Introduction
The world of security and peace research in a 40-year perspective

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I. Introduction

The first SIPRI Yearbook was published in 1969 under the leadership of SIPRI’s first Director, Robert Neild. It described a world dominated by the East–West strategic confrontation of the cold war, in which few countries—Sweden being one of them—could avoid becoming militarily aligned with one bloc or the other, and few observers—SIPRI itself aspiring to be one—were in a position to look impartially at the behaviour of both blocs. The strategic temperature in 1969 was hardly at its warmest: only two years earlier the Harmel Report had proposed that the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be paired with efforts to reach out to the other side in détente, but the brutal realities were underlined in 1968 by the Soviet-led military invasion that crushed a democratic movement in Czechoslovakia. When SIPRI’s analysts wrote about developments in weaponry and military technology, therefore, it was natural that they should see the East–West rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) and NATO as the main driver of the arms race and the most dangerous context in which weaponry might be used. It is to their credit that, nevertheless, they devoted great attention to conflicts and arms races elsewhere in the world that lacked any direct connection with cold war politics. In doing so and in seeking to document military expenditure in all the world’s countries and regions, the drafters of the first Yearbook set targets of comprehensiveness and balance that their successors have always kept in sight, while never finding them simple to achieve.

The present Yearbook is SIPRI’s 36th and appears 40 years after the Institute was founded. It presents a natural opportunity to review what has changed and what has not over the past four decades of global security development. While many specific perspectives of change are taken up in subsequent chapters, this introduction is limited to four main themes. Section II looks at the

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transition from an East–West strategic polarity to a global system in which several other kinds of polarity or organizing principles have been mooted, but none has (yet) gained a clear ascendancy. Section III deals with changes in the kind of objects, events, processes and actors that are regarded as important for security analysis and influential—for good or ill—in security developments. Section IV discusses the changing evaluation of, and approaches to, arms control and disarmament and expands on the role of various institutions in security building more generally. Section V closes by highlighting some concerns reflected in the first SIPRI Yearbook that are still all too present today and by underlining the importance of data-based security research and transparency.

II. From East–West confrontation to what?

It became something of a truism in the 1990s, but is none the less true for that, that the bipolar strategic scene of cold war times had some convenient and even comforting features for policy makers. Each side in the confrontation found it easy to identify the primary source of threat and relatively easy to quantify it. Distinctions between friend and foe were for the most part clear, and the peccadilloes of some friends could be overlooked in view of their strategic value. While the obligations of friendship were onerous, demanding from the West’s larger powers a constant vigilance against Communist encroachments, no compunction was felt about the welfare of a large category of states ‘on the other side’. At the same time, arms control and disarmament processes and other rule-based frameworks that reached across bloc divisions played a clear and widely valued role in limiting both the existential risks and the economic costs of confrontation.

New geo-strategic models

Since the collapse of the two-bloc system in 1989, many thinkers and policy makers have been tempted to seek a ‘quick fix’ for describing the new strategic environment in terms of equally well-defined camps. Roughly speaking, the formulas proposed for this can be divided into those that still recognize something like geo-strategic ‘blocs’ and those that use less traditional categories. Among theories of the former type, the notion of East–West tensions being overtaken by North–South ones—manifesting themselves more in the realm of economics and human security than through military relations—has been persistent because it has real descriptive value. There is no precise dividing line between the North and the South, but it is broadly true that the

great majority of armed conflicts now occur in Southern locations\(^4\) and that both the levels and the prime causes of mortality are different there from those prevailing among powers in the North, including China and Russia. In recent years there have been growing signs of deliberate South–South cooperation, both in defending developing countries’ characteristic commercial and economic interests\(^5\) and in the pattern of arms sales and related technology transfers.\(^6\) Adopting a North–South diagnostic, however, can only lead to a recognition of how different today’s security conditions are from those of the East–West divide. Even in the sphere of trade and economics, North and South are far less opposed and more interdependent in their interests than the Eastern and Western blocs ever were. They do not view or treat each other as enemies in any moral or conceptual sense;\(^7\) on the contrary, the only politically correct discourse in the North is about ‘aiding’ the South in terms of sustainable development, peace-building and so on. Moreover, the neatness of the dichotomy is rapidly being blurred by the rise in economic and military strength of powers like China and India, which show many parallels of behaviour even though the former is considered to be in the North and the latter in the South. Of course, some analysts—especially in the USA—have persistently attempted to position China as the West’s strategic rival of the future, taking the place of the Soviet Union.

Also useful for capturing at least a part of the new landscape is the idea of West–West tensions. It is easy to see why these might become more overt and influential than in cold war times. As the discipline imposed by facing a shared geo-strategic threat has weakened, the West itself has become much larger and more diverse. Successive enlargements of the memberships of NATO and the European Union (EU) have brought the number of states integrated into one or both of these institutions from 17 in 1990 to 32 today, to which may be added several applicant countries that are already more or less fixed in a Western alignment. Democratic countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area that have a security partnership with one or more NATO powers (usually the USA) have also been moving into more open and active strategic roles—two examples being the part played by Australia in the Iraq conflict and the ongoing debate about a higher defence profile for Japan.\(^8\) When security views and interests diverge within this extended democratic family, the reper-

\(^4\) Of the 17 major armed conflicts in 2005, 15 took place in Africa, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and South America. See appendix 2A in this volume.


\(^6\) See chapters 10 and 13 in this volume.

\(^7\) At least, enemies are not defined on the ground of geographical location or wealth alone. The idea of opposition between ‘civilizations’ is given separate treatment below.

\(^8\) Australia contributed 2000 troops to the initial US-led operation in Iraq in Mar. 2003 and has also played a prominent part in regional peace interventions, e.g., in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.
discussions can be truly global. West–West dynamics determine which major cross-regional interventions will be carried out and who will volunteer or be asked to join them. Western factions have touted for support among other countries in a manner sometimes all too reminiscent of the former East–West competition.\(^9\) Even the conceptual currency of West–West debates strongly affects the language in which other actors are permitted, or at least expected, to express their security concerns. West-based, and often distinctly top-down, perspectives are betrayed by the recent move to classify terrorism as an ‘asymmetric’ threat; the argument over ‘pre-emption’ or ‘extended self-defence’ as the criterion for decisions on military intervention in place of internationally sanctioned guidelines; and even the prevailing discourse about ‘weak states’ and ‘human security’.

Even so, it would be verging on the absurd to accept a West–West strategic dynamic as today’s equivalent to the blocs of the cold war. Divergences within NATO have been powerful drivers of policy ever since SIPRI began to study them, and it is too early to conclude that they have undergone a decisive change of quality as well as quantity since 1990. Even leaving aside the fundamental interests and beliefs still shared by the whole West, groups of wealthy democratic countries do not behave in the traditional style of strategic adversaries: forming fixed alignments to arm against, to subvert and to prepare or incite military action against each other.\(^10\) Up to now at least, the most extreme manifestations of disagreement in US–European or intra-European relations have involved abstention from proposed joint actions, frustrating the joint adoption of new policies and initiatives (e.g., on climate change) or bringing cases peacefully before the relevant international tribunals (such as the World Trade Organization). Moreover, and despite what is said above about the wide reach of West-centric influences, what is going on in the rest of the world patently does not reduce itself to transactions between groups of US or European hangers-on. Some Europeans talk about ‘multipolarity’ as a preferred state of affairs precisely because they recognize the existence of other power bases outside the Euro-Atlantic area that may, at least indirectly, mitigate the consequences for Europe of an otherwise highly asymmetric US–European balance.

This leads on to perhaps the most fertile new geo-strategic vision since Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the post-cold war ‘end of history’;\(^11\) the one that focuses on the role of the USA as a single superpower vis-à-vis all other countries.\(^12\) Reflecting on the singularity of the USA’s position helps to

\(^9\) E.g., during the Iraq crisis there was lobbying by pro- and anti-US camps for votes on a possible UN Security Council resolution legitimizing the USA’s wish to invade Iraq, leading to the temporary anti-US bloc formed by France and Germany with Russia.

