3. Peace-building: the new international focus on Africa

SHARON WIHARTA

I. Introduction

Since the end of the cold war the international security agenda has undergone a transformation: it has been broadened and redefined to include a host of new issues ranging from ethnic strife, environmental degradation and transnational organized crime to diseases such as AIDS. The new concept of security is based on a comprehensive understanding of this type of threat and is oriented towards ‘human security’. The nature of the new security threats is characterized by their inter-connectedness and their propensity to ‘cross borders’, making them shared threats. In the light of this normative change Africa is experiencing a geopolitical renaissance: its peace and security concerns have become greater global concerns. This has been attributed partly to the ‘global war on terrorism’ but also to the fact that certain sub-regions of Africa, mainly West Africa, are becoming significant world providers of oil and gas.

It is against this background that post-conflict peace-building, and in particular the peace missions conducted in Africa, featured prominently on the international peace and security agenda in 2005. The Human Security Report 2005 showed a strong correlation between the recent sharp decline in armed conflicts and the rise in international engagement, especially in the deployment of peace missions. In the light of the growing recognition of the critical role of peace missions in rebuilding war-affected countries, the international community sought in 2005 to build on recent successes and elaborate comprehensive policies for peace-building. Africa was a particular area of attention and is therefore the central theme of this chapter.

Section II of this chapter examines recent initiatives in the field of global peace-building and human security, in particular the establishment of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission. Section III reviews the successes and failures of multilateral peace missions that operated in Africa in 2005 and discusses possible future developments. Section IV presents the con-
II. Peace-building and human security

The release in early 2005 of major reports by the UN Millennium Project and the British-led Commission for Africa moved the African continent into the focus of international policy discourse and prompted various intergovernmental bodies, such as the UN, the European Union (EU) and the Group of Eight (G8) leading industrialized nations, to re-examine and strengthen their support of Africa’s development efforts. Both reports drew attention to the fact that Africa is currently the region that is the farthest from attaining any of the goals set in the Millennium Declaration for 2015 and that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago’. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) list a range of collective actions aimed at eradicating extreme poverty by addressing hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter and social exclusion—while concomitantly promoting basic human rights, gender equality, education and environmental sustainability, as well as devoting special attention to Africa. The 2000 Millennium Declaration paved the way for an individual rights-based approach to security and development issues and for an emerging consensus that security, development and human rights reinforce each other. Africa has provided pointed illustrations of the negative impact of weak governance and conflict on economic development, as in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, and also of how strong the turnaround can be when governance improves and conflict is resolved, as in Mali and Mozambique. At the same time there is growing political will in Africa at the national, subregional and regional levels to tackle the challenges facing the continent. Consequently, increasing stability, strengthening the continent’s own capacity and improving state governance are priority tasks, but none of them can be mastered without external engagement. With only a decade left in which to achieve the Millennium Goals, 2005 represented a critical point for a renewal of the global commitment to Africa.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended in 2004 that a new UN organ be created to address post-conflict peacebuilding. This proposal was endorsed in September 2005 by the UN World Summit, and in December the Security Council and the General Assembly

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adopted concurrent resolutions on establishing the Peacebuilding Commission. The creation of the Commission was the first tangible achievement of the World Summit, where world leaders gathered to take up *inter alia* proposals for reform of the UN. The Commission is intended to fill the institutional gap between peacekeeping and development activities and further strengthen the UN’s capacity for peace-building ‘in the widest sense’. On a practical level, it is an attempt to simplify the UN’s increasingly convoluted programming procedures. The lack of coordination and complementarity between actors has prevented otherwise sound peace-building strategies from being converted into concrete, sustained achievements.

The three main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission are: (a) to serve as a central node to bring together different international actors, marshal resources, and propose integrated strategies and overall priorities for post-conflict peace-building in general terms and in specific country situations, thus enhancing inter-institutional coordination; (b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for the functioning of a state; and (c) to develop expertise and best practices, with a view above all to ensuring predictable and sustained financing as well as sustained international attention to peace-building activities.

The decision not to include conflict prevention in the Commission’s purview was seen by many as a realistic compromise because it is too vast and complex an agenda for any one UN body to undertake. The core of the Commission’s work is envisaged to be its country-specific activities, notably in the period when countries move from transitional recovery towards development. The Peacebuilding Commission is expected to report on its activities initially to the Security Council and then to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Acknowledging the need to anchor peace-building efforts in local context and dynamics, the Commission is expected to promote the principle of local ownership where the primacy of local stakeholders is recognized.

