4. Regional security cooperation in the early 21st century

ALYSON J. K. BAILES and ANDREW COTTEY

I. Introduction

Since 1945, especially since the 1990s, regionalism and regional cooperation have been growing features of world politics. In the decades after World War II, the cold war and decolonization resulted in the establishment of multilateral regional organizations across the world, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the predecessors of what is today the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU, the predecessor of the African Union, AU), the Arab League and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (A list of these and other regional organizations is presented in table 4.1.) In the 1990s the end of the cold war and the advance of globalization triggered the so-called new regionalism, with the establishment of a number of regional cooperation frameworks, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, as well as efforts to rejuvenate and strengthen existing regional institutions and the creation of several sub-regional ones in Europe and Africa.

Security cooperation has been an important part of this wider phenomenon. Some institutions, such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), are explicitly and primarily security organizations. Most of the general-purpose regional organizations—such as the Arab League, the AU and the OAS—have significant security dimensions, as do a number of other smaller regional (or sub-regional) groups—such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Many regional and sub-regional organizations bridge the gap between traditional definitions of security and wider concepts of security involving democracy, human rights, and economic and environmental issues. Although many regional institutions are primarily economic and have no explicit or direct security role, even these are often implicitly designed to promote stability, conflict avoidance and the collective viability of their communities—important factors for security—by encouraging integration among their members. This was most obvious in the early development of European integration but is arguably also the case today in institutions such as APEC and the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market).

Despite this trend towards regional security cooperation, there has been surprisingly little theoretically informed comparative analysis of the phenom-
Table 4.1. Regional organizations and groups with security functions

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year founded</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Website URL</th>
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<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>57&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Lists of members and further details of these organizations are given in the glossary in this volume.
There is a growing body of literature on the general phenomenon of regionalism in world politics, particularly the ‘new regionalism’ that has emerged since the 1990s. However, this literature has primarily an international political economy perspective, reflecting not only the fact that many of the new regional institutions are economic in nature but also an assumption that economic factors are the main drivers behind the new regionalism. This chapter addresses the gap in the literature by providing a generic framework for analysing regional security cooperation as an aspect of global, interstate and (where appropriate) intra-state security governance in the conditions of the first decade of the 21st century.

Section II of this chapter addresses the issue of what defines a region, while section III reviews conceptual models of regional security cooperation, drawing on recent and contemporary history. Section IV examines emerging patterns of regional security cooperation since the 1990s, offering a new categorization of the direct and indirect security functions that regional organizations and cooperation processes fulfil. Section V discusses, and advocates further research on, the dos and don’ts for making regional cooperation benign yet effective in security terms and the conditions that promote or obstruct it in particular regions. The conclusions are presented in section VI.

II. Regions, regionalism and security

Both ‘region’ and ‘security’ are widely used but vague and contested terms. In world politics the term region has become most closely associated with the different continents of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Oceania and Europe. Subcontinents (e.g., South Asia) and the areas surrounding seas (e.g., the Baltic and the Caspian seas) are sometimes also referred to as regions. An additional distinction may be drawn between regions and sub-regions, with the latter understood as geographically distinct sub-areas of continents, although the two terms are often used interchangeably and the difference between them is sometimes blurred.

Geography alone, however, does not define regions in world politics. Regions are political and imagined constructs just as nations are: they are shaped both by local countries’ concepts of identity and connections and by

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the way outsiders view and react to them—\textit{vide} the use of the names Near East and Far East at a time when Eurocentric imperialist visions were dominant. The recognition or willed construction of regional and sub-regional systems, interstate groupings and organizations is similarly driven by historical and cultural factors and by a range of subjective perceptions and preferences as much as by any objective logic. Regions can be ‘made’ as part of a conscious policy programme, as happened with European integration in the 1950s, and as some observers see happening now in regions like Latin America and East Asia in an effort to balance potential US hegemony.\footnote{The USA was deliberately not invited to the new East Asian Summit meeting in Dec. 2005. McGregor, R., Mallet, V. and Burton, J., ‘A new sphere of influence: how trade clout is winning China allies yet stoking distrust’, \textit{Financial Times}, 9 Dec. 2005, p. 11.} A similar interplay of motives determines the definition and the aspects of security that a given set of countries will select for their activities. All these explanations are needed to understand why real-life regional ventures sometimes leave out countries that seem geographically to belong to the region or take in additional countries; why several security-related groups with different memberships and agendas can coexist on the same territory; why sub-regional groups form in some regions but not others and often lack an obvious geographical basis; and why a region as defined in security terms may not have the same boundaries as it does for economic, climatic, cultural or other purposes. This chapter’s subject of study is necessarily those regions and sub-regions that governments have created and deemed to exist and which can directly or indirectly shape security-related policy.

III. Conceptualizing regional security cooperation

How can regional security cooperation be conceptualized and understood? At least four models of regional security cooperation have prima facie relevance for the 21st century: alliances, collective security, security regimes and security communities.

\textit{Alliances} are one of the oldest forms of international cooperation, designed for both defence and attack (typically by military means) against a common external, or even internal, threat or opponent. They use cooperation as a means to an end rather than a good in itself, and an alliance’s membership necessarily excludes the enemy. These relatively zero-sum characteristics are matched by the often negative practical impacts of the alliance method on international security: even a purely defensive alliance may heighten its members’ threat consciousness more than it eases it, may exacerbate tensions and entrench dividing lines, and may take part in competitive arms acquisition. Alliances that turn on internal enemies (whether aberrant states or religious or ethnic groups) can also radicalize the latter and encourage them to seek external backers. On the other hand, an alliance should at least reduce the likelihood of war between its members by promoting confidence, encouraging dispute avoidance and resolution, and perhaps triggering cooperation in other non-
security areas. Both ASEAN and NATO may be seen as examples of this type of dynamic. Despite the ending of the classic East–West confrontation in 1989–90, NATO and (albeit much less intensely) a number of other groupings continue to fulfil at least some of the roles associated with alliances.

The concept of collective security emerged in the 20th century in response to the ambivalent effects of older-style balance-of-power politics and alliances. First attempted in the framework of the League of Nations and again in the United Nations (UN), a collective security system aims to prevent or contain war by assuring a response to any act of aggression or threat to peace among its members. To work as intended, any such system must include all states in a region or the world, and it directs its attention inwardly at their actions. Apart from the global UN, some larger regional entities—such as the AU, the OAS and the OSCE—may be viewed as institutions that explicitly or implicitly aim at, and at least partially produce, collective security. Notoriously, however, no such system has ever been made to work perfectly because of the evident problem—which is more difficult the larger the membership—of arriving at a common judgement and common will to act against offenders. Experience shows that the approach works well when there is consensus among the major powers but fails when faced with the largest dangers, including when the major powers come into conflict. The lessons here may indicate some limiting factors for the security aspirations of regional groups as well.

