2. Major armed conflicts

CAROLINE HOLMQVIST*

I. Introduction: changes in conflicts

Analysis of armed conflict has been a standing feature of the SIPRI Yearbook since the publication of the first edition, in 1969. Even a cursory glance at the conflicts of the past four decades reveals significant changes in both the dynamics and conceptualization of conflicts. Notably, the geopolitical framework has evolved, and attempts have been made to adjust international laws and norms in the light of the increasing prominence of non-state over state actors in conflict.¹

While the bipolar structure of the international system during the cold war was sometimes characterized as a ‘long peace’ between the Soviet Union and the United States, it had a decidedly non-peaceful impact internationally, as the conflicts in Angola, Korea and Viet Nam testified.² The convergence of motives of ideology and power politics resonated with a second main theme of conflicts during the 1960s: national self-determination.³ Wars of liberation in Africa, Asia and Latin America frequently assumed the shape of proxy conflicts, with one or other of the superpowers seeking to expand and consolidate its sphere of influence. While the end of the cold war brought optimism about a new potential for peaceful resolution of conflict in the absence of the superpower stand-off, distinct new conflict themes have emerged.⁴

During the 1990s much attention was devoted to the rise of ‘ethnic’ conflicts (e.g., those in the former Soviet republics, the Balkans and Rwanda) as well as to conflicts featuring state weakness and competition for the control of natural resources.⁵ Although the issue of statehood remained a central concern,

¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the changing dynamics of international security politics over the past 40 years see the Introduction in this volume.
³ The passing of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was a significant landmark in this respect. UN General Assembly Resolution 1541, 14 Dec. 1960. This and other General Assembly resolutions are available at URL <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>.

* SIPRI interns Sara Lindberg and Haruko Matsuoka assisted the author in the preparation of this chapter.

SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
‘ethnic’ and resource wars appeared to shift the emphasis from national self-determination to the issue of ‘good’ or equitable governance. However, the international transition from bi- to multi-polarity did not quite deliver on the initial post-cold war expectations of international cooperation in dealing with violent conflict. The broad international consensus that developed around the first Gulf War, in 1991, failed tragically to translate into collective action in the face of the impending genocide in Rwanda in 1994. By the time of the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, a deadlock in the United Nations (UN) Security Council led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to intervene without UN sanction.

Significant change has also occurred with regard to international norms governing the use of force. Forty years ago it was difficult to hold non-state actors accountable under the international norms and laws of war—most importantly, international humanitarian law and human rights law. The addition in 1977 of Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions represents the most significant attempt to confront the inherent state bias in the provisions of international law, imposing on non-state armed actors the same obligations regarding conduct in war as had previously been defined for states—thus altering the legal personality and standing of non-state actors in international law. It was only in the 1980s and 1990s that leading organizations advocating respect for human rights, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, altered their definitions of human rights abuses to include acts committed by non-state actors. Although the broadening of the human rights framework is a considerable achievement, the international community’s capacity to hold armed non-state actors accountable for breaches of international humanitarian law remains limited.


Certain conflicts seemed to escape the notion of statehood entirely, however—notably recent conflicts featuring religious aims. On religiously motivated violence see appendix 2C.


Previously, it was argued that, because states are responsible for upholding human rights on their territory, states are by definition the only abusers of human rights. For further discussion see, e.g., Menkhaus, K., ‘Warlords and landlords: non-state actors and humanitarian norms in Somalia’, Paper presented at the conference on Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups, Armed Groups Project, Vancouver, Canada, 13–15 Nov. 2003, URL <http://www.armedgroups.org/>.

Sriram, C. L., ‘Achieving accountability for armed non-state groups: the use of domestic mechanisms for international crimes’, Paper presented at the conference on Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups (note 9); and Holmqvist, C., ‘Engaging armed non-state actors in post-
Discussions in the late 1990s on the emergence of ‘new wars’ coincided with the analysis of ‘new security threats’—threats or risks that were non- or supranational and non-military in nature. In effect, the global discourse on security shifted from geopolitics in the traditional sense to normative (with the spread of the human rights culture and human security agenda) and functional concerns. However, the ‘new’ functional threats of international terrorism, organized crime, state failure, trafficking in humans and illegal substances, environmental hazards, disease and uncontrolled migration could not be neatly separated from conflicts; and both debates brought to the forefront the role of non-state actors, frequently with transnational links. The Human Security Report 2005 reinvigorated discussion about the relevance of the traditional focus on state actors in conflicts: in addition to measuring battle-related deaths in conflicts between the government of a state and one or more opposition groups, it recorded the categories of ‘non-state conflict’ and ‘one-sided violence’, highlighting the increasing significance of the activity of non-state actors. The fact that non-state conflicts—conflicts involving the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state—were found to outnumber those involving state parties in 2002 and 2003 (the only years for which data are available) indicates that the international community needs to find more effective ways of addressing non-state actors.

Section II of this chapter discusses two conflicts that have outlived (or reflected) global changes over the past few decades: the conflict in Israel (Palestine) and that in India (Kashmir). Section III focuses on non-state actors in conflict and elaborates on three themes that have been associated with their increased role in contemporary conflicts. It includes synopses of selected conflicts that were prominent in 2005 and which illustrate some of the key

University of British Columbia, Human Security Centre (note 4), parts I, II and V.


dimensions of the involvement of non-state actors in conflict today. Section IV looks exclusively at Iraq, which perhaps most clearly reflects the complexity of conflicts involving high levels of violence by non-state actors. Section V concludes with lessons for conflict management. Appendix 2A presents the findings of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and appendix 2B provides definitions, sources and methods for the UCDP data. Appendix 2C outlines the current discussion of Islamist violence and terrorist incidents.

II. Enduring conflicts

Important features of conflict have remained constant over the past four decades despite far-reaching changes in the nature of the actors involved and the normative frameworks evoked. Numerous conflicts take place in the same location today as in the 1960s: for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India (Kashmir), Israel (Palestine) and Colombia. The flare-up of loyalist violence in Northern Ireland in September 2005 and the unresolved issue of Basque separatism in Spain are other reminders of the persistence of low-intensity conflict. The conflicts in India (Kashmir) and Israel (Palestine) in particular demonstrate how shifting perceptions of conflict—from decolonization and superpower dominance to the current preoccupation with international terrorism—have influenced international attitudes and engagement, or the lack thereof, in certain conflicts. Despite the continuity in the insurgent groups’ ultimate objectives in both conflicts (control over disputed territory and sovereign statehood), both cases also illustrate a changing trajectory of conflict owing to the particularities of contemporary non-state actor activity.