The consensus-based Commission will have a 31-member standing Organizational Committee that is responsible for its procedures and organizational matters. Seven of the Committee members will come from the Security Council, including the five permanent members; seven from among the 54 members of ECOSOC; five from the top 10 providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies.

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6 On the summit meeting, held on 14–16 Sep. 2005 at the UN General Assembly, and for the summit documents see URL <http://www.un.org/summit2005/>.

7 These purposes are listed in UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (note 5), para. 2(a)–(c).


cies; five from the top 10 contributors of military personnel and civilian police to UN peace missions; and seven elected by the General Assembly to ensure geographical balance.\textsuperscript{10} When the Commission meets to consider a country-specific situation, it will be enlarged with additional representatives from the national or transitional authorities in question, key UN bodies, international financial institutions and regional organizations. Non-permanent membership of the Organizational Committee is limited to a renewable two-year term and, to avoid double representation, member states may be selected from only one category at any one time. It is uncertain whether the leadership of the Committee will be provided by a senior UN official, as previously suggested by the Secretary-General, or by one of the elected members. The size of the Organizational Committee is twice as large as the Secretary-General originally envisaged, and its complex make-up raises the question whether it will be able to carry out its functions effectively or will become bogged down in the UN’s unwieldy bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{11} There is also concern that the powers of the Peacebuilding Commission, which are only advisory in nature, may render the body toothless.

In order to aid the work of the Commission, a small unit was created within the UN Secretariat using existing resources. The main tasks of this Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) are: (a) to gather and analyse information from the Commission members on their peace-building activities and the availability of financial resources; (b) to contribute to the planning process for peace-building operations; and (c) to conduct best practices analysis and develop policy guidance.\textsuperscript{12} However, given the PSO’s potentially limited size (approximately 20 staff members) and the fact that the UN Secretariat is perennially under-resourced, there is a danger that the PSO will suffer the same fate as most UN departments and barely fulfil the Commission’s basic organizational and monitoring needs, let alone perform its analytical and policy-forming tasks.\textsuperscript{13}

In support of the Peacebuilding Commission, a standing Peacebuilding Fund, financed by voluntary contributions and designed to accelerate the release of funds for the launch of peace-building activities, was established. This step reflects the realization that the implementation of peace-building programmes has in the past often suffered from a lack of resources. It would be more useful for the promotion of sustainable recovery of a post-conflict country if the Fund financed longer-term programmes and activities instead of only quick-impact projects. Ideally, the Fund should also have more resources at its disposal than the proposed level of $250 million.\textsuperscript{14} This issue should be

\textsuperscript{10} In spite of this, strong concerns have been voiced by developing countries that the Commission’s composition will still reflect a West European/North American bias.
\textsuperscript{11} UN General Assembly (note 8).
\textsuperscript{12} UN General Assembly (note 8).
\textsuperscript{13} Ponzio, R., \textit{The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission}, Saferworld Briefing (Saferworld: London, Nov. 2005).
\textsuperscript{14} UN General Assembly (note 8).
revisited when the size, the scope of activities to be covered and the manner in which the Fund is to be used are discussed.

The Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund are all expected to be operational by mid-2006.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Towards a coherent strategy for Africa}

Other multilateral organizations undertook parallel efforts in 2005 to review the Millennium Development Goals. Africa benefited from the happy coincidence that the United Kingdom—a traditionally important actor in Africa—both chaired the 2005 G8 Summit and held the EU Presidency in the last six months of 2005, contributing to putting the continent’s security and development needs firmly on the agendas of the Western world. The G8 and the EU collectively represent the largest aid donors, and their development policies have a profound effect on Africa’s socio-economic growth. Both organizations have taken a comprehensive approach and share a similar perspective that a wide range of political, economic and social tools exist to address underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. The policy documents of the Commission for Africa and the EU emphasize an equal partnership between Africa and the developed world. For instance, in order to move the principle of ownership from rhetorical expression to practical policy, the EU has indicated that support for budgets (direct contributions to a partner government’s budget for sectoral policies) is to be the main form of aid delivery.\textsuperscript{16}