A third type of regional security cooperation is a security regime. Regimes are a common phenomenon in such non-security dimensions of international relations as the regulation of international trade and transport. They define norms—of a cooperative and generally positive nature—for states’ behaviour and often provide ways to implement, support and verify these norms. A security-related regime may cover broad prescripts for behaviour such as the non-use of force and respect for existing international borders, or may more concretely regulate certain types and uses of weapons or activities like military movements and transparency. Several regional constructs, notably the OSCE and some Latin American initiatives, may be understood as security regimes, as may regional arms control measures such as nuclear weapon-free zones or the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The value of all such constructs depends on how well their norms are respected, and there is much debate on what features—in terms of internal power patterns, institutionalization, incentives and penalties—are needed to ensure observance. It should be noted that regimes with functional security goals may not need, or lend themselves to, a geographically contiguous membership. Indeed, some

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5 For details see the subsection on ‘Security dialogue and conflict management’ in section IV below.
would argue that using limited groups to handle tasks like export control has zero-sum overtones and that certain regimes work best when fully global.  

A security community has been defined as a group of states among which there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’. The concept was developed by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s to reflect the particularly far-reaching goals of post-World War II European integration, which in turn placed Europe in a larger security community of the world’s industrialized democracies. A security community implies more intense, sustained and comprehensive interaction than any of the above models. Starting by removing the risk of conflict within the group, it can develop strengths that are greater than the sum of its parts for security tasks going well beyond the prevention of specific ills. Ambitions to build such communities have recently been displayed also in several non-European regions, but the nature and effects of regional integration in the security domain remain poorly understood. The EU experiment has eliminated conflict between but not within its states (vide Northern Ireland and the Basque region). The tendency of security communities to weaken internal frontiers potentially means that they can be more quickly affected by ‘transnational’ threats (e.g., terrorism, criminal traffic and disease). Their open-ended agendas tend to lead them to confront new security challenges as soon as old ones are settled and, in particular, to feel an impulse to start ‘exporting’ their surplus of security to others, notably in the form of peace missions (on which more below).

These four models can help in understanding the nature of, prospects for and limitations of particular forms of regional security cooperation; but they use a language that is rare today in the actual public discourse or decision making of the regions concerned. They also suffer from being relatively static, revealing little about why regional groups change their membership or agenda and why they may mutate from one form to another. Various alternative ways of categorizing regional structures could be mooted, for example in terms of their institutional or governance characteristics (i.e., their degree of institutionalization, the nature of any fixed decision-making procedures, their collective organs and funds, the depth of involvement of non-state and local actors, and so on). This would not, however, directly lead to judgements on security utility since experience shows that different institutional forms can be appropriate for different types of security task in different environments. For instance, when several security institutions exist in the same region, this could be because states prefer to address various aspects of security in a variety of procedural styles. The most straightforward way to approach a new understanding of regional groups is through the functions they perform in terms of security as such.

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8 See chapter 16 in this volume.
10 On institutional change and ‘drift’ see the Introduction to this volume.
IV. New patterns of regional security cooperation

This section examines the emerging patterns and functions of regional security cooperation as they have evolved since the 1990s. It proposes a four-way (but not exhaustive) generic framework for understanding contemporary regional security cooperation: security dialogue and conflict management, new forms of military cooperation, democracy and human rights, and economic integration and the wider non-military security agenda. Since the section looks for evidence of regional contributions wherever they can be found, it may seem to present an over-positive balance, but this has been done consciously in order to offset a more usual analytical tendency (both within and outside the most integrated regions) to see the glass as half empty. It can also be argued that some achievements of regional cooperation are ignored because of the difficulty of proving a negative (e.g., that conflicts would have been worse otherwise).

Security dialogue and conflict management

At the most basic level, regional security institutions serve as frameworks for communication and dialogue among their members. Regular meetings of heads of state or government, ministers and lower-level officials, and the military arguably help to build trust between states, avoid miscommunication, resolve disagreements and develop a sense of common interests and identity. The EU and its predecessors have done much to overcome historic patterns of enmity between the countries of Western Europe, especially France and Germany; and founding of MERCOSUR in Latin America in 1991 has had a similar role in reinforcing the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil that has existed since the 1980s. Analysis of the cause–effect cycle between institutions and changed relationships is, however, disputed and problematic: it may be argued that the conflict resolution is as much a facilitating factor as a consequence of regional cooperation.11

Since the 1990s there have been significant efforts to extend (geographically) the pacifying effect of long-standing regional security frameworks, in particular in Europe and Asia. In Europe, the enlargement of the EU and NATO has been based in significant part on the view that their success in contributing to the emergence of a security community in Western Europe can now be extended to Central and Eastern Europe. The EU and NATO are now seen as doing for Germany and Poland or Hungary and Romania, among others, what they did for Franco-German rapprochement in the 1950s and 1960s (and in avoiding open war between Greece and Turkey). During the 1990s the EU and NATO made accession conditional in effect on candidates’ resolving conflicts with neighbouring states, thus encouraging governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe to conclude treaties reaffirming exist-

ing borders and guaranteeing ethnic minority rights and to establish new forms of cooperation such as joint peacekeeping forces and cross-border economic zones. Following the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargements of the EU and NATO, the two institutions now face the perhaps even more difficult challenge of extending their integrative model to the Western Balkans. In the 1990s ASEAN followed a somewhat similar enlargement process: between 1995 and 1999 taking in Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam and, controversially, Myanmar. As part of this enlargement process, all four countries signed ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which commits signatories to prevent disputes from arising and to renounce the threat or use of force to resolve disagreements. Parallel to this, the ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1994 as a means of promoting dialogue with ASEAN’s neighbours in the wider Asia–Pacific region. Since then the ARF has become an established feature of the region’s international politics. Most recently, China signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003—an arguably important achievement for ASEAN and the ARF given unresolved disputes between China and ASEAN members over the South China Sea.

A number of regional organizations have developed more explicit and formal mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts among their members. Since the end of the cold war, for example, the OSCE has developed semi-permanent missions and the use of special envoys in areas of actual or potential conflict and has used the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to help prevent and resolve conflicts relating to ethnic minorities. Similarly, the African Union has established new mechanisms for conflict management: the AU Commission includes a Commissioner for Peace and Security, a Peace and Security Directorate (incorporating a Conflict Management Centre) and an Early Warning System, and is supported by a Panel of the Wise (composed of five ‘highly respected African personalities’) tasked to provide advice and support. Since it was established in 2002, the AU has engaged in a number of political mediation missions for internal conflicts in member states (in the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Somalia and Sudan). The OAS has its own Office for the Prevention

12 On recent and future developments in the Western Balkans see appendix 1A in this volume.
15 Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s the OAS expanded by accepting a number of Caribbean countries and Canada; its 35 members (of which, Cuba is suspended from participation) now include all independent states of the Americas. Organization of American States, ‘The OAS and the inter-American system’, 2005, URL <http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/oasinbrief.asp>.
and Resolution of Conflicts for the design and implementation of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms.\textsuperscript{17}

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the most developed example of a regional construct that goes beyond internal peace goals to use collective modes of action externally, designed \textit{inter alia} to help avoid and manage conflicts beyond the EU’s borders. While the EU has had its well-known failures and setbacks, including those in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia on its own doorstep in the 1990s, the trend has been for a steadily growing ambition, reach and diversity of the CFSP and, since 2000, its military instrument, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Other institutions, such as ASEAN and MERCOSUR, include elements of common policies towards their wider regions, an example being ASEAN’s leadership role in the ARF and its dialogue with large neighbours like China. However, none has gone as far as the EU in attempting to develop a wider common foreign and security policy. For the moment, the strongest dynamics in regions other than Europe seem to run either towards the better projection of shared regional interests in world economic and functional negotiations (e.g., talks in the World Trade Organization) or towards fending off unwanted external security influences by gaining better control of the region’s own internal weaknesses.