Israel–Palestinians

The conflict between the Israeli Government, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and various Palestinian groups stands out as one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. Originating in the war of 1948–49, the current phase of the conflict began in September 2000 with the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the beginning of the second intifada. The election of Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen), a moderate who is viewed positively by the United States, as President of the PA on 9 January 2005 raised hopes for a reinvigoration of the peace process. The first top-level meeting in four years between Israeli and Palestinian leaders took place at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt,
on 8 February and, although both leaders stopped short of using the term ‘ceasefire’, coordinated declarations from the two leaders offered prospects of a temporary truce.20

The challenges faced by President Abbas in reining in militant elements of the Palestinian uprising were underscored by the 25 February suicide bombing outside a Tel Aviv nightclub. Officials of the Islamic Jihad organization in the West Bank and Damascus, Syria, later claimed responsibility for the bombings.21 The PA made several arrests in the aftermath of the bombings.22 Another suicide bomb attack in the coastal town of Netanya, on 12 July, also claimed by Islamic Jihad, killed three people and caused the Israeli army to again seal off the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, following four months of relative calm.23 Repeated instances of Israeli use of force against Palestinian civilians continued to stir unrest in the occupied territories.24

Great hope was pinned on the high-level meeting of representatives of the ‘Quartet’ (Russia, the USA, the European Union and the United Nations), President Abbas, and a number of other states and organizations that was organized by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in London on 1 March. Although the participants made a commitment to support Palestinian plans for capacity building in the areas of governance, security and economic development, the meeting failed to have a tangible impact on the peace process because Israel did not attend it. The USA later pledged $50 million in direct aid to the PA during 2005.25

Under the disengagement plan of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, withdrawal from the occupied territories in the Gaza Strip began in July amid

widespread protest from hard-line Israeli settlers. On 15 August 2005 the main crossing point was sealed off and the remaining settlers were forcibly evicted. Thousands of PA security forces were deployed to prevent militant attacks during the Israeli pull-out. In addition, some 10,000 Israeli troops were required to clear out two of the West Bank settlements, where withdrawal attracted fierce resistance from radical Zionists from across Israel and abroad. Violence rose again in mid-October: responsibility for the killing of three Israelis outside Gush Etzion, a northern West Bank town, was claimed by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and Israeli forces launched missile attacks on the Gaza Strip, killing eight Palestinians. Attacks by Hezbollah on northern Israel and the Golan Heights led to repeated clashes between Israeli and Hezbollah fighters on the Lebanese border. Such events, together with air strikes in Lebanon at the end of November, indicated the continued regional, and indeed global, repercussions of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

At the end of the year there were more positive signs of the Palestinian prospects for statehood. Great symbolic value was attached to the formal establishment of Palestinian control of the Gaza Strip’s border crossing with Egypt at Rafah on 25 November: Israel has controlled the perimeter of Gaza since the 1967 Six-Day War, and crossing the border into or out of Gaza has been notoriously difficult. Nevertheless, prospects for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict (envisaged to be completed by 2005 under the 2003 ‘roadmap to peace’) still seemed remote at the end of the year. President Abbas maintained the same minimum conditions for peace as his predecessor, Yasser Arafat: Israeli withdrawal from all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; designation of East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state; and a negotiated right of return for Palestinian refugees. In December, the success of Hamas in municipal elections led to Israeli apprehension regarding the

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Palestinian parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2006. Speculations about future political realignment also on the Israeli side started when Sharon left the Likud Party and then had serious health problems. Although classic issues of political leadership were central to the conflict at the close of 2005, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict demonstrated that protracted conflicts can also assume new characteristics and patterns, often related to the activity of non-state actors.

India–Pakistan

The Indian and Pakistani governments have vied for control over the territory of Kashmir since 1947. A Line of Control (LOC) divides Kashmir into two main parts administered by India and Pakistan, with a smaller area under Chinese control. Subsequently, rivalry between the two nuclear weapon powers India and Pakistan has been complicated by the territorial insurgency in Kashmir, and the conflict is estimated to have cost around 45,000 lives. The Composite Dialogue, initiated in early 2004, continued to offer prospects of tangible improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations in 2005, although tensions mounted temporarily in January with mutual accusations of violations of the LOC. Several confidence-building measures were undertaken during the year; for instance, bus services were started between Pakistan- and India-controlled Kashmir. Moreover, the two governments made a commitment to increase trade and facilitate transit across the frontier, and deals were struck on security cooperation. The devastating earthquake that struck Kashmir on 8 October and the resulting humanitarian catastrophe—in which over 74,000 people were killed and 3 million made homeless in the Kashmir region—prompted both sides to make conciliatory gestures. However, it was not until a month after the earthquake that the LOC was opened to allow

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34 Since 1947 there have been 3 periods of armed conflict between the 2 states for control of Kashmir: 1947–49, 1965 and 1999. Most recently, the transfer of Pakistani militant groups to Kashmir in May 1999 precipitated the so-called 'Kargil war'.
transit for relief agencies. India continued in 2005 to accuse Pakistan of supporting extremist groups in Kashmir, and allegations of Islamabad’s support for infiltrations across the LOC were often followed by retaliations by Indian troops against members of Kashmiri militant groups.

Developments in interstate relations provided only a partial picture of the developments in Kashmir in 2005. The emergence of new armed groups in the region and the purported links between Kashmiri extremist groups and international Islamist networks, accompanied by a shift in emphasis from secular nationalism to Islamist goals, was testimony to the fluidity of the insurgency. Thus the Lashkar-e-Toiba group, the first in Kashmir to espouse jihadist aims in 1999, has officially ceased to exist but is believed to have broken up into several smaller groups with similar aims, one of which (the Inqilabi) claimed responsibility for the major bomb attacks in New Delhi on 29 October, which killed 59 and injured 210 people. Local elections were held for the first time in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the beginning of the year but separatists’ calls for a boycott of the elections and violence led to low voter turnout, and on 24 February militants stormed government buildings in Srinagar. There was a rise in violence in the summer months. Despite the announcement in the autumn of a ceasefire by the United Jihad Council, an umbrella body of Kashmiri separatists, this did not result in any lasting renunciation of insurgent violence.


41 The pro-independence Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), previously at the forefront of the insurgency, is perceived as less active, while more religiously motivated groups—such as the Save Kashmir Movement (SKM), Hizbul Mujahideen, Farzandan-e-Milat and al-Badr—have increasingly taken centre stage. ‘Who are the Kashmiri insurgents?’, BBC News Online, 6 Apr. 2005, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/4416771.stm>. See also Council on Foreign Relations, Questions & answers website, ‘Kashmir militant extremists’, URL <http://cfterrorism.org/groups/harakat.html>.


III. Non-state actors in conflict

Non-state actors in conflict have received considerable attention in recent years, highlighting the challenges of even defining or reliably identifying, let alone dealing with, these actors. At the same time, it has become increasingly difficult to adequately define ‘state actors’, inter alia because of the extensive use of private companies to carry out functions traditionally associated with the state in the context of armed conflict. In broad terms, however, ‘armed non-state actors’ can be said to include rebel opposition groups and other groups not under state control (militias, warlords, vigilantes, and so on) that use armed force for a variety of purposes, often ‘shadowing’ the equivalent functions of the state. This definition does not view ‘terrorist groups’ as necessarily distinct from other armed non-state actors: armed groups have used terrorist tactics throughout history. Three key themes that emerge from a focus on armed non-state actors in conflict are discussed below: (a) the frequent irregularity or fluidity of non-state actors and the challenges this poses for the management and resolution of conflicts; (b) the scope for state actors to deny the existence of ‘conflict’ (traditionally understood as physical confrontation between two parties with a stated incompatibility) when faced with non-state opposition; and (c) the artificiality of distinct ‘conflict’, ‘post-conflict’ and ‘peace’ phases given the frequent presence and activity of armed non-state actors throughout.