\(^10\) The pattern of an alignment of the UK, Italy, the rest of so-called ‘new Europe’ and Australia in support of the USA, with France and Germany and now Spain on the other side, has seemed stable since 2001 but is neither self-explanatory nor necessarily permanent. The UK’s policies on trade, environment and European defence tend to cut across it in any case.


\(^12\) The USA’s military expenditure, $507 billion in 2005, accounts for 48% of all global spending, while no other country accounts for more than 5%. See chapter 8 in this volume. The USA is also the
explain that country’s own evolving policies and also to understand why the Western alliance can never again be a monolith and why the USA’s allies sometimes share with non-allies, or even opponents, worries about the superpower’s behaviour. Analysts of US reactions have raised important questions about the effectiveness and durability of ‘hard’ power (i.e., military strength and coercion) compared with ‘soft’ power (i.e., persuasion and influence); about the merits of unilateral action vis-à-vis institutionalized alliances and global norms; and about the implications of pre-emptive action vis-à-vis a more realist and reactive strategic posture. Considered as general explanations of post-cold war evolution, however, these analyses—together with the obverse view that ascribes all the world’s ills to a sole ‘rogue superpower’—hold traps for the unwary. Not only do they generally overstate the USA’s absolute and relative strength (inter alia by undervaluing the constraints on the use of coercive power), but the USA-centric approach more generally risks overlooking security processes and dynamics in which the USA is not engaged, and underplaying the importance of types of power and influence that are less relevant or attractive for Washington. The actual or potential US empire postulated in several of these works is no more omnipresent than the European 19th century empires were, and the onus of proof is on those who wish to claim that it will be more lasting. That said, the issue of US power and of how to relate to it is as nearly omnipresent as makes no difference in today’s security discourse. An explanation of modern strategic reality that incorporated not just US actions but also the reasons and ways that others decide to act without the USA, and how they react to the USA’s decision not to engage in a given region or process, could start to amass considerable descriptive power.

Models with functionally defined ‘opponents’

A community that cannot define its own antithesis in traditional geo-strategic terms readily turns to a more generic, abstract or functional, definition of ‘the other’. In the cold war many policies treated Communism as the adversary, rather than, or in addition to, the specifically Communist countries. A subtlety of such visions is that they admit the possibility of an ‘enemy within’; that is, of elements integral to the given community that may be corrupted by the single largest national economy, with a gross domestic product in 2004 of $11 734 billion. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Online Service.


14 On the question of limitations to traditional state power and to its exercise through military force see Bailes (note 3), pp. 2–13.
hostile principle and work for it in ways more insidious than conventional spies.

There have been many models based on this kind of analysis since the end of the cold war. With the passing of the 1990s, when the strong focus on local conflicts—each with its own rights and wrongs—tended to push more philosophical visions into the background, the early 21st century has arguably seen a renascence of Manichaean thinking. Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ was an early formulation that hinted at what characterizes many of the new models. While Communism was practised by people many of whom looked like Westerners and had a comparable material civilization, the new ‘other’ is defined in terms of more fundamental human differences—of ethnicity, belief and general way of life. The ‘enemy’ is not a particular country or alliance, but Islam, immigration or international terrorism; or from the other side, the infidel, materialistic tyranny of the West. The ground has, arguably, been prepared for such concepts to come to the fore with the fading of the North’s (and thus of Christendom’s) main internal conflicts; the weakening of what control colonialism and extended East–West competition ever exercised over the behaviour of states in the South; the cultural impact of globalization in non-Western societies (added to their own divides and dysfunctions); and the increasingly typical human experience of living in (perhaps increasingly tense) multicultural communities. All moral objections aside, however, the acceptance of any such ethnically, confessionally or culturally defined duality as the successor to cold war bipolarity creates far more problems for strategy makers than it could solve. In the cold war it was possible to sympathize with fellow human beings living under an imposed Communist system. Under the new approach the individuals themselves must be seen as the problem, even when living in a superficially friendly state (such as the Arab monarchies) and perhaps most of all when based within Western societies. No known military formula could eliminate a ‘threat’ defined in such terms, and the use of other possible forms of coercion—conversion, suppression, neo-imperialistic occupation and self-isolation—is much hampered by the economic interdependence (mainly but not only because of oil) between the Western and Islamic worlds. It is no wonder that writers who adopt this line of analysis deal more often in the currency of pessimistic prophecy than of strategic prescription.

What has tended to happen in practice is that those setting out to combat new, functionally defined adversaries have fallen back into techniques designed for handling old, geo-strategic ones. The USA’s declaration in 2001, following the brutal al-Qaeda attacks on its cities, of a global war on terrorism is the classic case in point. True, policy makers in the USA and like-minded countries have not simplistically equated the new ‘super-terrorism’ with Islam or with specific ethnic groups. They deplore it also as a general aberration of

16 See also appendix 2C in this volume.
behaviour, whether defined in military strategic terms as a use of asymmetric techniques (by a weaker actor against a stronger target), or in moral and legal terms as the unacceptable use of indiscriminate force against non-combatants. Nevertheless, US policy has repeatedly shown a tendency to concretize and even personalize terrorism as a unitary phenomenon with a limited, identifiable and—given the proper security tools—destructible set of sources. Osama bin Laden and a succession of extremist figures in Iraq have become the new Fidel Castros, Ho Chi Minhs or Ayatollah Khomeinis. Engagement with terrorism plus the additional generic evil of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has, further, become the typical way for the USA to characterize ‘rogue states’ and their leaders, as in the cases of Iran and North Korea. According to the US National Security Strategy of 2002, the threat to world peace and to the USA’s own interests from such regimes may justify the pre-emptive use of force against them, even without an international legal mandate. It is here that the resemblance to cold war threats starts to break down because the East–West system of strategic deterrence would not have allowed such action by the USA against its primary adversaries of the time. The US-led action against Iraq in 2003 reflected not just the new intimacy of the outrages that struck the US population two years before but also the new permissiveness of the environment that left the USA, in practice, as free to strike out at its foes as al-Qaeda had been to strike at New York and Washington.

Problems arising from the USA’s actions against its new Feindbilder (‘enemy images’) have been well documented and are further addressed in this volume. Apart from anything else, as soon as the idea of terrorists and proliferators as the adversaries in a new global contest is matched against the actual events of the past five years, it becomes clear that neither the USA nor any other state has been able to use such yardsticks consistently. Countries in de facto possession of WMD—India, Israel and Pakistan, at least one of which has also condoned terrorist action against its adversaries—have continued to enjoy the USA’s partnership and have even received some new favours.


20 See chapters 2 and 8 in this volume.

21 The present administration of US President George W. Bush has recently agreed on closer (civil) nuclear cooperation with India—see appendix 13B in this volume; has been perceived as leaning
USA’s greatest military effort was made against a regime—that of Iraq—that in retrospect has been more or less cleared of both terrorist and (recent) WMD offences. US military aid has, indeed, been increasingly directed towards governments fighting terrorism, but it has also been witheld from some staunch anti-terrorism allies because they would not cooperate over the unrelated issue of the International Criminal Court. Resort to forceful methods has also been inconsistent, with one significant anti-terrorist intervention (Afghanistan) and one supposedly WMD-related intervention (Iraq) contrasting with two proliferation cases that have thus far been tackled by non-military means (Iran and North Korea) and one that involved a peaceful buyout (Libya).

To be sure, such patterns of variation can be traced in the pursuit of almost any strategic principle, usually as a function of limited resources, lessons learned and a preference for lower-risk targets. Beyond this, however, it is clear that, in order to judge the acceptability of various partners and the relative degrees of threat from various foes, the USA and its partners have had to use a wider set of criteria than those related to terrorism and WMD. Terrorism and proliferation are not at the origin of all, or even a majority of, current security disorders. They are absent from many significant conflicts, including those in the Balkans and two where the USA has intervened since 2001—Haiti and Liberia. Where they are present, observations both of their course and of the result of efforts to stop them strongly suggest that they are symptoms of other things that are wrong in security and governance, rather than the primary ills to be cured. In sum, the US-defined ‘new threats’ agenda that represents perhaps the most sustained effort since the cold war to define a global adversary in functional terms is, after a few years, already looking inadequate both as a philosophy and as a practical guide. States need to be judged on the totality of their security-related behaviour as much as on factors of identity, belief and ostensible goals.