Under the coordination of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the Commission for Africa was set up in 2005 to identify the global trends that influence Africa’s development and to propose effective policies to tackle the continent’s problems.\textsuperscript{17} The Commission’s findings were presented in March 2005, ahead of the July Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission’s recommendations included a 100 per cent debt cancellation for the poorest countries, the doubling of official development aid (ODA) for Africa to $25 billion a year by 2010, improved governance of African nations through increasing transparency and stamping out corruption, and further strengthening of key institutions of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).\textsuperscript{18} These Commission proposals are aimed at accelerating Africa’s progress towards the Millennium Goals. An important element of the recommendations is the focus on promoting African ownership of initiatives and steps to build on Africa’s own development efforts. The African Peer Review Mechanism and NEPAD are key instruments: NEPAD

\textsuperscript{15} United Nations, Daily press briefing by the offices of the spokesman for the Secretary-General and the spokesperson for the General Assembly President, 2 Feb. 2006.
\textsuperscript{16} Commission for Africa (note 4).
\textsuperscript{17} The Commissioners included British, other European, US and African experts and dignitaries.
has been endorsed by virtually all international agencies and bilateral donors as the general framework around which the international community should structure its development efforts in Africa.

In July 2005 the G8 Gleneagles Summit adopted many of the proposals advanced by the Commission for Africa. In areas relating to Africa’s peace and security structure, the G8 leaders reiterated their previous commitments to support the AU’s efforts to build its own peacekeeping forces. To many observers, however, the only concrete commitment made by the G8 was the 100 per cent relief of all debts of eligible heavily indebted poor countries to the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions, and the increased financing commitments.19 The United States pledged to double its aid contribution over the period 2004–10 and created the Millennium Challenge Account with the aim of providing up to $5 billion a year. Similarly, each of the EU member states pledged to give 0.7 per cent of its gross national income in ODA by 2015 with an interim collective target of 0.56 per cent by 2010. Furthermore, it was agreed that the EU will double its ODA between 2004 and 2010, from €34.5 billion to €67 billion, of which half will go to Africa.20 This was seen by some analysts as a catalytic step and built on lessons learned from the recent experience of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq and Liberia, which highlighted that debt is often a major issue for countries emerging from conflict.21 In addition, empirical research shows that increased and targeted aid reduces the risk of recurring conflicts.22

The European Commission presented the EU Strategy for Africa in October with a view to reviewing and updating the EU’s existing policies and giving the EU a comprehensive, integrated, long-term framework for its relations with Africa.23 The aim of the Strategy is to strengthen the EU’s contribution to reducing poverty and enabling the achievement of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals in Africa over the period 2005–15, together with African partners, and to ensure that EU policies are in line with Africa’s needs and priorities. It is also aimed at enhancing the EU’s political dialogue and broader relationship with Africa and its institutions. For instance, the Strategy highlighted how current relief, rehabilitation and development efforts can be

20 Group of Eight (G8), ‘Financing commitments (as submitted by individual G8 members)’, Gleneagles Communiqué, Annex II, 6–8 July 2005, URL <http://www.g8.gov.uk>.
streamlined by using the EU’s newly created financing mechanism, the stability instrument.\textsuperscript{24} However, the result may be that the EU will have enhanced the flexibility of its financing instruments without necessarily guaranteeing the resources for real growth in security–development activities.\textsuperscript{25} The Strategy did not spell out many new initiatives as such, but rather focused on how the EU could utilize existing instruments more effectively, and it highlighted concrete measures for specific countries.

While the dedication of entire summit meetings to issues concerning Africa has contributed political momentum, this will not translate into action if the political and financial commitments are not backed up by actual budget allocations.

\section*{III. Peace-building in practice in Africa}

In 2005, with over 65,000 personnel deployed in 14 peace missions, Africa was the region with the highest concentration of large, multi-dimensional, costly peace operations (see table 3.1 and figure 3.1).\textsuperscript{26} This level of engagement by external actors reflects the ebbing of concerns that they might become embroiled in disasters such as those in Mogadishu or Kigali.\textsuperscript{27} Over the past decade the UN has intensified its engagement in Africa and, by December 2005, 75 per cent of UN resources, both personnel and peacekeeping budgets, were devoted to Africa.\textsuperscript{28} Nearly half the number of deployed UN peacekeeping personnel are African, a reflection of the ‘African solutions for African problems’ renaissance. Since 2004 the UN has deployed nine missions in Africa—the highest number recorded since 1991 and the highest for any region.\textsuperscript{29} Several of the nine UN missions that were under way in 2005 took place in neighbouring countries—for example, those in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone; and those in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan. Based on this operational reality and on the regional nature of conflicts across the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[26] These figures are as of 31 Dec. 2005.
\item[27] This refers to incidents in Somalia in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994, when UN peacekeepers in the UN Operation in Somalia and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, respectively, were attacked and drawn into violent confrontations.
\item[29] For an in-depth statistical analysis of peace operations in Africa see Heldt, B., Patterns of Peacekeeping in Africa (Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications: Stockholm, forthcoming 2006).
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Table 3.1. Number of peace missions in Africa, 1991–2005