The fluidity of non-state actors

Armed non-state groups vary considerably in their degree of organization and cohesiveness. They are liable to splinter into different factions, to re-form under new command or resurface as yet more loosely bound entities, and to be
backed up by international networks. The presence of several irregular armed
groups may lead to a fragmentation of violence, thereby drawing in civilians
as both targets and perpetrators. The arming of civilians has occurred in var-
ious places: for example, in Colombia, in soldados campesinos (peasant
soldiers) have been trained and armed by the central government. In Nigeria,
the Bakassi Boys have periodically been sponsored by state authorities and
have even been given official status as the Anambra State Vigilante Services,
despite documented abuses of human rights. Conflicts featuring irregular
non-state actors are particularly prone to a blurring of the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants.

Demographic patterns (both national and regional) provide part of the
explanation for the fluidity in the composition of armed non-state actors. In
particular, large populations of unemployed and marginalized youth provide
recruitment pools for armed groups, as the West African cases of Côte
d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrate. Abducted children are forced to
carry out much of the insurgency waged by the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) in Uganda. Similarly, disenfranchised refugee populations may be
tempted to join armed groups, such as the refugees in Guinea’s Région
Forestière or refugees from Myanmar in northern Thailand. In other cases,
the fluidity of non-state actors may result from direct state policies: for
instance, the USA has raised and funded local ‘irregular brigades’ in Iraq to
stem the insurgency there.

50 ‘Fluidity’ as used here is in part derived from the concept of ‘liquidity’ used by sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman to argue that social relationships in the post-modern world are more brittle and
concept of liquidity has been used in writings on international security; see, e.g., Coker, C., ‘NATO’s
unbearable lightness of being’, RUSI Journal, vol. 149, no. 3 (June 2004).

51 Human Rights Watch (HRW)/Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN), ‘The
Bakassi Boys: the legitimization of murder and torture’, Human Rights Watch, vol. 14, no. 5 (May
2002); and HRW, ‘Rivers and blood: guns, oil and power in Nigeria’s river states’, HRW Briefing Paper,
Feb. 2005. See also Ero, C., Vigilantes, civil defence forces and militia groups: the other side of the

52 Research in 2005 showed significant re-recruitment of ‘demobilized’ ex-fighters across the sub-
region of West Africa. Human Rights Watch, ‘Youth, poverty and blood: the lethal legacy of Africa’s
regional warriors’, Human Rights Watch, vol. 17, no. 5 (13 Apr. 2005). For a discussions of the
relationship between youth, underemployment and conflict see Picciotto, R., Olonisakin, F. and Clarke,
pp. 152–53.

53 It is estimated that the LRA has abducted a total of 25 000 children since 1986. Amnesty Interna-
590162005>.

54 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) Web special, ‘Guinea: living on the edge’,
IRINews.org, Jan. 2005, URL <http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/guinea/default.asp>; and Milner,
J. and Loescher, G., International Institute for Strategic Studies, Protracted Refugee Situations:
Domestic and International Security Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 375 (Oxford University Press:

55 ‘Middle East and North Africa: Iraq’, IISS (note 47), pp. 173–74. For more detail on Iraq see
section IV below.
Several conflicts in 2005 demonstrated how the irregularity of armed non-state actors may cause conflicts to assume the characteristics of an insurgency. Mounting tension and periodic violence perpetrated by loosely organized groups in southern Thailand constitute one such example: the insurgency, which began in early 2004, worsened considerably in mid-2005. From the perspective of conflict management and resolution, groups with a fluid or irregular structure are particularly difficult to negotiate a peace with—in part because it is difficult to discern the dominant party and the leadership may be unclear (as in Somalia). Much of the attention devoted to ‘lessons of counter-insurgency’ in 2005 focused on the US strategy in Iraq (see section IV), but the problem of dealing with a fluid opposition was not unique to that setting. Similar developments in Kashmir showed that dealing with irregular non-state actors complicated conflict resolution efforts. In 2005 the efforts to manage the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, were notably complicated by a lack of cohesiveness on the part of the non-state actors.

Sudan

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 2005, formally ended Sudan’s long-standing conflict in the south between the National Islamic Front (NIF) Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It provided for a sharing of revenues from natural resources and partial autonomy for the south. A new Government of National Unity was sworn in on 9 July, with SPLM/A leader John Garang as vice-president and the former rebels receiving 28 per cent of the positions in the national transitional administration. The death of Garang on 31 July and the ensuing riots and violence in Khartoum and several southern towns, killing at least 130 people, raised serious concerns over the fate of the peace process. Despite the quick identification of a successor to Garang—Salva Kiir Mayardit—progress on implementation of the CPA and democratic reform were lagging. Moreover, local populations in the south were still affected by

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60 In Khartoum 84 people were killed after thousands of southern Sudanese clashed with police; similar unrest was reported in Juba and other southern towns in government-controlled areas. England, A., ‘Khartoum suffers third day of ethnic violence’, Financial Times, 4 Aug. 2005; and Integrated Regional Information Network for the Horn of Africa (IRIN-HOA), ‘Leaders call for calm as death toll rises to 130’, IRIN-HOA Weekly Round-up 288, 30 July–5 Aug. 2005.
violence during the year, often at the hands of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), a band of government-aligned militias.61

The conflict in Darfur between the Government of Sudan and several rebel groups has killed at least 200,000 people and displaced over 2 million since 2003. In 2005 it remained a grave threat both to the lives of local populations and to regional security, particularly because of criminal activities and clashes across the border with Chad.62 Extreme violence against civilians continued and led to further displacements during the year.63 Moreover, members of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) were repeatedly targeted, together with humanitarian agencies and aid workers.64 While the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) remained the main groups opposing the government, several other factions, such as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), which emerged as a breakaway group from the JEM in 2004, continued to operate in the region. The proxy use of the Janjaweed militias by Khartoum in attacks on civilians in the region continued, in violation of the ceasefire agreements reached in April 2004.65