In the inaugural speech of his second term in office, in January 2005, US President George W. Bush brought discourse closer to reality in US policy by citing a larger number of principles on which the USA would henceforth judge other countries. Particularly striking was the emphasis that he placed (and other US speakers have since placed) on democracy as a good, also in security terms, and on its absence as one trigger for corrective action. Democracy is, indeed, one of the more logically attractive functional principles for judging the contemporary global scene. It was a major part of what the Western powers stood for during the cold war and one of the criteria (unfortunately, not
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consistently applied) by which they chose their partners. Since 1990 progress in democracy has been one of the conditions for joining NATO and the EU and has helped to stabilize relations also between these organizations and their neighbours. It has allowed lasting structures of regional cooperation, with clear security benefit, to be built in other parts of the world. Lack of functioning democracy is a frequent factor in conflict generation, and one core aim of modern peace-building is to correct it. Last but not least, it is possible to define democratic norms in terms that are almost wholly culturally neutral, so that the elevation of this principle need not necessarily be linked with West-centric thinking or the more visceral type of reaction to ‘the other’.

As commentators on the new US policy have noted, however, there are two levels of difficulty about making democracy the touchstone of judgement and policy in the sphere of security as such.25 First, it does not correlate closely enough with the absence or solution of other important strategic problems. Democracies are liable to be infected, as well as targeted, by terrorism; they have both aided WMD proliferation and been proliferators themselves; they may rarely go to war with conventional weapons with their neighbours but they can be involved in all other kinds of external and internal turbulence, including civil wars. Democracy, notoriously, cannot be successfully imposed without local ownership, but when local forces are given free play the results may not be to Western tastes.26 In sum, although the spread of democracy correlates well in the longer term with the chance of more orderly and peaceful international relations, in the short term the qualities of democracy on the one hand and of order, stability and avoidance of conflict on the other hand will by no means coincide everywhere. The second layer of the problem is that, if democracy means anything, then its principles of pluralism, fairness and equality under the law should prevail in relations among states (and in transnational contacts between individuals) as much as inside national systems. This is not an objection to the international use of force as such, since the notion of a ‘just war’ can be linked philosophically to the right and need to punish wrongdoing within societies. Nor does it mean subordinating democratic goals to considerations of order and risk avoidance: change in the direction of more democracy is as inherently risky as all change but none the less legitimate for that. It does mean, however, that for any single country to decree what democracy is, and to claim a special right to reward and punish other countries accordingly, is something of a contradiction in terms. If a powerful state, while promoting democracy, claims a right to disregard rules and norms that the international community has democratically adopted then


26 Thus, post-colonial states often took an anti-Western stance in the first period of their independence, and observers have warned that more democratic forms of government in Arab countries could bring extreme Islamist elements (and even movements with a terrorist background) to power.
the democratic cause itself risks being discredited and its rhetoric being seen by many as just a gloss on the bad old style of strategic power play.

All the bipolar methods of analysis surveyed above, whether geo-strategic terms or functional terms based on some combination of behaviour and identity are used, fall at the first hurdle of failing to capture the full complexity of global security today. None can convincingly describe, let alone prescribe policies towards, all the different regional security dynamics (competitive or cooperative) that now account for so many significant trends in armament and military spending, for the origins of so many conflicts, and also for so many conflicts that have been prevented or resolved. None of the models is completely useless, but the successful modelling of reality calls for a combination of all of them and more. Whether or not the post-cold war world can be described as multipolar, it is certainly multidimensional. In section III, the changed security landscape is described in terms that relate to process: tracking changes in the kind of issues that are thought to belong to the security agenda and in the kinds of actors, instruments and actions that are seen as problematic or appropriate.

III. From armed blocs to multifunctional, ‘human’ and active security

When the SIPRI Yearbooks were given the sub-title ‘World Armaments and Disarmament’, and later ‘Armaments, Disarmament and International Security’, no explanation was needed for why these were matters for concern. In the cold war, with its constant fear of an East–West nuclear conflagration—which might also have been triggered by fighting elsewhere—higher levels of arms anywhere in the world were a danger sign, and anything that would reduce them could be expected to improve security. The slogans of cold war peace movements were almost always about getting rid of some specific weapons or ending some specific conflict, such as that in Viet Nam. Today, protests against the US-led operations in Iraq have inherited part of this approach, but what has become of the arms-directed campaigns? Those that used to target the most destructive—nuclear—weapons have been largely dormant or sidelined since the agitation against French nuclear testing in 1995. The campaigns mustering the largest public support in the past decade have been about weapons, such as anti-personnel mines and small arms, that are abhorrent for the way they affect human beings rather than frightening for the way they promote and escalate conflict. Much energy has been poured into causes with no (or only marginal) military connections, such as ecological and

27 The original subtitle was used up to the 1993 edition and the new title from the 1995 edition onwards.
28 There were, of course, variations such as the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s in the USA.
29 Direct links even between the flow of small arms and the spread or intensity of intra-state conflicts have been very difficult to demonstrate. See Wezeman, P. D., ‘Conflicts and transfers of small arms’, SIPRI, Stockholm, Mar. 2003, URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/smarm.html>.
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environmental protests—including those against civil nuclear energy; warnings against other forms of technology development such as genetic modification and nanotechnology; and the general anti-globalization movement. While section II above detects no clear answer to who the new ‘enemy’ is, the question of what people are afraid of—and hence, what kind of security they seek—has no easy answer nowadays either.

At the cost of over-simplification, and bearing in mind the enormous variety of perspectives among different regions and communities, three processes of change may be seen as feeding today’s conceptions of danger and security: (a) diversification of the security agenda, (b) diversity of actors and (c) the preference for solutions involving action rather than restraint.

Diversification of the security agenda

The diversification of the security agenda is the functional widening of the concepts of danger and security to cover much more than the traditional business of defence, a process that in its turn has two major aspects. First, the forms of violence that constitute the focus of security policy have broadened and shifted from war between states to cover not just other varieties of ‘conflict’—intra-state conflicts and transnational opponents such as terrorists—but also internal lawlessness and criminality, and for some analysts even interpersonal violence. Apart from hurting people, what all these have in common is that they threaten the monopoly of force, and hence the authority and integrity, of the traditional state structure. The security goal of a national government is accordingly increasingly defined as protection of its people and their rights against the whole range of such disorders, with no firm dividing lines between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ security. The international community is similarly concerned not just with stopping existing conflicts but also with making ‘weak’ states strong enough to block both internal outbreaks and external incursions of violence in the future. The growing appreciation of the importance of internal security can be tracked as much in the latest thinking on the goals of international intervention, and the priorities for peace-building in the affected state, as it can in the attention being given by stronger states to their own ‘homeland security’ or the equivalent.

The second part of this trend involves acknowledging the security importance of phenomena that do not involve any kind of human conflict and perhaps have no human perpetrator at all. Forty per cent of the world’s population live on less than $2 per day and 1 billion live in abject poverty on less than $1 a day. By 2005, 40.3 million individuals worldwide were infected with
HIV/AIDS and there were more than 3 million deaths caused by AIDS in that year.\(^3^3\) Forecasts of deaths in the next great influenza pandemic have also ranged in the millions, depending on assumptions. A further set of risks involving mass mortality are typified by the tsunami of 26 December 2004, which cost at least 275 000 lives, the severe earthquake of October 2005 in Kashmir and the (apparently) partly irreversible damage that hurricanes Katrina and Rita inflicted in the autumn of 2005 on the USA. Other disorders of climate and the environment that can afflict human beings, and the animals and crops on which they rely, range from one-off events like volcanic eruptions, droughts and floods to large-scale processes of global warming, desertification and attrition of natural resources. All these non-military risks have grown in prominence for rich countries with the relative easing of traditional threats and for poor countries with the sheer scale of damage they can cause to fragile societies. They are, moreover, increasingly seen to be interlinked with the armed conflict agenda, inasmuch as the tensions they cause can trigger or prolong conflict and because conflict itself makes populations more vulnerable to them. Traditional military forces and skills (but fewer kinds of specifically military equipment) can be used to cope with many of these types of disaster, as well as with some of the internal security tasks mentioned above. The larger question remains whether some or all of the money spent on traditional defence would save more lives if transferred to combating non-military scourges that are the common enemies of mankind.\(^3^4\) The modern successor to the debates of the cold war period on disarmament and development is the notion of a broader concept of ‘human security’—including also rights and freedoms which are important for the quality of life—to which the narrow considerations of defence should be subordinate and which the military resources deemed worth retaining should be better tailored to serve.\(^3^5\)