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* UN peace operations are those administered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the UN Department of Political Affairs.

Source: SIPRI Peacekeeping Missions Database.

continent, a broad consensus has emerged in the peace-building community on the need for regional approaches. Such approaches would address linkages in regional conflict, prevent conflicts from spreading across borders, and promote sustainable regional economic and social development.

UN peace missions in West Africa

The year 2005 marked the successful completion of the long-standing UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) also made salient progress in assisting the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to implement the transition priorities set out in the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but such results were less apparent in the case of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The year also marked the deepening of cooperation between these three missions in terms of joint cross-border patrolling to prevent the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking, and smuggling of and illegal trade in natural resources; and logistical support and information sharing. UNMIL was also uniquely mandated to assume responsibility for providing security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and it was given arrest and detention powers with respect to former Liberian President Charles Taylor.

30 United Nations (note 28).
31 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties was signed on 18 Aug. 2003; for the agreement see URL <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html>.
Sierra Leone

At the end of its six-year mandate in 2005, UNAMSIL had accomplished several key elements of its mandate: the mission had disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated more than 72,000 former combatants; assisted in restoring government authority throughout the country; organized both national and local elections; assisted in the rebuilding of the security forces; and repatriated nearly 300,000 refugees.\(^{34}\) UNAMSIL is heralded as one of the UN’s successes, not least because of its remarkable recovery from a near collapse in 2000 after the kidnapping of 500 peacekeepers by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).\(^{35}\)

UNAMSIL was also credited with breaking new ground in a number of areas. It was the first UN mission to employ the integrated mission concept (in which humanitarian aid and development agencies are subsumed in the peacekeeping mission), to ‘re-hat’ a parallel regional peacekeeping force to take over the running of a mission,\(^ {36}\) and to enter into an ‘over-the-horizon’ (rapid reaction reinforcement) arrangement with a bilateral troop contributor.


\(^{36}\) UNAMSIL absorbed the personnel of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone. United Nations, Presidential Statement, UN document S/PRST/2005/63, 20 Dec. 2005. At the same time, in the former Yugoslavia the UN Protection Force was re-hatted as the NATO-led Implementation Force.
UNAMSIL’s drawdown strategy was a striking departure from that of previous missions. For example, the procedure was initiated as early as 2003 and consisted of a gradual scaling down of the military component. The Sierra Leonean Government’s ability to assume its primary responsibility for internal and external security, exercise control over natural resources and consolidate civil administration throughout the country was identified as an essential benchmark for determining the timing and pace of UNAMSIL’s withdrawal.37

In an unprecedented move, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted an opinion poll in Sierra Leone to ascertain the degree of social legitimacy of UNAMSIL. The findings indicated that a majority of the population were satisfied with the performance of the mission and were optimistic that the gains made by UNAMSIL would be sustained.38 While the end of the peacekeeping phase of UN engagement in Sierra Leone reflects the now stable security environment, considerable weaknesses remain in the state institutions, particularly those belonging to the justice sector, and in the government’s capacity to deliver services (e.g., health or education) to the population.

A smaller UN presence—the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)—was established with a strong peace-building mandate to address the shift to ‘soft’ issues, such as corruption and youth unemployment.39 One of the central functions of UNIOSIL is to support the government’s efforts to implement the country’s MDG-based poverty-reduction strategy by coordinating donor support in key areas such as the capacity building of state institutions (including transparency and anti-corruption measures), human rights and the rule of law.40 In November the Consultative Group for Sierra Leone pledged a total of $800 million for implementation of the strategy over the three-year period 2005–2007.41

**Liberia**

The monumental task of preparing for Liberia’s first presidential and parliamentary elections since the end of the 14-year conflict consumed UNMIL’s attention for most of 2005. More than 1 million Liberians went to the polls in October and about 800 000 in the November run-off elections, in which Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president—Africa’s first elected