Efforts to instigate a comprehensive peace process, led by the African Union (AU), were compromised by the irregularity of the Darfurian groups and the corresponding failure to identify adequate and able representation from the rebel side.66 On 5 July the government, the SLM/A and the JEM signed the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur, which stated the need for a negotiated settlement but failed to spell out all the details.67 Statements by rebel leaders indicated their scepticism about the process, and the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, backed by the AU, did not resume until 15 September. The failure of one faction of the SLM/A to participate derailed the process from the outset and the talks were largely ineffective, lending to an increase in violence.68 On 20 September, 500 SLM/A


fighters launched attacks and seized the town of Sheiria in southern Darfur; military officials blamed the SLM/A faction that had been absent from the Abuja talks, and a pro-government militia simultaneously attacked rebel strongholds in the Marra mountains, killing at least 40 people.\textsuperscript{69} Mutual accusations followed between the SLM/A delegation and government representatives that each side was purposely letting violence derail the talks, and the conflict in September reached an intensity not seen since January 2005.\textsuperscript{70} Leadership struggles within the SLM/A delayed the talks until 29 November,\textsuperscript{71} when the SLM/A was finally able to participate as a single party. However, no decisive agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, despite their agreement to resume the talks, and reaffirmation of the existing ceasefire agreement, the NMRD rebels did not attend the Abuja talks.\textsuperscript{73} However, the NMRD continued to threaten local populations during the year and was involved in heavy clashes with government forces in the northern Jebel Moon region in April.\textsuperscript{74} At the end of 2005, an intra-Darfur dialogue to consolidate the irregular armed groups appeared to be a precondition for negotiations and a relaunch of the peace process, along with an end to the ‘scorched earth’ policy of the government reflected in its use of the Janjaweed militia, which continued to inflict immense suffering on the civilian population.\textsuperscript{75}

**Disputing the existence of conflict**

Among the conflicts involving non-state actors, some stand out as having little or no foreign involvement, often because governments portray such conflicts as an ‘internal affair’. Violence by non-state actors is particularly likely to cause a blurring of the distinction between conflict and crime or between conflict and terrorism; defining or labelling an armed group as ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ may prove to be an effective way of denying that group a role as a polit-

\textsuperscript{69} ‘Sudan’s rebels seize Darfur town’, BBC News Online, 20 Sep. 2005, URL \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/4263926.stm>}.  
\textsuperscript{71} Abdul Wahid, the Chairman, and Mini Minavi, the Secretary-General, of the group were the main competitors for leadership of the SLM/A. ‘Rebels dispute delay peace talks’, Reuters, 18 Nov. 2005.  
\textsuperscript{72} ‘Darfur rebels “united” for talks’, BBC News Online, 29 Nov. 2005, URL \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/4480748.stm>}.  
The rejection of classic or traditional conflict management measures (negotiation and mediation) in favour of ‘law enforcement’ mechanisms is a tendency in the conflicts dominated by non-state actors. In such cases, international aid for border control to stem the movement of armed groups between states, the provision of military aid and training to foreign state forces, or interstate police and intelligence cooperation may amount to international engagement to mitigate the effects of conflict, rather than efforts directed at the root causes of conflict. The revival of the ‘responsibility to protect’ agenda (stipulating the responsibility of the international community to intervene, even militarily, to protect the lives of civilians in the face of impeding genocide or other large-scale crisis), and its inclusion in both the 2004 report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 2005 UN World Summit outcome document, should in principle signal greater international willingness to combat widespread and serious harm to civilian lives, although to what extent this will materialize remains to be seen.

However, international engagement in conflicts in 2005 was still to a large extent contingent on securing cooperation from the government in question. A case in point is the conflict in Colombia, where President Álvaro Uribe Vélez continued to refer only to a domestic problem of ‘narco-terrorism’; he also banned contact with the armed groups unless expressly sanctioned by the government and even explicitly forbade the use of the term ‘conflict’ by Colombian diplomats. The conflict between the Russian Government and Chechen separatists makes the point even more explicit, illustrating the scope for governments to deny the existence of ‘legitimate’ conflict when faced by non-state opposition and the impact of that denial on the international community’s capacity (or willingness) to engage in conflict management or resolution efforts.

Russia (Chechnya)

The second conflict between the Russian Government and Chechen separatists, which began in 1999, continued to pose a growing threat to the wider North Caucasus region in 2005. Russian President Vladimir Putin has gone to
great lengths to portray the problems in the region—including instability and insurgent attacks in the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia—as an internal concern for the Russian Federation of ‘organized crime’ or ‘terrorism’ rather than politically motivated ‘conflict’.80 Meanwhile, the toll of the conflict on civilian populations in Chechnya has been significant: one human rights organization estimates that there had been 3000–5000 ‘enforced disappearances’ in the country in the five-year period 2000–2004, and total casualties are estimated at 80 000–100 000 people, including civilians, Russian forces and Chechen fighters.81 Abductions (often of young men and relatives of rebel fighters), frequently at the hands of Russian forces, were still carried out with impunity in 2005.82

The Russian Government’s policy of ‘Chechenization’ (ironically also referred to as ‘normalization’) derives from its consistent denial of the continued existence of conflict.83 The main tenet of this policy has been to shift the task of fighting the insurgents to local forces, mainly the ‘Kadyrovtsy’ forces under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya (and son of the pro-Moscow President Akhmad Kadyrov, who was killed in rebel attacks in 2004). The Kadyrovtsy carried out numerous search (‘clean-up’) operations in 2005, also outside the Chechen republic, resulting in, for example, the capture of Chechen fighters in the Ingush town of Nazran in January.84 The Russian authorities accepted the activities of the Kadyrovtsy; indeed, some argue that they have endorsed them by giving the Hero of Russia award to Ramzan Kadyrov in December 2004.85 Perhaps the starkest, and most alarming, indication that Moscow eschewed any political solution to the conflict was the killing of rebel leader and former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov on 8 March by Russian forces, despite the fact that Maskhadov had publicly distanced himself from the use of terrorist tactics and had declared a unilateral ceasefire in February.86 In mid-April Russian Special

Forces suffered their greatest casualties since the Beslan siege of 2004, in a shoot-out with rebels in Grozny, Chechnya.87 Meanwhile, Russian (and Russian-backed) forces were unable to stem the spread of the insurgency across the region and in 2005 made several violent raids in Nalchik, Dagestan, in search of members of the Yarmuk rebel group. Rebels for the first time launched attacks on the town of Nalchik in southern Kabardino-Balkaria in October, resulting in at least 60 deaths.88

In its insistence on denying the existence of conflict, the Russian Government’s policy appears to be counterproductive, resulting rather in the promotion of radicalism. First, Abdul-Khalim Saidulaev succeeded Maskhadov as leader of the Chechen rebels in March and soon emerged as more radical than his predecessor by announcing the creation of a ‘Caucasian front’ to counter Russian influence.89 Shamil Basayev (who was previously linked to the Beslan hostage taking in 2004 and Moscow theatre siege in 2002, and was routinely condemned by Maskhadov) was made second in line in the Chechen rebel leadership in August.90 Moreover, the persecution of Muslims in the Russian Federation (including the closing of mosques) has only served to fuel confessional elements of the conflict, thereby pushing Chechen separatists closer to international jihadist networks.91 Third, the Russian policy on Chechnya has precluded effective engagement on the part of the international community with the conflict in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus. In a typical instance, a meeting held at the European Parliament in March 2005 was unproductive because the rebels were not represented there.92

Attempts at Chechen reform and ‘democracy’ were halting; the parliamentary elections held on 27 November, awarding a 61 per cent majority to the Kremlin-backed United Russia Party, were widely criticized as fraudulent and seen as concentrating effective power in the hands of Ramzan Kadyrov.93 The refusal to engage in dialogue with the Chechen rebels was not confined to

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88 Another Dagestani militant group, Sharia Jamaat, was found to be linked to Chechen separatists. Tumelty, P., ‘Chechnya and the insurgency in Dagestan’, Chechnya Weekly, vol. 6, no. 18 (11 May 2005); and Reuters, ‘Chechen rebel Basayev said he directed town raid’, 17 Oct. 2005.
Moscow but extended to the Chechen government under President Alu Alkhanov.94 Ultimately, progress in Chechnya and the wider Caucasus will only come about if the devastating socio-economic situation in the region is effectively addressed and basic state structures are established.95 Russia’s neglect in this respect has allowed the insurgency to recruit from an ever-growing pool of discontented and marginalized people. To further complicate developments, there were indications in 2005 that Russia’s reliance on the Kadyrovtsy posed a threat not only to local populations but also to the central government, as the private forces appeared increasingly unruly and at times clashed with Russian federal troops as well as Chechen police. The increased autonomy and licence of the Kadyrovtsy led some analysts to speculate about the development of ‘another war’ in the region.96

Violent peace?