**Diversity of actors**

During the cold war, as in much of previous history, threat and risk analysis remained focused on transactions involving traditional nation states and the alliances that they led; this is often called the Westphalian model. Since 1990 the analysis of both security problems and their solutions has given growing attention to other kinds of actors that operate below the national level—insur-

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gent movements, ethnic and regional communities and so on—to those above it—multinational companies and multilateral institutions—or to those in some kind of ‘transnational’ dimension—for instance, terrorist and criminal networks. The broad trends of globalization, democratization and, in the economic sphere, privatization have created new space for all these types of actor to exercise power, but the relative heightening of their security role can also be tied to two other trends mentioned above. Greater focus on intra-state and trans-state forms of conflict brings other participants in armed violence into the arena that used to be monopolized by battling states or by their direct proxies. When the agenda is widened to include other internal and ‘human’ dimensions of security, the people who are engaged both as victims and as providers in these dimensions—from policemen to doctors, seismologists and people who repair electricity cables or combat cyber-crime—have to be counted as security actors. Aside from public employees and members of civic society, corporate enterprises and employees are also active in practically every one of these fields, not excluding (at the traditional end of the spectrum) the provision of combat services.36

The introduction to SIPRI Yearbook 2005 discussed the ways in which such non-state actors can exercise power and influence in the security field.37 Most commentators have focused on the problems posed for states, and for multilateral organizations, by these actors when they play negative roles: and these problems are indeed serious. Very few of the groups and individuals involved can be deterred, and not many more can be negotiated with, in the style of Westphalian diplomacy. Traditional military intelligence is not adapted to anticipating and tracking their activities and—as the past few years have abundantly shown— traditional military resources do not perform well in eliminating them. When it comes to risks like disease, aberrations of nature and infrastructure problems not attributable to human intent, techniques for risk analysis and early warning are at best scattered among different expert communities and unevenly developed around the world, and at worst may simply be undeveloped. The sheer variety of types of risk to be assessed and prioritized poses enormous problems in itself for policy development and resource allocation.

A question that follows from this, but which has yet to be fully explored, is how to mobilize the positive potential of new actors within the security community. One challenge that has already been singled out is how to coordinate all the different groups whose skills may be needed to tackle a complex domestic emergency or to carry out a successful conflict intervention and peace-building operation.38 A more generic problem is that non-military actors are by definition not subject to military discipline or even—if in the private


37 Bailes (note 3).

38 On peace-building see Dwan and Wiharta (note 31); and chapter 3 in this volume.
sector—to the obligations of public service. They do not have the equivalent of the armed forces’ trained reserves and of much larger mobilization capacities. They do not come free of charge, aside from citizens’ voluntary associations. A government or institution trying to activate mixed military and civilian, public and private sector teams for a single security cause thus has to operate in multiple modes and under multiple rules. Another complicating factor is that almost every state in the world has options for drawing upon resources at levels other than the purely national: they can turn to (more or less integrated) regional communities of fellow states, to the universal community of the UN and its agencies or to ad hoc groups of countries (and private sector entities). The horizontal issue of overlapping competences between different organizations is returned to below, but the point to note here is the growing vertical range of different types of actors with which a modern government can choose to work. Finding the right level or combination of levels for tackling a given defensive need or active task—or, to use EU parlance, the art of subsidiarity in the security field—is a skill that many are still only slowly and haltingly acquiring.

The preference for solutions involving action rather than restraint

As noted in the introduction to SIPRI Yearbook 2003, a further change in security behaviour since cold war times has been the greater resort—perhaps above all by strong democratic states—to active methods for building a state’s preferred security environment.39 The most obvious indication of this is the rising number of outside interventions in regional conflicts and against ‘rogue states’ since 1990.40 Explanations for this part of the phenomenon include: (a) the disappearance of the risk of East–West escalation, (b) surplus capacity for ‘exporting’ security from regions freed from cold war threats, (c) more cooperative and active security communities in other regions, (d) wider understanding and concern about the implications of any conflict, anywhere, for the world community, and (e) doctrines (notably but not only in the USA) providing new rationales to intervene in the context of extended self-defence. There are, however, other forces at work in the new environment that have further weakened the notion of security being based on ‘restraint’ or on ‘avoidance’ or (in military technical terms) on a minimal capacity for self-defence. One force that most people would consider to be positive is the falling of cold war barriers to positive military cooperation between former adversaries, including potentially transformational elements like assistance in modernization and reform, as well as collaboration in training and joint missions abroad. This has been going on between East and West in the Euro-Atlantic space under NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership and in the framework

40 SIPRI counted a total of 34 multilateral peace missions in 1993, of which 20 were led by the UN; in 2005 the total figure was 58, of which 21 were UN-led. See chapter 3 in this volume.
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);\(^{41}\) it is also an increasing trend among groups of states emerging from conflict and tension in Africa and Latin America, incipiently in South-East Asia, and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization made up of China, Russia and four Central Asian states.\(^{42}\)

A less obvious point is that the functional widening of the security agenda also draws security policy thinking into areas where efforts to avoid risk by eschewing provocation are as meaningless as traditional deterrence would be. Some kind of material defensive measures can be taken against most ‘new threats’, from terrorism to violent weather, but it is not possible to negotiate disengagement or disarmament deals or confidence-building measures with them. The only kind of active policy that makes sense in these dimensions is one aimed at ejection and suppression of the threatening element—ideally, before it can manifest its threat. The language of crime prevention or disease prevention or accident prevention is just as natural—and for most people as unproblematic—as the ambition of conflict prevention has become in recent years. The step to pre-emption of threats manifesting themselves in more traditional, armed, terms may then strike certain thinkers as a short one, even if it has strategic and moral consequences of a quite different order.

An active, interventionist security policy needs resources; and, as long as the challenges being tackled include some that involve armed violence, the resources in demand will include military ones. The increasingly wide array of international organizations now offering themselves for the execution of peace missions—NATO, the EU, the African Union (AU), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional or sub-regional groups—all exhort their members to build up their intervention capabilities as a matter of long-term policy. Increasingly often, following repair efforts in a post-conflict region, the recovering states are encouraged to seal their new respectability by contributing in their turn to cooperative peace missions. The higher levels of armaments (at least, of the varieties needed for long-range missions) that this implies for the given region are no longer seen as problematic when former adversaries are pooling their resources for good works elsewhere. Countries providing support against terrorism or in efforts to stop the proliferation of WMD may also be rewarded with arms sales and the transfer of relevant technologies. In short, far from military abstemiousness being seen as a virtue, the virtuous state today is both expected to rearm itself for the active, collaborative export of security and offered chances to improve its arsenal precisely as a reward for its virtue. Alongside these essentially Western-inspired processes, meanwhile, some states of other regions continue to pile up arms for older reasons of regional balance or competition; and at least one—the USA—does likewise to retain its global superiority over both geographical and functional menaces.