\footnote{45 UNMIL staff, Interview with the author, 15 Nov. 2005.
\footnote{48 New York University, Center on International Cooperation (CIC), \textit{Annual Review of Global Peacekeeping Operations} (Lynne Reinner: Boulder, Colo., Feb. 2006), pp. 54–61.} UNMIL’s role was to provide security, assist in the establishment of electoral offices throughout Liberia, and provide public information and voter education training. Persistent allegations that former President Charles Taylor was trying to disrupt Liberian politics and threats of possible large-scale violence cast a shadow over the process, but UNMIL’s substantial presence of 15,000 troops and the 1,800-strong, newly trained Liberian National Police proved to be effective deterrents.\footnote{44}

The restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) made little headway in 2005. Although phase I, which consisted of demobilizing the 9,000 irregular armed forces personnel, was completed, disagreement between international donors resulted in funding shortfalls, affecting the demobilization of the 4,000 AFL personnel due in phase II.\footnote{45} The delay in the demobilization process coupled with the refusal of squatters to vacate Camp Schiefflin, the site of the new AFL barracks, contributed to postponing the recruitment and training of the new AFL.\footnote{46} The core of security sector reform in Liberia is driven by the twin imperatives of enhancing operational efficiency and strengthening democratic governance. The reform process in Liberia has, to date, focused almost exclusively on the efficiency aspect; for it to be sustainable, efforts to improve democratic oversight of the security functions need to be strengthened.\footnote{47}

Economic governance was a central issue for peace-building in Liberia in 2005. In May, international partners, led by the European Commission and the World Bank, proposed an initiative for Liberia aimed at tackling public service corruption and at ensuring the proper management and accountability of Liberia’s public revenue streams. The plan provided for international control for a period of three years through the appointment of international experts with co-signature authority in the Central Bank and the finance and other key ministries.\footnote{48} Objecting to the plan as eroding Liberia’s sovereignty and as being tantamount to international trusteeship, in July the NTGL
presented its own proposal, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). A compromise plan, which retained the key co-signatory element of the international plan, was hammered out and, after much political pressure, the NTGL finally signed the agreement in September. GEMAP remains a controversial issue, but the newly installed government has indicated that it will accept the terms of the plan and work with the international community towards its implementation.

At the end of the year cautious optimism prevailed regarding Liberia. Given the relatively stable security environment, a drawdown of at least the military component of UNMIL is planned for 2006, and a concurrent augmentation of the civilian component is planned to secure the gains made thus far. The reshaping of UNMIL’s deployment is expected to draw on lessons from the Sierra Leonean model of gradual downsizing tied to specific benchmarks.

**Côte d’Ivoire**

In 2005 the impasse in the battle over the eligibility of the presidential candidates in Côte d’Ivoire brought the peace process there to a grinding halt and has resulted in a nearly three-year “no peace, no war” stalemate. Fresh violence was prompted by the failure to hold elections in October owing to the intransigence of the factions on issues relating to citizenship, voting rights and land ownership and also because of the subsequent decision by the AU to extend the term of the transitional president, Laurent Gbagbo, by a year. The stalled implementation of the 2004 Accra III Agreement not only hampered the ability of UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire to carry out its mandated tasks but also threatened the already fragile stability in the region. By the end of the year, the severity of the situation led UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for a sharp increase in the number of UNOCI troops in order to allow the mission to ‘react robustly’ if necessary. Alternatively, the Security Council


51 President Johnson-Sirleaf pointed out that her administration will put in place its own oversight programme so that the GEMAP plan would not need to be renewed beyond its initial timeframe. Johnson-Sirleaf, E., Inaugural address, Monrovia, 17 Jan. 2006, URL <http://allafrica.com/stories/200601170106.html>.


may consider redeploying troops from UNMIL to UNOCI, as allowed by Resolution 1609 ‘within the authorized personnel ceiling’, but this could run into various financial, procedural and political obstacles.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{AU and UN missions in Sudan}

After a series of intensive negotiations that lasted for two and half years, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), brought to an end one of Africa’s longest-running wars.\textsuperscript{57} A major new UN peace operation, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was established in March 2005 to support implementation of the agreement.