The assumption that there are discrete ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ phases, which still informs most conflict prevention, management and peace-building efforts, often proves to be misleading. Instead, situations on the ground may more closely resemble a war–peace continuum, where armed non-state actors continue to commit acts of violence and exert pressure on local communities irrespective of a formal ending of conflict.97 In various ‘post-conflict’ circumstances, violence continues unabated even after peace agreements are signed or demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes have started, including the incorporation of groups into transitional government—sometimes owing to the formation of new warring parties (breakaway factions and changing allegiances) and in other cases to various groups being left outside the formal peace process (e.g., the Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi).98 It is increasingly recognized that peace-building is simultaneously post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention: the failure to instigate successful peace-building means the re-eruption of conflict, and ‘getting out of the “conflict cycle” at the right time’ remains a key challenge.99 Afghanistan and Haiti are both cases that continued to be affected by violence in 2005 despite extensive efforts by the international community. Similarly, the formation of

94 Interfax (Grozny), ‘Alkhanov will have no contact with wanted separatists’, 1 Dec. 2005.
96 ‘Putin’s heroes’ (note 83).
98 The full name of the group is the Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu–Forces nationales de libération, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–National Liberation Forces.
local vigilante groups in Liberia illustrates a situation of continuing insecurity and violence despite a formal ‘peace’.

In Côte d’Ivoire, both the rebels and the government appeared to accept a stalemate after the division of the country into a rebel-held north and a government-controlled south in 2002, as this allowed them to exercise control over their respective territories. Meanwhile, periodic violence continued to affect the country throughout 2005.

Developments in the Horn of Africa highlighted the danger of latent inter-state conflict as tensions mounted anew between Eritrea and Ethiopia in November. The role of neighbouring states was also called into question as the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, on 14 February sparked political turmoil—in this case Syria was accused of involvement and tensions mounted between the two states.

High rates of communal violence and crime constitute another indicator that societies which are not recognized as being at war may nonetheless be living in conditions that are far from peaceful, as illustrated by the cases of Brazil and Nigeria, each in their own way. The Democratic Republic of the Congo stands out as a case where numerous peace agreements have been signed but violence at the hands of non-state actors continues—also with a significant regional dimension. Moreover, developments in the DRC show how failure on the part of the international community to directly address armed non-state actors, other than through formal negotiating procedures, remains a significant challenge to effective conflict management and the protection of civilian populations.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The conflict between the DRC Government and various rebel groups formally ended with the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in

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The agreement was subsequently endorsed by all parties in connection with the approval of a two-year transitional constitution and the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government under President Joseph Kabila in July 2003. Despite this, the DRC continued to be plagued by violence in 2005 and peace remained elusive. Although a draft constitution was adopted by the National Assembly on 13 May, the national elections that were scheduled for June 2005 were postponed until March 2006. Mass protests greeted the postponement, and government forces responded by firing at demonstrators.

The Congolese transitional government forces—the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), or the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo—and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) continued to face attacks from various armed groups, primarily in the country’s eastern regions of Ituri, North and South Kivu, and the Katanga provinces. Insecurity was exacerbated as several parties in the transitional authority relied on the support of militias for influence in lieu of a political base. Fighting between the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, or the Congolese Rally for Democracy)-Goma and government forces was intense in North Kivu in the beginning of the year, and in March fighting between government forces and the Mayi-Mayi militia forced over 5000 people to flee. Facing opposition from at least five militias in Ituri province, MONUC forces suffered repeated attacks in January, and on 25 February responded by storming a stronghold of the rebel Front des nationalistes intégrationnistes (FNI, or the Nationalist Integrationist Front), killing 50–60 members of the militia in the worst fighting the UN has experienced in the DRC since the 1960s.

The presence of Rwandan rebels, organized under the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, or the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda), in eastern DRC continued to constitute a security threat and raise concerns about a re-engagement of Rwanda in Congolese affairs and further

105 The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed on 16 Dec. 2002. URL <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf>. The agreement was signed by the Government of the DRC, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RCD/ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N) and the Mayi-Mayi.

106 Opposition leaders inferred that the decision to postpone the elections was a convenient stalling manoeuvre by the transitional authority. ‘Peace is pricey’, Africa Confidential, vol. 46, no. 3 (4 Feb. 2005), p. 3.


108 On MONUC’s mandate and size see chapter 3 in this volume.


regional repercussions. The Tripartite Agreement, signed between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda on 21 April 2005, did not prevent violence: 18 civilians were killed and 50 taken hostage after an attack by the ‘Rastas’, another armed group dominated by Rwandans, on 23 May, and FDLR attacks on Kigalama village, South Kivu, caused a further 5000 villagers to flee in late July.

By the end of 2005 little substantial progress had been made on governance or effective post-conflict peace-building in eastern DRC. Apart from the direct physical security needs of civilian populations, the painstaking integration of rebel fighters into the FARDC exposed problems of corruption and impunity outside and within the state security apparatus. The relationship of local populations with both international forces and the FARDC remained problematic and subject to abuse by all parties. The burning alive of 39 villagers by Rwandan militia in South Kivu on 9 July, purportedly as a punishment for local support of UN forces, was a gruesome example. Despite progress made on demobilization of some rebel groups in eastern DRC, resulting in the official neutralization of the Forces armées du peuple Congolais (FAPC, or the People’s Armed Forces of Congo) and the Union of Congolese Patriots under Floribert Kisembo (UPC-K) by August, significant problems remained with reintegration of former combatants. The presence of a large number of unemployed former rebels and several remaining militia groups—the Union des patriotes congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots) under Thomas Lubanga (UPC-L), the FNI and the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI, or the Patriotic Resistance Forces in Ituri)— constituted a volatile mix in the eastern provinces. With the limited effect of the UN arms embargo on militia violence, the situation for large segments of the Congolese population in 2005 resembled war more than transition to a stable peace.