\textbf{New forms of military cooperation}

Regionally based military cooperation has historically focused on either cooperation driven by and directed against (perceived) external enemies or efforts to contain the risks of such confrontation through regional arms control agreements and military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The best-developed set of CSBMs are those concluded in the frameworks of the OSCE and its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), since the 1970s,\textsuperscript{18} the CFE Treaty, and the nuclear weapon-free zones agreed in various regions of the world. More recently, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have concluded a set of agreements limiting their deployment of military forces in mutual frontier zones.\textsuperscript{19} Other regional organizations, such as the OAS, have engaged in more limited discussions on arms control, CSBMs and military transparency. Overall, however, regional arms control and CSBMs are far from having been explored to their full potential.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{20} See chapter 15 in this volume.
Since the early 1990s new patterns and forms of regional military cooperation have begun to emerge in most parts of the world. Primary examples include NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), the EU’s ESDP and the AU’s Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). These ventures are generally inclusive rather than exclusive, seeking to engage most or all states in a region rather than being directed against particular states. They are process-oriented and open-ended, emphasizing active military dialogue and cooperation in contrast to the traditional arms control methods of abstinence and formal constraints. They have the flexibility to address a range of practical military challenges such as reforming armed forces, peacekeeping and support for humanitarian relief work. Their methods can be characterized as ‘defence diplomacy’: multilateral and bilateral dialogue among defence ministries and armed forces aiming to foster confidence and transparency, as well as helping partners with concrete challenges such as downsizing armed forces and establishing democratic, civilian control of militaries.21 The archetypal example, NATO’s PFP (established in 1994), has at the same time been the central vehicle for helping to prepare applicant states for NATO membership. Similar, although less extensive and developed, cooperation frameworks have emerged in other regions. Since the mid-1990s defence ministers from the Americas have met biennially to discuss common challenges, although this forum has not resulted in much grassroots military cooperation. In the Asia–Pacific region, bilateral military ties (notably with the USA) remain strong, but states were until quite recently reluctant to engage in region-wide defence dialogue or cooperation. The Shangri-La Dialogue, established by the non-governmental International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2002, was the first framework that brought together defence ministers and senior military leaders from across Asia and the Pacific.22 Since then, the ARF has begun, albeit cautiously, to develop limited military dialogue and cooperation.23

Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and, more controversially, peace enforcement have been a key functional focus of much of the new regional military cooperation.24 As documented in the SIPRI Yearbook, both NATO and the EU (through the ESDP) have evolved since the cold war into providers of a variety of types of crisis intervention worldwide. They both have mechanisms to allow non-members to join in the coalitions of member states set up for each operation.25 Peacekeeping has also been undertaken by African sub-regional groups, in particular ECOWAS, and was defined from the start as a core role of the AU. In a significant break with the OAU’s previous emphasis

25 See chapters 1 and 3 in this volume.
on state sovereignty, the AU’s Constitutive Act establishes ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State . . . in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.26 A key goal of the AU’s CADSP is the establishment of an African Standby Force of 20,000 military, police and civilian personnel, based on five brigades to be provided by each of the continent’s five sub-regions.27 The AU undertook its first peacekeeping missions in Burundi in 2003–2004 (where an AU mission preceded the deployment of a larger UN force) and in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2004. These experiences have highlighted the AU’s capacity problems (also in the non-military dimensions) and strong dependence on outside support.28 There have also been steps towards regional cooperation in peacekeeping in other areas of the world, although thus far these are less developed: for instance, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti has since 2004 been viewed as a model for a regionally led UN peacekeeping operation, with Latin American states providing the majority of forces under Brazilian leadership. In Central America, common problems with drug trafficking, criminal gangs and natural disasters led in mid-2005 to a proposal from the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua to establish a regional military force—although critics argue that this risks turning into an overly militarized and US-dominated approach to these challenges.29

Democracy and human rights

Democracy and human rights have increasingly come to be viewed as part of the security agenda. There is evidence (although it is not uncontested) to support the hypothesis that war is rare, perhaps even non-existent, between democracies—even though transitional, ‘democratizing’ states may, at least in some circumstances, be more prone to involvement in international and civil wars.30 Democracies are also less prone than authoritarian regimes to engage in genocide or other forms of mass violence against their own citizens.31 These links between governance and security are gaining in significance with the wider acceptance of definitions of human security, which see human rights

28 On peacekeeping and peace-building missions in Africa see chapter 3 in this volume.
abuses as major threats to the latter. Furthermore, the dramatic global extension of democracy to many previously authoritarian states since the 1970s has given credibility to the idea of a global community of democracies, within which regional organizations may play a natural role in promoting and protecting good governance and human rights among states with comparable cultures and histories.

The longest history of regional organizations designed to support democracy and human rights is in Europe. The central mission of the Council of Europe is to support democracy and human rights. Through its Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, European Court of Human Rights and various legally binding conventions (most prominently the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights), the Council of Europe plays an important role in setting standards for human rights and democracy for its members, monitoring whether member states are living up to those standards and putting political pressure on states that may have breached them. Since it started in the 1950s, the European integration process that evolved into today’s EU has also made democracy a prerequisite for membership. The creation of NATO had explicit democratizing motives vis-à-vis states like Germany and Italy, although the exigencies of the cold war made the alliance willing to tolerate authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal and Turkey at various times. In the 1970s, human rights were included as one of the three ‘baskets’ of issues addressed by the CSCE, alongside military CSBMs and scientific and technological cooperation.

Since the end of the cold war, all these European organizations have directed considerable effort to promoting democracy and human rights beyond their own borders. The Council of Europe, the EU and NATO have extended their membership to include Central and East European and Mediterranean states. The EU and NATO actively supported both acceding and other neighbour states in transforming post-communist political and bureaucratic structures. The leverage of the EU and NATO has arguably played a central role in underpinning democratic consolidation as well as peace in the territory from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Both organizations now face the even more daunting task of extending this model to the post-conflict Western Balkans, where the legacy of the wars of the 1990s poses major challenges for democratization. The Council of Europe and the CSCE/OSCE have also played important roles in promoting democracy and human rights in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by establishing basic normative standards in this area, monitoring elections and providing advice and technical

33 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was opened for signature by the member states of the Council of Europe on 4 Nov. 1950 and entered into force on 3 Sep. 1953. The text of the convention is available at URL <http://conventions.coe.int/>.
34 See appendix 1A in this volume.
assistance to states. Developments since the 1990s have also highlighted the limits of these regional organizations, with states such as Belarus and Uzbekistan (both members of the OSCE, but neither a member of the Council of Europe) still violating basic democratic and human rights norms and ignoring criticisms from all European sources. Moreover, it is arguable that certain aspects of the Western powers’ policy—notably, their insistence on stronger national and group measures against terrorism since the events of 11 September 2001—have encouraged or at least provided fresh excuses for antidemocratic excesses in the field of internal security, both in Europe’s neighbouring regions and elsewhere.