\(^{42}\) See the glossary in this volume.
This analysis should not be pushed too far: it leaves out the economic reasons that can (and do) drive states to reduce rather than increase their military efforts; and it should give credit for the qualitative shift in armouries (away from the items best suited for attacking neighbours) that the new ‘expeditionary’ emphasis should logically bring. This wider view of what might be called pro-armament pressures is, however, useful in highlighting that the USA’s conspicuous military consumption is only the most extreme example of a much wider trend. Everywhere else in the world today, the policies of leading regional powers typically do not stigmatize armaments and military methods as such but rather aim to reserve them for the ‘right’ users and purposes. The notion that it is the user, rather than the weapon, that is good or bad goes a very long way to explain how non-proliferation has taken the place of disarmament in the security policy thinking of the world’s dominant powers—and why the latter seem less willing than ever to trade their own weapons as the price for non-proliferation solutions (as the original logic of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty implied). It lies behind the evolution in many export control groupings away from restrictions expressed as permanent prohibitions on certain recipients (as with the strategic adversaries of the cold war) to ones based on types of recipient or various generic consequences of transfer. It could help explain why, since the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, it has not proved possible to agree blanket bans on any further items of weaponry except those that are only of marginal interest for the new interventionist agenda (e.g., landmines and blinding lasers). As for the question of the right purposes for which, and conditions under which, armed force may be used outside the narrowest reading of self-defence, this has been at the very heart of the post-2001 debates between the USA, its NATO allies and the rest of the world. It was disappointing, if hardly surprising, that the UN World Summit of September 2005 failed to agree on a full set of proposals—formulated in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004—that would have clarified the restraints on, as well as the goals of, intentionally legitimated intervention. Even had it done so, recent years have underlined the weakness of such purely normative restraints, in modern conditions, on a state that possesses means, motive and opportunity for military action and anticipates (rightly or wrongly) little backlash against itself.

An environment shaped by these trends is, clearly, not going to be a particularly favourable one for the processes of arms control and disarmament that have held so much of SIPRI’s attention since the Institute’s establishment.

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43 Thus, e.g., Western Europe’s aggregate military spending stayed constant at 2.0% of GDP in 2000–2003 despite both NATO and EU demands for greater performance. Sköns, E. et al., ‘Military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (note 3), p. 316.
44 See chapter 12 in this volume.
45 Even so, the USA has declined to sign the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Convention. See annex A in this volume.
How these processes have fared, against the broader background of developments in institutionalized security work, is the subject of the next section.

IV. From arms control treaties to security building—with or without a rule book

At first glance, what is striking when comparing the early 21st century’s institutional landscape with that of the 1960s is how little has changed. The United Nations and the international financial institutions remain the most universal, or universally active, frameworks. Of Europe’s post-cold war creations, NATO and the European Union have survived several metamorphoses and emerged with more members and more competences each time. For 10 former Communist states, one or both of these institutions now provides the integrated multilateral framework that the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) used to attempt to provide.47 The OSCE, successor to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), created in 1975, still exists to link the members of the West-based integrated groupings with their non-member neighbours as far as the eastern bounds of the former Soviet Union;48 and so, with a more limited membership and remit, does the Council of Europe. Where changes have taken place, their balance has run more towards institutionalization than de-institutionalization. The Western European Union (WEU) was reduced to an inactive skeleton when the EU took over responsibility for European-led military operations in 2000; and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), linking Russia with its more compliant post-Soviet neighbours, remains a shadowy and under-performing successor to the Warsaw Pact.49 Elsewhere, however, the de-colonization process and gradual pacification of post-colonial conflicts have allowed the rise of many new regional and sub-regional groupings that contribute indirectly or directly to security. There is an obvious coincidence between the regions that have not so far found such a cooperative formula and those where the most security dangers remain: the greater Middle East, South Asia and East Asia.

Considered in relation to armaments, disarmament and other security processes, however, the cold war pattern of institutional role play has become blurred in at least two respects: (a) in the divide between organizations with and without a security role, and (b) in the relationship between security and disarmament.

47 On the post-cold war development of regional security processes see chapter 4 in this volume.
49 On the WEU and the CSTO see the glossary in this volume.
The move towards multifunctionalism

There used to be a clear divide between organizations that engaged in defence and other security-related activity and those that did not. NATO was a military entity and the European Communities (the EU’s predecessor) a civilian, political and economic one. The same role division characterized these bodies’ Eastern equivalents, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. So long as the NATO-style Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) were operational, they also played a purely military role for their respective regions. At world level, the security responsibilities held by the UN and more particularly by the Security Council were doubly demarcated from the economic competences of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the one hand and from the functional, humanitarian focuses of the UN agencies on the other. The contrary trend towards multiple competences can perhaps be detected in the 1970s with the conception of the CSCE as having three complementary ‘baskets’—military security, the economy and the human dimension. It became a feature also of the Group of Seven industrialized nations (the G7, now the G8 with the addition of Russia), which started as an economic policy-coordinating group, but from the time of the 1983 Williamsburg Summit onwards started adopting positions on strategic issues such as nuclear policy. Today, the G8’s agenda has shifted so far towards security topics that Germany was reported to have protested before the 2005 Gleneagles Summit about the lack of any serious economic focus in the principals’ draft agenda.

Since the end of the cold war, the model represented by the G7/8—the ‘securitizing’ of an originally economic, or other civil, forum—has become one affecting many different regions and institutions. The EU is the classic case: it waited 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall (until the Helsinki decisions of December 1999) to claim its first specific military competence, but it had been dealing with elements of regional and global security governance, and internal and ‘human’ security for long before then. In Asia, ASEAN and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation developed explicit policies against terrorism and proliferation after 2001 and by 2005 ASEAN was offering itself as a provider of peacekeeping forces in the Aceh province of Indonesia. When the Organization of African Unity converted itself into the AU in 2001–2002, it seemed natural that the new organization should adopt a man-

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50 CENTO was established in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK; the USA joined in 1958, but Iraq withdrew in 1959 and Iran in 1979, effectively dissolving the pact. SEATO was established in 1954 and dissolved in 1977; its members were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK and the USA.


53 The AU’s Constitutive Act entered into force on 26 May 2001, but its inaugural event was a summit meeting held at Durban on 9–10 July 2002.
date that seamlessly combines considerations of conflict management and security building with economic development and good governance.\textsuperscript{54} Even purely economic organizations have been building up policies to counter economic abuses that are also security ones, examples being the Financial Action Task Force of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which targets money laundering for terrorism and crime, and the recent International Maritime Organization initiative to tighten harbour and container security against WMD trafficking, among other things.\textsuperscript{55}

Mirroring this, there have of course been extensions in the competence of formerly defence-focused institutions, such as NATO’s progression between 1990 and 2002 from the territorial defence of a specified area to readiness for peace missions (or in theory, operations for extended self-defence) anywhere around the world. The focus of the UN itself has evolved, and is still evolving, towards more integrated multidimensional approaches to human welfare, long-lasting conflict resolution and peace-building. The UN’s Millennium Goals dating from 2000 focus on ‘human security’, with little or no direct reference to conflict or other traditional security processes, such as the arms trade.\textsuperscript{56} The Global Compact that was developed in 1999–2000 to enlist private-sector support for UN goals deliberately left military matters aside.\textsuperscript{57} By the time of the major UN self-review in 2004–2005, however, the proposals of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and those recommended to governments by the UN Secretary-General in his report ‘In larger freedom’\textsuperscript{58} drew the connections much more tightly between conflict, armament issues, development, democracy and other factors in human well-being—and with the changes needed in the machinery of the UN itself to deal with the interlocking of all these tasks.

The World Summit outcome document that was adopted in the General Assembly on 20 September 2005, after difficult negotiations, was true to these antecedents at least in that it freely combined development-related, security-related and human rights aspirations.\textsuperscript{59} Its chief weaknesses were the truncated (only 8 pages out of 40) and generally toothless nature of its security section—lacking in particular anything on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation—and its failure either to accept the rationale for major systemic reform at the UN or to explain why it could be dispensed with. Its strong points could all be linked conceptually with the breaking down of inter-

\textsuperscript{54} A similar mixing of functions is seen in African sub-regional groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Adisa, J., ‘The African Union: the vision, programmes, policies and challenges’, SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (note 17), pp. 79–85; and Williams, R., ‘National defence reform and the African Union’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (note 22), pp. 231–49.

\textsuperscript{55} On institutions with security-relevant activities see appendices 1 and 2 of eds Bailes and Frommelt (note 36).


\textsuperscript{57} See the website of the United Nations Global Compact, URL <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>.