IV. Iraq

In SIPRI Yearbook 2005 the chapter on major armed conflicts noted how the situation in Iraq resembled a reversal of the classic spillover from intra-state to interstate conflict, as the international intervention had sowed the seeds of a
civil war; indeed, the country continued to move in that direction in 2005. From the restoration of sovereignty on 28 June 2004 and throughout 2005 the US-led Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq participated in the conflict on the side of the Iraqi Government, against various insurgent groups. While significant milestones were passed with respect to the political development of the country, violence continued unabated. The conflict in 2005 demonstrated to the extreme the difficulties of analysing and responding to non-state violence. Armed groups were irregular or fluid in structure, high crime rates complicated the distinction between conflict and crime, and the use of terrorist tactics, as well as links to international terrorist networks, to a great extent shaped perceptions of the insurgency and unfolding civil war. On 9 November 2005 the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to a one-year renewal (until 31 December 2006) of the UN mandate for the MNF under UN Security Council Resolution 1637, albeit with a stipulated revision of terms in June 2006 and earlier termination of MNF presence if expressly demanded by the Iraqi Government.

Political developments

The year 2005 was one of major political restructuring for the country, jump-started by the elections of 30 January. The results of the election—in which the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a multi-party, Shia-dominated group, took a 48 per cent majority and the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan came second, with 25.7 per cent of the votes—were perceived in many quarters as embodying a process that disadvantaged the Sunni minority in the country. Several Sunni parties, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), boycotted the elections, in part out of a fear of violent reprisals. The creation of the UIA was largely the initiative of Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Hussein Ali al-Sistani, the most respected Shiite religious leader in Iraq. With a high proportion of politically unaffiliated candidates, the UIA coalition looked fragile from the outset. After protracted negotiations, the new 275-member


121 Among others, the influential (Sunni) Muslim Scholars Board called for a boycott of the elections and various insurgent groups threatened voters. As a result, voter turnout in Sunni provinces ranged from c. 29% in Salaheddin to barely 2% in Anbar. ‘Shia delight and Sunni gloom’, The Economist, 19 Feb. 2005, pp. 38–39.

Transitional National Assembly finally convened on 16 March. The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) was formed on 28 April, under the leadership of President Jalal Talabani (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK) and Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari (from the Shia Islamist Dawaa Party). The main task of the ITG was the drafting of a permanent constitution, to pave the way for new national elections in December 2005.

Iraq’s ethnic and religious composition (broadly divided into approximately 20 per cent Sunni Arab, 60 per cent Shia Arab and 20 per cent Kurdish) featured as a baseline for discussion of the country’s political future. While the tripartite categorization of the Iraqi population into distinct communities is itself flawed (groups are rarely homogenous and in many areas coexist), the increasing politicization of ethnic or sectarian identity during the year created a dangerously self-perpetuating logic: ‘it appears that tripartite Iraq has become a political reality and the very framework in which political discourse takes place in today’s Iraq’.

Initially, the constitution drafting process was hampered by a lack of representation from the constituencies that did not participate in the January elections. Overtures were made by both the USA and Al-Sistani’s UIA to ensure the inclusion of Sunni representatives, but belatedly. The final draft of the constitution, approved by the parliament on 28 August, was widely portrayed as a flawed document. Analysts warned that ambiguities contained in the text created the risk of postponing the settlement of several key issues. Most notably, the constitution was inconclusive on the prospects for a federal structure for the country—a sticking point for many Sunni Arab politicians who feared that greater autonomy for the Kurdish north and the Shia south (potentially under Iranian influence) would divide the country and

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126 Only 2 of the initial 55 members of the Constitution Drafting Committee were Sunni Arabs. By 5 July, 15 Sunni Arab representatives were added to the 55-member committee. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004), UN document S/2005/585, 7 Sep. 2005, p. 2; and ICG, ‘Unmaking Iraq: a constitutional process gone awry’, Middle East Briefing no. 19, Amman and Brussels, 26 Sep. 2005, p. 2.
compromise their share of oil revenues in these regions. Further Sunni Arab opposition derived from provisions hinting at the exclusion of former Baath Party officials from public office.

The politicized nature of the constitution-drafting process was established from the outset. The scramble to ensure Sunni Arab participation at the beginning, but their marginalization in the final stages, meant that the process further entrenched ethnic–sectarian identities and, as a result, played into the hands of elements of the insurgency. The constitution was not only opposed by Sunnis, however, and an estimated 100,000 supporters of the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr (instrumental in triggering the Shia uprising in 2004) rallied in protest on 14 October 2005. As expected, the fate of the constitution in the referendum of 15 October was determined by reactions in Sunni-dominated provinces; the constitution was passed with only a razor-fine margin as Sunni Arab opponents failed to mobilize enough voters. Ironically, the constitution-drafting process became ‘a new stake in the political battle rather than an instrument to resolve it’.

Political developments in Iraq throughout the year were accompanied, and marred, by unabated violence. A surge in attacks preceded the January elections to the national assembly, and on the day of the elections suicide bombings and mortar attacks killed at least 30, mainly in Baghdad. In the worst single attack since the invasion in 2003, a suicide attack on 28 February in Hillah, a Shia town 100 km south of Baghdad, killed over 125 civilians, police and National Guard volunteers and wounded more than 140. The attack (claimed on an Islamist website by a group calling itself Jama’at al-Tawhid Wa al-Jihad, or the al-Qaeda Organization for Holy War in Iraq) was followed by mass protests in the city, where demonstrators expressed outrage at local police and security forces for failing to prevent the attack.

Yet another surge in violence followed the announcement of the members of the Transitional Government: from 28 April to 6 May, 10 major suicide bombings and 35 major attacks killed over 270 people. The constitution-drafting process was also directly affected by violence: the killing of three of

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129 ICG (note 126), p. 5.

130 On the Shia uprising and its consequences see Dwan and Holmqvist (note 15), pp. 113–16.

131 The constitution was rejected in the provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin by the two-thirds margin required for a veto (but in Nineveh by only 55%). Anderson, J. W., ‘Sunnis failed to defeat Iraq constitution’, Washington Post, 26 Oct. 2005.


the Sunni Arab representatives on the Constitutional Committee on 19 July led to a one-week boycott of the committee’s work by the Sunni Arab delegates.\(^{136}\) In the final days of the negotiations on the draft text tension mounted and, following a suicide attack on police forces in Baghdad, fierce gunfighting broke out in the city. Violence again followed the referendum on the constitution on 15 October as US forces clashed with insurgents in the town of Rutba in Anbar Province and across central and western Iraq.\(^{137}\) Meanwhile, there were indications that Shia groups around Basra interpreted the draft constitution as further consolidating their hold on the southern part of the country. Lethal roadside bombings and other attacks in mid-October pushed British troops further into retreat from the centre to the outskirts of the city.\(^{138}\)

**Patterns of the insurgency**

Several factors complicated analysis of the Iraqi insurgency in 2005. First, there was little reliable information on the size or composition of the insurgency. Estimates varied between 20,000 (the figure most frequently cited by US officials) and over 60,000 individuals, and attempts to draw up comprehensive lists showed significant variation.\(^{139}\) Many of the insurgents appeared to be ‘part-timers’, not formally associated with any one group; and civilians (both unemployed and criminal elements) were frequently co-opted.\(^{140}\) Evidence suggested that insurgent groups paid civilians to plant improvised explosive devices and offered bounties for the killing of government officials. Analysis of hostage-taking and kidnapping incidents indicated a three-tier structure where abductions were frequently carried out by hired ‘foot soldiers’, paid by organized criminal groups, which in turn acted as ‘contractors’ for insurgent groups.\(^{141}\) Suicide bombers were recruited from various constituencies, and the rate of attacks stood at a devastating average of 50 per month throughout 2005.\(^{142}\)