In the Americas the democratic transitions which many South and Central American states underwent in the 1980s created new momentum for using the OAS as a means of consolidating democracy across the region. The OAS’s 1948 Charter includes the goal of promoting and consolidating democracy, and the separate Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights did valuable work, for example, in Peru. However, in practice the prevalence of authoritarian regimes across South and Central America and US willingness to support those regimes as bulwarks against Communism meant that the OAS as such played little role in this area until the 1990s. In 1990 the OAS created its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to provide advice and technical assistance to member states, and in 1991 it adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, reaffirming the OAS’s commitment to the ‘defense and promotion of representative democracy and human rights’ and created procedures for responding to ‘sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power’. On the basis of the Santiago Commitment, the OAS responded to threats to the democratic regimes in Guatemala, Haiti and Peru in the early and mid-1990s by mobilizing various forms of political and economic pressure against democratic backsliding—with some success in Guatemala and Peru, although it failed to prevent the effective collapse of the Haitian state.

35 The CSCE expanded its members’ existing human rights commitments to include democracy and free elections in its 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and has established a number of institutions to promote democracy and human rights, in particular its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and, since 1997, its Representative on the Freedom of the Media. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris Summit, 21 Nov. 1990, URL <http://www.osce.org/item/16336.html>.

36 See the Introduction to this volume. For further examples of the tension between anti-terrorist rigour and positive goals in regional security see, e.g., Rosas (note 2); and Dwan, R. and Holmqvist, C., ‘Major armed conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (note 2), pp. 83–120.

37 The Charter of the Organization of American States was signed on 30 Apr. 1948 and came into effect on 13 Dec. 1951. The text is available at URL <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html>.


The challenges that the OAS still faces in the domain of democratization are illustrated by Cuba and Venezuela. Cuba is now the only clearly undemocratic state in the Americas and, while still a member of the OAS, has been excluded from participation since 1962. The USA wishes to use the OAS to put further pressure on Cuba, but many South and Central American states—wary of what they view as US neo-imperialism—argue that the best way to encourage liberalization in Cuba is through constructive engagement. As a consequence, the OAS has been unable to agree a common approach towards Cuba. Similarly, many in the USA view Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ as a dangerously populist threat to democracy and free enterprise. However, Chavez has confirmed the strength of his domestic support (notably in presidential elections of 1998 and 2000 and referendums of 2004), and indications that the USA supported a 2002 coup attempt against Chavez have reinforced perceptions elsewhere in the Americas that the USA may be more interested in defending its economic interests than the cause of democracy. As a consequence, the OAS has also been divided over Venezuela, although the OAS Secretary General has played a role in trying to encourage moderation from both Chavez and his right-wing opponents. These cases highlight tension over the USA’s hegemonic role in the region as one factor complicating the OAS’s efforts for democracy: another problem is the continuing high degree of economic inequality in South and Central America.

The promotion of democracy and human rights is also viewed as a central role for the more recently established African Union. In contrast to its non-interventionist predecessor, the OAU, the AU’s goals as defined by its 2000 Constitutive Act include the promotion of ‘democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’ and ‘human and peoples’ rights’. Governments which ‘come to power through unconstitutional means’ will be suspended from participation in the AU’s activities. The AU Peace and Security Council, a key decision-making body, is mandated to ‘institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place’. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights can also issue comments and advice (albeit without enforcement capacity) on abuses found in such states as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and on generic issues such as avoiding damage to human rights through counter-terrorism policy. Against this background, the AU has mobilized political pressure in order to


41 Constitutive Act of the African Union (note 26), Article 3.

42 Constitutive Act of the African Union (note 26), Article 30.

43 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (note 16), Article 7(1)(g).
counter, for example, a coup in Mauritania.\(^{44}\) The states thus targeted have, however, been small ones, while larger AU members have found ways to escape censure. The AU has been reluctant to criticize the Sudanese Government over human rights abuses in Darfur and has been reticent about what some see as a worrying drift towards authoritarianism in Ethiopia—all the more problematic since the AU’s headquarters is in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Most prominently, Zimbabwe’s increasingly authoritarian leader, President Robert Mugabe, has long been able to portray himself as an African nationalist resisting Western neo-imperialism and thus to escape significant pressure from the AU over his regime’s human rights abuses.\(^{45}\) How far the relatively young AU can extend its role in promoting and protecting democracy and human rights remains to be seen.

In contrast to Africa, the Americas and Europe, the states of Asia and the Middle East remain reluctant to give regional organizations any role in relation to democracy and human rights. ASEAN has been inhibited by the Asian historical and cultural preference for non-interference in neighbours’ internal affairs, which in turn is explained partly by concerns about avoiding interstate conflict. Despite democratization in some states (most prominently Indonesia since 1998), ASEAN members still argue that the principle of non-interference has served the region well and should not be abandoned. Moreover, ASEAN’s four most recent members—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam—all have undemocratic regimes, and some critics see their entry as a strategic mistake that has significantly weakened the organization.\(^ {46}\) Beyond ASEAN, China’s Communist regime would presumably resist any efforts to give pan-Asian institutions such as the ARF or APEC any democracy-promoting or human rights functions.

The situation in the Middle East is even starker, with Israel being the region’s only democracy (although Iran arguably underwent a partial, albeit limited, democratic transition in the 1990s and some would hope that a democracy may yet emerge from the current chaos in Iraq). So long as their key members remain authoritarian states, it is difficult to conceive of the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council adopting any role in relation to democracy and human rights. Since the 2003 Iraq War, the administration of US

\(^{44}\) The AU’s approach is complicated by the apparent popular welcome for the new military regime. Mauritania will remain suspended from the AU until elections are held. ‘Envoys snub ex-Mauritanian leader’, BBC News Online, 10 Aug. 2005, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/4137434.stm>.


President George W. Bush has made the promotion of democracy one of its key long-term objectives for the Middle East, institutionalizing this through the Middle East Partnership Initiative. However, this remains an essentially external effort, to which Middle Eastern states have at best reluctantly acquiesced. The larger lesson from Asia and the Middle East is that, in the absence of a significant core of democratic states willing to use regional frameworks to promote democracy and human rights, the role of such institutions in this area is likely to remain limited.