\textsuperscript{59} United Nations (note 17).
dimensional barriers: making a state’s responsibility to protect its own people a formal matter of international concern; creating a UN peace-building commission to attempt a coordinated, complex approach to all aspects of reconstruction; clarifying several connections between security processes and the protection of individual and gender rights and so on. In terms of the various power models discussed in section II above, it may be noted that constructive new solutions were found in this document where both West–West and North–South interests could be more or less speedily reconciled. Although many commentators adopted the USA-versus-everybody diagnosis in blaming the USA for the loss of the remaining proposals, the negotiating reality was rather that of an unholy alliance between the USA and other countries that are resistant to the increased intrusiveness of international norms (see below).

To return to the phenomenon of institutional ‘mission creep’ into security, two trends mentioned above are relevant here: (a) the increasingly multifunctional understanding of the demands of conflict analysis and resolution and of peace-building; and (b) the extension of security agendas towards fields where economic, social and other functional processes (and competences) prevail. The evolution of originally economic regional organizations has also been driven by integration dynamics, which push constantly towards new spheres of cooperation, and by the interest in regional self-sufficiency or at least self-expression, which makes local cooperation attractive as an alternative to—or an efficiency booster for—broader affiliations in the UN or with the USA. It is easier in this light to grasp why the overlapping competences have not been fully symmetrical between former military and non-military institutions. NATO has, indeed, moved into new kinds of security building: but not into economic or functional security operations, hardly even into internal security, and only in limited and experimental fashion (notably in Afghanistan) into hands-on democracy building. The non-military security contributions that are most in demand today require the application of substantial, jointly owned or controlled, resources and often—notably where non-state offenders and contributors must be ‘captured’—the exercise of some kind of regulatory competence designed for binding effects both between and within states. The EU has both these things, but NATO has neither, and even its best friends have not suggested that it should acquire, for example, a large aid budget or the power to apply economic sanctions or adopt binding anti-terrorist laws for its members. Of course, there is no objective reason why all institutions should seek all competences, and no shame for an institution that tries, rather, to maximize efficiency in a limited but vital field. Experience since 1990 suggests that overlapping competences merely deepen the prob-

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60 Specific explanations for why this pressure should lead to cooperation in defence and security as such could include (a) the interest in defending collective assets and interests acquired through economic cooperation and (b) the increasingly open frontier between technological and industrial cooperation in the non-military and the military sectors respectively.

61 The OSCE has the same deficiencies but also lacks any power of global action—hence, perhaps, the current anxieties about its future. Dunay (note 48).
lems of role sharing and collaboration between institutions, as discussed below.

**Disarmament and its relationship with other security work**

The second way in which institutional roles have become blurred since the classic cold war period relates more particularly to arms control and disarmament. These used to be processes with their own discrete framework and forms. The UN had its Committee (now Conference) on Disarmament, in Geneva, that either negotiated global measures itself or ‘spun off’ separate negotiating processes for new conventions. NATO, since the time of the Harmel Report, sought arms control agreements with its rival bloc as part of a separately defined, ‘détente’ wing of its policy (the first wing being deterrence through strong defence). When NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed to talk about conventional arms cuts they did so in a tailor-made forum with its own rules: first the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, then the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, which were linked to, but kept formally separate from, the CSCE framework. The Soviet Union and the USA negotiated directly on their strategic nuclear forces, while keeping their allies informed. Characteristic of all these processes were that: (a) the agreements sought were framed as treaties, conventions or in some other legally binding form; (b) resulting cuts were to be executed by the state owning the weapons, with no outside help; but (c) monitoring and verification of the required cuts and constraints were normally provided for through a purpose-built mechanism or agency, as typified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention or the role that the International Atomic Energy Agency was called upon to play in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was thus natural to see arms control and disarmament as a distinct ‘business’ that worked along different tracks from—if not always in contradiction to—the provision of defence and building of security by active, voluntary and collaborative means. It was certainly handled by distinct departments (usually in foreign ministries) within most national administrations.

This disarmament model did not end with the cold war. It extended well into the mid-1990s with the Russian–US Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties of 1991 and 1993 (START I and II), the 1990 CFE Treaty and its 1999 Adaptation Agreement, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, also with its own follow-up organ). This flowering of arms control after the fall of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, when the worst of the danger might have seemed to be past, did not strike anyone as contradictory at the time. It could be rationalized as putting a seal on the gains of strategic relaxation and limiting risks within the still unsettled and evolving East–West relationship.

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62 NATO (note 2).
63 On these agreements see annex A in this volume.
Equally to the point, it coincided with a period of large voluntary force reductions (and scrapping of plans for increases) by all those most involved in the cold war. At such a time, negotiated reductions did not have to be punitive—as shown by the fact that some countries cut more deeply than they were obliged to—but they could offer some assurance that the other side was acting in parallel and could be called to account if it switched course. For all this, in retrospect, the post-cold war crop of agreements looks not so much like a new start as like the beginning of the end for traditional arms control. Three of its main products—START II, the CTBT and the CFE Adaptation Agreement—have not entered into force. An important earlier agreement, the Soviet–US 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, ceased to have force in 2002 when the USA abrogated it in order to proceed with its ballistic missile defence programme. True, Russia and the USA did agree in 2002 on a new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), but—at US insistence—this was of a much more ‘political’ nature than its predecessors, with no intrusive verification arrangements and no requirement to take systems permanently out of use.64

Taken together with the pressures discussed in section III for quantitative and qualitative arms increases, do these setbacks signal that disarmament—even in the regions that profited most from the end of the cold war—has come to a halt? The answer, of course, depends on what is meant by ‘disarmament’. What might be called the ‘legislative’ approach to arms control and disarmament—quantified and verifiable reductions prescribed by treaty—has certainly suffered serious, and in many cases deliberate, reverses. During the two terms of President Bush, the USA has chastised the old methods for being both too weak and too strong: weak towards the ‘bad guys’—who can resile from or choose not to join key treaties and are not effectively enough detected or punished when they offend—and too strong in holding back well-intentioned states that seek the means to defend themselves and export security to others. The growing crisis of faith in recent years among the traditional arms control and disarmament community would not have been so serious if these charges did not, in fact, carry some weight. It is true that treaties as vital as the NPT do not have as parties all the states that are vital for their purpose. Legal instruments of the traditional kind are neither capable of enforcing themselves nor backed in practice by guaranteed enforcement assistance from elsewhere. The treaty method in general has a certain rigidity and sterility, lacking in positive cooperative features and in evolutive potential, that tends to dim its attraction alongside more active modern approaches to security. It would by no means be impossible to reinvent ‘legislative’ disarmament in a way that overcomes these reproaches—the new universal rules on WMD trafficking contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 were an inter-

testing attempt—but it has to be said that no state has yet succeeded in, or even devoted national capital to, this task.

Nevertheless, reductions in forces, weapons and military spending have never completely ended. The end-goals of arms control and non-proliferation have been pursued in several other ways besides the treaty method, even (or especially) in the 15 years since the cold war. Very roughly, the processes involved can be divided into five: (a) unilateral steps, (b) coercive measures, (c) constraints on use rather than numbers, (d) interventions elsewhere in the arms cycle and (e) package approaches.

As noted above, a large part of the reductions in both WMD and conventional weapons made by former cold war antagonists since 1990 have been of type a, that is, wholly voluntary or exceeding treaty obligations. There has also been at least one case of parallel unilateral measures, in the package on short-range (‘tactical’) nuclear forces announced by Russia and the USA in 1991.66 Ironically, given that ‘unilateral’ disarmament was such an ardent wish of the cold war peace movements, it is clear today that such voluntary measures have serious limits in what they can contribute to security. They are not verifiable or—sometimes—even clearly measurable: they can be reversed at any time and they do not prevent the acquisition of different systems that add new qualitative, or even quantitative, capacities. The present US administration’s explicit preference for such methods is now often criticized by pro-disarmament lobbies.67

The most dramatic cases of type b, enforced disarmament, are those carried out through military action, such as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but other variants are less immediately controversial. It is now almost routine for the international community to promote disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures as part of the peace-building process after intervention in an intra-state conflict. Part of the 1995 Dayton Agreement called for enforced, internationally monitored force reductions by the combatants within the former Yugoslavia, and the process was completed smoothly on schedule.68 The measures to deprive Iraq of its WMD capabilities that were ordered by the UN in 1991, overseen by the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and later reviewed by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), turn out in retrospect to have been

67 The US permanent representative to the OSCE stated there in Sep. 2005 that: ‘We are against negotiating new traditional style arms control [confidence- and security-building measures], although we MAY be willing to consider specific proposals if there is a clear security need to be addressed.’ United States Mission to the OSCE, ‘Statement by U.S. Permanent Representative Ambassador Julie Finley’, Vienna, 13 Sep. 2005, URL <http://osce.usmission.gov/>.
remarkably effective. The obvious pitfall with such measures—as shown by Europe’s own earlier experience—is that they will not stop the targeted countries and communities from trying to rearm as soon as they can, unless there is a larger national or regional transformation that removes both opportunity and reason to do so. Lasting effects are more likely if the state concerned commits itself voluntarily to all the relevant local and global arms control regimes.