Notwithstanding a long lead time, the deployment of the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in 2004 and participation by the DPKO in the political negotiations of the CPA, UNMIS faced difficulties throughout 2005 in building up the mission.\textsuperscript{58} By the end of the year UNMIS was operating at only a third of its authorized capacity. Military and civilian elements were deployed in the south to monitor the security elements of the CPA and in support of the fledgling Government of Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, implementation of the CPA made slow but steady headway in 2005. The establishment of state institutions in Southern Sudan, however, proved to be a major challenge, partly because of a lack of resources. Capacity building in policing, the rule of law and human rights was initiated through various training programmes. The facilitation of the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) showed more tangible dividends—500 000 persons have returned home.\textsuperscript{59} The mandate of UNMIS allows for a robust approach to protecting civilians in areas where it is deployed. However, its ability to do more than deal with minor disturbances in its immediate vicinity is questionable. Even when the mission reaches full strength, it will have neither the mandate nor the capacity to deal with a major breakdown in security in Sudan. The slow progress in Southern Sudan has led many Sudanese to feel that the peace dividend is small.\textsuperscript{60}

The continued worsening of the conflict in Darfur led to the deployment of the African Union’s second-ever peace operation.\textsuperscript{61} The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was originally deployed in Darfur in June 2004,

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\item \textsuperscript{57} On the conflict in Sudan see chapter 2 in this volume.
\item \textsuperscript{58} New York University (note 48), pp. 34–41.
\item \textsuperscript{60} ‘Little cheer from Sudan peace’, BBC News Online. 9 Jan. 2006, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/4594242.stm>.
\item \textsuperscript{61} The AU was the lead mediator in negotiating a series of agreements for resolution of the conflict in Darfur. They include the 2004 N’djamena Agreement, Addis Ababa Agreement and Abuja Protocols. On these agreements see URL <http://www.unsusdanig.org/emergencies/darfur/index.htm>.
\end{itemize}
with only 60 unarmed observers and a protection force of 300 soldiers mandated to monitor both parties’ compliance with the agreement.\(^{62}\) The option of establishing a joint UN–AU protection force was considered at the time, but it was dropped because of the AU’s determination to succeed in Darfur and because the Sudanese Government opposed the deployment of non-African troops.\(^{63}\) The decision to rely on AU monitors, peacekeepers and police had broad support: African leaders viewed it as an opportunity to establish the AU’s credentials as the primary political–military institution in Africa.

As events on the ground unfolded, it quickly became evident that AMIS was woefully inadequate and that it was necessary to significantly ‘scale up’ the mission in order to make an impact on the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur.\(^{64}\) Thus, in the wake of heightened media and political pressure, in October 2004 the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the enhancement of the mission’s strength to just over 3000 personnel and gave it a more robust mandate.\(^{65}\)

The fundamental objective of AMIS in 2005 was to overcome its own persistent deployment and operational challenges. Following an AU-led Assessment Mission in March 2005, AMIS was again expanded, to a force of 6171 military personnel and 1586 civilian police.\(^{66}\) At the same time it was acknowledged that it could not be made larger without a corresponding increase in its capacity to equip, transport and finance the large number of troops required. Accordingly, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to provide AMIS with strategic airlift, in-mission training in areas of command and control and operational planning, as well as financial and material support.\(^{67}\) The mission finally reached full strength at the end of October. Its new tasks included helping to create ‘a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief; the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes’; protection of civilians ‘under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity’ within the limits of its resources and capabilities; and proactive deployment to areas where trouble was expected ‘in order to deter armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population’, not just in response to reports of violations.\(^{68}\) However, since the creation of AMIS, there

\(^{62}\) AMIS was established by the Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur on 28 May 2004 as an observer mission and was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1556, 30 July 2004.

\(^{63}\) New York University (note 48).


have been 170 reported violations of the 2004 N’djamena Agreement and over 700 deaths.\\(^{69}\)

At the end of 2005, UN Secretary-General Annan declared Darfur to be in a state of anarchy.\\(^{70}\) Equipment shortages, combined with intelligence and communications problems, were still sapping the operational efficiency of AMIS and prevented it from carrying out its duties. The mission itself was a target of repeated attacks in 2005. There were also reports that the government had painted its military vehicles in the white colours of the AU’s ceasefire monitors during attacks in North Darfur.\\(^{71}\) While the international community continues to work for local consent to its activities in Darfur, the collapse of the situation in the autumn of 2005 suggested that this may be a vain hope. Events towards the end of the year raised questions about the peacekeepers’ capacity to respond to widespread and systematic violence and the intertwined challenges facing UNMIS and AMIS were plentiful. They included constant delays by the ruling National Congress Party to comply with the ‘sharing’ principles embodied in the CPA, the problem of how to deal with marginalized opposition groups throughout Sudan, and the slow build-up of state institutions in the South.