**Economic integration and the wider security agenda**

Many of the new or reinvigorated regional institutions that have emerged since the early 1990s are primarily economic in character. Regional economic cooperation and integration can, however, be regarded as having important security dimensions or implications. Economic cooperation and integration may be driven by the desire to reduce the likelihood of political or military conflict between the states involved: economic interdependence between states, it is argued, increases the costs of using force and creates shared interests. This logic was one of the driving forces behind the early post-World War II process of European integration, and similar dynamics are arguably at work in APEC, ASEAN and MERCOSUR. Much of the economic regionalism of the past two decades can also be seen as a self-protecting response—with security overtones—to economic globalization: by working together in regional groups, states can help to protect markets and industries in their region, increase their competitiveness in the global economy and strengthen their hand in global economic forums (such as the World Trade Organization). Regionalism is thus intimately linked with the wider debate on globalization and neo-liberal economics. Analysts draw a distinction between open and closed economic regionalism, with the first being essentially compatible with the liberalization of trade and finance and the latter representing an alternative model that limits the free flow of trade and finance. This debate can also be translated into terms of ‘economic security’, which on one view benefits from market-driven economic growth but on the opposite view suffers from the damage done by competition to state solvency, employment, social security safety nets and so on. It can also be argued that the more complex international interdependence and longer supply chains fostered by globalization increase states’ vulnerability to security setbacks not just on their own territories but also on those of suppliers and transit states. This is a problem most often ‘securitized’ in the context of energy supplies, but relevant in several other dimensions as well. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address this debate, it is clear that regional institutions are a significant part of the larger question of global economic security.

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Beyond economics, regional organizations have also been one of the main institutional frameworks in which the idea of a wider security agenda—beyond traditional political military security—has been pursued. A number of organizations have explicitly adopted concepts of comprehensive security. This development has probably proceeded furthest in Europe, where the OSCE’s common and comprehensive concept of security was developed during the 1990s to incorporate economics and environmental issues alongside traditional political military security concerns and democracy and human rights.49 A number of European sub-regional groups, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, have also adopted broad approaches to security, seeking to respond to cross-border problems such as environmental degradation and pollution and transnational organized crime.50 Non-European groups have carried cooperation into novel fields that are particularly relevant for their regions, such as the Kimberley Process set up in response to the problem of ‘conflict diamonds’ in Africa,51 ASEAN’s anti-piracy measures,52 the proposed new tsunami warning network for the Indian Ocean region and the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, launched in July 2005 under US leadership.53 Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, there has been a parallel trend in all major regional groups to develop common initiatives against non-state threats—most obviously terrorism, but also the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated materials and technologies, crime and drugs trafficking. Such efforts have been boosted by patent threats in the regions themselves, such as the March 2004 Madrid and July 2005 London bombings in Europe or the October 2002 Bali bombings in Asia, but also by the wish to support US endeavours or the global efforts embodied in UN Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540.54 The EU, with its legislative powers and central resources, has gone particularly far and fast in elaborating such non-military security policies.55 New policy frameworks in this field have, however, also been adopted by APEC, ASEAN, the Collective Security

Treaty Organization (CSTO), MERCOSUR, the OAS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others. The nature of the problems being tackled in all these cases is such that, with the best political will, even the strongest states are only starting to devise cooperative methods that can make a meaningful impact on them. Yet systematic international cooperation is the logical response to truly transnational threats and also has the potential to speed up global responses (e.g., to an epidemic or sudden environmental challenge) by reducing the number of ‘addresses’ involved in coordination. This looks set to be a significant growth area for regional endeavours in the future.

The US dimension

As the world’s only superpower, the USA plays a central role in shaping the security dynamics of all regions of the world and is a leading member of many regional security institutions, including NAFTA and the OAS in the Americas, NATO and the OSCE in Europe, and APEC and the ARF in Asia. Indeed, the global character of US power means that it may be seen today as a power of all regions and none. The USA continues to have formal defence and security commitments in Europe, through NATO, and in the Asia–Pacific region, through its commitments notably to Japan and South Korea, its policies on Taiwan and various troop stationing arrangements. The five regional commands of the USA’s own forces, covering Europe (and Africa), the broader Middle East, the Asia–Pacific region, South America and North America, all maintain extensive bilateral and multilateral military ties in their regions. In these and other contexts the USA has developed military outreach activities aimed at more inclusive multilateral regional cooperation. It has established a series of regional security studies centres that train military and civilian defence personnel and act as forums for defence dialogue. Similarly, the US regional military commands sponsor region-wide multilateral military exercises in areas such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.


58 These centres are the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, based near Munich; the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, based in Honolulu; and the Center for Hemisphere Defense Studies, the African Center for Strategic Studies and the Near East Center for Strategic Studies, all based in the National Defense University in Washington, DC.
During the cold war, US support for regional security cooperation was oriented towards supporting allies in the global conflict with Communism. In the 1990s the administration of President Bill Clinton sought to build more inclusive regional institutions: the USA was thus a supporter of NATO’s reorientation and the PFP in Europe, of APEC and the ARF in Asia, and of efforts to rejuvenate the OAS in the Americas. Post-September 2001 the administration of President Bush has sought to use regional organizations as one element of its broader war on terrorism, but regional endeavours have also been affected by the more general shift in US foreign policy towards action outside institutional (and sometimes international legal) constraints. As a consequence, the US approach to regional security cooperation has become rather narrowly utilitarian, viewing it as useful in as far as it contributes to specific US goals, especially in the context of the war on terrorism, but certainly not as a goal in itself.

There are, thus, undeniable and growing elements of ambivalence in the US impact on ‘regionalizing’ endeavours. At least three levels of this problem can be identified, the first lying in the way in which US national demands may skew or unbalance local cooperation agendas both when local groups exert themselves to meet the USA’s wishes and when they unite against some feature of US policy. The second problem is that steps taken by the USA to safeguard its own interests and power in a given region often have a de facto polarizing effect, dividing local ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ or using some states to balance and encircle others, in a way that (to say the least) complicates local multilateralism. This pattern is clear in the greater Middle East and East Asia but has sometimes also cut across the multilateral nature of the USA’s European ties. In early 2003, in the lead-up to the US-led action against Iraq, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld drew a distinction between the unhelpful attitudes of ‘old Europe’ and the helpful attitudes of ‘new Europe’ that has cast a shadow over the relations between these two groups in the EU and NATO.

The Iraq crisis also fuelled debate in the USA itself about the third level of the issue: are advanced regional structures becoming such an inherent threat to US supremacy in themselves that they should be actively disrupted to avert the spectre of a ‘multipolar’ world? The clear temptation during President Bush’s first term in office was to answer ‘Yes’ to this question: the USA should not only evade institutionalized constraints on itself in favour of ‘coalitions of the willing’ but should also try to prevent the rise of multilateral as well as one-state regional competitors. In parallel, against a background of deadlock in the Doha round of world trade talks, US negotiators sought bilateral trade deals

59 There are some signs of China’s pursuing a mirror-image strategy by courting those states that face local and global isolation as a result inter alia of US disfavour: vide recent Chinese oil deals with Iran and Venezuela.


with local partners rather than going through regional channels. While such bilateralism may reflect a certain ‘default mode’ in US thinking, there are signs—as in other fields—of some re-balancing of policy since Bush’s re-election in November 2004. The EU’s internally generated crisis over its proposed Constitutional Treaty in 2005 made many US policy makers realize how inconvenient a seriously weakened Europe would be at this delicate juncture in world affairs, while the USA now more actively supports regional peacekeeping (by the EU in the Balkans or by African organizations) that frees its own troops for new missions elsewhere. In any event, as the EU showed after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, US efforts to discourage or to ‘divide and rule’ regional groups may merely harden the determination of other states to consolidate their regional institutions beyond the point where the USA could do them any serious harm. Where these dynamics will ultimately lead is still an open question and is addressed again in section VI below.