Measures of type c, non-quantitative restrictions, can be of several kinds but most commonly involve either confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs, which address force deployments and activities plus transparency and accident control) or limitations on the contexts in which a given type of armament can be used—usually for humanitarian purposes. CSBMs have more typically developed in bilateral or limited regional contexts, notably in Europe but also in Latin America and on the China–Russia border. They do not place any constraint on the numbers or types of weapons held or on force levels, and this is both their weakness and their potential strength in the kind of security environment prevailing today. In a few cases they may pave the way to actual disarmament; more often, they have eased and controlled the type of transition described above from an adversarial arms build-up to the pooling and collaborative use of military resources within a given area. Where conditions continue to be tense, CSBMs may at the least reduce risks of surprise attack or of an accidental slide into conflict (as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the cold war, or India and Pakistan today). Generic humanitarian restrictions on weapon use can, in turn, reduce the damage done by conflict when it does occur. Many further applications and developments of these methods might be imagined, especially in regional contexts and as part of ‘package’ approaches (see below).

As documented by SIPRI, measures of type d that focus elsewhere than on the size of existing arsenals have been in growing vogue since the end of the cold war. They include technology controls and export controls, designed to stop new destructive techniques being developed at all or, when developed, being disseminated to certain categories of users; and measures at the other end of the arms cycle, designed to ensure that weapons taken out of use (for whatever purpose) are brought under safe control, guarded and preferably destroyed. The latter method of ‘disarmament assistance’ has thus far been

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71 On CSBMs see Lachowski (note 68).

applied predominantly to ex-Soviet WMD\textsuperscript{73} and to stockpiles of smaller items like landmines, small arms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{74} Both approaches have drawn special interest in recent years because of their relevance to threats of non-state origin. Effective export controls can help keep the means of destruction out of terrorist hands and out of the private marketplace; assisted disarmament—which can be applied just as much to voluntary cuts as internationally agreed ones—reduces risks of terrorist or criminal theft, as well as the possible onward sale of the objects to unreliable users. Whether acknowledged to be part of arms control or not, such measures have their own limitations. Export controls have been criticized as inherently discriminatory and non-transparent, and their effectiveness is not easy to prove.\textsuperscript{75} There is no obvious downside to disarmament assistance, but questions can be asked about the transparency of its methods and results and whether the resources devoted to it are being optimally used. Nevertheless, both types of measure have earned their place in the modern policy armoury and can be expected to develop further in coming years.

In processes of type \textit{e}, arms control and disarmament ‘packages’ can be put together at several levels. The simplest kind of packaging is to combine several measures within the (expanded) range of arms control, for example, to supplement a reductions agreement by disarmament assistance and confidence-building measures. Other packages extend beyond the arms control field and perhaps even beyond the security field proper. Since all techniques required for WMD development stem from or are closely related to technologies that also have legitimate civilian uses, the barrier to WMD proliferation needs to be guarded through a combination of measures on both sides of the civil–military divide—by monitoring and disciplining civil nuclear activities (e.g., by international control of the nuclear fuel cycle\textsuperscript{76}) or by safety and security controls in the chemical and biotechnology industries,\textsuperscript{77} as well as by cracking down on the corresponding weaponized versions. The most diverse packages are typically put together ad hoc to stop a given state from developing dangerous capacities or to make it give up existing ones, using an array of sticks and carrots from the political, economic and technical as well as security spheres. In practice, even the classic cold war disarmament agreements had diverse strategic, political and economic drivers behind them; and the greater readiness to acknowledge and use such methods today matches the general

\textsuperscript{73} This has been done in the framework of what used to be the USA’s national ‘Nunn–Lugar’ programme, which became the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme and is now the Global Partnership programme of the G8. Anthony, I. and Fedchenko, V., ‘International non-proliferation and disarmament assistance’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2005} (note 3), pp. 675–98.


\textsuperscript{76} See appendix 13C in this volume.

\textsuperscript{77} See appendix 14A in this volume.
acceptance of multifunctional approaches to security. The buying-out of Libya’s WMD potential in 2004 was a classic example,\(^7\) and the ongoing efforts to resolve the North Korean and Iranian WMD challenges also aim to combine economic or political incentives with strategic disincentives. In such cases, weapons-related inspections and controls may still be vital ingredients, but more as tools for the implementation of an eventual bargain than as the levers to achieve it.

Here, however, it is necessary to return to the question of who has the ability, and is authorized, to put such packages together. It is clear that arms control agencies of the classic, OPCW type cannot do it on their own. Equally, packages are unlikely to do the job demonstrably and to hold fast for long unless they can be anchored in clear definitions of goals and standards, such as those provided by treaties, and serviced by the impartial monitoring and inspection capacities of the corresponding agencies. On this view, recent evolution has not so much superseded the traditional instruments as highlighted their limitations and their dependence on other types of input by other internal actors—organizations, individual states or both. The range of such ‘add-ons’ required for effective solutions is very wide indeed because it includes not just the tools relevant to meet an arms control or non-proliferation end—from military ‘sticks’ to economic and financial ‘carrots’—but also all the other contributions needed to convert the dysfunctional security situation that lies behind all weapons offences to a stable and cooperative one: in a state, for a state or for an entire region.

Linking this perception with what is said above about the evolution of security institutions, three further thoughts emerge. The first is that institutions with resources to bestow, and with rule-making competences, are at an advantage also in the specific realm of arms control and in promoting durable non-proliferation solutions. The EU has a comprehensive anti-WMD strategy that can include among its instruments the refinement of regulatory systems within the Union and globally, the transfer of funds notably for disarmament assistance, the control of European exports, and the construction of ad hoc carrot-and-stick packages for cases like Iran—while NATO has far fewer tools with which to pursue its similar goals.\(^7\) Second, in most problem cases, several different institutions with differing competences will need to collaborate for good package solutions. Third, joining a strongly integrated institution such as NATO, the EU or (increasingly) ASEAN can itself do much to guarantee virtuous behaviour on the part of the acceding state. The new member may, indeed, be required to upgrade some of its conventional forces for collective interventions, but it will have neither motive nor opportunity to develop types

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\(^{78}\) Hart and Kile (note 23).

\(^{79}\) Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, European Council, Brussels, Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=718>. NATO has its own WMD Centre following a decision at the 1999 Washington Summit, but this has a relatively limited remit to promote consultation between NATO members; improved performance in areas such as the protection of armed forces in environments with nuclear, biological or chemical contamination; and civil emergency planning. In principle it also prepares joint NATO inputs to international negotiations, but European–US differences on many of the specific issues have hampered this.
of weapons of which the given institution disapproves, and it must expect (direct or indirect) sanctions within the organization if it uses its capacities in prohibited ways.

These five kinds of input to arms control and to general security building—with the important exception of making internationally binding rules—can all, however, also be provided by individual states. In criticizing the treaty method, the current US administration was also expressing a positive preference for freedom to act nationally, alone or with self-picked partners, to tackle threats arising in the armaments field as much as in any other. National action does offer prima facie advantages of speed and flexibility, while a country as powerful as the USA can bring resources to bear (at least initially) that exceed those centrally controlled by any known institution. However, even a little reflection on the lessons of Iraq will show that the longer-term effectiveness and ultimate security impact of such national initiatives are questionable. Their lack of legitimacy in others’ eyes, notably the eyes of the populations being acted upon, is an obvious problem when the interveners claim to be upholding generally valid norms (including those of arms control and non-proliferation). A country acting alone is also more prone than a multinational grouping—where internal doubts and differences must be argued out—to act on incomplete information, to misjudge the information that it has, to misread the situation in the target area (also because of subjective likes and dislikes) and to take excessive risks. Even the greatest state’s resources will sooner or later buckle under the burden of all the different inputs needed and of sustaining them over time. These practical points reinforce the arguments in section II about how hard it is for any nation to observe and be seen to observe consistent principles of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for international security, so long as it insists on being its own judge and executioner.