Second, difficulties encountered in determining the identity of and in categorizing insurgent groups in Iraq obscured clear analysis of their motives. High rates of both petty and spectacular violent crime complicated the distinction between politically and criminally motivated violence. Attempts to map the insurgency coalesced around the identification of three broad groups: Islamist (radical/Jihadi/Salafist/Wahhabi), Sunni Arab/nationalist (including ex-Baathist elements, as well as the Islamic Army of Iraq and Ansar al-Sunnah groups) and Shia (the most well-known being the Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade). Most analysts found the majority of insurgents to be Sunni Arab (one source estimated that close to 90 per cent of the attacks were perpetrated by Sunni Arab groups), while other sources suggested that a better characterization might be opposition groups operating in traditionally Sunni areas, or insurgents derived from formerly powerful groups, disenfranchised by the collapse of the complex structures of power and possession under the Baathist regime, which included networks defined in terms of tribe and clan.

Third, deconstructing an insurgency that was predominantly opposed to the US-led MNF and anti-government was complicated by the maintenance of militias by several groups that supported the government. Although Iraqi officials periodically suggested that reliance on local militias was necessary to ensure ‘security’ on a local basis, the continued existence of such militias indicated a fragmentation of authority and further proliferation of non-state actors in Iraq’s complex security landscape. Most prominent among the militias were the Peshmerga, controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK, and the Badr Brigade, backed by the (Shiite) Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a member of the UIA. Inter-militia violence, such as the clashes that took place between al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade (both Shia militias) across the south in August, indicated that there were divisions in Iraq beyond the opposition to the MNF or ethnic–sectarian divides related to local competitions for power.

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144 ed. Posch (note 120), pp. 107–13; USIP (note 143); Cordesman (note 118); and HRW, ‘A face and a name: civilian victims of insurgent groups in Iraq’, Human Rights Watch, vol. 17, no. 9 (Oct. 2005).


Fourth, the proportion of jihadist elements in the insurgency, and the extent to which they maintained links with international terrorist networks (or were externally directed) remained under question. International dimensions of the Iraqi conflict were clear, given that the porous border with Syria functioned as a transit route for insurgent recruits as well as weaponry and ammunition; Shia militias in the south were allegedly provided with Iranian (and by some accounts Hezbollah) materiel support and training; and sources in Jordan stood accused of financing parts of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{149} Several US offensives deployed to seal the Syrian border indicated the emphasis placed by the US military on the insurgency’s external links.\textsuperscript{150}

Frequent reference to ‘international terrorism’ and ‘foreign jihadists’ in the international media notwithstanding, in the spring of 2005 coalition officials reported that more than 95 per cent of the insurgents who had been killed or captured were Iraqi, and in November both Iraqi and US officials estimated that the proportion of fighters with Iraqi citizenship was close to 95 per cent.\textsuperscript{151} Domestically, most analysts judge the extremist/jihadist element of the Sunni Arab insurgency, often ‘neo-Salafi’ groups, to be 5–10 per cent of the insurgency, yielding (depending on which figure is taken as the total) anywhere between 1500 and 6000 members.\textsuperscript{152} Most ominously, the al-Qaeda Organization in Mesopotamia under the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was responsible for several high-profile attacks in 2005.\textsuperscript{153} Devastating triple bomb attacks on three hotels in Amman, Jordan, on 8 November—killing over 50 people and wounding over 100—underscored the threat that the organization posed not just in Iraq (where al-Zarqawi propagated sectarian violence against Shiite religious targets) but also for wider regional and international security.\textsuperscript{154} A rocket attack on two US warships in Aqaba, Jordan, in August 2005 also appeared to have been directed by an unidentified insurgent group within Iraq.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} Cordesman (note 139).
\textsuperscript{153} E.g., the organization claimed the responsibility for the deadliest attack on the capital’s main police academy in Baghdad on 6 Dec., killing at least 36 police officers and wounding 72 other people. Wong, E., ‘Suicide bombers kill 36 officers at Iraqi academy’, \textit{New York Times}, 7 Dec. 2005; and Cordesman (note 118), pp. 28, 50–56.
In terms of tactics, the insurgent forces appeared to retain the initiative over the MNF and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and continued to exploit the strategic vulnerabilities of the new regime. The ISF stood out as key targets of the violence: in a striking example over 60 people were killed in a single suicide bombing attack (carried out by a member of the Ansar al-Sunna group) on a police recruitment centre in the Kurdish city of Irbil, in northern Iraq, on 4 May. Between May and October the ISF lost more personnel than in any previous comparable period, averaging 69 fatalities per week. By June over 2600 Iraqi security personnel had been killed since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, more than coalition military and non-military casualties combined. Targeted assassinations of Iraqi officials further destabilized the political landscape, and a surge in attacks, on occasion lethal, on foreign diplomats in Iraq caused embarrassment for the transition regime internationally.

Most extreme, however, was the extent of civilian casualties caused by insurgent attacks. Suicide attacks perpetrated against civilians queuing outside a hospital in Mahmudiya in the Euphrates River valley south of Baghdad on 25 November, killing over 30, were indicative of the indiscriminate nature of the violence. The Iraq Body Count in mid-December estimated the number of civilians killed since March 2003 at 30,989. In terms of location, the Euphrates River valley south of Baghdad continued to be an epicentre of violence in 2005 (frequently referred to as the Triangle of Death), combining bandit ambushes with sectarian struggle for control of the towns and of the major arteries leading south from the capital to the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Baghdad, Mosul and the western province of Al-Anbar were worst affected by the violence, but the northern Kurdish provinces also faced serious unrest. A series of attacks in the centre and north of the country in the last week of October and the first week of November in Baghdad, Tikrit and the town of Hawija, near Kirkuk, left close to 400 Iraqis dead.

The prospects at the end of 2005

By the end of 2005, the British and US administrations had not found a way to contend with the MNF’s paradoxical role in Iraq: while the MNF presence...

158 The Egyptian ambassador to Iraq, Ihab el-Sherif, was killed on 8 July, and diplomats from Pakistan and Bahrain were targeted. Burns, J. F., ‘Iraq asks Muslim states for support after envoy’s killing’, New York Times, 9 July 2005.
159 Wong (note 142).
161 Wong (note 142).
provided a key recruiting incentive for the insurgency, its departure amid highly insecure conditions would be widely regarded as an abdication of responsibility. Meanwhile, US opinion polls in June recorded the lowest level of support since the invasion in 2003: more than half the number of respondents believed that the war in Iraq had not contributed to US security and 56 per cent that it had not been worth going to war in the first place. At the end of the year domestic pressure was propelled further by the symbolic impact of total US troop casualties passing the 2000 mark. Moreover, much of the analysis in 2005 noted the poor historical record of external parties in defeating insurgencies. As the insurgency gained ground anew in Fallujah (seen as a ‘successful’ operation after US forces retook the city from insurgent control in November 2004) it was clear that a lack of local support and inadequate economic reconstruction made consolidation of temporary gains against the insurgents difficult.

