia and Russia. Long-standing disagreements include that over Russia’s role in the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and trade disputes. In May 2006, Russia added a ban on the import of Georgian mineral water to its 2005 ban on Georgian wine.\textsuperscript{159} In late September, Georgia arrested four Russian soldiers, accusing them of spying. Even though they were handed over to the OSCE in early October for repatriation, Russia imposed punitive sanctions, cutting all air, road, rail, sea and postal communication between the two countries. This was followed by a crackdown on Georgian immigrants in Russia, hundreds of whom were expelled for alleged visa offences, threatening the vital flow of remittances to the Georgian economy.\textsuperscript{160} In November the Russian gas supplier Gazprom announced that it would increase the price of gas supplied to Georgia from $110 to $235 per 1000 cubic metres, close to the price some West European customers pay.\textsuperscript{161} The Georgian President fuelled


\textsuperscript{157} Kozhukhar, I., ‘V Kieve budet dva pravitel'stva i dve oppozitsii’ [There will be two governments and two oppositions in Kyiv], \textit{Nezavisimaya gazeta}, 18 Oct. 2006, p. 6.


the fire in November by accusing Russia of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, these events made it more difficult for the EU or NATO to plan for strengthening their relations with Georgia.

During 2006, a series of referendums were held by the de facto authorities in the disputed province of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Georgia’s break-away territory of South Ossetia and Moldova’s Trans-Dniester region. Even without general international recognition, the majority pro-autonomy votes were a signal of how difficult any eventual solution based on reintegration would be.

Changes in Central Asia in 2006 were limited, although not without long-term significance. In Turkmenistan an opportunity for potential change arose with the death in December of President Saparmurad Niyazov, whose autocratic rule lasted for two decades (i.e. since Soviet times). In Kazakhstan there was some move away from a clearly presidential system—encouragingly, as the result of parliamentary pressure. The lack of parallel progress in Kyrgyzstan, which had already prompted demonstrations in February 2005, led to a new wave of demonstrations against President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his advisors in November 2006 and this time did result in constitutional change. Presidential powers were curtailed and those of the government and the parliament increased. However, in January 2007 the President signed a new constitution that restored some of these powers. This indicates a stalemate, with the prospect of future instability in Kyrgyzstan.


163 With the notable exception of Cyprus, the EU and NATO have expected candidate countries to solve any outstanding conflicts that may threaten security before membership is granted.


VII. Conclusions

The events of 11 September 2001 changed the focus of the Western world’s security concerns, as the strategic ambiguity prevailing since the end of the cold war gave way to the imperative of fighting terrorism. Since then there has been a basic continuity in Western mainstream analysis, as evidenced by the US Administration’s new strategic documents. The largest ongoing military operation, the fight against insurgency in Iraq, seems bound to create a lasting liability for the international community. It may soon become clearer that it is in the best interests of the campaign against terrorism to keep its major strands separate from the issues at stake in Iraq, rather than link them as closely as President Bush is still inclined to do.

Although transatlantic relations improved somewhat during 2006, the two main Euro-Atlantic security institutions remain in transition, still seeking ways to prove their respective relevance to the main new challenges. The European Union’s foreign and security policies will remain handicapped for some time by the Union’s constitutional crisis and, perhaps even more seriously, by enlargement fatigue. NATO has not done much better so far with its long-advertised transformation process. The continuing moderation of NATO’s ambitions in 2006 suggests that NATO will continue to experience something of an interlude rather than a transformational breakthrough. Meanwhile, the fact that neither institution has reached a consensual ‘grand vision’ on global and European security also hinders closer EU–NATO cooperation.

Efforts to establish a lasting state structure in the Western Balkans continue to advance slowly with the separation of Serbia and Montenegro and the prospect of a new status for Kosovo. Kosovo also stands as a reminder that, despite newer agendas, ethnic composition and population trends can still influence international security. In the shorter term the focus will shift to Serbia’s ability to make a productive adjustment, both internally and externally, to the emerging new realities.

Russia has recently modified the international security paradigm by reviving the perception that the security of oil and gas supply is a major strategic issue. Initial responses in the West risked a possible breakdown of European solidarity. During 2006, however, European states have at least accepted in principle the need to effectively coordinate their positions on this matter. It is possible that other aspects of Russia’s current propensity for coming into collision with (most of) the Euro-Atlantic community might similarly bring West European actors closer to each other. From Russia’s point of view, it has been using its new oil riches to recreate its pride, restore influence and maximize its power. It remains to be seen whether Russia’s assumptions about its own relative independence of others’ goodwill in the process make sense for the longer term. As long as the present course lasts, one consequence is the emergence of a—still not geographically precise—‘soft division’ between the new expanded West and the under-reformed, less integrated parts of Eastern Europe.