The world’s multilateral security institutions—for their part—seem to be spending less time now on demarcation squabbles than they did during the 1990s, and more on learning better and more varied ways to combine their forces. Some competition as well as confusion between them will probably always remain and need not always be condemned. Self-assertion by an organization can reflect positive factors like esprit de corps, internal cohesion and ambition. In an environment that constantly creates new demands, institutions’ jostling for a new pecking order can be a way of testing their respective success in adaptation—and hence, their fitness to survive. Nevertheless, the bottom line of this analysis is that all multinational institutions have more in common with each other than they do with purely national, unregulated actions in pursuit of the same goals. The dichotomy between using and not using, respecting and not respecting, institutions is one of the most profound in the whole field of security. De-institutionalization is a threat that would need to be taken extremely seriously, even if the world has not yet approached as close to it in the early 21st century as some believe (or hope) it has. It could come as much from the erosion of confidence within institutions—resulting in poorer-quality outputs, but also the shunning of new tasks—as from attacks on
them, or the successful flouting of their rules, from outside. The struggle to ensure that ‘the best’ do not lose ‘all conviction’ has become a particularly open one in the EU since the crisis of the constitutional referendums in 2005. It will be fought from now on in the UN, as actors of good will strive to build on and maximize the advances in the 2005 World Summit outcome (and find new ways to fill its gaps), while other actors try to second-guess even what was agreed. To get the most balanced and complete assessment of how institutionalization is faring, however, requires a much fuller survey than research has yet provided of multilateral developments (including relations with global institutions) in all the world’s regions as well.

V. Conclusions

In historical terms, 40 years is a brief period of time, representing little more than one generation. It is no wonder that the speed of change in security affairs since 1966 has been uneven and its directions sometimes incoherent. Full credit should be given to some major, positive transformations that the period has witnessed, even if they merely opened the door to new challenges. Alongside the end of the cold war and the peaceful unification of Germany and Europe, examples could include the end of apartheid in South Africa, the end of Communist insurgency in South-East Asia (sealed through the enlargement of ASEAN) and the strategic de-polarization of Central America. A further set of problems have evolved in directions that greatly reduce the risks of major conflict, even if they still have to be seen as problematic: Russia’s relations with other Euro-Atlantic powers, the political geography of West and Central Asia, and arguably (although there are more pessimistic schools of thought on this) the strategic role of China.

In depressingly many cases, however, 40 years cannot be said to have made things any better and may even have made them worse. SIPRI Yearbook 2005 highlighted the problems of longevity and recidivism in the field of conflict:80 in 2005 also, of 17 armed conflicts defined as ‘major’, 15 were at least 10 years old and 3 had lasted for 40 years or more.81 The conflict between Israel, its neighbours and the Palestinians is the most obvious example of such a stubborn case; but the tension between India and Pakistan has also been virtually unremitting since Pakistan was created, and there are states in Africa that have hardly known a year of peace since independence. In very broad terms, what seems to characterize these chronic cases is the zero-sum nature of views and interests within the cycle of conflict, combined with a set of factors that make external intervention ineffective or counterproductive (or, perhaps, deter it altogether). There are other, internal conflicts that do not come above the statistical horizon used in the Yearbook but have persisted for decades or even centuries within some of the world’s most advanced democracies: notably Northern Ireland and the Basque issue. There are countries—Cuba and North

81 See appendix 2A in this volume.
Korea—that have clung to the most unregenerate form of Communism, and others that remain gripped by personal dictatorships. The whole Arab region is deeply fissured by internal governance problems and dysfunctional interstate relationships.\textsuperscript{82} One loose but still suggestive connection that many of these state-related challenges have in common is a seminal period around the end of World War I, which links them to the first stage of dismantlement of the pre-modern empires.\textsuperscript{83} Given that causation, it would have been too much to expect that the end of the cold war (even when combined with the completion of decolonization) would of itself have done much to help with the full range of these problems. As argued in section II, it has made certain kinds of outside interference easier, but almost certainly not the right ones.

The balance sheet of problems solved and unsolved looks, if anything, even gloomier in the functional dimensions of security. US military spending now exceeds its highest cold war levels\textsuperscript{84} and the global arms trade was worth $44–53 billion in 2004.\textsuperscript{85} Development and human welfare continue to suffer both from conflict and from resources tied up in military assets that are never actively used. It is shaming to reflect on the tenacity of such phenomena as torture, use of child soldiers, rape as a tool of war and human trafficking in conditions close to slavery. Some of the basic riddles about how to move towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and how to live safely with them in the meantime, are as far from solution as ever, and not just because of the proliferators. It is sad to note, for instance, that a fissile material cut-off treaty was being discussed at the time that the earliest SIPRI Yearbooks were written and is still stuck on the drawing board, despite new concerns about both state and non-state misuse of nuclear capacities that should have redoubled its value. A full stop to nuclear testing has also been discussed ever since the 1960s but now seems blocked on the threshold of the CTBT’s entry into force.

One thing that has not changed is the importance of reliable and impartial information: on the statistics of security, the processes, the roles played by different actors and the known or foreseeable consequences of different choices. SIPRI was established as an independent authority partly because the data available from other sources on these topics were so often incomplete and tendentious in the 1960s: and they still are. The problem is actually greater now that so many different dimensions of security-related activity, and so many actors, have to be monitored for the sake of completeness. Good data also need a fourth dimension, of time, to chart all the stages of a given process—not just crisis intervention but follow-up; and not just the production of


\textsuperscript{83} It is fashionable to connect a group of the recently most salient problems with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire around the time of World War I, but other cases could just as well be tied to the withdrawal of empire in the early 20th century in East Asia and the Americas.

\textsuperscript{84} US military spending during the cold war peaked in 1986 at $472 billion. In 2005 spending reached $478 billion. Figures in constant 2003 prices from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. See also chapter 8 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{85} This rough estimate of the financial value of the arms trade is arrived at by adding data released by supplier governments. See chapter 10 in this volume.
weapons but where they go, how they are used and whether they are destroyed. Bits of these stories are covered by measures of different kinds that aim at or incidentally produce transparency, including export controls, verification and monitoring, and assisted destruction schemes. There still remain serious gaps in the chain, and great inequalities in coverage from place to place and user to user, and problems of incompatibility in the techniques used and in their findings. These problems not only hamper governments and organizations that are seeking in good will to analyse the security effects of all these transactions and to redress the negative ones. They are also an obstacle to popular understanding; to proper debate within states on choices affecting the defence and security sectors; to the exercise of democratic control at all levels by representative institutions; and to informed reporting and campaigning by the concerned non-governmental organizations and civil society movements.

SIPRI’s goal has been, from the start, to produce and disseminate the ‘cleanest’ possible information on key security transactions, on all states and to all the audiences that it can reach. The task is anything but simple or routine. The targets and sources for information gathering change, technologies change, new audiences enter the picture and existing audiences have new needs. SIPRI is, moreover, far from alone in this field of research and must stay alert to the possibilities of synergy, partnership and division of labour with others. Increasing the range of actors in security processes that produce, exchange and disseminate their own good data is desirable, not just for the sake of transparency itself and for democracy, but because of its potential to foster confidence and active security cooperation. In today’s uncertain and complex world, the formulation of goals for security-related action cannot stop at the idea of doing good, and doing it in the right ways. To show, and to convince world opinion, that any given security move is good is perhaps the toughest demand of all, given all the confusions and disagreements about both challenges and remedies that are explored in this introduction. Unless that challenge is also confronted and met, there can be little hope that security in the next 40 years will show even as many elements of progress as SIPRI’s first 40 years have done.

86 See chapter 6 in this volume.
87 See chapter 5 in this volume.