V. The ‘quality’ of regional cooperation and how to promote it

Not all regional constructions that fit the definitions of this chapter can be judged to have positive aims and effects nor have all well-intentioned ones been successful. Even after the cold war, judgements on whether a given group is intrinsically good or bad—and whether or not it can be trusted with a certain task—remain tinged by politics and partisanship. Policies towards existing organizations and efforts to create new ones should benefit if some more reliable, evidence-based means of evaluation could be devised. As a starting point and to encourage further work, five relevant criteria are suggested here: (a) whether cooperation is coerced and hegemonic; (b) whether it posits a zero-sum relationship with the outside world; (c) whether it is rigid or static; (d) whether it is artificial and superficial; and (e) whether it is efficient in terms of management and resource use.

An example of coerced and hegemonic regional cooperation is the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact) of cold war times. The model is rare these days, although some would see Russia’s successive attempts to build new security groupings in the former Soviet space—making allowance for the greatly changed context—as hegemonic in intention and to a certain extent in style. The leaders of such groups will, of course, do their best to make them look respectable, while complaints from smaller members may be stifled by precisely those power imbalances that allowed them to be corralled in the first place. To judge a given group as abusive, therefore, outside observers must go

62 See chapter 1 in this volume.
63 The discussion that follows is based on the record of larger regional and sub-regional groupings that have been active since 1945. It is inevitably coloured by the authors’ Euro-Atlantic experience but takes account of other regional groupings. A detailed statistical test of the hypotheses offered would demand much more research on the extra-European cases in particular.
by what they know of its origin and history, by how far the group’s actions seem fairly to reflect its members’ interests and how its internal governance works. The single best diagnostic is a lack of democracy in the group’s working at the interstate level, which often turns out to be coupled with non-democratic and anti-democratic impacts within its constituent states—the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its allies in 1968 being a flagrant example.

Such structures may sometimes look more effective than democratic ones in eliminating (overt) conflict among their members and avoiding (overt) outside interference. Since these goals are achieved by coercion, however, the members’ ‘true’ wishes and interests are always liable to break through. In the worst case this leads to conflict among or within former member states (or with neighbours), but in all cases the group’s collapse will at least temporarily affect the region’s stability and its standing in the international power balance. Coerced and unwilling groupings are also likely to fail in subtle aspects of efficiency among other reasons because: their ‘command’ style of management cannot exploit members’ true comparative advantages; hegemons often maintain or worsen inherent tensions between members by divide-and-rule tactics; and lack of democracy makes it harder to deal with dimensions of security where willing support from different actors in society is important. Such groups also have trouble in adjusting to changed environments because of the hegemon’s attachment to tried and trusted methods of control.

As argued above, zero-sum goals as such are not enough to judge a group negatively. However, even the most justified and democratic groups with an adversarial agenda cannot avoid some inherent hazards. Lasting tension between groups breeds permanent arms races that both burden group members and increase the risk of proliferation to others. Such tension also makes it harder to address the more universal components of threat (vide terrorism in the cold war) in a cooperative way. Any lengthy confrontation also tends to draw other players into the game with equally zero-sum roles, as backers and sympathizers, equipment suppliers, or flag-carriers and dependents in other regions. During the cold war, the price of avoiding outright conflict between the blocs in Europe was paid, not least, in a series of ‘proxy’ wars elsewhere between countries or territories whose precarious state of development made them least able to afford it.

The understanding of these risks was, of course, also at the source of positive inter-bloc measures of détente, including arms control agreements, ‘confidence-building’ measures and the development of wider frameworks of regional cooperation available to members of both camps.65 In retrospect, the very dysfunctionality of the East–West confrontation generated some of the strongest and most significant arms control and disarmament measures ever

65 A notable example is the CSCE/OSCE, as discussed above. However, pan-European networks for cooperation in fields like the environment, energy, communications, sports and culture also played their part, and some limited cross-bloc sub-regional cooperation was also initiated before the fall of the Berlin Wall in Nov. 1989 (e.g., the Pentagonale cooperation between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia).
enacted; while the more diffuse global balance and vogue for intervention since 1989 has made it hard to conserve the progress made, let alone go further. In this specific sense, two ‘wrongs’ (i.e., zero-sum and opposed regional groupings) can make a partial ‘right’. Even so, it is clearly better if a group can set constructive goals from the outset and devote all its resources to them, rather than going round by the long way of confrontation with all the concomitant costs and risks. A group at ease with its own members and neighbours will have more security ‘surplus’ for helping the less fortunate—and is less likely to be mistrusted by the recipients. Without a siege mentality, it can accord its members and their citizens more freedom to apply their diverse capacities. It will work more easily with other international actors to combat security challenges—including the newer and ‘softer’ ones. Finally, a group based on positive common interests and aspirations may survive longer because positive aims can generally be extended and reformulated for new conditions, while threats are defeated or withdrawn.

The third criterion, the rigid or static nature of a regional group, may apply to democratic as well as undemocratic constructions. The key is not how formal the group’s governance is, but how smoothly it can be adapted to external change and to internal drivers such as a larger membership, the demands for involvement by new internal constituencies or the exhaustion of earlier (and simpler) agendas. A group that cannot adjust risks being sidelined or hollowed out while its members (or at least the more powerful ones) look for satisfaction elsewhere. The death or mothballing of an institution is not necessarily bad for security if members can move on to higher things, including action in more effective frameworks. More worrying are cases of ‘de-institutionalization’, where actors step out of regional frameworks for security action of their own choosing, as the USA did by creating non-UN, non-NATO coalitions for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. These cases highlight, however, that it is hard to defend and reassert the institutionalized approach unless it can be shown to satisfy the needs even of those members (the strongest) which have the most alternatives. This requires delicate calculation, since giving too much ground to the most rule-averse parties may compromise the group’s normative authority as seen by other members or the wider cause of security. Worst of all is the case where the group and its principles maintain a formal existence—and thus risk being ascribed some of the blame—while their members increasingly take actions without peer discipline or support.

This leads to the fourth set of indicators: artificiality and superficiality. These characterize structures that are set up to distract attention from the region’s true security problems, to make the region look good to other regions,

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66 Examples are the treaties between the Soviet Union and the USA on strategic nuclear arms reductions (SALT and START) and the agreement to ban a whole category of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. For details of treaties see annex A in this volume.