The AU experiment in Darfur became in 2005 a critical test of Africa’s ability to assume responsibility for regional crises. If it succeeds, this could substantially enhance the international community’s ability to halt future human rights catastrophes in Africa. The challenge posed by the multiple conflicts in Sudan is a test of the ability of the UN, the AU and a host of other organizations to work cohesively to assist a fragile and lengthy peace process. The AU’s fundamental vulnerability remained its dependence on external financial support. For instance, despite initial promises of support, the USA decided to withdraw the $50 million it had pledged to AMIS.\\(^{72}\) Meanwhile, on the ground the AU’s valiant efforts to halt the violence have not succeeded. The AU seems ready to integrate AMIS into the existing UNMIS or into a separate UN mission.\\(^{73}\) This option would ensure that the mission had more reliable sources of funding and better-equipped and -trained personnel.

**EU and UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

EU engagement in the DRC is not new: the EU launched its first out-of-area military mission, Operation Artemis, in 2003 to assist the UN Operation in the DRC (MONUC) to clamp down on insurgent attacks in Ituri. Since then, the

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EU has redoubled its efforts to help bring stability to the DRC with two civilian crisis management missions in 2005—the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) and the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC DR Congo). Both missions were launched to provide assistance in security sector reform, particularly in the formation of an integrated DRC national police force. The EU’s past experience in capacity building in the Balkans makes it well placed to lead such missions.

EUPOL Kinshasa, a civilian police mission consisting of 30 police officers, was established in April 2005 to assist the DRC Government in its efforts to consolidate internal security, complementing the previously launched Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa. EUPOL Kinshasa is mandated to monitor, mentor and advise the IPU once IPU personnel have been trained and become operational under a Congolese chain of command. The purpose of the mission is to ensure that the unit acts in accordance with its training and with best international practices. EUPOL Kinshasa operates in the framework of UN–EU cooperation in crisis management, and so far this has functioned relatively smoothly. The main criticism of the mission (perhaps directed more at the institutional level than at the mission itself) is its size—EUPOL Kinshasa is considerably smaller than both the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The subsequent launch of EUSEC DR Congo, a mission for security reform, is intended to further strengthen EUPOL’s implementation, with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, or Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Following the model of the EU’s mission in Georgia, where civilian experts were embedded in relevant ministeries, EUSEC DR Congo will comprise eight EU advisers assigned to posts in the DRC’s newly integrated military structure, the army general staff, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, the Joint Operational Committee and the Ministry of Defence.

While the EU has focused its efforts on institutional capacity building in the security sector, the UN concentrates its efforts on bringing stability to the eastern part of the DRC. In 2005 the strength of MONUC was almost doubled, from 10 800 to 17 500 personnel, and its mandate was expanded, in terms of both the tasks it was to accomplish and its ability to use force to accomplish them. Following brutal attacks on several UN peacekeepers, a three-phase military campaign plan—carried out in conjunction with troops from the FARDC—orchestrated to gain control of territories occupied by rebel forces, starting with the province of Ituri and followed by the North and South Kivu provinces. In an innovative step to improve command and control of forces

operating in a demanding environment, the mission created a Divisional Head-
quarters, located in Kisangani. It is responsible for tactical operations against
the militia groups and foreign armed combatants in Ituri and the Kivu
provinces. Repeating the model employed in West Africa, MONUC also
worked with the UN Mission in Burundi to prevent cross-border
infiltration of combatants. MONUC’s increasingly robust posture from 2003
onward reflects the UN’s determination to bring the DRC peace process to a
successful conclusion, which is not possible without the creation of a secure
environment for the holding of credible elections.

Despite the increasingly militarized nature of the mission, MONUC has
taken on a widening range of tasks related to the DRC’s political, economic
and social transition. A successful programme of voter registration was also
undertaken throughout the country, in anticipation of a constitutional referen-
dum at the end of the year and elections scheduled for June 2006.76

The year 2005 ended on a mixed note for peace operations in the DRC. The
security situation in eastern DRC remained perilous, while attempts to
integrate the FARDC and police have produced marginal results.