Progressive handing over of security operations to the ISF was widely regarded as the solution to the coalition’s deepening embroilment in Iraq. About 75,000 local police officers had been trained and deployed by the end of 2005, about half the estimated requirement of 135,000. Although another 7300 are currently in training, the training of local police is lagging. In the meantime, 99,000 Iraqi soldiers have been trained and equipped, out of a total target of 160,000. US and Iraqi security forces launched several joint offensives in the year, with mixed results. At the end of February a major counterinsurgency operation was conducted in Anbar Province on the border with Syria, but strong concerns were raised over the political and humanitarian impact of the operation. In June ISF units were left in charge of small parts of Baghdad and Mosul, and further joint operations were conducted in the northern town of Tal Afar. Because the Iraqi forces were hampered by the attacks and lacked both training and equipment US officials doubted their


166 Testimony by Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Saban Centre for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq’s Security, 18 July 2005, URL <http://www.brook.edu/views/testimony/pollack/20050718.htm>.


capacity to take over operations; and major changes in the US strategy were considered in order to make better use of local forces.170

More disturbing than the deficit in effectiveness was the failure of both ISF and MNF forces to uphold democratic standards. The detention of nearly 20,000 people without due process was identified in several reports of the UN Secretary-General as one of the major human rights challenges in the country, and repeated accusations of excessive use of force deeply tarnished the standing of both Iraqi and US security forces.171 Charges of sectarian violence directed against Sunni communities by the mainly Shia ISF mounted during 2005. In November, pictures of Sunni Arab prisoners who had suffered torture at a Ministry of Interior centre for detainees were leaked to the international press.172 Sectarian abductions and executions by the ISF were substantiated also by human rights organizations, and allegations that insurgents were infiltrating Iraq’s new police force continued to raise serious concerns about the credentials of the new Iraqi forces.173

The failure of the MNF to promote effective and accountable behaviour on the part of the ISF led some analysts to conclude that the effort to build up security forces was linked more to the USA’s wish to exit than to a nuanced understanding of the population’s security needs or of governance networks.174 Despite sporadic assertions of insurgent groups expressing their willingness to join the political process, the credibility of such contacts was doubted and any wider renouncing of violent means seemed remote at the end of 2005.175 A visit to Iraq in October by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amre Moussa, led to the holding of a conference on Iraqi ‘national reconciliation’ in Cairo, Egypt, in November, and seemed to offer prospects of a new kind of external engagement with the situation in Iraq.176 Encouragingly, parliament-

ary elections were held in Iraq on schedule on 15 December, under relatively calm conditions. The results were inconclusive at the end of the year, however, especially as regards the future role of Sunni constituencies.\textsuperscript{177}

Despite the passing of several political milestones for Iraq during the year, relentless violence indicated that the Iraqi Transitional Government, the multinational forces and the international community more broadly were hopelessly ill equipped to avert the country’s decent into civil war. Dealing with the activity of non-state actors was at the heart of the challenges faced; the failure to understand either the motivations or the composition of the insurgency, let alone identify reliable entry points for political dialogue, continued to cast a shadow over Iraq at the end of 2005.

V. Conclusions: dealing with non-state actors in conflict

The brief retrospect at the beginning of this chapter noted some significant changes in conflict patterns and dynamics over the past four decades. Forty years ago states were treated as the key actors in both conflicts and international security relations more broadly, and it was largely taken for granted that self-determination was the goal of any rebel movement. Subsequently, the increasingly significant role of non-state actors in conflict, together with the emergence of non-traditional or ‘new’ security threats, has significantly altered the dynamics of and international responses to conflicts around the world.\textsuperscript{178} In addition, the growth of the human rights culture and the emphasis on individual and multidimensional, or human, security have shifted the traditional concern from physical and national security to promoting greater efforts to deal with threats to the lives of civilian populations, regardless of whether those threats originate from state or non-state actors.

Nevertheless, the instruments that are available to deal with non-state threats and actors are still to a large extent wielded by states. Events in 2005 demonstrated the extent to which the United Nations—the most important international organization in terms of addressing threats to peace and security—still battles with the tension between individual state interest and institutional development in response to changed international circumstances.\textsuperscript{179} In particular, the UN is limited in its capacity to directly address armed non-state actors in conflict, in large part owing to the risks of being seen to confer undue legitimacy on armed opposition groups or antagonize the government in question. In other words, the UN needs to ‘solve the rebel problem’. The particular characteristics of non-state actors’ activity that are highlighted in this chapter—the fluidity of armed groups, the portrayal of conflict as a domestic

\textsuperscript{177} ‘The wrong lot won, dammit’, \textit{The Economist}, 5 Jan. 2006.


\textsuperscript{179} The Sep. 2005 UN World Summit was, of course, the central event in this respect. See chapter 3 in this volume.
problem of criminality or terrorism activity, and the continued activity of armed groups after the formal ending of conflict—help to explain why efforts to address armed groups are so notoriously difficult.

Another much-debated dimension of the contemporary political climate is the growth and proliferation of civil society organizations engaged in conflict management and peace-building.\(^{180}\) In part this is a natural outgrowth of the established role of civil society (notably, non-governmental organizations) in humanitarian aid and development activity more broadly, as the inseparability of security and development is increasingly recognized.\(^{181}\) Some analysts suggest that non-state conflict managers and peace-builders may in fact be better suited to addressing armed groups, and non-state threats more generally, than state (or inter-governmental) actors.\(^{182}\) In particular, non-governmental organizations are emerging as willing and able to engage directly with armed groups, for example, through ‘sensitization’ programmes and broader promotion of human rights, precisely because they do not face the same political obstacles as states do.\(^{183}\) While states are increasingly recognizing the need to cooperate to address (transnational) non-state threats, cooperation between state-led and civil society efforts is still inadequate. The newly established UN Peacebuilding Commission could provide a forum to address this gap and improve the integration of official and non-official efforts: in this case, it is important to investigate preventive action, including early mediation.

The conflict in Iraq has been at the centre of international debates on conflict since the much-contested US-led invasion in 2003. Developments in 2005 indicated that the conflict will continue to resonate internationally and, despite its unique origins, have implications for broader conceptions of conflict and conflict management. In particular, the conflict in Iraq brought to the forefront the problems associated with a diversity of non-state groups in conflict. The question whether viable political entities will emerge out of the insurgency, or whether the conflict will spread in the region or internationally because of the activity of non-state actors, will undoubtedly feed into debates about conflict, security and transnational threats for the foreseeable future.


183 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) occupies a unique position in its work to raise awareness of, and increase respect for, international humanitarian law and human rights standards among armed groups by virtue of its permanent mandate under international law and its recognized policy of impartiality, independence and neutrality. On the ICRC see URL <http://www.icrc.org/>.