67 See the Introduction and chapter 15 in this volume.

68 An example is the fate of the Western European Union when the EU took over European-led crisis management missions.
or to glorify the country or countries taking the initiative (vide the series of competitive group-forming attempts during the post-cold war period in Central Asia\textsuperscript{69}). Alternatively, artificiality and superficiality may set in during a group’s declining days as members turn up to its meetings only out of habit, sending representatives of a declining level of rank. A group should not be hastily labelled as superficial, however, just because it lacks stable bureaucratic forms and resources or addresses only a small and non-vital part of the region’s security agenda. Such creations can be the first seeds of greater things and it makes sense to keep them ‘light’ as long as confidence needs to be built up and participants are learning to understand each other’s priorities. More reliable danger signs are: (a) a patently uneven level of enthusiasm among the participants, (b) a rapid decline in activities, (c) a duplication or multiplication of groups without complementarity, (d) a failure to engage meaningfully with outside actors who are relevant for the given agenda, and (e) widespread behaviour by the members that conflicts with the apparent aims and rules of the grouping. Even in such apparently hopeless cases, it is hard to say that security will actually be harmed by the nominal existence of such groups. ‘Rhetorical regionalism’ of this kind acknowledges that other actors and the world in general see cooperation as valuable. The greater risk of misjudgement may come when artificial groups appear just good enough to confuse—and create a sense of false security about—the real internal and external challenges of the region.

\textit{Efficiency in management and resource use} must be a relative measure, since the right amount of effort for a regional endeavour relates to the prospective gains and to how much the region can afford (or can get from others)—and it will consequently vary over time. An input–output balance must take account not just of visible cash flows and support in kind (e.g., buildings, the staffing of secretariats, or the loan of troops and other assets for operations), but also of ‘process costs’, including attendance at group activities and the time spent on group affairs in national administrations. On the other side of the balance are potentially large process benefits in terms of intra-group trust, understanding and solidarity, as well as the tangibles (e.g., greater negotiating power) and intangibles (e.g., standing and influence) of interaction with the outside world. Overall, a dysfunctional group can be one that either contributes too much in relation to what it gets out or one that contributes too little to achieve critical mass for its stated ends. The final balance must also take account of whether the group looks effective—to outsiders and to its own citizens and paymasters. Contradictions arise when a method of working that is acceptable and even appropriate internally makes no sense to outsiders whom it is important to impress, as often happens between the EU and the USA. In such cases the group may need to think about using double languages or messages, although preferably not double standards.

\textsuperscript{69} Allison, R., ‘Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia’, \textit{International Affairs}, vol. 80, no. 3 (May 2004), pp. 469–73.
The regional environment: facilitating and complicating factors

What has made security cooperation flourish in some regions or sub-regions and not in others? Finding the answers could be important for those seeking to fill the existing gaps in cooperation, but there is no simple formula. A few relevant factors are discussed here to show how complex their effects may actually be.

1. State size and balance of power. In East and South Asia the disproportionate size of China and India, respectively, presents a patent challenge for security-related cooperation, and the Soviet Union certainly exercised an unhealthy dominance in the Warsaw Pact. In NATO, however, the USA’s strength and leadership is generally seen as having made and kept the alliance viable; and history shows several cases of the alternative scenario where the presence of one or more large states encourages others to join together in order to balance it or them. The most that can safely be said is that groups encompassing giant members will find it hard to be highly integrative and intrusive because the large state will not accept dictation on its own territory and the others will be wary of simply accepting that state’s model.

2. Intra-region relations. Cooperation ought to be easiest when there is the least tension and the maximum of common security interests among neighbours or, alternatively, when a region is neatly divided into blocs (as in Europe in the cold war). The greater Middle East is a good example of the opposite situation, since cooperation is obstructed there not just by the fierceness but also by the complexity of extant rivalries and conflicts. On the other hand, in Western Europe’s institution building the presence of four or five larger states (now six with Poland) with contrasting agendas and shifting alignments has been a motive for and driver of, as much as an obstacle to, integration. Rivalries between Argentina and Brazil or Brazil and Mexico have not, so far, thrown off course Latin America’s slow and complicated progress towards an institutionalized security regime.

Sometimes relations between neighbours are simply not problematic enough to justify formal security solutions (the Nordic region is a case in point). Another important variable is the behaviour of large outside players. As noted above, if the deliberate or intrinsic effect of their actions is to ‘divide and rule’, a solid regional structure will either fail to emerge or be of a bipolar kind (like the Middle East in the earlier stages of Arab–Israeli confrontation).

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70 Of Africa’s 3 most active sub-regional groups, 2—SADC and ECOWAS—contain a disproportionately powerful state—South Africa and Nigeria, respectively.
71 Part of the logic of ASEAN can be read in this way, especially vis-à-vis China.
72 Hollis (note 2).
73 Rosas (note 2).
74 Since 2001 Europe has oscillated between being divided in pro- and anti-USA camps and pulling itself together in order to engage more effectively with, or offer an alternative to, the USA. The odds in this case are tilted towards the latter model, inter alia since the USA has more often than not encouraged European integration.
3. History and culture. There are two, contrasting ways in which shared histories have boosted modern regional cooperation. The past existence of supranational structures and authorities (such as empires and earlier forms of alliance) in the region creates habits, and experience, that can at least shorten the path to new agreements. Such traditions are sometimes deliberately invoked to give newly (re)created regions legitimacy, as when Norway in 1993 referred to medieval ‘Pomor’ cooperation when launching the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Sometimes, a voluntary local grouping arises to replace and contrast with an externally imposed multilateral framework after the latter’s withdrawal (e.g., Central European cooperation after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, COMECON). Conversely, a region that has suffered disastrous internal conflict can be driven to new forms of multilateral governance in a ‘never again’ spirit, as with Europe’s European Communities and the Western European Union after World War II. In such cases the new collective identity provides new legitimacy, especially for the losers of the previous conflict. History seems to be an impediment when it offers only models of division or of completely discredited multilateral experiments and where reconciliation after previous wars has not been complete and ‘leftover’ claims or border disputes stymie the building of regional structures from the outset.

The issue of political and cultural compatibility among neighbours is even more complex. Political and cultural identities have a subjective component that can change over time, and states that ‘reinvent’ themselves are likely to take a different view on who their natural neighbours and partners are. As to the impact on institutionalized regional processes, strong cultural resemblances may (as among the Nordic countries) make cooperation so easy that it remains little formalized. The common heritage of Islam has not saved the greater Middle East, or even North Africa, from remaining seriously ‘under-regionalized’—and is arguably an obstacle insofar as it offers an alternative transnational frame of reference qualifying the modern state’s authority. Successfully integrated regions, including Europe, have arisen in conditions of ethnic, religious, linguistic and behavioural diversity, powered partly by the wish to stop these differences leading to conflict. In sum, while cultural

75 Europe itself is an example, but it seems more than coincidence that ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African groups have taken root in regions that were extensively colonized. On the other hand, cultural boundaries established within regions by formerly competing empires (e.g., between the francophone and anglophone parts of Africa) have created some specific extra complications, both practical and political, in the building of modern sub-regional groups that cut across these borderlines, such as ECOWAS in West Africa.