The way forward for African capacities in peace operations

International efforts to boost African capacities to conduct peace operations
intensified in 2005.77 They include the G8’s commitment to assist the AU in
building a peacekeeping force, the African Standby Force (ASF), to consist of
five regional brigades (West, South, East, Central and North) and a total of
nearly 25,000 personnel by 2010, as part of the AU’s Common African
Defence and Security Policy. The G8 is also committed to supporting inter-
national training programmes across Africa and the EU’s Africa Peace
Facility.78 The G8 Africa Action Plan, adopted at its 2002 Summit, set out a
detailed list of AU priority areas which the G8 is committed to support,
focusing on human rights and political governance as well as on economic
issues.79 The Africa Action Plan also generally mentioned the promotion of

76 United Nations, Special report of the Secretary-General on election in the Democratic Republic of
77 On regional peacekeeping efforts see Dwan, R. and Wiharta, S., ‘Multilateral peace missions’,
SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press:
<http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%20a%20
Comm.Af%20Def%20Sec.pdf>; and Group of Eight (G8), ‘G8 Factsheet: Peace and security in Africa
today’, URL <http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=
Page&cid=1119518704554>. This decision is congruent with the commitments of the Kananaskis
79 The G8 Africa Action Plan was released at Kananaskis, Canada, on 27 June 2002. See URL
peace and security, but its only specific, time-limited commitment was ‘to deliver a joint plan, by 2003, for the development of African capability to undertake peace support operations, including at the regional level’. A report on the progress in implementing the Action Plan was duly presented to the 2003 and 2004 G8 summits. In 2004 the G8 members committed themselves to train ‘and, where appropriate, equip’ 75 000 troops worldwide by 2010. However, although the reports read as if much has been achieved, in practice there have been more words than action or financial support. The plan for the promised development of African capacity in peace support operations itself acknowledged freely that ‘it will take time and considerable resources to create, and establish the conditions to sustain, the complete range of capabilities needed to fully undertake complex peace support operations and their related activities’.

Over the past decade, regional security arrangements have been given the licence and some means to develop their own capacity. The recent AU initiatives are the latest in this evolutionary process. However, because of resource limitations, African security arrangements, including the most recent AU initiatives, can hardly be seen as self-sufficient. For example, the ASF will have half the number of personnel that the UN has deployed on the continent—and the demand for deployments is on the rise. AU members currently contribute nearly half (43 per cent) of the number of troops deployed in UN operations in Africa. Given the need for troop rotation and the likelihood that the brigades will be composed at least partially of already deployed troops, the implications are clear: a large gap would have to be filled before AU member states can assume primary operational responsibility for peace operations on the continent. Success of the ASF and of African security organizations in general in carrying out peace operations hinges on the capacity to plan and develop missions quickly, on the establishment of rosters of mission leadership, on having the necessary military, police and civilian experts for mission start-up, and on the development of a logistics base. All these are critical elements which so far have been given too little attention.

IV. Conclusions

The missions surveyed in this chapter demonstrated the austere realities of peace-building in Africa in 2005 and the problems that will continue to challenge peace operations in 2006. At the close of 2005, the MONUC, UNMIL, UNMIS and UNOCI missions placed a severe strain on the UN. If calls for the UN to take over AMIS are heeded, then certainly the DPKO and the newly created Peacebuilding Commission are likely to become over-

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burdened quickly. The success of UNAMSIL is attributed to the long-term commitment of the international community and serves as a reminder that peace-building is a long process. The efforts described in this chapter have the aim of boosting the capacity for peace operations in Africa—to enhance the ability of regional actors and organizations in Africa, of external countries and of the UN system to respond more quickly, consistently and effectively in order to halt violent and destabilizing conflicts on the continent. Africa’s wider security architecture may have been put in place, but considerable operational challenges remain. The AU’s recent experience in Darfur highlights one of the stark realities of African peacekeeping: the level of activity and success was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but by financial constraints, lack of technical know-how and appropriate transport mechanisms. The poor showing of the AU in Darfur underlines that its capacity to launch complex peace operations in a sustainable manner remains embryonic. This provides a strong argument for the international community to seriously consider the recommendations of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that the UN should provide equipment for regional operations and that such operations, when appropriate, should be financed from the UN peacekeeping budget.