77 The blockage effect is worst when the factors of legitimacy and identity involved for each side in the dispute are too powerful to allow it to be ‘compartmentalized’ and bypassed (e.g., India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories). The extreme case is when history leaves it uncertain how many states there are in the local regional system (e.g., Taiwan and Palestine).

78 A high level of integration helps in a practical way by giving ethnic groups similar rights, whichever sovereignty they live under, and allowing full freedom of movement.
compatibility can be a facilitator, cultural diversity need not be a decisive obstacle if: (a) strategic interests are strong enough and (b) the differences are not defended as political goods in themselves but are mediated by a culture of compromise.\textsuperscript{79} Last but not least, states do not have to be democratic to make security groupings work, as seen in the case of historical alliances, the Warsaw Pact or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (a group of six, at best imperfect democracies). There is, however, much evidence that groups pervaded by democracy can integrate more deeply and survive better, as discussed in the first part of this section.

VI. Conclusions

If nothing else, this chapter shows that 20th and 21st century regional security cooperation is not a transient phenomenon. It is a rich and diverse phenomenon that now involves the great majority of the world’s states—albeit some more deeply, sincerely and willingly than others. It is developing forms to cover the widest span of the contemporary security spectrum and is starting to combine security with non-security tools for both strategic and operational purposes. Nevertheless, many observers would still question whether the plethora of meetings, declarations and statements, military contacts, and the bureaucratic work of institutional headquarters and the like brings the proportionate value in terms of enhanced security for states or peoples. Those analysts who focus on the toughest security challenges—terrorism, proliferation, violent conflicts and large-power rivalries—may easily conclude that regional approaches are ineffective or irrelevant. The present authors’ view is that such arguments are simplistic and misleading. From a historical perspective, there is a powerful case that some key institutions—ASEAN, the EU, MERCOSUR and NATO in particular—have played an important role in overcoming deep-rooted conflicts between their members and in contributing to peaceful international relations at home and abroad. Since the 1990s these institutions have acquired many eager new members and partners. Over the whole period, there is mounting evidence that these processes—in locations as varied as Central America and Southern Africa, South-East Asia, Central Europe and the Balkans—have contributed to the prevention and resolution of conflicts between and within states and to the consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights.

Part of the problem in assessing regional security cooperation lies in the choice of benchmarks. It is easy to identify failure and weakness: Europe’s inability to deal with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia at its own back-door during the 1990s, Africa’s failings in responding to the continent’s many conflicts or East Asia’s inability to halt North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, to

\textsuperscript{79} Experience shows, however, that there are pitfalls in trying to create active security communities over very large areas where the true commonalities in culture as well as governance become too weak to sustain the weight of common standards laid upon them—an issue familiar from the debate over EU and NATO expansion.
cite only the most obvious examples. Yet other approaches to these security challenges—national or unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions of the willing and global action through institutions such as the UN—have proved little more successful. A fairer question would thus be what added value (if any) regional approaches provide compared to the alternatives on offer. In this context, both logic and the evidence suggest that local, inclusive approaches can provide legitimacy, a framework for long-term, self-sustaining efforts and an impact greater than their parts, especially when achieving deeper integrative effects. At the same time, they have the weakness of their strengths: notably, the cumbersome, usually consensus-based character of decision making. Regional security cooperation thus cannot wholly substitute for national action or for decision making via the UN Security Council but can at best powerfully supplement them. Lastly, states are likely to judge the value of regionalism in the light not just of their own size, location and attitudes to others, but also of their security priorities and favoured responses: a state that prefers to deploy military force against terrorism and to strengthen its border defences will not rate highly the civilian and legalistic, transnational and intrusive remedies being explored, for example, in the EU. Cooperative regional approaches have much clearer advantages, however, for tackling other priorities such as long-term peace-building between states, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and transnational challenges such as environmental pollution and organized crime.

How do such ‘regions of security’ relate to global security governance more broadly? The regionalization–globalization dialectic is a familiar theme in economics but, in the security context, is all too often addressed in polemical terms if at all. Thus, as noted in section IV above, regions that are integrating without the USA can be seen both by participants and the USA as attempts to balance US power or at least to mitigate US interference. As they gain confidence, local groups can and do reach out to others that they regard as following, or want to encourage to follow, their cooperative models—thus spreading the regionalizing ‘virus’ further. At the same time, states in weaker, more disorganized parts of the world may reasonably worry about the strengths of the larger groups being turned against them: an atmosphere of this kind still bedevils NATO and EU attempts at ‘outreach’ in the Mediterranean.

In more analytical terms, it may be questioned how the entrenchment of regional clubs fits with the increasingly global nature both of the repercussions of traditional security ills like conflict and of scourges like terrorism and disease. The answers should be positive if regional outputs can be shown to promote rather than interfere with shared global objectives. Where threats arise in a disaggregated way, as with local conflict, local response capacities like those in Africa and Europe reduce the risk of overloading the UN’s ‘last resort’ capacities for intervention. These local capacities allow the UN to be focused

80 Thus, the EU has had dialogue with groups like ASEAN and MERCOSUR and offers collective support for AU peacekeeping policies. There are also informal global networks of security-relevant organizations convened notably by the UN to discuss conflict topics.
where most needed, thus helping to equalize security standards in the longer term. In the case of transnational threats, organized regions can work to maximize their own defences and deliver ‘pre-packed’ inputs to global endeavours. Both these examples, however, point to the heightened importance of universal standards and frameworks of authority (including UN legitimation for forceful intervention) if the old vision of a ‘world of regions’ is not to become just a jungle with fewer beasts.

In any case, a world of regions is still a remote prospect, so long as China, India, Russia and, in particular, the USA are players with such limited experience of and commitment to regionalization. The immediate issue is how a heterogeneous world system of individual large states plus regional groups (whose states sometimes do and sometimes do not operate within group disciplines) can be made to work. Part of the answer lies in the existence of forums—not just the UN but also the international financial institutions and the World Trade Organization—where participants can interact on the basis of both national and group positions; and another part lies in the strengthened pressure for global cooperation that threats like terrorism, WMD and many ‘softer’ security challenges sour. The prospects are complicated, however, by cultural and normative differences among the players—even regarding some of the most basic premises of security—which the experience of living or not living in an integrated region has undoubtedly reinforced. Further objective study of regional security processes might help all concerned to approach the phenomenon more calmly and to focus more on its actual and potential instrumentality. In reality, even lacking such a conceptual framework, the EU and the USA are both struggling with the issue of how to give the greater Middle East, East Asia and South Asia at least some of the benefits of a stable regional system. The analysis above suggests that this is indeed a worthy and urgent cause and that it deserves even more informed thought and effort than it receives at present.

82 The USA’s involvement in NATO is only a partial exception in the sense that it had no intrusive or culture forming, and very few visible, effects in the USA’s own territory. In any case, the USA is busy redesigning NATO in a way that makes its own assets less regionally present in, and committed to, the territory of Europe as such.